Moral particularism and the charge of intuitionism

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Moral particularism and the charge of intuitionism

Type: Master thesis
Title: Moral particularism and the charge of intuitionism
Author: Eck, P.J. van
Issue Date: 2017-02-28
Keywords: Moral particularism
Moral generalism
Moral intuitionism
Moral principles
Methodological particularism
Jonathan Dancy
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Abstract: This thesis critically examines Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against moral particularism. He argues that moral particularism is untenable, claiming that even the weakest, most defensible version of moral particularism cannot be maintained. His main point is that particularism entails intuitionism, and that intuitionism is so objectionable, one ought to reject moral particularism as well. I show why Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument packs a strong punch against the particularist project, as Sinnott-Armstrong is correct in claiming that particularists necessarily need to accept intuitionism. However, I conclude that Sinnott-Amrstrong's argument against particularism does not succeed, as intuitionism really is not as objectionable as he makes it out it be.
Supervisor: Verbeek, Bruno
Faculty: Faculty of Humanities
Department: Philosophy (120 EC) (Master)
Specialisation: Philosophy of Political Science
ECTS Credits: 20
Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/1887/49361
 

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