||This thesis investigates the relation between the Kantian notion of the thing in itself and Heidegger’s analysis of it. Heidegger refuses the thing in itself, however, based on textual evidence, it is argued that Heidegger (implicitly) maintains the concept. The thing in itself is interpreted by Kant in multiple ways, notably as a ‘transcendental object =X’ and as ‘noumenon’. Based on an interpretation of Heidegger’s: Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Letter on ‘Humanism’, and Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; and Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, both Kantian interpretations of the thing in itself are found to be implied in Heidegger’s philosophy. This is argued with the problem of transcendence in the background.