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Introduction

On October 24, 1950, France presented the Pleven Plan, proposing West German rearmament encapsulated in a supranational European Army and a European defense organization, eventually evolving into the European Defense Community (EDC). Ultimately, European efforts to devise and ratify the EDC-Treaty, a framework in which West Germany could be safely rearmed, would last almost four years. However, it was the French National Assembly which ultimately rejected the EDC on August 30, 1954.¹ Charles Cogan skillfully described the EDC’s paradox: ‘the EDC, conceived by some (though not all) Frenchman to get around American insistence on German rearment in the wake of the invasion of South Korea, was finally rejected by the French themselves – who almost immediately thereafter turned around and accepted essentially what the Americans had preferred at the beginning: a German Army as part of a sovereign German state within NATO.’²

Because of European reluctance to remilitarize West Germany, Washington needed a solution and, Kenneth Weisbrode maintains, ‘squaring the circle meant the invention of something called the European Defense Community.’³ As Michael Creswell indicates, ‘much of the French public along with the military leadership and leading political parties loathed the EDC.’⁴ However, Washington ‘made establishing the EDC a top priority.’⁵ James McAllister even claims that installing the EDC ‘was by far the single most important objective

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² Quotation is from Charles G. Cogan, Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends. The United States and France since 1940 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994), 75.


⁴ Quotation is from Creswell, A Question of Balance, 166.

⁵ Ibid., 167.
of American foreign policy in the early 1950s.6 These statements indicate that Washington attributed considerable importance to the EDC.7

Accordingly, the research question of this thesis is: to what extent was the EDC initiated by the US and what was their intended aim with the EDC? Regarding the EDC’s initiation, Washington’s ‘single package’ proposal, presented by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) summit in New York in September 1950, was of considerable importance. As part of the ‘single package,’ Acheson demanded the creation of a ‘European defense force’ that should incorporate German divisions.8 Christopher Gehrz claims that many historians, such as James McAllister, have acknowledged Acheson’s assertion that before the September 1950 NAC summit, the JCS ‘forced him to adopt the so-called “single package” tactic.’9 But Gehrz argues that declassified documents show it was the State Department and Acheson who actually were in charge of decision making concerning the ‘single package.’10

As McAllister indicates, due to the international attention for the September 1950 NAC summit, it had become impossible to postpone Western discussions on German rearmament until Washington and Paris had settled their disagreements discreetly.11 However, although McAllister qualifies this fact as a ‘serious consequence’, this thesis argues that it seems more plausible that the Americans brought ‘the German rearmament question’ out publicly on purpose.12 For instance, Gehrz and Robert L. Beisner claim that Acheson fully supported the ‘single package’ as an American strategy in NATO-negotiations on rearming the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This suggests that the Truman administration deliberately brought the German rearmament issue to public attention.13 This thesis aspires to illuminate

7 McAllister eventually concludes that ‘the French rejection of the EDC was the most spectacular defeat of American foreign policy in the early postwar era.’ Quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 242.
9 Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135; and McAllister, No Exit, 188.
10 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135.
11 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; and McAllister, No Exit, 191.
12 McAllister, No Exit, 191.
13 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 150-153; and Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 366.
the historiographical disagreement on Acheson’s role in the ‘single package’, and explain this American proposal’s role in initiating the EDC project. Furthermore, this paper disagrees with Gehrz’s claim that Washington’s ‘single package’ strategy does not fit into ‘[John Lewis] Gaddis’ model of American democratic alliance management.’ Instead, it is argued that the ‘single package’ strategy is an exception within Gaddis’ model of US alliance management, which acknowledges that if required the US could adopt coercion against Western partners.14

Regarding Washington’s intended aim with the EDC, Ronald W. Pruessen observes that in the historiography, initially scholars primarily stressed US fixations on Communist expansionism. Washington became determined to increase Western Europe’s “containment” contributions, including a considerable FRG military contribution.15 As Pruessen and Creswell indicate, the argument was that Washington had two primary motives; ‘EDC was conceived as a tool of “dual containment,”’ containing both the SU and the FRG.16 However, Pruessen argues this concept ‘should be expanded to “triple containment,”’ which includes another American motive for supporting the EDC: resolving ‘more broadly European problems.’17 Although Pruessen’s ‘triple containment’ argument seems plausible, it seems it is not widely accepted in the historiography.18

Meanwhile, McAllister argues that the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration principally backed the EDC because they were convinced ‘it represented the best long-term solution to the German problem.’19 Eventually, it can be concluded that Washington had multiple aims with the EDC. However, this paper maintains that one of the

14 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 200-201; and Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 137, 154-155. Quotation is from page 155. Gaddis mentions the 1956 Suez Crisis as an exception to the rule, when the US used coercion because its allies refused to cooperate.
17 Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52.
18 Ibid., 67, 69.
19 McAllister, No Exit, 172.
three American aims as stated in NSC-160/1, ‘the securing of a German contribution to European defense,’ was Washington’s most crucial short-term aim with the EDC, because of NSC-68’s strategy of ‘military containment’ and its pressing request for an accelerated Western rearmament effort. Accordingly, contrary to McAllister’s account, it is argued that this was the fundamental reason for both US administrations involved to support the EDC. Because this paper’s primary interest is illuminating Washington’s involvement in the EDC, the historiography and primary sources that are discussed are mostly in English. However, many of the scholars referred to did make extensive use of French primary sources and French literature. Furthermore, this thesis will focus less on Britain’s involvement in the


21 McAllister, No Exit, 172.

EDC, the EDC-Treaty’s ratification process, and the alternative Western arrangement that was eventually devised for rearming the FRG.  

The first chapter will discuss the American position on, and involvement in, the EDC initiative, until the announcement of the Pleven Plan. It will also consider the Containment strategy and the historiography on the ‘single package’ proposal. The second chapter will discuss the French position on, and involvement in, the EDC initiative, until the Pleven Plan. Because this paper’s research question focuses on Washington’s role concerning the EDC, the second chapter will primarily illuminate how France’s position on a European army related to the American position. It also discusses the historiography on France and ‘the German problem.’ For instance, this thesis disputes Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’s argument that Paris was not somehow forced to accept a US policy for Germany which France totally opposed, and disagrees with their conclusion that fundamentally ‘Western policy [on Germany] was consensual’ before the September 1950 NAC. The third chapter will illuminate both the United States’ intended aim with the EDC, and the French intended aim with the EDC. Again, the main focus will be on how French aims related to Washington’s aims. Furthermore, the third chapter will illuminate the connection between the EDC, German rearmament and the Schuman Plan.

In researching American involvement with the EDC, many valuable primary and secondary sources were consulted. Particularly the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States series has been tremendously valuable for consulting US government records. Another useful source has been the Documents on British Policy Overseas series for British primary sources. This thesis also frequently refers to French documents from the Ministère

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24 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16. In this paper, ‘Germany’ as well as ‘Germans’ are descriptions that are used for referring to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and its nationals, except if indicated otherwise.


26 All volumes in the FRUS series can be accessed online: http://history.state.gov/

27 Documents on British Policy Overseas is available online: http://dbpo.chadwyck.co.uk/home.do
des Affaires Étrangères (MAE) series and mentions in its footnotes, when any French primary source is referred to, in which specific scholarly work this reference can also be found. Finally, for NATO records the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Archives have been consulted.²⁸

²⁸ The NATO Archives can be found online: http://archives.nato.int/
I. The American involvement in the EDC initiative until the Pleven Plan

It can be argued that particularly during September and October 1950 the French government was pressured by the Truman administration to present an elaborate plan for a ‘European defense force’, which eventually resulted in the introduction of the Pleven Plan.\(^29\) Meanwhile, Creswell indicates, Washington repeatedly emphasized that devising such a plan had to be initiated by one or several European countries.\(^30\) For Washington, Bonn’s partnership in Western defense was very desirable, because of the FRG’s strategic location in Europe and its industrial and military capabilities. However, German rearmament was controversial and could be dangerous because of Moscow’s conceivable negative response and the precariousness regarding Germany’s political organization.\(^31\) As Creswell maintains, two major concerns troubled Washington during 1950 regarding Western Europe: ‘a devastating Soviet attack and the possible withering of German democracy.’\(^32\)

However, the Korean War and increasing Cold War tensions eventually resulted in the Truman administration changing its position on German rearmament by end July 1950, now advocating swift FRG remilitarization.\(^33\) As Creswell indicates, NATO officials also maintained German units were required to implement NATO’s strategy for organizing European defense, as described in DC-6 and the Medium Term Defense Plan.\(^34\) Because Washington became convinced that a German military contribution to Western Europe’s defense was crucial for

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\(^{32}\) Ibid., 26.


containing the SU, it pressured European allies to accept immediate German rearmament, culminating in the ‘single package’ at the NAC in New York in September 1950. As part of this ‘single package’, Acheson demanded the creation of a ‘European defense force’ that should incorporate German divisions.

However, France continued to disagree with NATO allies on the pace of German rearmament in September 1950. According to McAllister, neither the State Department nor Acheson had considered the major consequences if France persisted in rejecting immediate German rearmament. Because of the international attention for the September 1950 NAC summit, it had become impossible to postpone German rearmament until American-French disagreements were settled discreetly. However, although McAllister qualifies this fact as a ‘serious consequence’, it could be that the Americans brought ‘the German rearmament question’ out publicly on purpose. For instance, Gehrz claims that Acheson fully supported the ‘single package’ as an American strategy in NATO-negotiations on rearming Germany. This suggests that the Truman administration deliberately brought the German rearmament issue to public attention. Eventually, McAllister concludes that ‘much of the [American] alliance diplomacy’ between 1950-54 was ‘an attempt to recover from the damage caused by the premature effort to sell the one package proposal in September 1950,’ and that in his memoirs Acheson ‘acknowledges his mistake’ in adopting the ‘single package.’

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36 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-148; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26-27; and Beisner, A life in the Cold War, 362.
37 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; and McAllister, No Exit, 191.
38 McAllister, No Exit, 191.
40 McAllister, No Exit, 191-192.
41 Ibid., 192; When making this claim, McAllister referred to Acheson’s own memoirs: Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 437-440.
NSC-68 and Western Europe’s contribution to containment

Already prior to the Korean War’s beginning in June 1950, Washington initiated a major revision concerning the Containment strategy. This review, which resulted in NSC-68 in the spring of 1950, was motivated by rapidly increasing Cold War tensions and the Soviet detonation of an atomic weapon in August 1949, which suddenly ended the United States’ nuclear monopoly.42 Cold War tensions had already increased when Washington announced the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 and implemented the Marshall Plan in April 1948, to contain ‘potential Soviet expansionism.’43

George Frost Kennan, the first director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), was the main architect of the American Containment strategy towards the SU, introducing the concept of ‘containment’ in summer 1947.44 As Gaddis indicates, Kennan argued that the United States’ national security interests could best be protected not by reorganizing the international order through international institutions, the ‘universalistic’ approach, but rather by adopting the ‘particularist’ solution, thus preserving equilibrium within the international order through ‘counterforce’ and maintaining its diversity.45 Accordingly, no single power or alliance ‘could dominate it.’46

Gaddis indicates that Kennan’s aim of containment was to confine ‘Soviet expansionism,’ and that Kennan particularly warned against Soviet subjugation through psychological means. Japan and Western Europe could become increasingly demoralized because of postwar reconstruction and societal disorder, thus making them susceptible to communist-inspired coups and communist political successes.47 Accordingly, Moscow could gain

42 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 2-3.
43 Quotation is from Ibid., 1.
45 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 26-28, 55.
46 Ibid., 26-28. For a more elaborate description of the concepts of ‘universalist’ approach and ‘particularist’ approach, see also pages 26-28 of Gaddis, Strategies of Containment.
47 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 33-34.
effective control over these strategically crucial areas. As Gaddis maintains, Kennan’s concept of containment was principally focused on this particular danger of Soviet expansionism; targeting nearby countries with psychological postwar misery and accordingly threatening the international ‘balance of power.’ Consequently, it was less concerned about a Soviet invasion or ‘international communism.’

Eventually, the Containment strategy’s ultimate aim was, in Gaddis’ words, ‘to build an international order made up of independent centers of power, in which nations subject to Soviet pressure would have both the means and the will to resist it themselves.’ By late 1948, Kennan had devised three points that were required to achieve this aim. First, restoring the international ‘balance of power’ by stimulating the self-confidence in countries confronted with ‘Soviet expansionism.’ Second, capitalizing on strained relations between ‘the international communist movement’ and the Kremlin. And third, ultimately changing the SU’s notion of ‘international relations,’ in order to produce a Cold War settlement with Washington on unresolved disagreements.

Finally, NSC-68 promoted ‘military containment’ of international communism through a considerable expansion in US conventional, nuclear and thermonuclear armaments. However, Western European nations would have to make a significant military contribution as well to NSC-68’s rearmament effort for containing the USSR. Meanwhile, the Korean War led to increased attention for NSC-68, but also endangered Washington’s plans for increasing Western military capabilities, draining crucial resources. With NSC-68’s rearmament effort, Washington wanted to restore the international ‘balance of power’ and rule out a decisive nuclear surprise attack by Moscow and US defeat by 1954.

NSC-68 distinguished four options for confronting Soviet Communism: ‘a. Continuation of current policies, (…); b. Isolation; c. War; and d. A more rapid building up of the political,

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48 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 34.
49 Ibid., 35, 55. Quotation is from page 55.
50 Ibid., 35.
52 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 234-292.
53 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 265-269.
economic, and military strength of the free world. Eventually, NSC-68 strongly recommended the fourth option, describing the general US Cold War strategy as: ‘building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used.’ Washington’s main objective was to develop ‘such political and economic conditions in the free world,’ supported by adequate military power, that Moscow would adjust itself to these circumstances ‘and eventually change its policies drastically.’

Washington eventually adopted NSC-68’s fourth option, which also demanded from the US to reinforce Europe’s defense. However, Creswell argues, US officials regarded this fourth option merely ‘as a temporary arrangement.’ Washington ultimately wanted its European allies to increase their own military power to such an extent that an American military presence was eventually no longer required. Yet, NSC-68 did not contain any proposals regarding German rearmament.

**German rearmament and the EDF concept**

Prior to the Korean War, the Pentagon already tried to persuade the State Department to abandon its opposition to German rearmament. Furthermore, US Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson tried to convince President Harry Truman by forwarding the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS) pro-rearmament position in NSC-71 in June 1950. NSC-71 suggested ‘applying

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58 Ibid., 25; and McAllister, *No Exit*, 184.

political pressure in order to overcome French opposition’ against remilitarizing Germany.\footnote{McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 185. Quotation is from page 185; and NSC-71,‘Extracts of Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Respect to Western Policy Toward Germany,’ June 8, 1950, \textit{FRUS, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union}, Volume IV (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1980), 686-87.} However, Truman condemned NSC-71, calling it ‘decidedly militaristic.’\footnote{McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 185; and ‘Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State’, June 16, 1950, \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume IV, 688-689.}

In response to NSC-71, which advocated American initiatives enabling European acceptance of German rearmament, the State Department produced NSC-71/1.\footnote{NSC-71/1, ‘Views of the State Department on the Rearmament of Western Germany’, July 3, 1950, \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume IV, 691.} This paper, written just before the Korean War by Henry Byroade\footnote{Henry Byroade was the Director of the State Department’s Bureau of German Affairs.} and approved by Acheson in July 1950, reaffirmed the State Department’s resistance to rearming Germany. NSC-71/1 asserted that FRG rearmament would obstruct Bonn’s democratic development and could reverse France’s moderate German policy.\footnote{McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 185-186; and NSC-71/1, \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume IV, 692-693.}

However, eventually the Korean War also led the State Department to favor German rearmament. Moreover, West German pressure combined with increasing demands from the US Congress and created strong impetus for resolving the rearmament question.\footnote{Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 124-127.} As Thomas Schwartz indicates, US High Commissioner John McCloy played a crucial role in this process because of ‘his interpretation of German sentiment’ and McCloy’s efforts for establishing a ‘European’ military force.\footnote{Ibid., 126. For a more elaborate description of how McCloy’s diplomatic reports from Germany, throughout this period, considerably influenced the State Department’s change regarding its policy on German rearmament, see Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 124-130.} Eventually, McCloy believed that without FRG rearmament it would be politically inconceivable that the US Congress would continue a US commitment to defend Western Europe.\footnote{Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 128-129; and Lawrence S. Kaplan, \textit{A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951} (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1980), 110.}
Concurrently Byroade, inspired by the Schuman Plan, advised Acheson that German rearmament should be based on ‘some type of European army.’68 The US ambassador in Paris, David Bruce, also reported that German rearmament within an Atlantic or European army would be more acceptable for France.69 By end July 1950, Acheson and Truman eventually agreed with FRG rearmament, and Truman approved the State Department’s ‘European army’ idea for integrating the FRG into the Western alliance.70 Consequently, McCloy and Byroade continued developing plans for a ‘European Defense Force’ (EDF). McCloy was primarily assisted by Colonel Al Gerhardt and Robert Bowie on covering the European resolution, while Byroade focused on military details.71

As McAllister indicates, the State Department developed a two-step strategy for rearming the FRG without estranging France and Europe. First, the US and British military presence in Europe should be strengthened before discussing FRG rearmament, because it wished to avoid a formal connection between these issues.72 Second was installing Germany’s military contribution inside a Western European institutional structure, resulting in the EDF, because the FRG should not be permitted to remilitarize on a nationalist footing.73

On August 16, 1950, the State Department forwarded a general EDF-concept to the Pentagon for consideration.74 The State Department believed that if the US took the lead in Western Europe’s defense, then European allies would readily hand over some of their sovereignty. Consequently, the EDF ‘could become a driving force toward further unification

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68 Schwartz, America’s Germany, 129.
70 Schwartz, America’s Germany, 129-130; McAllister, No Exit, 186; and ‘Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson’, July 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 167-168.
71 Schwartz, America’s Germany, 130-132; McAllister, No Exit, 187. McCloy was also lobbying among US officials in Europe for the European army concept and primarily focused on US Ambassadors Lewis Douglas in London, David Bruce in Paris, and the American Representative to NATO, Charles Spofford; see Schwartz, America’s Germany, 131-132.
72 McAllister, No Exit, 186-187.
73 Ibid., 187; and Schwartz, America’s Germany, 130.
in Western Europe,’75 and implied eventual German NATO-membership.76 As Schwartz indicated, the EDF would also accomplish the US objective of a ‘dual containment’; creating a powerful defense mechanism for Western Europe against possible military aggression from both Germany and the SU.77

**NSC-82: Washington’s request for an immediate FRG military contribution**

However, by September 1950 the JCS suggested that FRG sovereignty could be restored within the Western alliance but supervised by NATO instead.78 The JCS also dismissed sending more US soldiers to Europe, or the nomination of NATO’s Supreme Commander, until Washington’s allies, in particular France, had expressed their explicit agreement with ‘the principle of German rearmament.’79

One crucial contributing factor to Washington’s final support for German rearmament was the American resolve of warding off a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe, warned by the Korean War.80 This first consideration eventually combined with NSC-68’s recommended Western rearmament effort. Another important factor was US reluctance, particularly in the US Congress, to maintain a long-term military presence in Europe.81

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77 Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, 130; and ‘McCloy to Secretary of State’, *FRUS*, 1950, Volume III, 181.


79 McAllister, *No Exit*, 188.

80 As Creswell points out, US officials feared that the Korean War, with communist North Korea invading South Korea, could be considered ‘as a prelude to a Soviet attack’ on Western Europe, with communist East Germany invading the FRG. Quotation is from Creswell, *A Question of Balance*, 23-24 and 26; David G. Coleman, ‘The Berlin-Korea Parallel: Berlin and American National Security in light of the Korean War’, *Australasian Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (July, 1999), 19; and Schwartz, *America’s Germany*, 124-127. For more information on Washington’s concerns regarding a connection between the Korean War and the threat of communist East Germany invading the FRG see: Coleman, ‘The Berlin-Korea Parallel’, 19-41.

Gradually, rearming Germany was in the US Congress also regarded as a way of relieving the military and financial burden of the US and allies for defending Europe.\textsuperscript{82} So eventually, Creswell argues, ‘the Truman administration subordinated reservations about remilitarizing the Federal Republic to *realpolitik* thinking,’ culminating in NSC-82.\textsuperscript{83} This document, approved on September 11, 1950, authorized supplementary American troops for Europe, but also requested a military contribution from Bonn straightaway.\textsuperscript{84}

NSC-82 also adopted the EDF-concept and recommended an American as the EDF’s Supreme Commander on two conditions: that an American would be requested by the Europeans themselves and upon their pledge of contributing enough forces, including German troops.\textsuperscript{85} Because the EDF ‘should be subject to political and strategic guidance under NATO,’ NSC-82 recommended swift German NATO-membership. Finally, after European support had been achieved, the EDF-concept would be further developed.\textsuperscript{86}

**The September 1950 NAC summit in New York**

The Korean War caused a considerable acceleration of implementing NSC-68’s rearmament. Accordingly, Kevin Ruane indicates, at the New York NAC summit starting on 15 September 1950, Acheson advocated creating twelve FRG divisions to counterbalance the SU’s conventional military superiority and allow a ‘forward defense’ strategy in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{87} Acheson also demanded that NATO Allies concur instantly and officially to

\textsuperscript{82} Large, *Germans to the Front*, 38-39.

\textsuperscript{83} Quotation is from Creswell, *A Question of Balance*, 26; and NSC-82, ‘The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the President’, September 8, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, Volume III, 273-278.


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 277-278. Quotation is from page 277.

\textsuperscript{87} Ruane, *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community*, 3-4; Creswell, *A Question of Balance*, 24-26; ‘Memorandum by the United States Secretary of State: Establishment of a Force for the Defence of Freedom in Europe’, September 15, 1950, NATO, Document No. 5/6, CS-D/6, *NATO Archives*, Brussels, Belgium, 1-3; ‘Verbatim Record of the First Meeting Held in New York on 15th September 1950, at 10:30 a.m.’, 15th September 1950, NATO, Verbatim Record No. 1, CS-VR/1, *NATO Archives*, Brussels, Belgium, 15-16; and
establish a ‘European defense force’ that should incorporate German divisions, otherwise Europe would not be given supplementary US military and financial support.\textsuperscript{88}

Acheson gave several reasons for raising the German rearmament question. First, there seemed to be NATO-consensus that Western Europe’s defense should be installed as far east as possible in Germany.\textsuperscript{89} Therefore, requiring a German military contribution for defending itself was logical. Second, losing Germany would be a major geopolitical Soviet victory since Germany’s industrial and military potential could provide a decisive advantage in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{90} Finally, Konrad Adenauer, the FRG’s Chancellor, had offered German participation in a European army.\textsuperscript{91} At preliminary discussions on September 12, 1950, with Britain and France, Acheson already introduced this ‘single package proposal’: the deployment of supplementary US soldiers to Europe, a combined North Atlantic military framework and the nomination of a US citizen as SACEUR,\textsuperscript{92} would be contingent on European acceptance of rearming the FRG, and of establishing a European army that should contain twelve German divisions.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{88} Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-148; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26-27.

\textsuperscript{89} ‘Statement by the Chairman of the Council. (Verbatim Record Initiated for the Information of Ministers only)’, 15th September 1950, NATO, Verbatim Record No. 2, CS-VR/2 (Part), NATO Archives, Brussels, Belgium, 1-10.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} The SACEUR is NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.

The ‘single package’ and French objections

As McAllister indicates, Acheson did succeed in convincing the British ‘on the merits of the one package proposal.’ However, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin worried that rearmament would give the FRG a too powerful bargaining position, could antagonize France, and could instigate Soviet intervention before Western defense was ready. Still London accepted the ‘single package’, because Washington would not increase its European responsibilities without compliance with rearming Germany.96

However, France resisted the ‘single package’ and declined to support German rearmament without adequate military and financial assurances. Yet, Washington refused to deliver such guarantees. As Creswell indicates, although most historians have characterized France as fiercely resisting German remilitarization, the records concerning the September 1950 NAC prove that Robert Schuman, France’s Foreign Minister, did not reject German rearmament in principle. Instead, Creswell convincingly argues that Schuman’s main concern was keeping these plans confidential.98

94 McAllister, No Exit, 189.
97 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 26; and Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz, ‘America, Europe and German Rearmament, August-September 1950’, Journal of European Integration History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (December 2000), 16-17.
Before New York, Schuman had cautioned Acheson not to raise German rearmament, since this would publicly show NATO disagreements over the FRG.99 Schuman declared on September 12 that France wanted restrictions on the FRG’s power and sovereignty, but also agreed that European defense needed a German contribution. Besides, Schuman wanted secret discussions with the Benelux nations on German rearmament,100 and insisted that NATO should first be reinforced without Germany, before France could deal with FRG rearmament.101

Nevertheless, Acheson presented to the complete NAC Washington’s German rearmament plans. Accordingly, Schuman expressed French concerns that it might endanger Germany’s denazification, could revive its militarism, would complicate Franco-German peace treaty negotiations, and could strengthen Moscow’s ties with its satellites.102 Paris also feared that German remilitarization could trigger Soviet hostility.103 Finally, Schuman stated that although France was not against German rearmament, the timing was wrong and harmful.104 Still, McAllister indicates, Schuman was more responsive to Acheson’s reasoning than many other French officials. Particularly Minister of Defense Jules Moch stressed that Paris was not prepared to agree with the principle of rearming West Germany.105

McAllister indicates that the main objection of the Quai d’Orsay was skepticism that NATO could control a remilitarized Germany. For instance, senior official René Massigli maintained


104 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 28; and ‘Statement made by M. Schuman before the North Atlantic Council on September 16, 1950’, CS-VR/3 (Part), NATO Archives, 4-6.

105 McAllister, No Exit, 190.
German policy would always be principally driven by reunification, which could ultimately draw the West into a ‘preventive war’ with the USSR.\textsuperscript{106} Still, during the September 22-23 NAC-meetings even Moch conceded that remilitarizing Germany was ‘rational on political grounds.’\textsuperscript{107} Eventually agreement was reached on an ‘integrated force’, organized within the NATO-framework, commanded by a US SACEUR. France also made a major concession by not rejecting ‘the German rearmament proposal in principle’ in the final NAC-statement.\textsuperscript{108}

Although this NAC-agreement did not mention the American concept of a ‘European defense force,’\textsuperscript{109} it did approve the swift creation ‘of an integrated force under centralized command and control,’\textsuperscript{110} with a similar main objective; ‘to deter aggression and ensure the defense of Western Europe, including Western Germany.’\textsuperscript{111} However, ‘the nature, extent and timing of German participation’ in Europe’s defense remained unresolved because it was still being discussed by Paris, London and Washington with the FRG’s government. Eventually, this ‘integrated force’ would not be concluded until Germany’s specific contribution was determined.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{106} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 190-191; ‘Minute from Mr. Schuckburgh to Sir R. Makins’, September 21, 1950; and ‘Memorandum of Conversation by Ernest Davies’, September 29, 1950, both in \textit{DBPO}, Series 2, Vol. III, 84-85 and calendar 54i. The Quai d’Orsay refers to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


\textsuperscript{108} Quotation is from Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 29; and ‘Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe’, CS-D/11 (FINAL), \textit{NATO Archives}, 1-3; and ‘The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State’, \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume III, 348-358. The NAC also adopted other important decisions; officially concluding the war with Germany, expanding NATO’s military presence in Germany, commitment to German reunification, and proclaiming the FRG as the ‘legitimate successor’ of Nazi Germany. See Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 184 note 33.


\textsuperscript{110} ‘Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe’, CS-D/11 (FINAL), \textit{NATO Archives}, 1.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 3.
Historiography on the ‘single package’

There is some disagreement within the historiography on the ‘single package’, particularly on Acheson’s role. Gehrz indicates that many historians, such as McAllister, have acknowledged Acheson’s assertion that before the September 1950 NAC summit, the JCS ‘forced him to adopt the so-called “single package” tactic.’ But Gehrz argues that declassified documents show it was the State Department and Acheson who actually were in charge of decision making concerning the ‘single package.’ Therefore, Gehrz maintains that historians should particularly reassess Acheson’s reputation of managing ‘the Western alliance as a democratic partnership.’

According to Acheson’s memoirs, ‘the Pentagon stood united and immovable. I agreed with their strategic purpose and objective but thought their tactics murderous (...) I was clearly outflanked.’ However, as Gehrz indicates, memoirs are problematic sources for historical research on a policymaking process because of fading memories, and because players can adjust their particular roles, thereby distorting the truth. Gehrz argues that most historians have endorsed this characterization of strong Pentagon support for the ‘single package’ overpowering the State Department’s and Acheson’s position. Therefore, it is useful to include a brief review of relevant conclusions, to investigate Gehrz’s claim of ‘the predominance of Acheson’s account in the historiography.’

David Clay Large argued that the ‘single package’ was ‘a clear victory for the military.’ Furthermore, Large claimed ‘Acheson reluctantly combined’ American assurances concerning Germany ‘with the coercive part of the Pentagon “package.”’

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113 Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135; McAllister, No Exit, 188.
114 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 135.
115 Ibid.
116 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 438; quoted in Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 136.
117 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 139, 152.
118 Ibid., 136.
119 Large, Germans to the Front, 84.
120 Ibid., 85.
Using Acheson’s memoirs, Schwartz maintained ‘Acheson conceded the “essential correctness” of the Pentagon’s strategic objectives,’ but regarded the ‘single package’ tactic “murderous,” more an ultimatum than a negotiating position.’\textsuperscript{121} Schwartz also claimed that replacing Secretary of Defense Johnson by George Marshall ‘softened the sharp edges of the proposal.’\textsuperscript{122} Saki Dockrill argued that although Acheson ‘later confessed that “he had erred in agreeing to the package formula,”’ the Secretary had ‘several reasons why he felt impelled to adopt the Pentagon’s tactics.’\textsuperscript{123} For instance, the Europeans already discussed a European army, including West German divisions, at ‘the Council of Europe at Strasbourg between 9 and 11 August 1950.’\textsuperscript{124} Furthermore, the Korean War and the Soviet threat strengthened the Pentagon’s resolve to generate ‘greater European defense efforts,’ including FRG rearmament.\textsuperscript{125}

Lawrence Kaplan agreed with Acheson that the ‘single package’ was principally a creation from the Pentagon,\textsuperscript{126} and claimed that Acheson had anticipated its rejection by the French but understood the Pentagon’s stance. However, ‘in bowing to Pentagon demands, he followed a course which he later claimed was “largely my own fault.”’\textsuperscript{127} James Chace maintained the Pentagon insisted ‘that no more American troops be sent to Europe until the German troops were designated to serve in a unified command.’\textsuperscript{128} However, Chace argues, Acheson thought that France could be persuaded by first creating ‘the unified command and

\textsuperscript{121} Schwartz, America’s Germany, 135-136, 349; The Acheson quotations originate from Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, 438.

\textsuperscript{122} Schwartz, America’s Germany, 139.


\textsuperscript{124} Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, 23, 32. Quotation is from page 23. These debates were conducted in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 32.

\textsuperscript{126} Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 160; and Acheson, Present at the Creation, 437.

\textsuperscript{127} Kaplan, The Formative Years, 161; Acheson’s quotation is from Acheson, Sketches from Life, 29.

then demonstrate the need for German troops.’ But the Pentagon ‘held firm to their approach and Acheson finally gave in.’

Gehrz demonstrates that even the JCS’s and Secretary of Defense’s histories ‘agree with Acheson’s interpretation.’ Alternatively, Robert J. McMahon stresses that ‘Acheson took a lead role in the administration’s development’ of the ‘single package.’ Furthermore, ‘Acheson insisted’ that ‘US officials needed to “keep the heat on the French,”’ and McMahon asserts that Acheson and Marshall ‘privately pressed French officials hard.’

Beisner indicates Paris wanted ‘US troops directly opposite the Red Army and (...) a prestigious US general commanding NATO.’ The Pentagon agreed on the conditions that Europeans rearmed themselves and accepted German rearmament, resulting in a “single package.” Beisner maintains that although Acheson ‘never liked bundling them together,’ he concurred with all the components of ‘the Pentagon’s “single package”: new US divisions (...) an American in command, and a rearmed FRG confined within a European force under NATO’s command.’ The ‘single package’ caused considerable strain with US allies, but Beisner primarily blames ‘Acheson’s hard-charging diplomacy,’ and indicates that ‘Acheson was unusually aggressive.’

129 Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State, 324.
133 Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 360.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid., 362.
136 Ibid., 363.
137 Ibid., 365-366.
Gehrz concluded after researching the ‘single package’ that most scholars, prior to his article (published in 2001), have unfairly relied too much on Acheson’s memoirs. Accordingly, Gehrz asserts that the ‘consensus interpretation’, endorsing Acheson’s claim that ‘the JCS forced him’ to adopt the ‘single package’, is false.\textsuperscript{138} Meanwhile, McMahon’s and Beisner’s later research also has a more critical approach to Acheson’s role in the ‘single package.’\textsuperscript{139}

As Gehrz indicates, between April and August 1950, the Pentagon and JCS published three documents advocating German rearmament. Crucially, none proposed a connection between US military assistance to Europe and FRG rearmament.\textsuperscript{140} Gehrz convincingly demonstrates that with ‘Byroade’s “European Army” memo of 4 August,’ Acheson’s State Department was the first linking FRG rearmament to ‘the other elements of the package’\textsuperscript{141}: additional US troops, ‘an integrated force, a combined chiefs structure and a supreme commander.’\textsuperscript{142}

Furthermore, Gehrz demonstrates that the presidential ‘eight questions’ ultimatum, compelling the State Department and the Pentagon to make a decision on FRG rearmament, was formulated by the State Department officials Paul Nitze and Byroade on August 25, 1950.\textsuperscript{143} Gehrz also observed that ‘the condition of German rearmament’ before installing an

\textsuperscript{138} Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 139, 152. Quotation is from page 152.

\textsuperscript{139} McMahon, \textit{The Creation of an American World Order}, 137-139; and Beisner, \textit{A Life in the Cold War}, 360-366.

\textsuperscript{140} Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145. Those three papers, as pointed out by Gehrz, are: ‘JCS 2124 of 30 April, NSC-71 of 8 June, and JCS 2124/11 of 27 July.’ Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145.

\textsuperscript{141} Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 145, 152. The first quotation is from page 145, the second quotation is from page 152; and McMahon, \textit{The Creation of an American World Order}, 137-139.


\textsuperscript{143} Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 144, 146, 152; ‘The President to the Secretary of State’ (The eight questions ultimatum), August 26, 1950, \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume III: 250-251; Gehrz also refers to Draft Memo by Nitze and Byroade, Records of the PPS, Country and Area File, Box 28, \textit{RG 59, NARA}; MemCon, 21 Aug. 1950, \textit{Official Conversations and Meetings of Dean Acheson (1949-1953)}, Reel 3. Paul Nitze was head of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), the principal policy review division in the State Department.
American SACEUR cannot be detected in JCS records ‘until after the creation of a State-Defense working group,’ and that during the NAC the JCS had been the first approving a disruption of the ‘single package’, because it nominated a US SACEUR apart from its other components. This was considered ‘a change in the intent of NSC-82.’ Furthermore, Gehrz and Beisner indicate that Acheson proclaimed his satisfaction with the ‘single package’ as a tactic during the NAC.

Both scholars also maintain that once Truman and Acheson agreed, by 31 July 1950, that FRG rearmament was unavoidable, ‘the State Department and the White House controlled the decision making that led to the package plan.’

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144 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-147. Quotation is from pages 152-153; Gehrz also refers to Memo, JCS to Johnson, 5 Sept. 1950, Records of the Office of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section Decimal File: July to Dec 1950, CD 091.7 (Europe), Box 175, RG 330, NARA. As Gehrz indicates, the earlier JCS version of this document did not contain ‘the condition of German rearmament’, but after State Department officials in the working group had reviewed the JCS document, this particular condition had been added.


146 Ibid., 150; NSC-82 was the official publication of the joint State Department/Defense Department paper on German rearmament. Gehrz also refers to Memo, Burns to Marshall, 25 Sept. 1950, Records of the Office of the Administrative Secretary, Correspondence Control Section Decimal File: July to Dec. 1950, CD 091.7 (Europe), Box 175, RG 330, NARA.


148 ‘Memorandum by the Secretary of State on a Meeting With the President’, July 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 167-168.

149 Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 153-154; and Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 363, 366-367.
that the Pentagon was not involved in Acheson’s manipulative diplomacy. Alternatively, Gehrz asserts, Bradley and Nitze had recommended that ideally Paris could be persuaded to propose FRG remilitarization itself.

This latter approach would be in line with Gaddis’ model of US alliance management within NATO, through applying its democratic culture to international relations. According to Gaddis, Washington believed that by making sure not to intimidate or bribe its allies, it could prevent an adverse reaction within the US or Europe itself and could invalidate the Leninist thesis arguing that capitalist countries were incapable of cooperation. However, Gehrz argues that Washington’s ‘single package’ strategy does not fit into Gaddis’ model of US alliance management, because for obtaining European agreement with FRG remilitarization, Acheson bribed US allies by offering a stronger US commitment to Western Europe’s security. Acheson also demanded German rearmament and threatened that Europe could lose prospective military aid.

However, it seems more likely that the ‘single package’ is an exception within Gaddis’ model. Gaddis indicates that if required, Washington could in rare cases resort to using coercion against Western partners. It is plausible that the Truman administration did believe that, at that particular time, coercive diplomacy to impose German rearmament was necessary. Because of the Korean War and increasing Soviet-Western tensions, it had

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151 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 142, 146, 154; Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 196-198; Gehrz also refers to Memo, Nitze to Acheson, 8 Aug. 1950, Records of the PPS, Country and Area File, Box 28, RG 59, NARA; Omar Bradley’s memo, suggesting this particular idea, was dated August 17, 1950. See Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 196-198; Gehrz indicates that already from April 30, 1950, onwards the official JCS stand had been that Washington should defeat the political opposition to West German rearmament by attempting to alter the European position into favoring support for a FRG military role in defending Western Europe, see JCS 2124, 30 April 1950, Geographic File, 1948-50, CCS 092 Germany (5-4-49), Section 1, Box 25, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA (later summarized and distributed as NSC-71).

152 Gaddis, Rethinking Cold War History, 200; and Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 137.


154 Gaddis, Rethinking Cold War History, 200-201. Gaddis mentions the 1956 Suez Crisis as an exception to the rule, when the US used coercion because its allies, France and Britain, refused to cooperate.
become imperative to immediately implement the NSC-68 program. Meanwhile, Washington considered German rearmament as a crucial component for an effective Western defense structure.\footnote{Creswell, A Question of Balance, 22-26; Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 153-154; Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3-4; ‘Memorandum by the United States Secretary of State: Establishment of a Force for the Defence of Freedom in Europe’, Document No. 5/6, CS-D/6, NATO Archives, 1-3; ‘Verbatim Record of the First Meeting Held in New York on 15th September 1950, at 10:30 a.m.’, Verbatim Record No. 1, C/S-VR/1, NATO Archives, 15-16; and ‘Statement by the Chairman of the Council. (Verbatim Record Initiated for the Information of Ministers only)’, NATO, Verbatim Record No. 2, C/S-VR/2 (Part), NATO Archives, 1-10.} Furthermore, NSC-68 warned that a considerable Western military buildup was necessary to rule out a decisive Soviet nuclear surprise attack by 1954.\footnote{Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 265-269.} These facts can explain Washington’s sense of urgency, its use of the ‘single package’ and Acheson’s coercive diplomacy in New York, to enforce European and especially French compliance with German rearmament.

Eventually, Jean Monnet, the initiator of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), created a compromise plan for German rearmament.\footnote{Jean Monnet was also head of the Commissariat Général au Plan, a French government agency for organizing the modernization concerning France’s economy. Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 73-74, 78; and Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154-155.} On 24 October 1950, France presented the Pleven Plan, proposing FRG rearmament within a supranational European Army and a European defense organization. Accordingly, several scholars indicate, American pressure did succeed in inducing Paris to create a proposal for FRG rearmament.\footnote{Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 78; Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154-155; and Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.}

**Conclusion**

The Truman administration’s incentive for the FRG’s reconstruction and rearmament arguably originated from the Containment strategy’s final goal, as formulated by Kennan, of creating an international order consisting of ‘independent centers of power,’ enabling threatened countries to withstand ‘Soviet pressure’ themselves.\footnote{Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 35, 54-55. Quotations are from page 55.}
strategy’s first step was, as Gaddis indicated, ‘restoration of the balance of power through the encouragement of self-confidence in nations threatened by Soviet expansionism.’

Eventually, Washington’s efforts to initiate a European army, which would enable and control German rearmament while also containing the SU, can clearly be considered as American initiatives to restore the international ‘balance of power’ and develop Western Europe as an ‘independent center of power’ as part of its Containment strategy.

As Gehrz concluded, ultimately Washington did succeed with Acheson’s coercive diplomacy to induce a French proposal for German rearmament: the Pleven Plan. Therefore, McAllister’s claim that Acheson’s controversial diplomacy to ‘sell’ the ‘single package’ was a harmful ‘premature effort’ is arguably unjustified and can instead be characterized as a necessary evil from Washington’s perspective, because it had ultimately generated the necessary momentum for tackling the German rearmament problem.

Washington’s ‘single package’ and Acheson’s coercive diplomacy were certainly unconventional compared to Washington’s usual alliance diplomacy. However, contrary to Gehrz’s claim, it seems more probable that the ‘single package’ episode is an exception within ‘Gaddis’ model of American democratic alliance management,’ which acknowledges that if required the US could adopt coercion against Western partners. It is plausible that the Truman administration did believe that coercive diplomacy to enforce German rearmament was imperative at that particular time of increased Cold War tensions. Because of the Korean War, Soviet-Western tensions and a possible Soviet nuclear surprise attack by 1954, it was necessary to immediately implement NSC-68’s program. Meanwhile, Washington regarded German remilitarization to strengthen NATO’s defense of vital


162 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154-155; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.


164 Gaddis, *Rethinking Cold War History*, 200-201; and Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 137, 154-155. Quotation is from page 155. Gaddis mentions the 1956 Suez Crisis as an exception to the rule, when the US used coercion because its allies refused to cooperate.
importance.\textsuperscript{165} These facts can explain Washington’s sense of urgency, the ‘single package’ and Acheson’s coercive diplomatic strategy at the September 1950 NAC summit, to impose German rearmament on Europe. 

Regarding the ‘single package’, Gehrz rightfully points out the predominance in the historiography of Acheson’s own account. Many of the historians discussed, except for McMahon and Beisner, uncritically agreed with Acheson that the JCS forced him to adopt the ‘single package’, using Acheson’s memoirs.\textsuperscript{166} Gehrz’s account of Acheson’s own crucial role in the ‘single package’ is arguably more plausible than the latter general historiographical claim.\textsuperscript{167} Declassified documents prove that it was actually the State Department and Acheson who determined decision-making on the ‘single package.’ Furthermore, several scholars convincingly indicated that Acheson fully supported the ‘single package’ as a valuable strategy during the New York NAC conference to impose German rearmament on European allies.\textsuperscript{168}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 22-26; Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 153-154; Ruane, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community}, 3-4; NSC-68, \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume I, 265-269; ‘Memorandum by the United States Secretary of State: Establishment of a Force for the Defence of Freedom in Europe’, Document No. 5/6, CS-D/6, \textit{NATO Archives}, 1-3; ‘Verbatim Record of the First Meeting Held in New York on 15th September 1950, at 10:30 a.m.’, Verbatim Record No. 1, C/S-VR/1, \textit{NATO Archives}, 15-16; and ‘Statement by the Chairman of the Council. (Verbatim Record Initiated for the Information of Ministers only)’, Verbatim Record No. 2, C5-VR/2 (Part), \textit{NATO Archives}, 1-10.}
\footnote{Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 136, 139, 152. Historians that acknowledged Acheson’s account of the ‘single package’: McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 188; Large, \textit{Germans to the Front}, 84-85; Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 135-139; Dockrill, \textit{Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament}, 26-27, 32-33; Kaplan, \textit{The Formative Years}, 160-161; Chace, \textit{Acheson: The Secretary of State}, 324-325; Poole, \textit{The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy}, 200; Condit, \textit{The Test of War}, 321.}
\end{footnotes}
Eventually, it can be concluded that France was pressured by the US to initiate a plan for a European army, including FRG rearmament, when Acheson demanded such a force, as part of the ‘single package’, at NAC meetings in September 1950.\footnote{Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 146-148; and Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 26-27; NSC-82, \textit{FRUS}, 1950, Volume III, 273-278.} However, Washington was not the first to introduce such a concept, because European allies already unsuccessfully discussed a European army including FRG divisions in August 1950.\footnote{Dockrill, \textit{Britain's Policy for West German Rararmament}, 23, 32.} Nevertheless, on 24 October 1950, France proposed the Pleven Plan, which ultimately culminated in the EDC.\footnote{Gavin, ‘Power through Europe’?, 78; and Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.}
II. The French position on German Rearmament and European defense until the Pleven Plan

**France’s German policy before the September 1950 NAC**

There is some disagreement in the historiography on French policy regarding Germany and the SU during the first Cold War years. Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that many scholars have argued that during this period French policy was intensely preoccupied with a perceived German threat, rather than the more direct Soviet threat, and that the fundamental French foreign policy goal was keeping Germany subdued. Consequently, the primary issue for French policy was the American-British determination to build up their zones of control in Germany. Washington and London adopted a ‘western strategy’ for West Germany, encompassing its eventual complete integration, including political, economic and eventually military integration into the postwar Western system. There is historiographical disagreement whether this ‘western strategy’ was imposed on France, as argued by for instance Alfred Grosser, Pierre Gerbet, and Michael Harrison, or whether the French sincerely supported it,

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as argued by William Hitchcock (eventual support) and Creswell and Trachtenberg.\textsuperscript{176} Since halfway 1948, France increasingly maintained a more cooperative German policy with new ‘European’ frameworks. Yet, Creswell and Trachtenberg maintain that many historians concluded that France’s essential policy goal had remained the same: keeping Germany subdued, especially concerning military affairs.\textsuperscript{177}

Creswell and Trachtenberg question the validity of this ‘standard interpretation’, which also maintained that Paris fiercely resisted German rearmament in September 1950.\textsuperscript{178} They indicate that already in April 1945, Foreign Minister Bidault, General Charles de Gaulle, and additional French officials were quite anxious about ‘the Soviet threat.’\textsuperscript{179} Ultimately, Creswell and Trachtenberg conclude that France regarded ‘the Soviet threat’ as a more serious problem during the postwar period than Germany, although official French statements may indicate otherwise.\textsuperscript{180}

Nevertheless, Germany remained another crucial French foreign policy issue. Creswell and Trachtenberg maintain many scholars acknowledged that France’s German policy particularly changed course after Bidault was succeeded by Schuman halfway 1948.\textsuperscript{181} However, Hitchcock indicates that both men agreed that ‘closer Franco-German relations’ were required while maintaining the Allied occupation controls on Germany,\textsuperscript{182} and that

\textsuperscript{176} Grosser, \textit{Affaires extérieures}, 81; Gerbet, \textit{Le Relèvement}, 85, 279; Harrison, \textit{The Reluctant Ally}, 12-14; Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99-101; Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 6, 8-9, 14-16.

\textsuperscript{177} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 6; See for example Harrison, \textit{The Reluctant Ally}, 12-14; and Gerbet, \textit{Le Relèvement}, 279.


\textsuperscript{179} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 7-8; ‘Caffery to Secretary of State’, 11 April, 20 April, and 5 May 1945, attached to ‘Matthews to Dunn’, 12 May 1945, enclosing a memorandum for the secretary of the same date, in NARA, 751.00/5-1245, \textit{U.S. Department of State Central Files, RG 59}; In May 1945, de Gaulle even declared that eventually Soviet occupation of all of Europe was very likely, see: ‘The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State’, May 5, 1945, \textit{FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Europe}, Volume IV (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), 686-687.

\textsuperscript{180} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 13.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{182} Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99.
Bidault had a crucial role in initiating a French policy of reconciliation with the Germans. Concerning the Berlin Blockade since June 1948, Washington increasingly tried to convince France that maintaining restrictions on West Germany’s development could generate German resentment and anti-Western sentiments. Yet, Creswell and Trachtenberg emphasize that the Western occupation powers largely agreed on the fundamental issues concerning Germany after WWII, claiming that there was Western consensus on ‘organizing’ western Germany and incorporating it into the Western alliance. Meanwhile, domestic political conditions often prevented France from adopting a clear anti-Soviet position and from publicly supporting the ‘western strategy’ for Germany between 1945 and 1950. Confrontation with the influential French Communist Party (PCF) could instigate a political crisis, and French officials even feared civil war. Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that by 1947, after the PCF had quit government participation, France gradually started supporting the ‘western strategy’, concurring in 1948 with the FRG’s establishment. They also emphasize that French policymakers already concluded in 1947 that a Western repressive policy would ultimately be unable to retain Germany as a Western ally, and that a moderate Western policy for Germany would be more in line with France’s national interest. Consequently, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that insightful French officials

184 Ibid., 99-100.
188 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 14.
acknowledged the crucial premises concerning the ‘western strategy’, meaning that a structure founded on Germany’s separation and a moderate German policy would benefit France.  

Furthermore, Irwin Wall indicates that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned on July 21, 1947, that a French obstructionist policy on Germany was not beneficial and instead advocated more German industrial development. From Washington’s perspective, France obstructing Germany’s development complicated maintaining Western European stability. Furthermore, Hitchcock indicates, it could interfere with its Containment strategy. Particularly in the long run, French obstructionism on Germany would hamper the Containment strategy’s first step of restoring the international power equilibrium by stimulating self-confidence and economic reconstruction in countries ‘threatened by Soviet expansionism,’ such as West Germany.

As Hitchcock indicates, to assuage Washington’s concerns regarding Germany’s development, French policymakers needed to present ‘a constructive alternative.’ Accordingly, ‘through active and constructive policies’ France tried to forestall any American-British plans for entirely terminating the occupation regime’s controls over Germany’s sovereignty and economy. Hitchcock asserts that ‘from this diplomatic-strategic requirement’ evolved France’s growing insistence on Franco-German partnership since late 1948. Creswell and Trachtenberg give a different explanation for this development, and argue that influential French officials believed the ‘western strategy’ might settle, relatively structurally, both ‘the Soviet problem’ and the German question. Therefore, Paris was

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191 However, the Quai d’Orsay wanted several assurances in return: a ban on strategic industries in west Germany, for France a guaranteed and adequate supply of coal and assistance for its steel industry, and finally that the Ruhr would be internationally administered. Wall, The Making of Postwar France, 79; MAE, Y Internationale, 1944—49, Conversations Anglo—Américaines, July 21, 1947.

192 Hitchcock, France Restored, 100; and CIA Report, ‘Political Trends in Western Germany,’ July 22, 1948, President’s Secretary’s Files, box 255, Harry S. Truman Papers, HSTL.

193 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 35, 54-55. Quotation is from page 35.

194 Hitchcock, France Restored, 100.

195 Ibid.
progressively willing to accept the ‘western strategy.’\textsuperscript{196} For instance, on February 19, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall argued that French defense against the Soviet threat required integrating Western Europe, western Germany included.\textsuperscript{197} Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that both Schuman and Bidault concurred with Marshall’s analysis.\textsuperscript{198}

Since late 1948, Hitchcock indicates, French policymakers suggested integrating Germany’s economy with the Western European economy ‘in a controlled, politically balanced, and economically liberal environment.’\textsuperscript{199} Meanwhile, in case Germany remained separated, Soviet and Western troops would also remain in Germany. Particularly the American military presence would give France additional protection against both Germany and the SU. Creswell and Trachtenberg argue it was principally because this ‘Cold War political system’ served French interests, that Paris agreed with Washington concerning the fundamental issues on Germany.\textsuperscript{200}

Ultimately, Creswell and Trachtenberg conclude that fundamentally ‘Western policy [on Germany] was consensual,’ before the German rearmament debate from September 1950 onwards. They also assert that Paris was not somehow forced to accept a US policy for Germany which France totally opposed.\textsuperscript{201} However, their conclusion is incompatible with Hitchcock’s account of France’s German policy. Hitchcock argues that the French strategy since late 1948 for close Franco-German economic partnership was inimical to British national interests.\textsuperscript{202} When France started developing European integration plans involving Germany, London objected because it feared France wanted ‘a continental alternative to a British-led Atlantic community.’\textsuperscript{203} Furthermore, Hitchcock maintains, because France needed to strengthen its international position, French officials were compelled to devise an

\textsuperscript{196} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 9.


\textsuperscript{199} Quotation is from Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 100.

\textsuperscript{200} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 15-16.

\textsuperscript{202} Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 100.

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
alternative vision on the German problem. Consequently, Hitchcock argues, by adopting European integration France tried to claim a position ‘as the de facto arbiter of European economic reconstruction,’\footnote{Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 100.} which could counterbalance its huge diplomatic disadvantages because of French military and economic reliance on London and Washington.\footnote{Ibid., 100-101.}

As Wall indicates, the Quai d’Orsay concluded in August 1947 that because France depended on American aid, Paris was forced to make concessions on its German policy.\footnote{Wall, \textit{The Making of Postwar France}, 79-80; Wall also refers to \textit{Archives Nationales}, Paris. (AN), 457 AP 20, \textit{Georges Bidault Papers}, August 2, 1947. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often described as the Quai d’Orsay, which refers to its location in Paris.} Although Wall and Hitchcock maintain that Paris understood it was in France’s own interest to adopt a moderate German policy, their accounts still indicate that France was in a certain way forced to accept a US policy for Germany which it not fully supported.\footnote{Wall, \textit{The Making of Postwar France}, 79-80; Wall also refers to AN, 457 AP 20, \textit{Georges Bidault Papers}, August 2, 1947; and Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99-101.} Although Creswell and Trachtenberg may be right that France did not ‘deeply disapprove’ of Washington’s German policy, France certainly did not enthusiastically support it either.\footnote{Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16.} As Hitchcock indicates, Bidault and Schuman wanted stronger Franco-German cooperation while making sure that the Allied occupation controls remained active, while Washington wanted to lift most of those restrictions at short notice.\footnote{Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99-100.}

Ultimately, France did acknowledge that it was probably best to adopt the ‘western strategy’ for Germany. However, it did not have much choice either because of its own weak international position, as indicated by Wall and Hitchcock.\footnote{Wall, \textit{The Making of Postwar France}, 79-80; and Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99-101.} For France there was no viable alternative for the ‘western strategy’, which led Paris, as Hitchcock concluded, to embrace it by adopting European integration as a strategy to contain Germany, reinforce France’s economic reconstruction and increase French power in international relations.\footnote{Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 100-101, 204.} Therefore, contrary to Creswell and Trachtenberg’s argument, France was arguably somewhat forced to accept Washington’s German policy.
However, their conclusion that there was Western consensus on the fundamental notion of ‘organizing’ western Germany and integrating it into the West, is arguably right.\textsuperscript{212} Nonetheless, Western policy on Germany on other relating fundamental issues was not consensual before September 1950, because of British opposition to France’s European integration schemes involving Germany and France’s determination to maintain Allied occupation controls on Germany, which the US wanted to lift.\textsuperscript{213} Another indication is Wall’s conclusion that Washington’s Marshall Plan was partly created for finally achieving French agreement with German economic redevelopment.\textsuperscript{214}

**France’s position on German rearment until the Pleven Plan**

French officials acknowledged that eventually it would be impossible to treat Germany as a true Western ally, except if it would regain national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{215} Yet, according to official André François-Poncet, dealing with the German problem was ‘all a question of time.’\textsuperscript{216} Creswell and Trachtenberg argue this was an adequate representation of France’s fundamental concern: the pace of Germany’s integration into Western Europe, and how this should be controlled.\textsuperscript{217} The principal reasons for this French position were concerns regarding German power, domestic political considerations including Communism, and concerns about possible Soviet responses to integrating Germany into the West.\textsuperscript{218}

As Creswell maintains, Monnet and like-minded French policymakers originally argued FRG remilitarization could only be realized within an Atlantic structure with US participation, and

\begin{footnotesize}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 14.
\item Wall, *The Making of Postwar France*, 299.
\item André François-Poncet was a senior French official making this argument. Quotation is from ‘Poncet to Foreign Ministry’, 17 November 1950, in *MAE, Europe 1949–1955*, subseries *Allemagne*, box 913, referred to in Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 16.
\item Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 16.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
not in a European framework. Accordingly, Creswell demonstrates, in August 1950 two French memoranda advocated an expanded American military presence in Germany and nearly complete Atlantic military integration. However, as Creswell indicates, both memoranda merely proposed non-military German contributions to NATO’s defense. Eventually, Washington’s rejection of these initiatives compelled Monnet to abandon his ‘Atlantic army’ plans and to focus on a European army.

As Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, there is a general historical interpretation that France strongly resisted the concept of German rearmament, particularly at the September 1950 NAC Conference. For example, Large argues that ‘only when a “minimum level” of [NATO] rearmament had been reached,’ France might reconsider rejecting German remilitarization. Hitchcock agrees and asserts that in New York, Schuman declined to accept ‘the principle of German participation’ in a Western integrated force. Hitchcock also maintains that despite the NAC’s concluding statement ‘announced agreement on the

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219 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32.
223 Large, Germans to the Front, 85 (emphasis in original text); quotation within Large’s quoted sentence is from FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 1200.
224 Hitchcock, France Restored, 140-141. Quotation is from page 140.
integrated force concept, the French blocked any decision on Germany’s role within it. This issue was postponed until NATO’s Defense Committee meetings in October 1950. However, Creswell indicates, ‘Schuman did not’ explicitly and officially ‘reject the German rearmament proposal in principle’ at the concluding NAC meeting on 26 September 1950. Furthermore, already in August 1950, Quai d’Orsay officials cautioned that Paris could not impede FRG rearmament supported by the US. As Gehrz indicates, in their view the worst possible development would be the FRG’s rearmament ‘as an American fait accompli without French involvement.’ Therefore, these officials reluctantly suggested that the French should take the initiative in the upcoming NAC-discussions by introducing a scheme for rigidly controlled German rearmament. Gehrz also indicates that Schuman informed Britain and the US that France not was not opposed in principle to rearming Germany and wanted a compromise, before and throughout the NAC meetings.

Creswell and Trachtenberg claim ‘the French did accept the principle of a West German contribution’ to Western defense. Referring to a French memorandum dated November 4, 1950, they conclude that the general view that the French resolution and American resolution for German rearmament were ‘contradictory’ had been incorrect. This document asserted both countries had agreed with the ‘principle of forward

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225 Quotation is from Hitchcock, France Restored, 141.
226 Ibid., 141; and ‘Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe’, CS-D/11 (FINAL), NATO Archives, 1-3.
227 Quotation is from Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; and ‘Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe’, CS-D/11 (FINAL), NATO Archives, 1-3; and FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, 348-358.
228 Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154; and Memo, 10 Aug. 1950, MAE, EU [Europe] 1949-55, Allemagne, no.184. These officials were from the Direction d’Europe, a department of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which advised on European policy.
231 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 17.
defense,’ 233 defending Western Europe ‘as far to the east as possible.’ 234 Because this included West Germany, both had concluded that Bonn should contribute to Western defense. Consequently, the document concluded that there was ‘an agreement on the principle of “German rearmament.”’ 235

During October 1950 NATO Defense Committee meetings, Moch confirmed that France agreed with the principle of establishing FRG forces, ‘integrated into European Divisions.’ 236 Furthermore, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, Schuman repeated in December 1950 the French government’s fundamental position regarding German rearmament, that ‘it was really only a question of timing,’ starting with increasing NATO’s military power before deciding on FRG rearmament. 237 Schuman also maintained France ‘did not object to the principle of German participation’ in Western Europe’s defense. 238 Accordingly, Creswell and Trachtenberg conclude France’s fundamental position was that it would accept FRG rearmament ‘once the Western bloc had built up its own power.’ 239

Meanwhile, since 1948 the French military advocated swiftly remilitarizing West Germany, to counterbalance the Soviets and because it believed Bonn should contribute militarily to its

233 Quotation is from Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 17.
236 ‘Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, First, Second, and Third Sessions Held on 28–31 October 1950,’ Record-DC-004, NATO Archives, Brussels, Belgium; referred to in Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 18.
239 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 19; Comité de Défense Nationale meeting, 16 December 1950, in AN, Vincent Auriol Papers (552 AP 44), 4AU S/Dr 1, referred to in Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 19.
own defense. As Creswell indicates, Colonel Paul Stehlin warned that ‘a Germany that remained neutralized and demilitarized would soon fall under Soviet dependence.’ However, although many French civilian officials swiftly accepted the notion of an FRG military contribution, they wanted to proceed slowly. Nevertheless, as Creswell indicates, ‘their primary concern was how to control German rearmament, not how to prevent it.’ Meanwhile, the Pleven Plan was developed without consulting any military or Quai d’Orsay officials. The French military, Creswell maintains, considered it militarily incompetent, installing inadmissible supranational limitations on the French military’s usability while not efficiently utilizing the FRG’s military capability. Ultimately, French civil-military disagreement on timing and method of German rearmament would increase considerably during the ongoing EDC debate.

**Historiography on French acceptance of German rearmament**

Cogan agrees with Creswell and Trachtenberg’s claim that France’s postwar German policy was more aligned with Anglo-American intentions than other scholars commonly acknowledged. However, he claims they ‘give too much emphasis to the support of it.’ Cogan agrees there were two French primary concerns during this period which ‘coexisted’: possible Soviet military expansionism and preoccupation with a German threat. He also argues that France started regarding the ‘western strategy’ as a useful instrument for

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containing both the SU and Germany.246 Still, Cogan argues, France ‘never abandoned its long-term goal of finally bringing Germany to heel.’247

Hitchcock maintains Creswell and Trachtenberg’s argument cannot be considered ‘a departure from the “conventional wisdom,”’ because earlier published research already concluded that France’s German policy ‘was not obstructionist’ and that Bidault and Schuman followed a mainly ‘pro-Western policy’ for promoting French aims.248 Hitchcock also disagrees with their claim that French leaders considered the Soviet threat more critical than the German problem. Instead, Hitchcock stresses ‘the dual nature of the threat’ during 1945-1948 and that for France ‘both were urgent.’249

Creswell and Trachtenberg maintain that for Paris only after a Western defense framework was created that could incorporate German units and could withstand the Soviet response, German rearmament would be acceptable.250 They also argue that the French government reacted to American pressure for rapidly rearming Germany with an alternative: the Pleven Plan proposing a supranational European army that would integrate units from prospective ECSC members.251 Hitchcock agrees that France was instigated by Washington to propose its own plan for enabling FRG rearmament, because it needed ‘to counter a more direct American plan to rearm the FRG.’252 He also argues this EDC plan succeeded in achieving its

247 Ibid.
250 Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.
251 These prospective ECSC members were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.
252 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.
aim: ‘it fended off the American alternative of West German national rearmament and
delayed the entire undertaking.’

Mark Sheetz maintains Schuman eventually accepted ‘West German defense contributions
“in principle,”’ in September 1950 ‘because, for the French, *en principe* connotes a purely
hypothetical proposition with a low probability of realization.’ Furthermore, Sheetz
indicates, Schuman had orders not to agree with an FRG role ‘in practice.’ Sheetz also
observes that halfway the September 1950 CFM in New York, the French Government
collectively agreed that German remilitarization would produce serious risks without
considerably improving ‘French security’; accordingly, FRG participation should be
restricted ‘essentially, if not exclusively to the economic sphere.’ This seems to contradict
Schuman’s conciliatory NAC remarks, that ‘he was not fundamentally opposed to German
rearmament.’

Paris possibly adopted this aforementioned position, as Sheetz implies, because it believed
German rearmament at that particular time would be harmful to French security
interests. As Creswell argues, this does not necessarily mean that France definitely ruled
out German rearmament. Meanwhile, the US had major influence on French decision-
making, because if France would dismiss Washington’s condition for economic assistance,
FRG rearmament, Western defense cooperation concerning Europe could collapse.

253 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.
254 Mark S. Sheetz, ‘France and the German Question: Avant-garde or Rearguard? Comment on Creswell and
Trachtenberg’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer 2003), 43.
255 A conference of foreign ministers (CFM) was held in New York in September 1950 simultaneously with the
NAC conference. Sheetz, ‘Avant-garde or Rearguard?’, 43; Parodi to Schuman, 16 September 1950, MAE,
256 Original quotation is from ‘Direction d’Europe (Seydoux)’, 4 September 1950, *MAE, Europe 1944–1960*,
257 Quotation is from Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154; Kaplan, *The Formative
258 Sheetz, ‘Avant-garde or Rearguard?’, 43; ‘Parodi to Schuman’, 16 September 1950, MAE, *Secrétariat Général
Consequently, Creswell argues, Paris ‘designed the Pleven Plan (...) to delay [German] rearmament until a more opportune moment.’\textsuperscript{260}

Similarly, Sheetz argues that with the Pleven Plan France was ‘simply playing for time.’\textsuperscript{261} French policymakers recognized that if France was too obstructionist towards American-British policies, Paris risked being excluded from decision-making on Germany. For instance, Sheetz refers to Armand Bérard’s assessment that if France could not prevent German rearmament, the best strategy for damage control would be to engage in the debate and urge that French conditions would be met. Therefore, France had to propose a constructive alternative, resulting in the Pleven Plan.\textsuperscript{262}

\textit{Conclusion}

There is certainly historiographical disagreement on France’s German policy and its policy regarding the SU during the first Cold War years. As Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, many historians have argued that French policy was strongly preoccupied with a perceived German threat, rather than the more imminent Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{263} Therefore, a crucial problem for Paris was the American-British conviction to reconstruct Germany and adopt the ‘western strategy’, encompassing West Germany’s complete integration into the postwar Western system.\textsuperscript{264} Furthermore, there is historiographical disagreement whether this

\textsuperscript{260} Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 31.

\textsuperscript{261} Sheetz, ‘Avant-garde or Rearguard?’, 43.


\textsuperscript{264} Costigliola, \textit{The Cold Alliance since World War II}, 48; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 5-6, 9; Harrison, \textit{The Reluctant Ally}, 13; Gerbet, \textit{Le Relèvement}, 85, 279; Grosser, \textit{Affaires extérieures}, 81.
‘western strategy’ was imposed on France, or whether the French genuinely supported it.\textsuperscript{265} Eventually, since halfway 1948, France implemented a more cooperative German policy. However, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate, many scholars concluded France’s principal foreign policy goal remained keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs.\textsuperscript{266}

Ultimately, Creswell and Trachtenberg’s conclusion that fundamentally ‘Western policy [on Germany] was consensual’ before the September 1950 NAC, is not convincing.\textsuperscript{267} Although their argument of Western consensus on the fundamental notion of ‘organizing’ western Germany and integrating it into the Western alliance, is arguably right,\textsuperscript{268} Western policy concerning Germany on other closely relating crucial issues was not consensual before September 1950. As Hitchcock indicates, France’s obstructionist policy concerning Germany’s reconstruction, especially before summer 1948, could interfere with Washington’s Containment strategy.\textsuperscript{269} It can be concluded that particularly in the long run, French obstructionism on Germany would frustrate the Containment strategy’s first stage of restoring the international power equilibrium by stimulating self-confidence and economic reconstruction in countries ‘threatened by Soviet expansionism.’\textsuperscript{270} Other examples that Western policy on Germany was not consensual are, as Hitchcock shows, that London objected to French initiatives for European integration involving Germany, and that France insisted on maintaining the Allied occupation controls on Germany while the US wanted a strongly liberalized occupation regime.\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{265} The following scholars argued that the ‘western strategy’ was imposed on France: Grosser, \textit{Affaires extérieures}, 81; Gerbet, \textit{Le Relèvement}, 85, 279; Harrison, \textit{The Reluctant Ally}, 12-14. Scholars who claimed that France (eventually) genuinely supported the ‘western strategy’: Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99-101; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 6, 8-9, 14-16.

\textsuperscript{266} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 5-6; See for example Harrison, \textit{The Reluctant Ally}, 8, 12-14; and Gerbet, \textit{Le Relèvement}, 260, 279.

\textsuperscript{267} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16.

\textsuperscript{268} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{269} Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 100; and CIA Report, ‘Political Trends in Western Germany,’ July 22, 1948, President’s Secretary’s Files, box 255, \textit{Harry S. Truman Papers}, HSTL.

\textsuperscript{270} Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment}, 35, 54-55. Quotation is from page 35.

\textsuperscript{271} Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 99-101.
Furthermore, Creswell and Trachtenberg argue that Paris was not somehow forced to accept a US policy for Germany which France totally opposed.\(^{272}\) Both Hitchcock and Wall also maintain that Paris comprehended it was in France’s self-interest to conduct a moderate policy towards Germany.\(^{273}\) Nevertheless, eventually France did not have much choice in accepting the ‘western strategy’, primarily because of its weak international position, its dependence on US aid, and lack of a viable alternative, as Wall and Hitchcock indicated.\(^{274}\) This implies that France was at least to a certain extent forced to accept Washington’s policy for Germany.

Although Creswell and Trachtenberg’s claim that France did not ‘deeply disapprove’ of Washington’s German policy seems plausible, Paris certainly did not completely support it either.\(^{275}\) A crucial problem that remained was Allied disagreement concerning the occupation controls on Germany.\(^{276}\) Yet, Hitchcock concluded, Paris finally adopted European integration as a strategy to contain Germany, reinforce France’s economic reconstruction and increase French power in international relations.\(^{277}\)

As Creswell and Trachtenberg indicated, because of the Soviet threat, French officials agreed with the ‘western strategy’ and that repression would eventually be unable to preserve Germany as a Western ally.\(^{278}\) Meanwhile, another important French concern was

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\(^{272}\) Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16.


\(^{275}\) Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16.

\(^{276}\) Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 99-100.

\(^{277}\) Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 100-101, 204.


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how Moscow would respond to this ‘western strategy.’ Yet, it can be concluded that keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, indeed remained France’s primary objective of its German policy. For instance, French official François Seydoux insisted by September 1950 that Germany should be prevented from regaining sovereignty in military affairs, because ‘European integration itself was endangered’ by German rearmament.

As Creswell indicated, Paris actually preferred Atlantic defense agreements for rearming Germany. However, that France proposed in August 1950 Atlantic integration with exclusively non-military German contributions to Western defense clearly indicates that the French government did not favor German rearmament at that time. A crucial motive for French acceptance of the principle of rearming Germany was that if Washington would proceed without French engagement, France could no longer maintain control over Germany’s development. Accordingly, Sheetz indicates, the strategy of French policymakers was participating constructively in the German rearmament debate, but urge

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280 Seydoux was director of the Quai d’Orsay’s European Department at that time. Quotation is from Hitchcock, France Restored, 139; Hitchcock also refers to Note, September 10, 1950, MAE, EU [Europe] 1949-1955, subseries Allemagne, Vol. 68.


that French conditions would be met, such as the continued American military presence in Germany.\footnote{Sheetz, ‘Avant-garde or Rearguard?’, 43-44; ‘Bérard to Foreign Ministry’, 17 October 1950, MAE, Europe 1949–1955, subseries Allemagne, Vol. 70; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32-33, 35; and Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 6, 9, 14-16.}

Eventually, Schuman did not officially reject the principle of rearming the FRG at the concluding NAC-meeting on September 26, 1950.\footnote{Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; ‘Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe’, CS-D/11 (FINAL), NATO Archives, 1-3; and FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, 348-358.} Also supporting Creswell and Trachtenberg’s argument that France ‘did accept the principle of a West German contribution’ to Western defense,\footnote{Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 17.} is that preceding and during this NAC conference Schuman declared that he was not against FRG rearmament and wanted a compromise.\footnote{Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154; Kaplan, The Formative Years, 159-161; FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 285-288, 296-303, 311-312, 1200; DBPO, Series 2, Vol. III, 35-50.} The NAC concluded in New York that ‘the nature, extent and timing of German participation’ in Western defense would be discussed with Bonn.\footnote{‘Resolution on the Defence of Western Europe’, CS-D/11 (FINAL), NATO Archives, 3.} This arguably implies that France had already accepted a German military contribution. Furthermore, NATO’s Defense Committee would make ‘specific recommendations,’ concerning Germany’s defense contribution to an integrated force for Europe.\footnote{Ibid.} Contradicting Hitchcock’s claim, this suggests France did not reject ‘the principle of German participation’ in this integrated force. Otherwise France would not have approved this NAC concluding statement.\footnote{Ibid.; Hitchcock, France Restored, 140-141. Quotation is from page 140.} In October 1950, France indeed agreed with the principle of establishing FRG forces ‘integrated into European Divisions.’\footnote{‘Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, First, Second, and Third Sessions Held on 28–31 October 1950,’ Record-DC-004, NATO Archives, Brussels, Belgium; referred to in Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 18.}

Moreover, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicated, a November 4 French memorandum concluded, because France accepted the ‘principle of forward defense’\footnote{Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 17.} and an FRG
military contribution, that there was ‘an agreement on the principle of “German rearmament.”’

The French approach to German rearmament was in Schuman’s words that ‘it was really only a question of timing,’ and first increasing NATO’s military power before deciding on FRG rearmament. However, the French military advocated quickly rearming Germany since 1948. Eventually, because for France the German threat and the Soviet threat were so closely related, Hitchcock’s emphasis on ‘the dual nature of the threat’ and that ‘both were urgent,’ is more convincing than Creswell and Trachtenberg’s claim that Paris regarded the Soviet threat a considerably bigger issue. Nevertheless, Creswell and Trachtenberg do convincingly conclude that France’s fundamental position was that only when a Western defense organization had been created powerful enough for incorporating FRG units and coping with the Soviet response, regulated FRG rearmament would be viable.

As Creswell indicated, many French officials concurred that Germany should be rearmed for counterbalancing Soviet military superiority. Eventually, because France faced considerable American pressure to accept German rearmament with the ‘single package’ and feared that the US Congress would cut American aid, it responded with a constructive


296 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 34-35.


299 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 35. As Creswell maintains, the most notable French officials taking this position were Monnet, Schuman and Bidault.

alternative: the Pleven Plan for a supranational European army, culminating in the EDC. Therefore it can be concluded, as argued by Creswell and Trachtenberg, Sheetz, and Hitchcock, that France was instigated by the Truman administration to develop an alternative plan for rearming the FRG, to prevent Washington’s rearmament plans and for trying to postpone it.

Eventually it can be concluded, like many scholars argued before, that keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, remained France’s primary objective of its German policy. Accordingly, it can be argued that this was the primary reason for the French government to try to delay German rearmament, rather than Creswell and Trachtenberg’s suggestion that first the West should be ‘strong enough to withstand the Soviet reaction,’ which was nevertheless also a crucial factor. Supporting the former argument is Victor Gavin’s observation that Monnet’s ‘Pleven Plan’ should solve three interrelated French problems concurrently: rearming Germany, protecting the Schuman Plan, and keeping Germany restrained. These issues, and Hitchcock’s claim that the EDC achieved its objective, obstructing the American plan of ‘West German national rearmament’ and stall the whole enterprise, will be investigated in chapter three.

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304 Quotation is from Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 21. For supporting their claim, Creswell and Trachtenberg refer to the notes of the Comité de Défense Nationale meeting, 16 December 1950, in AN, Vincent Auriol Papers (552 AP44), 4AUS/Dr 1.
305 Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76.
306 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.
III. The United States’ intended aim and the French intended aim with the EDC

The ECSC and German rearmament

When Acheson declared in September 1950 that rearming Germany and German NATO-membership was a fundamental requirement for Washington’s commitment to Western Europe’s security, the French regarded this as dangerous for their German policy.³⁰⁷ Paris recognized that Bonn had agreed with the Schuman Plan primarily because it seemed the only possibility for Germany’s international rehabilitation and would grant the FRG equal rights as other ECSC member states.³⁰⁸

The Truman administration now appeared to be providing Germany another option for regaining sovereignty, by joining NATO and granting the privilege to have an army, but with less autonomy than other NATO members.³⁰⁹ France therefore feared that Bonn might abandon the ECSC-project, and that German rearmament could preclude creating the Schuman Plan’s ‘Franco-German framework.’³¹⁰ As Hitchcock observed, Seydoux and Monnet warned in September 1950 that if Germany started to believe remilitarization would grant Germany equal sovereignty as other European nations, Bonn would lose interest in European integration.³¹¹ Although the Schuman Plan was officially presented on May 9,

³⁰⁷ Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 75; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32; Hitchcock, France Restored, 4-5, 139-141; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 21; and Note, September 10, 1950, MAE, EU [Europe] 1949-1955, subseries Allemagne, Vol. 68.
³⁰⁸ Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 75.
³⁰⁹ Ibid.
³¹⁰ Quotation is from Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 75; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32; and Hitchcock, France Restored, 139-140.
1950, the ECSC negotiations were still ongoing when the ‘single package’ proposal was made.\textsuperscript{312}

Already prior to the September 1950 NAC, Gavin indicates, Monnet reminded Prime Minister Pleven and Schuman that ‘the Schuman Plan was France’s German policy,’ and was necessary for eliminating Germany’s competitive advantage over French industry. Therefore, FRG rearmament could only be considered within the supranational ECSC structure.\textsuperscript{313} As Hitchcock demonstrated, both Monnet and Seydoux maintained that French flexibility concerning German rearmament ‘would buy time’ to conclude the ECSC negotiations. Consequently, this would ensure that the FRG could not exploit remilitarization for enhancing its political status in negotiations with Western allies.\textsuperscript{314} Gavin also indicates that the Quai d’Orsay maintained that the German rearmament issue was less important than the fundamental French objective: that Germany could not regain full sovereignty.\textsuperscript{315}

The Schuman Declaration claimed ‘it was the first step towards a European federation,’ making another Franco-German war inconceivable.\textsuperscript{316} The Schuman Plan would establish ‘a new framework’ of Franco-German relations, installing a common market for coal and steel supervised by a supranational European institution. Accordingly, Gavin indicates, the issue of

\textsuperscript{312} Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 74; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32.

\textsuperscript{313} Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 75-76 Quotation is from page 76; Hitchcock, France Restored, 139-140; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29-30, 32; Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, AMI 4/3/6, ‘Jean Monnet to René Pleven’, 3 Sept. 1950; Memorandum for Robert Schuman by Jean Monnet, 9 Sept. 1950, in Jean Monnet - Robert Schuman, Correspondance 1947-1953, 53-55.

\textsuperscript{314} Hitchcock, France Restored, 139-140; ‘Monnet to Schuman’, September 9, 1950, and Monnet’s telegram from Paris to Schuman during the talks between foreign ministers of the Western occupation powers in New York, September 14, 1950, in Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Correspondance Jean Monnet – Robert Schuman, 53-56.


\textsuperscript{316} The Schuman Declaration officially announced the Schuman Plan. Quotation is from Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 74; for the original text of the Schuman Declaration see: http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/ninth_and_final_draft_of_the_schuman_declaration_6_may_1950-en-4909847d-df12-4c67-83d2-8e0978da025b.html
French industry lacking competitiveness would be settled, while securing the foundation for France’s future economic development.\textsuperscript{317}

The previous chapters already gave a detailed account of Schuman’s position on German rearmament in New York. Schuman originally wanted a confidential understanding on German rearmament.\textsuperscript{318} There were several reasons why France adopted such a careful approach to German remilitarization. Because Germany invaded France during the Franco-Prussian War, and in both World Wars, this was obviously controversial.\textsuperscript{319} Accordingly, Schuman told Acheson in September 1950 that merely ‘a minority in France appreciates the importance of Germany in western defense.’\textsuperscript{320} Furthermore, Creswell and Trachtenberg indicate that Monnet ‘wanted the rearmament issue put on hold until the ECSC treaty was signed,’\textsuperscript{321} because in Hitchcock’s words ‘the prospect of German rearmament threatened France’s entire postwar strategy of recovery’ and jeopardized the Schuman Plan’s controls on Germany.\textsuperscript{322} However, Creswell and Trachtenberg argue that France dreaded most a Soviet military response to FRG rearmament. Moscow announced in December 1950 that it would neither accept a German national army, nor FRG rearmament.\textsuperscript{323}

\textsuperscript{317} Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 74.


\textsuperscript{319} Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 28-29.


\textsuperscript{321} Quotation is from Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 21; Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 32.

\textsuperscript{322} Hitchcock, \textit{France Restored}, 4-5; see also Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 32.

By September 1950 Bonn had adopted a tougher position on the ECSC, which Monnet blamed on Western speculations on German rearmament. Therefore, Gavin indicates, Monnet summarized three conceivable courses for Paris, while strongly recommending the third one. The first course was ‘do nothing.’ Second was ‘treat Germany on a national basis.’ Third was ‘integrate Germany within Europe through a broader Schuman Plan.’ Meanwhile, because only France opposed immediate FRG rearmament in New York, it faced considerable NATO pressure. As Creswell indicates, because of a crucial French defeat at Lang-Son during France’s war in Indochina in October 1950, its international position was additionally weakened. The government responded by giving the Indochina War ‘absolute priority,’ thereby weakening France’s European military position. Therefore, Creswell maintains, the French military was convinced that German rearmament to forestall Soviet aggression had become even more imperative.

The Pleven Plan’s creation

Regarding how the EDC-concept was conceived, Weisbrode indicates that it first emerged ‘in parallel conversations on the one hand between Monnet, Bruce, and Tomlinson, and, on the other, between Hank Byroade, McCloy (...) Bob Bowie and Dean Acheson, in the spring and summer of 1950.’ Eventually, Weisbrode maintains, the Monnet-discussions

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325 Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76; original quotation is from Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Correspondance Jean Monnet – Robert Schuman, 56-59.

326 Quoted from Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76; The original quotations and a more elaborate description of Monnet’s three possible courses for France on the German rearmament issue can be found in: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Correspondance Jean Monnet – Robert Schuman, 56-59.

327 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29.


330 Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 91. Harry Tomlinson was the representative of the US Department of the Treasury in Paris.
produced the essence of the Pleven Plan, but the EDC should not be regarded ‘as primarily an American initiative,’ because most of the EDC’s ‘early support had been in France.’

On October 6, 1950, the French government analyzed the American plan for German rearmament through a ‘European defense force’ but postponed adopting any decision. Finally, Monnet advised Schuman and Pleven on October 16, 1950, to present an alternative French plan involving German rearmament. Monnet argued Washington’s current policy had to be firmly resisted, but this required a constructive French position ‘inspired by an overall policy for Europe.’

What was the French intended aim with the EDC? Monnet worried that French opposition to FRG rearmament would eventually be pointless and would cause crucial damage to the Schuman Plan. Accordingly, Gavin indicates, Monnet’s ‘Pleven Plan’ should solve three interrelated French problems concurrently: rearming Germany, protecting the Schuman Plan, and keeping Germany restrained. It envisioned a ‘supranational European army’, consisting of divisions from prospective ECSC member states combined ‘at the level of the smallest possible unit.’ Wall maintains that the Pleven Plan ‘meant to subordinate the German military to French overall command.’ Creswell argues it intended to keep France’s military unchanged while carving up German forces into small contingents. This condition was required for achieving French parliamentary authorization.

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331 Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 91-92. Quotation is from page 92.


335 Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76.

336 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29; Latter quotation is from Letter of October 14, 1950, quoted in Monnet, Memoirs, 345-346.


338 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29-30; Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76-77.
proposed European army supervision by a supranational institution. However, Gavin notes, this created a serious political issue, because it required establishing a European political authority, a ‘European civil power.’

Ultimately the French government approved the Pleven Plan on October 21, 1950. This plan, Gavin indicates, would enable Paris to obstruct the ‘single package’ with a defense scheme built on those principles that the US was advocating for Europe; promoting European integration by closer military, economic and political cooperation.[340] If the Pleven Plan would be accepted by Western allies, Gavin notes, France could maintain considerable control over the pace of the FRG’s remilitarization. Meanwhile, the Pleven Plan would reinforce the Schuman Plan, which enabled France to maintain control over the FRG’s industrial development. Finally, the National Assembly also agreed with the Pleven Plan on October 26, 1950.[341]

*The Spofford Plan as an American-French compromise on German rearmament*

The Truman administration’s response regarding the Pleven Plan had been supportive. However, American officials also had considerable objections.[342] On October 27, 1950, Moch called Secretary Marshall to present the Pleven Plan. Moch explained that ‘only after completion Schuman Plan,’ a European Defense Minister would be assigned, accountable to a European Assembly.[343] The European army would be directed by a Supreme Commander. Eventually German units could be established, however ‘only up to company or battalion

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339 Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76-77.
340 Ibid., 77; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 30; and ‘The ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State’, 10 Nov. 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, 442.
341 Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 77; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 30.
France ruled out German divisions because it feared they would constitute the start of a national army, thus ignoring American requests for twelve German divisions.\textsuperscript{345} Acheson concluded that the Pleven Plan appeared to assign Germany ‘permanently second class status.’ Accordingly, Acheson considered it ‘wholly unworkable’ and unacceptable to Bonn.\textsuperscript{346} On 3 November 1950, Acheson warned that if France would insist on the Pleven Plan’s acceptance ‘as interpreted by Moch,’ NATO-agreement would be impossible and Washington would have to review its European defense policy.\textsuperscript{347} Remarkably, Acheson claimed the ‘single package’ was not ‘a take-it-or-leave-it proposition,’ but that Washington has been and continues to be willing to ‘modify it just as long as the results makes [military] sense and will prove acceptable’ to NATO and Germany.\textsuperscript{348} Although this may be true for after the September 1950 NAC summit, during this conference Acheson was quite insistent on sticking to the ‘single package.’

Eventually, the Western Allies reached agreement on establishing a European army and by late November 1950 an American-French compromise on rearming West Germany was achieved. Washington wanted a ‘provisional or transitional agreement’ on German rearmament, which resulted in ‘the Spofford Plan.’\textsuperscript{349} Accordingly, Schwartz observed, Washington would concur with ‘the regimental combat team of between 5,000 and 6,000 men as the initial size of the German units.’\textsuperscript{350} Meanwhile, Paris would abandon its precondition that FRG units could enter the European army only after this force was up and running. Furthermore, German units would never make up more than one fifth of the European force.\textsuperscript{351} Finally, the US would proceed with sending a Supreme Commander for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{345} Ibid.; Ruane, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community}, 4; and ‘Memorandum by the United States Secretary of State: Establishment of a Force for the Defence of Freedom in Europe’, September 15, 1950, NATO, Document No. 5/6, C5-D/6, \textit{NATO Archives}, 1-3.
\item \textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 430.
\item \textsuperscript{349} Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 39; Beisner, \textit{A Life in the Cold War}, 372; Quotation is from \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume III, 460-464. The Spofford Plan was named after Charles Spofford, who was the American Representative to NATO and chair of NATO’s Council of Deputies.
\item \textsuperscript{350} Quotation is from Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 150; and Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 39.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 39; and Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 150.
\end{itemize}
commanding NATO. General Dwight David Eisenhower was the preferred candidate for this position.352

Acheson pleaded with Schuman to accept the Spofford Plan. Remarkably, Beisner observed that because Spofford advised exchanging a US Supreme Commander and additional American divisions for Europe, ‘for a French commitment to the principle of German rearmament,’ Acheson was ‘categorically abandoning the single package.’353 Furthermore, Acheson stressed Washington’s support concerning European integration, and asked Schuman to take charge of establishing a European army. France finally agreed with the Spofford Plan halfway December 1950.354

During the December 18-19 NAC meetings in Brussels, the Spofford Plan was officially accepted and two different tracks of negotiations were scheduled. Near Bonn, the Allied High Commission would consider strengthening NATO by obtaining a German defense contribution.355 Meanwhile, France would organize discussions in Paris concerning creating a European force. As Creswell indicates, this particular ‘two-track approach’ enabled Washington to proceed with bolstering NATO regardless of the Paris negotiations’ results.356 Schuman also received American promises that reconsidering Germany’s Occupation Statute would not result in full German sovereignty and that discussions with Moscow on Germany were still optional.357 Furthermore, Creswell indicates, NATO reached agreement on ‘a

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353 Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 372.
354 Ibid.; Schwartz, America’s Germany, 151; and ‘The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France’, November 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 496-498; and ‘The Secretary of State to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs (Schuman)’, December 20, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 605-606.
355 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 39.
356 Ibid.
forward defense strategy that ensured German participation, the creation of a SACEUR, Eisenhower’s appointment as SACEUR, and on an ‘integrated NATO defense force.’ Crucially, the concluding NATO report made a clear distinction between the ‘Integrated NATO Defense Force’ and a ‘European Defense Force.’ The former was defined as ‘a force (...) in which each nation retains political and certain military controls over its own forces.’ The EDF’s definition was: ‘a composite force composed of contributions by two or more nations under the political control of a European body.’ The EDF could ‘be an element’ of this NATO force. Moreover, Germany’s contribution could be realized by participation in a ‘European defense force’, or via directly contributing to this NATO force. French officials recognized that rearming the FRG was unavoidable, yet they understood that the French National Assembly would vigorously oppose it. Nevertheless, Hitchcock claims that the EDC accomplished the objective for which it was created: ‘it fended off the American alternative of West German national rearmament and delayed the entire undertaking.’ As Hitchcock indicates, when the EDC-Treaty was rejected in August 1954, Adenauer had proven to be pro-European, the FRG had become a cooperative ECSC-member since the ECSC-Treaty was signed in April 1951 and started operating in August 1952, and

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362 Ibid.

363 Ibid.

364 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was deceased. Consequently, Hitchcock argues, German remilitarization ‘had lost its force as a domestic political issue in France.’  

Eventually, French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France agreed to a final arrangement late 1954, accepting the FRG’s rearmament and its NATO-membership in return for controls on Bonn’s sovereignty concerning military affairs. Hitchcock maintains this arrangement succeeded in realizing all France’s primary goals, but without specifying those objectives (in that particular article). Yet, it can be argued that with this Western arrangement on German rearmament, France did succeed in realizing its objectives of containing both the FRG and the SU (to a certain extent), not provoking Soviet intervention by prematurely rearming the FRG and postponing it until NATO had sufficiently rearmed itself to deter Soviet aggression, not prematurely provoking French (anti-German) public opinion, and finally prevent Germany from regaining full sovereignty, including in military affairs. However, Hitchcock indicates, French officials did not have a well-developed strategy in advance to achieve this final arrangement.

Supporting Hitchcock’s claim that with the EDC Paris wanted to keep at bay Washington’s plan of FRG ‘national rearmament’ and postpone German rearmament is Creswell’s account of a crucial French military meeting on December 16, 1950. During this meeting, Moch stressed that Bonn should not be allowed to rearm ‘while Western forces are still not ready.’ French officials implied they would agree with FRG rearmament, once NATO was militarily powerful enough. Once again, Creswell indicates, French officials declared that immediate German rearmament might provoke a powerful Soviet response. Therefore,

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367 Ibid.
369 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.
370 Ibid.
Creswell maintains, France believed that Western allies had to proceed slowly with German rearmament.\textsuperscript{372}

**The EDC’s ratification process**

By February 1951, the six countries participating in the ECSC negotiations started a concurrent intergovernmental conference for founding the EDC. Because the British had objections of principle to supranationalism, they refused to participate.\textsuperscript{373} Eventually, by summer 1951, supporting the EDC became formal US government policy with NSC-115, with Washington wishing that the Paris Conference on the EDC would succeed.\textsuperscript{374}

McAllister argues there are two fundamental reasons that caused Washington to back the EDC’s establishment.\textsuperscript{375} First, powerful officials, such as McCloy and Bruce, convincingly contended that the EDC’s supranationalism was the only option to accommodate French concerns about FRG rearmament and Bonn’s demand ‘that it would only rearm on a nondiscriminatory basis.’\textsuperscript{376} As McAllister indicates, Bonn would refuse to ‘accept discriminatory conditions in an alliance of sovereign states such as NATO.’ However, it would agree with ‘[nondiscriminatory] restrictions within a European institutional framework,’ for all participating states.\textsuperscript{377} Contrary to NATO, McAllister argues, the EDC might solve the

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\textsuperscript{375} McAllister, *No Exit*, 24.

\textsuperscript{376} Quotation is from McAllister, *No Exit*, 24; and ‘The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State’, August 3, 1950, *FRUS, 1950*, Vol. III, 180-182.

\textsuperscript{377} Quotation is from McAllister, *No Exit*, 24.
current deadlock over FRG remilitarization, but also ‘recast the political future of Europe by placing French and German military affairs under’ supranational control.\textsuperscript{378}

The second fundamental reason, McAllister maintains, why the EDC eventually surpassed the NATO option, was Eisenhower’s ‘considerable authority’ supporting the EDC.\textsuperscript{379} By June 1951, Monnet and Bruce had convinced Eisenhower, at that time NATO’s first SACEUR, to support the EDC.\textsuperscript{380} A crucial problem for the EDC was that military officials consistently regarded a European army as impracticable. However, McAllister argues, ‘Eisenhower’s support decisively silenced all criticism of the plan on this basis.’\textsuperscript{381} This statement seems rather over-simplified. Concerning the EDC, Creswell maintains that because of Eisenhower’s excellent military reputation ‘others found it exceedingly difficult to oppose him on issues of national security.’\textsuperscript{382} Yet, Creswell’s account implies that there was still criticism among American officials concerning the EDC.

Weisbrode indicates that despite Eisenhower, US President since January 20, 1953, strongly supported the EDC, ‘there was more confusion than conviction, notably outside EUR [The State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs]’ in the US.\textsuperscript{383} The Pentagon wanted German rearmament ‘but mistrusted “jerry built” schemes like the EDC.’\textsuperscript{384} Meanwhile, McAllister argues, Eisenhower mainly backed the EDC because it could ‘enable Western Europe to emerge as an integrated unit’ capable of durable self-defense ‘without an American military presence.’\textsuperscript{385} Accordingly, McAllister maintains, Eisenhower’s intended aim with the EDC was achieving US military withdrawal from Europe. Eventually, the EDC’s founding treaty was signed on May 27, 1952, in Paris by all ECSC member states.\textsuperscript{386} One day before, the Treaty of Bonn was signed which terminated the Allied High Commission and Occupation Statute, and effectively reinstated the FRG’s sovereignty. However, the ‘Contractual Agreements’ still

\textsuperscript{378} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 24-25. Quotation is from page 25.

\textsuperscript{379} Quotation is from McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 25.


\textsuperscript{381} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 25.

\textsuperscript{382} Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 62.

\textsuperscript{383} Weisbrode, \textit{The Atlanticists}, 95.

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{385} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 25.

\textsuperscript{386} Ibid.; Dinan, \textit{Europe Recast}, 66; and Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.
imposed limits, because the FRG could not; drive out Western forces, sign a German-Soviet peace treaty, adjust its borders, or frustrate ‘Western access to Berlin.’ The Treaty of Bonn would also be subordinate to the EDC-Treaty.\textsuperscript{387}

A crucial question that remains is what was the United States’ intended aim with the EDC? McAllister maintains the EDC was developed to make FRG remilitarization more tolerable for France and was the foundation of Washington’s attempts to establish Western European integration: ‘many American policymakers saw it as the key element in the rebirth of Europe and in winning the Cold War.’\textsuperscript{388} As Creswell indicates, Washington desired transforming the FRG ‘into a military and political bulwark against Soviet Communism,’\textsuperscript{389} something the EDC could arguably enable.

As McAllister indicates, that Washington considered the EDC crucially important is supported by several US policy decisions, such as Washington’s indifference towards the Stalin Note dated March 10, 1952, which suggested reuniting Germany. Essentially, McAllister argues, the Truman administration did not want anything to disrupt the EDC-Treaty’s endorsement,\textsuperscript{390} while the Eisenhower administration would not seek ‘a general Cold War settlement’ after Stalin’s death, because this could obstruct EDC-Treaty ratification.\textsuperscript{391}

Besides pragmatism, McAllister argues that both US administrations principally backed the EDC because they were convinced ‘it represented the best long-term solution to the German problem.’\textsuperscript{392} NSC-160/1, adopted on August 13, 1953, provides some explanation: ‘the EDC was a vital ingredient in the national policy toward Germany as it “is designed to harmonize three aims:(1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{387} Quotation is from Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 90-91; Dinan, \textit{Europe Recast}, 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{389} Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 33-34. Quotation is from page 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{390} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 172; For more information on the connection between the Stalin Note of March 10, 1952, the contractual agreements with the FRG, and the EDC see: Rolf Steiniger, \textit{The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of German Reunification} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
  \item \textsuperscript{391} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 172.
  \item \textsuperscript{392} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.”

Pruessen maintains this EDC-characterization ‘was often Eisenhower’s personal message as well.’ Meanwhile, Creswell argues that when Washington demanded FRG rearmament within a ‘European defense force’, it had three objectives. First, contain and overturn ‘Soviet power and influence.’

Second, reduce Washington’s ‘share of the financial and military burden’ concerning Europe’s defense. And third, secure the FRG ‘firmly in the Western sphere of influence.’

Finally, McAllister argues, both US administrations regarded the EDC as a crucial factor ‘in transforming the basic power structure of the international system.’

McAllister indicates that many American policymakers believed that the EDC would relieve European concerns about reinstating German sovereignty, and that Western Europe merely required ‘political unity’ to ‘become a fully capable third power in the international system.’ Therefore, ‘the EDC was a crucial element’ for creating ‘a fully tripolar system.’

Once this was achieved, McAllister indicates, one of Eisenhower’s most crucial aims might be realized: completely ending the US military presence in Europe.

Pruessen remarks that in the historiography concerning Washington’s EDC involvement, scholars initially primarily stressed US fixations on Communist expansionism. Washington became determined to increase Western Europe’s ‘“containment” contributions,’ including a considerable FRG contribution. However, the West had to face two threats simultaneously. Therefore, the EDC’s use of German power for confronting the Soviet threat


394 Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 67.

395 Quotation is from Creswell, A Question of Balance, 1.

396 Quotations are from Creswell, A Question of Balance, 1-2.

397 McAllister, No Exit, 172.

398 Ibid.

399 Ibid., 172-173.

400 Ibid., 173.

while establishing an official framework for containing Germany, was quite beneficial. Accordingly, Pruessen indicates, the argument was that the West, and Washington in particular, had two primary motives; ‘EDC was conceived as a tool of “dual containment.”’\textsuperscript{402} However, Pruessen argues this concept ‘should be expanded to “triple containment,”’ which includes another significant American motive for supporting the EDC: resolving ‘more broadly European problems.’\textsuperscript{403} According to Washington, Pruessen indicates, European allies often conducted ‘problematic’ policies, what Kennan called ‘bad habits’, such as extreme nationalism, neutralist inclinations and colonialism.\textsuperscript{404} A considerable merit, Pruessen maintains, was the EDC’s potential capacity to steer many valuable European nations in useful directions, particularly toward containing the SU and fixing these structural European problems.\textsuperscript{405}

Pruessen acknowledges Washington’s crucial Cold War motives for supporting the EDC.\textsuperscript{406} Yet, he maintains Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower also considered the EDC as an instrument of ‘triple containment’; a secure way of reintegrating the FRG, and a mechanism to contain both the SU and what the Americans regarded as hazardous European policies, by promoting European integration. Ultimately, Washington wanted ‘France and Germany (...) woven together in a European fabric of mutual understanding and common endeavor.’\textsuperscript{407} Dulles also claimed European defense arrangements required ‘Franco-German [military] integration,’ and only the EDC ‘would provide a basis for such cooperation.’\textsuperscript{408}

\textsuperscript{402} Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52; Schwartz, America’s Germany, 130; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 1-4.

\textsuperscript{403} Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52.

\textsuperscript{404} Ibid., 52; The ‘bad habits’ quotation is from George Kennan in FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 620.

\textsuperscript{405} Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52.

\textsuperscript{406} Ibid., 53. For instance, Pruessen describes the EDC as one element of many 1950s initiatives to reinforce the Western Bloc.


\textsuperscript{408} Quotation is from ‘The Secretary of State to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer)’, November 20, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume V, Part 1, 855.
Pruessen ultimately concludes that a crucial reason for Washington’s strong support for the EDC was its potential capability of ‘triple containment’⁴⁰⁹. Meanwhile, Creswell indicates, West German nationalism was increasing even prior to the ‘single package’, which seriously worried the CIA, the US High Commission in Germany, and US government agencies⁴¹⁰. However, Weisbrode maintains, only few State Department officials were concerned about a German military threat, and the majority acknowledged the need for rearming Germany.⁴¹¹ Within the influential EUR, Weisbrode indicates, many believed American failure ‘to finesse German rearmament’ could have serious repercussions. Therefore, some plan like the EDC, or another scheme, was necessary for realizing German rearmament. Accordingly, Weisbrode implies, the EUR’s primary intended aim for the EDC was delicately achieving German rearmament.⁴¹² This position is a clear indication that the EUR prioritized German rearmament over the EDC itself, while arguably also indicating that the EDC was primarily regarded as a tool for achieving German rearmament.

Meanwhile Washington’s role concerning the EDC was, as Weisbrode indicates, convincing Paris and Bonn to back the EDC, and lobbying the British for support.⁴¹³ Once Washington realized the EDC-Treaty might never be ratified, Dulles warned on December 14, 1953, that without the EDC, Washington would ‘consider an “agonizing reappraisal” of its defense commitment to Western Europe’.⁴¹⁴ Nevertheless, eventually US diplomacy failed to persuade Paris to ratify the EDC-Treaty. Furthermore, Weisbrode argues that Dulles’s ‘agonizing reappraisal’ speech was more puzzling than helpful, confusing US officials whether Dulles was dedicated to the EDC.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹⁰ Creswell, A Question of Balance, 34, and note 60 on page 186.
⁴¹¹ Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 91.
⁴¹² Quotation is from Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 95.
⁴¹³ Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 92.
⁴¹⁵ Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 93, 95; Ruane, ‘Agonizing Reappraisals’, 152. Particularly David Bruce was confused by Dulles’s ‘agonizing reappraisal’ speech. See Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 95.
Weisbrode also maintains that the EUR probably could not have performed better with promoting the EDC, and that Pierre Mendes-France’s actions of August 1954 implied he believed that eventually ‘the German Army’ would be recreated anyway, regardless of EDC-ratification.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, Weisbrode suggests that possibly the EDC was just not taken seriously enough by Washington, because it would conflict with the predominant development of Atlanticism.\textsuperscript{17} However, Weisbrode’s suggestion is incompatible with McAllister’s conclusion that ‘the French rejection of the EDC was the most spectacular defeat of American foreign policy in the early postwar era.’\textsuperscript{18} McAllister indicates Washington did take the EDC seriously, because in response Dulles ‘lash ed out at France’ and declared that only if Western European nations would integrate ‘certain functions of their government into supranational institutions,’ wars between them could be averted.\textsuperscript{19} Shortly after the French National Assembly had rejected the EDC on August 30, 1954, the West arranged an alternative settlement on German rearmament during the London Conference and Paris Conference in September-October 1954. These ‘Paris Accords’ allowed the FRG a national army, its integration into NATO, and German NATO-membership.\textsuperscript{20} Bonn also renounced producing ‘atomic, biological, and chemical (ABC) weapons.’\textsuperscript{21} The Western European Union (WEU), as proposed by British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, would exert controls on Bonn’s military sovereignty. The WEU, founded by the Brussels Treaty in March 1948, was a defensive alliance between the Benelux, France and Britain which would henceforth also include the FRG and Italy.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{16} Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 95-96. Weisbrode also points out that the EUR officials that were responsible, Theodore Achilles and John Hickerson, were initial opponents and could not convincingly advance the EDC. See Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 96.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 96.

\textsuperscript{18} McAllister, No Exit, 242.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.; First quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 242; Second quotation is from ‘Statement by the Secretary of State’, August 31, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume V, part 2, 1120-1122.

\textsuperscript{20} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22; and Creswell, A Question of Balance, 160-162. The London Conference was between September 28 and October 3, 1954, and the Paris Conference took place from 20 to 23 October 1954.

\textsuperscript{21} Quotation is from Creswell, A Question of Balance, 162.

\textsuperscript{22} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22-23; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 161-162; and McAllister, No Exit, 243.
Conclusion

Regarding to what extent the EDC was initiated by the US, Weisbrode is probably correct that the EDC should not be characterized ‘as primarily an American initiative,’ because it evolved from the French Pleven Plan.\textsuperscript{423} However, it is also undeniable that the US has been closely involved in the EDC’s initiation. Washington pressured France hard in September 1950 to present a plan enabling German rearmament and, as Beisner indicates, Acheson later appealed to Schuman that France would agree with the Spofford Plan.\textsuperscript{424} Although Acheson had to make American concessions, as Gehrz and others imply, the ‘single package’ did succeed in initiating a serious process of realizing German rearmament, within a European army structure and with French participation.\textsuperscript{425}

Acheson also asked Schuman to take charge of realizing a European army, indicating Washington’s desire that France would lead this European project enabling German rearmament.\textsuperscript{426} Yet, McAllister indicates, after France’s rejection of the EDC, some lower-ranking US officials did claim that Washington’s approach concerning the EDC could partly be blamed.\textsuperscript{427} Although Weisbrode argues that the EUR could not have performed better with advancing the EDC,\textsuperscript{428} McAllister refers to PPS official Leon Fuller, who claimed that US policy ‘had overemphasized the concept of federalism’ and underestimated nationalist opposition against the EDC.\textsuperscript{429} As McAllister concluded, despite a concrete plan for a supranational European force was introduced by France, Fuller’s plausible explanation for the EDC’s demise was that it became regarded as ‘a US project to force premature federation along military lines involving a high risk of German predominance in a European union, and with a

\textsuperscript{423} Weisbrode, \textit{The Atlanticists}, 91-92. Quotation is from page 92.

\textsuperscript{424} Beisner, \textit{A Life in the Cold War}, 372; and \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume III, 496-498.

\textsuperscript{425} Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 154-155; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22; and Beisner, \textit{A Life in the Cold War}, 372.

\textsuperscript{426} Beisner, \textit{A Life in the Cold War}, 372; Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 151; and \textit{FRUS, 1950}, Volume III, 496-498, 605-606.

\textsuperscript{427} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 242.

\textsuperscript{428} Weisbrode, \textit{The Atlanticists}, 96.

\textsuperscript{429} Quotation is from McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 242.
too apparent concern for realization of EDC as a device for mobilizing German armed forces."\(^{430}\)

Regarding the French intended aim with the EDC, Gavin indicated Monnet’s intended aim with the Pleven Plan was tackling three interdependent French problems: FRG rearmament, keeping Germany restrained and protecting the Schuman Plan.\(^{431}\) Furthermore, Hitchcock is arguably correct that the EDC was created from France’s perspective for warding off Washington’s plan of the FRG’s ‘national rearmament’, and postponing German rearmament.\(^{432}\)

Eventually Paris did succeed in stalling EDC ratification, and its rejection led to a final arrangement on FRG rearmament in 1954 that, as Hitchcock indicated, accomplished virtually all of France’s primary foreign policy objectives.\(^{433}\) These were: containing both the SU and Germany; not provoking Soviet intervention by prematurely rearming West Germany and accordingly deferring German rearmament until NATO had been sufficiently reinforced to withstand Soviet aggression; and preventing Germany from obtaining complete sovereignty, particularly in military affairs.\(^{434}\) Eventually, Creswell is arguably correct that French efforts to postpone and control FRG rearmament implied that disagreements with Washington ‘concerned timing and procedure, not ultimate objectives,’ because Paris did agree that the FRG should make a military contribution to Atlantic defense.\(^{435}\)

Regarding the United States’ intended aim with the EDC, McAllister maintains that the principal reason for the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration to back the EDC was that they believed this framework provided the best durable answer for ‘the German problem.’\(^{436}\) NSC-160/1 provides some clarification describing Washington’s three

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\(^{431}\) Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76.

\(^{432}\) Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.

\(^{433}\) Ibid.


\(^{436}\) McAllister, *No Exit*, 172.
EDC aims: ‘(1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.’

Accordingly, it can be argued that German rearmament for countering Soviet expansionism was Washington’s most crucial short-term aim, and, contrary to McAllister’s account, the primary reason for both US administrations to support the EDC, because of NSC-68’s pressing request for accelerated Western rearmament and its strategy of ‘military containment.’

NSC-68 combined with NSC-82, the ‘single package’, NSC-115 and NSC-160/1 clearly prove the crucial importance that the US attributed to instigating German rearmament. Furthermore, as Weisbrode indicates, the influential EUR also considered the EDC as primarily an instrument for delicately realizing FRG remilitarization. European allies also believed, as Fuller argued, that Washington primarily regarded the EDC ‘as a device for mobilizing German armed forces.’ Another American aim was that the EDC would serve as a tool for FRG’s admittance into NATO.

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438 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3-4; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24-25; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 234-292. See in particular pages 272 and 287-292.


440 Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 95.

441 McAllister, No Exit, 242; Leon Fuller, ‘Post-EDC Reappraisal’, September 2, 1954, Records of the PPS, Box 82, RG 59, NARA; The original quotation is from ‘U.S. Policy Toward Europe-Post-EDC,’ September 10, 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, Volume V, 1170-1177 (Quotation is from page 1170).

442 NSC-82, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 277-278; ‘Memorandum From the Secretary of State and the Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President’ (NSC-115), July 30, 1951, FRUS, 1951, Volume III, Part 1, 849-852. See especially page 852; ‘Report by the North Atlantic Military Committee,’ December 12, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 540.
Pruessen also provided a plausible account, arguing that Eisenhower and Dulles regarded the EDC as an instrument of ‘triple containment’ for containing Germany, the SU, and dangerous European nationalist policies, simultaneously. Another important American motive, McAllister argued, was that for both US administrations involved, ‘the EDC was an essential element in transforming the basic power structure of the international system.’ As McAllister indicated, Washington believed the EDC could reassure Western Europe concerning the FRG’s sovereignty and rearmament. Therefore, Washington maintained, the EDC could advance European integration and enable Western Europe to become ‘a fully capable third power in the international system,’ ultimately allowing complete American military withdrawal from Europe. McAllister maintains this was the primary reason why Eisenhower supported the EDC, so arguably this long-term military objective was also an intended aim with the EDC from the Eisenhower administration.

Ultimately, it can be concluded that the principal intended American aim for the EDC was providing an overarching military structure which would reassure Western European fears of a remilitarized Germany and thus enabling European, and particularly French, acceptance of rearming the FRG. Washington considered this German military contribution to European defense a crucial requirement for containing the SU. As McAllister argues, one of the fundamental reasons for Washington to back the EDC was that influential US officials convincingly maintained that the EDC’s supranationalism was the only option to accommodate French concerns about FRG rearmament, vetoing the recreation of a German

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444 McAllister, No Exit, 172.
445 Ibid., 25, 172-173. Quotes are from page 172.
446 Ibid., 25, 172-173.
national army, and Bonn’s demand ‘that it would only rearm on a nondiscriminatory basis.’

NATO could not provide the military framework for rearming the FRG, McAllister indicates, because the FRG would refuse to concur with discriminatory restrictions within ‘an alliance of sovereign states such as NATO.’ McAllister implied the EDC provided a solution because it enabled German rearmament without creating a German national army, and because Bonn would agree with ‘[nondiscriminatory] restrictions within a European institutional framework,’ applicable to every EDC member.

Eventually, both the National Security Council and the State Department had concluded by summer 1953 ‘that there is no really good alternative to the EDC.’ The ‘three general types of alternatives’ for the EDC that had been rejected, also fundamentally revolved around securing Germany’s military potential for Western defense. Accordingly, both the Truman administration’s and Eisenhower administration’s main reason for supporting the EDC seems to have been its potential as an instrumental framework for enabling German rearmament, thus providing a German military contribution to Western defense, which was primarily motivated by NSC-68’s strategy of ‘military containment’ of the SU.

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449 Quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 24; ‘The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State’, August 3, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Volume III, 180-182.

450 Quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 24.

451 Ibid., 24-25.

452 ‘Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf),’ Washington, July 21, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume V, Part 1, 799-800; These alternatives were: ‘first, German national armed forces,’ ‘second, any plan for the neutralization or unification of Germany,’ and lastly ‘falling back on a “peripheral strategy,”’ meaning giving up on West Germany and Western Europe. Quotes are from ibid., 799.

IV. Conclusion

Regarding to what extent the EDC was initiated by the US, as Weisbrode indicated, characterizing the EDC ‘as primarily an American initiative’ would be inaccurate, because it officially evolved from the French Pleven Plan. Nevertheless, particularly regarding initiating the EDC Washington played a crucially important role. The US had put considerable pressure on the French in September 1950, through the ‘single package’ and Acheson’s controversial diplomacy to force NATO’s compliance with German rearmament, inducing Paris, as several scholars concluded, to present a French plan enabling West German rearmament. The ‘single package’ proposal and Acheson’s coercive diplomacy were unconventional for Washington’s alliance diplomacy. Still, contrary to Gehrz’s account, this can be regarded as an exception within ‘Gaddis’ model of American democratic alliance management,’ since Gaddis does indicate that if Washington considered it imperative, it could in rare cases resort to using coercion against Western partners.

It is plausible that the Truman administration did believe that coercive diplomacy to enforce German rearmament was necessary during that specific Cold War period. Because of the Korean War, increasing Soviet-Western tensions and an eventual Soviet nuclear surprise attack by 1954, Washington believed it was necessary to immediately implement the NSC-68 program and accelerate organizing Western Europe’s defense. Accordingly, it had adopted a position in September 1950 that swift German rearmament was of vital importance for strengthening Western defense. These facts can explain Washington’s sense of urgency,

454 Weisbrode, The Atlanticists, 91-92. Quotation is from page 92.
455 Beisner, A Life in the Cold War, 372; Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 155; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.
456 Gaddis, Rethinking Cold War History, 200-201. Gaddis mentions the 1956 Suez Crisis as an exception to the rule, when the US used coercion because its allies refused to cooperate; and Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 137, 154-155. Quotation is from page 155.
457 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 153-154; Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3-4; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 265-269; ‘Memorandum by the United States Secretary of State: Establishment of a Force for the Defence of Freedom in Europe’, September 15, 1950, NATO, Document No. 5/6, CS-D/6, NATO Archives, 1-3; ‘Verbatim Record of the First Meeting Held in New York on 15th September 1950, at 10:30 a.m.’, 15th September 1950, NATO, Verbatim Record No. 1, C/5-VR/1, NATO Archives, 15-16; and ‘Statement by the Chairman of the Council.”
the ‘single package’ and Acheson’s aggressive diplomacy during September 1950, in order to command European compliance with German rearmament. Furthermore, as Gehrz indicated, Acheson completely supported the ‘single package’ as a useful strategy to impose German rearmament.458

One aspect showing Washington’s crucial influence on initiating the EDC was that as part of the ‘single package’, Acheson demanded that NATO allies would accept instantly to establish a ‘European defense force’, that should incorporate twelve FRG divisions, otherwise Europe would not obtain supplementary US aid.459 However, Washington was not the first introducing such a concept for rearming Germany, because European allies had already unsuccessfully discussed a European army, including FRG divisions, in August 1950.460

Although Gehrz argued Acheson could have adopted ‘less coercive tactics,’ Washington did accomplish with the ‘single package’ to induce a French proposal enabling German rearmament when Paris proposed the Pleven Plan on October 24, 1950.461 Consequently, McAllister’s claim that Acheson’s controversial diplomacy to ‘sell’ the ‘single package’ was a harmful ‘premature effort’ is unjustified and could instead be better described as a

(Verbatim Record Initiated for the Information of Ministers only), NATO, Verbatim Record No. 2, CS-VR/2 (Part), 15th September 1950, NATO Archives, 1-10.


460 Dockrill, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, 23, 32.

461 Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 155; and Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 78; and Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.
necessary evil from Washington’s perspective, because it eventually generated crucial European momentum for tackling the German rearmament problem.\textsuperscript{462}

By November 1950, Beisner indicated, Acheson appealed to Schuman that France would concur with the Spofford Plan and would take charge of creating a ‘European defense force’, showing Washington’s strong involvement in the EDC’s initiation.\textsuperscript{463} Washington’s role would be, as Weisbrode maintained, convincing Paris and Bonn to support the EDC, and lobbying the British for support.\textsuperscript{464} However, a plausible explanation for the EDC’s failure, as given by Fuller and acknowledged by McAllister, was that in Europe it eventually became regarded as ‘A US project to force premature federation (...) with a too apparent concern for realization of EDC as a device for mobilizing German armed forces.’\textsuperscript{465}

Regarding France’s position on the German problem, a complicating factor was that Paris and Washington had several conflicting interests regarding Germany’s reconstruction and rearmament during the early Cold War years. Accordingly, Creswell and Trachtenberg’s conclusion that essentially ‘Western policy [on Germany] was consensual’ before the German rearmament debate from September 1950 onwards, is not plausible.\textsuperscript{466} Although their claim concerning Western consensus on ‘organizing’ western Germany and incorporating it into the West, is arguably right,\textsuperscript{467} Western policy regarding Germany on relating fundamental issues was not consensual. As Hitchcock showed, London objected to

\textsuperscript{462} McAllister, \textit{No Exit}, 191-192; Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 40; Gehrz, “Dean Acheson, the JCS and the ‘Single Package’”, 155; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22.
\textsuperscript{463} Beisner, \textit{A Life in the Cold War}, 372; Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 151; and \textit{FRUS}, 1950, Volume III, 496-498, 605-606.
\textsuperscript{464} Weisbrode, \textit{The Atlanticists}, 92-96.
\textsuperscript{466} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 15-16.
French initiatives since late 1948 for European integration including Germany, and France was determined to maintain Allied occupation controls, while the US wanted a strongly liberalized occupation regime in Germany. For Washington, Hitchcock indicated, French obstructionism concerning Germany’s reconstruction, particularly before summer 1948, was a crucial issue because it could interfere with the Containment strategy. Particularly in the long term, it would frustrate Kennan’s Containment strategy’s first stage, restoring the international power equilibrium by stimulating self-confidence and economic reconstruction in countries ‘threatened by Soviet expansionism,’ such as West Germany.

Finally, as Wall and Hitchcock concluded, France did not have much choice in accepting the ‘western strategy’, primarily because of its dependence on US aid, its weak international position, and because it had no viable alternative. Accordingly, Hitchcock concluded, Paris ultimately welcomed it, adopting European integration as a strategy to contain Germany, reinforce France’s economic reconstruction and increase France’s international power. Like scholars such as Cogan and Hitchcock argued before, it can be concluded that keeping Germany subdued, and particularly preventing German military sovereignty, remained France’s primary objective of its German policy.

Nevertheless, as Creswell maintained, many French policymakers concurred that West Germany had to be rearmed for counterbalancing the conventional Soviet military superiority. Accordingly, Paris did not completely dismiss Washington’s demand of swiftly

468 Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 100.
469 Ibid., 99-101.
470 Ibid., 100; and CIA Report, ‘Political Trends in Western Germany,’ July 22, 1948, President’s Secretary’s Files, box 255, *Harry S. Truman Papers*, HSTL.
473 Hitchcock, *France Restored*, 100-101, 204.
rearming Germany. France also feared that the US Congress would cut American aid otherwise.\textsuperscript{477} Essentially, the French approach to rearming Germany was that ‘it was really only a question of timing,’ starting with increasing NATO’s military power.\textsuperscript{478} As Creswell and Trachtenberg maintained, France’s fundamental position was that only when a Western defense organization had been established powerful enough for incorporating FRG troops and for coping with the Soviet response, FRG rearmament would be acceptable.\textsuperscript{479} However, Creswell observed, only after Washington had rejected French plans for Atlantic integration as a framework for German rearmament,\textsuperscript{480} did Monnet start considering a European army.\textsuperscript{481}

Because France was considerably pressured to accept FRG rearmament with the ‘single package’, it responded with a constructive alternative: the Pleven Plan.\textsuperscript{482} Therefore it can be concluded, as argued by Creswell and Trachtenberg, Sheetz, and Hitchcock, that Paris was instigated by the Truman administration to develop an alternative plan for German remilitarization, which intended, however, to prevent an American initiative for direct


\textsuperscript{482} Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22; Sheetz, ‘Avant-garde or Rearguard?’, 43-44; Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 29-31.
German rearmament and postpone remilitarization. Eventually, it can be argued that keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, was the primary reason for the French government’s efforts to delay German rearmament, rather than Creswell and Trachtenberg’s suggestion that first the West should be ‘strong enough to withstand the Soviet reaction,’ which was nevertheless also a crucial factor. Ultimately, it can be concluded that although the US was not officially responsible for introducing the EDC-concept to its European allies, Washington did play a crucial role in initiating the EDC by demanding European acceptance of FRG rearmament and in steering the solution for this problem towards creating a supranational European army.

Regarding the French intended aim with the EDC, it is important to note that French officials seriously worried about the possible negative effect that FRG rearmament could have on establishing the ECSC. As Hitchcock indicated, Seydoux and Monnet warned in September 1950 that German rearmament could lead Adenauer to believe this would normalize the FRG’s international and sovereign status, and that Bonn would therefore lose its motivation for ECSC participation. Meanwhile, Gavin observed, the Quai d’Orsay

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483 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35; Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 22; Sheetz, ‘Avant-garde or Rearguard?’, 43-44; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 29-32.

484 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32; See in particular the following scholars that argued that keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, remained France’s primary objective of its German policy: Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, 8, 12-14; Gerbet, Le Relèvement, 260, 279, Hitchcock, France Restored, 4-5, 139-141; Cogan, ‘Response to Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’, 31; and Note, September 10, 1950, MAE, EU [Europe] 1949-1955, subseries Allemagne, Vol. 68.

485 Quotation is from Creswell and Trachtenberg, ‘France and the German Question’, 21. For supporting their claim, Creswell and Trachtenberg refer to the notes of the Comité de Défense Nationale meeting, 16 December 1950, in AN, Vincent Auriol Papers (552 AP44), 4AUS/Dr 1.


maintained that the FRG rearmament issue ‘was subordinate to’ the fundamental French policy objective that Germany could not regain full sovereignty. 

Consequently, Gavin indicated, Monnet’s intended aims with the Pleven Plan were tackling the German rearmament problem, keeping Germany subdued and protecting the Schuman Plan. Furthermore, as Hitchcock maintained, the EDC was created from the French government’s perspective for precluding Washington’s plan of the FRG’s ‘national rearmament’, and for postponing German rearmament. Meanwhile however, the French military primarily favored swift German rearmament. Eventually, France succeeded in stalling EDC ratification, and its rejection resulted in a final arrangement on FRG rearmament in 1954 that, as Hitchcock maintained, accomplished France’s primary foreign policy objectives. Finally, as Creswell concluded, French efforts to delay and control FRG rearmament indicated that disagreements with Washington concerned pace and method, not fundamental aims, because many French civilian officials did agree that Bonn should make a military contribution to Atlantic defense.

Concerning the United States’ intended aim with the EDC, it can be concluded that Washington actually had multiple aims. NSC-160/1 provides crucial explanation, defining three interdependent American aims with the EDC: ‘(1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.’

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489 Gavin, ‘Power through Europe?’, 76.

490 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.

491 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 30, 38.

492 Hitchcock, ‘Response to “France and the German Question”’, 35.


494 Quotation is from ‘Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf)’, July 21, 1953, FRUS,
The first objective was arguably Washington’s most crucial short-term aim, because of NSC-68’s strategy of ‘military containment’ and its pressing request for an accelerated Western rearmament effort. According to RUANE, the Truman administration and Eisenhower administration would have backed the EDC, rather than McAllister’s claim that both believed this structure provided the best durable answer for ‘the German problem.’

As Ruane indicated, as the Soviet threat became more urgent with the Korean War, so did NSC-68. Consequently, Washington wanted to swiftly obtain an FRG military contribution, in a way that was acceptable for European allies. Accordingly, securing German rearmament was the primary incentive for the State Department to develop the EDF concept, which was very similar to the European army as part of the EDC. Furthermore, considering NSC-68’s ‘military containment’, it can be argued that ‘securing of a German contribution to European defense,’ was first and foremost required for creating the necessary amount of Western military strength for containing Soviet expansionism. Arguably only after these security conditions had been created, in line with NSC-68, there would be a solid framework that could facilitate ‘the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.

NSC-68 combined with NSC-82, the ‘single package’, NSC-115 and NSC-160/1 clearly prove the vital importance that Washington attributed to realizing German rearmament, and also provide a clear indication that enabling German rearmament was Washington’s primary


495 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 234-292. See in particular pages 272 and 287-292.

496 McAllister, No Exit, 172.


intended aim with the EDC.\textsuperscript{499} Moreover, Weisbrode indicated, within the EUR, responsible for promoting the EDC, this concept was predominantly considered as an instrument for delicately bringing about FRG rearmament.\textsuperscript{500} Another indication, McAllister showed, was PPS official Fuller’s observation that European allies believed that Washington considered the EDC ‘as a device for mobilizing German armed forces.’\textsuperscript{501} NSC-82 and NSC-115 indicated another American aim: the EDC would enable achieving the FRG’s NATO-membership.\textsuperscript{502} Eventually, Pruessen maintained, the EDC’s use of FRG power for confronting the Soviet threat while establishing an official structure for containing Germany, resulted in the EDC being regarded by Washington ‘as a tool of “dual containment.”’\textsuperscript{503} Pruessen’s argument that Eisenhower regarded the EDC as an instrument of ‘triple containment’, also containing European nationalist policies, was arguably not Washington’s primary intended aim with the EDC, because it would still first require FRG rearmament before the EDC could implement ‘triple containment.’\textsuperscript{504}

Another important aim for both US administrations, as McAllister argued, was that the EDC would reassure Western Europe regarding the FRG’s sovereignty and rearmament, and would advance European integration significantly. Especially from the Eisenhower administration’s perspective, McAllister indicated, the EDC could therefore enable Western


\textsuperscript{500} Weisbrode, \textit{The Atlanticists}, 95.


\textsuperscript{503} Quotation is from Pruessen, ‘One Corner of a Triangle’, 52; Schwartz, \textit{America’s Germany}, 130; Creswell, \textit{A Question of Balance}, 1-4; and ‘McCloy to Secretary of State’, August 3, 1950, \textit{FRUS}, 1950, Vol. III, 181.

Europe to eventually become a powerful third international bloc, ultimately making a permanent US military presence in Europe superfluous.\(^{505}\) This American aim can arguably also be regarded as an effort to restore the international power equilibrium in line with Kennan’s first stage of the Containment strategy.\(^{506}\)

Eventually, it can be concluded that for both US administrations involved the principal intended aim for the EDC was implementing a supranational structure capable of reassuring Western European fears of a remilitarized FRG and thus enabling European, and particularly French, acceptance of FRG rearmament.\(^{507}\) Washington considered a German military contribution to European defense a crucial requirement for containing the USSR.\(^{508}\) Meanwhile, as McAllister argued, influential US officials convincingly maintained that only the EDC’s supranationalism could accommodate French concerns about FRG rearmament and Bonn’s insistence on rearmament ‘on a nondiscriminatory basis.’\(^{509}\) The FRG refused to concur with discriminatory restrictions within ‘an alliance of sovereign states such as NATO.’\(^{510}\) Consequently, McAllister indicated, the EDC provided a solution because it enabled German rearmament without creating a German national army and without complete FRG sovereignty, while establishing ‘[non-discriminatory] restrictions within a European institutional framework.’\(^{511}\)

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\(^{505}\) McAllister, No Exit, 25, 172-173.

\(^{506}\) Ibid., 25, 172-173; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 35, 54-55.


\(^{509}\) Quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 24; ‘The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State’, August 3, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, 180-182.

\(^{510}\) Quotation is from McAllister, No Exit, 24.

\(^{511}\) Ibid., 24-25.
Accordingly, Washington’s primary intended aim with the EDC was, as NSC 160/1 stated, ‘securing of a German contribution to European defense,’ and its main reason for supporting the EDC was probably its potential as an instrumental framework for enabling a German military contribution, primarily motivated by NSC-68’s doctrine of ‘military containment’ and NSC-68’s urgent request for an accelerated effort to strengthen Western defense. Eventually, concerning that particular Cold War period between 1950-54, it can be argued that Washington’s ambition to transform the FRG, in Creswell’s words, ‘into a military and political bulwark against Soviet Communism,’ was fundamentally incompatible with France’s primary objective of its German policy of keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, and these conflicting interests ultimately collided during the EDC affair.

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512 Quotation is from ‘Memorandum by Russell Fessenden of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Political-Military Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs (Wolf)’, July 21, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Volume V, Part 1, 799.

513 Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community, 3-4; Creswell, A Question of Balance, 24-26; and NSC-68, FRUS, 1950, Volume I, 234-292. See in particular pages 272 and 287-292.

514 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 33-34. Quotation is from page 33.

515 Creswell, A Question of Balance, 32; See in particular the following scholars that argued that keeping Germany subdued, particularly regarding military affairs, remained France’s primary objective of its German policy: Harrison, The Reluctant Ally, 8, 12-14; Gerbet, Le Relèvement, 260, 279, Hitchcock, France Restored, 4-5, 139-141; Cogan, ‘Response to Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg’, 31; and Note, September 10, 1950, MAE, EU [Europe] 1949-1955, subseries Allemagne, Vol. 68.
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