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Stability and change in the personality of a political leader

How the LTA and OCA can complement each other

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Introduction

The events on September 11 can without a doubt be seen as one of the most defining moments of this millennium. The attacks on both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are considered as being the biggest terrorist attacks in history, ensuring the death of nearly three-thousand people. This bachelor thesis will however not specifically focus on these attacks, though it will employ the attacks to uncover the possible change in the behaviour of former president of the United States George W. Bush as a result of the events on 9/11. Two important theories will be used to study Bush's behaviour in a systematic and objective way, namely Hermann's Leadership Trait Analysis and the Operational Code Analysis that was mainly developed by Alexander George. Especially within the Leadership Trait Analysis, and to a lesser extent within the Operational Code Analysis, it is assumed that the leadership style of a political leader remains stable over time. This corresponds with the idea of cognitive consistency (McGregor, 2013, pp. 168-169). However, in recent years, there are more critical voices towards this idea. Several scholars have concluded that the behaviour of political leaders can change over time, for example because of role change, 'learning', or because of a traumatic event (Renshon, 2008; Walker, Schafer & Young, 1998; Feng, 2005). Building on Renshon (2008), this thesis will focus on if and how the personality of a political leader can change, especially in the aftermath of a traumatic event like 9/11. Additionally, both Bush's traits and beliefs before and after the attacks will be compared to detect if similar patterns could be uncovered, believing that although the two aforementioned theories are often seen as being separate, they are in fact interrelated. The main goal of this research is not to give an irrefutable answer to the drafted research questions, but to provide more insights into the possibility of change within the leadership style and the operational code of a political leader. These insights could in turn give more information on how these theories can complement each other and possibly give a more comprehensive view of why political leaders choose to make specific foreign policy decisions.

Literature review

A lot of research within International Relations (IR) tends to ignore the role individuals can play on the world stage. Internal phenomena are often described using the second or third image, thus from the perspective of states (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 111; Hudson, 2005, p. 2) or of the international system (Wendt, 1999, pp. 10-11). It is often argued that they do not

have an influence worth mentioning on the major events that model international politics (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108). The state is then treated as if it were a black box, and as if actors within it, like political leaders, could not have any influence on it (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108; Hudson, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, it is often thought that the international system is characterized by anarchism and interdependence between states, which limits the choices leaders have when they try to achieve their goals. From this rationale comes the belief that political leaders cannot have an individual impact that is worth mentioning and therefore, the first image cannot give a conforming explanation for international politics (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 124). Besides, influential theories within IR, like (neo)realism, (neo)liberalism and constructivism assume that the beliefs and personalities of leaders simply reflect the foreign and domestic situations they face when they make their foreign policy decisions. For example, neoliberalists believe that international economic and political institutions limit the choices of those political leaders that participate within these institutions. These theories do not focus on the fact that beliefs are subjective and that people have different beliefs that lead to a different representation of reality and a different explanation for phenomena that happen within this reality (Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 4). This had partly to do with the fact that during the Cold War, there was such a highly structured bipolar system that the choices of political leaders were indeed restricted, and it was more difficult for them to have a significant impact on the world stage (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, pp. 124-125; Walker & Schafer, 2006, p. 6).

However, after the Cold War had ended, the new world order became less structured, so that the influential IR theories were no longer sufficient to explain certain phenomena (Mintz, 2007, p. 169). Over the course of time, more studies have acknowledged that the personalities of political leaders can vary and not all individuals share exactly the same traits (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 111-112). Political leaders can have different preferences that can have a varied influence on a state's policies. It is believed that how leaders behave, is influenced by for example their cultural background and gender, the generation they are born into and what important events they have witnessed during their lifetime (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, pp. 131-132). When trying to explain the last hundred years of history, it would make no sense to disregard certain important political leaders as if they did not have any relevance in it. Leaders like Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein and Nelson Mandela, as well as every United States (U.S.) president, have had an important influence on the decisions that were made within their respective countries and on the world stage. Without them, history would have probably looked very different (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108).

Leadership Trait Analysis

Two valuable techniques can help study the impact of the individual level in IR. The first technique is the *Leadership Trait Analysis* (LTA) designed by Margaret Hermann and used to determine the leadership style of political leaders and show how a particular leadership style can influence a leader's foreign policy behaviour. A leadership style is about "the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituents, advisers, or other leaders – and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions" (Hermann, 2003, p. 181). It is thus about how a political leader will behave in a certain situation because of his traits. Hermann created the LTA by doing inductive research from which she built a theory. In her first study, she came up with six personal characteristics of individual leaders that represent four broader types of personal characteristics (1980, p. 8). She focused on how these personal characteristics can have an influence on specific foreign policy behaviour and underlines that there are indeed visible relationships to detect (p. 41). For example, she concluded that there was a correlation visible between the degree of 'distrust to others' a leader has and the degree of commitments their nations made. If a political leader has more distrust towards others, his nation will make fewer commitments to others (p. 34). Because there were multiple visible relationships, the study concludes with the statement that personal characteristics and orientations to foreign affairs of political leaders are worth focusing on when researching the behavior of states (p. 45).

In a later article, Hermann, together with Preston, builds on her first study by looking at how the leadership style of a president determines the kind of advisers he will choose and the relationship he will establish with these advisers (1994). In their article, they try to determine the influence of the leadership style of a president by looking at five traits that were obtained by the examination of earlier researches. These variables are then linked to three organizational functions and from these interrelations, four types of advisory systems presidents can use come forward. Hermann builds on this article when she looks at the first seven months of 42th U.S. president Bill Clinton's term and how it has affected the authority and coordination within his advisory system (1994). In a later piece, Hermann (2003) evolved seven leadership traits that together constitute the personality of a political leader: the belief that one can influence or control what happens; the need for power and influence; conceptual complexity; self-confidence; task focus; general distrust or suspiciousness of others; and the intensity with which a person holds an in-group bias (p. 184). These traits are further elaborated in Table 1. The scores of these traits could then be compared to 122 political leaders from all over the world that were already analysed by Hermann. Focusing on those

leaders, it can be defined if a leader has a relatively high or low score on the trait compared to others. Together, these traits can give information on how leaders respond to constraints in their environment, how they process information and what motivates them to get into action (p. 186). Multiple scholars have used these seven traits in later studies (Shannon & Keller, 2007; Görener and Ucal, 2011; Rohrer, 2014; Van Esch and Swinkels, 2015; Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin and Ozkececi-Taner, 2017)

Table 1: Leadership Trait Analysis

Trait	Description
<i>Belief in the ability to control events</i>	Degree of control the author perceives over the situations the author is in; there is a perception that individuals, groups, organizations and governments can influence what happens.
<i>Need for power</i>	Degree of author's concern for establishing, maintaining, or restoring one's power or, in other words, the desire to control, influence, or have an impact on other persons or groups.
<i>Self-confidence</i>	The author's sense of self-importance, or image of his or her ability to cope adequately with objects and persons in the environment.
<i>Conceptual complexity</i>	Degree of differentiation which the author shows in describing or discussing other people, places, policies, ideas, or things.
<i>Task focus</i>	The author's relative emphasis on interactions with others when dealing problems as opposed to focusing on the feelings and needs of relevant and important constituents.
<i>In-group bias</i>	A view of the world in which one's own group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds center stage, is perceived as the best, and / or there are strong emotional attachments to this in-group.
<i>Distrust in others</i>	Wariness about others or the degree of the author's inclination to suspect the motives and actions of others.

Retrieved from the output descriptions of the seven leadership traits performed by Profiler Plus, based on Hermann's Leadership Trait Analysis, www.profilerplus.org.

Operational Code Analysis

The second technique that can be used to study the impact of individuals in IR is the *Operational Code Analysis* (OCA), which was mainly developed by Alexander George (1969). He was inspired by Nathan Leites' study of the Bolshevik operational code that was published more than fifteen years before. In this study, Leites (1953) focussed on the principles of political tactics and strategies that shaped the classical Bolshevik approach to

politics. In his framework for the OCA, George (1969) focused specifically on a leader's beliefs towards "the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics" (p. 197). More specifically, the OCA is focused on five philosophical beliefs and five instrumental beliefs that can be identified by answering the ten questions that were generated by George (see Table 2). The five philosophical beliefs focus on the views a leader holds towards the political universe and other actors. The five instrumental beliefs mention a leader's own preferences in terms of strategies and tactics (Walker, Schafer & Young, 2003, p. 217). Renshon (2008) conceptualizes these beliefs as structuring and ordering reality for decision makers "and helping them to sort the signals in their environment from the noise". Furthermore, these beliefs have a great influence on how leaders interpret information, how they see their social environment and on how they make decisions (p. 821). The answers to George's ten questions can thus elucidate the orientation a leader has towards the world and together form someone's operational code. It is however important to note that George's model does not include all beliefs and attitudes that can influence the behaviour of a political leader. A leader, just like every other person, has to simplify and structure the world around him in order to deal with specific situations and understand an otherwise complex reality (George, 1969, p. 197).

Dyson (2010) is one of the scholars that uses the OCA. He analyses the operational code of George W. Bush (GWB) and concludes that Bush's distinctive personality and decision style were necessary conditions for the surge decision in Iraq. With this, he shows that Bush's individual personality had an important impact on decisions that were made on the foreign policy level. Another example is the study of He and Feng (2013). They compare the operational codes of the secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao. By this, they try to determine if and how China's foreign policy will be different under Jinping.

Table 2: The Operational Code

Philosophical beliefs

P-1: What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents?

P-2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

P-3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

P-4: How much control or mastery can one have over historical development? What is one’s role in moving and shaping history in the desired direction?

P-5: What is the role of chance in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental beliefs

I-1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

I-2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

I-3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

I-4: What is the best timing of action to advance one’s interest?

I-5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?

Retrieved from George (1969).

One important difference between the OCA and the LTA is that there has not been much research within the LTA on how personalities can change over time or because of specific events. Most scholars see the stability of traits as a matter of course (Hermann, 1994; Keller, 2005; Görener & Ucal, 2011). However, in recent years, some scholars within the OCA have adopted an alternative stance. From this stance emerged the assumption that beliefs could change because of several reasons (Walker et al., 1998; Renshon, 2008). One of these reasons is because of a traumatic event, which will be the focus of this thesis. Multiple scholars within the OCA used this focus to discover possible changes. Renshon (2008) for example concludes that a traumatic event, in this case the September 11 attacks, was able to permanently change the beliefs of former U.S. president GWB (p. 841). Furthermore, others have also used a traumatic event to show significant changes in the belief system of a political leader (Walker et al., 1998; Walker & Schafer, 2000; Feng, 2005; Robison, 2006). Even though the LTA and OCA are two different theoretical stances to focus on the impact of individuals on foreign policy decisions, the OCA can provide relevant information about change that can be applied to the LTA. This is because it is believed in this thesis that the two theoretical stances cohere

in more than one way. For example, one of Hermann's seven leadership traits is in fact a belief: 'belief in ability to control events'. How beliefs and traits exactly relate to each other will be elaborated in more detail later. Because there has been a lack of insights on change within LTA, this will be the focus of this thesis. This will be done by testing the stability of the theory in the aftermath of a traumatic event. Therefore, the first research question will be as follows:

To what extent does the LTA of a political leader remain stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event?

Additionally, this thesis will focus on the possible change of beliefs within the OCA. As was already briefly indicated, the LTA and OCA interrelate in multiple ways. Therefore, it can be interesting to see if similar patterns can be uncovered when using the same data for both theories. Furthermore, even though Lazarevska, Sholl and Young (2006) used both leadership traits and beliefs to resolve the question if there is a distinct terrorist personality (pp. 171-172), there have not been any studies that separately analyse both the LTA and OCA of a leader with the same data and then compare the results with each other. Therefore, the second research question of this thesis will be:

To what extent does the OCA of a political leader remain stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event?

Both theories analyse a part of the personality of a leader, which in turn can explain a leader's foreign policy decisions. However, when taken together, the results of both theories could give a more comprehensive view of why certain decisions are made. As Özdamar (2017) stated in his study on Islamist leaders: the LTA can be "an appropriate sphere in which to evaluate the operational code of the leader in terms of locating him or her within a specific typological model" (p. 186). By comparing the results of both theories with each other, similarities and differences between the theories can be detected. This could improve the ability to assess and predict the behaviour of political leaders when it comes to foreign policy. For example, there is no belief that is comparable to the trait 'task focus', which says something about the motivation for a leader to seek office (p. 197). On the other hand, the trait 'distrust of others' and the belief 'nature of the political universe' (P-1) are in accordance with each other and could thus complement each other, for the more hostile a leader will see

the political universe, the more distrustful he or she will probably be (Hermann, 2003, p. 202; Walker et al., 2003, p. 227). These examples show that when the LTA and OCA are both studied, it can give new insights on how these theories interrelate and can complement each other. Furthermore, they could perhaps give more comprehensive explanations about why political leaders make certain specific foreign policy decisions.

Theoretical framework

Stability and change

Although much research has been done already on the leadership style and beliefs of political leaders, there has not been much attention on if and how these leadership styles and beliefs can change. For a long time, the field was dominated by the idea of cognitive consistency. For the OCA, the idea existed that “beliefs are stable over time, internally consistent and interdependent, and hierarchical” (Renshon, 2008, p. 823). This means that people feel a strong tendency to digest information in a way that conforms to their already existing beliefs, they will try to maintain internal cohesion within their belief system and that some beliefs are more resistant to change than others (Hermann, 1980, p. 10; Robison, 2006, p. 108; Renshon, 2008, pp. 823-824). George (1969) based his analysis on these ideas. However, although his stance was supported by the results of some studies, not all examined belief systems turned out to be stable. This lack of stability was caused by for example the maturation of an individual, because of particular experiences or because of sensibility to change (Specht, Egloff & Schmulke, 2011, p. 862).

Therefore, some scholars adopted a different theoretical stance. From this stance emerged the assumption that beliefs can differ within a leader, depending on the issue he or she faces (see for example Walker & Schafer, 2000). Furthermore, it was recognized that the beliefs of leaders could change over time, which was referred to as ‘learning’, or because of a traumatic event (Walker et al., 1998; Renshon, 2008). Although there are thus different reasons that can cause a change of beliefs, this thesis will focus specifically on the possibility of change in the aftermath of a traumatic event, a term that will be conceptualized in more detail later. Renshon (2008) shows with his research that a change of role, as well as the experience of a traumatic event were able to change the belief system of U.S. president GWB. For instance, by looking at the operational code of the former president, he states that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bush’s beliefs changed significantly (pp. 836-837). He saw the political universe as being less friendly than before the attack, he was significantly

more negative when it came to the realization of his political goals, and his belief that there was an ability to predict the political future also saw a significant decline (p. 835). Robison (2006) too focused on the operational code of GWB in the aftermath of 9/11 and likewise, he evidenced some significant changes when it came to Bush's beliefs (pp. 111-112).

Walker et al. (1998) also show that a leader's beliefs can change in the aftermath of a traumatic event. When analysing the operational code of the 39th U.S. president Jimmy Carter, they concluded that his views remained relatively consistent in the first three years of his term. However, in the last year, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were some statistically significant shifts in his views, especially with respect to the Soviet Union and other actors on the world stage. Furthermore his approach towards political action regarding the US-Soviet relations and other issues as well saw a significant change (p. 175). Another example is the study in which was tested if the beliefs of former leader of the Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong changed in the aftermath of the Korean War in 1950 (Feng, 2005). The results show that in fact all five of his philosophical beliefs changed because of the transition to war. This was mainly the result of the fact that Mao felt threatened because of American interference within this war, even though there were no direct intentions from the U.S. to invade China (p. 657). Although GWB, Jimmy Carter and Mao Zedong were all exposed to different types of events, a pattern can be unfolded that shows that the experience of a traumatic event can cause a significant change in the belief system of a political leader.

Within the LTA, there has been much less focus on the possibility of change. Hermann does state that it is possible within the LTA to determine how stable the leadership traits of a particular leader are, for example by analysing data that focusses on someone's full tenure in office or by analysing two periods with a specific situation, like a traumatic event or elections, in between (2003, pp. 206-207). However, she does not take up why she exactly believes that this is possible. Furthermore, Van Esch and Swinkels (2015) did conclude that the scores of some individual leaders appeared to be more changeable and did therefore not fit within the idea that a leadership style remains stable over time. However, they state that most individual LTA scores do remain relatively stable over time and context (p. 1210). Cuhadar, Kaarbo, Kesgin and Ozkececi-Taner (2017) concluded approximately the same. Even though there has thus been some focus on the possibility of change within LTA, in practice, most studies focus on the leadership style of a particular leader at a specific moment in time and do not have an interest in how a leadership style can change. Examples of this are the aforementioned study

of Hermann on the leadership style of U.S. president Bill Clinton (1994). By focusing on the first seven months of Clinton's presidency, she tries to determine how his leadership style has affected the authority and coordination within his advisory system. Furthermore, Görener and Ucal measured the personality of current Turkish president Erdogan between 2004 and 2009 when he was still the Turkish premier (2011). Besides these two examples, more studies show that there is not much focus on possible changes within an individual's leadership style (Hermann & Preston, 1994; Hermann, Preston, Korany & Shaw, 2001; Keller, 2005).

Because the lack of research on changeability within the LTA, it is reasonable to glance at the literature on the OCA. Although the LTA and OCA are two different theories to analyse the personality of a political leader, there are some similarities to detect. First, both these theories focus on the impact an individual leader can have on the foreign policy decisions of a state. Furthermore, the OCA corresponds with the LTA, for what a leader believes, has an impact on how they relate to those around them and how they structure their interactions. Over the course of time, different studies within the field of psychology have shown how beliefs can have a direct influence on the behavioural traits of a political leader (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Moreover, as was already mentioned, one of Hermann's seven traits is actually a belief, namely 'the belief that one can influence or control what happens' (Hermann, 2003, p. 184). In addition, 'in-group bias' and 'distrust in others', two other leadership traits, focus specifically on a leader's motivation towards the rest of the world (pp. 199 – 203). These two traits can be compared to the philosophical beliefs within the OCA that concentrate on how a leader determines the nature of the political universe and other actors (Walker et al., 2003, p. 217). These arguments show that, although the LTA and OCA are two different theories to explain the behaviour of individuals within IR, they are in fact interrelated. Because of this interrelation, it is expected that the leadership style of a political leader can change because it is already demonstrated that a leader's belief system can change in the aftermath of a traumatic event.

Traumatic event

According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), that is often used in the field of psychology, a traumatic event can be conceptualized as an experience "that involves threatened death or severe injury to an individual or witnessing an individual experience threatened death or severe injury". It also particularizes that the individual in question must feel intense fear, helplessness, or horror because of the event. Traumatic events are thus physically severe, as well as psychological intense (Taylor & Weems, 2009, p. 91).

For this specific conceptualization, it is important to underline that a traumatic event does not always mean that the person himself has to be in physical pain. It can be traumatizing enough to see other people suffer (Edkins, 2003, p. 3).

Research design

To answer the given research questions, this study will focus on the possible personality changes of former U.S. president George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11. The September 11 attacks can be labelled as traumatic for Bush, although he was nowhere near the attack. However, in the direct aftermath of the attacks, he felt frustrated and helpless and pictures of that day show that he was visibly affected by the attacks (May, 2011; Choi, 2016). Furthermore, in many ways it was not only a direct attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, but also an attack on the U.S. as a whole. Because Bush was the head of state during the event, it can be argued that in some way, Bush was attacked directly. Because of these reasons, the September 11 attacks are a perfect example of a traumatic event experienced by GWB. By analysing the Bush's leadership style, as well as his operational code before and in the aftermath of 9/11, possible significant changes for the LTA and OCA can be detected. This thesis will build on the study of Renshon (2008), who also chose to analyse the possible changes in Bush's belief system in the aftermath of 9/11. Approximately the same time frame was used, but it was chosen to use spontaneous material instead of speeches. Why this choice was made will be elaborated later.

To answer both research questions a quantitative content analysis will be done with the use of both the LTA and the OCA. These two techniques will be applied to the following two separate phases:

1. Phase 1: January 20, 2001 – September 10, 2001

The first phase commences with the inauguration day of Bush's first tenure as U.S. president on the 20th of January 2001. The phase ends approximately eight months later on September 10, 2001, the day before 9/11.

2. Phase 2: September 11, 2001 – May 2, 2002

The second phase starts on 9/11, when the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. took place. The phase ends on the 2nd of May 2002, likewise approximately eight months after the second phase started.

By using these two phases, a clear distinction can be made between the traits and beliefs of Bush before 9/11 and in the aftermath of the event. After obtaining and analysing the data, the results of Phase 1 will be compared to those of Phase 2 for both the LTA and the OCA to see if the occurred changes are significant. This will be done with the use of an Independent Samples T-test. All data was analysed by using version 7.3.2. of Profiler Plus, which is an automated coding system. The main advantages of using Profiler Plus over coding by hand are that it is fast and efficient, while it also eliminates human biases and error. As Schafer and Walker put it: “automated coding gives us 100 percent coding reliability” (2006, pp. 38-39). For the LTA, Profiler Plus uses the seven leadership traits that were developed by Hermann (2003) and which were elaborated in Table 1. The scores of these seven traits can vary between 0 and 1 and are determined by the frequency that a political leader uses certain words or phrases. The higher someone scores on a specific trait, the more salient the content within this trait is to him (p. 186). For the OCA on the other hand, the program uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to retrieve the belief patterns of a political leader (Walker et al., 2003, p. 224). VICS is based on the five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs that were set up by George (1969) (see Table 2). The VICS codes sentences that contain verbs for directionality (where + means cooperative and – means conflictual) and for intensity (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 31).

For this content analysis, an ‘at-a-distance method’ was used. This means that the psychological characteristics of Bush can be assessed from a distance without having direct access to him (Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 26). The used data for this research was mostly collected from the *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, which offer the transcripts of public speeches and interviews with the media. Hermann states that a LTA can only be performed accurately when there are at least fifty interview responses with a minimum of one hundred words (Hermann, 2003, p. 180). This comes down to at least five-thousand words. For an OCA on the other hand, most researchers assume that a minimum of 1500 words per speech act or interview is necessary to carry out an accurate analysis (Schafer & Walker, 2006; Renshon, 2008). Furthermore, it is often suggested that the minimum amount of words that needs to be analysed when doing an OCA is five-thousand (Dyson,

2006, p. 293). For this thesis, it was chosen to only use interviews with a minimum of thousand words. Although this is a lower number than was suggested for doing an exact OCA, it is believed that this amount of words per interview will be enough, especially because the total amount of words largely transcends the required minimum for both the LTA and OCA. For the first phase, fourteen interviews were analysed with a total amount of 27,057 words, while for the second phase, eighteen interviews were analysed with a total amount of 28,011 words.

Even though this thesis builds on Renshon's study (2008), one main difference with his research is that this study will use interviews instead of speeches. Renshon believed that the use of interviews and speeches would give only slightly different results (p. 833). However, it is believed here that the use of interviews will be advantageous when it comes to the analysis of Bush's traits and beliefs. First, interviews with the media are preferred because the responses within it are more spontaneous. Therefore, they will give a more comprehensive image of Bush's personality than speeches, as he will have to respond quickly and with less preparation during an interview period (Hermann, 2003, p. 179). Furthermore, some studies have shown there can be relevant differences between the use of spontaneous and prepared statements, so it is more reliable to use interviews (Dille, 2000; Schafer & Crichlow, 2000; Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 47). To make sure that the analysis will not be context-specific but will give a good impression of Bush's full personality, it was attempted to include as many different topics as possible in different interview settings. Included are, for example, individual interviews, as well as interviews together with other political leaders, but also question-and-answer moments with children from elementary schools and interviews on his ranch while enjoying the outdoors. Furthermore, most studies in the field of LTA and OCA only focus on material on foreign policy (Hermann, 1980; Walker & Schafer, 2006; Renshon, 2008). However, for this research it was chosen to include interviews that discuss a wider range of topics. These other topics also explain a part of the personality of a political leader, and therefore, it will give a more all-embracing view of Bush's personality.

Results

Leadership Trait Analysis

Table 3 shows the results of Bush's LTA. Phase 1 shows the results of his leadership style before 9/11, while Phase 2 focuses on the period after the event. The numbers without parentheses show the scores of Bush's leadership traits, while the scores within the

parentheses are the t-scores that were obtained by using the Independent Samples T-test. When looking at the change in leadership style of GWB, it is notable that most of his traits do not change significantly. However, there are two exceptions: the traits 'in-group bias' and 'distrust towards others'. As was already mentioned, these two traits focus specifically on what a leader's motivation is towards the rest of the world. First, there was a significant change for the trait '*in-group bias*' ($t(28,89) = -2,15, p = 0,04, r = 0,37$). According to Hermann, "in-group bias is a view to the world in which one's group (social, political, ethnic, etc.) holds center stage" (2003, p. 201). When a leader scores high on this trait, he will make decisions that are in favour of his own group. When it comes to Bush his behaviour after 9/11, it can thus be said that he has a significant higher tendency to favour his own group in comparison to the period before the attacks. When the results for this trait are put in context by comparing them to the reference group of 284 world leaders that was given by Cuhadar et al. (2017), it can be concluded that Bush scores medium on this trait. This thesis assumes that when the score of a leader falls one standard deviation below or above the means given by Cuhadar et al., his score can be labelled as low or high. As can be seen in Table 3, Bush's score on 'in-group bias' has gone up from 0,09 to 0,13 after 9/11. The mean of the reference group for this trait is somewhat higher, namely 0,15 with a standard deviation of 0,05 (p. 47). By comparing these results, it can be stated that Bush became more biased towards his own group in the aftermath of September 11, as his score shifted from the low category in the direction of the mean. Furthermore, when focussing on effect size (r), the score of the change from the first to the second phase is 0,37, which shows that the change had a medium to high effect.

A second significant change can be seen when analysing the trait '*distrust of others*' ($t(29,76) = -4,88, p < 0,01, r = 0,67$). A leader who scores high on this trait often feels wary, uneasy and suspicious towards others. He or she will often misdoubt the intentions and actions of others (Hermann, 2003, p. 202). Table 3 shows that Bush's score on this trait has gone up significantly from 0,12 to 0,33. From this, it can be stated that the former president became significantly more suspicious and distrustful in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Furthermore, when comparing these results to the results to the reference group of Cuhadar et al. (2017), it shows that Bush had an average score on this trait before 9/11, as the average score for the 284 world leaders was 0,13 with a standard deviation of 0,06. However, after the attacks took place, his score can be categorized as high as his score was more than one standard deviation above the mean (p. 47). Therefore, it can be said that Bush had significantly more distrust in the aftermath of 9/11 when comparing him to other world

leaders. When regarding the effect size (r) of this score, the effect of the change is 0,67, which can be labelled as a high effect.

Table 3: The Leadership Trait Analysis of George W. Bush

Leadership trait	Phase 1 (n = 14)	Phase 2 (n = 18)
<i>Belief in the ability to control events</i>	0,37	0,33 (1,55)
<i>Need for power</i>	0,26	0,26 (-0,18)
<i>Self-confidence</i>	0,35	0,38 (-1,16)
<i>Conceptual complexity</i>	0,58	0,58 (0,11)
<i>Task focus</i>	0,60	0,58 (0,52)
<i>In-group bias</i>	0,09	0,13 (-2,15**)
<i>Distrust in others</i>	0,12	0,33 (-4,88***)

Note: the data in bold denote significant results. Values in parentheses are t-statistics that show the change relative to the previous phase.

† $p \leq 0,1$ ** $p \leq 0,05$ *** $p \leq 0,01$

Operational Code Analysis

Just like the results of Bush's LTA, Phase 1 shows the operational codes for the period before 9/11, while Phase 2 focuses on the scores in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. The scores that are not in parentheses show the scores for Bush's operational codes, while the scores within the parentheses show the t-scores that were obtained by using the Independent Samples T-test. When focusing on the philosophical beliefs, multiple significant changes in the belief system of GWB can be uncovered. The first significant change can be uncovered when concentrating on 'predictability of political future' (P-3) ($t(21,74) = 2,53, p = 0,02, r = 0,48$). After the 9/11 attacks had taken place, his score decreased from 0,21 to 0,15, which shows that he saw the political future as being less predictable (Walker et al., 2003, p. 230). The effect size of this change is 0,48, which can be determined as being a medium to high effect. A significant change can also be seen for 'control over historical development' (P-4) ($t(21,87) = 2,50, p = 0,02, r = 0,48$). The score of this belief dropped from 0,60 to 0,44, which indicates that Bush believed that he had less control over historical developments after 9/11 than before. However, he still has an average score (p. 228). The effect size of the change of this belief is also 0,48, like the effect size of P-3, which means that the effect of this change

can also be determined as being medium to high. The last philosophical belief that has changed significantly is the '*role of chance*' (P-5) ($t(24,52) = -3,96, p = 0,01, r = 0,62$). Bush's score on this belief increased from 0,88 to 0,93, which shows that he already attributed a great role to chance before 9/11 and that this attribution only got bigger after the attacks. This belief takes into account the aforementioned two philosophical beliefs P-3 and P-4. The higher the scores on the two mentioned beliefs, the lower the role of chance will play (Walker et al., 2003, p. 230). In the case of George W. Bush, it can be seen that the scores of both beliefs decreased, while the role of chance increased in the aftermath of the attacks. Furthermore, the effect size (r) of this change is 0,62, which means that the effect of the change between the results before and after the September 11 attacks can be labelled as high.

There are also some significant changes to uncover when analysing Bush's instrumental beliefs. First, his '*tactical pursuit of goals*' (I-2) saw a significant decline from 0,25 to 0,09 ($t(28,66) = 3,04, p < 0,01, r = 0,49$). This shows that although Bush still has a tendency towards cooperation instead of conflict when it comes to the realisation of his goals, this tendency has attenuated compared to the period before 9/11 (p. 227). Furthermore, the effect size (r) of this change can be labelled as being medium to high. The next instrumental belief that saw a significant change is '*utility of means*' (I-5), or more specifically, all three conflict means: punishment, threats and opposition / resistance. The cooperation means on the other hand remained stable. The trait '*utility of means*' can be analysed proportionately, so by comparing all the scores to each other, or simply by their descriptors (p. 229). It was here chosen to use the last form of analysis. Focusing on the conflict means, it can be noticed that Bush's belief in the utility of *punishments* increased (I-5a) ($t(26,55) = -3,53, p < 0,01, r = 0,57$). Second, he also believed that *threats* were more useful in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks (I-5b) ($t(25,21) = -2,49, p = 0,02, r = 0,44$). On the other hand, there was a significant diminution in Bush's belief in the utility of *opposition / resistance* (I-5c) ($t(18,92) = 2,18, p = 0,04, r = 0,45$). Focusing on the effect size of these three means, it can be seen that the effect of the change of both threats and opposition / resistance can be labelled as medium to high. On the other hand, the effect of change for punishments can be labelled as high.

Table 4: The Operational Code of George W. Bush

		Phase 1 (n = 14)	Phase 2 (n = 18)
P-1	<i>Nature of the political universe</i>	0,45	0,31 (1,64)
P-2	<i>Realization of political values</i>	0,17	0,10 (1,15)
P-3	<i>Predictability of political future</i>	0,21	0,15 (2,53**)
P-4	<i>Control over historical development</i>	0,60	0,44 (2,55**)
P-5	<i>Role of chance</i>	0,88	0,93 (-3,96***)
I-1	<i>Strategic approach to goals</i>	0,54	0,36 (1,74†)
I-2	<i>Tactical pursuit of goals</i>	0,25	0,09 (3,041***)
I-3	<i>Risk orientation</i>	0,31	0,28 (0,48)
I-4	<i>Timing of Action</i>		
a.	<i>Cooperation / Conflict</i>	0,47	0,59 (-1,64)
b.	<i>Words / Deeds</i>	0,48	0,53 (-0,53)
I-5	<i>Utility of Means</i>		
a.	<i>Punish</i>	0,08	0,17 (-3,53***)
b.	<i>Threaten</i>	0,01	0,06 (-2,50**)
c.	<i>Oppose / Resist</i>	0,14	0,08 (2,18**)
d.	<i>Appeal / Support</i>	0,56	0,56 (0,10)
e.	<i>Promise</i>	0,04	0,05 (-0,37)
f.	<i>Reward</i>	0,17	0,10 (1,89†)

Note: the data in bold denote significant results with $p \leq 0,05$. Values in parentheses are t-statistics that show the change relative to the previous phase.

† $p \leq 0,1$ ** $p \leq 0,05$ *** $p \leq 0,01$

Discussion

Now that both Bush's leadership style and operational code are analysed, it is tried to answer the two given research questions and connect them to each other. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, it was chosen to only focus on the traits and beliefs that saw a significant change. The first research question focused on if the LTA of a political leader remains stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event. After analysing the leadership style of former president Bush before and in the aftermath of 9/11, it can be concluded that two of his seven traits, namely 'in-group bias' and 'distrust towards others', saw a significant change. When comparing Bush's scores with the reference group of Cuhadar et al., it can be seen that both these traits changed category, as was already shown in the analysis. Although there is a significant change for only two of the seven traits, it can be stated that this could have at least partly led to a change in Bush's overall leadership style, because of these category changes. From these results, it can be concluded that the leadership style of a political leader does not always remain stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event and that the model of cognitive consistency is thus not always comprehensive enough to explain the leadership style of an individual. Even though this thesis has shown that the leadership style of GWB was indeed able to change, more research needs to be done to determine if these results could be generalized to other political leaders that have dealt with a traumatic event of any kind. However, that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The second research question focused on the extent to which the OCA of a political leader remains stable in the aftermath of a traumatic event. It was concluded that in the case of GWB, five out of ten of his traits saw a significant change. However, it is important to determine if these operational codes are in any way coherent with the leadership traits that changed significantly. Within the LTA, the leadership style of Bush saw a significant increase for the traits 'in-group bias' and 'distrust towards others'. According to Hermann, political leaders are more likely to perceive threats from the environment and confront those responsible for these threats when they score high on both these traits (2003, pp. 200-201). As was already mentioned, these two traits are comparable to the philosophical beliefs within the OCA, as both focus on how a leader sees the world around him. When the results for the OCA would show a similar pattern to those of the LTA, it could be expected that all philosophical beliefs would show a significant change, while the institutional beliefs would remain mostly stable. This accords with Renshon's hypothesis (2008, pp. 830-831), although his actual study only showed a significant change for P-1 and P-2 (p. 834). Robison (2006), who also

researched GWB's operational code in the aftermath of 9/11, had the same results as Renshon when focusing on the philosophical beliefs (p. 111). The current study however does not match the results of both Renshon and Robison, as a significant change for only P-3, P-4 and P-5 can be seen. This means that in the aftermath of 9/11 Bush believed that the political future was less predictable (P-3), that he had less control over historical development (P-4) and that he was convinced that chance got a bigger role (P-5). The results of these three philosophical beliefs do correspond with the traits that saw a significant change, as those have indicated that Bush saw the world in a more negative way and became more confrontational in the aftermath of 9/11. Both the results of Bush's OCA and LTA thus show a similar stand, as all discussed beliefs and traits show that his view towards the world became more pessimistic.

Besides, it can be argued that these three beliefs can be linked to other traits. For example, the belief 'the political future is predictable' (P-3) indicates that when this belief is high, a political leader will likely take the lead, instead of waiting passively. Furthermore, the belief 'the control over historical development' (P-4) is about how much influence a political leader believes to have on historical events and outcomes (George, 1969, p. 204). Both these beliefs can be connected to the trait 'belief in one's own ability to control events', which can be described as a view of the world in which leaders have some degree of control over situations in which they find themselves (Hermann, 2003, pp. 188-189). However, although both the score of the discussed beliefs and trait show a decrease after September 11, there was only a significant change for the belief-scores.

While Renshon did not find significant changes for any of Bush's instrumental beliefs, Robison did see a significant change for I-1 and I-2, which indicates that Bush preferred conflict over cooperation in the aftermath of the attacks (2006, pp. 111-112). His results for I-2 correspond with the results of this thesis, which also saw a significant change for this belief. Bush's score on the belief 'tactical pursuit of goals' (I-2) shows that although he is still focused on using 'somewhat cooperative tactics' in the aftermath of 9/11, his score dropped significantly and he increasingly inclined towards using more conflicting tactics (Walker et al., 2003, pp. 227-228). Furthermore, the current study also saw a significant change in the instrumental belief 'utility of means' (I-5), which is in contrast to both Renshon's and Robison's study. Two of the three conflict means, namely 'punishments' and 'threats', saw a significant increase, which indicates that Bush saw more utility in using punishments and threats in the aftermath of September 11. However, his score for 'oppose / resist' declined, which suggests that Bush's expression of opposition / resistance decreased. The results of

both I-2 and I-5 can be partially linked to the significant changes of the two aforementioned traits, as a more negative approach of a political leader towards the world will make their respective state more confrontational. Besides, it will also lead to more engagement in economic sanctions and military interventions, which can be seen as punishments and threats (Hermann, 2003, pp. 199-200).

Lastly, although it was not the main purpose of this thesis to analyse this, it must be noted that, when comparing the results of this OCA to that of Renshon (2008) and Robison (2006), it is striking that there are differences between the outcomes. Renshon also focused on the impact of 9/11 on the operational code of GWB and only found a significant change for two philosophical beliefs (2008, p. 834). Robison on the other hand only found a significant change for two philosophical and two instrumental beliefs (2006, pp. 111-112). However, in this thesis a significant change can be found for five out of the ten beliefs while using approximately the same timeframe. The main difference between this study and that of Renshon and Robison is that they both used public speeches, while this thesis used spontaneous material in the form of interviews. While Robison did not specify why he chose to use speeches, Renshon believed that spontaneous and prepared statements would generate approximately the same results. However, the differences between his and this analysis show otherwise. This could indicate that there are indeed significant differences between the use of prepared and spontaneous material, as was already suggested by various studies (Dille, 2000; Schafer & Chrichlow, 2000; Schafer & Walker, 2006, p. 47). It is possible that prepared material does not give an equally complete image of Bush's personality as spontaneous material. However, examining why these different results occurred exactly is beyond the scope of this research.

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the stability and change of the LTA as well as the OCA by focusing on George W. Bush. Although only two of the seven leadership traits saw a significant change in the aftermath of 9/11, it is stated that not only Bush's traits, but also his leadership style saw a significant change in the aftermath of 9/11. Furthermore, the analysis has also elaborated that five out of ten of Bush's beliefs have shown a significant change. The results of both these theories show that the idea of cognitive consistency is not always tenable when focusing on the impact of a traumatic event on the personality of a political leader.

Furthermore, the discussion has tried to show how beliefs and traits can relate to each other. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, it was chosen to only focus on the traits and

beliefs that saw a significant change in the aftermath of 9/11. The results of this thesis partly match the idea that the traits 'in-group bias' and 'distrust to others' correspond with the five philosophical beliefs, as P-3, P-4 and P-5 saw a significant change in the same direction. Furthermore, these philosophical beliefs were also linked to another trait, namely 'belief in one's own ability to control events'. However, this trait did not see a significant change. For the instrumental beliefs, this thesis found significant changes for both I-2 and I-5. These results could also be linked partly to the results of the traits 'in-group bias' and 'distrust to others', for the more negative someone considers the world around him to be, the more he will use conflictual instead of cooperative means towards this world. However, these results did not match those of Renshon (2008) and Robison (2006), who also analysed the operational code of GWB in the aftermath of 9/11. Perhaps this was because of the fact that they both analysed speeches, while this thesis used interviews. However, this can only be stated with certainty when more research will be done on it.

Analysing the same data with both the LTA and OCA and then comparing the results is something that has almost never been done. However, it was concluded in this thesis that some of Hermann's traits are not appointed within George's beliefs and vice versa. Furthermore, it was shown that some beliefs and traits complement each other in some ways. Using both the LTA and OCA could thus give a more comprehensive view of how the personality of a leader could have an influence on foreign policy decisions. However, because of the limited scope of this thesis, it was not yet possible to gain a complete picture of all ways in which the LTA and OCA interrelate. Furthermore, this study only focused on traumatic events and did not include any other possible reasons why the leadership style or operational code of a political leader can change. Besides, the focus was specifically on the personality of GWB in the aftermath of 9/11, so that the results cannot be generalized to other political leaders. More extensive research is therefore necessary.

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Appendix A

Phase 1 (interview fragments prior to 9/11)

#1: Interview ABC News, 04/26/2001, 1196 words

<https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=127022&page=1>

#2: Interview with Time, 04/27/2001, 1700 words

<http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,107844,00.html>

#3: Conference with the president of Poland, 06/15/2001, 1188 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book1/pdf/PPP-2001-book1-doc-pg670.pdf>

#4: Conference with Vladimir Putin, 06/16/2001, 1450 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book1/pdf/PPP-2001-book1-doc-pg685.pdf>

#5: Conference with Tony Blair, 07/19/2001, 1423 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg873.pdf>

#6: Prior to meeting with the Virginia Gubernatorial candidate, 07/26/2001, 1217 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg913.pdf>

#7: While signing an Executive Order on Energy Efficiency, 07/31/2001, 1025 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg930.pdf>

#8: Exchange with reporters in Waco, Texas, 08/07/2001, 1077 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg944.pdf>

#9: Exchange with reporters in Crawford, 08/13/2001, 1695 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg960.pdf>

#10: Q&A on an elementary school, 08/15/2001, 1431 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg974-2.pdf>

#11: Remarks on Q&A with students at elementary school, 08/23/2001, 2748 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1010.pdf>

#12: Exchange with reporters on Bush Ranch, 08/25/2001, 8182 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1029.pdf>

#13: Prior to meeting with Senate Minority Leader, 09/04/2001, 1283 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1070.pdf>

#14: With the president of Mexico, 09/06/2001, 1442 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1078.pdf>

Phase 2 (interview fragments after 9/11)

#15: Arrival at the White House, 09/16/2001, 1224 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1114.pdf>

#16: Remarks to employees in the Pentagon, 09/17/2001, 1208 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1117-2.pdf>

#17: Prior to discussions with the president of Indonesia, 09/19/2001, 1297 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1129.pdf>

#18: About financial sanctions against terrorists and supporters, 09/24/2001, 1978 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1149.pdf>

#19: After discussions with the prime minister of Japan, 09/25/2001, 1073 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1157-2.pdf>

#20: Following discussions with business leaders, 10/03/2001, 1535 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1184.pdf>

#21: After discussions with the Chancellor of Germany, 10/09/2001, 2131 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1206.pdf>

#22: After meeting with the Homeland Security Council, 10/29/2001, 1056 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1317.pdf>

#23: After discussions with the President of Nigeria, 11/02/2001, 1559 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1337.pdf>

#24: Q&A with high school students with Putin, 11/15/2001, 2691 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1409.pdf>

#25: At a ceremony for rescued humanitarian aid workers, 11/26/2001, 1315 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1443.pdf>

#26: Remarks on the new Oval Office carpet, 12/21/2001, 1963 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2001-book2/pdf/PPP-2001-book2-doc-pg1534-2.pdf>

#27: After roundtable discussion on retirement savings, 03/01/2002, 1150 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book1/pdf/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg312.pdf>

#28: After remarks on the situation in the Middle East, 03/07/2002, 1224 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book1/pdf/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg359-2.pdf>

#29: After discussion on corporate management reform, 03/08/2002, 1080 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book1/pdf/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg363.pdf>

#30: Remarks on the situation in the Middle East, 03/30/2002, 1421 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book1/pdf/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg526.pdf>

#31: Interview with UK ITV Television Network, 04/04/2002, 2986 words

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72994>

#32: After discussions with the president of Colombia, 04/18/2002, 1120 words

<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2002-book1/pdf/PPP-2002-book1-doc-pg626.pdf>