Immediate extended deterrence: A comparative case study in a search for answers

Bachelor Thesis
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Introduction

This bachelor thesis shall be concerned with extended deterrence theory.

The first author, according to George & Smoke (1974), to ever have empirically examined factors that could have an influence on the question of how to defend third areas, was Bruce Russett in 1963 (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 88). Russett saw a constant issue for military planners and policy makers. This problem was not knowing how to defend third areas (Russett, 1963, p. 97). How could a major power successfully deter another big power from invading his protégé and thereby maintain the status quo? Russett (1963) tried to address this problem with his work “The calculus of deterrence”.

Russett (1963) picked all seventeen cases from the three decades before 1963 in which, in his opinion, a defender attempted to deter a challenger from invading the defender’s “pawn”. The pawn, or the protégé, meaning the small nation under protection of the defender, a major power (Russett, 1963, p. 98). The author developed nine variables to work with and only one seemed to have an impact on the outcome of a deterrence: the variable “economic interdependence” (Russett, 1963, pp. 103-109). This variable was described by Russett as “does the pawn take a larger than average proportion of its imports from the defender or, vice versa, does the defender take a larger than average proportion of its imports from the pawn?” (Russett, 1963, p. 104). It turned out that in five of the six cases where the deterrence had been successful, there was an abnormal high amount of import from the defender into the pawn or vice versa (Russett, 1963, p. 105). The type of explanatory research carried out by Russett shall be conducted throughout this thesis with variables that differ from the ones Russett used.

Thus, this bachelor thesis shall attempt to contribute to the field of extended deterrence theory by providing and testing factors that possibly have an influence on the outcome of the success of an extended deterrence attempt. The overall objective of this thesis will not be to provide a new overarching theory on how to deal with deterrence cases, since this would be too much to handle in the few weeks of time available. This thesis looks at the lessons of history, how they can be drawn and how they might be shaped into policy-relevant information. The main research question is: Which factors play a role in determining the outcome of immediate extended deterrence encounters?
Theoretical scope

What does “deterrence” actually mean? Huth & Russett (1984), describe deterrence as “a game of strategic interaction, in which a “rational” opponent assesses the potential costs and benefits of its actions based upon expectations regarding the likely behaviour of its adversary” (Huth & Russett, 1984, pp. 499-500). Patrick Morgan (1983) provided a definition of deterrence that Huth & Russett deploy as well. Morgan defines deterrence as “the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else” (Morgan, 1983).

Something that has to be clear from the outset is that this thesis is not concerned with the problem of “strategic deterrence”. Strategic deterrence, as described by George and Smoke, is the effort of two sides to deter each other from launching a general war at the other (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 1). According to Huth & Russett there are two types of deterrence. Deterrence could be an attempt to prevent an attack on oneself (strategic deterrence), or an attempt to prevent an attack on another party, a third area, like an ally. The latter type of deterrence is also known as “extended deterrence” (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 496).

This thesis shall be concerned with the phenomenon immediate extended deterrence. Extended deterrence is a situation with three players. A challenger (or initiator), a protégé and a defender. The challenger and the defender are the two major powers in the setting. The protégé is a smaller state under protection of the defender. The challenger has the intention, for whatever reason, to invade the protégé. The defender has the difficult task of trying to deter the challenger from invading the protégé. Once the challenger and defender, or the challenger and protégé have come to a military confrontation, the deterrence has failed. As Signorino & Tarar describe, immediate extended deterrence is immediate in the sense that the situation is in circumstances of a crisis. A potential attacker makes threats, a defender makes counterthreats and because of these recurring threats, the atmosphere is tense. The situation is a crisis and therefore the use of force is imminent. That is why immediate extended deterrence is immediate (Signorino & Tarar, 2006, p. 587).

As Huth & Russett describe, the outcome of a deterrence is not always clear. Sometimes it can be debatable whether a deterrence was a success or failure. The absence of an attack does not always mean the deterrence was successful. Perhaps the potential aggressor never had the intention to invade another state. If so, the potential
aggressor was never deterred (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 497). The authors come up with the example of the Kremlin. Since we never had and never will have access to the minds and archives of the Kremlin, we will never know whether the Soviet Union in fact ever the intention had of invading Western Europe. Therefore, we will never know whether the Soviet Union was successfully deterred (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 497). Since there is no way around this limitation, success of a deterrence in this thesis shall be defined as whether there has been a military confrontation between the challenger and the defender or protégé. If so, the deterrence attempt has failed. If there was no military confrontation, the deterrence by the defender has been a success.

Another clarification that has to be made concerns the difference between deterrence and compellence. According to Schaub Jr (2004), deterrence and compellence both “rely on threats to motivate the adversary to comply with a coerker’s demands, but they differ with regard to the nature of these demands”. Deterrence would demand the opposition to refrain from action, whereas compellence would demand the opposition to undertake action. In both deterrence and compellence, the goal of the coerker is to put the initiator in a position in which compliance is preferable to defiance (Schaub Jr, 2004, p. 389). To put it simply, one is passive and the other active. Deterrence is the passive one. Deterrence is all about maintaining the status quo. To persuade an opponent not to initiate action. If people sat in the same room together, an example of deterrence would be “Remain seated or something bad will happen to you”. Compellence is active, all about changing the status quo. To persuade an opponent to stop or change an action. A simple example of compellence would be “sit somewhere else or something bad will happen to you”. Compellence cases shall not be addressed in this thesis. The focus will be on immediate extended deterrence cases only in which the goal of the defender is to maintain the status quo.

Within the existing theory on extended immediate deterrence cases multiple factors have already been tested to see whether they had an influence on the outcome of a deterrence case. One of these factors is the military balance of power between states. Fearon (1994) has used this variable in his research, in which he concludes relative power influences the effects of threats made in international conflict situations (Fearon, 1994, p. 239). Huth & Russett come to the same conclusion in their research. According to these authors, the greater the ratio of the defender’s capabilities to the challenger is, the more likely an immediate deterrent threat is to succeed (Huth & Russett, 1988, p. 38). Lieberman however, argues initiators could misperceive the actual military balance,
due to motivated biases. Therefore, challengers could still use force if they are unsatisfied with a certain situation, even when the military balance is not in their favour (Lieberman, 1995, p. 835). Because these authors differ in their opinion this much and to see whether military balance actually has an influence on the outcome of deterrence cases, military balance of power shall be the first variable to be examined in this thesis.

The second variable coming forth out of the literature concerns alliances. Stephen Walt alliances are formed against a threat, because of common or diverse ideologies, or due to bribery. The latter two being the less likely options (Walt, 1985, p. 33). Huth & Russett discuss and examine the role of an alliance between the protégé and a defender, but ignore the alliances the two sides have separately (Huth & Russett, 1988). Quite surprisingly, their results were that an alliance between the defender and a protégé ensure deterrence is more likely to fail (Huth & Russett, 1988, p. 42). The authors do not look into separate alliances of the defender or protégé. Since Walt described alliances are usually created against threats and Huth and Russett neglected a type of alliance, this thesis shall address this type. This thesis shall dig into the alliance the defender has, outside of the one it has with its protégé.

The third variable concerns the amount of risk involved in deterring an adversary. The game of deterrence is a game of risk taking. A deterrence situation entails tensions, in which a challenger could invade a protégé and a defender has to decide whether it is worth the risk to assist the protégé. Knowing this, the findings from Arquilla & Davis in their research seem surprising. They conclude from their case analysis, that a challenger is capable of aggression even under extremely risky circumstances (Arquilla & Davis, 1992, p. 28). This raises the question whether risk is even a factor to influence the outcome of extended immediate deterrence cases. To see if it is, the risk in the eyes of the defender to deter the challenger will be a variable.

In their article from 1988, Huth & Russett discuss that in assessing the importance of a protégé to a defender, geographic proximity plays a role. For strategic reasons, the loss of an adjacent protégé might be much bigger than the loss of a distant one (Huth & Russett, 1988, p. 35). Danilovic also went in on the importance of geographic proximity of a protégé to its defender. He claims that, even though a state may not be of great importance for a major power, it may still be of significance if that state is located in a critical region. A critical region would then be a region of strategic importance for the major power’s interest. However, Danilovic acknowledges that regional aspects have barely been discussed through theoretical and empirical analysis
in deterrence theory (Danilovic, 2001, p. 348). To further examine this possible influence, the fourth and final variable, geographical proximity of the protégé to the defender, shall be included in this thesis.

Methodology
This research shall be executed through the method of structured, focused comparison. George & Bennett (2005) devoted a chapter of their book “Case studies and theory development in the social sciences” to the structured, focused comparison. They describe this method was born to examine historical cases in a way that they would deliver useful knowledge to big foreign policy problems. The aim of the establishment of this method was to encourage decision-makers to move away from using a single historical analogy in dealing with a future case (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 67). To carry out a structured, focused comparison a researcher must meet some requirements, as stated by George and Bennett. For starters, the researcher must identify the area of work, or the class of events. The cases in a study must all be of a mutual nature. This means all cases must be deterrence cases, or cases on crisis management or another phenomenon (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 69). In this particular research, all cases will be immediate extended deterrence cases. Secondly, the research strategy should guide the selection and analysis of the cases within this class of phenomena under investigation (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 69). Finally, the variables chosen or developed should serve policymakers and enable them to influence outcomes (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 69).

According to George and Bennett the structured, focused comparison has to be focused. All the interesting aspects of a historical case cannot be addressed by a single study. A single event can be interesting and relevant for a variety of theoretical topics (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 70). The authors provide the example of the Cuban Missile Crisis. To prevent confusion, this case, in my opinion, is an example of a compellence case. The case shall therefore not be used in this thesis. However, George & Bennett use the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example to show how a single case be useful for various topics and theories. Theories on negotiations, coercive diplomacy, crisis management or other theoretical interests. Every single theoretical interest requires the researcher to take a different focus, to develop a different theoretical framework and to adopt a different set of data (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 70).
Now that the main research objective is clear and the theoretical scope and research design have been provided, the four variables that will be used in this thesis shall be discussed. In a total of six extended deterrence cases, four different dichotomous variables will be tested. The first variable is the *military balance of power*. Within a conflict or a case in which tensions are rising, there is usually one side with higher military capacities and capabilities than the other. On beforehand, one would expect, this should have an influence on the outcome of an extended deterrence. For the variable military balance of power, I mean the military balance in the local area where the deterrence situation might escalate into conflict. In other words, the military balance in the third area, the territory of the protégé. The total amount of weapons or military budget of the three players involved is not taken into consideration here. The military balance is the balance between the total military capacity of the defender and protégé versus the total military capacity of the challenger or initiator *in the local potential conflict area*. If the military balance is in favour of the challenger, so if the military capacity of the challenger exceeds the capacity of the defender and protégé combined, the variable will take the value 1. If the military balance is even or in favour of the defender and protégé, the variable will take the value 0.

Moving on to the second variable, called *alliance of the defender*. If the defender is part of an alliance or coalition with other countries, these countries might join in the conflict. If there is a reasonable expectation in the eyes of the challenger that the allies of the defender will join the conflict, one would expect the challenger will hesitate and consider his options more carefully. This is essential for this variable. From the literature must come forth that the allies in the alliance are willing to assist the defender in the local conflict. Otherwise the alliance of the defender does not put pressure on the challenger and will not enhance any more hesitation for the challenger to invade the protégé. If the defender in the case is not part of an alliance prepared to assist in the local conflict area, the variable gets the value 0. If the defender is part of an alliance that is willing and prepared to assist, the variable gets the value 1. The condition bound to this variable, is that the alliance the defender is part of is one next to the relationship with the protégé. So, a relationship between defender and protégé is not considered an alliance, otherwise all cases would gain a 1 as value for this variable.

The third variable is named *high/low risk in eyes of the defender*. This variable can be viewed as a cost/benefit analysis of the defender to protect the protégé. If there is a high risk to the deterrence in the eyes of the defender, there is a risk regarding its
home security or bigger ideals. Ideals that exceed the protection of the protégé. It is to be expected that the defender will reconsider assisting the protégé in the situation once there is a lot at stake. Also, if the defender does try to deter when there is a high risk, it might go through lesser lengths than it would have if there was a low risk to the case. An example of high risk would be that a deterrence has a high probability to escalate into war within which the defender would get involved. Or regarding the United States, a deterrence situation where, if the deterrence would fail, communism would spread rapidly. If there is a low risk, other factors exceed the importance of assisting the protégé in the deterrence situation. If there is a low risk in the eyes of the defender, the variable gets the value 0. If there is a high risk in the eyes of the defender, the variable gets the value 1.

The fourth and final variable is called geographical proximity. This variable compares the distances of both the defender and challenger to the protégé. The expectation is that if the defender is further away from the protégé than the challenger is, the challenger has an advantage. This geographical advantage of the challenger would suggest the chances of a successful deterrence for the defender decrease. If the defender is closer to the third area, the variable gets the value 0. If the distances from the challenger and defender to the protégé do not differ much, the variable also gets the value 0. If the challenger is considerably closer to the third area than the defender is, the variable gets the value 1.

Once all the variables have been tested by case, a table can be formed with zeros and ones. The outcome of a deterrence (Y), the dependent variable, will also be dichotomous. A failure of a deterrence attempt, where a military confrontation occurred, gets the value 0. A successful deterrence attempt, where no military confrontation between the challenger and the defender and/or protégé took place, gets the value 1. After the testing of the variables per case, a logistic regression will be applied to see if there is a true relationship between any of the independent variables and the outcome Y of a deterrence attempt. It then becomes clear if any of the independent variables has an influence on the success or failure of a deterrence attempt.
Analysis

1. Cases

For this thesis six cases have been selected. Three deterrence successes and three deterrence failures. A short timeline of each crisis will be provided after which the variables will be assigned the values 0 or 1 in each case.


The first case to be examined is the Berlin Blockade of 1948. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets blocked allied ground access to West Berlin (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 107). Their goal was to pressure the West, in particular the United States, into withdrawing from Berlin or to pressure them into making major diplomatic concessions on other European issues. Prior to the blockade, the US had maintained a general policy of containment towards the Soviet Union. The Americans were slow to see the implication that deterrence was needed for their containment policy to work. The western allies all together created an airlift to supply West Berlin. This was not expected to resolve the crisis, since the amount of resources the airlift could supply to West Berlin was not enough to fulfil all the needs. However, the airlift turned out to be very useful and in fact became an effective weapon to break the blockade (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 108). The dilemma of choice was now with the Soviet leaders. Would they take the situation to a riskier next level, or try to negotiate their way out? Since the airlift was so effective, the Soviets had little option but to cut their losses, so the latter happened. Through negotiations in 1949 the blockade was lifted and with that the Soviet failed to pressure the West on withdrawing from Berlin or to force them into making concessions on other European issues (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 107-108).

With regard to the variable military balance of power, the Soviets had the balance in their favour. The Soviets blocked Berlin with their military and the Allies were locally outnumbered. As George & Smoke describe, “West Berlin was indefensible, with a small number of Allied troops there surrounded by hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops” (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 131). Therefore, this variable gets the value 1 in this case.

Alliance of the defender clearly gets the value 1, since the United States had the alliance with the other members of the Western Allies. They acted as one in the crisis against the Soviet Union.

The risk in eyes of the defender, The United States, was quite high in this case.
As George & Smoke describe, the Truman administration realized more and more that the international system was slowly polarizing with the uprising of the Soviet Union. The world situation was unstable and one misstep in a local area could have had big consequences for the international system and America’s security (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 117). A big war between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union was feared for in many countries, so this variable gets the value 1.

Finally, geographical proximity to the local third area, West Berlin, is considered even in this case. Obviously, Russia is closer positioned to West Berlin. However, not close as such that it could send troops into the local conflict area much quicker than the United States could. As Williamson (2003) describes in his article, the Americans flew three corridors and sixty B-29 bombers to East Anglia (Williamson, 2003, p. 2). The Americans had positioned military capacity closer to the conflict. Besides, France and Britain are positioned closer to West Berlin than the Soviets. Therefore, the Soviet Union was not considerably closer to the third area than the United States or the Allies were, so this variable gets a 0.

The United States with the allies eventually succeeded at deterring the Soviets from engaging in a military confrontation, so the outcome of this deterrence attempt gains the value 1.

2. Outbreak of the Korean War 1950.

Obviously, the origins of the Korean War lay with the division of Korea into Soviet North and American South. Both sides established hostile competing governments, claiming sovereignty over the country and wanting to use force to reunify it if necessary (Stueck, 2010, p. 2). In order to maintain peace and prevent South Korea from turning fully communist, the United States called in the United Nations for help. They tried to reach an agreement in which the Soviets and Americans would simultaneously withdraw their troops from North and South Korea (George & Smoke, p. 143). Besides this, the United Nations called for elections in both countries. North Korea refused to take part in elections under control and oversight of the United Nations. South Korea however, cooperated with this proposal. Therefore, the United Nations recognized the South Korean government as the lawful of the two (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 143). North Korea, afraid it would lose sovereignty over the whole of Korea, invaded South Korea with the support of communist Soviet Union and China (Stueck, 2010, p. 2).

The military balance of power in this case was in favour of North Korea, the challenger. The US withdrew its forces from South Korea in 1949. They left a small
group of five hundred military men to assist the ROK, the South Korean Army, in training (Stueck, 2010, p. 6). North Korea, however, did get big Soviet assistance in the form of tanks, heavy artillery and airplanes and with that developed a decisive military advantage over its adversary (Stueck, 2010, p. 2). As Appleman (1992) shows in his research, the North Korean army troop count is estimated on 135.000 and the South Korean on 65.000 (Appleman, 1992, pp. 8-12). This research thus indicates the North Korean army was more than twice as big as the South Korean. This variable gets the value 1.

The defender, the United States, was still part of the alliance with the Western Allies. Besides, the United States clearly had the United Nations on their side in this situation. Therefore, this variable gets the value 1.

The risk in the eyes of the defender, the United States, to assist South Korea was very high. As in the previous case of the Berlin Blockade, tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States were still very much present. Besides, both the Soviet Union and the United States themselves had withdrawn their troops from Korea (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 143). To interfere with the developing situation as it was before the outbreak, would have been a provocation towards the Soviet Union and China and therefore a threat to the United States itself. This variable, therefore, gets a 1.

The geographical proximity here was obviously in favour of North Korea. Since the two countries are adjacent, North Korea could carry out a surprise attack on South Korea. Besides, the United States had withdrawn almost all its forces. This variable gets a 1. The attempted peace establishment and deterrence by the United Nations and United States had failed, so the outcome of this deterrence attempt gains the value 0.

The Quemoy crisis of 1958 is also known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. This case is known as a failure to actually attempt the deterrence rather than a failure to employ deterrence more effectively. As Bellows (1976) describes, on August 23, 1958, Chinese communists bombarded the Quemoy and Matsu islands. The United States had made a pre-crisis commitment that it would assist Quemoy if China was to invade the island. This pre-crisis deterrence was called the Formosa resolution, a bill enacted to defend Formosa, now called Taiwan, against an invasion by Republic China (Bellows, 1976, p. 595). The United States did prevent an all-out attack of China on Quemoy and Matsu but could not deter Peking from using lesser options such as a bombardment (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 363-368). China assumed the Americans would be very reluctant
about taking the war to the mainland. This would have brought about fierce opposition at home and abroad, with worries that a conflict at the mainland might escalate to a general war (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 365-366). China took advantage of the situation to see how far the United States would go and did not remove the placed artillery blockade on the islands, even though the United States pushed for this (pp. 366-367). Eventually, mid-September, the blockade had been broken and after negotiations mid-October the crisis had been resolved (p. 367).

The military balance of power in this case was in favour of China. There were some Chinese nationalists battling China with limited American assistance on the islands (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 367). China however, had an artillery barrage which was extremely heavy and effective. According to the authors, the amount of shells that fell on the islands on August 23 alone is estimated on 50,000. Besides this barrage, there were Chinese Communist patrol torpedo boats in waters near Quemoy (p. 363). This variable gets the value 1.

For the alliance of the defender variable, this case gets a 0. The United States still had the Western Allies and NATO, but essential for this variable to receive a 1, was that the allies had to be likely to assist if a conflict in the local area would occur. The United States solely enacted the Formosa Resolution in 1955 to protect Taiwan and the islands. It did not seem likely for the States to get any assistance from their allies in a developing conflict with major power China over the small offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu. They acted privately, as George & Smoke mention as well (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 377-378). Therefore, this variable receives the value 0.

The risk in the eyes of the defender, the United States, was high in the Quemoy case. The United States did not want to risk war with China. As is mentioned above, that risk of going to war was feared by people at home and abroad. Besides, this was obviously a scenario the Eisenhower administration wanted to avoid as well. Eisenhower was conservative on the matter, as is shown by George & Smoke. He could even have been called reluctant to make big decisions, as we examine the words he used in an interview, two days before the bombardment of the islands: “You simply cannot make military decisions until the event reaches you” (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 379). This variable gets the value 1.

Finally, the geographical proximity variable was also in favour of China. China is positioned next to the islands, closer to them than the United States, even closer to them than Taiwan itself. Therefore, this final variable gets the value 1.
China bombarded the islands, so a military confrontation occurred. Therefore, the deterrence attempt by the United States had failed, so the outcome of this deterrence attempt gains the value 0.

Operation Vantage was a move by Britain to prevent Iraq from invading Kuwait. The British stalled 8000 troops in and near Kuwait to deter Iraq from attacking the adjacent much smaller country (Mobley, 2001, p. 56). The British commitment to the protection of Kuwait dates back to 1899. This agreement promised Kuwait British protection in case of an invasion in exchange for British control over the foreign policy of Kuwait (Ashton, 1998, p. 163). Besides the big amount of oil that Kuwait possessed, and Britain was interested in, the British agreed on this proposal to protect Kuwait in order to sustain their relationships with other Gulf areas. (Ashton, 1998, p. 164).

General Qassim of Iraq was in a tough position in his country at the time. His actions were usually spontaneous and due to the fact that he was under fire domestically, he needed a success abroad to gain back some prestige. The seizure of Kuwait would be a huge success for the general (Von Bismarck, 2009, p. 87). At a press conference on 25 June 1961, Qassim asserted Kuwait belonged to Iraq. The British ambassador in Iraq considered this to be enough warning and encouraged the British government to quickly undertake action after this press conference. And London did (Ashton, 1998, pp. 166-169). It was agreed among the government, that “operation Vantage, involving the full deployment of forces required to counter a full-scale Iraqi attack on Kuwait, should commence forthwith” (Ashton, 1998, p. 169). The decision was to send troops, due to the fact that intelligence had lost track of the Iraq tanks and that the “Iraq forces would be sufficient to invade Kuwait in absence of any British strength on the ground” (Aston, 1998, p. 170). With the troops present, Operation Vantage, and thereby the deterrence, had been a success. As Von Bismarck stated: “By preventing the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, the intervention had not only strengthened the Anglo-Kuwaiti friendship, but also bolstered British prestige in the other Gulf States” (Von Bismarck, 2009, p. 92).

The military balance in this case was thus, thanks to the defender Britain, in favour of Kuwait and the British military troops. Thanks to this change in troop count, General Qassim hesitated and took back his decision to attack Kuwait. Therefore, military balance gets the value 0.

Britain, at this time, was the only country that had signed the commitment to
protect Kuwait (Ashton, 1998, p. 163). Besides the fact Britain did have allies, they were not likely to join in a potential fight. This situation was to be solved by Britain and Kuwait together. Therefore, the variable *alliance of the defender* gets the value 0.

The risk for the British to assist Kuwait was not too high. Even though there was an interest in the oil and the maintenance of the relationship with other Gulf areas, a British deterrence was very unlikely to turn into a general war. There was no significant threat to the security of Britain itself. The variable *risk in the eyes of the defender* gets the value 0.

Finally, challenger Iraq is adjacent to Kuwait. Britain is not even close to Kuwait. So, the *geographical proximity* variable was in favour of Iraq and thus gets the value 1. Since the British successfully deterred Iraq from invading Kuwait, this deterrence attempt gains the value 1.

With Kennedy as the new president of the United States taking office in 1961, the new administration expected another round of crisis around Berlin after the previously discussed blockade of 1948 (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 414). Soviet president Khrushchev presented the US with an aide-memoire. This aide-memoire stated the two Germanies themselves had to negotiate a means of reunification. If the two sides would not come to an agreement in a six month period of time, the four World War II victors would each separately negotiate with the two sides to reach an agreement and West Berlin would become a “free city”, substantially under East German control (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 415). Kennedy responded to this with a willingness to negotiate but full of confidence and reassertion that the western rights in West Berlin would remain present. Khrushchev considered this response to be quite belligerent and tensions rose. He stopped the flow of citizens from East into West Berlin. First by wire barriers and later through a wall, to see how far he could go before he would overprovoke the West. The Soviet leader also adopted a program of menacing gestures: harassment of the air corridors and a resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere at home (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 415-416). As the situation stood at breaking point, Kennedy delivered a speech, stating he understood Soviet concerns and was willing to negotiate on the matter, but would also increase military spending. “We seek peace, but we shall not surrender” (Kennedy, 1961). This speech shows the intention of the United States to deter the Soviets from going even further. However, on October 27, 1961, the Soviets placed ten tanks on the East side of Checkpoint Charlie. The United States had now
been met by equal force and Soviet and American tanks stood a hundred yards from each other, ready to engage (Carmichael, 2011, p. 5). Luckily for Berlin and probably the rest of the world, Moscow and London furthered negotiations and not much later Khrushchev announced the aide-memoire had been a success. With that announcement, the intense period of the crisis had come to an end (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 416-417).

The statement of Carmichael on the well-known standoff at Checkpoint Charlie shows the two sides both had tanks and other military powers at their disposal in the local area. Since the Soviets and Americans had equal forces ready for battle in the third area when tensions rose, the variable military balance of power gets the value 0.

The United States worked together with the French and British throughout the crisis situation. The western allies together faced the Soviet Union, so the variable alliance of the defender gets the value 1.

The risk in the eye of the defender was incredibly high and gets the value 1. The two major powers had a face off at Checkpoint Charlie. This showdown of tanks at the Berlin Wall became a visual representation of the situation for the world to see (Carmichael, 2011, p. 5). With trying to deter the Soviets in the Berlin situation, the United States risked a third world war, a nuclear war, between the two major powers at the time.

Finally, as in the case of the Berlin Blockade of 1948, the variable geographical proximity gets the value 0. American troops were present at the local deterrence area and the Western Allies were not further away from the third area than the Soviet Union.

Since the tanks at Checkpoint Charlie did not fire any shots and a military confrontation had been avoided, this deterrence attempt by the United States and the western allies gains the value 1.

As Dutta (1998) describes, the post-1949 communist regime in China has had multiple wars over territorial claims ever since its outset. There were usually wild swings in its foreign, ultra-left policy. Because of this, Pakistan and North Korea are the only two countries that have maintained a stable relationship with the communist regime (Dutta, 1998, p. 100). So when India stood at the point of invading Pakistan in 1965, China assisted its recent ally in trying to prevent this from happening. Or at least, one would expect that. For Pakistan, the motivation to maintain a relationship with China was clear: Pakistan wanted Kashmir and believed China could help them in obtaining this
region (Pringsheim, 1965, p. 173). China, according to Pringsheim, had several reasons to sustain a certain relationship with Pakistan. The gradual integration of Pakistan in their satellite empire, the expansion of Chinese influence into the Islamic world through Pakistan, mobilisation of Pakistani propaganda support for Chinese campaigns and demonstrating that no matter what, China is powerful enough to get her way, no matter what the United States say (Pringsheim, 1965, p. 173). Besides, China feared the rise of India. Therefore, China sought to attack India’s prestige both regionally and internationally through war and tried to balance Indo-Pakistani arms (Kroon, 2018, p. 15). Even though China had the intention to deter India from invading Pakistan, they failed to do so. India crossed the border with Pakistan on 6 September 1965, after which several military clashes followed (BBC, 1965).

The military balance of power was, due to a lack of military support from China to Pakistan, in favour of challenger India. As BBC News shows in an article on the war, the troop count of Indian soldiers was over 100,000 during the war. The army of Pakistan consisted of around the 60,000 soldiers (BBC News, 2015). Therefore, this variable gets the value 1.

The communist regime of China, as shown in the beginning of this section, had not made lots of friends over the years. The only decent relationships they had left before the Indo-Pakistani war were the ones with North Korea and Pakistan. The alliance of the defender variable gets the value 0.

Furthermore, there was no high risk for China to try and deter India from invading Pakistan. The variable risk in eyes of the defender gets a 0. China was the bigger country at the time, fought lots of wars and even wanted to oppress India, as mentioned by Kroon before. After India invaded the country at September 6, China started to take their own measures. On September 19 for example, they started posting ultimatums to India because of their aggression at the border. So perhaps the deterrence came too late (Pringshein, 1965, p. 174). To conclude this final case, the variable of geographical proximity gets the value 0. Both China and India cross their borders with Pakistan. The distances, therefore, are the same.

Due to the several clashes between the Indian and Pakistani army, the Chinese deterrence attempt failed. It gains the value 0.
2. Logistic Regression

Table 1 in the Appendix shows the results of the test of each variable to each case. For starters, all independent variables together will be tested to the outcome of a deterrence in a binary logistic regression. As Andy Field describes, if multiple variables are put in the independent variable box at the same time, the effect of all the independent variables in combination on the outcome variable is tested. This is also called the interaction effect: “the effect (on an outcome variable) of two or more variables in combination” (Field, 2009, p. 279).

Table 2 (Appendix) shows the result of the first binary logistic regression that has been run. The alarming fact of this result is the value 1 of the Nagelkerke R². R-squared provides the proportion of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables (Nagelkerke, 1991, p. 691). Thus, if Nagelkerke R² has the value 1 this represents the fact that 100% of the variation of our dependent outcome variable is associated our independent variables (Field, 2009, p. 207). This means the model with all independent variables included is overdetermined. The number of variables is too high compared to the number of cases. Therefore, no adequate results are provided.

Forced, each independent variable will now be run separately to test its own effect on the outcome variable (Field, 2009, p. 279). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test will be included, to assess how well the chosen model fits the data (Field, 2009, p. 281). From this Hosmer-Lemeshow test, the Log-Likelihood is important. As Field describes: “The larger the value of the Log-Likelihood is, the more unexplained observations there are” (Field, 2009, p. 267). In model 0, the Log-Likelihood represents the best guess. This means, since we only have the values 0 and 1 in the outcome variable, the log-likelihood is the predicted outcome that would occur most often (Field, 2009, p. 268). In Model 1 the independent variable is included. If the Log-Likelihood in model 1 is lower than in model 0, the model with the independent variable included has a better fit than the model without the independent variable (Field, 2009, p. 268). If this is the case, we can move on to the expected B-value. The Wald statistic will not be discussed. This statistic provides the statistical significance of the B-value (Field, 2009, p. 270). Significance however, is the extent to which generalization can be made from the data to the population. Since in this research the data examined consists of the population, this statistic is irrelevant.

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in the appendix show the results of the binary logistic regression of the variable military balance of power with the outcome of a deterrence.
As described above, the Log-Likelihood shall be discussed first. Table 3.1 shows a Log-Likelihood of 8,318. In model 1, table 3.2, the log likelihood is 4,499. This means the model with the independent variable included (model 1) has a better fit, so we can check the expected B statistic. The expected B value shows what one change in the predictor variable does to the outcome variable (Field, 2009, p. 286). Within this research it is important to be careful with this interpretation. Since there are only dichotomous variables, one change in the predictor variable means the instant change from 0 to 1. So, from military balance in favour of the defender or even, into in favour of the challenger. The answer provided by this statistic is one to the following question: If the military balance switches from 0 to 1, so if it switches in favour of the challenger, what does this do to the outcome of the deterrence? Since the B value is 0, it means the military balance of power does not have an influence on the outcome of a deterrence.

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (Appendix) show the results of the logistic regression of the variable alliance of the defender with the outcome of a deterrence. Table 4.1 shows the Log-Likelihood of model 0, which is 8,318. Table 4.2, which has the independent variable included, has a Log-Likelihood of 7,638. This means the model with the independent variable included (model 1) has a slightly better fit. The B value in model 1 is 4 (Table 2). Therefore, we can conclude on the basis of these findings, that if the defender is part of an alliance, the chances of success of a deterrence attempt increase.

The third variable is the high/low risk in the eyes of the defender. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (Appendix) show the same Log-Likelihood values. In both model 0 and model 1 this value is 8,318. This means the model with the independent variable included has the same fit as the model without the independent variable. We can conclude from this that the variable high/low risk in the eyes of the defender does not have any kind of relationship with the outcome of a deterrence, even though the B value is 1.

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 (Appendix) show the results of the logistic regression of the variable geographical proximity with the outcome of a deterrence. Table 6.1 provides a Log-Likelihood of 8,318. The next table with the independent variable included in the model shows a Log-Likelihood of 7,638. This means the model with the independent variable included has a slightly better fit. The B value from table 6.2 is 0,25. Therefore, we can conclude on the basis of these findings, that if the challenger in a deterrence situation is considerably closer to the third area than the defender is, the chances of success of a deterrence attempt increase slightly.
Figure 1 represents a brief overview of the Expected B odds of the four independent variables.

### Figure 1. Odds comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Exp B Odds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Balance</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of the Defender</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk in the Eyes of the Defender</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical Proximity</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: the Log-Likelihood of Risk in the Eyes of the Defender did not decrease from model 0 to 1. Therefore, this B value of 1 does not indicate a relationship with the outcome variable.*

### Conclusion

The main objective of this thesis has been to contribute to the field of extended deterrence theory by providing and testing factors which were expected to have an influence on the outcome of the success of an immediate extended deterrence attempt. If any variables were indeed to have an influence on the outcome of a deterrence attempt, this would be relevant information for foreign policy makers. Four different variables have been created and tested to six cases throughout this thesis. Three of the six cases were deterrence successes and three of them were deterrence failures. After the dichotomous independent variables had been valued per case, the logistic regression was run. The results of the logistic regression provided answers to the main research question. The variables *risk in the eyes of the defender* and *military balance of power* turned out not to have a relationship with the dependent variable *outcome*. This might have been the case, since the amount of 0 and 1 values of these two variables within the six cases were unequally divided. Perhaps further research could focus on cases in which the values of these variables are equally divided among the cases. A second logistic regression might then contain different results.

Fortunately, the other two created independent variables did have a relationship with the outcome variable. This research has shown that if the defender in a deterrence situation is part of an alliance with other actors outside of the protégé, the chances of a deterrence attempt to be a success highly increase. The second result concerns the geographical distribution of countries. If the challenger is geographically closer
positioned to the protégé than the defender is, the chances of a deterrence attempt to succeed increase slightly. This might come across as a surprising result. As discussed in the theoretical scope, regional aspects have barely been discussed through theoretical and empirical analysis in deterrence theory. This result is a clear indication that further research regarding geographical proximity is necessary.

The necessity of further investigation brings me to a final point of attention. This research brings forth a clear implication. This implication entails the necessity of further research within the immediate extended deterrence research area. Researchers need to deliver foreign policy makers additional relevant information on immediate extended deterrence situations. For example, thoughts have come up about what the influence of an alliance of the challenger would mean for the outcome of a deterrence situation. Once more variables are created and tested and this research area expands, the life of a foreign policy maker regarding extended deterrence situations becomes a lot easier. Because if our knowledge regarding immediate extended deterrence theory further improves, this could make the world a safer place.
Bibliography


BBC News. (2015). *Are India’s plans to celebrate 1965 war “victory” in “bad taste”?*


## Appendix

### Table 1. Binary Logistic Regression numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Var 1</th>
<th>Var 2</th>
<th>Var 3</th>
<th>Var 4</th>
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<td>1</td>
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### Table 2. Syntax

```
LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Outcome
   /METHOD=ENTER MilitaryBal Alliance HLR_defender Distance
   /PRINT=GOODFIT ITER(1)
   /CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).
```

### Table 2. All independent variables

<table>
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<th>Model 1</th>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>-2LL</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox and Snell’s R²</td>
<td>0,75</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6</td>
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Table 3 Syntax

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Outcome
/METHOD=ENTER MilitaryBal
/PRINT=GOODFIT ITER(1)
/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).

Table 3.1 Military Balance (model 0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iteration</th>
<th>-2 Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
<td>8,318</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</table>

- Constant is included in the model
- Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 8,318
- Estimation terminated at iteration number 1 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 3.2 Military Balance (model 1)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>Military Balance of Power</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
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<tr>
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</table>
Table 4 syntax

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Outcome
/METHOD=ENTER Alliance
/PRINT=GOODFIT ITER(1)
/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).

Table 4.1 Alliance of the Defender (model 0)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Iteration</th>
<th>-2 Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
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<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
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</table>

a. Constant is included in the model
b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 8,318
c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 1 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 4.2 Alliance of the Defender (model 1)

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<td>Cox and Snell’s R²</td>
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<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
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</table>
Table 5 syntax

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Outcome
/METHOD=ENTER HLR defender
/PRINT=GOODFIT ITER(1)
/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).

Table 5.1 Risk (model 0)

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<td>Iteration</td>
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- a. Constant is included in the model
- b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 8,318
- c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 1 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Table 5.2 Risk (model 1)

<table>
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<td>Cox and Snell’s R²</td>
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<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
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<td>N</td>
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Table 6 syntax

LOGISTIC REGRESSION VARIABLES Outcome
/METHOD=ENTER Distance
/PRINT=GOODFIT ITER(1)
/CRITERIA=PIN(0.05) POUT(0.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(0.5).

Table 6.1 Geographical Proximity (model 0)

Iteration History

<table>
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<th>-2 Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 0</td>
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*a. Constant is included in the model
b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 8,318
c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 1 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Table 6.2 Geographical Proximity (model 1)

<table>
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