Bridging Old and New Authoritarianism in President el-Sisi’s Egypt:
How has the hybridization of classical and newer forms of authoritarian rule manifested under el-Sisi’s regime since 2014?

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Abstract

The geopolitical realignment which took place in the Middle East and North Africa since the uprisings of the Arab Spring has brought about a new manifestation of authoritarian rule in Egypt under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Egypt is among a growing number of countries around the world governed by a paradoxically open, yet harshly repressive, type of new authoritarianism. At the same time, with the presidency of the former General el-Sisi entering its fifth year, the return to power of Egypt’s military establishment has seen a resumption of the older authoritarian methods used by past Egyptian leaders to quell dissent against the government, and to maintain power generally. This thesis seeks to answer how President el-Sisi’s actions since becoming President in 2014 has led to a hybridization of both classical and new authoritarian theories. Through the significant utilization of the country’s national security apparatus, manipulation of the political and justice systems, and reliance on vast sources of economic aid from the United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf states, el-Sisi appears to exhibit strategies from both old and new theories of authoritarianism. This thesis demonstrates the Egyptian experience of hybridized authoritarianism by incorporating overviews of authoritarianism generally, discussions of authoritarian theories, scholarly debates, and evidence from Egypt’s national security, legal, judicial, political, economic, and foreign relations sectors. This thesis will lend itself to broader scholarly discussions on authoritarianism in contemporary times, as well as on international relations in the Middle East, and the durability of strongman regimes in the developing world. While this thesis can only provide a secondary overview of Egypt’s recent return to authoritarianism, the researcher hopes it will make a small contribution to the political and foreign policy affairs in a region both rich in history and fraught with conflict.
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This thesis is dedicated to the people of Egypt, who continue to struggle for a future of peace, prosperity, and co-existence in such uncertain times.

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List of Abbreviations

CSF Central Security Force (Egypt)
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
EU European Union
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIA General Intelligence Agency (Egypt)
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq & Syria
MENA Middle East & North Africa
MIR Military Intelligence & Reconnaissance
NDP National Development Policy
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA National Security Agency (Egypt)
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
US United States of America
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the wake of the Arab Spring and the unrealized promise of democracy throughout the Arab World, a counterrevolutionary force of authoritarian leaders has emerged to challenge the reforms demanded of protestors across the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt, once seen as the lynchpin bridging political and diplomatic divides between the Middle East and Western powers (King 2009, 33), has seen its citizens demand a popular revolution to bring about regime change, only for its progress to be dismantled by the return of a dictatorial President which persists to this day, with the support of Egypt’s influential military establishment. Egypt is currently led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, himself a former army general.

This thesis will seek to establish how the security state controlled by President el-Sisi has expanded the role of the military to create a culture of authoritarian continuity and regime stability, while using its legal system which has increasingly been used to employ martial law in civil society, as well as flouting international conditions for economic support in pursuit of the regime’s internal goals. To what extent can the durability of the el-Sisi regime be attributed to a hybridization of classical and new authoritarian theories through the use of martial law in the pursuit of domestic security and power consolidation? How has the use of presidential decrees by el-Sisi for expanding military tribunals into civilian litigation increased the presence and scope of the already powerful military establishment? This thesis seeks to answer these questions, which illustrate an evolving understanding of how dictators such as President el-Sisi maintain power. This thesis will examine secondary source material and data to determine the depth of military control since el-Sisi came to power in June 2014. The report also seeks to illustrate a specific trend of growing military influence in Egypt under el-Sisi which is more authoritarian relative to past leaders.

The state of Egypt has experienced multiple significant changes to its leadership and the regimes which have ruled the country over centuries (Kassem 2004, 7). Despite its position as a pivotal international actor in Middle Eastern political stability, Egypt has been led by its largely influential military establishment since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952 and subsequent constitution of the Arab Republic in 1956 (Gat 2018, 19). The country has been ruled by a succession of former army officers who became President including Gamal Abdel Nasser, from 1954 until his death in 1970; Anwar Sadat, from 1970 until his assassination in 1981; and Hosni
Mubarak, from 1981 until his resignation during the Arab Spring in February 2011 (Cherif Bassiouini 2017; 472, 475, 620). The current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (referred to hereafter as el-Sisi or President el-Sisi), is the latest former army general to come to power in Egypt. El-Sisi was first appointed Minister of Defence in 2012, followed by his election as President in May 2014, and who remains in power since his re-election in 2018 (Black 2018, 24).

This thesis will examine how the el-Sisi regime maintains power through an extensive utilisation of Egypt’s national security apparatus, the manipulation of the country’s political and justice systems, and with the benefit of significant economic aid from the United States, Europe, and the Persian Gulf states. The tactics and strategies used by el-Sisi’s regime share attributes of both classical and new authoritarianism, as observed by authors on those theories. The manifestation of both classical and new theories of authoritarianism raises the question to what extent President el-Sisi’s style of leadership and governance, tactics used against opposition forces, and reliance on international aid creates a hybridization of both these theories? This thesis will explain that through the additional theories of regime resilience and authoritarian learning, the Egyptian regime exhibits a dual, or hybridized, development of authoritarianism which has evolved under el-Sisi in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Throughout recent decades, Egyptian leaders have sustained their regime by consolidating power internally, in which private organisations and public institutions are headed by business elites loyal to the regime, as well as serving or retired military officers. This type of classical authoritarianism is described by Huntington and Moore (1970; 101, 113) as part of an overall strategy of control, building a wide ranging “political machine” of elites and stakeholders. Pepinsky (2009, 18) adds to this understanding of maintaining power through strategic coalition building between military regimes and economic elites in his analysis of other authoritarian regimes, such as in Malaysia and Indonesia. Consequently, Egyptian presidents’ abilities to quell dissent and retain their legitimacy through unfree elections, corrupt institutions, and preserving control through elites in the military and business have also characterised the country’s challenging journey to democracy as an authoritarian regime.

The depth of influence exercised by the military within government is exhibited in Egypt’s foreign relations with its Western allies and patrons. Since 1979, when President Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords and a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has enjoyed large sums of economic and diplomatic support from the United States (King 2009, 108). This has
provided critical leverage to the United States in exercising its Middle Eastern policy, with the joint goals of preserving Israel’s statehood and sustaining regional peace by its support for Saudi Arabia and Egypt – two of the Arab World’s largest economies and most influential political regimes (Springborg 2014, 5).

With the end of the Cold War after 1989, the geopolitical shifts which occurred following the collapse of the Soviet Union confirmed the dominance of the United States as a global hegemon, with European and other Western allies following the open and liberal economic, military, and development policies fostered by the U.S. For states in the developing world, such as Egypt, the end of the Cold War brought about a new era in the clientelist relationship with richer Western states, upon which Egypt relied for its security and national economic stability. During this period Hosni Mubarak, who served as Egypt’s president for nearly thirty years from 1981 until his overthrow during the Arab Spring in February 2011, had cultivated better diplomatic relations with fellow Arab states who opposed Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. Mubarak also made efforts to reform democratic and state institutions conditionally in line with continued financial support from the West, but the openness of elections and efficacy of opposition parties were neutralised throughout this time.

Attempts were made internationally to improve security cooperation and diplomatic relations through the EU-led European Neighbourhood Policy and Partnership for the Mediterranean (Bauer 2011, 427). These international associations of EU member states and their neighbouring countries replicated the patron-client relationship which the United States held over many countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, with similar conditions of promoting human rights, democratic reform, and economic openness in exchange for access to European markets and security funding (Bruno 2016, 86). Even though the Egyptian government has depended on economic and diplomatic support from the West for many years, the conditions and expectations for which Egypt receives this support have often gone unfulfilled (Armbrust 2017, 328). Normative Western political ideals such as freedom of association, enhanced civil liberties, open elections with multiple parties, and free market economics have been partially implemented for the convenience of the regime and not entirely in the interests of the Egyptian people. Despite criticism from humanitarian organisations, civil rights groups, and other governments in the international community, the Egyptian government has often been excused for its dereliction of
responsibility in delivering on these conditions, citing their interest for internal security and regional stability above all other matters (Cook 2016, 113).

Egypt’s asymmetric reliance upon the United States and other Western powers for economic support is conditional upon improving domestic conditions within the country (El-Dean 2002, 33). The Camp David Accords, Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, and Partnership for the Mediterranean are among the agreements which form the basis, and outline the conditions, for which Egypt receives this support, which include expanding human rights and opening civil society, cultivating domestic markets, and security cooperation (Bruno 2016; 72, 120, 141, 161). Although Egypt is dependent on Western economic and financial aid, its successive governments have played a pivotal role as a strategic ally for the West in supporting stability in the Middle East, as well as aiding the War on Terror through their military and security (King 2009, 121). Despite this influence, the conditions for which the West has given financial aid to Egypt are increasingly unfulfilled, due to internal stability and regional security taking priority in the wake of the Arab Spring (Fradkin 2012, 11).

Meanwhile, the security apparatus in Egypt controlled by President el-Sisi has broadened the scope of his power and expanded the definition of “national security” to justify the arrest and imprisonment of tens of thousands of protestors (Abu Zeid 2017, 164). This has led to a process of authoritarian continuity and regime stability where political opponents are encouraged to stand aside, in addition to establishing a culture of Egyptian citizens made to feel little, if anything, can be achieved through protest for fear of arrest (Greene 2016, 31). These circumstances are reflective in part to the resilience of Egypt’s regime through institutional changes made during the Mubarak era from the early 1990s until shortly before the Arab Spring (Perkins 2010; 32, 37, 41). Numerous institutions from the ruling National Democratic Party, the intelligence services, the administrative bureaucracy, and the Presidency itself were “intimately” cultivated into President Mubarak’s control during his decades in power, thus ensuring his long tenure (Perkins 2010; 23, 27, 28).

The Egyptian legal system has similarly undergone several significant changes since the 1950s through constitutional and statutory reforms which help sustain the regime of the day. Egypt’s constitutional, state, and religious laws have been influenced by their colonial past, with a mixed system of Roman civil law, Napoleonic Code, and Sharia for various sectors in society. Despite the variety of legal sources enabling Egypt to function as a pluralistic, secular, and civil
republic since 1952 the military has nonetheless held an outsized role in the public sphere. Several changes have been brought about through presidential decrees and edicts, which have helped place the military as an important actor within the apparatus of government. Retired army officers are often placed in leadership roles at the head of state, semi-state, and private sector companies and organisations, ensuring the fraternal strength of the military in society. The influence of the military has been key to the resilience of the el-Sisi regime since 2014, where martial law is used increasingly more often in civil litigation against protestors and suspected dissenters. This course of action by the regime is not new in modern Egyptian history, as military courts hearing civilian trials goes back to 1966. However, the increased use of military tribunals in civilian litigation represents a growing disregard for the rule of law on the part of el-Sisi’s government and poses challenges to any form of democratic transition in future (Abu Zeid 2016, 3).

Assumptions that the Arab Spring would bring about democracy and openness throughout the Middle East and North Africa were eventually proved wrong given the scale of regime continuity and authoritarian resilience seen in Egypt, as well as the lack of change in the Gulf states, along with the collapse of Libya (Ryzova 2017, 512). Only the democratic transition of Tunisia from dictatorship to a pluralist, multi-party civil republic is viewed by other authors as the Arab Spring’s best success. Neither the Gulf states, Libya, or Tunisia are explored further in this thesis. The relative stability of Morocco and Jordan are also noteworthy, but neither are examined in this work. The effect of Egypt’s attempt at opening and legitimizing its democracy was undone in part by the removal of Mohammed Morsi from power in July 2013, following protests against his Muslim Brotherhood-backed government. The return to military control from 2013 until el-Sisi’s election in June 2014 paved the way for the new President and his supporters’ counterrevolutionary tactics. Initial steps taken by the regime returned the military elite to their preeminent position in government institutions and in the private sector.

In terms of the progress sought after by the Arab Spring protestors, the Persian Gulf monarchies remain absolutist and in control of their wealthy countries with little or no democratic accountability, achieved by continued Western support paying off their citizens at home with modest financial subsidies in exchange for obedience. Syria remains devastated by a civil war that, well into its eighth year at time of writing, has pitted the Russian- and Iranian-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad against disunited factions of Western-supported rebels.
Chapter 1.1: Theory & Literature Review

The literature examined for this thesis includes scholars of old authoritarianism such as Aras (2015, 328), Huntington (1991), Kienle (2000), and Linz (2000) who define classical authoritarian as forms of government with high degrees of central control and few political freedoms for citizens. Linz (2000; 34, 35, 68) observed the basic tenets of authoritarian power as limiting social openness through suppressing anti-government protests, reducing political participation through repressing opponents, and cultivating legitimacy through emotional appeals instead of the rule of law.

Scholarship has evolved to define new authoritarianism from the older meanings of the past, characterizing new forms of regimes by the inclusion of a wider variety of interest groups (Linz 2000, 36), broader social, political, and economic coalitions (Pepinsky 2009, 16), and through the opening of the national economy to market liberalisation, among other developments. Linz (2000, 71-72) posits that two key definitions separate old and new authoritarian structures. Those of the old or traditional form of authoritarianism hold power through a complex “combination…[of] legitimacy, patron-client ties, and repression”. Newer manifestations of authoritarian regimes include the bureaucratic-military model, in which a coalition of civil servants and military officers govern without a particular ideology, and operate within an illiberal or semi-democratic political environment (Huntington 1991, 118). Egypt under President el-Sisi reflects the latter trend in which older political philosophies of Arab socialism and Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Islamism do not feature. Instead power is held with minimal opposition thanks to sweeping security state and only a semblance of electoral democracy.

Another part of the literature for this thesis is drawn from recent theories including new authoritarianism as examined by Guriev and Treisman (2015), Krastev (2011), and Ryzova (2017). These authors, among others, observe the general domestic and international considerations facing authoritarian leaders in the post-9/11 world (Ryan 2001; Aras 2015), and specifically the developments in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East since the Arab Spring in 2011. Guriev and Treisman (2015) articulate the context in which countries once part of the “Third World” have transitioned to a type of developing status (Development Policy and Analysis 2014) supported by the United States, Europe, and other great powers with economic, military, and infrastructural aid as a condition of support for United States and Western foreign
policy (Hamzawy 2017, 398). As a result, the governing regimes of Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries have transformed into styles grouped under the term “new authoritarianism” and referred to as either illiberal democracies or “vegetarian” soft authoritarian states in which the leaders can use “mass violence, ideological indoctrination, and closed borders to monopolize power” (Guriev 2015, 32).

It is worth providing a brief overview of what might be termed “classical” or “old” authoritarianism that emerged in developing countries during the twentieth century. Authors include Samuel Huntington and his 1991 book *The Third Wave*, which examined democratization in the late twentieth century among mostly developing countries between 1974 and 1990 (Huntington 1991). Authoritarian regimes were defined by their repressive tactics against political opponents and opposition groups which involved exercising central control of the government and the economy, the implementation of martial law, in addition to imposing restrictions on civil liberties (Huntington 1991, 38). Additional characteristics of old authoritarian regimes involved arresting and executing political opponents and dissenters, as well as suppressing media outlets and restricting citizens from travelling abroad (King 2009, 58). These restrictions effectively closed the borders of a country to outside scrutiny and minimized the awareness of the rest of the world to life under the regime.

Another critical element to the difference between old and new authoritarianism is the ability of the regime to control the economy through the central government, coordinating economic activity with ruling elites in business and commerce (Kienle 2000, 73). President Sadat brought about an era of economic openness, known as *infitah*, beginning in the early 1970s which sought to grow the Egyptian economy through market competition and international trade (Gat 2018, 218). These economic development strategies continue today under President el-Sisi, with the help of long-standing economic aid form the United States, European Union, and latterly from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since the Arab Spring (Sowa 2013, 6). The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in 1979 helped to further normalize relations with the United States, opening Egypt to substantial economic aid from the United States and the rest of the West (Jankowski 2002, 179). This influx of capital allowed the Egyptian economy to increase domestic subsidies and grow free enterprises and markets, while lessening the central influence of the government over the economy (Kienle 2000, 88).
While it may be convenient to explain President el-Sisi’s regime through classical authoritarianism, several actions and strategies taken by el-Sisi differ from those of Egypt’s past presidents, such as the expansion of open markets, and greater security cooperation with the West. The more recent theory of new authoritarianism provides an important perspective on the development and evolution of authoritarian regimes and their survival, despite the post-Third Wave of democratization articulated by Huntington (1991). The degree to which new authoritarianism is manifest in Egypt can be explained by the resilience of the Egyptian regime’s structures due to changes made by President Mubarak in the 1990s and 2000s, which included enhancing Egypt’s diplomatic influence in the rest of the Middle East, continuing to open domestic market reforms, and transitioning to ostensibly more democratic elections (Kienle 2000, 117).

Another theoretical strand in the literature concerns regime resilience theory in some developing world countries such as , and researchers such as Heydemann (2011) observe the adaptive qualities in regimes like Egypt which have changed their behaviours in a new era of globally connected economies, with more open borders, and mass communications. Regime resilience theory opines that strongmen and dictators in developing world countries have changed their tactics over the years. In the past, regime leaders could remove political opponents and dissenters through mass executions, disappearances, and state control of the media with sweeping powers of censorship. Authors such as Aras (2015), Fradkin (2012), and Heydemann (2011) argue that the contemporary context of globalization and mass media prevents authoritarian leaders from using such harsh tactics (Fradkin 2012, 11). This has essentially transpired through the exposure of authoritarian led countries such as Egypt to the globalized international economy. While these changes have brought about domestic economic reforms, the opening of borders has led to increases in terrorist threats since the Arab Spring (Bruno 2016, 229). As a result, new authoritarians like President el-Sisi have utilized his domestic security institutions, such as Egypt’s National Security Agency (NSA), the Interior Ministry, and the Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance (MIR) services.

The exposure of authoritarian countries, like all countries, to the globalized economic system as well as the presence of mass communications and social media have necessitated changes to the tactics used by governing regimes (King 2009, 97). As the demand for international norms around human rights, civil liberties, and political participation grew in Egypt
and other Arab Spring countries, such as Tunisia and Syria, so too did the expectations that these norms would be adopted under the new constitutions which would follow regime change (King 2009, 194).

Egypt’s own experience with regime resilience, according to Perkins (2010, 17), has its roots in structural and institutional reforms brought about by President Hosni Mubarak during his nearly thirty years in power. By consolidating control over the military leadership, intelligence services, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), the civil service administration, and by coordinating public spending projects with loyal business elites, Mubarak essentially transformed his presidency into the country’s central authority (Perkins 2010, 29). Simultaneously, Mubarak neutralized opposition politicians through regular, albeit manipulated, elections every six years. This is evidenced by presidential elections held in 1981, 1987, 1993, and 1999 in which Mubarak secured ninety per cent or more of the vote (Kienle 2000; 41, 46, 128). The first “contested” election in 2005 in the wake of minor constitutional reforms to elections removed the selection of candidates from parliament, which had been dominated by the ruling NDP, and into the authority of a Presidential Election Commission (King 2009, 83). The independence of the Commission was called into question, and President Mubarak won the 2005 election with a slightly more modest eighty-eight per cent of the vote (King 2009, 92). These political examples are only one element of the resilience of Mubarak’s regime, which demonstrate the strategic control over which he maintained his power.

The use of regime resilience theory will be used to explain how many of the institutions in Egypt, such as the judiciary and legal system, parliament, the bureaucratic administration, private business enterprises, and civil society organisations, are influenced by the President’s regime. These institutions rely on the support and approval of the Egyptian President and his government, engendering loyalty in exchange for carrying out their functions (Kassem 2004, 63).

Research into the Egyptian experience and development of new authoritarianism merits discussion given the recent re-election of President el-Sisi in March 2018, and the continuing issues of Middle Eastern stability and the rise of populist, illiberal political movements in the United States and Europe. Discussion of regime resilience and authoritarian learning adds to the relevance of this thesis, as the era of President el-Sisi is characterised by institutional stability and a degree of popular support despite weak economic performance and unfulfilled reforms.
Aspects of authoritarian learning are also explored as part of the counter-revolutionary tactics of the Egyptian regime in response to the upheaval of the Arab Spring.
Chapter 2: Research Methodology

The purposes of this research have been to determine to what extent the el-Sisi regime’s use of its security institutions and manipulation of the Egyptian legal system has enabled them to suppress dissent and political opposition than either past Egyptian presidents or contemporary authoritarian leaders have done. While the tactics employed by the el-Sisi regime, such as mass incarceration of protestors and using expansive definitions of national security threats to justify the suppression of anti-government activists, are not new to Egypt, they have been characterised as being more severe than before the Arab Spring (Bruno 2016, 61).

This thesis examines the performance of the el-Sisi regime in Egypt and how the government security apparatus controlled by President el-Sisi has expanded the role of the military as part of its strategy to continue its authoritarian policies in an effort to maintain regime stability throughout the country in the wake of the Arab Spring. The researcher will also examine how Egypt’s legal system has increasingly been used to employ martial law in civil society using Presidential decrees, broadening their definition of national security threats to justify mass imprisonment, and neglecting to implement conditions for international economic support as the regime pursues its own internal security and development goals.

According to Hart (1998, 12), the research question should drive the selection of the most suitable approach for any research project. Whilst much debate prevails on which type of design can deliver the strongest level of evidence, it is generally accepted that many forms of information including research from publications, surveys, interviews as well as present and historical literature and professional expertise, all contribute to the development of sound research practices (Hart 1998, 17).

Justification for using this methodology

As this study aims to contribute to the knowledge base on the el-Sisi regime in Egypt, using a secondary literature format is deemed an appropriate methodology as it offers a rigorous approach to contextualizing and interpreting information both current and historical to respond to the question (Hart 1998, 11). While this was a key factor in choosing this approach, other aspects were considered in the final decision.
The researcher had originally intended to conduct field interviews with officials from the European Neighbourhood Policy unit in Brussels and from the Egyptian Embassy in the Hague. However, lessons learned through previous research experience while assisting with the collection of primary data, led to the realization of the expansive time involved in this process. Additionally, while officials from the ENP unit and Egyptian Embassy were willing to be interviewed, challenges beyond the control of the researcher involving time constraints, appointment deferrals, and rescheduling prevented such interviews being conducted. As a literature review provides the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the topic itself and to identify knowledge gaps that may exist, it was agreed that given the aforementioned limitations, analyzing existing evidence is appropriate for this study.

**Searching the literature**

Hart (1998, 7) suggests that a quality literature search and analysis starts with identifying a topic that is of key interest to the researcher, then advancing and refining it until the study question is well formulated. While this may appear a simple process, it requires much patience and deliberation on the part of the researcher, exploring and progressively narrowing the topic to ensure that the subject is indeed researchable. In respect of this study, the researcher initially developed the research question based on his passion and interest in Egyptian and Middle Eastern politics, history, and international relations.

Following initial literature searches and discussion with the researcher’s supervisor, it was agreed that the topic was very broad as it involved an expansive era to be reviewed, which would go beyond the scope and timeframe to complete this masters’ thesis. Consequently, the researcher refined the research question by confining the period under investigation to the el-Sisi governance as President of Egypt spanning a period from 2014 to the present day. In deference to the course programme’s specific remit of global order in historical perspective, references are also made spanning Egypt’s political history from 1952 up to the present day for contextualisation.

Searching the literature is the process used to find the most current and relevant information for the topic question. While the internet offers quick access to large amounts of information, it is dependent on the researcher’s input to define terminology and the sequence used for the search. As such, retrieving information can prove both a lengthy task at the least,
and fail to capture all relevant information at best, given the ‘hap-hazard’ way it may be performed. Avoiding such pitfalls is essential, hence the researcher applied a rigorous search strategy.

*Description of design method (Search Strategy)*

The researcher has chosen to find answers to these questions using a mix of quantitative secondary source data such as those found in reports by international organisations; qualitative academic articles and books by authors in such fields ranging from authoritarianism, Middle Eastern politics, democratic transition, and regime resilience; qualitative newspaper and press articles, as well as translations of primary source documents of laws and presidential decrees originally published in the Arabic language from within the Egyptian government and its institutions. The researcher’s criteria used for narrowing down these findings focused on the period between 2014 and the present, excluding sources not originally published in or translated to English, and relating to the topics of contemporary Egyptian politics, post-Arab Spring international relations, authoritarianism theories, and democratic transition studies.

Academic search engines such as JSTOR and EBSCO host were also used to gather literature and data for research. These sources examine recent developments in the growth of new authoritarianism as a structure of governance in developing countries like Egypt. Sources such as the Library of Congress (2015), Gat (2018), and Black (2018) also look at the steps President el-Sisi’s regime has taken through Presidential decrees and existing legal frameworks to expand military authority in civil society as a source of security consolidation, which allows his regime to survive. Sources from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Beblawi 2018), as well as statistics from economic journal articles, examine the levels of both conditional and unconditional international economic aid by which Egypt receives international support from the United States, Europe, and the Gulf states (Sowa 2013, 2).

At the beginning of the search process, the researcher utilized online sources, employing Freedom House’s definition of countries worldwide as either “free” or “unfree”, based on overall political rights and civil liberties enjoyed by citizens of those countries. Freedom House assigns a scaled score from 1 meaning “most free” to 7 meaning “least free” (Freedom House 2018). These “Freedom in the World” reports are published annually by this US-based NGO and are cited in journals and peer-reviewed research articles on human rights, political freedom, and civil
liberties (Freedom House 2018). While Freedom House has data on Egypt dating back to 1998, the years of the el-Sisi presidency from 2014 to the present have consistently reported Egypt as scoring 5.5 (Freedom House 2014, 2015, 2016) or 6.0 (Freedom House 2017a, 2018), declaring Egypt to be “not free”. Consequently, supplementary Freedom House reports were searched specifically examining freedom of the press (Freedom House 2017b) and freedom to internet access (Freedom House 2017c) in Egypt, where the country was respectively assigned scores of 77 out of 100 and 68 out of 100, both designating Egypt once again as “not free”. While these reports provide general observations of Egypt regarding freedom of press, political rights, civil liberties, and fair elections, along with nearly every other country worldwide, they are notable standards by which to begin an assessment of Egypt’s domestic society and internal political culture. Critics of Freedom House posit that their reports are biased toward United States’ interests, however such reports help illustrate critical literature by authors such as Brownlee (2012; 62, 77, 157) and Ikenberry (2014; 69, 273), whose expertise is widely acknowledged in the examination of tactics authoritarian regimes have used in other countries to prevent democratic growth and challenges to their authority.

This research adopted a ‘snowball method’ commencing with relevant course textbooks where most important authors works on the subject are generally cited. Citations were identified from the footnotes of selective sections of the textbooks and the articles sourced through the university library using a selection of search engines, such as JSTOR and EBSCO. This process was repeated using citations from articles sourced which continued to identify further important sources. Additionally, an informal interview in December 2017 was conducted with researchers and policy analysts during an academic visit to the Fondation Robert Schuman in Brussels. The objective of this interview was to enquire about the European Union’s general approach to diplomatic and economic relations with the Middle East and North Africa. This interview had the advantage of clarifying specific policy positions on the part of the European Union, with regard to current and future international aid grants to Egypt in exchange for closer security cooperation in the years ahead.

**Background and rationale for Design Choice**

The historical context and importance of contemporary Egypt as a country whose regime’s resilience are part of the strategic priorities of the United States and their allies to
maintain peace in the Middle East and support for Israel (Gat 2018, 186). Egypt’s international relations have developed in asymmetrical, dominant-subordinate relationships (Ikenberry 2014, 68) under the United States, European Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since 1979. Successive Egyptian presidents, from Anwar Sadat to Hosni Mubarak and currently Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, have relied upon the support of the United States and its international aid funding to secure the stability of Egypt, invest in security and infrastructural projects, and help develop their domestic economy (Sowa 2013, 5). Some of the sources used here on regime resilience examine the history and evolution of Egypt’s central political institutions, and the various structures each Egyptian president has put in place, from the security services to parliament to the administrative bureaucracy, to hold power since the formation of the Arab Republic in the 1950s.

As the purpose of this research is to convey an understanding of established knowledge and ideas on a topic, it is imperative that all sides of the argument are explored. This involves using critical analytical skills to identify strengths and weaknesses within research material and to uncover potential bias that could impact findings and conclusions, (Hart 1998, 21). Although a systematic approach is adopted, Hart (1998, 23) advises against developing chronological catalogs of descriptive summaries, suggesting using a structure on which an argumentative thesis can develop by gradually integrating previous research, while simultaneously explaining how the research relates to the current topic; this in turn enhances the researcher’s skill and competence.

**Evaluation of choice of method, and statement of its limitations**

The researcher acknowledges that all relevant material may not be sourced as the topic selected could be under explored or the research strategy implemented may be too limited. In order to avoid bias and misleading results affecting this study’s reliability, a number of alternative methods were considered before beginning the study. The researcher’s choices of using mixed secondary source literature and data from international organisations allow this thesis to examine the particular regime style of President el-Sisi since 2014, in relation to old and new authoritarian theories, tactics against political dissent generally, and specifically his use of the security and legal systems to maintain power. By focusing only on the regime of President el-Sisi, aided by the historical context of his predecessors, limitations can be minimized when discussion arises. The quantitative data allows the researcher to examine trends in social, economic, and political developments in Egypt during specific time periods. Qualitative research allows for theoretical
understandings to be defined and specified, as well as for intellectual arguments to be examined side by side for the purposes of critical analysis. Research into new authoritarianism theory is limited by the fact that this is a relatively new theory whose hypotheses can only be proved with the passage of time as more developments occur.

Limitations in the researcher’s use of regime resilience as a supplementary theory to classical vs. new authoritarianism rest upon the question of whether President el-Sisi is truly a continuation of his predecessors, or if his harsher authoritarian tactics could represent something different in the way Egypt transitions from the Arab Spring. Older theories such as complex interdependence theory (King 2009, 203) are used to explore the extensive, yet asymmetric, economic relationship between Egypt and its US/EU supporters. However, this theory is limited by the changing levels of economic aid Egypt has received since the Arab Spring, in addition to the support from the GCC providing alternative sources of unconditional funding. These funds allow President el-Sisi to circumvent his human rights and reform obligations to the West (Sowa 2013, 6). As the researcher carries the responsibility to ensure that academic integrity is respected by presenting findings objectively and avoiding bias, all efforts are made to mitigate plagiarism ensuring that the work and findings of other researchers is appropriately interpreted and acknowledged (Hart 1998, 24).
Chapter 3: Security Structures under President el-Sisi

How security structures reflect Old and New Authoritarian hybridization

This chapter focuses on President el-Sisi’s use of the security institutions and other intelligence organisations in Egypt to retain power and consolidate his authority. New authoritarian theorists such as King (2009, 51) and Kienle (2000, 77) have opined that regimes will use the significant capacity of their security forces and paramilitary organisations in conjunction with conventional armed forces to consolidate dictators’ power (Huntington 1991, 53). Given that both the armed forces and security services are centrally controlled by el-Sisi’s regime, he is able to wield an excessive degree of power over national institutions, the legal system, economic activity, and crucially over protestors and anti-government activists (Hellyer 2018, 3). With this understanding in mind, authoritarian regimes throughout the decades and until the present day have benefitted from the unrestrained of their armed forces and security networks (Huntington and Moore 1970, 104). Whether old or new authoritarian leaders, their first line of defence against those who would oppose them has routinely been the country’s security forces. This reality helps to illustrate the crossover between both authoritarian theories.

An overview of Egypt’s security institutions is included in this chapter, and provides significant evidence into the use of the country’s security structure to both combat terrorist threats on the borders as well as to quell protests in Egypt’s cities. Actions taken, and tactics used, by el-Sisi include the systemic deployment of domestic security agencies such as the National Police and Central Security Force (CSF) who counter nearly all the protests and anti-government demonstrations which crop up across the country. These security forces behave with almost total impunity, devoid of much public scrutiny, and with the protection of the government in their actions against protestors (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 251).

President el-Sisi has been engaged in an ongoing security struggle against Islamist terrorists, factions from what is left of Daesh, and maintaining its border integrity in the Northern Sinai and the areas surrounding the Israeli-Gaza boundaries (Mohamed 2014). Attacks and bombings in the Sinai Peninsula in October 2014 (Mohamed 2014) prompted President el-Sisi to reinstate the Emergency Law 136 (Hamzawy 2016, 4) which has kept Egypt in a state of emergency for most of the last three decades (Gat 2018, 203). Since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 this emergency law has allowed successive regimes to impose curfews across Egypt, cracking down on protestors and anti-government demonstrators, and crucially
enabling the military and security services to aid the police in maintaining martial law (Cook 2016, 118). The Emergency Law was one of the main grievances for Egyptians when they began protesting during the Arab Spring in 2011 (Hamzawy 2017, 401), but since 2014 has returned as another tool in the el-Sisi regime’s security arsenal to remove dissent and sources of opposition to his regime (Hall 2017, 148).

The overall security and paramilitary strength of the Egyptian Armed Forces is complemented by the extensive personnel employed in the country’s security and Central Police forces. The presence of multiple branches of military and security services across cities, and in the streets against protestors and activists, is another reminder of the extent to which both old and new authoritarian leaders rely on the armed forces as a source of both legitimacy and protection.

Security Services and the Armed Forces

Egypt’s security institutions, the Armed Forces, and the police service comprise the large and influential network responsible for national security under President el-Sisi. The Egyptian Armed Forces consists of nearly 440,000 active personnel alongside 480,000 reserve forces (Chipman 2016, 324). Their annual budget, according to the IISS (Chipman 2016, 326), of $5.47 billion represents nearly two per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Nearly a quarter of defence expenditure comes from economic aid received annually from the United States of $1.3 billion, or 23.8% of annual military spending (Chipman 2016, 327). As commander in chief of the Armed Forces, President el-Sisi also has an extensive and personal expertise in the function and operation of Egypt’s military (Cook 2016, 112). Having served as both director of Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance and as Minister of Defence before assuming the presidency, el-Sisi was an officer of distinction and an astute leader of security forces which propelled him through the ranks of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and into power after the removal of President Morsi (Hamzawy 2017, 395). President el-Sisi’s experience at the centre of Egypt’s security institutions demonstrate the hallmarks of and “old” authoritarian leader, and helps explain the kinds of expertise needed for “new” authoritarian regimes to survive and adapt to more nuanced security developments.

Other security institutions such as the Central Security Forces, the Egyptian National Police, the General Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency will be explored in
more detail in this chapter. With a combined strength of over one million personnel (Chipman 2016, 325), these agencies have wide-ranging security responsibilities and are directed by the Egyptian government to prevent and suppress nearly all forms of anti-government dissent in the name of national security. Their presence represents the institutional “hard” power of President el-Sisi’s domestic security strategies, and reflect both old authoritarian ideas of centrally-directed state security institutions (Huntington 1991, 48) and new authoritarian theories on regime durability in the face of a precarious, multifaceted security environment (Guriev 2015, 26).

*Military Intelligence & Reconnaissance, el-Sisi’s period as director 2010-12*

Officers in Egypt’s Armed Forces have been the source of both national pride for the Egyptian people (Hamzawy 2017, 393), and a recruiting ground for the high offices of the country’s political establishment. President el-Sisi has been both a military officer and now serves as Egypt’s top politician, due in part to his experience as director of one of Egypt’s key security agencies, the Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance Administration. Egypt’s central government has control over several important intelligence and security institutions which have been extensively used to suppress dissent and remove protestors in the name of national security (Luengo-Cabrera 2018, 2). These agencies have been deployed as part of a general strategy posited by theorists of authoritarian learning (Hall 2017, 151), utilizing harsher methods of arrest, imprisonment, and torture as counter-revolutionary measures against all forms of protest (Greene 2016 21). New authoritarian theorists such as Ryan (2001, 36) posit that the intelligence apparatus within states such as Egypt are more critical to the survival of the regime than the military, due to their ability to suppress domestic dissent and sources of anti-government opposition.

President el-Sisi served as director of Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance from 2010 (Cook 2016, 115) until his appointment as Minister of Defence in 2012 (Cook 2016, 116). His appointment made him the youngest member of the influential Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and his repressive tactics as President against protestors and perceived security threats reflect his experience leading two of Egypt’s national security institutions.
Other intelligence agencies

Several other intelligence agencies are active in Egypt and provide critical support to President el-Sisi’s regime in his effort to dispel anti-government protestors (Hellyer 2018, 2), removing what has been more broadly defined as security threats against the regime (Roccu 2018, 48), and maintaining overall security. These agencies include the National Security Agency (NSA), the General Intelligence Agency (GIA), and the Central Security Forces (CSF).

Egypt’s Central Security Force (CSF) is a paramilitary police force operating in conjunction with both the National Police and the General Intelligence Directorate (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 439). According to Cherif Bassiouni (2016, 38) the CSF operate as the country’s “riot police” and have been used against protestors and anti-government public assemblies since the Arab Spring. Under the power of the Ministry of Interior, the CSF has engaged against all forms of protestors to prevent riots and secure public safety. However, the CSF’s actions during protests have escalated to violence and human rights abuses against protestors, leading to claims about their suitability and accountability in the aftermath of protests (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 438).

As was previously mentioned, the National Police are another main security institution, serving as the front line of domestic security in public. With as many as half a million personnel, the National Police observe a culture of “internal loyalty and solidarity” similar to the military which, according to Cherif Bassiouni (2016, 345), enables them to behave without much regard for public accountability. Their presence at numerous protests and anti-government demonstrations has resulted in the injury, torture, and deaths of hundreds of protestors under the direction of the Interior Ministry and the government. With the protection of the highest officials in the country, the National Police are another branch of the Egyptian security apparatus which operate “with impunity” on behalf of the government who seek stability in public (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 440).

While the CSF and National Police forces confront protestors and suppress dissent on the ground, the General Intelligence Agency (GIA) is another security agency whose chief responsibilities are carried out behind closed doors. General Intelligence used to be tasked with all matters relating to “external national security” (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 250), but now focuses on counter-terrorism and transnational security issues (2016, 411). The evolution of the GIA from an old authoritarian institution with a broad, general remit for intelligence gathering into a
more focused operation for counter-terrorism strategies reflects the adaptability of security structures, as new authoritarian theorists such as Aras (2015, 327) and Ryan (2001, 31) have pointed to for regimes to survive.

The Egyptian National Security Agency (NSA) was formed in 2011 as a replacement to the State Security Investigations Service (Taha 2015, 181). Under the authority of the Interior Ministry, the NSA employs as many as 200,000 personnel responsible for internal security, border protection, counter-intelligence, and more broadly the detection of potential security threats both internally and overseas (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 286). While the Ministry of Interior officially oversees the NSA’s operations, Egypt’s Security Council is mandated to adopt strategies against potential security risks with a broad remit over all sectors of the country (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 251). The National Security Council comprises the President of Egypt, along with several other key administrators including the Defence Minister and the chief of General Intelligence (Cherif Bassiouni 2016, 286).

Tactics by Sisi, military campaigns against terrorists

Classical authoritarian theorists often cite local or national police forces as among the first Central police and security services have continually engaged against protestors since President Morsi’s removal in July 2013 (Hamzawy 2017, 394). These skirmishes with pro-Islamist, secular, and other various anti-government groups have led to criticism of the police neglecting their duty to protect civilians, and instead being viewed as the frontline force of the el-Sisi regime (Roccu 2018, 46). Egypt’s Central Police Force (CPF) has been repeatedly cited by human rights groups and citizens for their personnel’s brutal and excessive use of force against protestors and anti-government activists (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 296). Under the authority and support of the central government, the CPF carry out their actions with relative impunity, and have been regarded as one of several personal networks of el-Sisi’s regime in his campaign to remove any opposition to his government.

At the same time, President el-Sisi has faced growing security challenges from militant Islamists and terrorist groups such as Islamic State. Attacks and bombings in the Sinai Peninsula in October 2014 (Mohamed 2014) prompted President el-Sisi to reinstate the Emergency Law 136 (Hamzawy 2016, 3) which has kept Egypt under a state of emergency for most of the last three decades (Gat 2018, 203). This heightened security environment has been used to justify el-
Sisi’s brutal tactics against his people, many of whom are now in fear for their own lives and freedom should they protest in public (Cook 2016, 118).

The rise of international, cross-border terrorism presents new challenges for governments around the Middle East and Europe, and President el-Sisi’s cooperation with international allies has led to a broader securitization of Egypt’s public sphere (Hellyer 2018, 3). While pacifying the Middle East and the southern European border region has been a priority for the EU, security cooperation has come at the cost of the ENP’s objectives to improve human rights and civil society openness in Egypt (Kaunert 2011, 303). As long as threats remain to Egypt’s national security, the el-Sisi regime will be emboldened to combat all forms of what it perceives to be security threats either on their borders or domestically. It appears, therefore, that the securitization needs of the EU and their desire for regional cooperation can lead to further repression of ordinary Egyptian citizens.

*How Old and New Authoritarian theories hybridize through institutional structures*

New Authoritarian theorists like Krastev (2011, 8) and Ryan (2001, 26) describe the importance of security services as tools to remove anti-government protestors and reformist organisations as part of a general strategy to eliminate many forms of opposition with which regimes are confronted. With many personnel, numbering over 1.1 million across all security forces, it is apparent that an extensive security state operates within Egypt as a general tactic of regime survival domestically and to maintain stability in the Middle East. Theorists of old authoritarian strategies like Huntington (1991, 270) and Kienle (2000, 117) view Egypt’s consolidation of power, through the extensive use of security forces to suppress opposition and exercising authority through unaccountable institutions, as part of its difficult transition to democracy. While the transition to democracy remains unfulfilled, new authoritarians such as King (2009, 120-124) observe the gradual opening of the Egyptian economy through business elites loyal to the regime and the simultaneous repression against anti-government protestors creates a new asymmetrical security state in Egypt. These developments reflect an institutional transition toward what King (2009, 88) refers to as “an uncertain ‘something-else’” in which Egypt’s regime has casted off its old functions of mass repression, politically-sanctioned murders, and martial law to preserve national security. Egypt has instead transitioned into a scenario in which the regime’s security institutions operate more strategically against sources of
opposition and with more regard for international scrutiny, as much of what the regime does to its people is observed by the international community.

**Regime Resilience as one answer to el-Sisi survival**

With the ability to control the Egyptian security services, and with his several years’ experience directing military intelligence and defence before becoming President, it appears el-Sisi has utilized the existing state institutions to his advantage and to maintain power in a fraught security environment. The decades-long history of the military establishment in Egypt has engendered loyalty in the minds of some Egyptians, who see the armed forces as a source of stability, continuity, and national pride, despite the apparent lack of democratic accountability (Aziz 2016). This represents an element of what Perkins (2010) and others, such as Heydemann (2011), refer to as authoritarian learning. Such a theory is characterised by authoritarian regimes engaging in counter-revolutionary strategies through more sophisticated methods of repressing dissent, expanding the use of security services against protestors, and aiding the domestic police with counter-revolutionary security forces. At the same time, the regime utilizes the military to act as a non-ideological functionary of the state against, according to the government, to be the twin threats to national stability from the ideological “left” and “right”, in the form of anti-government reformists and anti-regime Islamists.

This escalation in the use of military and security forces, where once the police and paramilitary security personnel used to operate, reflects President el-Sisi’s reliance on old methods of authoritarian rule to adapt to the new security and political environments within Egypt.
Chapter 4: Manipulation of the Legal, Parliamentary, and Justice Systems

Legal, parliamentary, and justice systems as part of el-Sisi’s general strategy

If the extensive influence of Egypt’s security infrastructure can be regarded as the hidden sector of President el-Sisi’s regime, then the manipulation of Egypt’s legal institutions may be the visible, public face of el-Sisi’s ability to wield power. This chapter focuses on the ways in which President el-Sisi has overridden the impartiality of Egypt’s legal and justice systems through the exercise of presidential decrees to control public activity and repress anti-government dissent (Sadek 2014). These old authoritarian tactics were used by his predecessors, such as Presidents Sadat and Mubarak from the 1970s to 1990s (Kienle 2000, 32), to consolidate their power and change the direction of Egypt’s regime. This chapter will also focus on the electoral system in Egypt, which has faced accusations of manipulated and controlled elections through intimidating opposition candidates, and electing technocrats and business elites to Parliament who are loyal to President el-Sisi, thereby reducing political competition (Sadowski 2017, 175). These political developments reflect new authoritarian tactics mentioned in previous chapters, and illustrate a trend toward hybridization of old and new authoritarian practices by el-Sisi and his regime’s supporters.

The use of a country’s legal system to advantage a regime is not new in authoritarian history, and in the case of Egypt has characterised the era of President el-Sisi by relying upon Presidential decrees (Jamal 2016, 201), the use of military tribunals in civil courts (Aziz 2016), and controlling Parliament with a majority of members personally loyal to the regime (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 134). These can be seen as legitimizing tactics for maintaining el-Sisi’s authority during a critical stabilization period in Egypt. Enhanced securitization in the wake of the Arab Spring and the overthrow of President Morsi’s administration in July 2013 has led to President el-Sisi’s increased use of presidential decrees to keep Egypt under a state of emergency, arrest and imprison anti-government protestors under a widened catchment of legal offences, and broadened the definition of what constitute threats to national security (Hecan 2016, 791). Along with these sweeping changes, President el-Sisi passed wide-ranging laws which allow extensive monitoring or outright disbandment of charities, liberal groups, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) suspected of being supported or funded by foreign sources as tactics to remove opposition to his regime (Benhamou 2017, 121).
These extensive uses and abuses of the Egyptian legal system through presidential decrees and unchecked institutional powers represent an element of old authoritarianism in which undemocratic leaders manipulate existing laws or create new legislation to remove political opponents and enforce the peace on their own terms (Kassem 2004, 21). At the same time President el-Sisi’s leadership methods reflect a part of new authoritarianism in which regimes behave less severely than in the past to maintain a sense of legitimacy (King 2009, 108). Historically, leaders resorted to using extrajudicial killings, assassination of opponents, official executions of prisoners, and other repressive tactics to assert their power and prevent dissent as ways to consolidate power and instill fear in potential opponents (Huntington and Moore 1970, 113).

*Background leading up to Arab Spring*

The use of military tribunals in civil courts has been undertaken by Egyptian governments as long ago as 1966, attempting to stabilize the authority of the government against opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and anti-military reformists such as followers of the New Wafd Party from the 1980s (King 2009, 93). Presidential decrees have been used by Presidents since the 1960s to either supplement or even override the authority of the Egyptian justice system, whose authority is constitutionally independent of the government (Kassem 2004, 89). Successive Egyptian presidents, from Sadat to el-Sisi, have benefitted from this exercise in making selective legal declarations to advantage their regime and to cement their authority whenever potential opponents arise or if they feel their position is under threat, which are typical strategies according to Huntington (1991, 164).

While the Egyptian judiciary has been officially independent of government influence since the constitution of 1923, there have been repeated infractions by el-Sisi to circumvent the authority of the courts as he strives to remove sources of opposition to his government (Aziz 2016). This represents the latest breach of legal norms in a long history of Egypt’s presidents acting of their own accord to consolidate power (Kienle 2000; 124, 178). The absence of a long, uninterrupted tradition of the rule of law presents a further obstacle to Egypt’s democratic transition.
Presidential, Emergency, and anti-NGO Laws in effect under el-Sisi

Several presidential decrees and legislative regulations are critical to examining the growth of government and military influence in Egypt’s legal and justice systems since President el-Sisi came to power. For example, Law 136 passed in 2014 allowed the military and security services to protect “vital public services” and facilities (Aziz 2016), defined broadly as any establishment, public works, or public spaces near these facilities. These measures brought a number of protest grounds and public buildings used by protestors under military authority, and made anti-government demonstrators liable to prosecution. This has led to an increased number of civilian protestors being brought to trial under military courts, and President el-Sisi’s government have justified these measures as protecting against national security. The manipulation of the legal system to widen the definition of national security threats which target civilians is an example of old authoritarian tactics to quell dissent.

Another controversial legal manoeuvre by President el-Sisi, receiving much international attention at the time, was Law 70 of 2017 (Sadowski 2017, 177) which prevented NGO’s and other civil society organisations from receiving international funding, support, and protesting the regime (Hamzawy 2016, 4). This led to the closure or enhanced scrutiny of many NGOs, charities, and liberal groups as a way for el-Sisi’s regime to monitor opposition activities, and to dismantle organisations potentially threatening protest or anti-government dissent (Kouddous 2015, 21). Such a crackdown on civil society organisations runs counter to the expectations of Egypt’s obligations to its international benefactors, and reflects a new strategic manoeuvre on the part of el-Sisi to cement his authority in the interests of national security.

Military tribunals in Civil Courts

The ability for President el-Sisi’s government to override the independence of the justice system and courts represents an old authoritarian tactic to exercise the regime’s authority through official institutions, while at the same time appearing to respect the independence of the legal and justice systems. The passage of Law 136 in 2014 was a presidential decree expanding the securitization of public facilities (Hamzawy 2017, 403). This decree necessitated the protection of public facilities and broadened the definition of security threats, which in turn gave wider authority to the military by aiding the police forces against protestors and anti-government activists (Aziz 2016). This move under Law 136 brought those arrested for violating public
protection orders under the authority of military, instead of civil, courts (Hamzawy 2017, 403). Law 136 renewed the ability of the government to impose martial law on the court system, a strategy which had been used at various times by previous Egyptian presidents since 1966 (Kienle 2000, 41). This old authoritarian trait to impose government control over legal matters, while appearing to remain impartial on the surface, President el-Sisi used Law 136 and its expansive remit to prosecute protestors accused of threatening public facilities during protests. These actions have helped cultivate fear among Egyptians who dare not protest should they be arrested and subject to harsh imprisonment.

Sadek observes that Law 136 of 2014 is potentially in violation of the Egyptian constitution, in which article 204 prohibits the trial of civilians by military tribunals unless for crimes against public or military facilities (Sadek 2014). By extending the definition of public facilities under military supervision, President el-Sisi has widened the chances by which anti-government activists and protestors can be arrested, tried, and imprisoned by the military courts (Law 136 2014, 3). Hamzawy (2016, 2) argues that Law 136 “legalizes authoritarianism” in Egypt, and is extremely critical of the actions taken by el-Sisi’s government to deprive citizens of their civil liberties and legal rights in the name of national security. From a similar standpoint, Aziz (2016, 4) observes that the growing presence of the military in the legal system, prosecuting tens of thousands of Egyptian protestors and subverting their due process rights, has the potential to cause further escalations in violence and civil disobedience as the rule of law gives way to the “whims of military politics”.

These instances of manipulation of the legal system, and the undermining of the judiciary in favour of the military establishment, reflects the capacity for el-Sisi’s regime to bend the laws of the country for political or strategic expedience. His actions reflect the slower-moving coup of power consolidation undertaken by President Mubarak in the 1990s, which ultimately set in place the unwieldy influence of the military establishment in nearly every public institution in Egypt (Kienle 2000, 184).

Parliament under el-Sisi’s direction

Egypt’s parliament currently consists of 596 members elected in 2015 from a wide range of political ideologies and factions (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 231). More importantly, however, are the 350 or so members who belong to no political party and are instead pro-regime business
elites and legislators loyal to President el-Sisi (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 188). These independent members, who were largely elected unopposed in the most recent elections, represent the domestic economic base of financial and business interests el-Sisi relies upon for political support and the pretense of electoral legitimacy (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 193). The parliamentary elections of October 2015 were held under manipulated and controversial circumstances (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 221) and has led to an in-built pro-government majority comprising obedient lawmakers whose interests seldom involve scrutinizing President el-Sisi’s regime.

The effect of these parliamentary and legislative manoeuvres by the el-Sisi government harkens back to older authoritarian methods of governing, in which Egyptian and other countries’ dictators filled parliamentary assemblies with technocrats and supportive elites (Huntington 1991, 178). At the same time, when this strategy was used by el-Sisi to control the outcome of the 2015 parliamentary elections, it was his way of presenting to the international community the pretense of fair elections and democratic institutions. While the token appearance of parliamentary elections served to help el-Sisi’s legitimacy, parliament’s ability to scrutinize the government is severely hampered by the presence of a majority of members supporting the regime.

Authoritarian learning

As part of the counter-revolutionary backlash against protestors and anti-government activists, President el-Sisi’s strategy of using the legal system to advantage his regime to adapt against newer anti-government movements which emerged during the Arab Spring reflects theories on the durability of regimes, illustrated by Perkins (2010) and Heydemann (2011). While old authoritarian regimes such as in Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen were overthrown by popular protests, Egypt’s underwent a brief separation from the control of the military establishment after the resignation of President Mubarak. Due to the unpopularity and perceived extremism of President Morsi’s government, he and his Muslim Brotherhood supporters were overthrown in July 2013 (Hamzawy 2017, 392). Instead of holding new elections or replacing the government with a new coalition, the military returned under the auspices of stabilizing Egypt (Hellyer 2018, 4). The degree of division and instability among the political class and the people caused a multifaceted protest movement to form (Hamzawy 2016, 3). Liberals, reformists, and secularists were joined by the Islamist activists recently removed from power,
creating a broad coalition of groups facing suppression from the military-backed provisional government (Hamzawy 2017, 395).

Before assuming the presidency in June 2014, General el-Sisi had served as Minister of Defence, and formed the provisional government tasked with drafting a new constitution and holding fresh elections. This strategy was seen both as a renewal of government legitimacy and a stealth return to the old order led by the military establishment (Ouf 2018). By positioning themselves as alternatives to President Morsi’s Islamist government, and as guarantors of Egypt’s freedoms and political traditions, the military under President el-Sisi and his generals were viewed even by anti-military liberals and reformists as an appropriate alternative government with the people’s interests in mind. However, the new regime under President el-Sisi embarked upon a more systemic crackdown against dissenters to protect national security (Roccu 2018, 44). Through the legal system and a more powerful arrangement of presidential powers, el-Sisi has consolidated control at an observably faster rate, and using harsher tactics against protestors, than Mubarak during the 1980s (Kienle 2000, 98).

*Regime resilience from Mubarak era, continued under el-Sisi*

Human rights and Egyptian’s civil liberties appear to have continually been violated by the el-Sisi regime’s manipulation of the legal system, parliamentary political institutions, and justice procedures to date. President el-Sisi’s extensive use of presidential decrees have grown, enabling the military to usurp the authority of the courts in civil litigation against anyone arrested for anti-government activism or street protests (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 178). High incidences of arrests and crackdowns on civil society organisation has created a culture of fear against anyone considering protesting or expressing their disapproval of the regime (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 397). President el-Sisi’s use of the country’s legal and justice institutions to suppress anti-government dissent reflects strategies which Perkins (2010) refers to in her work on regime resilience. Her explanation of

Using Heydemann’s (2011) observations on authoritarian learning, it appears President el-Sisi’s regime is adapting to the post-Arab Spring security environment to suppress dissent in a more severe and holistic way. The negative implications against the regime are clear under normal circumstances, but the last seven years following the Arab Spring have witnessed the removal of President Morsi, and the return of the military-backed regime under el-Sisi,
characterizing Egypt’s recent past with instability and upheaval. Under international law, countries supporting Egypt with economic aid would be obliged to impose sanctions against regimes like President el-Sisi’s until his government improves its domestic situation. However, bringing an end to repeated human rights abuses is not a tenable position given the current security environment. The strategic importance of Egypt as a pro-Western Arab World country combatting terrorism and extremism appears to have taken priority over domestic human rights and civil society considerations.
Chapter 5: Economic Aid Arrangements Maintaining el-Sisi in Power

Economic and Development Aid

Apart from control of the internal security and military services, as well as manipulating the country’s electoral institutions and legal system, President el-Sisi also utilizes significant sources of international economic aid to help maintain his hold on power. Ongoing funding from the United States since 1979 has enabled Egyptian regimes to hold power, in which successive presidents have exerted their will over domestic affairs while providing strategic cooperation with the U.S. for its regional Middle Eastern policy (Black 2018, 24).

As was examined in Chapters 3 and 4, the size and strength of Egypt’s security and military apparatuses can be attributed to the extensive economic aid funding Egypt’s government has received over many years. Funding has enabled the Egyptian regime to grow its security forces and military personnel through both the country’s Armed Forces and several security and intelligence agencies, resulting in over one million active personnel controlled by el-Sisi’s government to defend against many sources of opposition and anti-government protests (Hecan 2016, 788). Economic aid from the U.S. has been $1.5 billion per year on average since 2011, and as a consequence Egypt has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid after Israel (Cherif Bassiouni 2017, 158).

Economic data and performance since 2014

Egypt’s economy is classified as a “lower middle income” country by the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Development Policy and Analysis 2014, 148). The larger sectors of the economy rely on oil and petroleum exports, services, agriculture, tourism, and luxury goods, along with a smaller manufacturing sector (Figure 6.1). In terms of potential economic growth and future investment, Egypt’s economy has been referred to as one of the “next eleven countries” who are projected to develop at higher than average rates between now and 2025 (O’Neill 2005, 5). Countries such as Iran, Turkey, and South Korea have already attained levels of development approaching this higher status, and Egypt is projected to achieve similar levels through economic reforms and foreign direct investment over the coming decades (O’Neill 2005, 7). These measures take into account potential for both public and private foreign direct investment (FDI) and the relative openness of the country’s economy, which President el-
Fig. 6.1 ‘What did Egypt Export in 2016?’ Harvard Center for International Development (2017)

Figure 6.2: ‘What did Egypt Export in 2014?’ Harvard Center for International Development (2017)
Sisi has sought to continue cultivating in order to increase prosperity for Egyptians, and to maintain stability and political legitimacy (Kandil 2016, 12). Egypt is also currently the recipient of large development grants from the IMF (Beblawi 2018). These financial grants are used to encourage economic reforms of Egypt’s domestic markets, striving to cut subsidies and allow the economy to grow. With the ultimate goal of wider prosperity among Egyptians, challenges remain in the country’s general economic structures, and in centres of power where outsized economic control is wielded by those close to the regime (Hecan 2016, 771).

*International aid from United States & European Union*

Since 1979 Egypt has been the recipient of significant economic aid amounting to billions of dollars from the US (Sowa 2013, 2), as well as both bilateral and regional aid contributions from France, Germany, and the European Union collectively (Bruno 2016, 28). President el-Sisi has used this funding to enhance his country’s security capacity, investing in the armed forces and security services to.

Economic aid from the United States can be seen in Figure 6.3 (Sowa 2013, 3), and has been considerably increased from 1979 in the wake of the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (Gat 2018, 224). Economic aid has been granted on the conditions of securing military and other related strategic cooperation between Egypt and the United States, as well as maintaining peace with Israel.

![Fig. 6.3: Economic aid to Egypt since 1946 (Congressional Research Service 2012).](image)

In addition to economic support from the U.S. the European Union has provided economic aid through the auspices of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This EU initiative
has been cultivated to foster better relations with Europe’s neighbouring states who face little chance of becoming members of the EU themselves. By accepting the rules of ENP membership, such as promoting civil liberties, greater political rights for citizens, domestic economic reforms

The EU in this instance functions as an economic, strategic, and regional corollary to the US’ global influence (Bruno 2016, 91). Both the US and EU have shared security interests, and their cooperation with Egypt has been critical to the continuation of the West’s counter-terrorism strategy in the Middle East (Jamal 2016, 196). The growth of the EU as a regional and global economic and security power, with its broad capacity for international aid funding to country’s like Egypt, has taken place in the wider context of economic globalization (Sowa 2013, 4). This has mirrored the more contemporary development of new authoritarian theory, by which authors such as Heydemann (2011, 13) and Krastev (2011, 9) ground their observations of authoritarian leaders’ actions with the new reality of open borders, global economic connectivity, and exposure to mass media and the scrutiny of international public opinion. As Krastev refers to this “paradox” of authoritarian rulers, leaders such as President el-Sisi are cognizant of the fact that their actions are reported around the world, yet despite repeated condemnation from international observers, his regime persists in its long and brutal security campaign.

Aid from Gulf states, implications on security priority over civil rights

Following the Arab Spring and the return of military rule to Egypt in 2014, the powerful and rich Gulf monarchies have contributed substantial financial and economic aid to Egypt (Sowa 2013, 6). As much as €16 billion has been granted to Egypt by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to help Egypt in its fight against terrorism (Heineman 2014, 4). Given that aid from the Gulf states is granted with few, if any, conditions toward human rights improvements and civil society reforms (Sowa 2013, 7), as has been the stipulation with Western aid, it is apparent that the expectations for human rights reforms in Egypt will be overtaken by security considerations to the advantage President el-Sisi’s regime. The government’s attempts to securitize Egyptian society by trading off civil liberties and reducing protests for increased security cooperation has enabled el-Sisi’s security apparatus to broaden the definition of what constitutes a threat to national security and public safety (Roccu 2018, 55).

Although the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been in operation since 1981, the Gulf states have established a regional status and global wealth which enables the organisation to
aid its neighbours, including Egypt. Their shared security interests against Islamist terrorism and a resurgent Iran enable the Gulf states to fund Egypt for its own stability and national security agenda (Sowa 2013, 6). This regional cooperation and reliance of Egypt upon the GCC represents another new authoritarian manifestation in which the traditionally powerful Western countries, such as the U.S. and E.U., are not solely responsible for international economic aid to a Middle Eastern state.

Regime resilience aided by international support for security

Guriev and Treisman (2015) view the ability of el-Sisi’s regime to survive based on the international economic and security links Egypt shares with Western countries. While the US and EU request conditionality for Egypt to put in place economic reforms and human rights improvements in exchange for security cooperation and access to European markets, the security environment is of a higher priority for both Egypt and the West (Sowa 2013, 7). There are negative implications for the Egyptian regime by not adhering to the terms and conditions that come with international aid. By not fulfilling their human rights and civic reforms as expected by the United States and the European Union, President el-Sisi’s government faces criticism from the international community. The Egyptian regime has already been scrutinized and observed by human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch, the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and Amnesty International (Hellyer 2018, 3), which have uncovered repeated suppression of protestors (Hamzawy 2017, 399), unfair legal trials against thousands of anti-government activists (Abu Zeid 2017, 166), and continued favouritism toward loyal elites in business and economic projects (Luengo-Cabrera 2018, 2).

The theory of regime resilience occurs in this instance, whereby pre-existing political and economic arrangements crafted during the Mubarak era from the 1990s to the Arab Spring in 2011 (Perkins 2010, 41), were reinstated after el-Sisi assumed the presidency (Armbrust 2017, 228). Given the strength of Egypt’s security institutions to weather the tumults of the last seven years, along with its continuous funding by the central government through economic aid grants, it would appear that old authoritarian structures remain an important feature in the resilience and durability of regimes such as President el-Sisi’s.
Chapter 6: Discussion & Conclusion

Discussion

A variety of institutions and strategies have been examined in the course of this thesis. The el-Sisi regime has exhibited both classical and newer forms of authoritarian tactics to ensure the stability of both their government in power and of Egypt as a whole during the post-Arab Spring period.

Security: Theorists of old authoritarian strategies like Huntington (1991, 270) and Kienle (2000, 117) view Egypt’s consolidation of power, through the extensive use of security forces to suppress opposition and exercising authority through unaccountable institutions, as part of its difficult transition to democracy. While the transition to democracy remains unfulfilled, new authoritarians such as King (2009, 120-124) observe the gradual opening of the Egyptian economy through business elites loyal to the regime and the simultaneous repression against anti-government protestors creates a new asymmetrical security state in Egypt. These developments reflect an institutional transition toward what King (2009, 88) refers to as “an uncertain ‘something-else’” in which Egypt’s regime has casted off its old functions of mass repression, politically-sanctioned murders, and martial law to preserve national security. Egypt has instead transitioned into a scenario in which the regime’s security institutions operate more strategically against sources of opposition and with more regard for international scrutiny, as much of what the regime does to its people is observed by the international community.

New Authoritarian theorists such as Krastev (2011, 8) and Ryan (2001, 26) describe the importance of security services as tools to remove anti-government protestors and reformist organisations as part of a general strategy to eliminate many forms of opposition with which regimes are confronted. With an enormous number of personnel, numbering over 1.1 million across all security forces, it is apparent that an extensive security state operates within Egypt as a general tactic of regime survival domestically and to maintain stability in the Middle East.

The combination of both these theories is a testament to the adaptability of the old, military-led authoritarian regime predating the Arab Spring, as well as the manifestation of new strategies which increase the presence and power of Egypt’s security services, to face the changing security threats and developments of the day. While this is advantageous to President el-Sisi, the overt securitization of the country has fostered a culture of fear in the minds of citizens, who now fear taking part in even the smallest form of protest should they be arrested.
Legal & Political: By manipulating the Egyptian legal and justice systems, and tightly controlling the parliamentary establishment, President el-Sisi has pursued old authoritarian tactics of enhancing his presidential authority to undermine the supposedly independent judiciary, expanding the presence of the military in the prosecution of protestors and non-governmental organisations, and cultivating coalitions of business elites placed in parliament under the auspices of democratic elections (Cherif Bassiouni 2017; 187, 231, 409, 448). Meanwhile, el-Sisi has engaged in a more expansive use of presidential decrees and proclamations which undermine the established legal system, challenging the independence of the judiciary, and imposing the President’s own will over established legal norms to quell dissent against his regime. This strategy is controversial to say the least, as it hinders the rule of law, affecting thousands of civilians whose protests result in unfair trials and lengthy prison terms.

These manoeuvres by President el-Sisi and his government illustrate in part the hybridization of new and old authoritarian theories. Authors such as Huntington and Moore (1970, 126) argue the presence of a one-party political system or authoritarian regime, the efficacy of a political check against the government is virtually untenable, as regime coalitions maintain power through coercion and controlled elections. In contemporary times, these political strategies by el-Sisi in Egypt reflect a new authoritarian ploy (Guriev 2015, 23). Having adopted the semblance of multi-party parliamentary elections, the 2015 plebiscite was only a cosmetic visage to the reality of controlling the legislature by different means (Ryzova 2017, 513). While a majority of Egyptian parliamentarians are apolitical business and financial elites supportive of the regime, Egypt’s elected officials are hindered by their lack of ability to scrutinize or oppose actions taken by the el-Sisi regime. This development is also discouraging for democratic transition, and confirms the strength of the el-Sisi regime to wield its own power independent of other political institutions.

Economic: As the el-Sisi regime continues to benefit from wide and significant sources of economic aid, the government continues to pursue its economic reform agenda through investment in large public infrastructure projects, while at the same time domestic welfare subsidies and relief for the poor remains steady or slightly lower (Beblawi 2018, 4). Positive economic implications can be seen in the decreasing unemployment rate, which peaked at 12.8 per cent in 2015 and now sits at 10.6 per cent (Trading Economics 2018). Egypt’s cooperation
with the IMF to secure further funding for domestic infrastructural and security expenditure reflects

While there are negative implications for the Egyptian regime by not adhering to the terms and conditions that come with international aid. By not fulfilling their human rights and civic reforms as expected by the United States and the European Union, President el-Sisi’s government faces criticism from the international community. However, the regime’s pursuit of securitization in the face of terrorist threats and pacifying the Middle East weighs positively with the US, EU, and GCC who supports Egypt financially (Heineman 2014, 3). The Egyptian regime has already been scrutinized and observed by human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch, the UN High Commission for Human Rights, and Amnesty International (Hellyer 2018, 2), which have uncovered repeated suppression of protestors (Hamzawy 2017, 399), unfair legal trials against thousands of anti-government activists (Abu Zeid 2017, 166), and continued favouritism toward loyal elites in business and economic projects (Luengo-Cabrera 2018, 2).

The findings in this discussion showed the extent to which President el-Sisi’s use of the security, intelligence, and legal systems reflected the old authoritarian tactics utilized by his predecessors to maintain power. The data and secondary source materials also show how the el-Sisi regime’s uses parliamentary control, economic practices, and international aid institutions in line with the new authoritarian theorists, in which regimes strive to hold power while participating in a globalized, more deeply connected world system. The concluding chapter will include institutional implications, research limitations, and areas for scholars to explore in similar fields.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the extent to which classical and newer forms of authoritarianism have hybridized under President el-Sisi’s regime in Egypt. The durability of the regime has been observed under numerous conditions as el-Sisi’s government begins its second term in office. Does the increase in international aid given to Egypt from the West and Middle Eastern allies enable President el-Sisi’s ability to suppress dissent through military law? Do Western allies, such as the United States and the European Union, need to reconsider their part in continuing economic aid to Egypt on the condition of expanding human rights and democratic reforms which the el-Sisi regime willfully neglects to deliver? It has been
shown that President el-Sisi’s tactics both in terms of his domestic security strategy, use of the country’s legal and political systems, and his selective commitments to international economic obligations have emphasized stability and security at the expense of civil rights, free speech, and restraining the participation of opposition groups. However, as some scholars and observers attribute these policies to the new authoritarianism taking shape in the Middle East and other regions, the resilience of Egypt’s regime is owed in part to structures and institutions put in place by former Presidents Sadat and Mubarak during their periods of rule from 1970 to 2011.

The regime’s consolidation of institutional power, opening sectors of the economy to favoured private enterprises, and maintenance of the military establishment’s influence reflect older methods of authoritarian rule. At the same time, new authoritarian tactics used by the el-Sisi regime include gradual steps toward democratic transition through constitutional reform with shorter presidential terms and more active political parties; carrying out mass arrests and coercing political opponents in lieu of outright suppression and execution of government critics; and fulfilling Western international security obligations over domestic human rights and civil society reforms.

Future scholarship on the hybridization of old and new authoritarianism theories can be explored as both time passes and regimes themselves evolve. In the years since the Arab Spring and the return of Egypt’s military leaders to the presidency, it would appear that the hybridization of classical and new authoritarianism in Egypt is a recent political phenomenon, evolving throughout the developing world. The implications of the growth in old and new attributes of authoritarianism has the potential to be replicated in other countries of the Middle East, or in any developing country where the likelihood of democratic transition is low, and where democracy and the rule of law experience either an uncertain evolution or a precarious future.
References


