Maps in De Heere’s Journal

Cartographic Reflections of VOC Policy on Ceylon, 1698

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Table of Contents

Preface .............................................................................................................................................. iii

List of Figures and Tables ........................................................................................................ iv

Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1

Historiography .......................................................................................................................... 1

Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 7

Chapter 1 – A Mighty Island ..................................................................................................... 9

Ceylon and its position in the VOC ................................................................. 10

The Territorial Ambitions of Van Goens .............................................................. 12

The VOC in the Late Seventeenth Century ........................................................ 20

Policy on Sri Lanka ............................................................................................................. 22

Chapter 2 – The Journal ........................................................................................................... 25

Physical Context ..................................................................................................................... 25

Contents ....................................................................................................................................... 28

De Heere, Toorzee, and the Itinerary .................................................................................... 29

Daily Activities ....................................................................................................................... 33

Inspections .............................................................................................................................. 35

Chapter 3 – Overview Maps and Land Survey Maps ....................................................... 39

Overview Maps ...................................................................................................................... 39

Land Survey Maps .................................................................................................................. 42

The Tombo ................................................................................................................................... 43
The Report ........................................................................................................................................... 44

Chapter 4 – Fortification Plans ........................................................................................................ 49

European Fortifications: Developments and Innovations......................................................... 49

Dutch Fortifications on Sri Lanka: Initial Purposes and Criticisms ........................................ 52

Dutch Fortifications on Sri Lanka: Purposes and Problems in De Heere’s time................. 57

Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 63

Bibliography and Sources .................................................................................................................. 67

Cited Primary Sources ...................................................................................................................... 69

Appendix – Cartographic Material in De Heere’s Journal ....................................................... I
Preface

I would be remiss if I did not thank fellow student and friend Lars de Bruin for his moral support and many instances of advice, both for the content of this thesis as for managing to actually get the work done. In a similar vein, my family deserves recognition for allowing me to complain to them about how tough it is to write something like this.

Furthermore, I owe much to the National Archives and its employees for having me as their intern in the summer of 2017. It is there that I found the inspiration and source material for this thesis, as well as the skills to be able to do the research. In particular, I must thank Gijs Boink for his patience and his mentorship which allowed me to learn how to work with early modern cartographic material.

I also want to thank Erik Odegard, currently research fellow at the Scheepvaartmuseum Amsterdam for allowing me to use his unpublished doctoral thesis on which I lean heavily in Chapter 1, as well as his – again unpublished – extensive study on European fortification work in Asia.

From Leiden University, I am thankful for all the teachers I have had in the past five years. Special mention must be made to Professor Jos Gommans, who taught me much and supervised my bachelor thesis, as well as to PhD student Tristan Mostert, who introduced me to the National Archive as an intern. Dr. Alicia Schrikker advised me on literature about Sri Lankan history in general, as well as literature on the tombo specifically. Professor Michiel van Groesen and Martijn Storms, curator of the cartographic material in the Special Collections of the Leiden University Library, initiated me in the field of early modern cartography. The former is also my thesis supervisor and I am thankful for his excellent mentorship, his willingness to let me make mistakes and learn from them, and his incredibly fast response time to my emails.
List of Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 1 Galle, taken from H47 ................................................................. 18
Figure 2 Kaarte van 't eijland Ceylon, Toorzee, National Archives VEL 923 ................. 30
Figure 3 Map of Sri Lanka showing De Heere's route.................................................. 32
Figure 4 Map of Colombian Lands, H47 .................................................................. 39
Figure 5 Map of Colombian Lands, VOC 1604B ......................................................... 39
Figure 6 Fortresses on the Colombo Overview Map ...................................................... 41
Figure 7 Land survey map, bottom right only.................................................................. 45
Figure 8 The six maps made to test the surveyors ......................................................... 46
Figure 9 Fields of Fire. Edited detail of Map 22............................................................. 50
Figure 10 Profile of the walls of Batticaloa, as seen on Map 11...................................... 53
Figure 11 Hammenhiel, cropped version of Map 20 ....................................................... 53
Figure 12 Detail of Map 4, showing the profile and the map with legend......................... 56
Figure 13 Map 18, showing the small forts Pijl, Beschutter and Eliphant....................... 58
Figure 14 Detail of the back of Map 19, fol. 390v.......................................................... 58
Figure 15 Detail of Map 6, showing the proposed buildings in red................................. 60
Figure 16 Map 7, depicting a possible method of sluicing water to the moat of Galle .......... 61

Tables

Table 1 Itinerary of De Heere's Party............................................................................. 31
Table 2 Odegard's typology of forts............................................................................. 55
Table 3 Forts drawn by Toorzee...................................................................................... 57

Maps

For the cartographic material in the journal in greater size, see the Appendix.
Introduction

The Dutch East India Company (VOC) sent thousands of reports back to the United Provinces of the Netherlands, or patria. These reports ranged from salary rolls to diplomatic letters from native rulers to an overview of the costs of dredging the river of Batavia.¹ Many of these reports had cartographic material attached, but few books in the VOC archives residing in the National Archives in The Hague have as many maps as the journal of Governor Gerrit de Heere, which contains 23 maps of various types. There are two extant copies, one in the VOC Archive of the National Archives and one in the Special Collections of the Leiden University Library.

The journal is a daily register of the activities and decisions made by Governor De Heere during his inspection tour around Sri Lanka, then Dutch Ceylon, in 1698. Because of the location and the time period, these activities and decisions, as well as the reflections upon them that De Heere provides in the text, can tell us much about the policies of the VOC on Sri Lanka, as well as the VOC in general. Besides this, the abundance of cartographic material, of which more than half concerns fortifications, can allow us insights into historical cartography and the nature of fortifications in Asia. The historiographical analysis below will therefore have to be split in four; as the angles of approaching this source also number four.

Historiography

To start, let us look at the debates concerning the VOC as a whole in the late seventeenth century. While there is some debate on when the decline of the VOC started, there is consensus that the last few decades of the seventeenth century were a time of crisis and reconfiguration. After the war of 1672-1678 and decades of increased pressure on the trade of the Dutch Republic by the mercantilist policies of France, England and Sweden, the Dutch economy

¹ There are around one hundred maps accompanying these reports or sent without such a report in the Collection Leupe (4.VEL) at the National Archives in The Hague. An example of a map like this and the report it accompanied: National Archives The Hague, Collectie Kaarten Leupe, 4.VEL, inventory number 388A; National Archives The Hague, Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 1.04.02, inv. nr. 1750 fol. 698-707.
needed to adapt to survive.\(^2\) Within this situation, the VOC faced a similar issue: prices were falling and they had to change course or fall to the pressures of the French and especially the English East India Companies.\(^3\) This debate plays only a small role in this thesis, but it is important to point out that there was a certain amount of pressure on the VOC in the late seventeenth century to understand their policies on Sri Lanka.

The other debate concerning the VOC that this thesis can contribute to is that of the VOC as a state versus the VOC as a merchant. Whereas traditionally the VOC was described mostly as a merchant company, recently historians have favoured the viewpoint that it was a state. A good historiographic overview of the traditional emphasis on the VOC as a mercantile company can be found in Jur van Goor’s introduction to *De Verenigde Oost-Indische compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie*.\(^4\) This volume was important in redefining the VOC as a state instead of purely a merchant, which is now commonly accepted as a valid way to interpret the VOC.\(^5\)

I favour the interpretation of Arthur Weststeijn, who sees the VOC as a Company-State, with some adaptation.\(^6\) In his article, he focuses on the debates contemporaries had about the nature of the VOC. It becomes clear that even in the time of the VOC the nature of the Company was called into question along similar lines as historians debate it now. It is precisely this idea which leads me to the lens through which I wish to approach this debate. In my mind, the VOC was in fact both a mercantile company and a state, but it should be seen as a spectrum on which it moved. This movement was caused by VOC officials. Individuals such as the famous Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen and Rijckloff van Goens, discussed below, tried to pull

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\(^3\) Ibidem 677.


\(^5\) For example: Gerrit Knaap, *De ‘Core Business’ van de VOC: Markt, macht en mentaliteit vanuit overzees perspectief* (inaugural lecture, Utrecht 2015).

the Company further towards empire, while their critics attempted to pull it back into the mercantile end. By providing this context through secondary sources, we can use the journal of De Heere as a measurement of these changes by the late seventeenth century. Both this historical context as well as the historiographical debates around it will be further explored in Chapter 1.

This first chapter will also discuss the history of the Dutch on Sri Lanka. The tension between mercantile and territorial ambitions will be discussed through the character of the aforementioned Rijckloff van Goens. This man was the primary force behind policy on Sri Lanka before, during, and after his tenure (1660-1661, 1663, 1664-1675) as Governor of that island – when he was promoted to Governor-General in Batavia (1678-1681), his son took over as Governor of Ceylon. This – combined with his particular stance on VOC policies towards Sri Lanka – makes him a good subject to focus on for that period of Sri Lankan history, which is essential to understanding De Heere’s journal.

Unfortunately, the literature on Dutch Ceylon is limited compared to that on, say, the Dutch East Indies. While Van Goens is a well-studied figure and his period of operation has been examined thoroughly – though one must rely in large part on the work of Sinnappah Arasaratnam – the period between his departure and the governance of Governor Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff is much less covered. It is telling that in the History of Sri Lanka the chapters on Van Goens’ period and the period after have widely different timespans. Arasaratnam’s chapter on the consolidation of Dutch power spans from 1658 until 1687, a period of 29 years where he focuses in large part on Van Goens and his son Rijckloff van Goens Jr. The following chapter by Don Ariyapala Kotelawele covers the period 1688-1766, or 78 years. Within this chapter, he spends some time discussing the criticisms raised against Van Goens and the resulting policy shifts, but summarizes the period of 1687-1696 in one paragraph, after which
he skips to the late 1730s. This dearth in secondary literature will of course not be sufficiently filled with just this thesis, but perhaps it is a start. There is, however, enough coverage by the secondary literature to at least contextualize the source discussed here.

The field of cartographic history is similarly badly covered. The studies published in this field mostly fall into the category of cartobibliographic works such as Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon or The Comprehensive Atlas of the VOC. Kees Zandvliet’s seminal Mapping for Money is an excellent analysis of the cartographic machine of the VOC but is rather general in its approach. It is a good starting point, but more, detailed studies are necessary. Using maps as primary sources for analysis is even less common, especially with the kind of questions I will be raising. I intend to use the maps in this journal not as a decorative element but as an integral part of the source. While I will not interpret them as reflections of culture and social structures like Brian Harley proposed, I intend to show they can reflect the intentions of the mapmaker, in this case Johan Christiaanszoon Toorzee, and his superior, here Governor De Heere. This, then, allows us to come to a better understanding of VOC policies and the way the officials of the VOC came to these policies. This should show the value of cartographic material for historical research.

To do this, I make a distinction between two purposes of maps within the context of the VOC. While I will not comment on other cartographic material, as that is beyond the scope of this study, these two purposes can be used to categorize maps sent to patria by VOC personnel. The two categories I have devised are decorative and illustrative.

10 Kees Zandvliet, Mapping for Money: Maps, plans and topographic paintings and their role in Dutch overseas expansion during the 16th and 17th centuries (Amsterdam 1998).
When maps are meant to be decorative, they serve only to show an area, mostly for the sake of it. That is not to say there is no ‘subtext’, as it were: Even if a map does not directly serve an argument, it still primes the reader to think in a certain way. When the purpose is to be illustrative, however, a map directly supports an argument. To use a modern-day analogy, the map a historian might put on the cover of his book is usually strictly decorative. A map of Sri Lanka on the cover of this thesis would not argue for anything. It would, however, prime the reader: This is a thesis dealing with Sri Lanka.

On the other hand, a map showing the trade routes used in a given area might illustrate the importance of the port the historian is examining. If I put a map in this thesis showing all the trade routes of the VOC that stopped at Sri Lanka, I would be using this map to directly argue that Sri Lanka was an important centre of trade. Of course, the distinction would be arbitrary if used as absolute categories. The cartographic material is on a spectrum; even a map that is not mentioned in the text might say something about what the author is trying to bring across by contextualizing the area he is talking about.

One category of maps tends to be more illustrative than not: fortification plans. There are many of these in the journal of De Heere, which allows for an examination of fortifications in Asia. This, too, is a subject which historians have not written nearly as much about as could be and should be done. Generally speaking, European forts are examined within the context of Europe. Geoffrey Parker famously saw the new European forts as initiating the military revolution. He saw them as the “engine” of European expansion across the world, in the sense that they allowed Europeans to actually hold on to territories and also forced them to continue to invest in areas where they settled.

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The developments of these fortifications and the responses thereto have been studied, but
the effect of these developments in Asia is much less apparent. Parker’s comments on their role
in European expansion are not explored well by him or later authors. There has been more
attention for European military operations in Asia recently, but they often are too generalist or
focus solely on the eighteenth century or later.\textsuperscript{15} Erik Odegard is currently finalizing a
monograph which examines this phenomenon in depth, but it remains unpublished.\textsuperscript{16} Books
and articles which do examine fortifications in Asia tend to be either examinations of particular
forts, or summaries of a series of forts.\textsuperscript{17} Recently, the Stichting Menno van Coehoorn published
a book on Dutch fortifications overseas, combining a few general chapters on forts in Asia and
“the West” with examinations of specific fortresses, such as Chapter 3’s Fort Nassau on the
Gold Coast by Hans van Westing.\textsuperscript{18} This is a good start, but much is to be done.

Another issue with the literature on these forts is that it is often written not by historians,
but by architects and archaeologists. They are, obviously, good at what they do, but it does not
help us if we want to have historical context for these forts. An example of an architect writing
on Dutch fortifications in Asia is Ron van Oers, who tried to categorize Dutch towns overseas
but did so based on architectural characteristics rather than their historical context.\textsuperscript{19} I will
elaborate further on this in Chapter 4, where classifications of forts will be directly relevant.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{15} Gurbir Mansigh, \textit{French Military Influence in India} (New Delhi 2006) focuses on the eighteenth century. Gerrit
Knaap, Henk den Heijer and Michiel de Jong, \textit{Oorlogen Overzee: Militair optreden door compagnie en staat
buiten Europa} (Amsterdam 2015) is very generalist and rather descriptive.

\textsuperscript{16} Erik Odegard, \textit{Untitled Monograph on European Forts in Asia} (Unpublished).

\textsuperscript{17} Examples of specific fortifications: Erik Odegard, “Designing a New Fort on the Gold Coast: Johan Fredrik
Trenks, the WIC, and the New Fort at Takoradi, 1774–1791”, \textit{Itinerario} 40:3 (2016) 523-547. A comparative study
is offered by I. Nirmalagiri, I., \textit{St. Angelo and Bekal fortresses – a comparative study} (unpublished PhD thesis,
Kannur University 2010), but it remains focused on only two forts.

A very important book on fortifications on Sri Lanka is W. A. Nelson, \textit{The Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka: The military
monuments of Ceylon} (Edinburgh 1984). This work is very short and descriptive but does provide a good summary
of the Dutch forts on the island.

\textsuperscript{18} Ron van Oers, \textit{Dutch Town Planning overseas during VOC and WIC rule} (1600-1800) (Zutphen 2000).

\textsuperscript{19} One other example of an architectural work on fortifications on Sri Lanka that I cannot neglect to mention is
D.P. Chandrasekara, \textit{Architectural Heritage of Sri Lanka: Fortifications Along the Kelani River} (Colombo 2012).
Unfortunately, it is not directly relevant to my thesis because De Heere did not visit the smaller forts along the
Kelani river.
Archaeologists examine the remains of the fort, which can be useful to be sure, but cannot provide all the answers a historian might ask, especially for earlier periods.

Methodology

The present thesis, then, provides some insights in four different fields and nestles itself in lacunae in each, though not each of these is the same size. I do not wish to imply that this thesis can fully fill any of these gaps; but it can make a start and provide an example of the research that can be done with this kind of material.

Specifically, I want to elucidate what the purpose was of De Heere’s inspection described in this journal, how this relates to the situation on Sri Lanka specifically and the VOC in a wider sense, and what role the maps in the journal play in this. Along the way, I will also strive to add to the historiography of cartography and fortifications in Asia.

It is precisely because my thesis nestles in the gaps of four different debates that I will focus solely on one source. Most historical studies approach one subject from multiple sources, but doing the opposite has its own benefits. By focusing on this one source, the interplay between these various historiographic debates becomes clear. The downside, of course, is that I will have to rely on secondary literature to contextualize the findings in this study. As Philip Pomper pointed out concerning the reliance on secondary sources by historians who study world history, this “evokes disapproval among guild members, for whom only direct scrutiny of documents validates the status of historians.”21 Perhaps this is the result of the Cartesian anxiety that Richard J. Bernstein points out in his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism.22 In an attempt to find some basis on which we can uphold the idea of truth within history writing, historians latch onto primary sources as the utmost important measure. It is my opinion that, as long as proper care is taken to be self-consciously aware and reflect on whether we are being objective, it is

possible to rely on secondary sources for information, especially when contextualizing a primary source.\textsuperscript{23}

In Chapter 1 I will provide the immaterial context of the diary, in the sense that I will explicate the administrative structure and historical context in which it was created. The focus will be on the relationship of the Directors, Batavia and the Ceylon office; the long-term history of the Ceylon office and its relationship with Kandy; and the direct historical context on both the broader Dutch and VOC level, as well as the specific Ceylonese level.

Chapter 2 will explicate the material context of the diary: why are there two copies, how did these copies come to be in the places they are, but explanation will also be given of the material contents of the journal, such as the nature of the cartographic material. The chapter will also explore the textual contents of the journal, focusing on those parts of the text that do not interact with the cartographic material.

In the third chapter, I will focus on two kinds of maps in the journal. The overview maps and land survey maps examined in this chapter will explicate my distinction between decorative and illustrative maps rather well. They will also provide insights on the purpose of De Heere’s inspection journey.

The final chapter will focus on fortification maps and the changing role of fortifications on Sri Lanka by the time of De Heere. This should provide insights both into the fortification debate in itself, as well as showing the changing considerations of VOC policy makers on Sri Lanka.

\textsuperscript{23} For an excellent reflective article on reliance on secondary sources, see Janet Abu-Lughod, “The World-System Perspective in the Construction of Economic History”, in: \textit{History and Theory} 34 2 (1995) 86-98. The emphasis on self-conscious awareness and reflexivity she adopted from Gadamer, as can be read on page 92 of that article.
Chapter 1 – A Mighty Island

Sri Lanka was often called the “Mighty Island of Ceylon”. This chapter will elaborate on the historical context of the VOC in general and Sri Lanka specifically. Contextualizing the position Governor De Heere was in is important to understanding the inspection journey he made and the paperwork it produced. The goal is to assess the situation in the final years of the seventeenth century situation by examining what came before, so that I can provide the policy points which would be of importance to De Heere and what this means in the context of the merchant-state spectrum. As pointed out before, the goal of this thesis is to use De Heere’s journal as a snapshot of the situation at the end of the seventeenth century, but without the context of what came before there would be nothing to compare it to.

The chapter is divided into three sections. I will start with a general overview of the position of Ceylon in the VOC apparatus, as well as a short history of the initial Dutch incursion into Sri Lanka. The second section will discuss the impact of Rijckloff Volckertszoon van Goens and, to a lesser extent, his son of the same name. Van Goens is not only interesting because of his large impact on the history of Dutch Ceylon, but also because his career shows the (potential) importance of Ceylon to the VOC as a whole as well as the reasons why the course was changed after Van Goens retired. This plays directly into the aforementioned merchant-state spectrum on which I argue the VOC moved, as Van Goens was adamantly on the state side and his critics on the merchant side. The third section will deal with the history of the VOC in general in the late seventeenth century. Much of what is decided about Ceylon is informed by the course of VOC policy in general. The chapter will end with a summary of what has been discussed in the form of the aforementioned policies I expect to find in the journal of De Heere’s inspection tour.
Ceylon and its position in the VOC

In 1638 the VOC signed a treaty with King Rajasimha II detailing the conditions under which the Dutch would cooperate in the expulsion of the Portuguese from Sri Lanka. Significantly, the treaty stipulated that captured Portuguese forts would be garrisoned by the Dutch or demolished. The additional clause “as the King sees fit” was only present in the Sinhalese version of the treaty, not the Dutch one.24 The other justification the Dutch used for their occupation of the coast was that the king of Kandy, who technically owned the land, was supposed to reimburse the Company for costs incurred while removing the Portuguese from the island. Seeing as it was impossible for the king to actually pay this debt, they kept the lands as security.25 Femme Gaastra disputes Sinnappah Arasaratnam’s assertion that this debt never shrunk – the Dutch records lowered the debt by the theoretical price paid for cinnamon extracted from Ceylon, though this was not the actual profit gained from this spice – but he, too, agrees that the king would never be able to pay the enormous debt the Dutch accorded him.26

The tensions caused by the weak legal foundations of the Dutch occupation of the Sri Lankan lowlands made the Dutch-Kandyan alliance rather shaky. When the Dutch took Colombo in 1656 and fortified it, the alliance broke down. After this and other diplomatic breaches, King Rajasimha responded with armed force: on multiple occasions his forces systematically devastated swathes of land on the western and southern frontiers and many of the locals were removed from the Dutch-occupied lands.27 This displacement disrupted the cinnamon production, which was the main purpose of the Dutch entry into Sri Lanka.

27 Arasaratnam, ‘Consolidation of Dutch Power’ 212.
This cinnamon trade was very profitable and a large part of what made Ceylon a very important office to the VOC in itself. According to both overview tables provided in Gaastra’s seminal work *Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC*, Ceylon accounts for roughly 20% of the expenses made by the VOC in Asia, and roughly 10% of the income.28 On the side of expenses, no other office besides Batavia comes close, with Malabar at 6.8% in the period 1670-1680 coming closest.29

There are some remarks to be made about these figures. It is important to note that Ceylon acted as a sort of secondary rendezvous besides Batavia. Many of the ships coming from the various establishments of the VOC in India passed through Ceylon, which figures into the expenses of the office. Also, while the expenses of the nearby Cochin possessions were counted as part of Ceylon’s balance, any income derived from these places was not.30 An important aspect of the way income was usually calculated is that the cinnamon income was based on a set price of 2 *stuivers* per pound, while the price in Europe, for which it was actually sold, varied between 3 and 5 guilders per pound. This amounts to profits which were 30 to 50 times the income cited in the books.31 As such, Ceylon was much more profitable than implied by these tables.32

One of the most important sources for Gaastra’s work was Johannes Hudde, a mayor of Amsterdam (1672-1704) and a mathematician. Hudde was a part of the commission headed by secretary of the VOC Pieter van Dam, which was assigned in 1683 to redress “matters in the Indies and in this country”.33 Hudde was one of the most active members of this commission of redress and left many reports in a collection which lies in the National Archives in The

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28 For the period 1670-1680: Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid* 81. For the period 1684-1694: ibidem, 214
29 Ibidem 81. Also of interest might be Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic trade, 1620-1740* (The Hague 1981), in which Glamann looks at the trade in specific goods throughout the specified period.
30 Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid* 216-221.
33 Ibidem 19.
Hague. He is also a good example of one of the VOC officials who were firmly on the mercantile end of the spectrum, emphasizing trade and criticising Van Goens’ territorialism.

Hudde made a different calculation of the income and expenses of Ceylon, though he too was not consistent in counting both income and expenses when adding smaller offices to Ceylon. He added the income and expenses of the Tuticorin office to the Ceylon office in his overview but neglected to add the income of the textile exported from it to Ceylon. He emphasized the fact that Ceylon was a secondary rendezvous as well, and in that he was more generous towards Ceylon than most who made calculations like these.

Significantly for the point made in this section, he also added that there were some benefits to holding Sri Lanka that could not be easily expressed in numbers: it accorded great prestige among other European nations and had good resupply ports. The island also had a significant strategic importance, especially for the Indian possessions of the VOC. In the words of Hudde: “God forbid that Ceylon would fall in other European hands.” On the other hand, Hudde was part of the group who did not believe it was prudent to have a large territorial commitment in Ceylon. It is clear, then, that even for those like Hudde who favoured the merchant side of the merchant-state spectrum, it was important to keep other Europeans out of Sri Lanka. However, it was also important to them to reduce the costs incurred by the Ceylon office, which is reflected in the journal of De Heere, as will become clear in the following chapters. This focus on commercial endeavours over state-building differed significantly from the main figure of the following section.

The Territorial Ambitions of Van Goens

The most important figure of Dutch Ceylon in much of the latter half of the seventeenth century was Rijcklof van Goens. An able military man with a strong personality, he was responsible for

34 Ibidem 20.
35 Ibidem 220.
36 Odegard, Colonial Careers 189.
removing the Portuguese from the island and southern India around 1656. In the next few decades his career revolved around Ceylon and he dominated the VOC’s policy on the island, first as superintendent, then as governor, and finally as governor-general in Batavia with his son succeeding him on Sri Lanka. The reason Van Goens is so interesting is that he is focused on so much in the historiography of Sri Lanka, whereas the period after him, in which De Heere’s journal was written, is much more under lighted. Van Goens is also a prime example of a VOC official who wanted the VOC to be a state more than a merchant company. The competition between him and his critics exemplifies this debate.37

Van Goens started his career as an orphan under the patronage of his uncle, Boyckes Rijckloff van Goens, who got him his first job as an assistant to the governor of Coromandel. Van Goens then made it back to Batavia and spent some years doing diplomatic missions within the Indonesian archipelago. These appointments gave him important experience in diplomacy and, according to Odegard, shaped Van Goens’ views on how the VOC should operate within Asia. In 1654, Van Goens was appointed to be the commander of the homeward-bound fleet. This brief stay in patria is important to understanding the way Van Goens was able to circumvent the High Government in Batavia later. Van Goens spent his time in the United Provinces making connections with the directors of the Company, gaining their trust. As the commander of the retourvloot, Van Goens was also expected to provide a report on the state of the Company’s possessions in Asia. In this report, we can already see his ambitions for the VOC as a state in Asia, and especially his intentions for Ceylon: “I am of the opinion that with God’s help it is possible to beat the Portuguese off of the island in two years, if only a thousand soldiers are added to those already there.”38

37 What follows is a summary of Van Goens’ career path until 1655, based primarily on the doctoral thesis of Erik Odegard. In this thesis, Odegard spends much time on explaining how Van Goens progressed through this career, but as that is not always relevant here, especially for the early stage of his career, I have chosen to leave much of this out. Odegard, Colonial Careers Chapter 3.

In 1657 Van Goens arrived again in Asia at the head of a fleet. He had been appointed as commissaris en veldoverste in the South Asian commands, which placed him above the local governors and commanders in the hierarchy. Therefore, though there was a governor of Ceylon, Adrian van der Meijden, Van Goens was the primary force driving policy on Sri Lanka. After conquering most of the Portuguese possessions in South Asia and removing the Portuguese from the island, he undermined Van der Meijden whenever he could. In 1664 he was appointed as governor of Ceylon.

The Supreme Government in Batavia was not enthused by the extent of territorial – and therefore financial – commitment in Sri Lanka. Batavia instructed the officials on the island to keep the peace with the king and attempt to maintain good relations. By 1664, after mounting pressure from European competition – especially by the English East India Company – Batavia relented and instructed Van Goens, now returning to Sri Lanka as Governor, to take the eastern ports of Batticalao and Trincomalee. These forts were taken and still under VOC control when De Heere did his inspection 34 years later. In a stroke of luck, internal struggles started in Kandy, providing an opportunity which the Dutch eagerly took to double their territory by 1670. The toll of this increased presence was an increasing number of troops required from Batavia. At the time, though, the Supreme Government was receiving requests for additional military support from many of the offices in South East Asia as well. Many quarters were territorially expanding, and as such, Batavia was hard pressed. For this reason, the High Council in Batavia tried to curb expansion in Sri Lanka; the ports and even the coastline if necessary were considered of importance, but the incursions deeper into the highlands were discouraged.

Normally, the Ceylon office was expected to follow these instructions, being subordinate to the Supreme Government. Van Goens, however, manipulated the flow of information to push

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40 Ibidem 130-131.
41 Ibidem 215-217.
42 Ibidem 219-220.
through his own views. As mentioned before, he had spent time in the United Provinces building connections with the Directors. In 1665 he started sending ships with letters and reports directly to the Republic instead of via Batavia, which allowed him to control the narrative.\textsuperscript{43} Combining his connections in the patria with this control of information and his reputation as a military commander and diplomat, Van Goens was able to gain the support of the Directors even in the face of criticism from Batavia. The narrative he pushed, partly based on one-sided and misleading evidence, was that Kandy was a dying state and the Dutch were in a prime position to take the entire island.\textsuperscript{44} This was part of Van Goens’ personal ambition to make Sri Lanka the centre of Dutch operations in Asia instead of Batavia. This ambition was partly because of his love for the island – he named his daughter Esther Ceylonia van Goens\textsuperscript{45} – and partly because he was of the opinion that the VOC should behave as a state. He thought it would be more than possible to use taxation to pay for the costs of this occupation.\textsuperscript{46} This plan was also, however, based on a severe underestimation of Kandyan resilience.

Under the initial pretext of defending king Rajasimha against the rebels he was facing, Dutch troops invaded the Kandyan territories in 1665. Even then Batavia protested, but Van Goens moved forward anyway, knowing the Directors would back him up. Soon, the pretences of defending Rajasimha were abandoned and it was made clear Dutch occupation was permanent, which Batavia disagreed with even more.\textsuperscript{47} The Directors in the Netherlands, however, continued to rely on Van Goens’ judgement, who presented the successful Kandyan counterattack in 1670 as dissidents opposed to both the VOC and king Rajasimha, despite this attack being quite clearly an operation of the latter.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{43} Odegard, \textit{Colonial Careers} 140.
\textsuperscript{44} S. Arasaratnam, \textit{Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1658-1687} (Amsterdam 1958) 46-49.
\textsuperscript{45} Odegard, \textit{Colonial Careers} 121.
\textsuperscript{46} Arasaratnam, ‘Consolidation of Dutch Power’ 221.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibidem 218-223.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibidem 223.
The VOC officials on Ceylon started to voice criticism towards Van Goens in the 1670s, though, and the attack by Rajasimha cast doubts on Van Goens’ narrative. Two years later, however, the war with France and England in Europe broke out and Van Goens was once again made superintendent, admiraal en veldoverste – that is, superintendent, admiral and supreme commander – in South Asia. His son, Rijckloff van Goens Jr., took over the governorship, albeit unofficially. Van Goens was able to show his quality as a military commander once more, fighting the French in the South Asian waters and in Coromandel.

After another five years of assaults and guerrilla warfare by the Kandyans, as well as heavy military engagements in the Indonesian archipelago and a costly war in Europe, the Dutch officials in patria and in Batavia reconsidered the policy towards Sri Lanka. The Council in Batavia was now even more convinced that their reluctance to commit to the conquest of Sri Lanka had been justified. In the United Provinces, there had been a large political shift as a result of the events of 1672. Many of Van Goens’ patrons among the Directors of the VOC were no longer in that position, being replaced by men less sympathetic to his strategic views, such as the aforementioned Joannes Hudde and Pieter van Dam. This caused a shift in patria towards the mercantile end of the spectrum, which continued until after De Heere’s tenure. This made it increasingly hard for Van Goens to circumvent Batavia where he and his views were unpopular. On the other hand, he had once again proven his merit and experience during the war. As such, he was promoted first to director-general in Batavia in 1676, followed by a promotion to Governor General in 1678. Van Goens Jr. became the new Governor of Ceylon in an official capacity after his father was sent to Batavia. This was an unprecedented succession of father by son, which irked other VOC officials in Asia even more.

49 Odegard, Colonial Careers 184.
50 Ibidem 186-189.
51 Ibidem 193.
In general, Van Goens Sr. was unable to keep the Council of Batavia on his side. As such, they often voted for proposals he did not agree with. The Council members realized they had to return lands to Kandy if they were to return to peace and be able to cut down on expenditure. In 1675 they sent instructions amounting to the full return of territories gained since 1665 to Ceylon, under heavy opposition from Van Goens. Governor of Ceylon Van Goens Jr. sent an altered proposal to Rajasimha. This latter proposal excluded multiple regions which the Dutch had recently taken and was therefore ignored by the king of Kandy.52

With Van Goens as Governor General and his son as Governor of Ceylon, it seemed impossible for a return to peace with Kandy. In 1679, however, Van Goens Jr. vacated his office, which was taken over by Laurens Pijl, initially as a provisional Officer administrating the Government, then as Governor in 1681. Pijl wished to solve the problems of the Dutch on Sri Lanka and to do so turned to a report written by Adriaan van Reede in 1677 by orders of Batavia.53

Adriaan van Reede tot Drakensteyn is an interesting figure in the story of Van Goens and Ceylon. He had been under the patronage of Van Goens for many years, eventually becoming Governor of Malabar. At that time Van Goens refused to listen to the opinion of Van Reede and attempted to micromanage him, provoking his ire.54 In 1677 he was tasked with reviewing Van Goens’ policies on Ceylon and Malabar. In the report, Van Reede voiced many criticisms, on matters ranging from Van Goens’ projections for trade and profits to his fortification programmes. The bias present on the side of Van Reede becomes obvious when one looks at his calculations for the soldiers required to man these fortresses. Van Reede assumed the European standard of three men per Rhineland Rod (3.77 metres) to defend the walls properly. This brought him to a total of sixty thousand men, which he reduced to around

53 Ibidem 228.
54 Odegard, Colonial Careers 183.
thirty thousand with some concessions. This is still a ludicrous number, however, as the VOC never had more than around ten thousand regulars active in Asia, according to Gaastra’s data in *De geschiedenis van de VOC*. During De Heere’s inspection tour, it was still clearly a priority to reduce the costs of the forts system. As Odegard points out in his doctoral thesis, this number is clearly a piece of rhetoric. To start, the total mileage of the walls of these forts was not a strong basis for the calculation, as the fortifications often made use of the geography to allow only one approach for enemy soldiers. In Galle, for example, this would significantly reduce the garrison required, as one can see on the map taken from De Heere’s journal below.

Still, the report had its intended effect. Laurens Pijl came to the conclusion that “it was impossible for the Dutch to subsist on the island without peace with Rajasimha.” He reported as much to the Council on Java. Despite Van Goens’ position as Governor-General, he could

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55 Ibidem 190-191.
56 Arasaratnam, ‘Consolidation of Dutch Power’ 228.
not prevent the growth of a majority in the council opposed to him by 1681. In October and November, the Council formulated new policies based on an extensive review of previous Sri Lanka policy, and Van Goens retired from office in November.57

The conclusions of the High Council were similar to those of Governor Pijl: it was not possible to defeat Kandy, and Rajasimha could significantly disrupt cinnamon production with relative ease. The fundamental question they asked themselves was why the Dutch were on Sri Lanka, and the answer was cinnamon. “Territorial commitment on the island and attendant expenditure was justified only so far as it was necessary for the maintenance of the cinnamon monopoly.”58 As such, policy became very different to that of Van Goens; the goal became to focus on the cinnamon monopoly, with expenditure as low as possible. These two points, the increased focus on commerce and importance of reducing costs, continue to be important in De Heere’s time.

To do this, they offered to return much of the conquered territory. The Dutch wanted to come to a peace with Kandy before the elderly king would die, as they were unsure of the attitude of his successor. In Ceylon, the officers pleaded not to give up territory right before a possible succession crisis. On the other side of the frontier, Rajasimha was initially unwilling to even negotiate before his territory was returned, but with failing health he seemingly wanted to ensure good relations between the Dutch and Kandy for the sake of his successor.59 This successor refused to negotiate until trade was reopened for the Kandyans. The Dutch acquiesced in 1696 or 1697 and opened trade in goods other than cinnamon to private merchants.60 By 1703, they closed the ports again because the Kandyans had tried to circumvent the Dutch

57 Ibidem 228-229.
58 Ibidem 229.
60 Two contributors to the History of Sri Lanka which is the basis of this section apparently disagree on which year this event occurred, though the further description is the same. L. S. Dewaraja, ‘The Kandyan Kingdom 1638-1739: A Survey of its Political History’, in: de Silva (ed.), History of Sri Lanka Vol. II 183-209, there 202 and Kotelawele, ‘The VOC in Sri Lanka 1688-1766’ 238.
completely in trading. The Kandyan hostile response was shortlived and feeble. By 1707 the
Dutch were no longer as worried about Kandyan hostilities, though they were still acutely aware
that they could not take the island by force – certainly not in a profitable manner.61

The story of Van Goens and the policy shift after his retirement is indicative of the position
of Ceylon within the VOC. After Van Goens’ tenure it was possible for the Governor of Ceylon
to communicate directly with the Directors, especially in the case of the strong personality and
reputation of Van Goens. This dynamic, where Ceylon was technically subordinate to Batavia
but could ignore their instructions or heavily disagree with the policy set forth by the Council
there had a large influence on how the office operated. The story of Van Goens also shows the
shifting attitude of the VOC officials in this period from accepting Van Goens’ state-like
ambitions on Sri Lanka to the more mercantile end of the spectrum. Instead of warring with
Kandy and focusing on territorial ambitions, commerce and therefore peace became a priority.
While defensive measures were not abandoned, efforts were made to reduce the costs of
fortifications on the island.

The VOC in the Late Seventeenth Century

The second half of the seventeenth century was one of both expansion and contraction for the
VOC. Their operation in Asia expanded – and with them their expenses – but profits contracted.
Though I will not go into much detail here, the reasons must be discussed in general terms to
provide context for the subject of this thesis.

In The First Modern Economy by Jan de Vries and Ad van de Woude, they call the “volatile
years” of the 1670s the close of an “era” and the beginning of a new one. This new era, from
1680 to 1730, was marked by steps taken by the Directors to “increase the volume and adjust
the commodity composition of the Company’s trade.” 62 The two primary causes they identified

62 De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy 436.
were the structural change in European tastes for Asiatic products and an “abundant supply of capital at low interest rates.”\textsuperscript{63} They also increased the labour force and both the amount and tonnage of return ships sent to Asia. Total revenue did not increase at the same rate, but this was what the VOC directors expected. Diversification in trade was meant to augment the spice trade. Generally, the VOC leadership did not reasonably expect to return to the remarkable profits of decades past but aimed to solidify the revenue of the company.\textsuperscript{64}

To secure the spice trade and expand in this way, the VOC proved more than willing to use political and military force. They fought Europeans and interfered in the affairs of local rulers. One other source of increased pressure in Asia was the interference of Europeans. The British East India Company attempted to fight over the control of trade, but a more telling example is the interference of the French.

In the war of 1672-1674, the French attempted to take control of Trincomalee. Their fleet arrived in Surat in September 1671, then sailed to the bay of the former to attempt to build a fort with permission from King Rajasimha. The VOC had, as mentioned above, appointed Van Goens as supreme commander once more, who blockaded the bay of Trincomalee. The French were hoping for aid from king Rajasimha when Van Goens trapped them in the inner bay, but this help did not come. In July 1672 they escaped to Coromandel, where they captured Meliapore. This move angered the Qutb Shahi of Golconda, who joined Van Goens in an intermittent siege of the French forces, sometimes by forces of Golconda on land and sometimes by Dutch forces from the sea, eventually defeating them.\textsuperscript{65}

In 1674, the French established a trading post in Pondichéry. During the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697), the VOC headquarters on the Coromandel coast was moved south to put more pressure on the French position there. This shift south, so that the Dutch could rely on

\textsuperscript{63} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibidem 436-437.
\textsuperscript{65} Odegard, Colonial Careers 184-185.
reinforcements from Sri Lanka, is indicative of the efforts by the VOC as a whole to attempt to neutralize European competition and consolidate their hold on the Asian trade.\textsuperscript{66}

The role of Ceylon as a place to get reinforcements from is evidenced in the journal. The news of the Treaty of Rijswijk (1697) arrived in Sri Lanka on the 25\textsuperscript{th} of May, 1698.\textsuperscript{67} On the 12\textsuperscript{th} of July of the same year, a letter from the Council and Commander of Nagapatnam arrived in the commandment of Jaffnapatnam, where De Heere was at that point. This letter spoke of the “torments”\textsuperscript{68} that the “unreasonable servants of the Great Mogol”\textsuperscript{69} exacted upon the Dutch at Pondichéry.\textsuperscript{70} Apparently, the Dutch had yet to vacate Pondichéry, despite it being part of the peace terms at Rijswijk. In fact, De Heere sent an order to Colombo to have a fluyt sail to Point Pedro to pick up one hundred soldiers to be sent to Coromandel.\textsuperscript{71} On the 17\textsuperscript{th} of July, he sent another letter to Colombo with the instruction to ship sixty men to Jaffna to strengthen the garrison, from which 52 men had been drawn to be moved to Coromandel.\textsuperscript{72}

It is clear, then, that the VOC had a few main policy goals in Asia overall: diversify trade, protect the spice trade as the main core of the Company’s revenue, and increase the total volume of goods shipped.\textsuperscript{73}

Policy on Sri Lanka

These goals were reflected in the new policies on Sri Lanka as instructed by the Directors and Batavia and executed by the Ceylon office. Where Van Goens wanted the VOC to act as a state and conquer the entirety of the island, his successors focused more on the mercantile aspects. The main goal of the Dutch presence on Sri Lanka was the cinnamon trade, which required

\textsuperscript{66} Israel, \textit{Dutch Primacy} 331, 333.
\textsuperscript{67} National Archives The Hague, Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) 1.04.02, inv. nr. 1604B 470v. Henceforth VOC 1604B.
\textsuperscript{68} “quellingen”
\textsuperscript{69} “verscheijde onredelijcke bedienden van den groten mogol”
\textsuperscript{70} VOC 1604B 536v-537r.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibidem 537r-537v.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibidem 539v.
\textsuperscript{73} Further analysis can be found in the important works of Gaastra, \textit{Bewind en Beleid}, and De Vries and Van der Woude, \textit{The First Modern Economy}. 
stable relations with Kandy. As such, the policy of the Ceylon office became to be outwardly submissive towards the king and to keep the peace. This changed when the Company had become much more confident in their ability to fight Kandy and they asserted themselves more forcefully, but this only becomes the case in the 1710s and 1720s, showing a return to a more state-like VOC. In the late seventeenth century, the VOC attempted to maintain cordial relations, though they still maintained fortresses on the island to protect their interests.

Policy on Sri Lanka reflects certain themes of general VOC policy in Asia. The most important reason for the VOC’s existence was commerce, and while protecting this commerce through military means was certainly acceptable, it had to remain profitable. The period after 1672 is marked by expansion of operations but attempts to reduce expenses, reflecting the shift on the spectrum.\(^\text{74}\) The High Council in Batavia reconsidered what was important in Sri Lanka in the 1680s. The fundamental question was why the Dutch had to wield power on the island. The answer was that “cinnamon was [the] chief motivating factor. All other considerations were subordinate and should not be allowed to get in the way of the cinnamon monopoly. Territorial commitment on the island and attendant expenditure was justified only so far as it was necessary for the maintenance of the cinnamon monopoly.”\(^\text{75}\)

As mentioned above, this resulted in diplomatic channels being reopened with the king of Kandy in the 1680s to discuss the territories the Dutch would be willing to return. Rajasimha initially showed no intentions of negotiating from a position of weakness in which the Dutch held his territory and were the ones who could dictate what would be given back. Eventually, the roles reversed. The Dutch had lost their enthusiasm for negotiation and were willing to stay in a stalemate for the same reason Rajasimha now tried to normalize relations: he was getting old. The king wanted to secure good relations for his heir; the Dutch feared a civil war breaking out in Kandy because they were not sure there was a Kandyan heir. For the VOC to give up

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\(^\text{74}\) See the projects of Van Beuningen and others in Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid*.

\(^\text{75}\) Arasaratnam, ‘Consolidation of Dutch Power’ 229.
fortresses then, in the 1680s and 1690s, would be “to invite trouble.” Kandy continued to make overtures, with high ranking ambassadors and even the unilateral release of many Dutch prisoners. When Rajasimha died in 1687 and his son took the throne, the Dutch recognized him as king, expressed their condolences for the former’s death, and sent a company of Dutch troops and Sinhalese soldiers, called *lascars*, to congratulate the new king.

Moving forward, then, there are a few policy goals to keep in mind when reading the journal of De Heere. These are reflections of the Dutch policy specific to Sri Lanka, as well as the overall goals of the VOC. The points presented below are the expectations I would have for policy pursued by the Dutch in Sri Lanka; in the following chapters I will show these are reflected in De Heere’s journal. As they are interrelated and have some overlap, there is no specific hierarchy present here. Firstly, the VOC would endeavour to protect the commercial interests in Sri Lanka. Primarily this concerned cinnamon, but elephants and other goods were also of importance. Besides protecting the cinnamon peelers, there was also the second policy point: maintaining peace with Kandy through diplomacy and deterrence. This means that the fortresses on the island must be maintained and should provide defence against any incursions from the highlands, but not be so deep inland as to aggravate the king.

These forts would also serve to protect the Dutch interests in Ceylon against European threats, the third policy point I will look for. Much like the rest of the VOC’s possessions in Asia, Ceylon was under threat from the English, French, Portuguese and Danes. The fortresses on the coast had to protect against threats from the sea. However, this had to stay affordable. This fourth policy point, to reduce expenses where possible, was one of the main points for those who favoured the mercantile end of the spectrum. The profit margins of the VOC were shrinking and prices were unlikely to increase much. Without the ability to increase revenue in substantial enough amounts, expenses had to go down.

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76 Ibidem 229-231.
77 Ibidem 231-232.
Chapter 2 – The Journal

The journal of De Heere requires some specific context to be properly understood. This context exists on two levels. First, I will examine the physical aspects of the journal, with the objective of contextualizing the contents of the journal. This is particularly relevant for the maps it contains. The second part of this chapter will focus on the contents of the journal besides the maps and the text relating to them, as those sections will be examined further the next two chapters.

Physical Context

Initially, I started work on this thesis after I found the copy in the National Archives of the Netherlands in The Hague during my internship there. It appears that this copy is relatively unknown. I have not found any citation of it and was told in personal conversation by Gijs Boink, one of the collection specialists and authors of the Grote Atlas van de VOC series, that the authors of Volume IV: Ceylon (GAVOC IV) were fully unaware that this copy exists.78

During my research, however, I found out that there is another copy of the manuscript in the collection of the University Library Leiden.79 This copy is titled Dagelijke Aentekeningen gedaen en gehouden... in their catalogue but is also referred to as De Heere’s Diary by R. K. de Silva and K. D. Paranavitana, two authors who wrote on Ceylon.80 It appears this copy is much more well-known; the maps of this copy were also used for the GAVOC IV.81 The reason for the Leiden copy being more well-known can only be speculated upon; perhaps it is simply because it has a title instead of a number in a rather large archive.

This copy is currently in the possession of the University Library Leiden, but it passed into its possession through the collection of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en

78 Van Diessen et al., Grote Atlas van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie IV.
79 Leiden University Library Special Collections, Collection KITLV, shelfmark D H 47.
80 Paranavitana and de Silva, Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon.
81 GAVOC IV passim.
Volkenkunde (KITLV). Within this collection, it is part of the collection Johannes Hageman Jcz., a Dutch amateur historian based in Indonesia in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{82} He wrote on many aspects of Javanese history, as well as providing inventories of antiquities.\textsuperscript{83} It has proved difficult to find out how it came into the possession of the latter.

The version in the National Archives is from the VOC archives, specifically the section \textit{Heren Zeventien en kamer Amsterdam, Overgekomen brieven en papieren uit Indië}.\textsuperscript{84} In my experience working with these “Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren” or OBPs, it is not uncommon for copies to have been sent to the two largest chambers of the VOC in patria: Amsterdam and Zeeland. It would not surprise me, as such, that the copy in Leiden was originally sent to the chamber Zeeland. The archive of this chamber is rather incomplete and I have been able to find an entry for this journal. However, if this is the case, it is a mystery how the Indonesia-based Hageman came into possession of a Zeeland chamber manuscript. One could speculate that Hageman got his copy from the archives in Batavia, as it is not unreasonable to expect a copy to have been sent there in the seventeenth century. However, the Leiden copy is in a very good condition, which is unusual for archival material from this time that was stored in tropical conditions for multiple centuries.

The differences between the two copies are very minor. Based on extensive random spot checks, the texts do not differ in content. The clerks who wrote the text were different however, which means there is not a 1:1 concordance between page numbers in the Leiden copy and folio numbers in the National Archives copy. Interestingly, the National Archives version has contemporary folio numbers in ink, whereas the Leiden copy has page numbers in pencil, which

\textsuperscript{82} All biographical details are from the only source I can find that writes about Hageman: T. C. L. Wijnmalen, ‘Johannes Hageman J.C.z.: nekrologie’, \textit{De Nederlandsche Spectator} (1872). The version I have consulted was reprinted from \textit{De Nederlandsche Spectator} and can be found in Google Books here: <https://books.google.nl/books?id=KBNL:UBL000034721&redir_esc=y> [Accessed 01/07/2018].

\textsuperscript{83} For example: Johannes Hageman (Jcz), \textit{Handleiding tot de kennis der geschiedenis, aardrijkskunde, fabelleer en tijdrekenkunde van Java: Kort begrip der algemeene geschiedenis van Java Deel I} (Batavia 1852).

\textsuperscript{84} I have simplified the archival structure to conserve space and readability.
appear to me to be of later date based on the style of the numbers. It is also worth noting that a mistake was made in the numbering in the National Archive version: the numbering jumps from 249 to 451. After folio 249 follows Map 5, numbered 450 with pencil – most likely added at a later date – after which Map 6 and 7 appear, numbered 451 and 452 respectively.\textsuperscript{85} The text continues from 249v to 453r, so there are no pages missing; it appears to be a mere clerical error. The 23 maps in the journal, based on a full inspection, do not differ in content, only in minor stylistic components. This thesis will be based primarily on the text as it is written in the National Archives copy. This choice is based on the practical reason that this copy has been (mostly) digitized. Because of how minor the differences are there should not be any qualitative difference as a result of this choice.

As mentioned above, the copy in the National Archives is part of the VOC archive, specifically within the Directors and Chamber of Amsterdam. In this section, the category the journal belongs to is the OBPs, the received letters and papers from the Indies. Generally speaking, these are bundles of such letters and papers, sometimes with maps included.\textsuperscript{86}

Materially, the journal fits in well with the other documents in this category. It uses the same kind of paper, ink and binding. The contents are very different however. Most of the OBPs are simply an incoherent collection of papers and letters, usually from the same office but without an internal cohesion like the journal has. There are a few other journals like this one, specifically from Ceylon, of which the most famous example is Isaac Rumpf’s travel diary, which has recently been translated into English by K. D. Paranavitana.\textsuperscript{87} These journals are the exceptions, however.

\textsuperscript{85} See the Appendix – Cartographic Material in De Heere’s Journal for the maps, numbered in the order in which they appear in the journal.
\textsuperscript{86} Unfortunately, many of these maps were separated from this context. Some of these connections have been restored. For further details see Clemens Deimann, ‘Herkomstonderzoek naar uit hun context geraakte kaarten in de collectie van het Nationaal Archief’, \textit{Caert-Thresoor} 37 1 (2018) 24-33.
\textsuperscript{87} I. A. Rumpf, \textit{Travel Diary of Isaac Augustin Rumpf: The Dutch Governor of Ceylon (1716-1723)} (Translated by K.D. Paranavitana, 2015).
Many of the OBPs have some degree of water damage, probably incurred on the voyage from Asia to the Netherlands. The journal has been spared this, mostly, and only has some discolouration from age. The copy in Leiden has fared better in that regard.

Both copies have tears in the maps. These tears exist because of the way the maps are stored: folded into the books and upright. It seems unlikely to me that the tears were created by extensive usage; the spines of the books are not particularly damaged and it seems likely that extensively used maps would have been removed from the books, as has been done with other OBPs.

The journal is fully in manuscript, as are the maps. We can infer from the content of the text and the context of the archive that this journal was not meant for wide consumption, but the fact the maps are in manuscript shows this as well: if they were meant for mass consumption they would usually be in print. Another reason the manuscript nature of the maps is interesting, though, is that there are at least two copies of each map, one for each journal in the Netherlands. Presumably, there was also at least one copy of each map in Sri Lanka for utilisation there. This means that the contents of the maps were deemed important enough to create multiple manuscript copies, which can be relevant for the interpretation of the purpose of these maps.

Contents

In the text, the journey is described as a “reijse en visite des eylands Ceijlon”. As such, the contents of the journal fall into roughly two categories: daily activities of the governor and inspections. Under daily activities I count those things which the governor of Ceylon is expected to do regardless of whether he is on an inspection trip or not. This includes correspondence with the Political Council at Colombo, the Council at Batavia, governors of the Indian offices, the king of Kandy et cetera. It also includes decisions about trade, solving

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88 Literally “journey and visitation of the island of Ceylon”. VOC 1604B front matter.
disputes and other matters. Inspection includes the many inventories of personnel and the inspections of fortifications at the places visited.

Both of these broad categories will form a section below. First, however, I will identify the two most important participants of the journey for the present thesis: Governor Gerrit de Heere and military engineer and surveyor Johan Christiaanz. Toorzee. Within that first section I will also describe the route taken and the duration spent in each of the destinations.

De Heere, Toorzee, and the Itinerary
Gerrit de Heere took up the position of Governor of Ceylon in February 1697. Little has been written on him; as mentioned in the introduction, historians of Sri Lanka often skip over this period, and therefore also over Governor De Heere. When he is mentioned, it is mostly as a quick namedrop without further information. Lodewijk Wagenaar mentions that De Heere organized the return journey of Arakan monks from Sri Lanka but makes no further mention of him.\textsuperscript{89} In the \textit{History of Sri Lanka} De Heere is mentioned once, by D. A. Kotelawele. The context of this mention, however, is that the Kandyans wanted to have a mission to Siam and “reminded the Dutch that in the time of Governor de [sic] Heere (1647-1703) the Dutch were of great assistance to the court in a similar matter.”\textsuperscript{90} This likely refers to the mission mentioned by Wagenaar.

It is in histories of the VOC’s mapping activities that I found two other mentions of De Heere. In Kees Zandyvliet’s seminal work \textit{Mapping for Money} he mentions De Heere in relation to the \textit{tombo} administration.\textsuperscript{91} He is referring to the inspection of the \textit{tombo} administration of Jaffna during the journey discussed here. K. D. Paranavitana and R. K. de Silva mention him a few times in their book \textit{Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon}, though they elucidate very little. They made heavy use of the maps in the Leiden copy of the journal, so De Heere is mostly

\textsuperscript{89} Lodewijk Wagenaar, \textit{Kaneel & OlifantenL Sri Lanka en Nederland sinds 1600} (Nijmegen 2016) 106.
\textsuperscript{90} Kotelawele, ‘The VOC in Sri Lanka’ 243.
\textsuperscript{91} Zandyvliet, \textit{Mapping for Money} 153. The \textit{tombo} was essentially a land registry and will be discussed extensively in Chapter 3.
mentioned but not described. They do quote the paragraph of Zandvliet mentioned above and have an interesting take on De Heere’s relation to the *tombo* administration: “Governor Gerrit de Heere who took office in 1697 determined to push forward the *tombo* registration on scientific lines and appointed a committee the following year (composed of Gunnery Major and Engineer J C Toorzee, Claas Isaaqz […] to suggest measures of improvement.” As will be further explained in Chapter 3, this might be giving De Heere too much credit; I have found little evidence of further pushes like this during his tenure.

De Heere, then, appears to have left little which speaks to the imagination of historians. Whereas it is common for women in history to be known mostly for who they marry, De Heere’s only other claim to historic attention seems to have been his marriage to Johanna Maria van Riebeeck, who married the more well-known Governor General Joan van Hoorn after De Heere’s death in 1702 and left many letters written on the journey home to the Netherlands.

The other important figure for this thesis is Johan Christiaanz Toorzee, a military engineer and surveyor. He signed all the maps in the journal and is one of the most prolific mapmakers of Sri Lanka. Hailing from Jutland, Denmark, he arrived in Asia on the *Velzen* for the Amsterdam Chamber. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1699, after the inspection journey discussed here, and

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became *dessave* of Colombo in July 1707. He died in 1709 in Batavia.\textsuperscript{94} Toorzee made many maps, including multiple versions of fortification maps of Colombo and other forts on Ceylon.\textsuperscript{95} The most well-known map he made was the first “filled in” map of Ceylon, seen in Figure 2. As is usual for mapmakers very little else has been written about the man. He was an engineer and land surveyor, which explains the care with which he drew the manuscript maps presented in the journal.

The itinerary of the journey is displayed in the form of Table 1, as well as in the shape of a map in below. The table mentions the places at which the travellers stayed for at least a day. With the exception of Negombo near the end of the trip, they mostly did not stay in a place merely to rest for longer than a night or a few hours during the day. It is unclear from the text when they left Hanwella to return to Colombo near the beginning of the trip, and it is also unclear when Governor De Heere moved from Point Pedro to the Company garden at Nallur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>Until</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>Starting Location</td>
<td>31 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negombo</td>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>3 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malwana</td>
<td>4 April</td>
<td>5 April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanwella</td>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>10 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalatura</td>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>12 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>15 May</td>
<td>6 June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matara</td>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>1 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>3 July</td>
<td>5 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>11 July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Pedro</td>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nallur (Jaffna)</td>
<td>? At least 21 July</td>
<td>16 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mannar</td>
<td>18 September</td>
<td>20 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negombo</td>
<td>27 September</td>
<td>29 September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo</td>
<td>29 September</td>
<td>Ending Location</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{94} Zandvliet, *Mapping for Money* 274, in endnote 33 found on page 301.

\textsuperscript{95} Most of these maps can be found in the National Archives, in the Collection Leupe (VEL). Most of these were clearly part of the aforementioned OBPs and some of these connections were restored, but this information is not presently available in the NA database.
Figure 3 Map of Sri Lanka showing De Heere's route.
Also left out are the times when De Heere or Toorzee would leave the location they were staying at for one or more days to inspect another location nearby. For example, the table does not show Toorzee’s absence from Nallur during the inspection of the Jaffna *tombo* administration. The locations listed should be seen as a sort of ‘base of operations’ during the period attached to it.

What stands out is that the Governor and his entourage stayed for slightly less than a month in both Galle and Matara, and about two months in Point Pedro and Jaffna put together. Seeing as Galle and Matara are, like Point Pedro and Jaffna, within a day’s travel of each other, one might group those two as well. As such, it is fair to say that the majority of the journey was spent in the main Dutch ports on the south coast and on the north coast of Sri Lanka. Much of the rest of the trip was spent going to forts for a few days and then moving on.

**Daily Activities**

One of the key components of ruling is communication. It is unsurprising, then, that much of the daily activities category consists of correspondence between Governor De Heere and other entities. In Chapter 1 I discussed the exchange of letters concerning a troop movement from Sri Lanka to Coromandel, but many other letters were sent and received.

Interestingly, some letters are copied into the text while others are not. A letter from a local ruler on the Madurai coast concerning possible breaches of contract between him and the Company was copied fully, but on the last page of this copy the diary then continues with “Received a missive from merchant and chief Krijn Caperman, from the council of Tutucorijn dated the 23rd of the past month August being of such content, as will be found in the book of received letters in Colombo.”96 The italicised part states that the content of the received letter can be found in the “received letter-book” of Colombo’s secretariat. The only note for the next day of the journal is that a letter was received from the Political Council of Colombo, the

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96 Italicisation mine. VOC 1604B 582r. “Ontfangen een missive vanden coopman en opperhoof Krijn Caperman, nevens den raad tot Tutucorijn gedateert 23e den gepasseerde maand aug:o zijnde van zodanigen inhout, als bij het aancomend brief-boek den Colombose secretijstaat gevonden tewerden.”
contents of which can be read in the “afgaande briev-book”, or “sent letter-book”.\footnote{Ibidem.} It appears that letters to and from other political entities were copied, as well as letters which were not sent to or received from Colombo.

One letter in particular that is worth highlighting was sent to Kandy regarding the Treaty of Rijswijk. As mentioned in the previous chapter, news of the peace with the King of France had come on the 24th of May 1698, when De Heere and company were in the Commandment of Galle. On the 28th, De Heere sent a letter to the court of Kandy to inform the king of the peace with France. It is noteworthy that he referred to the Kandyan King as the “grootmagtigsten Monargh en onverwinnelijken Keijsser” or “mighty Monarch and unconquerable Emperor” multiple times in the letter.\footnote{VOC 1604B 473r-473v.} The letter is also signed “His Mighty Monarch, and unconquerable Emperor’s loyal governor and obedient servant signed: Gerrit de Heere”.\footnote{VOC 1604B 473v.} This is a clear indication of the VOC’s policy to be outwardly polite and subordinate to the Kandyan king, even if the Dutch were occupying the king’s land and therefore all but obedient.

A regularly recurring subject is that of trade in elephants. The second most important trade good of Sri Lanka at the time brings with it many lists of elephants, inspections of stables and disputes over the animals. When visiting Matara in June, for example, the journal lists the seventy elephants stabled there. It includes their height and notes such as “short tail”, “small piece missing from the left ear”, and “is with young”.\footnote{VOC 1604B 500r.} Similar lists appear in multiple places throughout the journal. While the elephant trade was not as important as the cinnamon trade, this still shows the priority given to trade, one of the four policy points the VOC focused on in this period.

\footnotetext[97]{Ibidem.}
\footnotetext[98]{VOC 1604B 473r-473v.}
\footnotetext[99]{VOC 1604B 473v. “Sijn Grootm: Monargh, en onverw: keijssers getrouwen gouverneur en gehoorsamen dienaar getekent: Gerrit de Heere”.}
\footnotetext[100]{VOC 1604B 500r.}
Sometimes seemingly minor incidents relating to elephant trade are also mentioned: on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of August, in Jaffna, a “Moorish merchant named Resolu Khan”\textsuperscript{101} arrived from Coromandel and requested to buy elephants. He had heard that the elephant trade had been completed for this year but asked if it was possible to sell his goods anyway. He was then very pleased to hear there were still some elephants left to be sold to him.\textsuperscript{102}

One interesting example of local affairs being taken up by Governor De Heere is one concerning “Moors”, that is, Muslims. This episode took place at Galle in May 1698. On folios 464-466 it is mentioned that Governor Van Goens has attempted to repulse Moors and “Portuguese creaturen” by disallowing them to buy real estate. However, by offering loans to Dutch and Singhalese inhabitants of the city with the latter’s houses as collateral, they still managed to procure houses and land.\textsuperscript{103} Some deliberations were had, and a few days later a letter was received from the Political Council of Colombo concerning, among other matters, this Muslim property issue. It was decided to release a notice: Muslims would no longer be allowed to procure property in Galle.\textsuperscript{104}

**Inspections**

Besides these kinds of rulings, there were the actual inspections, which happened not just in these major locations, but also in the places which were visited for only a few days. These fall into three main categories: land division, fortifications and personnel. The first two will be discussed in respectively Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, because they involve cartographic material I want to discuss in detail for the purposes of the thesis. The matters of personnel are dealt with in text only, which I will discuss here.

In each of the places visited, a list was made of the personnel present there. Personnel was divided into ranks and ethnicity; distinguishing between “Europeanen”, “mestiesen” and

\textsuperscript{101} VOC 1604B 573r. “moors-coopman genaamt Resolukhan”
\textsuperscript{102} VOC 1604B 573r-573v.
\textsuperscript{103} VOC 1604B 464-466.
\textsuperscript{104} The letter from Colombo: VOC 1604B 474-482, “Placcaat”: 482v.
“toepassen”. The latter two categories are somewhat difficult to separate but based on the VOC-glossary by M. Kooijmans and J.E. Oosterling, the *mesties* is a person of mixed European and Asian heritage, and a *toepas* is a Christian native, though they might also have Portuguese ancestry.\(^{105}\)

In the majority of the lists, it also mentions how much the employees were paid, sometimes in rice, sometimes in cash, sometimes both. It also happened that soldiers were given a parcel of land to feed themselves and their families with. These inventories of personnel were made primarily to lower the salaries where possible, though.

The very first inspection exemplifies this. It is explained that the fort is mostly useful to protect the cinnamon warehouses from water. It is unnecessary to “keep the large number of troops other than a good guard to show the Company’s possession: which men thought would suffice at 57 heads”.\(^{106}\) Then, an inventory is made of the personnel currently present in the fort, a total of 139 people.

Twenty *toepassen* were removed from their duties, as they could be done without, ten *mestiesen* were discharged because they were “incompetent and unworthy”\(^{107}\) to work for the Company because of their “debauchery and vexatious lives”.\(^{108}\) Fifty-two other employees would be divided between other places to replace those *toepassen* who were still to be discharged. These *toepassen* were easy to discharge because they “can always be assembled again, if need be”.\(^{109}\)

It is then decided that the native employees are being paid too much, especially those who are already receiving rice besides their cash payments. As such, their salaries are lowered,

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\(^{106}\) VOC 1604B 226v, list on 226v-227r.

\(^{107}\) VOC 1604B 227v. “onbequaam en onwaardigh”

\(^{108}\) Ibidem. “deboucie en ergerlijck leven”

\(^{109}\) VOC 1604B 230r.
meticulously tracked in another table listing the names of those who are paid 1 or more rijksdaalders per month, while those who are paid one third rijksdaalders per month are listed by role and ethnicity.110

In Matara, too, an inventory of personnel was made. This list is so long it covers four pages, including native, European, toepas and mesties personnel and the rice and rijksdaalders paid to them. The next entry after the list is that of the 8th of June, in which there’s only mention of the fact the whole day was spent deliberating over how to best reduce the costs of Matara, which in the end would be mostly done by reducing the salaries, both in cash and kind, given to the European and native personnel.

Not every entry about personnel is fully based on reducing the salaries of employees or discharging them. While it is mentioned multiple times that especially mestiesen and toepassen were discharged for bad behaviour, there are also some occurrences of pensions being given to those who served long and faithfully. To stay in Matara, five men who had served the company for thirty, forty, or even fifty years were given a continued salary of a few rijksdaalders a month, despite being too old now to work.111

In Hanwella, one toepas captain was considered redundant, but was still kept on because of his competence. Instead of staying here, where he would be in command of European troops and would not have much authority over them, he was sent to Colombo, where his experience with “land affairs”112 would be useful. Besides this, it was generally useful to keep men like him on, “so that we would not be lacking an officer of such competence, if it would become necessary to enlist toepassen for some time: because that folk are used to his command, and he knows especially well how to rule them.”113

110 VOC 1604B 231r-232r.
111 VOC 1604B 500v-501r.
112 VOC 1604B 237r. “landzaken”
113 Ibidem.
These are exceptions to the rule, however. For the most part, when De Heere arrived in one of the Dutch establishments on Sri Lanka, an inventory of personnel was made and followed by either an explication of those who were discharged or a list of those who were kept on.

It is clear, then, that one of the primary purposes of this journey was to reduce costs, as was predicted in chapter 1. In this sense, the personnel aspect of the inspections is very much a reflection of the overall goals of the VOC in this period: continue or even expand commerce but reduce costs where possible.
Chapter 3 – Overview Maps and Land Survey Maps

As discussed in the introduction, the fourteen fortification maps comprise the majority of cartographic material and are thus in need of a specific chapter. The maps and drawings discussed in this chapter, then, are the other types. They can be divided into two categories: Overview maps and land survey maps. To start with, I will discuss the six overview maps in the journal. These are maps of parts of Sri Lanka, showing the important rivers, cities, ports and the coastlines to a few kilometres inland in three of them, while two others show the bays of Trincomalee and the final one shows a stretch of coastline. Second, I will discuss the aforementioned report on land surveys by Toorzeed, including a discussion of the attached maps.

Overview Maps

In both the Leiden University Library and the National Archives copy, one of the first pages of the manuscript is the map shown in Figure 5 and Figure 4, respectively. There are small differences, but they are in essence the same map of the lands surrounding Colombo. I will discuss the overview maps in the journal in the order they appear. This means that the purpose of the map of Colombo’s surroundings and the similar one of Galle will be discussed first. Afterwards, I will briefly examine the other overview maps that appear and reflect on the purposes of these maps.

Figure 5 Map of Colombian Lands, VOC 1604B  Figure 4 Map of Colombian Lands,
There is another map, again in two copies in the two different versions of the manuscript, which looks fairly similar to the one pictured above. This second map can be found in the appendix of this thesis and shows the lands surrounding Galle. It, too, is oriented in such a way that the sea is at the bottom of the map and it, too, uses colours to distinguish between the different *corles*, or districts. These two maps, of the lands surrounding Colombo and Galle, are clearly within the same category. As such, I will focus on the map of the lands surrounding Colombo and the reader may assume the comments on purpose carry over to the map of Galle as well. The map of “Colombese landen”, or “Colombian lands”, is a manuscript, coloured map. The text on it reads as follows in translation, with the names in the original spelling:

*map of Colombian Lands*

*Presently belonging to the district or dessave; to the north determined by the river of Caymello, and to the south by that of Bentotte; consisting of the following Corles, namely; Alutcour, Hapittijgam, Hina, Hevegam, Halpittij, Reijgam, Passedum, and a part of the Wallalawittij Corle. Wherein lies the fortresses Colombo, Nigombo, Hangwelle and Kaliture.*

*Colombo the 16th November Anno 1698*

*[signed J.C. Toorzee, Engineer]*

The map is primarily meant to illustrate the territory belonging to the *dessave*, or district, of Colombo. The colours on the map represent the different *corles*, smaller districts subordinate to the *dessave*. It appears very unlikely that these maps were coloured after the maps arrived in the Netherlands, for practical reasons. Also, the colours and ink interact on the page in a way they wouldn’t if the colouring was of later date. Other than the extent of the *corles* within the *dessave*, the map shows important rivers in dark blue and the important roads in yellow with black dots. Many of the towns are also shown with small circles, as well as the fortresses owned by the Dutch in small representations of the layout as can be seen in Figure 6.

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114 VOC 1604B 228.
Gourbevile, a small fort built near Hangwelle, is also marked. Similarly, other small forts appear on the map, but none of them are mentioned in the description. This points in the same direction for the purpose of this map as the other details mentioned: it is meant to be an accompaniment to the travel journal to give a sense of where the places mentioned in the text are. It is surprising in a way, then, that no route is visible on the map. One might expect that Toorzee would have marked the journey on this overview, but that is not the case. Neither of these two overview maps, of Colombo’s and Galle’s hinterlands, are mentioned at all in the text. This further supports the notion that they were added after the journey was completed as an overview of the places visited. The dates on the signature of Toorzee on the maps are in November, two months after the party returned to Colombo. Evidently, they were added later. A final reason to believe the purpose of these maps is to give an overview is that the map of Galle’s surroundings starts where the map of the Colombo district ends: the river Bentotte. This continuity implies that each overview map is meant to accompany the time spent in that district.

The third overview map (Map 10) is different from these two. It is a map of the coastline between the fort of Batticaloa and that of Trincomalee, showing “how far apart the forts […] [Figure 6 Fortresses on the Colombo Overview Map. The top section is in original orientation, Nigombo Colombo and Caliture are rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise to maintain the resolution of the image presented here.]”
The description then specifically mentions that the map goes on north, past Trincomalee, until it reaches “the river Palvakeaar; from where the map of Wannij and Jaffanapatnam [sic] is continued.”

This map of Wanny and Jaffnapatnam (Map 15) is of a smaller scale than the other ones, showing much more territory. The description points out some important features of this map: the coloured four provinces of the Jaffna peninsula and the “inhabited islands”, the fortifications on the Jaffna peninsula marked with letters, and the “New Elephants-road” marked in red. Much like those previously discussed, this map is meant to show the places the group has visited on this inspection journey, but without a marked route. The fortifications shown with letters on the map are all ones mapped by Toorzee. The elephant road is mentioned in one of the many pages of the manuscript devoted to the elephant trade. The final overview map shows the bay of Trincomalee (Map 14). This one is different from the others mostly in the sense that its focus is on the water near Trincomalee, instead of the land controlled by the Dutch. Otherwise, its role and purpose are much the same: it is an illustration of the areas visited by the party of De Heere.

To summarize, these maps are all meant to frame the journey of De Heere and his company. They do not support a specific argument and are not directly involved in the text, but they are meant to provide the reader with some spatial context. They are, then, not purely decorative, but they are not meant to support an argument either.

Land Survey Maps

In a sense, the land survey maps are the opposites of these overviews. These are maps with the express purpose of being an accompaniment to a report written up by Toorzee and a few other

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115 VOC 1604B 521. “kaarte waarinne vertoont wert, hoeverre de forten Batticaloa en Tricoenmale [sic] van malkander leggen”.
116 VOC 1604B. “en verder noordwaarts tot aan de revier Palvakeaar; vanwaar de kaarte der Wannij en Jaffanapatnam werd vervolgt.”
117 VOC 1604B 536.
employees of the VOC. In this section, I will first discuss what the *tombo* is, as well as some historiographical notes on this particular situation. Then I will examine the report, first focusing on the textual part, then on the maps, then on the “amplification” and the responses to all of it by Governor De Heere.

**The Tombo**

The *tombo* administration was initially introduced by the Portuguese. They were the first European power to hold significant lands in Sri Lanka and sought to properly record the land holdings of its inhabitants so they could be taxed.\(^{118}\) They started this process after integrating the conquered kingdom of Kotte, which held the western part of Sri Lanka. Kotte itself had a form of land administration called *lekam miti*, which the Portuguese based their administration on.\(^{119}\) When the Dutch conquered land from the Portuguese, they in turn took over the *tombo* from the Portuguese.

Unlike the Portuguese, however, the Dutch saw the need to have maps accompanying the *tombo*. There were two parts of the *tombo*: the *Head tombo* and the *Land tombo*. The former was a registry of people living in the lands controlled by the Dutch, while the latter was a registration of their lands. The *Land tombo* records owner of the land, the names of the lands he owns, the trees planted there, and the revenues due from it.\(^{120}\) With the maps, however, one could also see the shape and the extent of these lands as well as their relative positioning. As written in the report of Toorzee’s group, it was difficult to make an accurate count of the various trees each tract of land without a proper map of the different tracts and their borders. This, in turn, would make it more likely that the resulting inaccuracy in the number of trees on a plot of land would incur a tax rate either too high or too low for the person in question.\(^{121}\)

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\(^{118}\) Paranavitana, *Land for Money* 1-2.

\(^{119}\) Ibidem 4-5.

\(^{120}\) Ibidem 86-87 has examples of entries in both the *Head tombo* and the *Land tombo*, translated into English.

\(^{121}\) VOC 1604B 558r.
The initiative to map these lands started, according to Paranavitana, with the efforts of De Heere and Toorzee. I find this assertion strange, however, as this 1698 report refers multiple times to “the map” or “the maps” with which Toorzee’s measurements would be “confronted”\textsuperscript{122}. Evidently there had already been some efforts to make maps before Toorzee’s report. The point of their inspection, after all, was to see if the maps created in Jaffna were accurate enough after complaints from the inhabitants of this district. It is difficult to ascertain whether these fairly recent maps were the first of their kind, so perhaps Paranavitana was referring to the last decade of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century as a period in which the first initiative for mapping was taken.

**The Report**

The inspection discussed here was undertaken by Constable Major Jan Christiaanz. Toorzee, Lieutenant Claas Isaackz., *tombohouder* or *tombokeeper* Pieter Bolscho, and wage bookkeeper Joannes Schouten. More information on these men is difficult to find. Why Toorzee and Bolscho were chosen is fairly obvious: Toorzee was a trained cartographer and Bolscho was the keeper of the *tombo*. Schouten might have been chosen because he was an accountant. Lieutenant Isaackz. can only be speculated upon. Perhaps his rank indicates that he, too, was an engineer, but this is not mentioned in the text. The inspection was initiated because there were many “complaints and rumours” about the recently created new *tombo* of Jaffna.\textsuperscript{123} Their objective was to provide a written report which would elucidate any defects of this new land register. The ordinance was written on Monday the 21\textsuperscript{st} of July 1698.

On the 9\textsuperscript{th} of August, the report was delivered to Governor De Heere. It was found that there were many defects in the new *tombo* and the maps made by the surveyors. When Toorzee remeasured the lands near the village of Tetkukoernitje, he found that the recorded maps were

\textsuperscript{122} For example: VOC 1604B 558v. The Dutch term used are “de kaart” or “de kaarten” and “geconfronteerd” respectively.

\textsuperscript{123} VOC 1604B 541r.
quite distorted. For example, one line of land division was too long to even fit on the map. This meant that either the measurement tools were incorrect, or the maths done to convert the measurements onto paper went wrong, or both.\textsuperscript{124}

As it turned out, the measurement tools were rather faulty. The local surveyors had been using measuring ropes, as opposed to chains. This caused issues because conditions caused by for example weather could make the ropes lengthen or shorten. When confronted with a proper measuring chain, the longest rope, that of Hendrik de Kroese, was 6 \textit{duim}, or inches, too long on 6 Rijnlandse Roede.\textsuperscript{125} The shortest rope, belonging to Jeronimus Heelaart,\textsuperscript{126} was 5½ \textit{duim} too short.\textsuperscript{127} The total difference between the longest and shortest measuring rope would then be 11½ \textit{duim}, or 29.56 cm. This could cause a fairly significant distortion and both make the tax rates for various people higher or lower than they should be or make it impossible to make a proper inventory of the trees on a plot of land, as the map would be inaccurate. Furthermore, the compasses used were of bad quality: they had a deviation between them of up to 3 degrees.

In the next village, more faults were found, with the native surveyors having bad equipment again. It was noted that the local inhabitants were not even able to show the boundaries of their own lands. The bottom right of the larger map shows this region, as isolated in Figure 7. The yellow part comprises lands which were accurately portrayed in the locally

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{map.png}
\caption{Land survey map, bottom right only. VOC 1604B}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{124} VOC 1604B 558r.
\textsuperscript{125} 1 \textit{duim} $\approx$ 2.57 cm, 1 Rijnl. R. $\approx$ 3.76 meters, so on a total of $\pm$ 22.56 m the rope was 15.42 cm too long.
\textsuperscript{126} On the map by Toorzee his name is spelt “Jeronimus Hillaartsz.”
\textsuperscript{127} $\approx$ 14.14 cm on 22.56 m.
produced maps, whereas the green section had some deviation. For the pink part, the deviation could not be determined because of a map “defect”.128

At the village of Altchewelij the four native surveyors were tasked with drawing six lots of land. These were then confronted with the map made by Toorzee, as can be seen on the land survey map. I have cut out each of the six maps and put them together in Figure 8. The top left image is the map drawn by Toorzee, the top right is by Jeronimus Hillaartsz. The two middle maps are both by Casper Tiellensz., where the one on the left is the map which accompanied the *tombo*, and the right is the map made in this exercise. The map on the bottom left was drawn by Hendrik d’Kroese, while the bottom right map is by the hand of Andris Honter. Evidently, they all have different results. Some are distorted in shape to an unacceptable degree, especially that by Hillaartsz, but there are also large discrepancies in the area calculated by these surveyors. Whereas the actual area, as calculated by Toorzee, is 3066 square Rhoede, the surveyors come to different numbers. The highest number comes from d’Kroese, who claims the land has an area of 3361 square Rhoede, while the lowest number in the exercise comes from Honter, with 3110 square Rhoede. This comes to a total difference of 251 square Rhoede, or 3,562 square meters. This is more than 1⁄3 of a hectare, or almost an acre, of difference.

128 “manquement”
Clearly, the surveyors were not very good at their job. Toorzee et al appear to have drawn the same conclusion. In fact, when discussing one particularly inaccurate map, they say it is such a “mess of lines and blotches, it seems like it was designed by a lunatic rather than a land surveyor.” When resorting to the new *tombo*, it turned out to not be much better. The conclusion of Toorzee et al was, then, that the register of lands was insufficient. The role of the maps accompanying this report is different from the overview maps in exactly that sense. They are an accompaniment to the text, illustrating what is reported and giving further information. The other small maps on the sheet are similar in purpose to the ones already highlighted.

In response to the report, De Heere ordered Toorzee and his fellow commissioners to write an amplification for the report, as it was not clear enough on their conclusions and recommendations. A few days later, this addition came in. It takes a step back and summarizes the situation and the conclusions of Toorzee. In short, the conclusion was that the new land registry is wholly inadequate.

They concluded that the new *tombo* was ordered for good reasons, which Toorzee listed in four points: (1) To find lands which were concealed before. (2) To relieve the tax pressure on the poor. (3) To increase yearly income. (4) To have pertinent maps of all the lands in the area.

Unfortunately, this did not work out very well. The concealed areas were often still not accurately represented. The methods used were indeed meant to relieve the poor, but in the end the tax reductions mostly helped the rich circumvent taxation while the poor still had to pay. The income increases were fairly minimal and the maps were, as we saw above, inadequate. The idea was good, then, but the execution was lacking. The problems, as pointed out by Toorzee’s group, boiled down to four factors: (1) The surveyors were natives who lacked the

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129 VOC 1604B 561v. “een menigte liniën en kladden, die meer door een kranksinnige als bij een Landmeter scheenen ontworpen.”
130 VOC 1604B 570r.
knowledge and experience to map these areas properly. (2) The measuring ropes were faulty and the surveyors did not bother to use even wooden pegs to mark what they had already measured, deeming a groove in the ground to be sufficient. (3) The compasses were inadequate. (4) The drawing materials were also not up to standard. In conclusion, then, it was impossible for the surveyors to deliver on the maps which were intended to improve the land registry.

De Heere’s response to this amplification, which was presumably sent on to Batavia, was agreement. His opinion on the matter was that while it would be very useful to have a new high-quality *tombo*, accompanied by properly drawn maps, the VOC would need to employ European land surveyors to do this. In addition, they would require additional employees to supervise the process and eliminate possible corruption.\(^{131}\) The implication seems that this might not be worth the money.

This is why the statement made by Paranavitana and his co-writer De Silva in *Maps and Plans of Dutch Ceylon*, where they assert that De Heere “determined to push” for a new registration based on scientific lines seems rather bold to me. From what I can tell, De Heere certainly appreciated the usefulness of such an endeavour, but it appears that it was not actually undertaken until the tenure of Governor Gustaaf Willem, Baron van Imhoff (1736-1640). De Heere clearly thought that the endeavour of mapping these areas and creating a new *tombo* was useful, but it does not appear he found it worthwhile. In this sense, he is clearly not on the state side of the merchant-state spectrum. Administrating land and extracting taxes from it is important to make territorial possessions worth keeping, but reducing costs took precedence for De Heere.

\(^{131}\) VOC 1604B 570v-571r.
Chapter 4 – Fortification Plans

There are two reasons the fortification plans in De Heere’s journal are particularly interesting. As mentioned in the introduction, European fortifications in general, but in Asia in particular, are not well studied. There is a severe lack of specific literature on the subject. Therefore, there will be a section below to elucidate the nature of European forts, as well as a section on how they were different in Asia.

The other reason these maps are so interesting is that they provide very good examples of the policy points I expected to see after examining the context of the VOC and Sri Lanka in Chapter 1. The map of Nigombo and the deliberations that come with it in the text will show the primary concern of the VOC was to protect their commercial interests in Sri Lanka. After that, some smaller fortifications in the province of Jaffna will exemplify the policy of maintaining the peace with Kandy, as became the standard after the two Van Goenses left their respective offices. The remaining two policy points of reducing costs and protecting against European powers in Asia are more ubiquitous than the first two and will therefore be exemplified by a few cases in short, instead of one at length.

European Fortifications: Developments and Innovations

After the introduction of gunpowder, European siege warfare changed over time. Initially, guns were inaccurate, prone to failure and expensive, but as they became more numerous and available, medieval style castles with vertical stone walls became obsolete. The response was perhaps the most iconic part of the European style early modern fortress: the bastion. It is this structure which Parker saw as the innovation that started the military revolution. It is also a good starting point for explaining why European forts were made the way they were.

Where medieval castles had vertical walls, early modern forts were built with thicker, sloping walls and broader parapets, to prevent breaches by cannon fire and protect against small
shot fired at defenders on the walls.\textsuperscript{132} They would usually be made by digging a moat around the fortress and using the displaced earth to make the basis of a wall, which was often covered by stone or preferably brick. This, however, removed the ability to use vertical fire to cover the walls, making flanking fire even more important. The most successful solution for this was the Italian bastion. The basic premise of the bastion’s effectiveness is that it provides flanking fire along the curtain wall and for the bastion on the opposite side of the wall. In this way, attackers would be in a crossfire of cannon and musket fire. At the same time, it functioned as a covered position and large platform for guns firing at enemy siege emplacements and breaching batteries in front of the wall they were attached to.

On Figure 9 a representation is given of the fields of fire provided from three positions on the walls of Manaar. On the left (northern) side of the fort, the blue arrow pointing down from bastion b shows that fire could come from that position along the face of bastion c. If bastion c was a square tower, there would be an area of “dead ground” uncovered by fire, where enemy soldiers could find safety. The circle of dead ground near bastion b would be covered by fire from other positions.\textsuperscript{133} Crucially, it would not be covered if there could be no fire coming from the other bastion. On the right side, the two fictional positions are chosen to have lines of fire that go as closely along the face of the opposite bastion. This shows how much of the wall and bastion a could provide fire along the face of bastion b and vice versa. It also shows the crossfire created in front of the fortress.


\textsuperscript{133} The extent of dead ground is based on a firing angle of 60 degrees and the height of the walls being 26.5 feet as indicated on the map. The 60 degrees is somewhat guesswork, but sharper angles seem unlikely. The amount of dead ground from the wall turns out to be around 13.6 meters or 3.5 Rijnlandse Roeden.
The bastion spread quickly, in large part thanks to the Habsburg empire, which included parts of Italy at the time. This allowed them to recruit engineers there and use them to build fortifications in Spain, the Netherlands, the Holy Roman Empire and the Americas.\textsuperscript{134} Developments differed in various parts of Europe, which Odegard examines quite extensively. Here I will focus solely on the developments in the Low Countries, as it is most pertinent to the subject here. Around the turn of the seventeenth century, new innovations quickly became mandatory for a fort to be considered up to date. The most important of these was the \textit{covered way}, which was a road leading around the moat of the fortress. Between the besiegers and the defenders on this road was a \textit{glacis}, an artificial slope which would protect the defenders on the road and also provide cover for the fortress walls by making sure it could not be targeted from a close range without the shot bouncing off the \textit{glacis}.\textsuperscript{135} Like the bastion before it, this innovation also increased the required garrison strength.

Initially, besiegers would surround these forts by double walls, one facing the defenders and one facing a potential relief force. As the seventeenth century progressed, though, this tactic made way for a strategy developed by Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, artillery commander of Louis XIV’s armies. Instead of the double wall to defend against relieving armies, the besieging army was split into two. One part would besiege the city, with only one wall facing the defenders, while the other part of the army would watch for any relief forces approaching and intercept them. This saved a lot of time, as only one wall had to be built.

This new tactic and others, combined with new armaments such as mortars, made it so that fortresses were guaranteed to fall sooner or later. In the war of 1672-1673, Vauban proved his methods were sound, taking many fortifications much faster than anticipated. The Dutch defence of Holland and Zeeland is a classic example of sound defensive warfare, however. The


\textsuperscript{135} Odegard, \textit{Unpublished Monograph} Chapter 2.
strategy of inundating the low-lying polders of eastern Holland with fortifications at key points introduced a new idea in fortification: defence through a physical obstacle and a system of forts to prevent the movement of enemy armies. Systems of fortifications became the norm in the eighteenth century. Further changes in the physical shape of individual forts also occurred in this century but fall outside the scope of this research. This system of fortification is what typifies the attempts in Sri Lanka.

Dutch Fortifications on Sri Lanka: Initial Purposes and Criticisms

With the ability – and sometimes necessity – to wage war independently of the Dutch Republic, the VOC required more military strength than would be expected of a strictly mercantile company. As has been shown above, whether this was desirable was a debate which raged contemporarily, with the main proponent for the VOC as a territorial and military power in Asia in the seventeenth century being Rijckloff van Goens. It was Van Goens who initiated the construction of most of the fortifications on Ceylon.

The fort system he created on Ceylon and nearby Malabar had, as Erik Odegard puts it, a dual purpose: to dominate the commercial traffic of Ceylon and the Malabar Coast, and to ensure the company’s control over these regions by providing obstacles to invading European forces or local states.\(^\text{136}\) Looking back to the policy points I listed at the end of Chapter 1, we see that protecting the commerce of Ceylon and protecting against European invasions was seen as an important purpose of the fortifications. The other two points, reducing costs and maintaining the peace with Kandy, came into being after Van Goens retired. As such, it is unsurprising that they were not considerations for Van Goens, who saw the costs as an investment to achieve remarkable profits later and wished to conquer Kandy. As will be shown

\(^{136}\) Odegard, *Unpublished Monograph* Chapter 4. Odegard explicitly mentions that Van Goens insisted that the fortifications would be able to withstand a European siege but provides no specific reference to evidence thereof. However, based on the general disposition of Van Goens and his plans to make Ceylon the capital of the VOC in Asia, as well as the European style of the forts, this seems likely to be true.
below, by the time of De Heere’s inspection, these points were in fact an important consideration.

How did Van Goens’ system of fortifications intend to protect the Company’s possessions on Sri Lanka against Europeans? There are two main factors to consider: the style of the individual fortifications and the system as a whole. Firstly, the individual forts were built in the European style, with bastions and sloped walls being nearly ubiquitous. In fact, one of the few forts visited by De Heere which lacks such a wall is Batticaloa (in use since 1638). On the map by Toorzee, a profile of the wall shows just how thin and steep the brick wall is, as can be seen in Figure 10. At about six feet wide, it is half the width of the walls of Hangwelle, a relatively small fort. The forts are mostly square with bastions for flanking fire, with some exceptions. The fort least in the shape one would expect of an early modern European fort is Hammenhiel, seen in Figure 11. Built by the Portuguese and taken by the Dutch in 1658, this “waterfort”\(^{137}\) is round and without bastions, lacking the polygonal shape typical of this tradition. It makes sense, however, if one looks at the shape of the small island it is built on. This is common among the forts Europeans built in Asia: the shape of the fort is in large part determined by the terrain it is built upon. This is evident from other examples on Sri Lanka as well. The largest fortress on the island, that of Galle, had its shape determined by the peninsula on which it was built, as affirmed by Nelson in his survey of Dutch forts on Sri Lanka and Lodewijk Wagenaar in his monograph.\(^{138}\)

\(^{137}\) VOC 1604B 593r.
\(^{138}\) Nelson, Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka 48.
De Heere and his companions deliberated with the commander of Jaffna, Hendrick Zwaardecroon on the necessity of Hammenhiel. Zwaardecroon had been acting Governor of Ceylon until De Heere took up the position and became Governor-General in 1718-1725. Their conclusion was that the fort had been built to defend against enemy ships, but that larger ships would not use the waterway Hammenhiel protected, as it was safer and more worthwhile for large (European) ships to land near Port Pedro or Jaffna. As such, they decided to abandon the fort.\textsuperscript{139} Evidently, whether the fort actually had any use against European ships was the main consideration. When it was concluded this was not the case, it was deemed to be “only a financial burden” to the Company.\textsuperscript{140}

The point of each of the fortifications was to serve a role in the defensive system on Sri Lanka. Odegard expresses this in a classification of forts which I find very convincing. Earlier classifications were often based on architectural premises, such as the classification by C.L. Temminck Groll of 1990 which counted the number of bastions and general shape of the forts.\textsuperscript{141} More recently, in 2000, R. van Oers approached fortification design from the field of town-planning, which he studied at the Technical University of Delft.\textsuperscript{142} The fundamental problem, Odegard states, is that form-based classifications do not necessarily make sense; Mannar and Castle Batavia have similar shapes, but are completely different in purpose. Gerrit Knaap, Henk den Heijer and Michiel de Jong use a classification based on the role of the forts within the wider system, using contemporary terms, but their classification is somewhat complicated and the reliance on contemporary terminology causes problems because they were not used consistently in the early modern period.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{139} VOC 1604B 593r.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibidem. “het absoluit voor d’E. Compa:e niet anders, dan een puire onnutte Last-post is”.
\textsuperscript{142} Van Oers, \textit{Dutch Town Planning Overseas}.
\textsuperscript{143} The classification by these writers can be found in Knaap, Den Heijer and De Jong, \textit{Oorlogen oversee} 232. Odegard’s commentary is found in Chapter 4 of Odegard, \textit{Unpublished Monograph}.
\end{flushleft}
Table 2 Odegard's typology of forts, altered to list the forts mapped by Toorzee as well as Colombo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Role in system</th>
<th>Examples in South Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortress</td>
<td>Main administrative and logistical center for region. Supports other fortifications in area</td>
<td>Colombo, Galle, Jaffna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st tier forts</td>
<td>Maritime forts for control of trade-routes and important nodal points in the trading network.</td>
<td>Trincomalee, Manaar, Batticaloa, Matara, Negombo, Kalutara, Kalpitiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd tier forts</td>
<td>Protection of Company territory, production of trade goods and important tactical locations (protection of other forts, often also with a role in commerce control).</td>
<td>Hammenhiel (protects Jaffna), Oostenburg (inner bay Trincomalee), Hangwelle (protects Colombo), Katuwana (protects Galle), Pijl (Jaffna), Beschutter (Jaffna), Elephant (Jaffna), Pooneriya (Jaffna)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This classification by Odegard is useful because it shows the role of forts in the wider system, which might provide insights into why forts were treated in a certain way by De Heere. Hammenhiel, for example, is classified as a second tier fort with the main purpose of protecting Jaffna. De Heere did not think the fort actually fulfilled this purpose in a meaningful way, so it was abandoned.

During the tenure of Van Goens and his son, especially near the end and also after their retirement and removal from office, criticisms were levelled at his system of fortification. Some of this was explored in Chapter 1. The most important problem identified with it was the sheer cost. An anonymous letter to the Directors in Amsterdam, cited by Odegard, cites the high costs and argues that the forts of Negombo, Kalatura, Trincomalee and Batticaloa were unnecessary, as a simple tower with a garrison of around forty men would be enough in those places. The reason for this, the writer claims, was that these towers would already be enough to signal to Europeans that they could not settle in these places, which was the only purpose the forts served anyway: they were not actually powerful enough to withstand a European siege, even with a small force of a few hundred men with proper artillery.¹⁴⁴

This claim is valid, as Odegard agrees. The fortifications on Sri Lanka lack basic elements which would be required to defend against a strong European force. Interestingly, not one of the plans drawn by Toorzee shows a covered way or a glacis. Based on the plans in Nelson’s overview of Dutch forts on Sri Lanka, some of these forts do appear to have had a glacis at some point in their history, but it is not clear which would have existed in 1698. One example in particular is Kalutara, which Nelson shows to have a glacis on the southern side of the moat. Looking at the map by Toorzee in Figure 12, we see no glacis marked on the map, nor in the profile. The text mentions that the southern wall has been “rained out”, in the sense that the wall’s earthen part has washed out of the structure because of damage to the casing. A decision was reached to have this wall be repaired in the good monsoon, by stuffing the holes with stone and then plastering the wall anew with brick or coral stone. It appears that the fort was updated later to include a glacis and other improvements, but not at the time of De Heere’s inspection. One might speculate this change happened because of observations made in De Heere’s inspection, but the text shows no evidence of the lack of these improvements being noted and no proposal for them is made in the text or on the map.

In the end, none of the fortresses was really tested until the late eighteenth century, when the garrisons often surrendered almost immediately. It seems, then, that Van Goens’ critics were right in their assertion that these forts would not resist European forces anyway. Perhaps

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145 Nelson, Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka 32.
146 Nelson, Dutch Forts of Sri Lanka passim.
it is true that simple towers or smaller forts meant solely to defend against Kandy would have sufficed. On the other hand, it is reasonable to argue that the English, French and Portuguese never made a more concerted effort to take these forts because they would be hard to take, or at least hard enough that a relief force could cause trouble for the invaders.

Dutch Fortifications on Sri Lanka: Purposes and Problems in De Heere’s time

As part of the inspection journey Governor De Heere undertook, he inspected forts along the route. Table 3 shows the forts of which there are maps in the journal, divided into the month in which they were visited. Most of these inspections lasted around three days, including deliberations on what to do with it, usually ending up with personnel cuts as examined in Chapter 2.

Table 3 Forts drawn by Toorzee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Forts (date visited)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Negombo (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Kalutara (11) Galle (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Matara (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Batticaloa (3), Trincomale (7), Oostenburg (8), Jaffna (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Mannar (18), Kalpitiya (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not visited</td>
<td>June: Katuwana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September: Pijl, Beschutter, Eliphant, Pooneryn (September)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Not every fortification of which there is a map in the journal was actually visited by De Heere. For example, the party wanted to inspect the small forts shown on Figure 13 in September 1698, as well as Pomerijn, but because of an extreme drought, there was not enough fresh water along the way to provide for more than maybe five people. They also reference the irony that drought was preventing this visit in September, while in June they were unable to visit Katuwana because of heavy rainfall. It is unclear whether Toorzee actually went to these forts without Governor De Heere, but maps are added into the journal.

As can be seen in Figure 14, there are puncture marks on the maps, which show on the scan as black dots. The punctures show that there is more than one of these maps, but it does not show whether the map in question is a copy or was copied. It is therefore hard to tell whether these maps in H47 and 1604B are merely copies of each other, or both copies of an entirely different map. One detail that favours the speculation that Toorzee did visit these forts is the dates on the maps in the month of June. This contrasts with Map 9 of Katuwana, which is dated in late October after the journey was completed.

It is obvious from De Heere’s journal that the consensus by the end of the seventeenth century was that these fortifications were costly and while they had to be maintained, costs should be reduced as much as possible. As mentioned above, some forts were abandoned or the

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147 VOC 1604B 592.
garrisons were reduced significantly. The four forts mentioned in the previous paragraph which also serve to protect Jaffna were deemed more important than Hammenhiel, but not important enough to have Europeans garrison them. Instead, lascorins would be used to man the forts of Pijl, Beschutter and Eliphant. On the other hand, Pooneryn protected an important road and was in a reasonable condition. The fact that Pooneryn is depicted on a separate map from the other three might illustrate that it was held in higher regard by De Heere. After all, why would such a small fort be given its own sheet, when the other three of similar size share a map?

Despite most forts being deemed unimportant enough to have their garrison reduced, there was an acknowledgement that they could not simply be abandoned or even demolished. When discussing the forts in the bay of Trincomalee, the text mentions that it would be very expensive to demolish the forts with gunpowder and carrying the remnants into the sea. If the forts were not demolished, other Europeans could move in, which would be a problem because the bay was an excellent anchorage. Also, if they did and the next king of Kandy would be less friendly to the Dutch, it could cause larger problems in the sense of a European-Kandyan alliance. Besides: Europeans might do so even if the forts were demolished. Therefore, a watch tower would have to be built instead with at least a small garrison, to “show, and protect [the Company’s] right and possession, of these lands”.148

As mentioned before, Toorzee does not show glacises or covered ways on any of his fortification plans. If they did not exist, it calls into question whether the designs were ever meant to defend against a proper European force. On the other hand, perhaps Toorzee would not have shown them even if they existed, as the purpose of these forts was not necessarily to defend against Europeans anyway at the end of the seventeenth century. Therefore, Toorzee had little motivation to show on the maps that these forts could in fact withstand such a siege. The maps seem to primarily show the layout of the forts and specifically always show where

148 VOC 1604B 533r. “tot betoningh, en bewaringh van haer recht en possessie, deser landen”.

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the warehouses are. On the map of Kalatura, shown in Figure 12, the only buildings marked and explained in the legend are the warehouses. Similarly, the visitation of Negombo yields Map 2, which shows the fortifications in place and the plans for an expansion. When deliberating on whether the fort should be kept, De Heere concludes that the fort is useful to protect the cinnamon warehouses located within the walls. The costs for keeping the fort to “show the Company’s possession” would be rather low, because only a small garrison was needed.\textsuperscript{149} So small, in fact, that a large portion of the current garrison is removed, as happens so often in this inspection trip.

On Map 6, depicting Galle, only the VOC buildings are marked in black, with the important ones described. The letters on the map only indicate the bastions though, except for projected new buildings marked in red. These buildings, depicted on Figure 15, consist of multiple warehouses, a carpentry workshop with another small warehouse, and a “corpsduguarde”. Storage space was apparently needed and this rather large map is made primarily to show the state of the fortifications and the location of the new places for this storage space. Besides the storage space being added, there was also a problem with the moat: It proved difficult to bring enough water to it for it to be functional for defence. As one of the most important forts on the island, De Heere \textit{was} prepared to undergo a project to solve this. Figure 16 shows two designs by Toorzee. The top left shows a way to stop dirt from flowing into the stream on a nearby mountain. The rest of the map shows the river Gindere to

\textsuperscript{149} VOC 1604B 226v “tot betoningh van de Ed. Comps. posessie”.
the city of Galle as it was in 1695, with instructions on how to improve the situation by digging a canal to bring the water to Galle. This example shows that De Heere wished to reduce costs, but not where forts were important enough for the defence of Dutch interests in Sri Lanka.

Still, Galle is an exception. As the other examples have shown, the main goal in regards to fortifications for De Heere’s inspection was to cut costs, while maintaining the forts with the purpose of protecting the VOC’s commercial interests on Sri Lanka. This was evidently not considered to require large garrisons and extensive fortifications in most cases. The phrase “tot betoningh van de Compagnie’s possessie”, or in English “to display the Company’s possession” is used very often. This signifies that in De Heere’s time, unlike when Van Goens drove policy on Sri Lanka, fortifications were primarily meant to show the land belonged to the Dutch, rather than actually physically defending it. The forts, then, become a symbol of occupation rather than a means.

Only one of the four policy points mentioned in Chapter 1 has not been discussed yet in this chapter: maintaining the peace with Kandy. One of the critics of Van Goens, Joost Segenaar, captain of the army at Colombo, argued that one of the main problems with Van Goens’ system of fortification was his hostile policy towards Kandy, as a European force was sure to find an ally shortly after landing on one of the many unprotected beaches. As discussed in Chapter 1 and evidenced in Chapter 2, policy towards Kandy had shifted into one of reverence for the purposes of peace, so that Kandy would leave the Dutch alone.
In June 1698, Governor De Heere visits Matara, built by the Portuguese in 1595 and captured in 1640, then rebuilt to Dutch specifications in 1645. De Heere is somewhat contradictory in his opinion on the fort. On the one hand, the text mentions that besides the principal fortresses of Colombo, Galle and Jaffna, most forts on Sri Lanka are not very useful. This in large part because it has been proven that a more effective policy is to “endeavour to stay with the king of Kandy, and to live, in a good genuine friendship without animosity”.150 Hostilities have “rarely brought benefits, but have brought millions of treasury damage and costs” and therefore the governor found the pursuit of friendship on Ceylon “the utmost point for conservation of peace”.151 On the other hand, the fort itself had been proven to be sufficient for the protection of the cinnamon production at its location. The conclusion was that, as it had been sufficient so far, it did not have to be upgraded and its garrison could even be reduced to drive down costs.152 This shows three of the main policy points: peace with Kandy must be maintained, commerce and especially the cinnamon trade must be protected, but costs must be reduced where possible.

Based on the results of De Heere’s visitations of these forts it is evident that attitudes changed in the late seventeenth century. Whereas Rijckloff van Goens attempted to create a system of forts with which to subdue Kandy and create a territorial VOC which could defend this island from European attacks, De Heere’s focus was on reducing costs as much as possible while maintaining the ability to protect commerce on the island. Still, Van Goens’ impact is still visible in quite a literal sense: his fort system was so extensive and so central to the shifting VOC policies that more than half of the maps in the journal focus on forts.

150 VOC 1604B 497r, “verre best is te betragten met den Coninck van Candia te blijven, en te leven, in een goede opregte vriendschap sonder geveijnstheijt.”
152 VOC 1604B 497v.
Conclusion

This thesis posed a number of interrelated questions. It asked what the purpose was of Governor Gerrit de Heere’s inspection of Ceylon, how it related to wider VOC policies and what the role of the maps in the journal was in this. It also questioned whether this journal could show the changing position of the VOC on the merchant-state spectrum in the late seventeenth century. Chapter 1 showed that the VOC’s position was changing in the late seventeenth century; the increasing competition from other Europeans and the decreasing prices meant the VOC had to reconfigure. Investment in Asia increased, but costs had to be cut where possible. On Sri Lanka specifically, Van Goens’ insistence on territorial ambitions was no longer accepted as policy by the Directors and Batavia. Instead, the VOC endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with the king of Kandy in an effort to protect commerce on the island, which was their main focus. This commerce had to be protected from Europeans, but with costs reduced where possible.

This is reflected in the journal of De Heere. As elucidated in Chapter 2, the text concerns two categories of activities. The daily activities of governance are covered and show a focus on commercial activities, particularly the elephant trade. The communications with the King of Kandy present in the journal also provide evidence of the policy to maintain the peace with that kingdom. The actual inspections done by De Heere and his party focused on maintaining the position the VOC had where possible but reducing costs as much as could be done. These cuts were particularly focused on personnel costs, with the native employees being laid off in most places. This is evidence that the policy points introduced in Chapter 1 are being followed and supports the idea that the VOC was moving closer to the mercantile side of the state-merchant spectrum.

In Chapter 3 we see that there had recently been an update to the land registry in Jaffna. This change was meant to increase the revenues from the land the VOC administered, as well as to redress unfair registration and alleviate the plight of the poor members of society. It is in
these reports by Toorzee that maps play a very prominent role: they illustrate the deficiencies of the local, native land surveyors. By showing how distorted their maps of the land were, Toorzee intended to convince his superiors that the new registry was deficient. The conclusions drawn from the report are indicative of the wider message of this inspection journey. It would be admirable to properly map out the land registry, but it would require European surveyors, which is too expensive.

This tells us that the VOC officials on Ceylon are focusing on increasing revenue to alleviate the declining income of the VOC. On the other hand, they are unwilling to actually invest in this project with proper land surveys done by expensive European surveyors. Generating revenue through land is a typical state activity – and one of the primary means Van Goens proposed to make Ceylon profitable – so the unwillingness to commit to this shows once more that the VOC was moving closer to the mercantile part of the spectrum.

The other maps examined in this chapter, the overview maps, are the opposite of the land survey maps in function: they are almost entirely decorative. They show the places Governor De Heere visited, but do not illustrate any arguments made. The purpose of these maps appears to be to give a sense of location for the reader. This does not mean they are randomly chosen or convey nothing of meaning. Providing a sense of location to the reader in this case means providing a sense of possession. The officials who would be reading this journal would be primed a certain way by seeing these maps. In a way, these maps are added to the journal “tot betoningh van de Compagnie’s possessie”, much like the forts in the physical world do. The point is that these maps display possession, even if they do not directly support an argument made in the text.

In Chapter 4 it became evident that the ambitions of Van Goens were no longer in fashion on Sri Lanka. The fortifications were generally speaking not up to date and most likely unable to hold off a determined European force. The comments on the fortifications in the text showed
as much; Hammenhiel for example was recommended to be abandoned because it was only useful against large ships, and Europeans would not be bothered by it anyway.

In this case, again, the maps are illustrative. They show the layout of the fortifications and provide evidence, sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, of the deficiencies. The lack of proper measures against European style sieges, such as covered ways, is clear to anyone who has knowledge of fortification building.

Perhaps less obvious is the focus on warehouses shown on the maps. In this sense, the fortification maps show the focus on commercial activity over territorial ambition of the VOC at this time. As mentioned in the introduction, it is my opinion that the VOC moved around on a spectrum between merchant and state. This journal shows that in the time of De Heere, the VOC on Ceylon was firmly in the merchant camp, or at least intended to be. In actual fact, it held and managed territory, had soldiers and fortifications and conducted diplomacy with a king. It is vital that more studies are conducted to examine more of these journals to see if this attitude changes over the next few decades, especially seeing as hostilities increased again and culminated in war in 1736.

All in all, then, the inspection journey of Governor De Heere was primarily meant to reduce costs. The other policy points of the VOC are evidently part of his considerations, but the measures actually implemented amount mostly to cutting costs, especially in personnel. Within this purpose, the overview maps are decorative and the fortification and land survey maps play illustrative roles. This tells us that the Dutch officials on Sri Lanka, including De Heere, saw the VOC as belonging on the merchant end of the state-merchant spectrum. The decisions made by De Heere in this journal show us that he actively worked to align Ceylon’s policies and position to reflect this.

It seems to me that this is the reason for the gaps in the historiography, too. Van Goens’ period is well-covered because the Dutch were actively state building under his leadership. In
the 1720s this starts picking up again, and the historiography becomes more detailed, but in the period in between, a lacuna exists. A period of mercantile focus, in which the Dutch mostly kept the political boundaries between Kandy and their possessions at a status quo is apparently less exciting for historians. I suspect this is not unusual for many places and periods in history, change is simply easier to write a compelling narrative about. Of course, this thesis has shown that there certainly was a change in this period, but the change is behind the curtains, in the machinery of the VOC, while the vehicle was parked and seemed to stand still on Sri Lanka. There were no shifting boundaries, so the map of Dutch possessions does not change, but the reality these maps reflected certainly did.

This thesis has also shown that these journals can tell us much about the way the Dutch looked at their governance of Sri Lanka. The benefit of examining these inspections as opposed to the normal daily registers, or dagregisters, is that the Governor is actively reflecting on the possessions of the VOC and their merits. These kinds of reflections are present in the dagregisters as well, but they are spread out more than in these relatively compact journals. I have not focused on the reflective quality of this journal, but researchers focusing on the attitudes of the Governors of Sri Lanka could definitely use this journal and others like it.

As I mentioned in the introduction, cartographic material is underutilized in history writing. Hopefully my examinations here have shown the possibilities. It is especially when maps are illustrative that one can glean attitudes of VOC officials from them, as well as reflections of VOC policies. In a sense, then, they can find a second life as illustrative objects, but this time for the arguments of current historians.
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Appendix – Cartographic Material in De Heere’s Journal

Below you will find the cartographic material present in the journal of De Heere. For all but one map, they are taken from the National Archives copy of the journal. Some notes must be made. The maps are presented in the order they occur in the journal. I have decided to add them here as large as an A4 sheet of paper allows while maintaining their aspect ratios. I have added the size of the maps in real life, measured as the height and width of the paper sheet on which they were drawn, accurate to half a centimetre. I have included the original title where present, followed by my own English title in italics. These English titles include the modern names for locations where relevant.

VOC 1604B was digitized for the National Archives by the Belastingdienst. Because there was a miscommunication about there being cartographic material in this journal, there were no allowances for the larger maps. As such, the people who scanned these maps could not get the larger maps onto one scan and did it in parts. I have used image manipulation software to “sew” these together, but because of rotations of the maps and slightly different angles of the photos, some graphical errors persist. These should not affect interpretations of the maps however. In the case of map 14, of the bays of Trincomalee, the way the map was folded was apparently too difficult to properly scan. As such, I have been forced to use the map from H47, the Leiden copy, instead. The other maps which I have sewn together are:

Map 6 Gale
Map 7 Spruijt
Map 12 Trincomalee
Map 16 Jaffna
Map 1 “Kaart der Colombese Landen”, Map of the District Colombo, 40.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 228. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 2 “Tegenwoordig gestalte van de vijvhoek aan de schans tot Nigombo”, Fort Negombo, 51.5 cm × 30.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 229. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 3 “t Fort Hangwelle”, *Fort Hangwelle*, 50.5 cm × 32.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 236. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 4 "T Fort Calleture", Fort Kalutara, 40 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 243.
Map 5 "Kaart van het Commandement Gale", *District of Gale*, 42 cm x 32 cm, VOC 1604B folio 450. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 6 "Gale", Gale, 101 cm × 73 cm, VOC 1604B folio 451. Rotated 90° counter-
Map 7 Designs for the river Gindere, 103.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 452. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 8 “Mature”. Fort Mature, 72 cm × 33 cm. VOC 164B folio 130. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map "Katoene", Fort Katuwana. 45.5 cm × 33 cm. VOC 1604B folio 507. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 10 "Kaarte waarinne vertoont wert, hoeverre de forten Batticaloa en Tricomenale van malkander leggen", *Overview of the distance between Batticaloa and Trincomale*, 41.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 521.
Map 11 "T Fort Batticaloa", *Fort Batticaloa*, 48 cm × 32.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 522. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 12 "Plattegrond van't Fort Tricoenmale, met de aangelegene Pagoodsberg", *Fort Trincomale and the Pagoodsberg*, 118 cm × 54.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 527. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 13 ""T Fort Oostenburg", *Fort Oostenburg*, 45 cm × 32.5 cm, VOC 1604B folio 530. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 14 "Baaij van Tricoenmale", Bay of Trincomale, 100 cm × 75 cm, H47 no page number. In VOC 1604B this map is on folio 531. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 15 "Landkaart van Iajjanapatnam ende tlandschap Wanny", *Overview of Jaffna and Wanny*, 71.5 cm × 53 cm, VOC 1604B folio 536. Rotated 90° counter-clockwise.
Map 16 "Jaffanapatnam", Jaffna, 72.5 cm × 52 cm, VOC 1604B folio 545.
Map 17 *Land Survey Map attached to Toorzee’s report*, 40 cm × 32.5 cm, unfoliated, between VOC 1604B folios 560 and 561.
De drie onderstaande opgaven toonen op p. 589, de situatie van de kastelen Pijl, Beschutter en Eliphant. Deze liggen in een start lineaire plattegrond van het gebied, waarvan de kastelen de belangrijkste delen van de Aziatische beschikkingen te zijn. Het is duidelijk dat de Pijl tegen de oost is gericht, terwijl de Beschutter en Eliphant tegen de west is gericht. De plattegronden tonen duidelijk de verschillende sectoren en gebieden die de kastelen tegenhouden, waaronder de westelijke en oostelijke delen. In de westelijke sector liggen de kastelen Pijl en Beschitter, terwijl in de oostelijke sector de kasteel Eliphant.
Map 19 "Ponnerijn", Fort Pooneryn, 30 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 590.
Map 20 "Hammenhiel", Fort Hammenhiel, 35 cm x 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 591.
Map 21 "Vebeelding van de Tank van Catchij", *The Tank of Kachchai*, 40 cm × 33 cm, unfoliated, between VOC 1604B folios 596 and 597.
Map 22 "Manaar", *Fort Mannar*, 27 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 602.
Map 23 "Calpentijn", *Fort Kalpitiya*, 23.5 cm × 33 cm, VOC 1604B folio 606.