MATERIALS TOWARD THE STUDY OF
VASUBANDHU’S VIṂŚIKĀ (I)

Sanskrit and Tibetan Critical Editions
of the Verses and Autocommentary,
An English Translation and Annotations

by
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Preface to the 2018 Open Access Edition

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Immediately upon the publication of the printed version of this book, I became aware, thanks to the very great kindness of two colleagues from Budapest, Ferenc Ruzsa and Mónika Szegedi, of the existence of a very important Dunhuang manuscript, Pelliot tibétain 797. Its readings are on the whole better than those preserved in the Tanjurs I used for the present edition. Had I known of this manuscript, I would certainly have printed many of its readings. I have not revised the edition, however, since I subsequently published Pelliot tibétain 797 as “Materials Toward the Study of Vasubandhu’s Vīśīkā (II): An edition of the Dunhuang Manuscript Pelliot tibétain 797”, Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, 39, April 2017, pp. 342–360. Interested readers are directed to this (also Open Access) publication, which is presently located at http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/ret/pdf/ret_39_07.pdf. Although I have not incorporated the new data of Pelliot tibétain 797 in the present edition, in the course of preparing that material, aside from noticing different (and usually better) readings, I detected several errors in the printed edition. Those errors, noted both in an errata sheet distributed with the edition and in the article cited above, are in the present edition corrected tacitly. For the rest, however, the Tibetan edition remains the same.

The main differences between the present edition and Pelliot tibétain 797 (below PT) are as follows:

3d: klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin || ] PT 797: klung la rnag la sogs mthong phyir ||
4d: de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro || ] PT 797: de dagis kyang gnod phyir ro ||
IV J: dngos po la sms can dmyal ba’i srungs ma | PT 797: sms can dmyal ba’i srungs ma = Skt.
IV K: de bzhin du gzhan yang | PT 797: de bzhin du gzhan du yang
IV P: ji lta bur | PT 797: de lta bur = Skt.
6c: de bzhin 'gyur bar 'dug na go || PT 797: de bzhin 'gyur ba 'ang 'dod na go || = Skt.
VI D: de'i las rnams kyis der || PT 797: de'i las rnams kyïs = Skt.
VI F: no equivalent in Tanjurs || PT 797: yang || = Skt. api ca.
VII A: gzhan ma yin na || PT 797: gzhan na ma yïn na = Skt. nänyatra
VIII B: sems can bzhin yod do || PT 797: sems can yod do = Skt.
IX E: bye brag tu gyur pa'i sa bon gang las byung || PT 797: bye brag tu gyur pa gang las 'byung = Skt.
10a: de ltar gang lag la bdag med par || PT 797: de ltar gang zag bdag myed par; Tanjur text is unmetrical!
10c: bstan pa'i chos la bdag med par || PT 797: bstan pas chos la bdag myed par
X D: rig pa tsam || PT 797: rig pa tsam nyid
X L: sangs rgyas kyi yul || PT 797: sangs rgyas rnams kyï yul = Skt. buddhänäm
X M: chos thams cad la chos la bdag med par || PT 797: chos thams cad la bdag myed par (la chos erased) = Skt.
XI D: rnam par rig pa || PT 797: rnam par rig pa rna.ms = Skt.
XI D: ji ltar || PT 797: dper na
12c: drug po dag kyang go gcig na || PT 797: drug po dag gi go gcig na || = Skt.
XII I: don gzhan rnams ma yin || PT 797: don gzhan ma yïn = Skt.
13b: de 'dus yod pa de gang gis || PT 797: de 'dus yod pa de gang gi || = Skt.
13d: de sbyor mi 'grub ma zer cïg || PT 797: de'ï sbyor myi 'grub ma zer chïg || = Skt.
XIII C: de bas || PT 797: de lta bas na
14c: grib dang sgrïb par ji ltar 'gyur || PT 797: grib dang sgrïb pa ji ltar 'gyur || = Skt.
XIV E: gang du 'ong ba'i phyogs la || PT 797: gang du 'ong ba'ï phyïr = Skt.
XIV G: ci gong bu'i yin pa de ltar yang || PT 797: gong bu'ï yin pa de ltar
XIV I: text as emended: smras pa ma yïn no || PT 797: smras pa ma yïn no || = Skt.
XV B: text as emended: du ma'ï nyes pa || PT 797: du ma'i nyes pa = Skt.
XV J: de dag gcig tu || PT 797: de gcïg tu = Skt.
XVI B: snyam pa blo || PT 797: snyam ba'i blo; better than Tanjur version
XVI D: gang gi tshe yul 'di nyid ni || PT 797: gang gi tshe 'di ni
XVII A: rnam par shes pa || PT 797: rnam par shes pas = Skt.
XVII D: myong ba ni || PT 797: myong ba'ï = Skt.
XVII H: ma log pa'i tshe na yang || PT 797: ma log pa na yang
XVIII B: dge ba'i bshes gnyen la brten pa || PT 797: dge ba'ï bshes gnyen la bsnyen pa
XVIII B: sems can rnams kyïs || PT 797: sems can rnams kyï = Skt.
XVIII H: don yod pa ni ma yïn no || PT 797: don yod pa ni rgyu ma yïn no
XIX C: 'byung po'i gdon phab par || PT 797: 'byung po'i gdon phab par; better reading
XIX G: sems can gzhan gyi srog || PT 797: gzhan gyï srog = Skt. pareśām
XX B: text as emended: des skal ba || PT 797: des skal ba = Skt.
XXE: bka' stsal pa || PT 797: rmas pa = Skt.
XX C: zhes smras pa || PT 797: shes rmas pa
XX E: drang srong rnams kyïs || PT 797: drang srong rna.ms kyï = Skt. rśīṇāṁ
XXII A: rnam par rig pa tsam gyis || PT 797: rnam par rig pa tsam gyï; better reading
XXII B: rtog ge'i spyod yul || PT 797: rtog ge' yul
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(I)

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Jonathan A. Silk
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In 1912 Louis de La Vallée Poussin published an edition of the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśīkā and its autocommentary (on the title, see below), accompanied by an annotated French translation, deeply informed by his profound learning. In 1925, thanks to a discovery in Nepal, Sylvain Lévi was able to publish the Sanskrit of the same text (1925a), which he followed with a French translation (1932). Lévi, however, was constrained to work primarily with a hand-copy, and a number of textual problems remained. In the decades since, although all based on Lévi’s edition, a number of editions and translations have been published, representing efforts to come to grips with what seems at first glance like a small and simple text. But as many scholars have discovered, while small, it is anything but simple. A great aid toward the further study of the text was made in 1989 by the publication by Mimaki, Tachikawa and Yuyama of (black and white) photographs of the unique palm leaf manuscripts, preserving both the verses and the author’s autocommentary. When I first took up work on these manuscripts, I was not aware of any published studies. In the intervening years, however, at least two have appeared, Balcerowicz and Nowakowska (1999) and Tola and Dragonetti (2004). Unfortunately, neither of these efforts is fully satisfactory (neither, moreover, took any serious account of the Tibetan translations). Although I prepared an edition and translation years ago, I hesitated to publish it, due to my conviction that without a thorough study not only of the Chinese translations, but also, crucially, of the commentaries, the text in its traditional understanding would remain plagued with problems.

Having reached the conclusion, however, that I was unlikely to be able in the foreseeable future to assemble the team of specialists necessary to adequately engage, most importantly, with the commentaries, preserved only in Tibetan and Chinese, I decided to concentrate on Vasubandhu’s texts, to produce critical editions of the Tibetan versions
of the verses and autocommentary and to present them alongside my edition of the Sanskrit text. I have renounced for the present my idea to accompany these with editions of the Chinese translations, since the problems presented even by the translation of Xuanzang (see below) would have both swelled the work beyond a reasonable size, and delayed its presentation indefinitely. (The other two Chinese translations confront us with even greater challenges.) Of the accuracy of the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions presented below I am more or less confident—meaning that even if I have not understood and emended the texts correctly, at least I have reported their readings accurately. Of the accompanying English translation, I remain in some spots in doubt. It illustrates my understanding, to be sure, but that understanding is anything but firm in more than one place—despite the kind and generous help I have received from a number of friends and colleagues who have been willing, over the years, to offer suggestions on these materials.

It is a genuine pleasure, now precisely 90 years after the publication of Lévi's editio princeps, to offer a reedition of this fundamental text. I have read it with students, and presented it at a Leiden Linguistics Summer School, and I thank all who participated. One draft was read by Jowita Kramer, whom I thank for her good suggestions. Lambert Schmithausen, with his characteristic charity and humility, shared "some haphazardly noted stray remarks." These many comments—surely needless to say—vastly improved the presentation. In the very few instances when I have still, stubbornly, disagreed with Prof. Schmithausen, I have given my reasons in the notes. Finally, with his well-known generosity my old friend Harunaga Isaacson, joined by Mattia Salvini, carved out some time to go over the Sanskrit edition with me, and this had—again, needless to say—very positive results. It need hardly be emphasized that none of those who have so generously offered advice is in any way responsible for the errors that remain, but these friends and colleagues are severally and collectively certainly to be credited with any merits the present work may have. In conclusion, I thank Prof. Michael Witzel for doing me the honor of including this volume in the Harvard Oriental Series.
In the materials presented here, my editions of the kārikās alone, and of the integral text with its commentary, are based for the Sanskrit respectively on manuscripts A (3a4-4a5) and B (in its entirety) published by Mimaki, Tachikawa and Yuyama (1989). I am grateful for the advice on decipherment and other matters given by Diwakar Acharya during the above-mentioned course in which I taught the text in Leiden in 2007. For the Tibetan, I have utilized the following editions of the Tanjur:

**For the Viṁśikā-kārikā (nyi shu pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa):**
- Cone: sems tsam, shi 3a4-4a2.
- Derge 4056: sems tsam, shi 3a4-4a2.
- Ganden 3556: sems tsam, si 4a3-5a5.
- Narthang 4325: sems tsam, si 4a5-5a5.
- Peking 5557: sems tsam, si 3b1-4b1.

**For the Viṁśikā-ṛṣṭī (nyi shu pa’i ’grel pa):**
- Cone: 3557, sems tsam, si 4a2-10a3.
- Derge 4057: sems-tsam, shi 4a3-10a2.
- Ganden 3557: sems tsam, si 5a5-13a5.
- Narthang 4326: sems tsam, si 5a5-10b7.
- Peking 5558: sems tsam, si 4b1-11a1.

As one would expect, Cone and Derge almost always agree against Ganden, Narthang and Peking. However, this does not mean that the readings of the former are always to be preferred, although they often are. In at least three places, it is clear that all editions have perpetuated an error (XV [B], XIX [G], XIV [I]).

Alongside the ‘canonical’ Tibetan translation of the verses, we are also lucky to have what plainly represents an earlier form of the translation, preserved in a single manuscript found at Dunhuang, now kept in Paris as Pelliot tibétain 125 (below, PT 125). This was recorded by Lalou (1939: 43) as follows:
I will have nothing further to say here about the *Trimśikā*, but the entire manuscript was earlier transcribed by Ueyama (1987). On the basis of color photographs available on the Artstor website, I have re-read the former portion of the manuscript, containing the verses of the *Viniśīka*, and been able to correct a few of Ueyama's readings. I agree with the following important conclusions offered by Ueyama: copyist errors prove that this manuscript is not an original or fair-copy coming from the translator's pen, but a copy of another manuscript. The similarity of the text to that eventually established in the Tanjurs shows that this version does not represent a different text or translation altogether, but is an earlier form of the later revised translation. There is no chance that it was translated from Chinese. (Ueyama is more cautious, saying that it is not made at least from any of the presently known Chinese versions, but as I show below, errors in understanding of the Sanskrit prove that its direct source must have been in Sanskrit.)

Although I have remarked on some points of interest in the notes to the edition, here I wish to point out some of the peculiarities of this version, in light of both the Sanskrit text and the 'canonical' translation. The first is that unlike the *Vṛtti*, but like the independent translation of the verses in the Tanjurs and Manuscript A of the Sanskrit, PT 125 contains the first verse. This verse also reveals the oddity that PT 125, which elsewhere translates *vijñapti* with *rnam shes*, here renders it *rnam rig*. When *vijñāna* appears in verse 6, PT 125 renders this too with *rnam par shes pa*, the (later?) standard translation equivalent. Further evidence for the copying of PT 125 is found in 1d, which is unmetrical. We might presume that *skra zla la stso gs pa myed mthong bas so* should be understood *skra zla lastso gs pa myed mthong baso*, which would provide (graphically at least) seven syllables. Finally, I do not under-
stand *shes bya ba*, normally *iti*, in 1a; was what is now *evedam* in Sanskrit somehow written in a way that led the Tibetan translators to understand an *iti* there? Verse 2 illustrates the fact that PT 125 follows the Sanskrit word order slavishly; this is particularly clear in d where *vijñaptir yadi nārthatah* appears as *rnam shes +on te don myed na+o*. (I do not understand what it means that this verse is followed not by a double shad, as is normal, but by something resembling [♀]). A number of other examples of literal rendition of Sanskrit word order are to be found throughout.

Verse 15, besides proving that it is based on a Sanskrit (rather than Chinese) original, provides an extreme illustration of the fact that the text in PT 125 required revision. The first line alone contains nothing but errors: the Sanskrit text has *ekatve na krameneti*, ‘If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion,’ which PT 125 renders *gchigis dang nī rims zhes pa*. Here *gchigis* [gcig gis] = *ekatvena* in place of *ekatve na*, and *rims zhes pa* = *kramena iti*, understanding *iti* as the quotative particle rather than as a verb (the second member of the compound is perhaps more commonly spelt *eti* than *iti*; for the grammar see Verhagen [1996: 28; 40n96], and my note to this passage). This word evidently motivated some possible misunderstanding in India as well, since the manuscript of the *Vṛtti* includes what I understand as a gloss in XV (C), *gamanam ity arthaḥ*, which would not be necessary unless the word *iti/eti* was liable to misunderstanding. While a detailed study of PT 125 must await another occasion, it is certain that the text recorded in PT 125 (although to be sure not this precise manuscript version) stood behind the revision later enshrined in the Tanjurs. Moreover, that this older version was in some way available at least to the translators of the *Vṛtti* in its unrevised form is shown by 20d, in which the *Vṛtti* preserves the reading of PT 125 against that in the Tanjur version of the kārikās.

The present work is nothing more than one step toward a more satisfactory and wholistic philological treatment of the *Vimśikā* (to say nothing of a contextualized philosophical study). What has not been taken into account in this treatment of the text are its Chinese transla-
tions (with only a few exceptions in the notes), and its commentaries, which comprise the following sources:

- **Weishi lun 唯識論**, T. 1588, translated by Prajñāruci 瞿曇般若流支.
- **Dasheng weishi lun 大乘唯識論**, T. 1589, translated by Paramārtha.
- **Weishi ershi lun 唯識二十論**, T. 1590, translated by Xuanzang. (On these three, with the Tibetan translation, see inter alia Sasaki 1924 and Akashi 1926)
- Dharmapāla's **Cheng weishi baosheng lun 成唯識寶生論**, T. 1591, translated by Yijing 義淨 (see Liebenthal 1935).
- Vinitadeva's **Prakaraṇavinśākāṭīkā, Rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad**, Derge 4065, sems tsam, shi 171b7-195b5 (see Yamaguchi and Nozawa 1953: 1-131, and Hillis 1993).
- Vairocanaraksita's subcommentary on Vinitadeva, **Viṃśikāṭīkā-vivr̥ti**, edited in Kano 2008.

Concerning the proper title of the work, it has long been referred to in modern scholarship as the **Viṃśatikā**, a mistake found in the Sanskrit manuscript of the **Vṛtti** which has at last been corrected by Kano (2008: 350. Note however that Lévi (1925b: 17) does already call the text “Viṃśatikā ou Viṃśikā”). Aside from the detailed Pāṇinian analysis provided by Vairocanarakṣita, as Kano points out there has long been abundant evidence for the correct title **Viṃśikā**. This includes a Chinese transcription in [Kui] Ji's commentary, and Tibetan transcriptions. In this regard, we should note that pace Kano, the Tanjurs do not read **viṃśika** (or even **biṃśika**) but rather clearly they have only a single vowel in almost all cases, therefore yielding at best **viṃśaka**, perhaps not coincidentally the reading of the colophon in MS (A), **viṃśakā-vijñaptiprakaraṇam**, and that contained at least in the Derge edition’s title of Vinitadeva's commentary, **Prakaraṇavinśakaṭīkā**. It is interesting to note that in PT 125, although Lalou read **bing**, a comparison with other examples of vowels on the same folio shows that it is only possible to understand here **beng**. We should also note that the Tanjurs have the Tibetan title of the verses as **nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa**, while PT
125 has instead *nyī shu pa dgos par byed pa+o*. Here *dgos par byed pa* seems to be an attempt to etymologically render *kārikā*, connecting it with the root $\sqrt{kr}$. I have not found this elsewhere.

I have imposed the sentence numbering on the text in an effort to make comparison between versions, and reference to the translation, more transparent. The identification of objections in the translation owes much to the commentaries, but I hasten to emphasize that I have not made a proper study of these, and this aspect of the work (as so much else) must remain highly provisional. I have retained in so far as practical the punctuation of the Sanskrit manuscript, although it must be admitted that the result often seems somewhat inconsistent.

The *Viṁśikā* has been translated into modern languages a number of times. Among the best efforts may be that of Frauwallner (1994: 366-383; 2010: 392-411), and I have profited much from consulting it. A step toward further improved understanding of the text will involve close study of both the Chinese translations, and the commentaries, listed above.

The text has been often studied by modern scholars, but I make no pretence here to contribute to the doctrinal, philosophical or historical study of the text (see recently the very interesting Kellner and Taber 2014). I am, moreover, aware that Vasubandhu’s text probably had significant influence on later works (such as Dharmakīrti’s *Santānāntarasiddhi*; see Yamabe 1998). My notes attempt to do no more than provide clues focused, in the first place, on philologically relevant aspects of the establishment of the Sanskrit text, rather than engagement with the text’s contents *per se*. It would thus be otiose here to attempt a (perforce very partial) listing of relevant studies on the doctrine of the *Viṁśikā*. 
I adopt the following conventions:

Tibetan:
I do not distinguish between pa/ba, or nga/da, selecting in all cases the ‘correct’ form.

I ignore for the most part Narthang’s frequent abbreviated spellings, such as semn for sems can, rnaṁr for rnam par and so on.

I mostly do not note minor orthographic oddities which may be due to breaks on the printing blocks (missing vowels, for instance).

In PT 125, I may have been ungenerous to the scribe; he writes pa/pha almost identically, and unless I am sure he intended pha, I transcribe this letter as pa.

ï transcribes the reversed gi-gu (gi gu log).

+ transcribes the ’a-rten with a flag on its right shoulder ⚍.

Sanskrit:

( Italics ) within parenthesis in the Sanskrit text indicate a reconstruction based on Tibetan and context. These usually but not always agree with the suggestions of Lévi.

[ ] Brackets in the Sanskrit indicate a partially legible character.

⟨ ⟩ Angle brackets indicate a supplement to the text.

+ A + indicates a missing letter, the number determined by the available space in the manuscript.

. One dot indicates either a consonant or a vowel missing.

* An asterisk after a letter indicates that the manuscript has a special form of the letter which does not include a vowel, or a virāma (typically with ṭ and sometimes ṁ).

Bold characters indicate the first aksara on a line of the manuscript.

Folio numbers are supplied in small notation to indicate folio and side.

When I have altered the text more than to make a trivial correction, I make a note on the same page. All changes, even trivial, are noted in the apparatus.
Punctuation marks are as in the manuscript, unless otherwise noted. The daṇḍa is indicated with |, half daṇḍa (rare) with ¹, a mark more or less like ¹ with ;, and one more or less like ³ with . When avagraha is not written in the manuscript, as needed I add it between ⟨ ⟩; in other cases, I transcribe it as written in the manuscript.
Literature


Frauwallner, Erich. 2010. The Philosophy of Buddhism. Trans. Gelong Lodrö Sangpo with the assistance of Jigme Sheldrön, under the supervision of Professor Ernst Steinkellner (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).

Funahashi Naoya 舟橋尚哉. 1986. “Nepāru shahon taishō ni yoru Yuishiki Sanjūju no gentenkō narabi ni Yuishiki Nijūron daichige daini ge no genpon ni tsuite” ネパール写本対照による『唯識三十頌』の原典考並びに『唯識二十論』第一偈第二偈の原本について [Textual notes on the Trīṃṣikāvijñāntibhāṣyaṃ based on the Comparison of Nepalese


Chinese texts are cited according to the Taishō edition.
Pāli texts are referred to in the Pali Text Society editions, with the standard sigla.

Tibetan sigla:

C: Cone Tanjur
D: Derge Tanjur
G: Golden (Ganden) Tanjur
N: Narthang Tanjur
P: Peking Tanjur
Sanskrit Manuscript A

Tibetan Tanjur Critical Edition

and

Pelliot tibétain 125

of the

Vīṃśikā-kārikā

With an English Translation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit Text</th>
<th>Tanjur</th>
<th>PT 125</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| In principle, manuscript A | C: Cone  
D: Derge  
G: Ganden (Golden)  
N: Narthang  
P: Peking |        |

| 0 | namah sarvajñaya || | rgya gar skad du | bingsha ka kā ri ka | bod skad du | nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa | 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo |
|---|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| a: | Written ཚོས in all versions  
kā ri ka | C: kā ri kā  
b: byas pa | CDN: byas pa | rgya gar kyi skad du beng shi ka | ka ri ka | bod skad du nyi shu pa dgos par byed pa+o |
| b: | Written ཚོས in all versions  
kā ri ka | C: kā ri kā  
b: byas pa | CDN: byas pa |
This [world] is just Manifestation-Only, because of the appearance of non-existent external objects, as in the case of the seeing of nonexistent hair-nets and the like by one with an eye disease.
If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy.
| 3  | deśādiniyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat pretavat punaḥ | yul la sogs pa 'nges 'grub ste ||  | yul la stsogs pa chad grub ste rmī +dra'o || yi dags bzhin du yang || ma chad rgyud do thams chad dag || rnag chu la stsogs mthong baso || |
|    | santānāniyamaḥ sarvvaḥ pūyanadyādi-darśane ||  | c: yi dags] G yi dwags  | c: ma chad rgyud] MS ma chad da rgyud |
|  | | | | | rnag chu = pūyanadī (klung la rnag) |

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.
Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts, in their all seeing the river of pus and so on.
| svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā narakavat punah | bya byed rmi lam gnod pa 'dra || thams cad sms can dmyal ba bzhin || dmyal ba'i srung ma sogs mthong dang || de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro || rmi lam gnod pa +dra bya ba dang || bya+o sms dmyal bzhin du yang || kun de sms dmyal srung la stsogs || mthong zhing de+is bda+ baso || |
| sarvvan narakālādīdaśane taś ca bādhane || |
| d: | de dag gis | G: de dag gi |
| b: | Ueyama read bye'i = byed'i, but it is clearly bya+o |
| d: | zhing de+is | MS zhing pa de+is |
| bda' ba [to chase] ≠ bādhane (gnod). (In a, both have gnod = upaghāta) |

Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream.
And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved],
in the seeing of the hell guardians and so on,
and in being tortured by them.
Animals are not born in hell
as they are in heaven,
nor are hungry ghosts,
since they do not experience the suffering produced there.
If you accept that gross material elements arise there
in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings],
and [you accept their] transformation,
why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The perfuming of the karmic deed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>you imagine to be elsewhere than the result;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]?

| karmmaṇo vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate | gzhan na las kyi bag chags la || | las kyī bag chags gzhan du la || |
| tatraiva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇaṁ || | 'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog || | +bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog || |
| | gang na bag chags yod pa der || | gang na ba der myi +dod na || |
| | ci yi phyir na 'dod mi bya || | bag chags ji+i phyir zhig du || |
| Vṛtty in d: ci'i for ci yi |
|  | The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. |
| 9 | yataḥ svabīd vijñaptīr yadābhāsā pravarttate | rang gi sa bon gang las su || gang bdag sa bon las rnam shes || |
|   | dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravit* || rnam rig snang ba gang 'byung ba || gang snang rab du +jug pa nī || |
|   | dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravit* || de dag de yi skye mched ni || +du mched rnam pa gnyis pasna || |
|   | dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravit* || rnam pa gnyis su thub pas gsungs || de dag de+ir thub pas gsungs || |

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object].

The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation].
<table>
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<td>10</td>
<td>tathā pudgalaṁairātmāprāveśo hy anyathā punah</td>
<td>de ltar gang zag bdag med par</td>
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<td></td>
<td>deśanā dharmaṁairātmyāpraveśaḥ kalpitātmanā</td>
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<td>cd dharmaṁairātmyā° ] MS (A) dharmīyanairātmyā°</td>
<td>b: 'jug par ] C: jug par</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vṛtti in c: bstan pa'i (D: bstan pa)</td>
<td>bshad pa = deśanā (bstan pa)</td>
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For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of the elemental factors of existence in terms of an imagined self.
| 11 | na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ | de ni gcig na'ang yul min la || phra rab rdul du du ma'ang min || de dag 'dus pa 'ang ma yin te || 'di ltar rdul phran mi 'grub phyir || | de ni myi gchig du ma+ang myed || yul ni rdul pran dagisö || de bs dus myin gang phyi ru || rdul pran myi +grub pa+i is so || |
| d paramāṇur na ] MS (A) erroneously adds ca in margin by na | c: pa'ang ma ] N: pa'i ngam |

That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary
nor atomically plural sense object,
neither are those [atoms] compounded,
since the atom [itself] is not proved.
Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms],
the atom [would have to] have six parts.
[Or] because, the six being in a common location,
the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom.

| 12 | saṭkena yugapadyogat paramāṇoh saḍaṁśatā | drug gis cig car sbyar ba na ||
|    | saṃnāṁ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād anu- | phra rab rdul cha drug tu 'gyur ||
|    | mātrakaḥ || | drug po dag ni go gcig na ||
|    | a | gong bu rdul phran tsam du 'gyur ||
|    | yogapadyogat | drugīs chig char ldan bas na ||
|    | MS (A) yogapadyogat | rdul phran cha nī drug du+o ||
|    | | drug rnams mnyam ba+i yul bas na ||
|    | | gong bu rdul tsam du +gyur ba+o ||

Vṛtti in a: sbyar bas na
In c: drug po dag kyang go gcig na

ldan ba = yoga (sbyar ba)
mnyam ba+i yul ba = amānadeśa (go gcig)
|   | paramāṇor asarīyoge tattaṁghāte (\')sti kasya saḥ | rdul phran sbyor ba med na ni || | rdul pran myī +du ba yīn na || | rdul pran myī +du ba yīn na || |
|   | na cāṇavayatvena tattaṁyogo na sidhyati || | de 'dus yod pa de gang gis || | de+i bsdu yod su+i de+ || | de+i bsdu yod su+i de+ || |
|   | rdul phran sbyor ba med na ni || | de 'dus yod pa de gang gis || | cha shas yod pa ma yīn pas || | bag bag kyang ma yīn | myīn bas || | de+i +du ba myī +grubo || |
|   | ma zer cig = ? ('do not say!'). In prose (B) = na vaktavyam. | +du ba = saṁyoga (sbyor ba) | bag bag = anavaya? (cha shas) |
|   | rdul pran myī +du ba yīn na || | de+i bsdu yod su+i de+ || | de+i bsdu yod su+i de+ || |
|   | de+i +du ba myī +grubo || | de+i +du ba myī +grubo || |

Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved.
| 14 | digbhāgabheda yasyāsti tasyaikatvam na yuyate | gang la phyogs cha tha dad yod || pyogs cha tha dad gang yod pa || |
|    | chāyāvṛtī kathaṁ vānyo na pīṇḍaś cen na tasya te || de ni gcig tu mi rung ngo || de+i gchig du myi rung ngo || |
|    |    | grib dang sgrīb par ji ltar 'gyur || drib dang sgrīb kyang ji ltar | +gyur || |
|    |    | gong bu gzhan min de de'i min || pung myin gal te de de myin || |

|   | c | MS (A) ॐvrītī |
|   | MS (A) ॐvṛtī |
|   | MS (A) ॐvṛtī |
|   | MS (A) vṛtī |
|   | MS (A) na added below the line |
|   | MS (A): In the margin below tāṁ na pi in another (more modern) hand is written mi li tā. Harunaga Isaacson suggests that this (as militāḥ) may be a gloss on pīṇḍa: ‘[the atoms] connected/combined’. |
|   | b | de ni | N: da ni |
|   | pung (phung) = pīṇḍa (gong bu) |

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentiation be singular.  
Or how is there shadow and obstruction?  
If the cluster is not other [than the atoms],  
the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster].
| ekatve na kramaṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau | gcig na rim gyis 'gro ba med ||
| vicchinnāneka-vṛttiś ca sūkṣmānīkṣā ca no bhavet* ||
| gchigis dang nī rims zhes pa ||
| gchig char bzung dang ma bzung myed ||
| bar chad du ma +jug pa dang ||
| phra dang myi mthong myed par +gyurd ||

| a kramaṇetir ] MS (A) kramaṇeti d sūkṣmā° | Both MSS sūkṣmā°

| mar gnas pa = ?
| Vṛtti in d: mi sod (N mi bsod).
| mig gis mi gsod: in the Vinayasūtra-vyākhyaṇa of Prajñākara (Derge Tanjur 4121, 'dul ba, ru 122b1) we find: mthong ba'o zhes pa yin te mig gis gsod pa'i srog chags yod na gdod nyes par 'gyur ba'o.
| gchigis = ekatvena! (≠ ekatve na)
| rims zhes pa = kramaṇa iti! (≠ kramaṇetī)
| bzung dang ma bzung = grahāgraha (zin dang ma zin)
| bar chad du = vicchinna (ris chad du ma +jug pa = ?
| myi mthong = anikṣa (≠ mig gis mi gsod; what is gsod?)

| gchigis = ekatvena! (≠ ekatve na)
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| bar chad du = vicchinna (ris chad du ma +jug pa = ?
| myi mthong = anikṣa (≠ mig gis mi gsod; what is gsod?)

- 18 -
If [the sense object] were singular,
there would be no gradual motion,
no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension,
nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic.
The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived?
As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object].

Recollection [comes] from that.

One who is not awake does not understand

the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream.
| i8 | anyonyādhīpataitvena viññaptiṇiyamo mithaḥ | gchīg la gchīg gi dbang gis nā || rnam par rig pa phan tshun nges || sems ni gnyid kyiś non pas nā || de phyir rmi dang 'bras mi mtshungs || | gchīg la gchīg dbang gis nā || rnam shes chad pa pan tshun tu+o || gnyid gyis nye bar non pa+i sems || rmi lam de dang +bras myi mnyam || |
| b | mithaḥ ] MS (A) mitha, with tha overwritten. | a: gis na ] C: gi ni | b: chad pa ] MS interlinear addition below c: bar ] ba+i written, +i cancelled and ra added below ba |

Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same.
Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on.
| 20 | katham vā daṇḍakāranyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ | drang srong khros pas dan ta ka'i || dbyig pa+i dgon pa ji ltar na || | de yis ji ltar 'grub par 'gyur || ji ltar de+is grub pa yin || |
|----|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| b: | dan ta ] GNP: dante | | |
| b: | stongs par 'gyur ] GNP: stong par gyur | | |
| d: | de yis ] CD: de mis | | |

Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by the sages' anger? Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?
How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality?

[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind.

Because one does not know [other minds or even one's own]
in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha.
I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. It is the scope of the buddhas.
C

| viṃśakāvijñaptipra Karanam samāptam* ||  | nyi shu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa rdzogs so ||  | nyi shu pa rdzogso ||  |
| sha20  |  | || rgya gar gyi mkhan po dza na mi tra dang | shi len dra bo dhi dang dā na shi la dang | zhu chen gyi lo tā ba ban de ye shes sdes bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa'o ||  |

The Twenty Verses written by the Venerable Vasubandhu. Translated by the Indian masters Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Dānaśīla, and the great translator Ye shes sde, it has been corrected.


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Sanskrit Manuscript B

and

Tibetan Tanjur Critical Edition

of the

Vīṁśikā-ṛtti

With an English Translation
rgya gar skad du | bingshi ka brītti ||
bod skad du | nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa |
'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo ||

I

(a) theg pa chen po la khams gsum pa rnam par rig pa tsam du rnam par gzhag ste | (b) mdo las | kye rgyal ba'i sras dag 'di lta ste | khams gsum pa 'di ni sms tsam mo zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro || (c) sms dang yid dang | rnam par shes pa dang | rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba ni rnam grangs su gtogs pa'o || (d) sms de yang 'dir mtshungs par ldan pa dang bcas par dgongs pa'o || (e) tsam zhes bya ba smos pa ni don dgag pa'i phyir ro || (f) rnam par shes pa 'di nyid don du snang ba 'byung ste | (g) dper na rab rib can rnam s kyis skra zla la sog pa med par mthong ba bzhin te | (h) don gang yang med do ||
The Great Vehicle teaches that what belongs to the triple world is established as Manifestation-Only, because it is stated in scripture: "O Sons of the Conqueror, what belongs to the triple world is mind-only." Mind, thought, cognition and manifestation are synonyms. And here this 'mind' intends the inclusion of the concomitants [of mind]. "Only" is stated in order to rule out external objects. This cognition itself arises having the appearance of an external object. For example, it is like those with an eye disease seeing non-existent hair, a [double] moon and so on, but there is no [real] object at all.
A) 'dir 'di skad ces brgal te |

gal te rnam rig don min na ||
yul dang dus la nges med cing ||
sems kyang nges med ma yin la ||
bya ba byed pa'ang mi rigs 'gyur || [2]

B) ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | c) gal te gzugs la soggs pa'i don med
par gzugs la soggs pa'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ste gzugs la soggs pa'i don
las ma yin na | d) ci'i phyir yul la lar 'byung la thams cad na ma yin | e) yul
de nyid na yang res 'ga' 'byung la thams cad du ma yin | f) yul dang dus
de na 'khod pa thams cad kyi sems la nges pa med pa 'byung la 'ga' tsam
la ma yin | g) ji ltar rab rib can nyid kyi sems la skra la soggs pa snang gi |
gzhan dag la ni ma yin ||
II

na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na [ca] |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

[Objection:]

A) To this it is objected:

If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy. [2]

B) What is being stated here? C) If there is the arisal of manifestation of material form and so on without any external object of material form and so on, and [consequently the manifestation] does not [arise] from a [real] external object of material form and so on, D) why does [such a manifestation] arise in a particular place, and not everywhere; E) why does it arise only in that place at some time, not always; and F) why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those present there in that place at that time, and not in [the minds] of just a few? G) For instance, while a hair and so on may appear in the mind of one with eye disease, it does not [appear] to others [free of that disease].
II

\[ \text{II, ci'i phyir gang rab rib can gys mthong ba'i skra dang | sbrang bu la sogs pas skra la sogs pa'i bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed | mri lam na mthong ba'i bza' ba dang btung ba dang bgo ba dang dug dang mtshon la sogs pas zas dang skom la sogs pa'i bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed | dri za'i grong khyer yod pa ma yin pas grong khyer gyi bya ba mi byed la | de ma yin pa gzhan dag gis ni byed | dri dag don med par med du 'dra na yul dang dus nges pa dang | sems nges pa med pa dang | bya ba byed pa 'di dag kyang mi rung ngo zhe na |} \]
II

κ) नियामः संतानानियामः क्र्याक्रियाः का नायुज्यते,

II.1 Why is it that the hair, bee and so on which appear to one with eye disease have no causal efficacy of a hair and so on, while for those others without [eye disease, those hairs, bees and so forth which appear to them] do have [causal efficacy]? II.2 The food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons and so on seen in a dream do not have causal efficacy [to address] hunger, thirst and the like, but those others not [in a dream] do have such [causal efficacy]. II.3 A mirage city, being non-existent, does not have the causal efficacy of a city, but other [cities] not [unreal like] that do. II.4 If these [things like dream food] resemble the non-existent in lacking any [real external] object, restriction as to time and place, nonrestriction as to personal continuum, and causal efficacy are not reasonable.

1: Here begins the Sanskrit manuscript; the translation hereafter is from the Sanskrit.
A) mi rung ba ma yin te | 'di ltar |

yul la sogs pa nges 'grub ste ||
rmì 'dra'o || [3ab]

B) rmi lam du rmis pa dang mtshungs pas na rmi 'dra'o || c) ji lta zhe na |

D) rmi lam na yang don med par yul la la na grong dang | kun dga' ra ba
dang | skyes pa dang bud med la sogs pa ji dag snang la thams cad na
ma yin yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' snang la dus thams cad du ma yin
pas e) don med par yang yul la sogs pa nges par 'grub po ||

D) thams cad na ma yin yul de nyid na yang res 'ga' snang la ] GNP: ø
III

A) na khalu na yujyate, yasmāt* ||

desādiniyamah siddhas svapnavat*

B) svapna iva svapnavat* ⟨ | ⟩ c) katham d) tāvat svapne vināpy arthena kvacid eva deśe kīncid grāmārāmastrīpuruṣādikāṁ dṛśyate na sarvatra tatraiva ca deśe kadācid dṛśyate na sarvakālam e) iti siddho vināpy arthena desakālaniyamah ||

[Vasubandhu]

A) They are certainly not unreasonable, since:

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.

[3ab]

B) “As with dreams” means as in a dream. (C) Well, how, first of all, [do you explain that] even without an external object, some village, grove, man, woman or the like is seen in a dream at a particular place, rather than everywhere, and at that particular place at some specific time, rather than always? E) For this reason, restriction as to time and place is established, even in the absence of an external object.

D) grāmārāmastrīpuruṣādikāṁ | MS: bhramarā°
III

sems kyang nges pa med |
yi dags bzhin te | [3bc]

\(r\) grub ces bya bar bsnyegs so || \(g\) yi dags rnams kyi dang mtshungs pas
na yi dags bzhin no || \(w\) ji ltar 'grub |

thams cad kyis |
klung la rnag la sogs mthong bzhin || [3cd]
Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts. [3bc]

"Is proved" is carried over [from the previous foot]. "As with hungry ghosts" means as in the case of hungry ghosts. How is this proved? Collectively

In their all seeing the river of pus and so on. [3cd]
III

jr. rnag gis gang ba'i klung ni rnag gi klung ste | k. mar gyi bum pa bzhin no || s. las kyi rnam par smin pa mtshungs pa la gnas pa'i yi dags rnams ni kun gyis kyang mtshungs par klung rnag gis gang bar mthong ste | gcig 'gas ni ma yin no || m. rnag gis gang ba ji lta ba bzhin du gcin dang | ngan skyugs dang | me ma mur dang | mchil ma dang | snabs kyis gang ba dang | dbyig pa dang | ral gri thogs pa'i mi dag gis srung ba yang de bzhin te | so gs pa zhes bya bar bsdu'o || n. de ltar na don med par yang rnam par rig pa rnams kyi sems nges pa med par 'grub bo ||
III

j) pūyapūrnā nadi pūyanadi | k) ghr̥taghaṭavat* | l) tulyakarmmavipākāvasthā hi preṇāḥ sarve (')pi samaṁ pūyapūrnān nadīm paśyanti naika eva | m) yathā pūyapūrnām evaṁ mūtrapūrisādi-pūrnāṁ daṇḍāsidharaṁ ca puṣair adhiṣṭhitāṁ ity ādigrahaṇena | n) evaṁ sāntānāniyamo vijñaptināṁ asaty apy arthe siddhāḥ ||

j) “The river of pus” means a river filled with pus, k) as [one says] a pot of ghee [when one means a pot filled with ghee]. l) For hungry ghosts in a state of equally experiencing fruition of their actions collectively all see the river filled with pus, not just one of them alone.

m) The word “and so on” is mentioned to indicate that as [they see the river] filled with pus, they [also see it] filled with urine, feces and the like, and guarded by persons holding staves and swords. n) Thus the nonrestriction of manifestations to [a specific] personal continuum is proved even without the existence of an external object.
bya byed rmi lam gnod pa 'dra || [4a]

a) grub ces bya bar rig par bya'o || b) dper na rmi lam na gnyis kyis gnyis phrad pa med par yang khu ba 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid ni rmi lam gyi gnod pa'o || c) de ltar re zhig dpe gzhan dang gzhan dag gis yul dang dus nges pa la sogs pa bzhi 'grub bo ||
Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. [4ab]

A) “Is proved” is to be understood. B) [Causal efficacy is established] as with ejaculation in a dream [that is, a wet dream], which is characterized by the emission of semen in a dream in the absence of [actual] sexual union. C) In this way at the outset is proved, through these various examples, the four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest.

anyānyair | MS: anyānair
thams cad sens can dmyal ba bzhin || [4b]

d. grub ces bya bar rig par bya’o || e. sens can dmyal ba dag na yod pa
dang mtshungs pas sens can dmyal ba bzhin no || n. ji ltar ’grub ce na |
IV

narakavat punah

sarvaṁ*

D) siddham iti veditavyaṁ | E) narakēṣv iva narakavat* ⟨ | ⟩

E) narakēṣv iva narakavat* ⟨ | ⟩

kathāṁ siddhaṁ |

And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved]. [4bc]

D) “Are proved” is to be understood. E) “As with hell” means like in the hells. F) How are they proved?
dmyal ba'i srung ma sogs mthong dang ||
de dag gis ni gnod phyir ro || [4cd]

g) dper na sems can dmyal ba dag na sems can dmyal ba'i sems can
rnams kyis sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa mthong ste | yul
dang dus nges par 'grub bo || v) khyi dang bya rog dang lcags kyi ri la
sogs pa 'ong ba dang 'gro bar yang mthong ba ni sogs pa zhes bya bar
bsdu ste | v) thams cad kyis mthong gi | gcig 'gas ni ma yin no || i) de dag
gis de dag la gnod pa yang 'grub ste | dngos po la sems can dmyal ba'i
srung ma la sogs pa med par yang rang gi las kyi rnam par smin pa
mtshungs pa'i dbang gi phyir ro || w) de bzhin du gzhan yang yul dang
dus nges pa la sogs pa bzhii po 'di dag thams cad grub par rig par bya'o ||
IV

narakāḷādidarśane tāiś ca bādhane

₉) yathā hi narakeṣu nārakāṇāṁ narakāḷādidarśanaṁ deśa-kālaniyamena siddham 〈 | 〉 ₉) śvāvāyasāyasaparvatādyāgamanagamanaṁcaḥ, rśanaṁ cety ādigrahaṇena 〈 | 〉 ₉) sarveṣaṁ ca naikasyaiva 〈 | 〉 ₉) tāiś ca tadbādhanaṁ siddham asatsv api narakāḷādiṣu samānasvā-karmmavipākādhipatyat* 〈 ḷ) tathānyatrāpi sarvam etad deśakālaniya-māḍicatuṣṭayaṁ siddham iti veditavyam* |

In the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being tortured by them. [⁴cd]

₉) Just as it is proved that in the hells hell beings see the hell guardians and so on with restriction as to time and place ₉) —“and so on” means that they see the dogs, crows, the iron mountains and so on coming and going— ₉) and all [hell beings see these], not merely one, ₉) and [just as it is] proved that they are tortured by them, even though the hell guardians and so on do not exist, because of the domination of the generalized common fruition of their individual karmic deeds— ₉) Just so it should be understood that the entirety of this four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest, is proved elsewhere too [and not only in the separate examples].
ci'i phyir sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma dang bya rog dang khyi la sogs pa de dag sems can du mi 'dod ce na |

mi rigs pa'i phyir ro || x, de dag ni sems can dmyal bar mi rigs te | de bzhin du sdug bsngal des mi myong ba'i phyir ro || o, gcig la gcig gnod pa byed na ni 'di dag ni sems can dmyal ba pa dag go || 'di dag ni sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma dag go zhes rnam par gzhag pa med par 'gyur ro || p, byad gzugs dang bong tshod dang stobs mtshungs pa dag ni gcig la gcig gnod pa byed kyang ji lta bur 'jigs par mi 'gyur ro || o, lcags rab tu 'bar ba'i sa gzhi la tsha ba'i sdug bsngal yang mi bzod na ni ji ltar de na gzhan la gnod pa byed par 'gyur || o, sems can dmyal ba pa ma yin pa dag sems can dmyal bar 'byung bar ga la 'gyur |
[Objection]

For what reason, then, do you not accept the hell guardians, and dogs and crows, as really existent beings?

[Vasubandhu]

Because it is not reasonable. For it is not reasonable for those [guardians and so on] to be hell beings, since they do not experience the sufferings of that [place] in precisely that same way. If they were torturing each other, there would be no differentiation that ‘these are the hell beings; these the hell guardians.’ And if those of equal form, size and strength were torturing each other, they would not be so very afraid. And how could [those guardians], unable to tolerate the suffering of burning on a flaming iron ground, torture others there? On the other hand, how could non-hell beings be born in hell [in the first place]?
A) 'o na dud 'gro dag kyang ji ltar mtho ris su 'byung ste | B) de bzhin du sems can dmyal bar yang dud 'gro dang yi dags kyi bye brag sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhe na |
V

A) kathan tāvat tiraścāṁ svarge sambhavaḥ | B) evaṁ narakeṣu
tiryakpretaviśeṣāṇāṁ narakaṃ pālādīnāṁ sambhavaḥ syāt* ||

[Objection]

A) [Well,] to begin, how [—as you admit as well—] could animals be born in heaven? B) In the same way, animals and certain hungry ghosts might be born in the hells as hell guardians and others.
ji ltar dud 'gro mtho ris su ||
'byung ba de ltar dmyal ba min ||
yi dags min te de lta bur ||
deyod sdug bsngal des mi myong || [5]

c) dud 'gro gang dag mtho ris su 'byung ba de dag ni snod kyi 'jig rten na
de'i bde ba myong bar 'gyur ba'i las kyis der 'byung ba dag ste | de na
yod pa'i bde ba so sor myong ngo || d) sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la
sogs pa dag ni de bzhin du sems can dmyal ba'i sdug bsngal mi myong
ngo || e) de'i phyir dud 'gro dag der 'byung bar mi rigs so || f) yi dags kyi
bye brag dag kyang ma yin no ||
Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven, 
Nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the 
suffering produced there. [5]

c) For, those who are born in heaven as animals, being born 
there through their karmic deeds conducive to happiness [performed] 
in the Receptacle World, experience the happiness produced there [in heaven], b) but the hell guardians and so on do not experience hellish 
suffering in a similar fashion. e) Therefore, it is not reasonable that 
animals are born [in hell], f) nor is it so for hungry ghosts.
A) sems can dmyal ba de dag gi las rnams kyis der 'byung ba'i bye brag dag 'di lta bur 'byung ste | mdog dang byad gzugs dang bong tshod dang stobs kyi bye brag gang gis sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma la sogs pa'i ming thob pa'o || b) gang lag pa brkyang pa la sogs pa bya ba sna tshogs byed par snang ba de lta bur yang 'gyur ste | de dag 'jigs pa bskyed pa'i phyir ro || dper na lug lta bu'i ri dags 'ong ba dang | 'gro ba dang | lcags kyi shal ma li'i nags tshal tsher ma kha thur du lta ba dang gyen du lta bar 'gyur ba lta bu ste | c) de dag ni med pa yang ma yin no zhe na |

B) 'gyur | CD: 'grub
VI

A) teśān tarhi nārakāṁ karmmaṁbhīs tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti varṇāṅkṛtipramāṇabalaviśiṣṭā ye naraka-pārthā samājāṁ pratilabhante | b) tathā ca pariṇamanti yad vividhāṁ hasta-vikṣepādikriyāṁ kurvanto dyāyante bhayotpādanārthāṁ yathā meśā-kṛtayaḥ parvata āgacchanto gacchantaḥ (ayahśābmalī) vane ca kaṇṭakaḥ adhomukhībhavanta ārddhamukhībhavantaṁ ceti | c) na te na sambhavanty eva ||

[Objection]

A) Then, particular types of gross material elements arise there through the karmic deeds of those hell beings, which, particularized as to color, form, size and strength, obtain the designations ‘hell guardian’ and so on. B) And they transform in such a manner that they appear performing activities like waving their hands and so on, in order to instill fear, as mountains in the shape of rams coming and going and thorns in the forest of iron thorn trees turning themselves down and turning themselves up [likewise appear in hell instilling fear]. C) Therefore, it is not that those [hell guardians and so on] are not born at all.

B) āgacchanto | MS: āganto
gal te de'i las kyis der
'byung ba dag ni 'byung ba dang |
de bzhin 'gyur bar 'dug na go |
rnam par shes par cis mi 'dod || [6]

de'i las rnams kyis der rnam par shes pa nyid der de lta bur 'gyur ba
ci'i phyir mi 'dod la | ci'i phyir 'byung ba rnams su rtog |
If you accept that gross material elements arise there in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those beings, And [you accept their] transformation, why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition? [6]

Why do you not accept that the transformation thus brought about by the karmic deeds of those beings is [a transformation] of cognition itself? Moreover, are gross material elements imagined [to play any role at all]? What is more:
VII

gzhan na las kyi bag chags la ||
'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog ||
gang na bag chags yod pa der ||
c'i phyir na 'dod mi bya || [7]

8) sems can dmyal ba pa rnams kyi las gang gis der 'byung ba dag de lta
bur 'byung ba dang | 'gyur bar yang rtog pa'i las de'i bag chags de dag
nyid kyi rnam par shes pa'i rgyud la gnas te | gzhan ma yin na 9) bag
chags de gang na yod pa de dag nyid la de'i 'bras bu rnam par shes par
gyur pa de 'dra bar c'i phyir mi 'dod la | 10) gang na bag chags med pa der
de'i 'bras bu rtog ba 'di la gtan tshigs ci yod |
The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be elsewhere than the result; What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming [takes place]? [7]

A) You imagine such an arising and transformation of gross material elements of hell beings there [in hell] as due to their karmic deeds, while the perfuming of those karmic deeds is lodged in their individual continua of cognition, not elsewhere. B) So why do you not accept that such a transformation of cognition as the result of those [karmic deeds] is precisely where the perfuming itself is? C) For what reason, in this case, do you imagine that the result of those [karmic deeds] is somewhere where the perfuming is not?
VII

D) smras pa | lung gi gtan tshigs yod de | E) gal te rnam par shes pa nyid
gzugs la sogs par snang gi | gzugs la sogs pa'i don ni med na gzugs la
sogs pa'i skye mched yod par ni bcom ldan 'das kyis gsung bar mi 'gyur
ro zhe na |
VII

D) āgamaḥ kāraṇaṁ | E) yadi vijñānam eva rūpādipratibhāsaṁ syān na rūpādiko ('')ṛthas tadā rūpādyayatanāstitvaṁ bhagavatā noktaṁ syāt*

[Objection]

D) The reason is scripture. E) If there were nothing but cognition with the appearance of material form and the rest, and no external objects characterized as material form and the rest, then the Blessed One would not have spoken of the existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest.
VIII

A) 'di ni gtan tshigs ma yin te | 'di ltar |

gzugs sogs skye mched yod par ni ||
des 'dul ba yi skye bo la ||
dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste ||
rdzus te byung ba'i sms can bzhin || [8]

B) dper na bcom ldan 'das kyis rdzus te byung ba'i sms can bzhin yod do || zhes gsungs pa yang phyi ma la sms kyi rgyud rgyun mi 'chad pa la dgongs nas dgongs pa'i dbang gis gsungs pa ste |
A) akāraṇam etat* yasmāt*,

rūpādyāyanāstītvarām tadvineyajaranam prati |
abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādakaśtvat* || [8 ||]

B) yathāsti satva upapāduka ity uktam bhagavatā'bhiprāyavaśāc
cittasantaṭyanucchedam ācārayām abhipretya |

[Vasubandhu]
A) This is not a reason, since:

The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. [8]

B) By way of example, the Blessed One with a special intention said “There are beings of spontaneous birth,” intending [allusion to] the nonannihilation of the continuum of mind in the future. D) [We know this] because of the [scriptural] statement:
‘di na bdag gam sems can med ||
chos ‘di rgyu dang bcas las byung ||

zhes gsungs pa‘i phyir ro || de bzhin du bcom ldan ‘das kyis gzugs la
sogs pa‘i skye mched yod par gsungs pa yang de bstan pas ‘dul ba‘i skye
bo‘i ched du ste | bka‘ de ni dgongs pa can no ||
VIII

C) nāstihā satva ātmā vā dharmaṁs tv ete sahetukāḥ (∥∥)

D) iti vacanāt* | E) evaṁ rūpādyāyatanāstitvam apy uktam bhagavatā tad desanāvīneyajanam adhikṛtyety aḥbhīprāyikam tad vacanaṁ |

C) Here [in our teaching] there is no being or self, but [only] these elemental factors of existence along with their causes.

E) Thus, although the Blessed One did speak of the existence of the sense-fields of form and the rest, that [scriptural] statement is of special intention since it is directed toward the individual who is to be guided by that teaching.
"dir ci las dgongs she na |
rang gi sa bon gang las su ||
rnam rig snang ba gang byung ba ||
de dag de yi skye mched ni ||
rnam pa gnyis su thub pas gsungs || [9]"
A) ko (’)trābhīprāyāḥ |

yataḥ svabijād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate |
dvidhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravit* || [9 ||]

A) In this regard, what is the special intention?

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation]. [9]
8) 'di skad du bstan 'gyur zhe na | 6) gzugs su snang ba'i rnam par rig pa rang gi sa bon 'gyur ba'i bye brag tu 'gyur pa gang las byung ba'i sa bon de dang | snang ba gang yin pa 6) de dang de dag ni de'i mig dang | gzugs kyi skye mched du bcom ldan 'das kyis go rims bzhin du gsungs so | 6) de bzhin du reg byar snang ba'i rnam par rig pa'i bar du rang rang gi sa bon 'gyur ba'i bye brag tu 'gyur pa'i sa bon gang las byung ba'i sa bon de dang | snang ba gang yin pa 6) de dang de dag ni bcom ldan 'das kyis de'i lus dang reg bya'i skye mched du go rims bzhin du gsungs te | 6) 'di ni 'dir dgongs pa'o |
What is being stated? The proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of visible form, and that as which this [cognition] appears: the Blessed One spoke of these two as, respectively, the sense field of visual perception [“seeing eye” = seed] and the sense field of visible form [= the object] related to that manifestation. The same [applies to all items in the stock list] up to: The Blessed One spoke of the proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of the tangible, and that as which this [manifestation] appears: [the Blessed One spoke] of these two as, respectively, the sense field of tangible perception [“body” = seed] and the sense field of the tangible [= the object] related to that [manifestation]. This is the special intention.
A) de ltar dgongs pa'i dbang gis bstan pa la yon tan ci yod ce na |

   de ltar gang zag la bdag med par
   'jug par 'gyur ro || [10ab]

B) de ltar bshad na gang zag la bdag med par 'jug par 'gyur te |

c) drug po gnyis las rnam par shes pa drug 'byung gi |
   lta ba po gcig pu nas reg pa po'i bar du gang yang med par rig nas gang dag gang zag la bdag med
   par bstan pas 'dul ba de dag gang zag la bdag med par 'jug go|
A) evaṁ punar abhiprāyavaśena deśayitvā ko guṇaḥ ||

tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hi ||

B) tathā hi deśyamāne pudgalanairātmyaṁ praviśanti | c) dva(ya)ṣ[a](tkāḥ śyāṁ vijñā)naṣaṭkaṁ pravarttate na tu kaścid eko draṣṭāsti na yāvan mantety evaṁ vidītvā ye pudgalanairātmyadeśaṁ-vineyās te pudgalanairātmyaṁ praviśanti ||

[Objection]

And what is the advantage of having explained things in this way by recourse to special intention?

[Vasubandhu]

For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. [10ab]

For when it is being taught in this way [those individuals to be guided] understand the idea of the selflessness of persons. c) The six cognitions come about from the two sets of six [= the twelve sense-fields], but when they understand that there is no distinct seer at all—[and all members of the stock list] up to—no distinct thinker, those who are to be guided by the teaching of the selflessness of persons understand the idea of the selflessness of persons.
gzhan du yang
bstan pa'i chos la bdag med par
'jug 'gyur || [10bcd]

gzhan du yang zhes bya ba ni rnam par rig pa tsam du bstan pa'o || b) ji ltar chos la bdag med par 'jug ce na | s) rnam par rig pa tsam 'di nyid gzugs la sogs pa'i chos su snang bar 'byung ste | c) gzugs la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid kyi chos gang yang med par rig nas 'jug go ||
Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of elemental factors of existence. [10bcd]

D) “In another way” refers to the teaching of Manifestation-Only. 
E) How does this lead to understanding the selflessness of elemental factors of existence? 
F) [One understands this by] knowing that this Manifestation-Only arises with the semblance of elemental factors of existence such as material form and the rest, but actually there is no existing elemental factor of existence having as its characteristic mark material form and the rest.
gal te chos rnam pa thams cad du med na rnam par rig pa tsam zhes bya ba de yang med pas de ji ltar rnam par gzhag ce na |
X

\[ \text{H) yadi tarhi sarvathā dharman nāsti tad api vijñaptimātraiṁ nāstīti ( | ) kathaṁ tarhi vyavasthāpyate |} \]

[Objection]

\[ \text{H) If, then, no elemental factor of existence exists in any fashion, Manifestation-Only does not exist either. How, then, could [your position] be established?} \]
chos ni rnam pa thams cad du med pa ma yin pas de ltar chos la bdag med par 'jug par 'gyur te |

brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis | [10d]
It is not the case that one comes to understand the selflessness of elemental factors of existence by thinking that the elemental factors of existence do not exist in any fashion at all. But rather [such understanding comes in thinking that elemental factors of existence exist only]:

**In terms of an imagined self.**
X

κ) gang byis pa rnams kyischos rnams kyi rang bzhin kun btags pa'i bdag nyid des de dag bdag med kyi ༨༨, sangs rgyas kyi yul gang yin pa brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis ni med pa ma yin no || ༨༨ de ltar rnam par rig pa tsam yang rnam par rig pa gzhan gyis kun btags pa'i bdag nyid kyis bdag med par rtogs pa'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam du rnam par gzhag paschos thams cad lachos la bdag med par 'jug pa yin gyi | yod pa de la yang rnam pa thams cad du skur pas ni ma yin no || ༨༨ gzhan du na ni rnam par rig pa gzhan yang rnam par rig pa gzhan gyi don du 'gyur bas rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du mi 'grub ste | rnam par rig pa rnams don dang ldan pa'i phyir ro ||
The reference is to the selflessness of those elemental factors of existence the intrinsic nature of which—characterized by subject and object and so on—fools fantasize in terms of an imagined self. The reference is not to [the selflessness of elemental factors of existence] in terms of the inexpressible self, which is the domain of the Buddhas. In this way, Manifestation-Only also leads to an understanding of the selflessness of all elemental factors of existence through the establishment of the fact of Manifestation-Only because of an understanding of selflessness in terms of a self fantasized by another manifestation, not because of a denial of the existence of those [elemental factors of existence] in each and every respect. For otherwise one manifestation would have another manifestation as its external object, and therefore the fact of Manifestation-Only could not be proved, because manifestations would possess external objects.
XI

bcom ldan 'das kyis dgongs pa 'dis gzugs la sogs pa'i skye mched yod par gsungs kyi | gzugs la sogs pa gang dag yod bzhin du de dag rnam par rig pa so so'i yul du mi 'gyur ro zhes bya ba de ji ltar rtogs par bya zhe na |
XI

A) kathāṁ punar idam pratyetavyam anenaḥbhīraṇeṇa bhagavatā rūpādyāyatanaṃstītvam uktam na punaḥ santy eva tāni yāni rūpādvijñāntām pratyekaṁ viṣayībhavantīti |

[Objection]

A) How, then, should one understand this, namely, that while the Blessed One spoke of the existence of the sense-fields of visible form and the rest with this special intention, those things which come to be the corresponding sense objects of the manifestations of visible form and the rest do not actually exist at all?
de ni gcig na'ang yul min la ||
phra rab rdul du du ma'ang min ||
de dag 'dus pa 'ang ma yin te ||
'di ltar rdul phran mi 'grub phyir || [11]
XI

yasmān

na tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viṣayaḥ paramāṇuṣah |
na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati || [11 || ]

[Vasubandhu]

b) Since:

That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms] compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved. [11]
 XI

c. ji skad du bstan par 'gyur zhe na | d. gang gzugs la sogs pa'i skye mched gzugs la sogs pa rnam par rig pa so so'i yul yin du zin na de ni gcig pu zhig yin te | ji ltar bye brag pa rnam pa rnam kyis cha shas can gyi ngo bor brtag pa'i lta bu 'am | rdul phra rab du ma 'am rdul phra rab de dag nyid 'dus pa zhig tu 'gyur grang na | e. gcig pu de ni yul ma yin te | cha shas rnam las gzhan pa cha shas can gyi ngo bo gang la'ang mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro || f. du ma'ang yul ma yin te | rdul phra rab so so la mi 'dzin pa'i phyir ro || g. de dag 'dus pa yang yul ma yin te | 'di ltar rdul phra rab rdzas gcig tu mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro ||
XI

\[\text{c) iti } ( | ) \text{ kim uktam bhavati | d) yat tad rūpādikam āyatanaṁ rūpādīvijñāptiṁ pratyekaṁ viṣayaḥ syāt tad ekaṁ vā syād yathā v'vayavirūpaṁ kalpyate vaiśeṣikaiḥ anekaṁ vā paramāṇuśaḥ saṁhataḥ vā ta eva paramāṇavah | e) na tāvad ekaṁ viṣayo bhavaty avayavebhyaḥ }\]

\[\, '(\text{')nyasyāvayavirūpaṁ\, }\text{kvacid apy agrahaṇāt* | f) nāpy anekaṁ }\]

\[\text{paramāṇunāṁ pratyekam agrahaṇāt* | g) nāpi te saṁhata viṣayī- bhavanti | yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyaṁ na sidhyati |}\]

\[\text{c) What is stated here? d) Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary—as the Vaiśeṣikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole—or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. e) First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. f) Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. g) Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance.}
A) ji ltar mi ’grub ce na |
B) 'di ltar ||

drug gis cig car sbyar bas na ||
phra rab rdul cha drug tu ’gyur || [12ab]

c) phyogs drug nas rdul phra rab drug gis cig car du sbyar na ni rdul phra
rab cha drug tu ’gyur te | gcig gi go gang yin pa der gzhan mi ‘byung ba’i
phyir ro ||
XII

A) kathaṁ na sidhyati

B) yasmāt*

ṣaṭkena yugapadyogat paramāṇoḥ śaḍaṇśatā ||

C) ḥṣaḍbhyo digbhyaḥ ḥṣaḍbhīḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ śaḍaṇśatā prāpnoti । ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsam-bhavat* ||

[Objection]

A) How is [the atom as a singular substance] not proved?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts, [12ab]

C) If there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise.
drug po dag kyang go gcig na ||  
gong bu rdul phran tsam du 'gyur || [12cd]  

\[\text{v)}\] ji ste rdul phra rab gcig gi go gang yin pa de nyid du drug po rnams kyi go yang yin na ni \[\text{v)}\] des na thams cad go gcig pa'i phyir gong bu thams cad rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur te | phan tshun tha dad pa med pa'i phyir \[\text{v)}\] gong bu gang yang snang bar mi 'gyur ro || \[\text{v)}\] kha che'i bye brag tu smra ba rnams nyes pa 'di 'byung du 'ong ngo zhes te | rdul phra rab rnams ni cha shas med pa'i phyir sbyor ba ma yin gyi | 'dus pa dag ni phan tshun sbyor ro zhes zer ba \[\text{v)}\] de dag la 'di skad du | \[\text{i)}\] rdul phra rab rnams 'dus pa gang yin pa de de dag las don gzhan rnams ma yin no zhes brjod par bya'o ||
D) Or, the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. Ele For this [reason], because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom, because they would not exclude one another. E) Thus no cluster would be visible at all. G) The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas say: “Atoms do not at all conjoin, because of being partless—absolutely not! But compounded things do conjoin one with another.” H) They should be questioned as follows: I) Since a compound of atoms is not something separate from those [atoms],

G) niravayavatvāt ] MS: niravayavatvāt
XIII

rdul phran sbyor ba med na ni ||
de 'dus yod pa de gang gis || [13ab]

A) sbyor ba zhes bya bar bsnyegs so ||
cha shas yod ba ma yin pas ||
de sbyor mi 'grub ma zer cig | [13cd]

B) ji ste 'dus pa dag kyang phan tshun mi sbyor ro zhe na | rdul phra rab
rnams ni cha shas med pa'i phyir sbyor ba mi 'grub bo zhes ma zer cig |
'dus pa cha shas dang bcas pa yang sbyor bar khas mi len pa'i phyir ro ||
c) de bas rdul phra rab rdzas gcig pu mi 'grub bo || d) rdul phra rab sbyor
bar 'dod kyang rung mi 'dod kyang rung ste |
Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? [13ab]

A) “Conjoining” is carried over [from the previous].

But it is also not due to their partlessness that the conjunction of those [atoms] is not proved. [13cd]

B) If you now were to claim that even compounds do not conjoin with one another, then you [Kashmiri Vaibhasikas] should not say that the conjunction of atoms is not proved because of their partlessness, for a conjunction of the compounded, even with parts, is not admitted. c) Therefore, the atom is not proved as a singular substance.

And whether a conjunction of atoms is accepted or not:

B) niravayavatvāt ] MS: niravayavatvāt
gang la phyogs cha tha dad yod  ||
de ni gcig tu mi rung ngo  || [14ab]

A) rdul phra rab kyi shar phyogs kyi cha yang gzhan pa nas 'og gi cha'i
bar du yang gzhan te | phyogs kyi cha tha dad na de'i bdag nyid kyi rdul
phra rab gcig pur ji ltar rung |

grib dang sgrib par ji ltar 'gyur  || [14c]
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dīghāgabheda yasyāsti tasyaikatvan na yuyjate |

A) anyo hi paramānoḥ [ṛvadig][bh](āgo) <śā| yāvad adho-
dīghāga iti dīghāgabhede sati kathāṁ tadātmakasya paramāṇor eka-
tvaṁ yokṣyate |

chāyāvṛtī kathāṁ vā |

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differen-
tation be singular. [14ab]

A) If there were spatial differentiation of an atom—namely, the
front part is different [and so are all the other sides] including the
bottom part—how would the singularity of an atom with that
[multiple] nature be reasonable?

Or how is there shadow and obstruction? [14c]
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b) gal te rdul phra rab re re la phyogs kyi cha tha dad pa med na ni nyi ma shar ba'i tshe ngos gzhan na ni grib ma 'bab par ji ltar 'gyur te | c) de la ni gang du nyi ma 'bab pa'i phyogs gzhan med do || d) gal te phyogs kyi cha tha dad par mi 'dod na rdul phra rab la rdul phra rab gzhan gyis sgrin par yang ji ltar 'gyur | e) rdul phra rab gang la yang cha shas gzhan med na gang du 'ong ba'i phyogs la gcig la gcig thogs par 'gyur | f) thogs pa med na ni thams cad go gcig tu gyur pas 'dus pa thams cad rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur te | de ni bshad zin to ||
If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it that when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, sunshine in another? For that [atom] does not have another portion on which there would be no sunshine. And how is an atom obstructed by another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? For [an atom] has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact with which one [atom] would be resisted by another. And if there were no resistance, then because all of them would share a common location, the entire compound would be the extent of a [single] atom, as has been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].
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grib ma dang sgrib pa rdul phra rab kyi ma yin yang | ci gong bu'i yin pa de ltar yang mi 'dod dam |

rdul phra rab rnams las gong bu gzhan zhig yin par 'dod dam ci na de dag de'i yin |

smras pa | ma yin no ||

1) ma yin no | All editions: yin no
[Objection]

Do you not accept in this way that the two, shadow and obstruction, belong to the cluster, not to the atom?

[Vasubandhu]

Do you, for your part, accept that the cluster which would possess those two [shadow and obstruction] is something other than the atoms?

[Opponent]

We say: no.
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gong bu gzhan min de de'i min || [14d]

j) gal te rdul phra rab rnams las gong bu gzhan ma yin na de dag de'i ma yin par grub pa yin no ||
k) yongs su rtogs pa 'di ni gnas pa'i khyad par te | gzugs la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid ni ma bkag na rdul phra rab ce 'am | 'dus ba zhes bsam pa 'dis ci zhig bya zhe na |
anyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te (|| 14 ||)

\[ j) \text{yadi } nā)\text{nyaḥ paramāṇubhyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati} | \]
\[ k) \text{sanniveśaparikalpa eṣaḥ } ( | ) \text{paramāṇuḥ saṁghāta iti vā kim anayā cintayā } ( | ) \text{lakṣaṇaḥ tu rūpā(} \text{dinām} \text{) na pratiśidhyate} | \]

[Vasubandhu]

If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster]. [14cd]

\[ j) \text{If you do not accept the cluster as something other than the atoms, then it is proved that the two [shadow and obstruction] are not [properties] of that [cluster].} \]

[Objection]

\[ k) \text{This is mere imaginative speculation about construction. Why do you have this worry about whether it is an atom or a compound? In any case, the characteristic of visible form and the rest is not negated.} \]
1) de dag gi mtshan nyid gang yin |

2) mig la sog pa'i yul nyid dang || sngon po la sog pa nyid do ||

3) gang mig la sog pa'i yul sngon po dang | ser po la sog ba 'dod pa de ci rdzas gcig pu zhig gam | 'on te du ma zhig ces de dpyad par bya'o ||
Then what is their characteristic?

Being a sense-field of visual perception and the rest, and blueness and the like [are the characteristic of visible form].

This is precisely what is being determined: is the sense-field of visual perception and the rest you accept as blue, yellow and so on a single substance, or rather multiple?
A) 'dis ci zhig bya zhe na |
B) du ma'i nyes pa ni bshad zin to ||

gcig na rim gyis 'gro ba med ||
zin dang ma zin cig car med ||
ris chad du mar gnas pa dang ||
mig gis mi sod phra ba 'ang med || [15]

B) nyes pa | All editions: nges pa
XV

A) kiñ cātaḥ |

B) anekatve doṣa uktaḥ ||

ekatve na krameṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau |
vicchinnānekavṛttiś ca sūkṣmānīkṣa ca no bhavet* || [15 || ]

[Objection]
A) And what [follows] from this?

[Vasubandhu]
B) The fault if it is [judged to be] multiple has already been discussed.

If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion, no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension, nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic. [15]
c) gal te mig gi yul sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa gang yin pa de ris su ma chad de rdzas gcig par rtogs na sa la rim gyis 'gro bar mi 'gyur te |
gom pa gcig bor bas thams cad du son pa'i phyir ro || d) tshu rol gyi cha zin la pha rol gyi cha ma zin pa cig car du mi 'gyur te | de'i tshe zin pa dang ma zin pa de mi rigs so ||
C) If one imagines the visual sense-object, blue and the rest, as long as it is undivided, to be a single substance, there would not be gradual motion on the ground—going, that is to say—because everything would be traversed with a single foot-step. D) And the apprehension of a facing portion and the non-apprehension of the non-facing portion would not be simultaneous, because the apprehension and non-apprehension of the very same thing at that [same] time is not reasonable.
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glang po chen dang rta la sogs pa'i ris su chad pa du ma gcig na 'dug par mi 'gyur te | gcig gang na 'dug pa de nyid na gzhan yang 'dug na de dag ris su chad par ji ltar rung | de gnyis kyis gang non pa dang ma non pa de dag gcig tu ji ltar rung ste | bar na de dag gis stong pa gzung du yod pa'i phyir ro || gal te mtshan nyid tha dad pa nyid kyis rdzas gzhan kho nar rtog gi gzhan du ma yin na go | chu'i skye bo phra mo rnams kyang chen po dag dang gzugs mtshungs pas mig gis mi sod par mi 'gyur ro ||
And there would be no existence of divided and multiple elephants, horses and so on in a single place; because one thing would be just precisely where another is, how could a division between them be reasonable? Or on the other hand, how is it reasonable that that [place] is single which is [both] occupied by those two [elephant and horse] and not occupied, since one apprehends that the gap between them is empty of the two? And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible.
de'i phyir nges par rdul phra rab tha dad par brtag par bya ste | de dag gcig tu mi 'grub bo || de ma grub pas gzugs la sogs pa yang mig la sogs pa'i yul nyid du mi 'grub ste | rnam par rig pa tsam du grub pa yin no ||
Therefore [since this is not the case], one must certainly imagine a distinction atomically. And that [atom] is not proved to be singular. Since [the singular atom] is not proven, the fact that visible form—and the rest—are sense-fields of the visual—and the rest—is unproven; therefore Manifestation-Only comes to be proved.
XVI

Aj tshad ma'i dbang gis na yod dam med pa dmigs kyis dbye bar 'gyur la |
tshad ma thams cad kyi nang na mngon sum gyi tshad ma ni mchog
yin no || Bj don de med na 'di ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam pa blo 'di
ji ltar 'byung zhe na |
A) pramāṇaśād astitvaṁ nāstitvaṁ vā nirdhāryate ( | ) sarveṣāṁ ca pramāṇāṁ pratyakṣam pramāṇaṁ gariṣṭham B) ity asaty arthe ka(tham) iyaṁ buddhir bha(vatidam me) pratyakṣam iti ||

[Objection]

A) Existence or non-existence is settled on the strength of the valid means of cognition, and of all valid means of cognition, direct perception is the most important valid means of cognition. B) Therefore, if an external object does not exist, how does this awareness come about, namely ‘this is before my eyes’?

A) pramāṇānāṁ | MS: praṇānāṁ
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mngon sum blo ni rmi sog s bzhin || [a6a]

c. don med par yang zhes sngar bstan pa nyid do ||

de yang gang tshe de yi tshe ||
khyod kyi don de mi snang na ||
de ni mngon sum ji ltar ’dod || [a6bcd]
The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on. \([16ab]\)

c\(_3\) I already earlier made the point that “Even without an external object” [is understood].

Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived? \([16bcd]\)
gang gi tshe yul ’di nyid ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam du mngon sum gyi blo de byung ba de'i tshe khyod kyi don de mi snang ste | yid kyi rnam par shes pas yongs su bcad pa dang | mig gi rnam par shes pa yang de'i tshe ’gags pa'i phyir ro || lhag par yang skad cig mar smra bas de mngon sum du ji ltar ’dod || de ltar na de'i tshe gzugs dang rol sogs pa de dag ni ’gags zin to ||
And [at the moment] when that idea [that there is] direct perception [of the external object] comes about with the thought “This is my direct perception,” that external object is not seen [at that same moment], because the discerning takes place only by means of mental cognition, and because at that time the visual cognition [which precedes the mental cognition] has ceased. Given this, how can you accept that that [object] is directly perceived? What is more, [this holds] especially for one who advocates the momentariness [of all things], for whom [the respective] visible form, or flavor and the rest, has [already] entirely ceased at that time.
A) myong ba med par yid kyi rnam par shes pa dran par mi ’gyur bas B) don gdon mi za bar myong bar ’gyur te | de ni de mthong ba yin no ||
C) de ltar de'i yul gzugs la sogs pa mngon sum du 'dod do zhe na |
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A) nānanubhūtam manovijñānena smaryate \( \langle \ ) \) B) ity avaśyam arthānubhavena bhavitavyam tac ca darśanam ity C) evaṁ tadviṣayasya rūpāde(h) p(r)atyakṣatvamī mataṁ |

[Objection]

A) What was not [previously] experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition. B) Therefore, there must be experience of an external object, and that is spoken of as ‘seeing’. C) In this way I consider it to be a case of an direct perception of that sense-object, [namely] material form and the rest.
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d) myong ba ni don dran pa yin no || zhes de ma grub ste | 'di ltar |

    dper na der snang rnam rig bzhin ||
    bshad zin | [17ab]

e) dper na don med par don du snang ba mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogsp a'i rnam par rig pa 'byung ba de bzhin te bshad zin to ||

    de las dran par zad | [17b]
This [argument about] recollection [being] of an experienced external object is unproved, since:

As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object]. [17ab]

I have discussed how, even in the absence of an external object, a manifestation consisting of visual cognition and so forth arises with the appearance of an external object.

Recollection [comes] from that. [17b]
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r) rnam pa rig pa de las dran pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa der snang ba nyid gzugs la sogs pa la rnam par rtog pa yid kyi rnam par rig pa 'byung ste | c) dran pa byung ba las don myong bar mi 'grub bo ||

h) dper na rmi lam gyi rnam par rig pa'i yul yod pa ma yin pa de bzhin du | gal te gnyid kyis ma log pa'i tshe na yang , de ltar yin na ni de kho na bzhin du de med par 'jig rten rang rang gis khong du chud pa'i rigs na | y) de ltar yang ma yin te | k) de'i phyir rmi lam bzhin du don dmigs pa thams cad don med pa ma yin no zhe na |
For from that manifestation arises a mental manifestation associated with memory, which has precisely the appearance of that [material form] and conceptually fantasizes itself [to refer to] material form and so on; thus the arisal of a memory does not prove the experience of an external object.

[Objection]

If a manifestation were to have as its sense-object an unreal external object also for one awake, just as is the case in a dream, in precisely that way everyone would understand by themselves the non-existence of that [external object]. But that is not how it is. Therefore, it is not so that all referential objectifications of external objects are, as is the case in a dream, devoid of external objects.
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1) de ni gtan tshigs su mi rung ste | 'di ltar |

rmi lam mthong ba yul med par ||
ma sad bar du rtogs ma yin || [17cd]

M) de ltar log par rnam par rtog pa la goms pa'i bag chags kyi gnyid kyis
log pa'i 'jig rten ni rmi lam bzhin du yang dag pa ma yin pa'i don
mthong te | N) ma sad kyi bar du de med par ji lta ba bzhin du rtogs pa
ma yin gyi | O) gang gi tshe de'i gnyen po 'jig rten las 'das pa rnam par mi
rtog pa'i ye shes thob nas sad par gyur pa de'i tshe de'i rjes las thob pa
dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes de mngon du gyur nas yul med par ji lta ba
bzhin du khong du chud de de ni mtshungs so ||
XVII

$^{1}$ idam ajñāpakām* | yasmāt* |

svapnadr̥gviṣayābhāvaṁ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati |[[ 17 || ]

$^{14}$ evaṁ vitathavikalpābhāabhāvaṁ nāprabuddhas tadabhāvaṁ yathāvaṁ nāvagacchati, o) yada tu tatpratipakṣalokottaranirvikalpa-

$^{14}$ jñānalabhāt prabuddho bhavati tadā tatprṣṭhalabdhaśuddhalaukika-

$^{14}$ jñānasammukhībhāvād viṣayābhāvaṁ yathāvaṁ avagacchatīti samānam etat* |

[Vasubandhu]

$^{14}$ You cannot draw a conclusion from this, since:

**One who is not awake does not understand the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream.** [17cd]

$^{14}$ Just so everyone, asleep with the sleep of repeated perfuming of erroneous conceptual fantasy, sees unreal external objects, as in a dream; o) being unawakened, they do not properly understand the non-existence of the [external object]. o) But when they are awakened through the acquisition of supramundane non-discriminative insight which is the antidote to that [erroneous imagination], then they properly understand the non-existence of the sense-object because the subsequently obtained pure worldly insight becomes present. This [situation] is the same.
A) gal te rang gi rgyud gyur pa'i khyad par nyid las sems can rnams kyi
don du snang ba'i rnam par rig pa 'byung gi | don gyi khyad par las ma
yin na | b) brten pa de dang bshad pa de med pas sdig pa'i grogs po dang
| dge ba'i bshes gnyen la brten pa dang | dam pa dang dam pa ma yin
pa'i chos mnyan pa las sems can rnams kyi kyi rnam par rig pa nges pa ji
ltar 'grub par 'gyur |
[Objection]

A) If manifestations with the appearance of external objects were to arise for beings only through particular transformations of their own mental continua, not through particular external objects, then how is it proved that association with bad or good spiritual guides, and hearing true and false teachings, shape the manifestations of beings, if that association with the good and the bad and that teaching do not [actually] exist?
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gcig la gcig gi dbang gis na ||
rnam par rig pa phan tshun nges || [18ab]

cj sems can thams cad kyi rnam par rig pa phan tshun gyi dbang gis phan tshun du rnam par rig pa rnam rnam nges par 'gyur te | ci rigs su sbyar ro || dj gcig la gcig ces bya ba ni phan tshun no || ej de'i phyir rgyud gzan gyi rnam par rig pa'i khyad par las rgyud gzan la rnam par rig pa'i khyad par 'byung gi don gyi khyad par las ni ma yin no ||
anyonyādhipatitvena vijñaptiniyamo mithah ||

cj sarveśāṁ hi satvānāṁ anyonyavijñaptyādhipatyena mitho vijñapter niyamo bhavati yathāyogāṁ | pj mitha iti parasparataḥ | ej atāḥ santānāntaravijñaptiviśeṣāṁ santānāntare vijñaptiviśeṣa utpadyate nārthaviśeṣāṁ* |

Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other. [18ab]

cj Because all beings exert an influence on each others’ manifestations, there comes to be mutual shaping of manifestation, according to the circumstances. pj “Mutually” means “reciprocally.” ej Therefore, a distinct manifestation arises within one mental continuum because of a distinct manifestation within another mental continuum, not because of a distinct external object.
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v) dper na rmi lam gyi rnam par rig pa'i don med ba bzhin du gal te gnyid kyis ma log pa'i yang de lta na gnyid kyis log pa dang ma log pa na dge ba dang mi dge ba'i las kun tu spyod pa'i 'bras bu phyi ma la 'dod pa dang mi 'dod pa 'dra bar ci'i phyir mi 'gyur |

sems ni gnyid kyis non pas na ||
de phyir rmi dang 'bras mi mtshungs || [18cd]

h) de ni 'dir rgyu yin gyi don yod pa ni ma yin no ||
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\[ F \] yadi yathā svapne nirarthikā vilōnapti evaṁ jāgrato (')pi syāt kasmāt kuśalākuśalasamudācāre suptāsuptayos tulyaṁ phalam iṣṭāniṣṭaṁ ayaṁ na bhavati ( )

\[ G \] yasmāt* |

middhenopahaṭaṁ cittaṁ svapne tenāsamāṁ phalaṁ  
[[[18 || ]] ]

\[ H \] idam atra kāraṇaṁ na tv arthasādhvāḥ |

[Objection]

\[ F \] If [as you claim] a manifestation were devoid of an external object likewise also for one awake, as is the case in a dream, why do those asleep and those not asleep not come in the future to have the same [karmic] result, desired and undesired [respectively], of [their] wholesome and unwholesome behavior?

[Vasubandhu]

\[ G \] Since:

\[ \text{When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same.} \ [i8cd] \]

\[ H \] This is the cause in this case, and not [some alleged] real existence of an external object.
XIX

A) gal te 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam du zad na gang la yang lus dang ngag kyang med pas shan pa la sogs pas gsod pa na lug la sogs pa 'chi bar ji ltar 'gyur | B) 'chi ba de des ma byas na ni shan pa la sogs pa srog gcod pa'i kha na ma tho ba dang ldan par ji ltar 'gyur zhe na |
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A) yadi vijñāptimātram evedāṁ na kasyacit kāyo (‘)sti na vāk* katham upakramamāṇāṇāṁ aurabhrikādhīṁ urabhṛādīṁ maraṇam bhavati , b) atatkṛte vā tanmarane katham aurabhrikādīṁ prāṇātipātāvadyena yogō bhavati ||

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, and no one has a body or voice, how does the death of rams and others being attacked by butchers come about? b) Or if their death is not due to those [butchers], how does there come to be a connection between the butchers and the crime of taking life?

A) upakramya° ] MS: anukramya°
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'chi ba gzhan gyi rnam rig gi ||
bye brag las de dper bya na ||
'dre la sog pa'i yid dbang gis ||
gzhan gyi dran nyams 'gyur sog bzhin || [19]

c) dper na 'dre la sog pa'i yid kyi dbang gis gzhan dag gi dran pa nyams pa dang | rmi ltas su mthong ba dang | 'byung po'i gdon phab par 'gyur ba dang | d) rdzu 'phrul dang ldan pa'i yid kyi dbang gis te | e) dper na 'phags pa kā tyā'i bu chen po'i byin gyi brlabs kyis sa ra ṇas rmi ltas su mthong ba dang | f) drang srong dgon pa pa'i yid 'khrugs pas thags zangs ris c) bzhin du gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa'i bye brag gis sens can gzhan gyi srog gi dbang po dang mi mthun pa'i 'gyur ba 'ga' 'byung ste | des skal ba 'dra ba'i rgyud kyi rgyun chad pa zhes bya ba 'chi bar rig par bya'o ||

G)

skal ba | All editions: bskal pa
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maranāṁ paravijñaptiviseṣād vikriyā yathā |
smṛtilopādikāṁyeṣāṁ piśācādimanovasāt* || [19 || ]

C) yathā hi piśācādimanovasād anyeṣāṁ smṛtilopasvapna-
darśanabhūtagrahāveśavikārā bhavanti | d) ṛddhivanmanovasaṅc ca | e) yathā sāraṇasyāryamahākātyāyanādhiṣṭhānāt svapndarśanaṁ | f) āranyakarṣimanaḥpradoṣāc ca vema[c]itriṇā.ṣṭam.ḥ parājayah | g) tathā paravijñaptiviseṣādhipatyāt pareṣāṁ jivitendriyavirodhini kācid vikri-
yotpadyate yayā sabhāgasantasattivicchedākhyam maraṇam bhavatiḥ veditavyaṁ |

Death is a transformation due to a particular manifes-
tation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on. [19]

C) Just as, due to the mental force of demons and so on others come to experience dislocations [including] memory loss, dream visions and possession by ghouls of illness, d) and [this also takes place] due to the mental force of those possessed of superpowers— e) For example, Sāraṇa had a dream vision due to the controlling power of Ārya-Mahākātyāyana, f) and the conquest of Vemacitrin was due to the hostility of the forest ascetics— C) Just so, it is due to the influence of a particular manifestation of another that there arises some transformation of others obstructing the life force, by which there comes to be death, designated as the cutting off of related [mental] continuities. This is how it should be understood.
drang srong khros pas dan ta ka'i ||
dgon pa ji ltar stongs par 'gyur || [20ab]

A) gal te gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa'i bye brag gis sems can dag 'chi bar mi 'dod na | b) yid kyi nyes pa kha na ma tho ba chen po dang bcas pa nyid du bsgrub pa na | bcom ldan 'das kyis khyim bdag nye ba 'khor la bka' stsal pa | c) khyim bdag khyod kyis dan ta ka'i dgon pa dang | ka ling ka'i dgon pa dang ma tang ka'i dgon pa de dag ci zhig gis stongs pa dang | gtsang mar gyur pa ci thos zhes smras pa dang | d) des gau ta ma drang srong rnams khros pas de ltar gyur ces thos so zhes gsol to ||
kathāṁ vā daṇḍakārṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ |

A) yadi paravijñaptiviśedhipatīt satvāṁṁ maraṇaṁ nesyaṁ |
B) mano daṇḍasya hi mahāśayatvāṁ sādhayatā bhagavatopālir
gṛhapatiḥ prṣṭaṁ c kaccit te gṛhapate śrutaṁ kena tāṁ daṇḍakārṇyaṁ
mātaṅgārṇyaṁ kalingārṇyaṁ śūnyāṁ udhyābhūtāṁ ( | ) D) tenok-
taṁ śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṛṣīṇaṁ manahpradoṣeṇetī ||

Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by
the sages’ anger? [20ab]

A) If you do not accept that beings die because of the influence
of a particular manifestation of another [how do you account for what
happened in the Daṇḍaka forests?]. B) For the Blessed One, in proving
that mental violence is highly objectionable, asked the householder
Upāli: C) “Have you heard anything, householder? By whom were the
Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the Kalinga forests emptied
and made ritually pure?” D) He said: “I have heard, O Gautama, it was
through the mental hostility of the sages.”
yid nyes kha na ma tho cher ||
ji ltar de yis 'grub par 'gyur || [20cd]

gal te 'di ltar rtog ste || de la dga' ba mi ma yin pa de dag gis de na gnas
pa'i sems can rnams kha btag gi | drang srong rnams kyis yid 'khrugs
pas dogs pa ni ma yin no zhe na | g de ltar na las des lus dang ngag gi
nyes pa rnams pas yid kyi nyes pa ches kha na ma tho ba chen po dang
bcas par 'grub par ji ltar 'gyur te | g de'i yid 'khrugs pa tsam gyis sems
can de snyed 'chi bar 'grub bo ||
manodanḍo mahāvadyaḥ kathāṁ vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||

E) yady evaṁ kalpyate, tadabhiprasannair amānuṣais tadvāsi-naḥ satvā utsāditā na tv ṛṣīnāṁ* manahpradosāṁ mṛṭā ity v) evaṁ sati kathaṁ tena karmmaṇā manodanḍaḥ kāyavāgdāṇḍābhyām mahā-vadyatamaḥ siddho bhavati ⟨ | ⟩ o) tan manahpradosaṁatrena tāvatāṁ satvānāṁ* maraṇāṁ maraṇāṁ sidhyati |

Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?

[20cd]

E) If you were to imagine as follows: beings dwelling there were annihilated by non-humans favorable to those [sages], rather than dying due to the mental hostility of the sages—f) if such were the case, how does that action prove mental violence to be a much greater violation than physical or verbal violence? o) That is proved by the death of so many beings solely on account of mental hostility.
A) gal te 'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam du zad na gzhan gyi sems rig pas ci gzhan gyi sems shes sam 'on te mi shes she na | b) 'dis ci zhig bya | c) gal te mi shes na ni gzhan gyi sems rig pa zhes kyang ci skad du bya | d) ji ste shes na yang |
XXI

A) yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṁ paracittavidaḥ kiṁ paracittam jānanti, atha na, B) kiṁ cātaḥ 1 C) yadi na jānanti kathaṁ paracittavido bhavanti | D) atha jānanti |

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, do then “those who know other minds” [really] know other minds, or not? B) And what [follows] from this? C) If they do not know, how do they become those who [are spoken of as ones who] know others minds? D) Or they do know [which is only possible if external objects do really exist, in which case]:

1


gzhan sems rig pas shes pa ni ||
don bzhin ma yin ji ltar dper ||
rang sems shes pa | [21abc]

d\{de yang ji ltar don ji lta ba bzhin du ma yin zhe na |

sangs rgyas kyi
spyod yul ji bzhin ma shes phyir | [2cd]

ji ltar de brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid du sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul du
gyur pa de ltar des ma shes pa'i phyir de gnyi ga yang don ji lta ba bzhin
ma yin te | g\{ log par snang ba'i phyir ro || h\) gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i
rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa'i phyir ro ||
XXI

paracittavidāṁ jñānam ayathārtham* katham* yathā, svacittajñānam*

e) tad api katham ayathārtham*

ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocaraḥ || [21 || ]

f) yathā tan nirabhilāpyenātmanā b(u),7bh,ddhānāṁ gocaraḥ |
tathā tadajñānāt ( | ) tad ubhayaṁ na yathārtham 6) vitathapratibhāsa-
tayā 8) grāhyagrāhakahavikalpasyąpahāṇīyatvāt* |

How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality?
[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one's own mind. [21abc]

e) How is that [knowledge of one's own mind] also inconsistent with reality?

Because one does not know [other minds or even one's own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha. [21cd]

f) Because we do not know that in the way that that [knowledge] is the scope of the buddhas, with respect to its nature as inexpressible. Both [knowledges, of one's own mind and of those of others,] are inconsistent with reality, 6) because [all that non-buddhas are able to know is an] erroneous appearance. 8) This is because they fail to reject the conceptual fantasy of subject and object.
A) rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu dbye ba rnam par nges pa mtha' yas
la gting mi dpogs shing zab pa'i |

rnam rig tsam du grub pa ’di ||
bdag gis bdag gi mthu ’dra bar ||
byas kyi de yi rnam pa kun ||
bsam yas | [22abcd]
A) Because [the idea of] Manifestation-Only has unfathomable depth, its explanations and divisions endless,

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. [22abcd]
b) bdag 'dra bas rnam pa thams cad ni bsam par mi nus te | rtog ge'i spyod yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro || c) 'o na de rnam pa thams cad du su'i spyod yul snyam pa la |

sangs rgyas spyod yul lo [22d]

zhes bya ba smos te | b) de ni sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi spyod yul te | shes bya thams cad kyi rnam pa thams cad la mkhyen pa thogs pa mi mnga' ba'i phyir ro ||
However, that [idea of Manifestation-Only] cannot be conceived in all its aspects by those like me, because it is beyond the domain of logical reasoning. For whom, then, is this [idea] in all respects the [proper] scope? We reply:

It is the scope of the buddhas. [22d]

For it is the scope of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones, in all aspects, because their knowledge of all objects of knowledge in all ways is unobstructed.
Colophon

slob dpon dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa nyi shu ba'i 'grel pa rdzogs so ||

|| rgya gar gyi mkhan po dzi na mi tra dang | shi len dra bo dhi dang | zhu chen gyi lo tsä ba ban de ye shes sdes zhus te gtan la phab pa ||
Colophon

viṁśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ
kṛtir iyam ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||

This is the Proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only in Twenty Verses
A composition of the Master Vasubandhu.
In his edition, Sylvain Lévi (1925: 3) ‘restored’ the missing first leaf of the Viṃśikā and its autocommentary. Later, Nasu Jisshū (1953: 114) offered a revised version. For these, see below. While most of the reconstructions remain unverifiable, according to the subcommentary of Vairocanaraksita (Kano 2008: 353), phrase 1 (H) should read nārthaḥ kaścid āsti. I therefore print this in the Sanskrit text.

Since both of these reconstructions are, with the exception noted above and that discussed below under (B), nothing but speculation, I translate the Tibetan text, distinguishing this translation from that of the extant Sanskrit by use of a smaller type size.

Lévi’s proposal, which has been adopted (uncritically, it seems to me) by almost all scholars, runs as follows, with the insertion of the first verse from his verse manuscript (in roman typeface):

I

A) mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñaptimātram vyavasthāpyate  
B) citta-mātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt  
C) cittam mano vijñānaṁ vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ  
D) cittam atra sasamprayogam abhipretam  
E) mātram ity arthapraṇīthārthaṁ

vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt |  
yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśacandrādīdarśanam ||

II

A) atra codyate |

yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo na deśakālayōḥ  
santānānasyāniyamaś ca yuktā kṛtyakriyā yuktā na ca || 2 ||
Nasu Jisshū (1953: 114) suggested some modifications on this reconstruction, with somewhat more attention to the Tibetan translation:

I

A) mahāyāne traidhātukāṁ vijñaptimātraṁ vyavsthāpyate | B) cittamātram idaṁ bho jinapatra yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtre vacanat | C) cittam mano vijñānam vijñaptir iti paryāyah | D) tac ca cittam iha sasamprayogam abhiprāyah | E) mātragrahaṇam arthapratīṣedhārthatṁ | F) vijñānam evedam arthapratīṣhāsam utpadyate | G) yathā taimirikānām asatkeśacandrādidarṣanam | H) na tu kaścid artho 'sti

II

A) atraitac codyate |

na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yukta vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

B) kim uktam bhavati | C) yadi vinā rūpādyarthena rūpādivijñaptir utpadyate na rūpādyarthat | D) kasmāt kva cād eva deśa utpadyate na sarvatra | E) tatraiva ca deśe kadācid utpadyate na sarvadā | F) tatra deśakāle pratiṣṭhitānāṁ sarveśāṁ saṁtānaniyama utpadyate na kasya cād eva | G) yathā taimirikāsayaṁ saṁtānasya keśādayāṁ drṣyante nānyeśāṁ | H) kasmād yaḥ taimirikāyair drṣyate keśabhāmarādiko na
keśādikriyāṁ karoti tadanye tu kurvanti | 1) svapne paśyamāno 'nnapāna-
vastraviṣayudhādiko nānnapāṇādikriyāṁ karoti tadanye tu kurvanti
abhūtagandharvanagaram na nagarakriyāṁ karoti tadanye tu kurvanti |
1) vinārthena eṣv asatsamaneṣu deṣakāla-

A)
The there is little question that the first word of the treatise is indeed Mahāyāne. For this reason I translate as I do, a bit unnaturally in English. Better would be “according to the Great Vehicle,” but in order to preserve the priority of the fundamental term mahāyāna, I make this choice in English.

B)
This scripture citation has been much discussed. As La Vallée Poussin (1912: 67n3) and Lévi (1932: 43n1) point out, it should undoubtedly be traced to the Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Kondō 1936: 98.8–9), which contains the sentence cittamātram ıdaṁ yad ıdaṁ traiddhātukam. Various forms of the same are found cited in a range of sources. The inclusion of bho jinaputra, and whether, with Tibetan dag, it should be taken as a plural, seems to me to have unnecessarily occupied the attentions of Harada 2000 who, however, does not pay attention to some of the citations offered by Lévi in the above mentioned note (he confessed in 1999: 101n2 that he did not “yet” have access to this book). See also for useful references Harada 2003.

C)
Lévi (1932: 43n2) points to Abhidharmakośa II 34ab (Pradhan 1975: 22) cittam mano 'tha vijnānam ekārtham, which of course does not take account of vijnapti.

FG)
While the Tibetan (and Chinese) translations present these two sentences as prose, the separate Sanskrit manuscript of the verses of the Viṃśatikā preserves instead a verse:

vijñaptimātram evedam asadarthāvabhāsanat |
yadvat taimirakasyāsatkeśoṇḍūkādidarśanam ||
This [world] is just Manifestation-Only, because of the appearance of non-existent external objects, as in the case of the seeing of nonexistent hair-nets and so on by one with an eye disease.

There is some discussion concerning the reading of the word keśonḍūka. In particular, how to read the shape under nd has been questioned. Dictionaries tell us to expect -u-, but a reading with the manuscript of ā is superior from a metrical point of view. On the first two verses see Funahashi 1986 (perhaps one of the first, if not the very first, to have made direct use of the Nepalese manuscripts); not much seems to have been added by Hanneder 2007.

As already noted by La Vallée Poussin (1912: 67n7, and see Lévi 1932: 44m1), the same verse is quoted in the Lokatattvanirṇaya of the Jaina scholar Haribhadrasūri, where it appears in the following form (verse I.74; Suali 1905: 283.16–284.1): vijñaptimātram evaitad asamarthāvabhāsanāt | yathā taimarakasyeha kośakītādīdarśanam |, in which at the very least kośa° must be read keśa°. [Ui 1917:2–3 cites the verse, credit- ing La Vallée Poussin for its discovery and identification, although most Japanese scholars appear to overlook the clear attribution offered by Ui, as well as La Vallée Poussin’s earlier article itself.]

For a partial translation and some observations on Dharmapāla’s commentary on timūra, see Chu 2004: 120ff.

III
As La Vallée Poussin (1912: 70m1, followed by Lévi 1932: 46m1) points out, we find a parallel in the Nyāyavārttika (he refers to 528.12 in an edition not available to me; in the edition of Tarkatirtha 1944: 1085.9–13): asaty ārthe vijñānabheda drṣṭa iti cet | atha manyase yathā tulyakarmavidākotpannāḥ pretāḥ pūyapūrṇām nadīṁ paśyanti | na tatra nady asti na pūyam | na hy ekaṁ vastv anekākāraṁ bhavitum arhati | drṣṭaś ca vajñānabhedaḥ | kecit tām eva jalapūrṇām paśyanti kecid rudhīrapūrṇām ity ato ‘vasīyate yathā ‘dhyātme nimittāpekṣam asati bāhye nimitte vijñānam eva tathotpadyate iti. This is translated by Jha (1919: 261) as follows: “But even in the absence of real objects we find diversi-
ty in the cognitions.’ You mean by this as follows: —‘From among persons born under the influence of similar destinies, while some (on death) have sight of a river full of pus—though in reality neither the river nor the pus are there; and though one and the same thing cannot have several forms, yet in regard to the same river we find diversity in the cognitions: Some other persons see that same river as full of water, others again as full of blood, and so forth; from all [of] which it follows that in each case the Cognition appears in that particular form in accordance with the inner consciousness of each person, and it has no external basis in the shape of an object.” The passage continues (Tarkātirtha 1944: 1085.16–1086.4; Jha 1919: 262): deśādinīyamaś ca prāṇnoti | ekasmin deśe nađīn pūyapūrṇām paśyanti no deśāntareṣu | asaty arthe niyamahetur vaktavyah | yasya punar vidyamāṇam kenacid ākāreṇa vyavasthitām tasya śeṣo mityāpratyaśa iti yuktam | mityāpratyaśa ca bhavanto na pradhānam bādhanta iti pūyādipratyayāṇām pradhānam vaktavyam iti | yathā pūyādipratyayāṇām evaṁ māyāgyandharvanagaragamārghatṛṣṇāsālilānāṁ iti. “Further (under the Opponent’s doctrine) there can be no restriction as to place &c.; that is, when no object exists, what would be the reason for the fact that persons see the river of pus in one place, and not another? He for whom there is something really existing in a definite form,—for him it is quite possible that all cognition in any other form should be wrong; and wrong cognitions, if they appear, never completely discard (do away with) their (real) counterpart; so that it behoves the Opponent to explain what is the counterpart of the cognitions of ‘pus’ and the rest; and just as in the case of the cognition of ‘pus’ so also in the case of the cognitions of magical phenomena, imaginary cities, miragic water and so forth (it would be necessary to point to real counterparts).” CD)

Tib. takes katham as a separate question, thus for the sake of indicating the correspondence between the versions I add (D) to the Sanskrit text, although in fact there is no boundary here.
Note that *vināpy arthena* is translated both *don med par* and *don med par yang* in (D) and (E) respectfully. Moreover, the same phrase is translated with the latter in XVI (C), and with the former in XVII (E).

E)
Tib. has no equivalent for *kāla*, instead reading *yul la sogs pa*, ‘place etc’.

I)
Tib. has no equivalent for *samaṁ*, which I also do not see in Vīṇātadeva (176b6–7).

M)
For the Skt. text’s *mūtrapurīṣādi*, Tib. has *gcin dang | ngan skyugs dang | me ma mur dang | mchil ma dang | snabs*, namely *mūtrapuriṣa*, with the addition of hot ashes (*kukkula*), phlegm/saliva (*kheṭa*), and snot/mucus (*singhānaka*). The last two are a set combination, as are the first two, but the inclusion of ashes I have not noticed elsewhere in such a context. The commentary of Vīṇātadeva and the translations of Paramārtha and Xuanzang agree almost completely with the Skt. text, but Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 65b8–9) lists pus 膿, blood 血, urine 小便, feces 大便, liquid iron 流鐵, and flowing water 流水.

IV

I)
In brackets “see” is added on the basis of Tibetan *mthong*.

J)
Chu (2011: 36): “The word *ādhipatya* is a special term in the Yocācāra system: it refers to the mutual influence between different living beings.”

L)
Tib. reverses the order of “dogs and crows” (and adds “et cetera”) both with respect to the Skt. and its own mention in (H) above.
V
A) Tib. has kyang (*api) after its equivalent of tiraścāṁ.
B) Tib. has yang (*api) after its equivalent of narakeṣu.
F) Tib. yi dags kyi bye brag dag suggests *pretaviśeṣāṇāṁ in place of the text's pretāṇāṁ.

VI
B) The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 1975: 164.2–4) speaks of: “The forest of iron thorn trees, the sharp thorns of which are 16 fingers long. The thorns turn themselves downwards on beings who climb them, tearing their bodies, and turn themselves upwards on those who descend,” ayahśālmalivanaṁ tikṣṇaśoḍaśāṅgulakaṇṭakam | teṣāṁ sat-tvānāṁ abhirohatāṁ kaṇṭakā avānimukhibhavantaḥ kāyāṁ bhindanti avataratāṁ cordhvībhavantaḥ.
6c
On the function of go in the Tib. see Silk 2016. I do not understand the reading in the Vṛtti with ‘dug in place of ‘dod, found in the verse-only translation.
D) Two cases of der (*tatra) in the Tib. trans. do not have any correspondent in Skt.

VII
7ab: La Vallée Poussin (1912: 73n4) points out that the half-verse is found in the Nyāyavārttika 529.7 (in the edition of Tarkatirtha 1944: 1086.4; Jha 1919: 262).
D) Tib. smras pa often renders āha (as it does in XIV [I], below)
VIII
B) An important passage for trying to understand the text here is no doubt that in the Abhidharmaṃśabhashya chapter 9 (Pradhan 1975: 468.10–15; Lee 2005: 90.1–8; cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931, v.258): asty eva pudgalo yasmād uktam nāsti sattva upapāduka iti mithyādṛśṭīḥ | kaś caivaṃ āha nāsti sattva upapāduka iti | sattvas tu tathāsti yathā vibhakto bhagavateti brūmah* | tasmād yah paratropapādakasattvā- khyaskandhasanāntāpavādāṁ karoti tasyaiśa mithyādṛśīr nāsti sattva upapāduka iti | skandhānām upapādakatvāt | athaisā mithyādṛśīḥ pudgalāpavādikā satī kīnprahātavyā bhave | na hy eśa satyadarśana- bhāvanāprahātavyā yujyate | pudgalasya satyesv anantarbhāvāt |. A very tentative translation of this passage might run: “[The Pudgalavādins assert that] the person really exists because the expression “There does not exist a spontaneously born being” was called a mistaken view. But who [claimed] in this way that “There does not exist a spontaneously born being”? We rather assert that a being does exist, [however] in just the fashion analyzed by the Blessed One. Therefore, this mistaken view that “There does not exist a spontaneously born being” belongs to whomever denies that a continuum of aggregates denominated ‘being’ may be spontaneously born in another [realm], because it is a fact that the aggregates are spontaneously born. Now, if [you hold that] this denial of the person is a mistaken view, [you must state] how it could be abandoned. For it is not reasonable that it could be abandoned by [the four noble] truths, by vision or by mental cultivation, because the person is not included in the [four noble] truths.”*: The MS adds mānusyakasūtṛa, but this seems to be an error. See Lee 2005: 90n340, Honjō 2014: 905, §9024. The expression na ‘tthi sattā opapātikā does occur, however, in MN (117) iii.71,30, Mahācattāri- sakasutta. More investigation is required to understand the relation between Vasubandhu’s positions in the present passage and in the Abhidharmaṃśabhashya. Note also that the statement denying the existence of the spontaneously arisen being (nāsti sattva upapādukaḥ)
is found cited in several sources, such as the Saṃghabhedavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya (Gnoli 1978: 220.28), and the Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 356.7, at which point La Vallée Poussin’s n6 refers to DN i.55.18, which contains the same sequence). See also the following.

C) This half verse is frequently cited, for instance in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya chapter 9 (Pradhan 1975: 466.9; Lee 2005: 74.12), Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 355.4) and in the Paramārthagāthā 4cd (Wayman 1961: 168).

IX

F) Should we follow the expression in (D) and restore tasyāḥ (vijñaptes)? Note that Tib. has the term neither in (F) nor above in (D).

G) The expression ity aya[m] (abhi)prāyaḥ is rendered in Tib. ‘di ni ‘dir dgongs pa’o, which might suggest that we restore instead (atrābhi)-prāyaḥ, but there does not appear to be enough room in the missing portion of the manuscript leaf to allow this.

X

A) The expression ko guṇah appears to be idiomatic. Edgerton (1953 s.v. guṇa) suggests that the meaning ‘advantage,’ for which he refers to the Mahāvastu, “is not recorded in this use” in Skt. or Pāli. For another example in a work of Vasubandhu, see the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 1975: 439,6). I have the impression that it occurs in non-Buddhist works as well.

C) The reconstruction of Tibetan drug po gnyis presents problems. What is visible in the MS is dva, and va is certain. We must reconstruct vijñāna, of course. The expression in question means ‘two sets of six’ or
'two times six,' namely twelve, the twelve āyatanaś (Viṇītadeva 183a6–183b1). The, or a, normal Sanskrit way to say this, however, is āvīśas, but there is no vowel above dva. Paramārtha has here (T. 1589 [XXXI] 71c29) 從唯六雙但六識生, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 75b28) 謂若了知從六二法有六識轉. I follow the suggestion of Harunaga Isaacson that we reconstruct dva(ya)s[a](t{kāhyāṁ vijnā)naśātkāṁ, without—as Isaacson emphasizes—insisting that this was indeed the original reading. But it certainly fits the context.

For the Skt. mantā, Tib. has reg pa po = *spraṣṭā. Paramārtha has this same reading (見者乃至知者), as does Viṇītadeva (183b1), while Xuanzang has 見者乃至知者 and Prajñāruçi (T. 1588 [XXX] 67a1) 覺者, agreeing with mantā. Akashi (1926: 160n2) wonders whether we should emend the Tibetan to rig pa po (which Sasaki 1924: 48 prints), but seems unconvinced by his own suggestion. reg pa po corresponds to the fifth, but not the sixth, item in the relevant list. The confusion, wherever it lies, seems to come from the (apparent?) contradiction of the presentation in IX (C-E), which limits itself to the visible through the tangible, but X (C) then states the listing to contain 2 × 6 = 12 members, not 10. One version of a listing is found in the Mañjuśrīvikriḍitā: mthong pa po, nyen pa po, smon pa po, za ba po, reg pa po, rnam par shes pa po = draṣṭā, śrotā, ghrātā, bhoktā, spraṣṭā, vijnātā (draft ed. J. Braarvig at https://www2.hf.uio.no). The (non-Buddhist) list in the Mahābhārata is slightly different (14.20.21): ghrātā bhakṣayītā draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā ca paṇicamaḥ | mantā boddhā ca saptai bhavanti paramartvijah ||. The matter should be carefully considered, paying attention also to Viṇītadeva's commentary.

toc

The Tibetan translation of the verses has bstan pas for what in the Vṛtti is read bstan pa'i (D: bstan pa).

H)

Tib. adds yang after its equivalent of vijnaptimātram iti, with rnam par rig pa tsam zhes bya ba de yang med pas representing something like *vijñaptimātram ity tad api nāst(ī)t, instead of tad api vijnaptimātram
nāstīti, although it seems that itī is made to do double duty here as the quotative zhes bya ba and as the reason represented by pas.

J) api tu is not represented in Tib.

K) Skt. grāhyagrāhakāḍiḥ parikalpitas is omitted in Tib.

L) Tib. has its equivalent for na tv anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānāṁ viśaya itī as sangs rgyas kyi yul gang yin pa brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis ni med pa ma yin no, which La Vallée Poussin (1912: 76) rendered: “mais elles [= les choses, dharmāḥ] ne sont pas sans exister de l’indicible manière d’être qui est du domaine des Bouddhas.” Paramārtha has (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72a9–10) 不由不可言體諸佛境界說諸法空, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 75c8) 非諸佛境離言法性亦都無故名法無我, the latter of which suggests something closer, perhaps, to the Tib. understanding.

M) For nairātmyapraveśo Tib. has chos la bdag med par 'jug pa, *dharma-nairātmyapraveśa, as we see in (I).

XII

12:
La Vallée Poussin (1912: 78n1, with additions by Lévi 1932: 52n1) notes a number of citations of this verse, including Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇḍitā ad IX.87 (La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 503.7, with the expression yad uktam ācāryapādaḥ) and Nyāyavarttika (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1068.20–21; Jha 1919: 243), and see La Vallée Poussin’s detailed note to his translation of the Sarvadarśanasamgraha (1901–1902: 179n77), as well as the citation in the Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha III.12 (edited in La Vallée Poussin 1901–1902: 403).

12b
Here and below, Tib. renders Skt. mātra with tsam but (as here) when it means ‘extent’ not ‘only,’ perhaps Tib. tshod would be better.
In the manuscript we find the reading niravayatvā, for what we would expect as niravayavatvā, and the same in XIII (B). The form niravayava is well attested, for instance in Brahmasūtra 2.1.26: क्यत्सन्प्रसांकतिर nira-
vayavatvāसांबद्धकोपो वा. However, there are also a number of instances in which the form without -va also appears. It is not possible at this moment to be absolutely sure that they are erroneous. In the Ekādaśaṃukhaḥrdayam (Dutt 1939: 35–40; input and corrected by Somadeva Vasudeva at http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/4_rellit/buddh/ekmuhr_u.htm, based on the published manu-
script [see von Hinüber 2014: 104, item 33a]), corresponding to Dutt’s 38.5–8 we find evaṁ mahārthiko याम्मात्मा bhagavat हः[dayam] eka-
velām prakāśitvā catvāro mūlāpattayah kṣa[yaṁ] gacchanti | pañcāna-
taryāṇī karmāṇi niravaya<va>m tanvikerisyā<nti | kah punar vādo athābhāṣitāṁ pratipatsyanti }. Here Vasudeva has restored the form niravayava, although the manuscript writes only niravaya. In the edition of the Mīmāṁsāslokavārttika with the commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra we find (sub 5.4.103) a sentence printed yadā kaścit sautrāntikāṁ pratyevaṁ sādhayati | ātmā nityāḥ niravayatvāt vyomavad iti tadā dharmadharmidvayasya bādhanaṁ bhavati. However, Kei Kata-
oka writes to me as follows (email 11 IX 2014): “I checked the Adyar manuscript of the Kāśikā. It has anavayavatvāt on p. 1863.6. (neither niravayavatvāt nor niravayatvāt) [manuscript preserved in the Adyar Library, Chennai, No. 63358, TR 66–4]. I noticed another instance of niravayatve in the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Mysore edition Vol. II 420.6. But the manuscript reads niravayavatve [manuscript preserved in Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras (Chennai), R 3583. Malayalam]. So the mistake niravayavatva > niravayatva does happen.” Somdev Vasudeva points out to me several other instances in which at least the electronically available versions of the Nyāyamaṇjarī, Jayatīrtha’s Nyāyasudha and several other texts also have the latter form, without -va-.
Skt. arthāntaram is pluralized in Tib. don gzhan rnams. There are several other places in this text where the Tibetan appears to be plural corresponding to singular forms in Sanskrit. In this sentence, I follow the advice of Prof. Schmithausen and connect it with the following verse, but note that this is not the understanding of the Tib. translation, or of Frauwallner, who understands things quite a bit differently here (for convenience I cite the English [2010: 402], but the German is the same [1994: 375]): “(Opponent:) The Individual atoms do not combine with one another because they are partless. Thus, this mistake need not result. When aggregated, they do, however, combine with one another; so say the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmir. (Answer:) But the amassment of atoms is nothing other than they themselves.” The Chinese of Parmārtha renders the passage (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72b3–7): 若汝言：「隣虚不得聚集，無方分故。此過失不得故起。是隣虚聚更互相應」。罽賓國毘婆沙師作如此説。則應問之: 如汝所説：「隣虚聚物，此聚不異隣虚」，while Xuanzang has (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a3–5): 加濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言: 非諸極微有相合義，無方分故。離如前失。但諸聚色有相合理有方分故。此亦不然. All of these versions, it seems to me, understand the thought to be completed here, rather than continuing into the following verse. Despite this, it is very clear that the Skt. expects a question (te idaṁ praṣṭavyāḥ), and the question does not come until 13ab.

XIV 14ab:
La Vallée Poussin (1912: 79m) notes the citation in Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇjikā ad IX.87 (La Vallée Poussin 1901–1914: 50210–11), and in Nyāyavārttika 522.10 (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1070.4; Jha 1919: 245), where it is read as digdeśabhdheda yasyāsti tasyaikatvam na yujyate.

B) The MS has pā and another illegible character. Tib. ngos suggests the restitution pā(ṛśv)e (see already La Vallée Poussin 1912: 80). A problem
is that we need *chāyā (Tib. grib ma 'bab par), while the text has only ātapa (‘sunshine’). Moreover, the syntax with anyatra pārśve bhavaty anyatrātapaḥ suggests, if it does not make quite certain, that something has dropped out between pārśve and bhavaty, which I here conjecturally restore as chāyā. Under this understanding, Skt. anyatrātapaḥ is missing from Tib. However, we find in Vinitadeva (187a7) the following: gal te rtul phra rab cha shas med pa'i phyir phyogs kyi cha tha dad pa med na de'i dus na nyi ma shar ba'i tshe ngos gcig la grib ma 'bab pa gcig tu nyi ma shar bar ji ltar 'gyur, indicating that the text available to Vinitadeva must have had something very close to what I conjecture. See Yamaguchi’s note in Sasaki 1924: 17 (n3 to §14). We find the following in the Nyāyavarttika (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1071.5–10; Jha 1919: 245–246): chāyāvṛtī tarhi na prāpnutaḥ paramāṇor adeśatvād iti | na deśavattvāc chāyāvṛtī | kim tarhi | mūrtimatsparśavattvāt mūrtimat sparśaviśiṣṭam dravyaṁ dravyāntaram āvṛṇoti | kim idam āvṛṇoti | svasambandhitvendatarasya sambandham pratiśedhatīti | chāyā tu tejāḥparamāṇor āvṛṇāt mūrtimatā paramāṇunā tejāḥparamāṇur āvṛṇyate yan na chāyeti viralatejāḥsambandhitā dravyaṇuṇakarmāṇi chāyety abhidhīyate sarvato vyāvyāttatejāhsvambhandhīni tu tāni tamaḥsaṁjñakānīti | tad evaṁ chāyāvṛtyor anyathāśiddhatvād ahetuḥ |. “In that case, as there would be no points of space in the Atom, there should be no shadow, nor screening.’ But shadow and screening are due, not to presence of space-points, but to corporeality and tangibility; it is only a corporeal and tangible object that screens another object. ‘What is the meaning of this screening?’ What it means is that the Object being itself connected (with something) prevents the connection (with that same thing) of another object. Shadow also is due to the screening of the atoms of light; i.e., the corporeal Atom screens the atom of Light; and there is ‘Shadow’ where this screening takes place. In fact ‘Shadow’ is the name applied to such substances, qualities and actions as are connected with the smaller amount of Light (than the adjacent things); and when those same substances have all light completely turned away from them, they come to be called ‘Darkness.’ Thus, as the phenomena of ‘shadow’ and
‘screening’ are capable of being otherwise explained, they cannot serve as valid reasons (in support of the proposition that Atoms are made up of parts)."

F)
The MS reads sarvāṁ saṁhātaḥ, which I emend to sarvaḥ saṁghātaḥ. Tib. ‘dus pa thams cad. The whole sentence is found as follows in Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72b24–25): 若無有障，一切六方隣虚同一處故，則一切聚同隣虛量. These translations demonstrate that sarva must govern saṁghāta. Note, however, that in Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76a21–23): 既不相礙，應諸極微展轉處同，則諸色聚同一極微量，this relation is not made clear (as usual, Prajñāruci will require some sorting out).

I)
The reading of all Tanjurs, yin no, must be emended in light of the Skt. to *ma yin no. Vinitadeva’s commentary (187b6) has mdo sde pas smras pa ma yin no zhes bya ba smos so. See Yamaguchi’s note in Sasaki 1924: 17 (n5 to §14).

M)
Tib. appears to have taken this as a verse. However, none of the Chinese versions do so, and the Skt. as we have it is not metrical.
Lévi (1932: 5411) quotes (and translates) the *Sphuṭārtha Abhidharmaśāsavyyākhya* of Yasomitra (Wogihara 1936: 26.11–16) as follows: 

Vaibhāṣikānām ayam abhiprāyaḥ. nilādigrahaṇam atapāloka grahaṇam vā samsthānani reapkeśaṁ pravartate. kāyavijñaptigrahaṇaṁ tu varṇanirapeśaṁ. pariśṭarūpāyatanagrahaṇaṁ tu varṇasaṁsthānāpekeśaṁ pravartata iti. Sautrāntikapāksikas tu ayam ācāryo nainam arthaṁ prayacchati. na hi cākṣuṣaṁ etat saṁsthānagrahaṇaṁ. mānasāṁ tv etat parikalpitaṁ.

XV
B) The emendation to *nyes pa* is supported by the sense, the Skt. and Vinītadeva (188a7): *gcig bu'i nyes pa 'tang bshad pa nyid de*. See also Yamaguchi’s note in Sasaki 1924: 18 (n8 to §14).

C) Tib. *sngon po dang ser po la sogs pa gang yin pa* suggests *nilapītādika*. Schmithausen suggests the reading and restoration *n(ilādī)kaṇḥ*, writing that the “aṅṣara nā in the ms. may well be a mutilated nī.” This is certainly an attractive solution; immediately earlier in the line in the word sūkṣmāṇikṣā (MS: sūkṣmāṅikṣā) we see the aṅṣara nī, the shape of which is compatible with what is left here at the end of the line (without color photos it is difficult to tell more), and there is likely enough space for two additional aṅṣaras, as Schmithausen suggests. The Chinese versions have: Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 68b2–4): 若純一青物不雜黃等, 若人分別眼境界者, 行於地中不得說言有次第行; Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 72c8–9): 若一切青黃等無有隔別, 是眼境界卽為一物, 道於地則無次第行; Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76b4–5): 若無隔別所有青等, 眼所行界為一物, 應無漸次行大道理. Paramārtha’s version agrees with Tib. in listing blue and yellow, while the others have only blue, supporting the suggested restoration of Skt.

Skt. *gamanam ity arthaḥ* looks like a gloss to clarify *krameṇetiḥ*; it is omitted in Tib., but it is possible that in Prajñāruci’s translation cited immediately above,不得說言有次第行, “we cannot say that there is
gradual motion,” is meant to stand for na syād gamanam ity arthaḥ. Verhagen (1996: 39n95–40n96) points to similar expressions in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan 1975: 138.2), eti gaty-arthaḥ, and in the Prasannapadā (La Vallée Poussin 1903–1913: 5.1), etir gaty-arthaḥ.

E) The Skt. MS’s anekatra (MS hastyaśvādikasyānekatra) is understood in Tib. (gcig na) and elsewhere as *ekatra. Vinītadeva (188b7): de’i tshe gnas gcig gi steng na ‘dug pa’i glang po che dang rta la sogs pa du ma ris su chad par ‘dug par mi ‘gyur ro; Prajñāruci (T. 1588 [XXXI] 68b13) 一處, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXX] 76b7) 一方處 (Paramārtha [T. 1589 (XXXI) 72c11] is unclear). There is no easily imaginable graphic way to account for the manuscript reading as a writing error.

F) I restore the lacuna in the MS vicche(do yujya)te in light of Tib. rung. That is, de dag ris su chad par ji ltar rung = katham tayor vicche(do yujya)te.

G) The MS has tadaikaṁ, for which I read tad ekam. However, Tib. de dag gcig tu might suggest *te ekam(?)

I add ‘reasonable’ on the basis of Tib. rung. See (F) above.

H) On the grammatical function of go in the Tib. see Silk 2016.

J) Tib. de dag seems to correspond to Skt. sa.

XVI
16c
I do not understand Tib. khyod kyi don as equivalent of so ‘artha.

D) Tib. yul ‘di nyid apparently corresponds to idam. Here the expression yad(ā) ca sā pratyakṣa(buddhir bhava)tiḍaṁ me pratyakṣam iti is rendered gang gi tshe yul ‘di nyid ni bdag gi mngon sum mo snyam du mngon sum gyi blo de byung ba, but above in (B) ity asaty arthe ka(tham) iyāṁ
buddhir bha\(vati\)da\(ṁ\) me\) pratyak\(ṣ\)am iti is rendered \(don\ de\ med\ na\ ˈdi\ ni\ bdag\ gi\ mngon\ sum\ mo\ snyam\ pa\ blo\ ˈdi\ ji\ ltar\ ˈbyung\ zhe\ na\.

Skt. \(na\ so\ ˈrtho\ dr\̊śyate\) appears in Tib. as \(khyod\ kyi\ don\ de\ mi\ snang\ ste\).

In \textit{manovijñānenaiva}, Tib. has no equivalent for \textit{eva}.

The Skt. expressions \(iti\ katha\\(ṁ\) tasya pratyak\(ṣ\)a \(tvam\ iṣṭ\(a\)ṁ|viś\(e\)ṣ(e)ṇa\) tu kṣaṇika(++)\(yas\)a tadānīṁ niruddham eva tad rūpaṁ rasādikaṁ vā | correspond to Tib. \(lhag\ par\ yang\ skad\ cig\ mar\ smra\ bas\ de\ mngon\ sum\ du\ ji\ ltar\ ˈdod\ ||\) de ltar na de'i tshe gzugs dang rol sog pa de dag ni ˈgags\ zin\ to\ || This suggests something like *kath\(a\)ṁ kṣaṇikavādinā tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭam | evaṁ tu tadānīṁ niruddham tadrūpaṁ rasādikar̥ṇ vā, perhaps: ‘How do the advocates of the doctrine of momentariness accept direct perception of that [object], given that at that time visible form, flavor and the rest have entirely ceased in that fashion?’

Lévi suggested restoring (sy\(a\) vi\(ṣ\)a), but I see no trace of *viṣ\(a\)ya in Tib. I follow Schmithausen (following Tib. and Frauwallner) in offering kṣaṇika(vādino). Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73a2–4) has: 是塵云何可證, 若人說剎那滅。此人是時執色乃至觸已謝, \textit{while} Xuanzang translates (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76b24–25): 刹那論者有此覺時, 色等現境亦皆已滅。如何此時許有現量. While the first two support the restitution of vādīn, Xuanzang’s version seems close to that in Tib.

\textbf{XVII}

\textbf{H)}

Tib. \(yod\ pa\ ma\ yin\ pa\) as a translation of \textit{abhūta}, which below is \(yang\ dag\ pa\ ma\ yin\ pa\).

\textbf{L)}

Tib. \(gtan\ tshigs\), here equivalent to \textit{jñāpaka}, elsewhere renders \textit{kāraṇa}. I wonder if this could be due to a confusion, in light of, for example, \textit{Mahāvyutpatti} §4460 \(jñāpakahetu\ =\ shes\ par\ byed\ pa\’i\ \(gtan\ tshigs\).
The *Nyāyabhāṣya* (Tarkatirtha 1944: 1077.4–1078.5; Jha 1919: 255) argues as follows: svapnānte cāsanto viśayā upalabhyaṁ ity atrāpi heṭvabhāvaḥ | pratibodhe 'nupalambhād iti cet | pratibodhaviśayopalambhād apratiśedhah | yadi pratibodhe 'nupalambhāt svapne viśayā na santīti tarhi ya ime pratibuddhena viśayā upalabhyaṁ upalambhāt santīti | viparyayē hi hetusāmartḥyaṁ | upalambhāt sadbhāve saty anupalambhād abhāvaḥ siddhyati udbhayāt tv abhāve nānupalambhasya sāmartṛtyam asti. “In fact there is no reason to show that what are cognised during dreams are non-existent things. ‘Inasmuch as things dreamt of are not perceived when the man wakes up, (they must be regarded as non-existent).’ [According to this reasoning of yours] inasmuch as we do apprehend the things cognised during the waking state, the existence of these cannot be denied; if, from the fact of our not apprehending, on waking, the things cognised in dreams, you infer that these things are not existent,—then it follows that the things that we do apprehend when awake are existent, because they are apprehended; so that the reason you put forward (in proof of the unreality of things dreamt of) is found to have the power of proving a conclusion contrary to your tenets. It is only when the existence of things can be inferred from their apprehension, that you can infer their non-existence from their non-apprehension. And if under both circumstances (of dream as well as of waking) things were equally non-existent, then non-apprehension could have no power at all (of proving anything).”

Tib. *ma sad kyi bar du* for aprabuddha understands it as ‘while they are not awake.’

XVIII

B)

In *sadasatsamparke*, Tib. omits *sadasat*.

18a

On ādhipatya see the note above to IV(J).
C)
The expression *yathāyogam*, ‘according to the circumstances,’ is explained by Vinītadeva (192a3–4) as referring to the ways in which one manifests good and bad physical forms in response to interactions with good and evil companions, and the same with good and bad teachings producing mental forms, although there are no externally existing actions at all.

18cd

Chu (2011: 36) refers to Dharmakīrti’s *Santānāntarasiddhi* and its commentary (so far available only in fragments), which a propos anyā-dhipatya (see the verse here, 18a) reads: *vijñānavādino middhabhi-bhavavibhramad eva puniso nyasyajñānasvyādhipatyaṁ sahakāritvam |* tena śūnyasyajñānasvṛttir bhavisyati |. “For the Vijñāvādin, precisely for the reason of being overpowered by torpor, of illusion, the influence of another person’s cognition is [only] a co-operative causal factor (sahakāritva), the cognition empty of that [influence] would take place.”

H)
In *arthasadbhāvaḥ*, Tib. omits sad.

XIX

A)
Skt. *idam* is rendered ‘*di dag*, and precisely the same in XXI (A), where again we get the expression *yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṁ* rendered *gal te ‘di dag rnam par rig pa tsam*.

Ui (1953: 21 from back) emends the MS’s *anukramyamāṇāṁ* to *upakramyamāṇāṁ*, and I accept this, although it is hard to explain how the error might have come about. Kano (2008: 356) cites the suggestion of Schmithausen to read *anupakramyamāṇāṁ* (Prof. Schmithausen suggests to me that this arose through the simple omission of -pa- in the MS). A meaning of *upa√kram*, however, is ‘attack, do violence to,’ and thus its usage here seems to me fitting. All Chinese versions support this as well. Tib. *gsod pa* is also used by Vinītadeva.
Prof. Schmithausen, however, writes to me: “Actually, a negation is found here in Paramārtha’s rendering of the passage.... In this case, we may translate: “If everywhere there is only vijñāpita, then there is no body and no speech. Why should cows, sheep and other animals, without being injured by the butchers, die? If their death is not effectuated by the butchers, why are the butchers guilty of killing living beings?” Paramārtha’s version reads (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73b8–10): 問：若一切唯有識，則無身及言。雲何牛、羊等畜生非屠兒所害而死。若彼死非屠兒所作，屠兒云何得殺生罪。

The passage in Xuanzang’s translation reads (T. 1590 [XXXI] 76c27–28): 若唯有識無身語等，羊等云何為他所殺。若羊等死不由他害，屠者云何得殺生罪: “If there is only consciousness, without body or speech, how are rams and the like killed by others? If rams and the like die without being violently treated by others, how does a butcher produce the sin of killing?” Prajñāruci’s translation (T. 1588 [XXXI] 69b4–8) has: 問曰: 若彼三界唯是內心，無有身口外境界者。以何義故。屠獵師等殺害猪羊及牛馬等。若彼非是屠獵師等殺害猪羊牛馬等者，以何義故。屠獵師等得殺生罪。是故，應有外色香等身口境界。At the very least the translation of Xuanzang seems to me to support my suggested reading, with the single negation corresponding to atatkrte vā tanmarane. Schmithausen suggests that the first negation (“without being injured by the butchers”) supports the retention of the negation in *an-upakramayamāṇāṁ.

F)
Skt. parājayaḥ omitted in Tib. (noted already by Lévi 1925b: 18).


G)
Skt. paresāṁ corresponds to Tib. sems can gzhan gyi.
I accept the GNP reading 'byung ste | des under the assumption that des is meant to render Skt. yayā.

The term sabhāgasantarati refers to the continuity of moments of mentality, one like moment following the next. Cp. for instance the expression from the Pitṛputrasamāgama quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall 1897–1902: 253.5): anantarasabhaṭṭā cittasamātati.

XX

Lévi (1925b: 26–35) discusses the Upāli sūtra in detail, and as he says (1925b: 27) “Par une rencontre singulière, j’ai découvert à la Bibliothèque du Durbar, à Katmandou, un feuillets où se retrouve la citation incorporée par Vasubandhu dans son commentaire.” This folio has been edited anew in Chung and Fukita (2011: 329–337), alongside its Chinese parallel.

C-E)
The quotation in Vasubandhu’s text — kaccit te gṛhapate śrutaṁ kena tāni daṇḍakāraṇyāni mātaṅgāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyi-bhūtāni tenoktaṁ śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṭṛiṇāṁ manahpradoṣeneti — is parallel to that found in the Upāli-sūtra edited by Chung and Fukita (2011: 335. §17–19): (k)iñcit t(e) gṛhapate śrutaṁ santi daṇḍakāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni maṇḍaṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyāny aranyabhūtātīti | śrutaṁ me bho gautama | kiñcit te gṛhapate śrutaṁ kena tāni daṇḍakaṁ kāraṇyāni kaliṅgāraṇyāni maṇḍaṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyāny aranyabhūtātīty | ... (§25) śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṭṛiṇāṁ manahprakopenti.

XXI

A)
See note to XIX (A) above.

B)
This expression, which is found in Tib. and Xuanzang but not the other two Chinese versions, may be meant to be Vasubandhu’s words, but might be a rhetorical device of the opponent.
D)  
I take the liberty of quoting in full, with his permission, what Prof. Schmithausen wrote to me:

D looks defective. We have an objection in the form: If this world is only manifestation, then what about the *paracittavidah*? Do they know others' mind or not (*atha na*)? *kiṁ cātah*? ... What regularly follows in such cases is pointing out difficulties in the case of both alternatives: If (*yadi*) x, then difficulty X; if however (*atha, very often used in the sense of "if however", "if on the other hand") y, then difficulty Y. What is missing here is Y, which might have run thus: "then how can you maintain that there is only *vijñapti* but no external object [because in this case the object, viz., the mind of others, does exist outside the cognition of the *paracittavid*]" (thus Paramārtha and, similarly, Prajñāruci), or: "then *vijñaptimātratā* would not be proved [in this case]" (Xuanzang). I think there is good reason to assume that a piece of text has dropped out here in part of the manuscript tradition, including ms. B and also the manuscript used by the Tibetan translators.

The Chinese of Paramārtha referred to here reads (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73c2–3): 若不知, 云何得他心通。若知, 云何言識無境. Prajñāruci has (T. 1588 [XXXI] 69c29–70a1): 若不知者, 云何說言知於他心。若實知者, 云何說言無外境界, while Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 77a19–21) has: 若不能知, 何謂他心智。若能知者, 唯識應不成。雖知他心, 然不如實. With the exception of what may be a gloss added by Xuanzang (not mentioned by Schmithausen), “although they know other minds, [their knowledge] is not in accord with reality,” these three translations agree quite closely with one another.

G)  
In accord with the Tib. translation, I attach this to the preceeding. I believe this is also the understanding of Paramārtha (T. 1589 [XXXI] 73c7–8): 此二境界不如是, 此顯現故。能取所取分别未滅故, and Xuanzang (T. 1590 [XXXI] 77a27–28): 此二於境不如實知, 由似外境虛妄顯現故。所取能取分別未斷故.
Skt. sarvaprakāram is omitted in Tib.

Colophon
As noted in the Introduction, the title is given wrongly by the manuscript: for the manuscript reading Viṁśatikā we must read, with all other sources, Viṁśikā or Viṁśaka. It is probably needless to point out that the text contains not twenty verses but either (with MS [A]) twenty two, or (with MS [B]) (most probably) twenty one.
The two first verses are found only in the independent verse MS (A); the commentary MS (B) is missing the first folio. It begins with \textit{niyamaḥ} on folio 2. Only in the case of verses is an indication of source necessary, since only MS (B) contains the prose commentary.

\textit{ac} = before correction
\textit{pc} = after correction.

II
J) santānāniyamaḥ | MS: wrongly santānānīyamaḥ, as if santānān niyamaḥ.

III
D) tāvat svapne | MS: tāvan svapne
gramārāmastrīpuruśādikāṁ | MS: reads bhramarā°. The correction is supported by Tib. and all Chinese versions.
L) pūyapūrṇan | MS: ac pūyaṁ pūrṇan

IV
C) anyānyair | MS: anyānair; reading anyonyair would also be possible, but when this Skt. term appears below in XVIII (C) it is translated in Tib. with the very common \textit{phan tshun}, while here we have \textit{gzh}an dang \textit{gzh}an dag gis.

V
B) tiryak° | I read a virāma under the ka.
5b yathā na | MS (A): erroneously yathā ca
5d duḥkhan | MS (A): written duṣkhan or duḥkhan
C) sarīvarttaniyena | MS: nī added in lower margin in the same script with caret to indicate insertion.
VI
A) narakapālādisaṁjñāṁ [MS: ac nana° with second na erased.
B) āgacchando [MS: āganto
gacchantah [MS: ḥ is not legible or even not present
ayaḥśālmai°] Parts of two letters visible but undecipherable; malī??
6d vijñānasya neṣyate [MS (B): vijñāna(sya) neṣ(ya)t(e)

VII
7c neṣyate [MS (B): n(e)ṣy(ate), at the very best (mostly illegible)

VIII
8c uktam [MS (B): ac uktarṇm, possible but not clear.
C) sahetukāḥ ⟨ || ⟩ [MS: sahetukā

IX
9c dvividhāyatanatvena [MS (A): dvividhāyatatvena
9d tasyā [MS (A): ac tasyā plus an extra (unnecessary, hence erased) vertical line for long vowel
C) rūpapratibhāṣā [MS (A): ac rūpā°.
upadyate tac ca] [MS: upadyate | tac ca
E) pariṇāmaviśeṣapṛaptād [MS: pariṇāmaviśeṣād
spaṣṭavya°] [MS: spaṣṭavya°
F) kāyaspaṣṭavyāyatanatvena [MS: kāyaspaṣṭavyāyatatvena

X
C) dva(ya)s[a](tābhyaṁ vijñā)naṣṭakarṇih [MS: dva(+)s.(++ vijñā)naṣṭakarṇ
10b punar [MS (A): punah
10cd
deśanā dharmaṇairātmya-praveśaḥ | MS (B): de[ṣa]nā dha(r)[m](manai)r-ātmya-praveśaḥ; MS (A): o dharmyaṇairātmya-praveśaḥ

10d
kalpitātmā | | MS (B): ///tātmā
M)
nairātmya-praveśād | MS: nairātmya-praveśā

XI
11d
paramāṇur na | MS (A): erroneously adds ca in margin by na
D)
vaīśeṣikaiḥ anekāṁ | MS: vaīśeṣikaiḥ | anekāṁ

XII
12a
yugapadyogat | MS (A): yugpadayogat
C)
śaḍaṇṭatā | MS: śaḍaṇṭatāṁ
D)
parasparāvyatirekad | The MS has a small mark resembling a cursive roman letter v between ra and vya, used to indicate that the vowel is to be extended.
G)
niravayavatvāt | MS (B): niravayatvāt. See in the notes above.
saṁghātās | MS (B): saṁghātās
kāśmīravaibhāṣikāḥ ( | | ) | MS (B): kāśmīravaibhāṣikās
I)
saṁghāto | MS (B): saṁghāto

XIII
13b
tat-saṁghāte | MS (B): tat-saṁghāte
B)
saṁghātā | MS (B): saṁghātā
niravayavatvāt | MS (B): niravayatvāt (see above XII (G)).
sāvayavasyāpi hi | MS (B): pc sāvayavyāpi hi with syāpi hi rewritten
saṁghātasya | MS (B): saṁghātasya
13c
na | MS (A): ac nā
13d
tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati ] MS (B): ta(tsa)ṁyogo na (s)idhyati; MS (A): ac
repeats tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati.

XIV
A) [p]ū(ṛvādīg) [bh](āgo) ] There seems to have been space for 2 more ākṣaras to
be restored after go.
iti digbhāgabhede ] MS (B): iti digbhāga added above line with caret.

14c
chāyārūṭī ] MS (A): ृ००००
B) pā(ṛśv)[e] (chāyā) bhavaty ] MS (B): pā. [e] bhavaty, to which I add the
conjectured chāyā (see notes above).
F) sarvah saṁghātaḥ ] MS (B): sarvaiṁ saṁhātaḥ

14cd
anyo na ] MS (B): anyonya; MS (A): syātāṁ na. See the note above.
cen na ] MA (A) nna added below line; MS (A): In the margin below tāṁ na pi
in another (more modern) hand is written mi li tā. Harunaga Isaacson
suggests that this (as miliḥ) may be a gloss on piṇḍa: ‘[the atoms]
connected/combined’.
K) saṁghāta ] MS (B): saṁhāta

XV
15a
krameṇetir ] MS (A): krameṇeti
15d
sūkṣmā° ] Both MSS: sūkṣmā°
C) syāt ( | ) gamanam ] MS (B): syād gamanam
D) syāt ( | ) na hi ] MS (B): syān na hi
E) hastyaśvādikasyaikatā ] MS (B): hastyaśvādikasyān ekatra. See the discussion
above.
na syāt ( | ) yatraiva ] MS (B): nna syād yatraiva
G) tad ekām ] MS (B): tadaikaṁ
I)
avaśyaṁ ] MS (B): avavaśyaṁ

XVI
A)
pramaṇanāṁ ] MS (B): praṇānāṁ
16a
pratyakṣabuddhiḥ ] MS (A): ṣuddhi
16b
tadā ] MS (A): ac tādā

XVII
17b
vijñaptiḥ ] MS (A): vijñapti
17d
nāprabuddho ] MA (A) nāprāmbuddho

XVIII
18b
mithaḥ ] MS (A): mitha, with tha overwritten.

XIX
A)
upakramya° ] MS (B): anukramya° (Ui 1953: 21 from back).
maraṇam ] MS (B): ac maraṇam
B)
tanmaraṇe ] MS (B): tat°
19a
maraṇaṁ ] MS (A): maraṇa
G)
jīvantendriyavirodhī ] MS (B): jitendriyavirodhī

XX
20b
ṛṣikopataḥ ] MS (B): ṣi of ṛṣi° inserted in top margin
C)
kaccit ] MS (B): kacci
F)
karmmanā ] MS (B): karmmanā
XXI
A) 
, atha na ] MS (B): atha , na
21b
ayathārthaṁ ] MS (A): rtha overwritten, no ṁ visible
21c
ajñānād ] MS (A): adds ṅā in top margin with ≥
G) 
°grāhakavikalpasyāpra° ] MS (B): pc kalpasyā rewritten in cramped space

XXII
22c
kṛteyaṁ ] MS (A): kṛtyeyam
22d

Colophon
viṃśatikā ] MS (B): ac viṃśitikā
ācāryavasubandhoḥ || ] The scribe adds: grantha<pra>māṇam asya bhāṣyasya
16o. MS (A): has the colophon viṃśakāvijñātiprakaraṇaṁ samāptam ||
Tibetan Variant Readings of the Vṛtti

O
bing shi ka bṛtī || | C: bing shi ka bṛtī ||; D: bingši ka bṛdhī ||

I
A) gzhag ste | NP: bzhag ste
B) mdo las | | CD: mdo las
C) rnam par rig pa | | N: rnaṁ rig pa
D) don dgag pa'i phyir ro | | P: don dgag gi
E) phyir ro
G) skra zla | | C: ska zla; N: sgra zla

II
2a) don min na | | D: don man na
B) zhe na | | C: zhe na ||
D) 'byung la | | N: 'byung ba
E) ma yin | | | N: ma yin ||
F) ma yin | | G: ma yin ||
G) snang gi | | C: snang gi
H) ma yin || | P: ma yin |
I) sbrang bu | | D: sgrang bu
J) byed la | | CG: byed la ||
K) mi byed la | | CG: mi byed la ||
III

3a  
'grub ste || ] C: 'grub sta ||; G: 'grub ste |; NP: 'gyur te |
C)  
ji ltar | NP: ji ltar
zhe na | ] N: zhe na
D)  
thams cad na ma yin yul de nyid na
yang res 'ga' snang la } GNP: ø
3b  
nges pa med | ] G: nges pa med ||
3c  
yi dags | G: yi dwags (consistently below, not further noted)

G)  
rnams kyï dang ] N: rnams kyï
H)  
ji ltar 'grub | ] G: ji ltar 'grub ||
I)  
rnag gi | N: rnagi
L)  
klung rnag pis } GNP: klung rnag gi
M)  
rnag pis gang ba } GNP: rnag gi gang ba
me ma mur } GNP: me mar mur
dbyig pa dang | ] GP: dbyig pa dang
srung ba } GNP: bsrungs pa

IV

4a  
gnod pa 'dra || ] C: gnod pa 'dra |
A)  
grub ces | GNP: 'grub ces
rig par bya'o || ] DN rig par bya'o |
C)  
bzhì 'grub bo } CDG: bzhin 'grub bo
D)  
grub ces | GNP: 'grub ces
E)  
 pas sens can ] N: pas serin
(occasionally used, without
discernable pattern; not noted
further)
4c  
dmyal ba'i | N: dmyal ba'i |
mthong dang || ] GNP: mthong dang |
G)  
sems can rnams kyïs ] NP: sens can
rnams kyï
I)  
thams cad kyïs mthong gi | ] GNP:
thams cad kyïs mthong gis
gcig 'gas ni } GNP: gcig 'gas na
yin no | N: yino (occasionally below;
not further noted)

O)  
sems can dmyal ba pa dag go || ] CG:
sems can dmyal ba pa dag go |
rnam par gzhag pa | N: rnam par bzhag
pa
med par 'gyur ro || ] D: med par 'gyur ro
| ; N: med par 'gyuro | (such
abbreviations not further noted)
P)  
gcig gnod pa byed kyïng ji ltar | C: gcig
gnod pa byed kyïng ji ltar |
ji ltar bur | C: ji ltar | bur
'jigs par | GNP: 'jig par
Q)  
sa gzhi | N: sa bzhì
gnod pa byed par 'gyur | ] GNP: gnod pa
byed par 'gyur
R)  
'byung bar ga la 'gyur | ] GN: 'byung bar
ga la 'gyur ||
V

A) 'byung ste || P: 'byung ste || (end of folio)

5c de ltar || verse version has 'di ltar

E) de'i phyir || GNP: de'i yi dags kyi || GNP: yi dags

VI

A) de dag gi || GNP: de dag gis
las mams kyis || GNP: las rnams kyi
B) de lta bur yang 'gyur ste || CD: de lta bur yang 'grub ste |
dags 'ong ba dang || N: dags 'ong ba dang ||
shal ma li'i || GNP: shal ma la'i
nags tshal || N: nag tshal
'gyur ba lta bu ste || GNP: 'gyur ba de lta bu ste

6a de'i las kyis || GNP: de'i las kyi

6b 'byung ba dang || CD: byung ba dang
6c 'dug na go || D: 'dug na go ||
6d mi 'dod || P: mi 'dod |
D) mi 'dod la || CGN: mi 'dod la ||
E) rnams su rtog || GNP: rnams su rtog

VII

7b rtog || D: rtog || GNP: rtogs ||
7d mi bya || N: mi bya |
A) bag chags de dag || GNP: bag chags dag
B) rnam par shes par gyur pa || GNP: rnam par shes par 'gyur pa
de 'dra bar || C: de 'da bar

C) ci yod || N: ci yod ||
E) snang gi || D: snang gi ||
gsung bar mi 'gyur ro || N: gsung par mi 'gyur

VIII

A) ma yin te || D: ma yin te ||
8b 'dul ba yi || GNP: 'dul ba'i
8d rdzus te || CD: brdzus te (P: ba may have been removed)

B) rdzus te || CD: brdzus te
bzhin yod do || GNP: yod do
zhes || C: zhis
sems kyi rgyud || GNP: sems kyi
C) las byung || GNP: las byung |
IX

A) she na | P: she na ||
9c
de yi | GNP: de'i
B) zhe na | N: zhe na ||
C) de dang | snang ba | CD: de dang snang ba
D) bcom ldan 'das kyis | GNP: bcom ldan 'das kyi
go rims | G: go rim
E) bye brag tu | G: bye brag tu pa'i bye brag tu
F) bcom ldan 'das kyis | G: bcom ldan 'das

X

C) shes pa drug | P: shes pa
gcig pu | GNP: gcig po
'jug go | D: 'jug go ||
10c
bstan pa'i | D: bstan pa
10d
'jug 'gyur || | GNP: 'jug 'gyur |
D) rig pa tsam du | GNP: rig pa tsam nyid du
F) nyid gzugs la | N: nyid gzugs (end of line)

G) mtshan nyid kyi | N: mtshan nyid kyis
'jug go || C: 'jug go |; GNP: 'jug |
L) sangs rgyas kyi yul | NP: sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul
M) rtogs pa'i phyir | GNP: rtog pa'i phyir
   rnam par gzhag pas | GNP: rnam par bzhag pas
N) don du 'gyur bas | N: don du 'gyur bas
   followed by 20 spaces filled with tsegs

XI

A) dgongs pa 'dis | D: dgongs pa 'das
   skye mchud yod par | D: skye mchud yang par
gzugs la sogs pa | GNP: gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par rig pa | N: rnam par rig par ji ltar rtogs par | GNP: ji ltar rtogs par
B) 'di ltar | CD: 'di ltar
C) zhe na | C: zhe na ||
D) ngo bor brtag pa'i | GNP: ngo bor brtags pa'i
   rab du ma 'am | GNP: rab du ma 'am |
XII

A) ce na | CD: ce na 'di ltar || GNP: 'di ltar 12a
drug gis | GNP: drug gis |
C) gcig gi go | NP: gcig gis go 12c
gcig na || N: gcig na |
D) ji ste | N: ji snyed
na ni | N: nad (see next)

E) des na | N: ni na
G) ma yin gyi | G: ma yin gyis ||; NP: ma yin gyis |
I) yin pa de de dag | GNP: yin pa de dag gzhan rnam | GNP: gzhan nam gzhan

XIII

13d
de | GNP: de'i
B) rdul phra rab | GNP: rdul phra rab gyi rnam | N: rnam
shas med | G: shes med
zer cig | D: zer cig
yang sbyor bar | GNP: yang sbyor bas

c) de bas | N: de bas na
phra rab rdzas | N: phra rab brdzas
D) rdul phra rab | C: rdul rab

XIV

A) rdul phra rab kyi | GP: rdul phra rab gyi 14c
grib dang sgrib | CD: sgrib dang sgrib
B) re re la phyogs | GNP: re re la yang phyogs
grib ma 'bab par | GNP: grib mi 'bab par C)
de la ni | N: de lta ni
D) phyogs kyi cha | CD: phyogs kyi phyogs ji ltar 'gyur | N: ji ltar 'gyur ||
E) gzhan med na | GNP: gzhan med na |
thogs par 'gyur | GN: thog par 'gyur || P: thog par 'gyur |

F) 'gyur te | G: 'gyur to |H) rnam las | CD: rnam la (either form seems grammatical)
de'i yin | GNP: de'i yin I) smras pa | GNP: smras pa
14d
gong bu | N: gang bu
K) yongs su rtogs pa | GNP: yongs su rtog pa
L) yin | CP: yin || N: yino ||
M) dang || GN: dang |
sngon po | N: sngon pa
XV
B) nyes pa | All editions: nges pa
15d mi sod | N: mi bsod
C) gom pa gcig bor | GNP: goms pa gcig bor
D) cha ma zin pa | GNP: cha ma zin pa |

XVI
A) thams cad kyi | N: thams cad kyis
nang na | CD: nang na yang
16b tshe de yi | GP: che de'i; N: tshe de'i
16c khyod kyi | GNP: khyod kyis
de mi | CD: de min

XVII
B) de ni de | CD: de ni da ma
D) yin no | GNP: yin no
'di ltar | CGNP: 'di ltar
17a rig bzhin | GNP: rig bzhin |
17b bshad zin | GNP: bshad zin nas
E) bzhin te | D: bzhin ta; GNP: bzhin de
G) 'grub bo | D: 'grub bo |
A) las sems can | C: las sems can followed by 25 spaces filled with tsegs 'byung gi | ] GNP: byung gi
B) bṛten pa | GNP: rten pa de dang ] N: de dang followed by 7 spaces filled with tsegs bshes gnyen la bṛten pa ] N: bshes gnyen la rten pa
sems can rnam kyis | GNP: sems can rnam kyi ji ltar 'grub ] GNP: ji ltar grub 'gyur | ] N: 'gyur ||
C) dbang gis ] N: dbang gi

E) rgyud gzhan gyi ] GNP: rgyud gzhan gyis 'byung gi don | ] GNP: 'byung gi | don
i8d rmi ] N: mi
H) rgyu yin gyi ] N: rgyu yin gyis

XIX

A) ji ltar 'gyur | ] GN: ji ltar 'gyur ||
19a rnam rig gi ] C: ram rig gi ; GNP: rnam rig gi ; P: rnam par rig gi
19b bya na ] ] GP: bya na |
D) rdzu 'phrul dang ] C: rdzu 'phrul dang |

F) thags zangs ris ] GNP: thag bzangs rigs [this is the form found in dictionaries]
zhes bya ba ] C: zhas bya ba
XX

20a
khros pas ] GNP: khros pa'i
dan ta ] GNP: danta
stongs par ] NP: stong par
A) rnam par rig pa'i ] GNP: rnam par rig
bye brag gi ] G: bye brag gi [folio flip]
gi; NP: bye brag gi
mi 'dod na ] ] GNP: mi 'dod na
B) kha na ma ] GP: kha na
chen po dang ] G: chen po dang
bsgrub pa na ] ] GNP: sgrub pa na
bdag nye ba ] GNP: bdag nye bar
dan ta ] GNP: danta
ling ka'i ] NP: lingga'i
dgon pa dang ] GNP: dgon pa dang
D) tang ka'i ] GNP: tangga'i
stongs pa ] ] GNP: stong pa
stongs pa ] ] GNP: stong pa
mi dpogs shing ] GNP: mi dpog shing
zhes smras pa ] GNP: zhes rmas pa (this is a rarer verb, but smras agrees with ukta; the Buddha's question itself is translated with bka' stsal pa)
rtog ste || ] NP: rtog ste
D) drang srong rnams kyis ] GNP: drang srong rnams kyi

XXI

A) sems rig pas ] GNP: sems rigs pas
shes pa ni || ] N: shes pa ni |

XXII

A) rig pa tsam gyis ] GNP: rig pa tsam gyi
rnam par nges pa ] C: rnam par [folio flip] par nges pa
D) mi dpogs shing ] GNP: mi dpog shing
spyod yul yin ] GNP: spyod yul yin
spyo yul yin ] GNP: spyod yul yin
mi dpogs shing ] GNP: mi dpog shing
spyod yul yin te ] GNP: spyod yul yin te

Colophon
dbyig gnyen gyis mdzad pa ] GNP: dbyig gnyen gi mdzad pa'i
len dra ] GNP: lendra
ban de ] GNP: bande

Sanskrit Reading Text

of the

Viṁśikā-vṛtti
I

...  [nārthāḥ kaścid asti] |

II

......

na deśakālaniyamaḥ sanṭānāniyamāḥ na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñapti yadi nārthataḥ || 2 ||

......-niyamaḥ sanṭānāniyamaḥ kṛtyakriyā ca na yujyate ,

III

A) na khalu na yujyate , yasmāt ||

desaḍiniyamaḥ siddhas svapnavat

B) svapna iva svapnavat | C) kathaṁ | D) tāvat svapne vināpy arthena kvacid eva dese kiṃcid grāmāramastrīpuruṣādikāṁ dṛṣyate na sarvatra tatraiva ca dese kadācid dṛṣyate na sarvakālam | E) iti siddho vināpy arthena deśakālaniyamaḥ ||

pretavat punaḥ
dsanṭānāniyamaḥ ||

F) siddha iti vartate ; G) pretānām iva pretavat | H) kathaṁ siddhaḥ | I) sāmaṁ

sarvaiḥ pūyanadyādidasāne || 3 ||

J) pūyapūrṇā nadi pūyanadi | K) ghṛtaghaṭavat | L) tulyakarma-
vipākāvasthā hi pretāḥ sarve 'pi sāmaṁ pūyaṁ pūryaṁ nadim paśyanti naika eva | M) yathā pūyaṁ pūryaṁ evaṁ mūtrapuriṣādipūrṇāṁ daṇḍā-
sidharaiś ca pūraṣair adhiṣṭhitām ity ādigrahaṇena | N) evaṁ sanṭānāniyamāḥ vijñaptināṁ asaty apy arthe siddhaḥ ||

IV

svapnopaghaṭavat kṛtyakriyā |
A) siddheti veditavyaṁ | B) yathā svapne dvayasmāpattim antareṇa śukravisargalakṣaṇaṁ svapnopaghātaḥ | C) evan tāvad anyānyaīr drṣṭāntair deśakālaniyamādicatuṣṭayaṁ siddhaṁ

narakavat punaḥ sarvaṁ

D) siddham iti veditavyaṁ | E) narakēṣv iva narakavat | F) kathāṁ siddhaṁ

narakapālādīdārsane tais ca bādhaṇe || 4 ||

G) yathā hi narakēṣu nārakaṁ narakapālādīdārsanāṁ deśakālaniyamena siddhaṁ | H) śvavāyasāyasaparvataḍyāgaśamanagamaṇa-
darśanaṁ cety ādigrahaṇena | I) sarveṣaṁ ca naikasyaiva | J) tais ca tadbādhanaṁ siddham asatsv api narakapālāḍīsu samānasvakarma-
vipākādhipatīt | K) tathānyatrapī sarvaṁ etad deśakālaniyamādicatuṣṭ-
tayaṁ siddham iti veditavyaṁ |

L) kim punaḥ kāraṇaṁ narakapāḷas te ca śvāno vāyasāś ca satvā neṣyante |

M) ayogāt | N) na hi te nārakā yujyante tathaiva tadduḥkhāpratih-
samvedanāt | O) parasparam yāṭyatāṁ ime nārakā ime narakapāḷā iti
vyavasthā na syāt | P) tulyākṛtipramāṇabalaṁ na ca parasmāṁ yāṭ-
yatāṁ na tathā bhayaṁ syāt | Q) dāhadoṭhānaṁ ca pradīptāyām
ayomayāṁ bhūmāv asahamāṇaḥ kathāṁ tatra parāṁ yāṭayeyuḥ | R) anārakāṇaṁ vā naraṅe kutaḥ sambhavāḥ |

V

A) kathāṁ tāvat tiraṁ ṣcāṁ svarge sambhavāḥ | B) evaṁ narakēṣu tiryakpretaviśeṣāṇaṁ narakapālādīnaṁ sambhavāḥ syāt ||

tiraṁ ṣcāṁ sambhavāḥ svarge yathā na naraṅe tathā |
na pretāṁ yatas tajjaṁ duḥkhaṁ nānubhavanti te || 5 ||

C) ye hi tīryaṇcaḥ svarge sambhavanti te tadbhājanalokasukha-
saṁvartaṇīyena karmāṇaḥ tatra sambhūtās tajjaṁ sukhaṁ pratyanub-
havanti | D) na caiva narakapālādāyo nārakaṁ duḥkhaṁ pratyanu-
havanti E) tasmān na tiraṁ ṣcāṁ sambhavo yukto F) nāpi pretāṁ |
VI

A) teṣān tarhi nārakāṇāṁ karmabhis tatra bhūtaviśeṣāḥ sambhavanti varṇākṛtipramāṇaṁ abalaviśiṣṭā ye narakapālādīsamjñāṁ pratilabhante | B) tathā ca pariṇāmanti yad vividhāṁ āhastavikṣepaṁ kriyāṁ kurvanto dṛṣyante bhayotpādaṁ ārthm yathā meśākṛtayaḥ parvata āgacchanto gacchantāḥ ayahśālmalivane ca kanṭaka adho-mukhibhavanta ēṛddhamukhibhavantaḥ ceti | C) na te na sambhavanty eva ||

yadi tatkarmabhis tatra bhūtānāṁ sambhavas tathā | 
īṣyate pariṇāmaś ca kim vijñānasya neṣyate || 6 ||

Dj) vijñānasyaiva tatkarmabhis tathā pariṇāmaḥ kasmāṁ neṣyate | E) kim punar bhūtāni kalpyante || 7 ||

VII

karmanā vāsanānyatra phalam anyatra kalpyate | 
tatra eva neṣyate yatra vāsanā kin nu kāraṇaṁ | 7 ||

A) yena hi karmāḥ nārakāṇāṁ tatra tādṛśo bhūtānāṁ sambhavaḥ kalpyate pariṇāmaś ca tasya karmāno vāsanā teṣāṁ vijñānasaṁtānasannivīṣṭā nānyatra , B) yatraiva ca vāsanā tatra eva phalaiḥ tādṛśo vijñānāparināmaḥ kin neṣyate | C) yatra vāsanā nāsti tatra tasyaiḥ phalam kalpyata iti kim atra kāraṇaḥ |

Dj) āgamaḥ kāraṇaṁ | E) yadi vijñānam eva rūpaṁdipratibhāsaṁ syān na rūpādikō 'rthas tadā rūpādyāyatanāstitvam bhagavata noktaṁ syāt |

VIII

A) akāraṇam etat yasmāt , 
rūpādyāyatanāstitvam tadvineyajanam ca prati | 
abhiprāyavaśād uktam upapādukasatvatvaṁ || 8 ||

B) yathāsti satva upapāduka ity uktam bhagavatā 'bhiprāyavaśāc cittasantatyanucchedam āyatyāṁ abhipretya |
nāstīha satva ātmā vā dharmmās tv ete sahetukāḥ ||

iti vacanāt | evāṁ rūpādyāyatanāstītvam apy uktaṁ bhagavatā taddeśanāvīneyajanam adhikṛtyety ābhīprāyikāṁ tad vacanaṁ |

IX

ko 'trābhīprāyaḥ |
yataḥ svabijād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravarttate | dvividhāyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt || 9 ||

kim utkam bhavati | rūpapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabijāt pariṇāmaviśeṣapraśīptāḥ utpadyate tac ca bijaṁ yatpratibhāsā ca | sā te tasyā vijñaptaḥ caksūrūpayatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravīt | evaṁ yāvat spraṣṭavyapratibhāsā vijñaptir yataḥ svabijāt pariṇāmaviśeṣapraśīptāḥ utpadyate , tac ca bijaṁ yatpratibhāsā ca | sā te tasyāḥ kāyaspraṣṭavyāyatanatvena yathākramam bhagavān abravid | ity ayam abhīprāyaḥ |

X

evaṁ punar abhīprāyavaśena deśayitvā ko guṇaḥ ||
tathā pudgalanairātmyapraveśo hi ||

tathā hi deśyamāne pudgalanairātmyam praviśam praviśanti | dvayaśaṭkaḥbhyaṁ vijñānaṣṭaḥkampravartate na tu kaścid eko draṣṭāsti na yāvan mantety evaṁ viditvā ye pudgalanairātmyadeśanāvīneyās te pudgalanairātmyam praviśanti ||

anyathā punar
deśanaḥ dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ ||

anyatheti vijñaptimātradesanā | kathāṁ dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ | evaṁ vijñaptimātram idaṁ rūpādiḥharmanairātmyapraviśam utpadyate na tu rūpādilakṣaṇo dharmaḥ kaścid astīti viditvā |

yadi tarhi sarvathā dharmaḥ nāsti tad api vijñaptimātram nāsti | kathāṁ tarhi vyavasthāpyate |
I) na khalu sarvathā dharmo nāstīty evaṁ dharmanairātmyapraśevō bhavati | J) api tu |

kalpitātmānaḥ, | 10 ||

K) yo bālair dharmanāṁ svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādiḥ

parikalpitas tena kalpitātmānaḥ teṣāṁ nairātmyam i) na tv anabhilāpyenātmānaḥ yo buddhānāṁ viśaya iti | M) evam viṇātmiṁatra-syāpi viṇāptyantaraparikalpitenātmāḥ nairātmyapraśevād viṇātmiṁatravyavasthāpanayā sarvadharmanāṁ nairātmyapraśevō bhavati na tu sarvathā tadastitvāpavādāt | N) itarthā hi viṇāpter api viṇāpty-antaram arthāḥ syād iti viṇātmiṁatrātvān na sidhyārthavatītvād viṇātmitānāṁ |

XI

A) kathāṁ punar idaṁ pratyetavyam anenābhiprāyeṇa bhagavatā rūpādyāyatanaśtītvam uktāṁ na punāḥ saṁty eva tāṁ yāni rūpādvijñātmitānāṁ pratyekaṁ viśayibhavantīti |

B) yasmān
a u tad ekaṁ na cānekaṁ viśayaḥ paramāṇuṣaḥ |
na ca te saṁhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati || 11 ||

c) iti | kim uktam bhavati | d) yat tad rūpādikam āyatanaṁ rūpādvijñātmitānāṁ pratyekaṁ viśayaḥ syāt tad ekaṁ vā syād yathā 'vayavirūpaṁ kalpyate vaiśesikaṁ anekaṁ vā paramāṇuṣaḥ saṁhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavāḥ | e) na tāvad ekaṁ viśayo bhavaty avayavebhāy 'nyasyāvayavirūpasya kvacīd apaśyataḥ anekaṁ paramā-ṇūnāṁ pratyekaṁ agrahanāt | f) nāpy anekaṁ paramā-ṇūnāṁ pratyekaṁ agrahanāt | g) naḥi te saṁhatā viśayibhavanti | yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyāṁ na sidhyati |

XII

A) kathāṁ na sidhyati |

B) yasmāt |

ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramāṇoḥ śādaṁśatā ||
C) saḍbhyo digbhyah saḍbhīḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ saḍaṅśatā prāṇipti | ekasya yo desas tatrānyasyāsambhavāt |

saṃnāṁ samānadeśatvāt pīṇḍāḥ syād anumātrakah || 12 ||

D) atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor desāḥ sa eva saṃnām | E) tena sarvēṣāṁ samānadeśatvāt sarvāḥ pīṇḍāḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt parasparāvyatirekād f) iti na kaścit pīṇḍo dṛśyaḥ syāt | G) naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṁyuyjante niravayavatvāt | mā bhūd eṣa dosaprasāṅgaḥ | saṁghatās tu parasparam saṁyuyjyanta iti kāśmiravaibhāṣikās h) te idam praśṭavyāḥ | H) yaḥ paramāṇunāṁ saṁghāto na sa tebhya 'ṛthāntaram iti ||

XIII

paramāṇor asaṁyoge tatsaṁghāte 'sti kasya saḥ ||

A) saṁyoga iti varttate |

na cānavavatvena tatsaṁyogo na sidhyati || 13 ||

B) atha saṁghaṭā apy anyonyam na saṁyuyjante na tarhi paramāṇunāṁ niravayavatvāt saṁyogo na sidhyatīti vaktavyam | C) saṁghatās tu parasparam saṁyuyjyanta iti kāśmiravaibhāṣikās | D) yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṁyoga iṣyate yadi vā neṣyate |

XIV

digbhaṅgabheda yasyāsti tasyaikatvam na yuṣyate |

A) anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāṅgabhede sati katham tādāṃkasya paramāṇor ektaṁ iṣyate |

chāyāvṛti katham vā |

B) yady ekaikasya paramāṇor digbhāṅgabhed na syād ādityodaye katham anyatra pārśve chāyā bhavaty anyatātapaḥ | C) na hi tasyānyaḥ pradeśo 'sti yatratāpao na syāt | D) āvaraṇaḥ ca katham bhavati
paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantareṇa yadi digbhāgabheda neṣyate | e) na hi kaścid anyaḥ parabhave 'sti yatrāgamanād anyenānyasya pratighātaḥ syāt | f) asati ca pratighāte sarvesaṁ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ sarīghātaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syād ity utkāṃ |

g) kim evaṁ neṣyate piṇḍasya te chāyāvṛtī na paramāṇor iti |
h) kim khalu paramāṇubhyo 'nyāḥ piṇḍa iṣyate yasya te syātāṁ |
i) nety āha |

anyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te || 14 ||

j) yadi nānyāḥ paramāṇubhyaḥ piṇḍa iṣyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati |
k) sanniveśaparikalpa eṣaḥ | paramāṇuh sarīghāta iti vā kim anayā cintayā | lakṣaṇan tu rūpādīnāṁ na pratiśidhyate |

l) kim punas teṣāṁ lakṣaṇaṁ

m) caksurādiviśayatvaṁ nilādītvaṁ ca

n) tad evedaṁ sampradhāryate | yat tac caksurādināṁ viṣayo nilapitādikam iṣyate kin tad ekaṁ dravyam atha vā tad anekam iti |

XV

A) kiṁ cātāḥ |

B) anekatve doṣa utkāḥ ||

ekatve na kramaṇetir yugapan na grahāgrahau | vicchinnānekaṅvṛttiś ca sūkṣmānīksā ca no bhavet || 15 ||

c) yadi yāvad avicchinnāṁ nilādikaṅ caksuṣo viṣayas tad ekaṁ dravyaṁ kalpyate prthivyāṁ kramaṇetir na syāt | gamanam ity arthaḥ | sakṛṭpādakṣepaṇa sarvasya gataṅtvat | d) arvāgḍhāgaṁya ca grahaṇaṁ parabhāgasya cāgraḥaṅaṁ yugapan na syāt | na hi tasyaiva tadānīṁ grahaṇaṁ cāgraḥaṅaṁ ca yuktam |
E) vicchinnasya cānekasya hastyaśvādikasyaikatra vṛttir na syāt | F) yatraiva hy ekan tatraivāparam iti kathan tayor vicchedo yuñyate | G) katham vā tad ekaṁ yat prāptaṁ ca tābhyaṁ na ca prāptam antarāle tacchūnyagrahāṇāt | H) sūkṣmānāṁ codakajāntūnāṁ sthūlāṁ samāna-rūpānāṁ anikṣaṇāṁ na syāt | I) yadi lakṣaṇabhедād eva dravyāntarātvaṁ kalpyate, nānyathā, tasmād avaśyaṁ paramāṇuo bhedaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ | J) sa caiko na sidhyati | K) tasyāsiddhau rūpādīṁ ca kṣurādiviṣayatvam asiddham | L) iti siddham vijñaptimātrām bhavatīti |

XVI

A) pramāṇavasād astitvaṁ nāsititvāṁ vā nirddhāryate | sarveśāṁ ca pramāṇāṇāṁ pratyakṣam pramāṇāṁ gariṣṭham | ity asaty arthe katham iyaṁ buddhir bhavatīdaṁ me pratyakṣam iti ||

pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā |

vināpy artheneti pūrvam eva jñāpitaṁ |

sā ca yadā tadā |

na so ’rtho drṣyate tasya pratyakṣatvāṁ kathāṁ mataṁ |

| 16 |

d) yadā ca sā pratyakṣabuddhir bhavatīdaṁ me pratyakṣam iti tadā na so ’rtho drṣyate manovijñāṇenaiva paricchedac ca kṣurvijñāna- sya ca tādā niruddhatvād | iti kathāṁ tasya pratyakṣatvam iṣṭaṁ | viśeṣena tu kṣaṇikavādino yasya tadānīṁ niruddham eva tad rūpaṁ rasādikāṁ vā |

XVII

A) nānanubhūtam manovijñāṇena smaryate | ity avaśyaṁ arthānubhavena bhavitayaṁ tac ca darśanam ity evaṁ tadviṣayasya rūpaṁ pratyakṣatvāṁ mataṁ |

D) asiddham idam anubhūtasyārthasya smaraṇaṁ bhavatīti |

yasmāt |

uktāṁ yathā tadābhāsā vijñaptiḥ ||
E) vināpy arthena yathārthābhāsā caṅṣurviṃjñānādikā vijñaptir utpadyate tathoktaṁ || smaraṇaṁ tataḥ |

F) tato hi vijñaptēḥ smṛtisamprayuktā tatpratibhāsaiva rūpādīvikalpikā manoviṃjñaptir utpadyata g) iti na smṛtyutpādār arthānu-bhavaḥ sidhyati |

H) yadi yathā svapne vijñaptir abhūṭārthaviṃṣayā tathā jaṅgrato 'pi syāt, tathaiva tadabhāvaṁ lokāḥ svayam avagacchet | j) na caivaṃ bhavati | k) tasmāna na svapna ivārthopalabdhiḥ sarvā nirarṭhikā |

I) idam ajñāpakaṁ | yasmāt |

svapnadṛgviṃṣayābhāvaṁ nāprabuddho 'vagacchati || 17 ||

M) evāṁ vitathavikalpaḥbhāvyāsāvānānīdrayā prasupto lokāḥ svapna ivābhūtam artham paśyānā prabuddhas tadabhāvaṁ yathāvān nāvagacchati, o) yadā tu tatpratipakoṣalokottaranirvikalpaḥ jñānalabhaḥ prabuddho bhavati tadā tatprṣṭhalabdhaḥuddhalaṅka- jñānasammukhibhāvād viṣayābhāvaṁ yathāvad avagacchatiḥ samānam etat |

XVIII

A) yadi svasantānapariṇāmaviṃśeṣād eva satvānām arthatpātir-bhāsā vijñaptaya utpadyante nārthaviṃśeṣāt | e) tadā ya eṣa pāpakalyāṇa-mitrasaṃprākāt sadasaddharmāsraṇaḥ ca vijñaptiniṃyamaḥ satvānāṁ sa kathaṃ sidhyati, asati sadasatsaṃparke taddeṣanāyān ca |

anyonyādhipatitvena vijñaptiniṃyamo mithaḥ ||

c) sarveṣāṁ hi satvānām anyonyaviṃjñānaparāhhipatyna mitho vijñapinerīyo bhavati yathāyogāṁ | d) mitha iti pararparataḥ | e) atāḥ santānāntaraviṃjñaptiviṃśeṣāt santānāntare vijñaptiviṃśeṣa utpadyate nārthaviṃśeṣāt |

F) yadi yathā svapne nirarṭhikā vijñaptir evaṁ jaṅgrato 'pi syāt kasmāt kuṣālakusalamudācāre suptāsuptayos tulyaṁ phalam īṣṭanīṣṭam āyatānān na bhavati |
G) yasmāt |
midhaṇopahataḥ cittaṁ svapne tenāsamaṁ phalaṁ || 18 ||

H) idam atra kāraṇaṁ na tv arthasadbhāvaḥ |

XIX

A) yadi vijñaptimātram evedaṁ na kasyacit kāya 'sti na vāk katham upakramyamāṇānāṁ aurabhrikādibhir urabhrādināṁ maraṇaṁ bhavati, H ataktye vā tanmarane katham aurabhrikādināṁ prāṇātipātāvadyena yogo bhavati ||

maraṇaṁ paravijñaptivisesād vikriyā yathā |
smṛtilopaḥdikānyeśāṁ piśācādīmanovaśāt || 19 ||

G) yathā hi piśācādīmanovaśād anyeśāṁ smṛtilopasvapna-
darśanabhūtagrahāveśavikāra bhavanti | D) rddhivanmanovaśāc ca | E) yathā sāraṇasyāryamahākātyāyanādhiṣṭhānāt svapnadārśanāṁ | F) āranyakarasārmanahpraḍoṣāc ca vemaṅcitriṇāḥ parājayaḥ | G) tathā para-
vijñaptivisesādhipatyaṭ pareśāṁ jīvitendriyavirodhini kācid vikriyotpadyate yayā sabhāgasantaticcchedāhyam maraṇaṁ bhavatīti veditavyaṁ |

XX

kathāṁ vā daṇḍakāraṇyaśūnyatvam ṛṣikopataḥ |

A) yadi paravijñaptivisesādhipatyaṭ satvānāṁ maraṇaṁ nesyaṭe |
B) manodaṇḍasya hi mahāśāvadyatvaṁ sādhayatā bhagavatopālir 
grhapatīḥ prṣṭaḥ c) kaccit te grhapatे śrutaṁ kena tāṇi daṇḍakāraṇyāni 
mātaṅgāraṇyāni kāliṅgāraṇyāni śūnyāni medhyibhūtāni | D) tenoktaṁ 
śrutaṁ me bho gautama ṛṣīnāṁ manahpraḍoṣeṇeti ||

manodaṇḍo mahāvadyaḥ kathāṁ vā tena sidhyati || 20 ||

E) yady evam kalpyate, tadabhiprasannair amānuṣaṁ tad-
vāsinaḥ satvā utsādita na tv ṛṣīnāṁ manahpraḍoṣan mṛta ity E) evam 
sati kathāṁ tena karmaṇā manodaṇḍaḥ kāyāvāgdandaḥbyām mahā-
vadyatamaḥ siddho bhavati | G) tan manahpraḍoṣamātrenā tāvatāṁ 
satvānāṁ maraṇāt sidhyati |
XXI

A) yādi vijñaptimātram evaṁ paracittavidaḥ kiṁ paracittaṁ jānante, atha na, B) kiṁ ca tathā C) yadi na jānante katham paracittavido bhavanti | D) atha jānanti |

paracittavidām jñānam ayathārtham kathāṁ yathā, svacittajñānam

e) tad api katham ayathārtham |

ajñānād yathā buddhasya gocarāḥ || 21 ||

f) yathā tan nirabhilāpyenatmanā buddhānāṁ gocarāḥ | tathā tadajñānāt | tad ubhayam na yathārtham gocarāḥ | g) vitathapratibhāsatayā h) grāhyagrāhakavikalpasyāprahīnatvāt |

XXII

A) anantaviniścayaprabhedādāgadhagāmbhīryāyāṁ vijñaptimātratāyāṁ |

vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ svaśaktisadvēśī mayā | kṛteyāṁ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā, |

B) sarvaprakārā tu sā madṛśaiś cintayituṁ na śakyā tarkkāvīṣayatvāt | C) kasya punah sā sarvathā gocara ity āha |

buddhaprakāraḥ, || 22 ||

d) buddhānāṁ hi sā bhagavatāṁ sarvaprakāraṁ gocarāḥ sarvākārasvajñeyajñānāvighātād iti ||

viṁśikā vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ 

kṛtir iyam ācāryavasubandhoḥ ||
English Reading Text

of the

Vimśikā-ṛtti
I

[Vasubandhu]

A) The Great Vehicle teaches that what belongs to the triple world is established as Manifestation-Only, because it is stated in scripture: B) “O Sons of the Conqueror, what belongs to the triple world is mind-only.” C) Mind, thought, cognition and manifestation are synonyms. D) And here this ‘mind’ intends the inclusion of the concomitants [of mind]. E) “Only” is stated in order to rule out external objects. F) This cognition itself arises having the appearance of an external object. G) For example, it is like those with an eye disease seeing non-existent hair, a [double] moon and so on, but there is no [real] object at all.

II

[Objection:]

A) To this it is objected:

If manifestation does not [arise] from an external object, it is not reasonable that there be restriction as to time and place, nor nonrestriction as to personal continuum, nor causal efficacy. [2]

B) What is being stated here? C) If there is the arisal of manifestation of material form and so on without any external object of material form and so on, and [consequently the manifestation] does not [arise] from a [real] external object of material form and so on, D) why does [such a manifestation] arise in a particular place, and not everywhere; E) why does it arise only in that place at some time, not always; and F) why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those present there in that place at that time, and not in [the minds] of just a few? G) For instance, while a hair and so on may appear in the mind of one with eye disease, it does not [appear] to others [free of that disease].
Why is it that the hair, bee and so on which appear to one with eye disease have no causal efficacy of a hair and so on, while for those others without [eye disease, those hairs, bees and so forth which appear to them] do have [causal efficacy]?  

The food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons and so on seen in a dream do not have causal efficacy [to address] hunger, thirst and the like, but those others not [in a dream] do have such [causal efficacy].  

A mirage city, being non-existent, does not have the causal efficacy of a city, but other [cities] not [unreal like] that do.  

If these [things like dream food] resemble the non-existent in lacking any [real external] object, restriction as to time and place, nonrestriction as to personal continuum, and causal efficacy are not reasonable.

III  

[Vasubandhu]  

A They are certainly not unreasonable, since:  

Restriction as to place and so on is proved, as with dreams.  

[3ab]  

B “As with dreams” means as in a dream.  

C Well, how, first of all, [do you explain that] even without an external object, some village, grove, man, woman or the like is seen in a dream at a particular place, rather than everywhere, and at that particular place at some specific time, rather than always?  

E For this reason, restriction as to time and place is established, even in the absence of an external object.

Moreover, nonrestriction to personal continuum [is proved] as with hungry ghosts.  

[3bc]  

F “Is proved” is carried over [from the previous foot].  

G “As with hungry ghosts” means as in the case of hungry ghosts.  

H How is this proved?  

J Collectively
In their all seeing the river of pus and so on. [3cd]

“The river of pus” means a river filled with pus, as [one says] a pot of ghee [when one means a pot filled with ghee]. 1) For hungry ghosts in a state of equally experiencing fruition of their actions collectively all see the river filled with pus, not just one of them alone. 6) The word “and so on” is mentioned to indicate that as [they see the river] filled with pus, they [also see it] filled with urine, feces and the like, and guarded by persons holding staffs and swords. 8) Thus the non-restriction of manifestations to [a specific] personal continuum is proved even without the existence of an external object.

IV

Causal efficacy [is proved] as in ejaculation in a dream. [4ab]

A) “Is proved” is to be understood. B) [Causal efficacy is established] as with ejaculation in a dream [that is, a wet dream], which is characterized by the emission of semen in a dream in the absence of [actual] sexual union. C) In this way at the outset is proved, through these various examples, the four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest.

And again as with hell all [four aspects are proved]. [4bc]

D) “Are proved” is to be understood. E) “As with hell” means like in the hells. F) How are they proved?

In the seeing of the hell guardians and so on, and in being tortured by them. [4cd]

G) Just as it is proved that in the hells hell beings see the hell guardians and so on with restriction as to time and place H) —“and so
“on” means that they see the dogs, crows, the iron mountains and so on coming and going—\textsuperscript{1}) and all [hell beings see these], not merely one, \textsuperscript{2}) and [just as it is] proved that they are tortured by them, even though the hell guardians and so on do not exist, because of the domination of the generalized common fruition of their individual karmic deeds—\textsuperscript{3}) Just so it should be understood that the entirety of this four-fold [characterization, namely] the restriction to time and place and the rest, is proved elsewhere too [and not only in the separate examples].

[Objection]
\textsuperscript{1}) For what reason, then, do you not accept the hell guardians, and dogs and crows, as really existent beings?

[Vasubandhu]
\textsuperscript{4}) Because it is not reasonable, \textsuperscript{5}) For it is not reasonable for those [guardians and so on] to be hell beings, since they do not experience the sufferings of that [place] in precisely that same way. \textsuperscript{6}) If they were torturing each other, there would be no differentiation that ‘these are the hell beings; these the hell guardians.’ \textsuperscript{7}) And if those of equal form, size and strength were torturing each other, they would not be so very afraid. \textsuperscript{8}) And how could [those guardians], unable to tolerate the suffering of burning on a flaming iron ground, torture others there? \textsuperscript{9}) On the other hand, how could non-hell beings be born in hell [in the first place]?

V

[Objection]
\textsuperscript{10}) [Well,] to begin, how [—as you admit as well—] could animals be born in heaven? \textsuperscript{11}) In the same way, animals and certain hungry ghosts might be born in the hells as hell guardians and others.
Animals are not born in hell as they are in heaven, 
Nor are hungry ghosts, since they do not experience the suffering produced there. [5]

c) For, those who are born in heaven as animals, being born there through their karmic deeds conducive to happiness [performed] in the Receptacle World, experience the happiness produced there [in heaven], d) but the hell guardians and so on do not experience hellish suffering in a similar fashion. e) Therefore, it is not reasonable that animals are born [in hell], e) nor is it so for hungry ghosts.

VI

[Objection]

A) Then, particular types of gross material elements arise there through the karmic deeds of those hell beings, which, particularized as to color, form, size and strength, obtain the designations ‘hell guardian’ and so on. b) And they transform in such a manner that they appear performing activities like waving their hands and so on, in order to instill fear, as mountains in the shape of rams coming and going and thorns in the forest of iron thorn trees turning themselves down and turning themselves up [likewise appear in hell instilling fear]. c) Therefore, it is not that those [hell guardians and so on] are not born at all.

[Vasubandhu]

If you accept that gross material elements arise there in this fashion through the karmic deeds of those [beings], And [you accept their] transformation, why do you not accept [the transformation] of cognition? [6]
Why do you not accept that the transformation thus brought about by the karmic deeds of those [beings] is [a transformation] of cognition itself? Why, moreover, are gross material elements imagined [to play any role at all]? What is more:

VII

The perfuming of the karmic deed you imagine to be elsewhere than the result; What is the reason you do not accept [that the result is] in precisely the same location where the perfuming takes place? [7]

You imagine such an arising and transformation of gross material elements of hell beings there [in hell] as due to their karmic deeds, while the perfuming of those karmic deeds is lodged in their individual continua of cognition, not elsewhere. So why do you not accept that such a transformation of cognition as the result of those [karmic deeds] is precisely where the perfuming itself is? For what reason, in this case, do you imagine that the result of those [karmic deeds] is somewhere where the perfuming is not?

[Objection]

The reason is scripture. If there were nothing but cognition with the appearance of material form and the rest, and no external objects characterized as material form and the rest, then the Blessed One would not have spoken of the existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest.

VIII

[Vasubandhu]

This is not a reason, since:
The existence of the sense-fields of material form and the rest were spoken of [by the Blessed One] with a special intention directed toward the individual to be guided by that [teaching], as [in the case of the mention of] beings born by spontaneous generation. [8]

B) By way of example, the Blessed One with a special intention said “There are beings of spontaneous birth,” intending [allusion to] the nonannihilation of the continuum of mind in the future. D) [We know this] because of the [scriptural] statement:

C) Here [in our teaching] there is no being or self, but [only] these elemental factors of existence along with their causes.

E) Thus, although the Blessed One did speak of the existence of the sense-fields of form and the rest, that [scriptural] statement is of special intention since it is directed toward the individual who is to be guided by that teaching.

IX

A) In this regard, what is the special intention?

A manifestation arises from its own proper seed, having an appearance corresponding to that [external object]. The Sage spoke of the two [seed and appearance] as the dual sense field of that [manifestation]. [9]

B) What is being stated? C) The proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of visible form, and that as which this [cognition] appears: D) the Blessed One spoke of these two as, respectively, the
sense field of visual perception ["seeing eye" = seed] and the sense field of visible form [= the object] related to that manifestation. e) The same [applies to all items in the stock list] up to: The Blessed One spoke of the proper seed from which—when it has attained a particular transformation—arises a manifestation having the appearance of the tangible, and that as which this [manifestation] appears: v) [the Blessed One spoke] of these two as, respectively, the sense field of tangible perception ["body" = seed] and the sense field of the tangible [= the object] related to that [manifestation]. c) This is the special intention.

X

[Objection]

A) And what is the advantage of having explained things in this way by recourse to special intention?

[Vasubandhu]

For in this way there is understanding of the selflessness of persons. [10ab]

e) For when it is being taught in this way [those individuals to be guided] understand the idea of the selflessness of persons. c) The six cognitions come about from the two sets of six [= the twelve sense-fields], but when they understand that there is no distinct seer at all—[and all members of the stock list] up to—no distinct thinker, those who are to be guided by the teaching of the selflessness of persons understand the idea of the selflessness of persons.

Moreover, teaching in another way leads to the understanding of the selflessness of elemental factors of existence. [10bcd]
“In another way” refers to the teaching of Manifestation-Only. How does this lead to understanding the selflessness of elemental factors of existence? [One understands this by] knowing that this Manifestation-Only arises with the semblance of elemental factors of existence such as material form and the rest, but actually there is no existing elemental factor of existence having as its characteristic mark material form and the rest.

[Objection]
If, then, no elemental factor of existence exists in any fashion, Manifestation-Only does not exist either. How, then, could [your position] be established?

[Vasubandhu]
It is not the case that one comes to understand the selflessness of elemental factors of existence by thinking that the elemental factors of existence do not exist in any fashion at all. But rather [such understanding comes in thinking that elemental factors of existence exist only]:

**In terms of an imagined self.** [10d]

The reference is to the selflessness of those elemental factors of existence the intrinsic nature of which—characterized by subject and object and so on—fools fantasize in terms of an imagined self. [The reference] is not to [the selflessness of elemental factors of existence] in terms of the inexpressible self, which is the domain of the Buddhas. In this way, Manifestation-Only also leads to an understanding of the selflessness of all elemental factors of existence through the establishment of the fact of Manifestation-Only because of an understanding of selflessness in terms of a self fantasized by another manifestation, not because of a denial of the existence of those [elemental factors of existence] in each and every respect. For
otherwise one manifestation would have another manifestation as its external object, and therefore the fact of Manifestation-Only could not be proved, because manifestations would possess external objects.

XI

[Objection]

A) How, then, should one understand this, namely, that while the Blessed One spoke of the existence of the sense-fields of visible form and the rest with this special intention, those things which come to be the corresponding sense objects of the manifestations of visible form and the rest do not actually exist at all?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

That [sense-field of form and the rest] is not a unitary nor atomically plural sense object, neither are those [atoms] compounded, since the atom [itself] is not proved. [11]

C) What is stated here? D) Whatever sense-field, consisting of visible form and the rest, would be the corresponding sense object of the manifestations of visible form and the rest, would be either unitary—as the Vaiśeṣikas imagine material form as a part-possessing whole—or it would be atomically plural, or it would be compounded of those very atoms themselves. E) First of all, the sense object is not unitary, because there is no apprehension anywhere at all of a material form as a part-possessing whole separate from its parts. F) Nor is it plural, because there is no apprehension of atoms individually. G) Nor would those [atoms], compounded, come to be the sense object, since the atom is not proved to be a singular substance.
[Objection]

A) How is [the atom as a singular substance] not proved?

[Vasubandhu]

B) Since:

Because [either] in the simultaneous conjunction with a group of six [other atoms], the atom [would have to] have six parts, [12ab]

c) If there were simultaneous conjunction with six atoms from the six directions [of possible orientation], this would result in the atom having six parts, because where there is one thing another cannot arise.

[Or] because, the six being in a common location, the cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom. [12cd]

d) Or, the place in which there are six atoms would be precisely the same as the place of the single atom. e) For this [reason], because all of them would be in a common location, the entire cluster would be the extent of a [single] atom, because they would not exclude one another. f) Thus no cluster would be visible at all. g) The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas say: “Atoms do not at all conjoin, because of being partless—absolutely not! But compounded things do conjoin one with another.” h) They should be questioned as follows: i) Since a compound of atoms is not something separate from those [atoms],
XIII

Given that there is no conjunction of atoms, what is [conjoining] when those [atoms] are compounded? [13ab]

A) “Conjoining” is carried over [from the previous].

But it is also not due to their partlessness that the con- 
junction of those [atoms] is not proved. [13cd]

B) If you now were to claim that even compounds do not con- 
join with one another, then you [Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas] should not say 
that the conjunction of atoms is not proved because of their partless- 
ness, for a conjunction of the compounded, even with parts, is not 
admitted. C) Therefore, the atom is not proved as a singular substance. D) 
And whether a conjunction of atoms is accepted or not:

XIV

It is not reasonable that something with spatial differentia-
tion be singular. [14ab]

A) If there were spatial differentiation of an atom—namely, the 
front part is different [and so are all the other sides] including the 
bottom part—how would the singularity of an atom with that 
[multiple] nature be reasonable?

Or how is there shadow and obstruction? [14c]

B) If no single atom were to have spatial differentiation, how is it 
that when the sun rises in one place, there is shadow in one place, 
sunshine in another? C) For that [atom] does not have another portion 
on which there would be no sunshine. D) And how is an atom
obstructed by another atom if spatial differentiation is not accepted? [e] For [an atom] has no other separate part whatsoever, from contact with which one [atom] would be resisted by another. Ṇ And if there were no resistance, then because all of them would share a common location, the entire compound would be the extent of a [single] atom, as has [already] been discussed [in verse 12cd, above].

[Objection]
  Ƒ Do you not accept in this way that the two, shadow and obstruction, belong to the cluster, not to the atom?

[Vasubandhu]
  ṇ Do you, for your part, accept that the cluster which would possess those two [shadow and obstruction] is something other than the atoms?

[Opponent]
  Ṇ We say: no.

[Vasubandhu]

If the cluster is not other [than the atoms], the two [shadow and obstruction] would not be [properties] of that [cluster]. [14cd]

  ṇ If you do not accept the cluster as something other than the atoms, then it is proved that the two [shadow and obstruction] are not [properties] of that [cluster].

[Objection]

  Ḃ This is mere imaginative speculation about construction. Why do you have this worry about whether it is an atom or a compound? In any case, the characteristic of visible form and the rest is not negated.
Then what is their characteristic?

Being a sense-field of visual perception and the rest, and blueness and the like [are the characteristic of visible form].

This is precisely what is being determined: is the sense-field of visual perception and the rest you accept as blue, yellow and so on a single substance, or rather multiple?

XV

And what [follows] from this?

The fault if it is [judged to be] multiple has already been discussed.

If [the sense object] were singular, there would be no gradual motion, no simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension, nor divided multiple existence, nor the invisible microscopic. [15]

If one imagines the visual sense-object, blue and the rest, as long as it is undivided, to be a single substance, there would not be gradual motion on the ground—going, that is to say—because everything would be traversed with a single foot-step. And the apprehension of a facing portion and the non-apprehension of the non-facing portion would not be simultaneous, because the apprehension and non-apprehension of the very same thing at that [same] time is not reasonable.
And there would be no existence of divided and multiple elephants, horses and so on in a single place; because one thing would be just precisely where another is, how could a division between them be reasonable? Or on the other hand, how is it reasonable that [place] is single which is both occupied by those two [elephant and horse] and not occupied, since one apprehends that the gap between them is empty of the two? And, if you were to imagine [the two] to have a difference in substance purely because of a distinction in characteristic feature, not otherwise, microscopic aquatic creatures, having forms like macroscopic [creatures], would not be invisible.

Therefore [since this is not the case], one must certainly imagine a distinction atomically. And that [atom] is not proved to be singular. Since [the singular atom] is not proven, the fact that visible form—and the rest—are sense-fields of the visual—and the rest—is unproven; therefore Manifestation-Only comes to be proved.

XVI

[Objection]

Existence or non-existence is settled on the strength of the valid means of cognition, and of all valid means of cognition, direct perception is the most important valid means of cognition. Therefore, if an external object does not exist, how does this awareness come about, namely ‘this is before my eyes’?

[Vasubandhu]

The idea that there is direct perception [of the external object takes place] as in a dream and so on.

I already earlier made the point that “Even without an external object” [is understood].
Additionally, that external object is not seen [at the moment] when one has [the idea that there is direct perception of an external object]; [so] how can you consider that [the external object] is directly perceived?

D) And [at the moment] when that idea [that there is] direct perception [of the external object] comes about with the thought “This is my direct perception,” that external object is not seen [at that same moment], because the discerning takes place only by means of mental cognition, and because at that time the visual cognition [which precedes the mental cognition] has ceased.  

E) Given this, how can you accept that that [object] is directly perceived?  

F) What is more, [this holds] especially for one who advocates the momentariness [of all things], for whom [the respective] visible form, or flavor and the rest, has [already] entirely ceased at that time.

XVII

[Objection]

A) What was not [previously] experienced cannot be recollected by mental cognition.  

B) Therefore, there must be experience of an external object, and that is spoken of as ‘seeing’.  

C) In this way I consider it to be a case of an direct perception of that sense-object, [namely] material form and the rest.

[Vasubandhu]

D) This [argument about] recollection [being] of an experienced external object is unproved, since:

As I discussed, manifestation has the appearance of that [external object].
I have discussed how, even in the absence of an external object, a manifestation consisting of visual cognition and so forth arises with the appearance of an external object.

**Recollection [comes] from that. [17b]**

For from that manifestation arises a mental manifestation associated with memory, which has precisely the appearance of that [material form] and conceptually fantasizes itself [to refer to] material form and so on; thus the arisal of a memory does not prove the experience of an external object.

**[Objection]**

If a manifestation were to have as its sense-object an unreal external object also for one awake, just as is the case in a dream, in precisely that way everyone would understand by themselves the non-existence of that [external object]. But that is not how it is. Therefore, it is not so that all referential objectifications of external objects are, as is the case in a dream, [actually] devoid of external objects.

**[Vasubandhu]**

You cannot draw a conclusion from this, since:

**One who is not awake does not understand the non-existence of a sense-object seen in a dream. [17cd]**

Just so everyone, asleep with the sleep of repeated perfuming of erroneous conceptual fantasy, sees unreal external objects, as in a dream; being unawakened, they do not properly understand the non-existence of the [external object]. But when they are awakened through the acquisition of supramundane non-discriminative insight which is the antidote to that [erroneous imagination], then they prop-
erly understand the non-existence of the sense-object because the subsequently obtained pure worldly insight becomes present. This [situation] is the same.

XVIII

[Objection]

A) If manifestations with the appearance of external objects were to arise for beings only through particular transformations of their own mental continua, not through particular external objects, b) then how is it proved that association with bad or good spiritual guides, and hearing true and false teachings, shape the manifestations of beings, if that association with the good and the bad and that teaching do not [actually] exist?

**Mutual shaping of manifestation is due to their influence on each other.** [8ab]

C) Because all beings exert an influence on each others’ manifestations, there comes to be mutual shaping of manifestation, according to the circumstances. d) “Mutually” means “reciprocally.” e) Therefore, a distinct manifestation arises within one mental continuum because of a distinct manifestation within another mental continuum, not because of a distinct external object.

[Objection]

f) If [as you claim] a manifestation were devoid of an external object likewise also for one awake, as is the case in a dream, why do those asleep and those not asleep not come in the future to have the same [karmic] result, desired and undesired [respectively], of [their] wholesome and unwholesome behavior?
[Vasubandhu]

Since:

When one dreams, the mind is overpowered by sloth; thus the result is not the same. [18cd]

H) This is the cause in this case, and not [some alleged] real existence of an external object.

XIX

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, and no one has a body or voice, how does the death of rams and others being attacked by butchers come about? B) Or if their death is not due to those [butchers], how does there come to be a connection between the butchers and the crime of taking life?

Death is a transformation due to a particular manifestation of another, just as the transformation of memory loss and the like of others is due to the mental force of demons and so on. [19]

C) Just as, due to the mental force of demons and so on others come to experience dislocations [including] memory loss, dream visions and possession by ghouls of illness, and [this also takes place] due to the mental force of those possessed of superpowers— E) For example, Sāraṇa had a dream vision due to the controlling power of Ārya-Mahākātyāyana, and the conquest of Vemacitrin was due to the hostility of the forest ascetics— C) Just so, it is due to the influence of a particular manifestation of another that there arises some transformation of others obstructing the life force, by which there comes to be death, designated as the cutting off of related [mental] continuities. This is how it should be understood.
Otherwise, how did the Daṇḍaka forest become emptied by the sages' anger?

A) If you do not accept that beings die because of the influence of a particular manifestation of another [how do you account for what happened in the Daṇḍaka forests?]. B) For the Blessed One, in proving that mental violence is highly objectionable, asked the householder Upāli: c) “Have you heard anything, householder? By whom were the Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the Kaliṅga forests emptied and made ritually pure?” d) He said: “I have heard, O Gautama, it was through the mental hostility of the sages.”

XX

Or how does that prove mental violence is a great violation?

E) If you were to imagine as follows: beings dwelling there were annihilated by non-humans favorable to those [sages], rather than dying due to the mental hostility of the sages—f) if such were the case, how does that action prove mental violence to be a much greater violation than physical or verbal violence? g) That is proved by the death of so many beings solely on account of mental hostility.

XXI

[Objection]

A) If this [world] is nothing but Manifestation-Only, do then “those who know other minds” [really] know other minds, or not? b) And what [follows] from this? c) If they do not know, how do they become those who [are spoken of as ones who] know others minds? d) Or they do know [which is only possible if external objects do really exist, in which case]:
How is the knowledge of those who know other minds inconsistent with reality?

[Reply:] It is as with knowledge of one’s own mind. [21abc]

e) How is that [knowledge of one’s own mind] also inconsistent with reality?

Because one does not know [other minds or even one’s own] in the way that [such knowing of minds] is the scope of a Buddha. [21cd]

f) Because we do not know that in the way that that [knowledge] is the scope of the buddhas, with respect to its nature as inexpressible. Both [knowledges, of one’s own mind and of those of others,] are inconsistent with reality, e) because [all that non-buddhas are able to know is an] erroneous appearance. h) This is because they fail to reject the conceptual fantasy of subject and object.

XXII

A) Because [the idea of] Manifestation-Only has unfathomable depth, its explanations and divisions endless,

I have composed this proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only according to my ability, but that [fact that the World is nothing but Manifestation-Only] is not conceivable in its entirety. [22abcd]

B) However, that [idea of Manifestation-Only] cannot be conceived in all its aspects by those like me, because it is beyond the domain of logical reasoning. c) For whom, then, is this [idea] in all respects the [proper] scope? We reply:
It is the scope of the buddhas. [22d]

d) For it is the scope of the buddhas, the Blessed Ones, in all aspects, because their knowledge of all objects of knowledge in all ways is unobstructed.

Colophon:

This is the Proof of [the World as] Manifestation-Only in Twenty Verses
A composition of the Master Vasubandhu.