WHOSE CULTURAL HERITAGE?
CRIMEAN TREASURES AT THE CROSSROADS OF
POLITICS, LAW AND ETHICS

Evelien Campfens*

INTRODUCTION

Restitution claims concerning cultural objects are often cause for vivid controversies, where concepts of property and State sovereignty are intertwined with intangible aspects such as a cultural-historical or religious identity. A case which exemplifies this is the so-called ‘Crimean Gold’ case, currently being litigated in Amsterdam.

At stake are 500-or-so archaeological artefacts from the Crimean Peninsula that had been sent to Amsterdam on a short-term loan by four Crimean museums for the exhibition ‘Crimea: Gold and Secrets from the Black Sea’ at the Allard Pierson Museum. The period of this exhibition in 2014 coincided with a series of political events, resulting in the Russian annexation of Crimea and its secession in March 2014 from the Ukrainian State of which the Peninsula had been part since 1954. This secession, however, is not recognised by most other States, including the Netherlands, adding a layer of complexity to the case. After the exhibition, the Allard Pierson was confronted with two competing claims to the objects: the Ukrainian State on the one hand and the Crimean museums on the other. Ukraine claims the objects as national patrimony and State property; the Crimean museums seek their return on the basis of guarantees contained in the loan agreement and the argument that Crimea is the ‘true home’ of the artefacts – having been discovered and preserved there over time.

In December 2016, the Amsterdam District Court delivered a first substantive verdict in this case:¹ it found in favour of the Ukrainian State and ordered the return of the objects to Kiev on the basis of the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.² It seems that the parties will continue their legal battle over the artefacts: by the time of publication of this article, it is expected that the appeal procedure will be well under way.

The Crimean Gold case presents a wealth of political, legal and ethical dilemmas for experts in our field, sufficient reason for an intermediary report. The present paper aims to detach from the political context and to focus on some of the legal and ethical issues, giving special


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* Ph.D. Candidate, Grotius Centre, University of Leiden; from 2002-2016 general secretary of the Dutch Restitutions Committee (Advisory Committee on the Assessment of Restitution Applications for Items of Cultural Value and the Second World War).
attention to the position of right-holders other than nation States (like local communities, indigenous peoples or individuals) in the international legal framework for return requests. To that end:

- Part I will give background information and an overview of the events leading up to the December ruling;
- Part II will discuss the legal arguments of the parties – in as far these can be deduced from the ruling3 – and summarise the verdict, focusing on the Court’s interpretation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention regarding the questions ‘what is unlawful transfer?’ and ‘who can make a claim for their return?’
- To conclude, Part III will touch upon aspects not addressed in the verdict, namely (i) the role of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its First Protocol;4 (ii) the status of right holders beyond the Nation State; and (iii) alternative dispute resolution and its role in cultural heritage disputes.

I. BACKGROUND

1. The Artefacts

‘Crimea: Gold and Secrets from the Black Sea’ at the Allard Pierson Museum in Amsterdam (hereafter also: AP Museum) was the second stage of an international travelling exhibition showing artefacts – jewellery, weapons, decorative objects – from five Ukrainian museums. Four of these were Crimean museums – the Tavrida Central Museum in Simferopol, the Kerch Historical and Cultural Preserve in Kerch, the Bakhchisaray History and Culture State Preserve of the Republic of Crimea in Bakhchisaray and the National Preserve of ‘Tauric Chersonesos’ in Sabastopol – and there was one museum in Kiev, the National Museum of History.5 Before travelling to Amsterdam, the exhibition was displayed in the Landesmuseum in Bonn.

The exhibition’s alternate title, ‘The Crimea: Greeks, Scythians and Goths at the Black Sea’, better characterises the objects. The exhibition would:

reveal the rich history of the peninsula colonised by the Greeks since the seventh century BC. The Crimea and the Black Sea were and remain an important crossroads between Europe and Asia.

As described in the announcement by the AP Museum. The artefacts, in other words, are testimony to the various civilisations the Peninsula has known. One exhibit, a Chinese lacquer box dating from the Han dynasty, for example, attests to Crimea’s position as part of the Silk Road.6

The present case is often referred to as the ‘Scythian Gold case’,7 a possible cause for confusion as the name ‘Scythian Gold’ is also used for a well-known collection of antiquities

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3 N.B. in the Netherlands, the Parties’ procedural documents are not public; the interpretation given in this article is therefore mainly based on the Court rulings.
5 The nineteen objects from the National Museum of History in Kiev were returned to Ukraine after the exhibition ended in Aug. 2014.
excavated from the territory of the present-day Ukraine preserved in the Russian Hermitage. That other collection of Scythian Gold had been the subject of a dispute which arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. It should be clear here that the artefacts at stake in the dispute in the Netherlands are not the same as the controversial Scythian Gold treasures from the Hermitage. In short, since the objects from the National Museum of History in Kiev were returned to Ukraine after the exhibition ended in August 2014, the objects at stake in this dispute are Crimean archaeological artefacts, that, until the loan, were part of four museum collections situated in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine.

2. Loan Agreements and Export Licences

To arrange for the loan of the objects from Ukraine to Bonn (from July 2013) and to Amsterdam (from February 2014), agreements were finalised in the spring of 2013. The parties to the agreements were the representatives of the Landesmuseum and the AP Museum on one side, and their counterparts at the five Ukrainian museums – one in Kiev and four in Crimea – on the other. The loan agreements stipulated that the AP Museum would return the loaned materials to each of the five museums in a timely manner “after the expiration of the term of the temporary storage for the purpose of demonstration”. The interests of Ukraine surface in the loan agreements in the reference to the objects as part of the ‘Museum Fund of Ukraine’ and a reminder that the parties:

realize that the exhibits of the exhibition are the property of Ukraine and world civilization and shall take all possible measures to avoid their loss and damage.

The Ukrainian executive branch of the Government approved the loans by signing export licences in June 2013 and an extension authorisation in January 2014.

3. Geopolitical Events

However, the exhibition at the AP Museum coincided with the Ukrainian-Russian political and military crisis with major consequences for the status of the Crimean objects. The Amsterdam court summarised the events as follows:

On 6 March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) agreed on the secession from Ukraine and accession to the Russian Federation. On 16 March 2014, the ARC held a referendum and voters in Crimea were in favour of accession to the Russian Federation. On 18 March 2014, the ARC and Sevastopol became part of the Russian Federation.

It is beyond the scope of this article – and the expertise of the author – to delve into the history of the region. It seems relevant, however, to note that Crimea has its own, turbulent, history. It was under Ottoman rule when it was annexed in 1783 by the Russian Empire, remaining under Russian influence till 1954, when it was transferred by an order of Nikita Khrushchev from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (both within the Soviet Union). In 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it gained its autonomous status within the newly founded independent Ukrainian State.

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9 Id. Verdict at 2.2 and 2.8.
10 Id. Verdict 3.4; Art. 7.1 of the Loan Agreements.
11 Id. Verdict at 2.3 and 2.4.
12 Id. Verdict 2.5.
From 1954 until the secession and Russian annexation in 2014, in other words, the Crimean peninsula was under Ukrainian rule.

The secession of Crimea – the ARC – from the Ukrainian State and the annexation by the Russian Federation in 2014, however, was not recognised by most other nation States, including the Netherlands. Ukraine took the position that Crimea was temporarily occupied rather than permanently annexed, and the General Assembly of the United Nations underlined the territorial integrity of Ukraine by adopting Resolution 68/262 in March 2014.\footnote{15}

That the Russian Federation considers Crimea as its territory while the international community regards the annexation as unlawful occupation of Ukrainian territory has international legal consequences. It may suffice in this regard to allude to the difficulties of a situation where the Ukrainian State is considered to be the lawful representative of Crimea but lacks effective control over the territory. Besides, it may be obvious that any official act that could be understood as a de facto recognition of the illegal situation – such as the return of cultural objects other than to the Ukrainian State – might cause political problems.

4. Competing Claims

During the exhibition, the AP Museum was confronted with competing demands for return of the objects that had come from Crimea: Ukraine on the one hand and the Crimean Museums on the other. From March 2014 onwards, the four Crimean museums insisted that the AP Museum return all objects to the lending institutions as stipulated in the loan agreements.\footnote{16}

That same month, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine requested an early return of the Crimean treasures to the State of Ukraine, stating that Ukraine was working on the return of all artefacts that belonged to the State Museum Fund as they were “national treasures and an integral part of the cultural heritage of Ukraine protected by law”.\footnote{17}

By July 2014, the AP Museum suspended its obligations under the loan agreement to return the objects to the four Crimean museums, and, instead, adopted a position that it had no interest in the Crimean treasures and simply wanted to return the artefacts to the entitled party, but that it did not want to be held liable for breach of contract or damages claimed by the other party.\footnote{18} This position was consistent with the AP Museum’s decision to return objects that had been borrowed from the National Museum of History of Ukraine in Kiev after the termination of the exhibition in August 2014.\footnote{19}

Less than two months later, on 19th November 2014, the four Crimean museums commenced legal proceedings against the AP Museum before the District Court of Amsterdam.\footnote{20} Ukraine’s request to intervene was granted by the Amsterdam District Court a few months later, on 8th April 2015.\footnote{21}
At that point, the Dutch State also asked to be admitted as a party to the civil proceedings in order “to see that its international obligations would not be jeopardised” and to prevent the artefacts from being returned to the Crimean Museums “unless it would be definitely and irrevocably established the Crimean Museums are the entitled party”. 22 This request was rejected by the Court in its April 2015 verdict on the grounds that the Dutch State lacked a specific interest in the outcome as it had shown no intentions to file an independent claim. This last point is of interest, as a basis for legal action would seem to exist under the 1954 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (hereafter: 1954 Protocol). 23 The Dutch State could (or even should), on this view, have taken the artefacts into custody for safekeeping pending their return to the appropriate party. This issue will be discussed in Part III as that path was not taken.

The Russian Federation did not enter the debate independently.

5. Immunity from Seizure?

One may ask, what was the role of immunity arrangements with the Dutch State to avoid litigation over works of art on short-term loan? In the Netherlands, this can be arranged by so-called ‘letters of comfort’, documents issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that aim to provide some degree of immunity from seizure for cultural property from foreign States in the event of international loans. More specifically, such letters are issued to the borrowing museum to pass on to the lending institutions and explain that:

the Government of the Netherlands will do everything that is legally within its power to ensure that the art object loaned by the foreign State will not be encumbered at any time while it is located on Dutch territory. 24

In the present case, such letters indeed were issued to the Crimean institutions; however, although such ‘letters of comfort’ may provide some protection (against attachment by others than the ‘foreign State’), they do not provide immunity from lawsuits, at least not in the Dutch situation. 25

II. The 2016 Amsterdam District Court Ruling

The arguments of the three parties – the four Crimean Museums, the Ukrainian State, and the AP Museum – and the Court ruling will be discussed below, in Part II. 26 In this discussion, the focus will be on the Court’s interpretation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention concerning

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22 Ibid. 4.6 and 5.4. According to the Court, the interest of the Dutch State could be better served by the right to a hearing as provided for by Art. 44 Rv [Dutch Code of Civil Procedure].
25 Cf. a US case, Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam 517 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D.C. 2007), ruling that foreign States lending art to the United States were not per se immune from jurisdiction, even if the loaned objects were immune from seize. In the US in 2016, however, the Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act (FCEJICA), or Art Museum Amendment, was passed into law, narrowing the expropriation exception in the FSIA to provide greater immunity from suit for foreign States lending artworks to the United States for temporary exhibit.
26 See above, note 4.
the questions as to what constitutes ‘unlawful transfer’, and which parties are entitled to make a return claim under the Dutch implementation laws of the UNESCO Conventions.

1. **The Arguments**

The opposing parties based their claims for the return of the Crimean objects, summarised (and at points, simplified), on the following arguments. Ukraine claimed legal ownership of the loaned objects on the basis of Ukrainian law, which deems archaeological objects to be State property. In addition, it relied on the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1954 Protocol for its international return claim. The Crimean Museums based their claim for the return of the objects on the loan agreement and on their rights of operational management. In their view, this right is stronger than the ‘bare’ ownership rights Ukraine may have, taking into account the close cultural-historical ties of the objects with the territory and people of Crimea, as well as the principle of the integrity of museum collections. The Crimean institutions, in other words, argued that they are the ‘true home’ of the archaeological findings as they were discovered and preserved there over time, while Ukraine argued on the basis of its sovereign rights over the Crimean territory that the artefacts are part of its national patrimony, protected by international conventional law.

On 14th December 2016, the civil chamber of the Amsterdam District Court held in favour of Ukraine and against the Crimean Museums by relying on the interstate return system as provided for in the 1970 UNESCO Convention. The following issues were discussed in the verdict:

- The obligations imposed by the loan agreement
- Who is legally entitled to the collection(s)?
- How does the 1970 UNESCO Convention and its implementation in the Netherlands apply?

2. **Contractual Obligations in the Loan Agreement**

One of the questions presented to the Court was whether or not the AP Museum was bound by its contractual obligations as to the ‘timely return of the exhibits to the museum’, given the change in circumstances in Ukraine. The loan agreements clearly spelled out an obligation to return the objects to their specific lending museums. That said, the choice of law clause in the loan agreement made Ukrainian law determinative, and according to Ukrainian Law article 652 CCU, any agreement can be terminated by the contracting parties in case of a ‘material change in circumstances’.27 A similar provision can be found in Dutch law.

The Dutch Court held that the Crimean annexation was indeed a ‘material change in circumstances’, justifying the termination of the AP Museum’s contractual obligations.28 The Court – referring as well to its main conclusion that the Ukrainian return request should be honoured (see below, 4.2) – set aside the loan agreement and found that the AP Museum was within its rights not to return the artefacts to the Crimean Museums.

3. **Legal Title to the Artefacts**

On the matter of legal title to the objects, as expected, opinions differ between Ukraine and the Crimean Museums.

Ukraine bases its claim on a Decree of 2nd February 2000 designating the collections of

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27 Verdict 4.24, 4.25.
28 Verdict 4.27.
the four Crimean museums as Ukrainian State property. More generally, Ukraine invokes
Ukrainian laws vesting ownership of all archaeological finds in the State, one of those
being the 2004 Law of Ukraine on Protection of Archaeological Heritage. Underlining
this argument is the premise that the secession of Crimea is irrelevant to the legal status of
Ukrainian-registered cultural objects.

The Crimean Museums, on the other hand, argue that the matter is more complex; the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC), not Ukraine, should be considered to be the
owner of the majority of the loaned objects. The ARC has had autonomous status since the
foundation of Ukraine as an independent nation in the early 1990s. Moreover, according to
the 1996 version of the Ukrainian Constitution, ARC is entitled to autonomously administer
its possessions and to keep and use its historical objects. Given that three of the four Crimean
Museums were apparently founded by ARC independently, the Crimean Museums believe
the ARC should be considered to have title to all the objects other than those from the
Sevastopol museum, which was founded by Ukraine. Further, they maintain that Ukraine’s
‘bare ownership right’ over the objects is superseded by the superior rights of the Crimean
Museums on the basis of their rights of ‘operational management’. Under the previous
version of the Ukrainian law, at least until May 2014, the Crimean Museums enjoyed
certain in rem rights known as ‘operational management rights’ over the objects in their
care. Following the annexation of Crimea, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture transferred
the operational management right over Crimean-based Ukrainian national patrimony to the
National Historical Museum of Ukraine. The Crimean Museums contest the legality of
this transfer.

Not without significance – and as a reminder that ‘national patrimony’ is a relative concept
– the Russian Federation adopted a law on 4th February 2015, which states that museum
collections in Crimea are to be included in the national museum registry of the Russian
Federation.

The Court in its December 2016 ruling avoided the issue of ownership. Instead, it limited
itself to the question as to whom the AP Museum was obliged to return the objects to on
the basis of the Dutch Heritage Act 2016 – the law implementing the 1970 UNESCO
Convention in the Netherlands. Questions as to ownership should be decided, according

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29 Decree on the basis of Art. 15 para. 3 of the Law of Ukraine on Museum and Museum Affairs of
29 June 1995. See: Verdict, 3.4.
30 Under the heading of ‘Rights and Duties of Archaeological Researchers’ Art. 18 reads: “Finds,
received in the result of archaeological research (immovable and movable items, which
were connected with the object of archaeological heritage and discovered and documented
during archaeological research) are the [sic] state property.” Law of Ukraine on Protection of
Archaeological Heritage (Vidomosti of Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2004, No. 26, p. 361), UNESCO
Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws: http://www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/
ukraine/ua_law_protection_archaelogical_heritage_engtof.pdf (acc. April 1, 2017). Moreover,
the Law of Ukraine on Protection of Cultural Heritage of 2000, Art. 17, confirms that all
‘archaeological finds’ are State property. (Vidomosti of Verkhovna Rada (VVR), 2000, No. 39, p.
333); See: UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws: (accessed. 1 April 2017).
31 Verdict 3.2.
32 Per Order No. 292 On Transfer of Museum Objects to the National Historical Museum of Ukraine
33 Verdict 3.2.
and tourism as related to the annexation of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation ...”
Information provided by Irina Tarsis.
35 The Dutch Heritage Act 2016 (officially ‘Act of December 9, 2015, Relating to the Combining
and Amendment of Rules Regarding Cultural Heritage’), supersedes the earlier Implementation
to the Verdict, once these objects have been returned to the State from which they came, as will be elaborated upon below.36

4. The 1970 UNESCO Convention

Ukraine as well as the Netherlands (and Russia) are States Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention and have implemented its principles, albeit in different ways. The Convention is non-self-executing: it needs to be implemented in domestic law, which in the Netherlands took effect with the Implementation Act of 2009 that was replaced by the Heritage Act 2016.

The aim of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, to which 132 countries are party as of June 2017, was to attain a minimum level of uniform protection against the illicit trafficking of cultural objects and international co-operation and solidarity in doing so. Its rationale, stated in Article 2, is the recognition of the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property as “one of the main causes of the impoverishment of the cultural heritage of the countries of origin”.38

The Convention’s pillars are:

- Adopting protective measures, such as creating national inventories of cultural property (Article 5). (The Museum Fund in Ukraine, for example);
- Control of the movement of cultural property through a system of export certificates and laws prohibiting the import of stolen objects (Articles 6-9). (As Ukraine issued temporary export licences with regard to the Crimean treasures.)
- The interstate return of illicitly transferred cultural property (Articles 3 and 7).

4.1 Unlawful Transfer?

The provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the product of lengthy negotiations, are very generally, and even, at times, vaguely, phrased. As a consequence, various interpretations can co-exist, such as what exactly falls under the definition of ‘illicit’ import, export or transfer.39 This is important, as Ukraine’s request for return was based on the argument that the unlawfulness of the situation is created by the non-return of the objects once the export licences had expired, while the way the objects had been sent abroad on a short-term loan and had entered the Netherlands was perfectly legal.

Under Ukraine’s implementing legislation for the UNESCO Convention, the expiration of an export licence results in an ‘illicit’ situation:

Those cultural values, which were temporarily exported from Ukraine and were not returned in the period provided by the contract, are considered [to have been] unlawfully exported.40

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36 The court rules that on the basis of Art. 1012 RV (Dutch Code of Civil Procedure) legal ownership of a cultural object shall be determined upon return of the cultural object in the country that requested its return by its national laws. Verdict, 4.17.
40 Law of Ukraine on Exportation, importation and restitution of cultural values, Art. 23 (Vidomosti Verkhovna Rada (BBP), 1999, No. 48, p. 405): “Those cultural values, which were temporarily exported from Ukraine and were not returned in the period provided by the contract, are
The applicable provisions of the Dutch Heritage Act, however, do not provide for the unlawfulness of the situation in case of non-return after a loan abroad. Article 6.7 of the Dutch Heritage Act makes the illicit import the sole prerequisite for return:

The return of cultural property imported into The Netherlands in breach of the prohibition as referred to in Section 6.3 may be claimed [...] by proceedings brought by the State Party from which the property originates or by the party with valid title to such property.\textsuperscript{41}

In its December 2016 decision, the Amsterdam District Court concluded on this point that the term ‘illicit import’ in the Dutch Heritage Act should be interpreted broadly and in such a way as to include a situation where the illegality is created by the non-return after the expiration of the loan contract or export licences. To come to this interpretation, the Court argued that to exclude a situation like the present would be contrary to the aim of the 1970 Convention.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the Court drew inspiration from the 2014 European Union Directive on unlawfully removed cultural objects,\textsuperscript{43} and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention,\textsuperscript{44} both of which include in their definition of ‘unlawfully removed’ cultural objects, objects that were not returned at the end of a period of lawful temporary removal. The Court furthermore found it:

not without importance that according to Ukrainian law [...] objects will be deemed illegally exported if they have not returned after the lapse of time limits mentioned in export licences.\textsuperscript{45}

Here the Court implicitly confirmed the view that the \textit{lex originis} should be decisive for the question as to what constitutes ‘unlawful transfer’ of cultural objects. The country of origin’s domestic law governs this matter, with the result that ‘illicit export’ means that an object which is considered by the country of origin to have been illicitly exported should then be considered to have been ‘illicitly imported’ if it enters other countries, thereby creating a sufficient basis for return claims under the UNESCO system. For the international

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Act of 9 Dec. 2015 Relating to the Combining and Amendment of Rules Regarding Cultural Heritage (Dutch Heritage Act) (9 Dec. 2015). Article 6.7. Article 6.3 reads: “It is prohibited to import into the Netherlands cultural property which: a) has been removed from the territory of a State Party and is in breach of the provisions adopted by that State Party, in accordance with the objectives of the 1970 UNESCO Convention in respect of the export of cultural property from that State Party or the transfer of ownership of cultural property, or b) has been unlawfully appropriated in a State Party.
\item See Art. 2, above. Not that the 1970 UNESCO itself provides much clarity by stating in Art. 7 in very general terms that States Parties undertake, at the request of the States Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural property imported [...]. The Court relied, however, for the interpretation of the 1970 Convention on the scholarly opinion of P.J. O’Keeffe (2017, above, note 39), and L.P.C. Belder’s doctoral thesis ‘The Legal protection of cultural heritage in international law and its implementation in Dutch Law’ (2014, not published).
\item Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 relating to the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012, states in Art. 2: “unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State” means: (a) removed from the territory of a Member State in breach of its rules on the protection of national treasures or in breach of Regulation (EC) No 116/2009; or (b) not returned at the end of a period of lawful temporary removal or any breach of another condition governing such temporary removal.
\item UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects Art. 5.2 (2), 24 June 1995 “A cultural object which has been temporarily exported from the territory of the requesting State, for purposes such as exhibition, research or restoration, under a permit issued according to its law regulating its export for the purpose of protecting its cultural heritage and not returned in accordance with the terms of that permit shall be deemed to have been illegally exported.”
\item Verdict at 4.15.
\end{enumerate}
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protective framework to be successful, recognition of the laws of the country of origin indeed seems a logical precondition. This basic principle had already been recognised, in 1991 in a Resolution of the Institut de Droit International,\(^{46}\) and at present seems generally accepted, as well as in line with the Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the 1970 Convention adopted in May 2015.\(^ {47}\)

For the Crimean case, it means that the non-return of the artefacts after the lapse of the loan agreement – illicit export under Ukrainian law – creates the ‘illicit’ situation the UNESCO Convention aims to reverse; and the situation of ‘illicit import’ within the meaning of the Dutch Heritage Act.

### 4.2 Return Claim?

The next question – of crucial importance in this case – is who can rightfully claim the return of cultural objects that are unlawfully retained in the Netherlands? On this point, Article 6.7 of the Dutch Heritage Act states that return may be claimed by “the State Party from which the property originates or by the party with valid title to such property”, seemingly facilitating return claims by States as well as non-State Parties. This possibility for non-State deprived owners ‘with a valid title’, as laid down in Article 6.7 of the Dutch Heritage Act, arises out of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention – aimed at harmonisation of the principles laid down in the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Whilst the Netherlands signed but did not ratify the 1995 Convention, the Dutch legislator nevertheless chose to implement some of its principles into Dutch law.\(^ {48}\)

The Dutch Court, on this point, ruled that, in the event of concurring claims between a State that listed the objects as protected cultural patrimony and a third party, the question of ownership will be suspended and the return claim of the State will have priority.\(^ {49}\) The question of title and ownership should be left open and decided upon after their return in the requesting State, in this case Ukraine. For this, the Court invoked Article 1012 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure stating that “ownership of the cultural object that is subject to a return request by a State Party will be decided upon after return by the national laws of the state that claimed for its return”.\(^ {50}\)


\(^{47}\) See, for example, P.J. O’Keefe, above, note 39, pp. 135-136; Stamatoudi, above, note 37, p. 34. The Operational Guidelines for the implementation of the 1970 Convention, adopted at the third meeting of the States Parties on 18-20 May 2015, e.g. number 26: “State ownership laws cannot fulfil their protective purpose or facilitate the return of cultural property if the removal of the relevant cultural property from the territory of the concerned State without its express consent as rightful owner is not internationally regarded as theft of public property. Thus, when a State has declared ownership of certain cultural property, States Parties are, in the spirit of the Convention, encouraged to consider the illicit removal of that cultural property from the territory of the dispossessed State as theft of public property, where such demonstration of ownership is necessary in order to allow for its return”, and number 90: “When a State has enacted laws on State ownership of certain cultural property in the spirit of the Convention, States Parties are, for recovery and restitution purposes, encouraged to duly take into account these laws”.


\(^{50}\) Article 1012 Rv [Dutch Code of Civil Procedure] implements Art. 13 of the 2014 EU Regulation discussed above. However, it differs slightly from the EU provision which reads: “Ownership of the cultural object after return shall be governed by the law of the requesting Member State.”
Prioritising claims of a sovereign State may well be in line with the UNESCO principles – based as they are on a system of protection in national patrimony laws. However, the question is raised by this outcome what are the possibilities for deprived owners, who are not national States, to claim their artefacts. What is the legal force of cultural rights of parties, other than sovereign States, like individuals or communities? This issue will be touched on below in section 2 of Part III.

5. The Verdict

In its decision of 14th December 2016, the District Court found in favour of Ukraine and held the following:

- the loan agreement between the Crimean Museums and the AP Museum is dissolved;
- the AP Museum shall transfer the loaned objects to the National Historical Museum of Ukraine in Kiev in its capacity as custodian of the Crimean objects designated by the Ukrainian State;
- pending an appeal, the artefacts shall remain in storage at the AP Museum;
- Ukraine shall pay storage and insurance costs to the AP Museum.

As noted above, in January 2017, the Crimean Museums lodged an appeal.

III. Alternative Approaches

The outcome of the case confirms the view that the system of the 1970 UNESCO Convention for cross-border return claims is an interstate affair, with a focus on the protection of national interests. Might there have been other approaches?

1. The 1954 Hague Convention

Surprisingly, the 1954 Hague Convention is not mentioned in the verdict. Given the fact that this Convention and its Protocols are specifically aimed at situations of armed conflict and occupation, and its principles are generally considered as binding customary international law, one may wonder why not. According to the 1954 Protocol, States should take into custody cultural property from occupied territories until the situation has stabilised, with the aim of ensuring its safe return, and cultural property “shall never be retained as war reparations”.

51 Verdict, 4.20 and 5.
52 According to the representative of Ukraine, G.J. van den Bergh, the case was scheduled for ‘Grieven’ (complaint by the Crimean Museums) in the summer of 2017.
53 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, First Protocol, ratified by the Netherlands, Ukraine as well as the Russian Federation, May 1954. On the customary international law status see, for example, W.W. Kowalski, _Art Treasures and War, a Study of the Restitution of Looted Cultural Property, Pursuant to Public International Law_, (Institute of Art and Law, 1998); Stamatoudi above, note 37, p. 235; Alessandro Chechi _The Settlement of International Cultural Heritage Disputes_ (OUP, 2014), p. 258; Jakubowski above, note 8, p. 265; It is problematic in this context that the Russian Federation does not accept these principles, given the adoption of the Law on Removed Cultural Property (1997) (Law ‘On Cultural Property Removed to the USSR as a Result of World War II and Located in the Territory of the Russian Federation’, No. 64-FZ, 15 April 1998, adopted by the State Duma on 5 Feb. 1997). The Law declares to be the property of the Russian Federation all cultural valuables located in the territory of the Russian Federation that were brought into the USSR following the Second World War by way of exercise of the right of the USSR to compensatory restitution.
54 Article 1 (2): “Each High Contracting Party undertakes to take into its custody cultural property imported into its territory either directly or indirectly from any occupied territory. This shall either
should not be used as hostages in a conflict. In the much cited words of Justice Croke in 1813 (by which he released artefacts seized during the Anglo-American war):

The same law of nations, which prescribes that all property belonging to the enemy shall be liable to confiscation, has likewise its modifications and relaxations of that rule. The arts and sciences are admitted amongst all civilized nations, as forming an exception to the severe rights of warfare, and as entitled to favour and protection. They are considered not as the peculium of this or that nation, but as the property of mankind at large, and as belonging to the common interests of the whole species.55

It could be argued that application of the 1954 Protocol would, in the short term, eventually, not produce more favourable results for the Crimean institutions: like the 1970 UNESCO Convention, it creates obligations between sovereign States, leaving entities like the museums or the Crimean Autonomous Republic as outsiders. That said, the Dutch authorities would seem to be in a position to ‘help out’, by taking the objects in custody for safekeeping with a view to their eventual return upon cessation of hostilities. Moreover, the Dutch Heritage Act, implementing the 1954 Protocol prohibits the possession of cultural property from occupied territory – implicating that action can be initiated irrespective of the question whether the object is unlawfully acquired or imported.56 And if “there is a reasonable suspicion that the prohibition … has been contravened, our Minister shall take into custody the cultural property concerned.”57

In fact, this is what happened (after some detours), in a case concerning the return of four Cypriot icons by the Netherlands to Cyprus in 2013.

2013 Dutch Return of Cypriot Icons

The icons, removed from the Greek Orthodox church of Christ Antiphonitis in Lefkosia in Northern Cyprus, were found in the possession of a Dutch private collector, who had bought them in 1975, shortly after the occupation of Northern Cyprus and their disappearance from the Church. The icons were attached by the Church upon discovery in 1995; however, at that point a civil action seeking their return before the Dutch courts was unsuccessful.58
The main reason for this was that the 1954 Hague Protocol which, although ratified by the Netherlands in 1958, had never been implemented in Dutch law. As a consequence, the ownership claim by the Church was time-barred under regular Dutch property law, as that law provides for a general limitation period for any right of action of twenty years.\(^{59}\) And although concerns were raised about the collector’s good-faith on acquiring the icons, the Appeal Court did not deal with those, stating that even if it was proven that the collector was in bad faith,\(^ {60}\) such a circumstance would not affect the outcome. The absolute twenty-year term, according to the Court, runs independently of the possible bad faith of the holder,\(^ {61}\) and since the icons had disappeared in March 1975 the claim was time-barred just months before their attachment in 1995. This controversial outcome – in the light of the fact the Netherlands signed the 1954 Protocol as early as 1958 – was one of the factors for the Dutch Government to speed up implementation.

Following that implementation in 2007 and an official request for their return from the Cypriot authorities in 2011, the Dutch authorities arranged for the acquisition of the icons from the collector (as discussed above, the legitimate owner under Dutch law) and their return to Cyprus in September 2013.\(^ {62}\) Two points are of interest within the present context. Their restitution to the Government of the recognised Republic of Cyprus was on the understanding that they would eventually return to the Church in Lefkosia: in the words of the Cypriot statement upon the presentation of the case at UNESCO headquarters “their journey will only end when they finally occupy their original and rightful place in the iconostasis of the Church of Antiphonitis”.\(^ {63}\) Another point of interest is that the icons were returned through diplomatic channels after the initial failure of civil litigation. The first point – rights of parties other than a national State and territoriality – will be touched upon in section 2, and the second point – access to justice for those right holders – in section 3.

2. Interests Beyond the National State

Returning to the Crimean Gold case: the 2016 Amsterdam District Court ruling highlights that the present international legal framework does not address issues that are at the heart of this case, such as partition of a country or disconnect between the territorial or cultural-historical link of the object to (groups of) people(s). That framework – based on the UNESCO Conventions – provides for a system of interstate co-operation and is based on the premise that the national State is the key ‘rights holder’ to cultural heritage when claims for return are made. In the majority of cases, this will work efficiently but, on occasion, it may be to the detriment of other interests, including groups who do not believe themselves to be represented by their former national government.

Interestingly, and perhaps exactly because of this ‘gap’ in the legal framework, a parallel

\(^{59}\) Dutch ‘regular’ law is far-reaching in its protection of new possessors of stolen goods, as a result of provisions on title transfer following a bona fide acquisition (Dutch Civil Code 3:86), and relatively short limitation periods for ownership claims; Art. 3:306 DCC provides for a general limitation period of twenty years for all rights of action, also for a right based on ownership (reindication), moreover, after that period a possessor will gain ownership title irrespective of his or her good faith (DCC 3:105).

\(^{60}\) Something that would not easily be assumed, as appears from the earlier District Court’s verdict in the case; NJK 1999, 37: Rb. Rotterdam, 4-2-1999, nr. 44-53/HAZA962403.


\(^{62}\) According to the mutual presentation of the return case at the 10th meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Hague Convention on 16 Dec. 2013 in Paris, the case was the first return in the world under application of the First Protocol <http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1954/NL-Cyprus-4icons_en>, acc. 27 July 2017.

\(^{63}\) Ibid.
system of soft-law signals a new trend, a trend under which group or individual rights of non-State actors to their cultural heritage is being acknowledged. Two such well-defined categories would be:

(i) rights of indigenous peoples to their lost cultural heritage – as included in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,\(^{64}\) and

(ii) rights of deprived individual owners of Nazi-confiscated works of art – based on the Washington Conference Principles of 1998, promoting ‘fair and just’ solutions to ownership claims.\(^{65}\)

Although non-binding, international practice in line with especially the 1998 Washington principles – honouring the rights of deprived former owners – is widespread, notwithstanding formal legal hurdles. Such cases clearly are not solely about property or patrimony rights, but essentially are about human rights: issues such as persecution and genocide, or the spiritual value of an object to a specific people, are at their core. The rationale underlying these soft-law regulations, in other words, may be found in the field of international human rights law.\(^{66}\) This development appears to signal a growing recognition of rights of previous (individual or collective) non-State owners of cultural objects taken or held in violation of human rights.\(^{67}\) In this sense, the independent expert on cultural rights in her report investigating the extent to which the right of access to and enjoyment of cultural heritage forms part of international human rights law, concludes that “varying degrees of access and enjoyment may be recognised, taking into consideration the diverse interest of individuals and communities depending on their relationship to specific cultural heritages”. Moreover, she concludes that “in arbitration or litigation processes, the specific relationship of communities to cultural heritage should be fully taken into consideration”.\(^{68}\)

**Which ‘Country of Origin’?**

A further question would be whether there is such a thing as a ‘genuine link’, that could prioritise interests in cultural objects. In that regard, it is worthwhile to reflect as well

\(^{64}\) UNDRIP: UN GA Res. 61/295, September 2007; E.g. Art. 11(2): “States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.”

\(^{65}\) Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-confiscated Art (1998), see Annex 2 to Evelien Campfens (ed.) *Fair and Just Solutions, Alternatives to Litigation in Nazi-looted Art Disputes: Status Quo and New Developments*, (The Hague Eleven Publishers, 2015). These principles were followed up by many other international soft-law declarations. Of interest to the present topic: efforts by UNESCO to arrange for a system of interstate return of objects looted during the Second World War were unsuccessful and the 2009 ‘Draft Declaration of Principles Relating to Cultural Objects Displaced in Connection with the Second World War’ was never adopted. *Ibid.*, p. 35.


\(^{67}\) The scope of such a right is not, in my view, full restoration of property rights (restitution), but a right to an equitable solution for disputes. This thesis is subject to further research by the author.

for a moment on the question of what is meant by the ‘country of origin’ in the language of UNESCO conventions – to see whether the 1970 Convention itself supports national interests over local (territorial or community) interests.

Article 4 of the 1970 Convention sets out five categories of objects that can qualify as protected national cultural objects,69 interestingly with a clear hint to territoriality as a necessary link between the object and national protection:70

Archaeological objects like the Crimean treasures would fall under Article 4(b), i.e. objects that form an integral part of the State’s soil.71 Arguably this would mean that protection may be granted only to objects emanating from soil within the national borders over which the State has effective control.72 And that is precisely the problem in the dispute under review; effective control over the Crimean territory is at present not with the Ukrainian State – and historically it had not been so either before Khrushchev transferred Crimea in 1954.73

In 1991 the Institute of International Law clarified the question of what should be understood as the ‘country of origin’ in return requests. For the purpose of protection of cultural heritage: “The country of origin of a work of art means the country with which the property is most closely linked from the cultural point of view”.74 Return claims based on the national patrimony argument should, in other words, be seen in relation to a ‘genuine link’ from a cultural-historical point of view. In my view, therefore, it could be argued that for a claim to archaeological objects based on generally stated national patrimony laws – typically declaring ‘all found within the soil within the national borders’ as national property – territoriality and effective control over that territory are necessary.

Obviously, a case like the Crimean Gold case, where national borders are contested and still unclear, pose a challenge to the UNESCO system; a system where protection is based on interstate co-operation. The just outcome of such a case will, ultimately, depend on political will, as can be illustrated by the following case.

The Case of the Pechory Treasure and Other Examples

A case with similarities to the Crimean Gold case is the return of the so-called Pechory Treasure to a Russian-Orthodox monastery in May 1973.75 The story behind it is that of the

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69 Article 4: “property which belongs to the following categories forms part of the cultural heritage of each State:
(a) cultural property created by the individual or collective genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural property of importance to the State concerned created within its territory of that State by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident within such territory;
(b) cultural property found within the national territory.”

70 Stamatoudi, above, note 37 at p. 38. See also Marie Cornu, and Marc-André Renold ‘New Developments in the Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution’, (2010) 17 International Journal of Cultural Property 16-17, giving examples such as historical archives, objects of sacred or symbolic value, objects found in archaeological excavations, elements removed from monuments. See also Jakubowski, above, note 8, Chechi, above, note 53.

71 Stamatoudi, p. 39.

72 Unless of course those objects were earlier acquired by the claiming State in accordance with the provisions of Article 4(c)-(d) of the 1970 Convention. See above, note 68.

73 Above, note 37.


75 I am much indebted to Ulrike Schmiegelt for bringing the case up in her paper ‘A Hostage of the Cold War? The Return of the Monastery Treasure of Pechory’ at the conference ‘From
return ‘home’ of the treasures of the Orthodox Pskovo-Pechersky Dormition Monastery in Pechory (‘Petserin’ in Estonian and ‘Petschur’ in German), in Russia, in an area that borders Estonia. It used to be under independent Estonian rule, however had been under Russian control since 1945. The Treasure – ecclesiastical objects and secular objects related to the history of the Monastery – was taken by Nazi officials in 1945 in anticipation of the advancing Russian army. It was discovered in the early 1970s, having been kept for decades in the storage area of a German museum, away from the public eye, by a German researcher. At that point, a return claim was voiced by the Monastery (as well as by the Estonian World Council in exile). After lengthy discussions on the legal implications of the case with a focus on the Baltic question (the non-recognition of Soviet rule over Estonian and other Baltic territory by Western European nations), the Treasure was returned directly to the Monastery by the authorities of the German Federal Republic. This, after the formal consent by Soviet authorities, in effective control over the territory, constituted an acknowledgement that the Treasure would remain in the Monastery.

In that sense, the return may be compared to the present dispute as in both instances the implicit recognition of an unrecognised State loomed around the corner as an unwanted side-effect of any act of restitution. In the German-Estonian-Soviet case of the Pechory Treasure a solution was found – and the politically sensitive issue of the ‘Baltic question’ was avoided – by the restitution of the objects directly to the Monastery. This, thanks perhaps to a moment of détente in international relations.

Recognition of the Cultural-historical Link

State practice honouring the cultural-historical link principle can also be found in various bilateral or multilateral peace treaties. The Treaty of Saint-Germain of 1919, for example, arranging for the division of the Austrian Empire, enabled the return of objects that were to be considered ‘intellectual patrimony’ of a given territory, to ‘their districts of origin’. Another famous example is the return of the leaves of the triptych of the Mystic Lamb by the Van Eyck brothers to Belgium after the First World War, taken by Germany in what appears to have been a perfectly legal transaction, as arranged for in the Treaty of Versailles.
Contemporary examples of intrastate cases that come to mind are, for example, the UK/Scottish disagreement regarding the Lewis Chess Men case – A longstanding debate over where the figures, most of which are in the British Museum in London, belong— and the Ancient manuscripts and Globe case between Saint Gall and Zurich in Switzerland.

In this last case, a creative solution was found honouring the cultural-historical link – and not focusing on the ownership issue, in the form of a long-term loan and a replica of the Globe.

**Ongoing International Litigation**

Two interesting examples of ongoing international litigation are also worth mentioning in this quest to a ‘true link’.

**Korean Buseok Temple Case (2017)**

The first is a case currently being litigated in South Korea which concerns a fourteenth-century bronze statue, stolen from a Buddhist temple on the Japanese island of Tsushima in 2012. Japan and South Korea both ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention, providing the basis for a decision to return other stolen artefacts, part of the same theft from Tsushima, to Japan in 2013. Pending the claim from Japan for the return of the specific bronze statue, however, the South-Korean Buseok Temple also filed a claim for its return. The statue apparently originated, in the fourteenth century, from the Buseok Temple from where it had disappeared centuries ago. In its January 2017 ruling the South-Korean Daejon District Court decided that that statue should indeed be returned not to Japan but to the Buseok Temple “considering the historical and religious value of the statue”. The Court found it sufficiently proven that the statue originated from the Temple – given a historic document inside the statue which mentioned its origin, while it was common knowledge that the territory had been invaded by Japanese military in the fourteenth century. Reportedly, an appeal by Japan has been filed.

As in the Crimean Gold case but from a different angle, the case illustrates the limits of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.

**Chinese Mummy Case (2017)**

A final example worth mentioning involves litigation in Amsterdam over a Chinese Song dynasty Buddha statue, with the very special feature of carrying a mummified monk inside who had died in the eleventh century. The statue is an object of worship and spiritual
importance for the local community in China from where it had disappeared in 1995. Moreover, ‘Zhang Gong’, as the mummified Buddha is named, is considered a god. In 2014 the statue was identified during an exhibition of mummies as the missing Zhang Gong from the Chinese villages of Yangchun and Dongpu. At that time, it was in the possession of a Dutch collector who claims his statue may not be the lost ‘Zhang Gong’; he also claims he acquired his statue in good faith in 1995 or 1996 (the facts are unclear), from a Dutch dealer who, in turn, had bought it in Hong Kong. The claim for the return of the statue by two Chinese village communities – according to Chinese law the collective owners of their missing statue – is pending before the Amsterdam District Court. A complicating factor in this case is that the loss and acquisition of the statue was before the Netherlands signed the 1970 UNESCO Convention in 2009 and, thus, the pre-Convention Dutch law would apply. As seen in the Dutch Cypriot icons case, Dutch law has relatively short limitation periods and is not favourable to original owners, even in cases where a new possessor cannot be held to have acted in good faith. Another intriguing (and worrying) aspect is that the collector claims he is no longer in possession of the statue as he ‘traded’ it in 2015 with a private collector, whose identity however he refuses to disclose. He decided to trade the statue, according to the collector, after negotiations with the Chinese authorities on the return of the statue/mummy had broken down. It will be interesting to see how the case will be approached by the Dutch judiciary, whether as a question of property title or from a human (cultural) rights perspective.

Although at points different from the Crimean case, in all these examples, cultural interests of entities other than the national State (monasteries, churches or communities) are at stake. Interests that go beyond the ‘property’ element and with a certain human (cultural) rights element to it, quite independent from national interests.

3. Alternative Dispute Resolution

A further question is how to approach such disputes with a fair chance for lasting solutions, that can take account of the specific interests of the parties. Within the context of cultural heritage claims, adversarial litigation procedures are generally considered a last option, to be entered into only after good-faith negotiations and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods have been exhausted. This, precisely because certain aspects are at stake in such cases that may not be ‘covered’ by the existing legal framework. Recognising this difficulty, the ‘Operational Guidelines’ to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, adopted in May 2015, for example suggest that:

The Convention does not attempt to establish priorities where more than one State may regard a cultural object as part of its cultural heritage. Competing claims to such items, if they cannot be settled by negotiations between the States or their relevant institutions ..., should be regulated by out of court resolution mechanisms, such as mediation [...] or good offices, or by arbitration. There is no strong tradition for the judicial settlement of such differences in cultural matters.
State practice would suggest a preference for mechanisms that allow consideration for legal, as well as cultural, historical and other relevant factors.\textsuperscript{91}

In the same sense, the International Law Association advises ADR methods for resolving cultural heritage disputes in its 2009 ‘Principles for Cooperation in the Mutual Protection and Transfer of Cultural Material’.\textsuperscript{92}

A preference for a non-formalistic approach is also voiced in the proposal for ‘Guiding Principles Relating to the Succession of States in Respect of Tangible Cultural Heritage’.\textsuperscript{93} If not directly, then surely of indirect interest to the present case, this proposal by Andrzej Jakubowski promotes equitable principles and alternative methods for dispute resolution regarding cultural heritage disputes in those cases where the borders of a national State have altered, for example as a result of dissolution of a State or war.\textsuperscript{94} With regard to the settlement of disputes he proposes:

\begin{quote}
In case of disagreement, the States ... are encouraged to bring their disputes before impartial arbitration or mediation commissions. The expert assistance of UNESCO is strongly recommended.
\end{quote}

Obviously, ADR in all forms should not be seen as a \textit{panacea} for complicated legal issues. As Follarin Shyllon rightly points out in his recent article,\textsuperscript{95} the outcome of negotiation or mediation for example – i.e. confidential procedures that are not guided by principles of justice – will depend on the bargaining chips brought to the table by parties that may not be equally powerful. If it is justice we are after, focus should therefore also stay on a just and creative interpretation of existing legal rules – or developing new ones, as well as on the development of neutral and transparent alternative procedures if litigation would be considered inadequate.

\section*{IV. Conclusion}

In the 2016 verdict, the Dutch Court held, unsurprisingly perhaps, that the Allard Pierson Museum should return the artefacts to Ukraine and not to the Crimean Museums. The ruling confirms that the international legal framework – based on the UNESCO Conventions – is still firmly anchored in the idea that national States are the main right holders of cultural heritage. Consequently, it is up to national authorities to pass the objects on to other possible stakeholders. Usually that will work adequately. In cases where a national government is not

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{92} As reproduced by J.A.R. Nafziger in an article by the same name in (2007-2008) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 147.

\textsuperscript{93} Jakubowski, above, note 8, Annex. The draft principles can be seen as an analysis of State practice and relevant legal doctrine and the ‘promising tendencies’ detected by Jakubowski in his extensive research of State practice. See p. 321.

\textsuperscript{94} In the first Principle the scope is defined as “to provide general guidance for bilateral or multilateral interstate negotiations in order to facilitate the conclusion of agreements related to movable and immovable cultural property, following succession of States.” Under 1(d) this is further refined by stating that it aims at situations like the present, being “the property, which is situated in the territory to which the succession of States relates, or having originated from said territory, was displaced to a different location by the predecessor State”.

\end{footnotesize}
in a position (or not willing) to represent the interest of such right holders, however, tensions in that framework will be noticeable, as in the present case.

Where, one may wonder, does this leave the rights and interests of non-State actors like local communities, minorities or individual victims of human rights violations, to ‘their’ cultural heritage? The principle of territoriality – over nationality – seems on itself an accepted notion in cultural heritage law. Such rights, however, are also increasingly acknowledged in soft-law instruments in recent decades – such as the UNDRIP recognising indigenous peoples’ rights to cultural heritage, and the Washington Principles recognising rights of individual former owners to Nazi-confiscated art. This development may even signal the coming into existence of a right for former owners to ‘their’ cultural objects under international (human rights) law.96 Although the content of that right may be far from clear as yet, an important point seems the acknowledgement of the intangible interests of cultural heritage for certain groups of people, beyond being a commodity or State property.97

A non-formalistic approach – alternative procedures – to settle such disputes, as advocated in various soft-law instruments to bridge this ‘gap’ in the international legal framework, was a path not taken yet in the Crimean Gold case. And neither was the path taken to search for solutions as offered by the 1954 Hague Protocol by taking the objects in custody ‘for safekeeping’ with an eye on their return by the Dutch authorities after the cessation of hostilities. Perhaps those paths are still open. A solution similar to that in the Pechory case might be an example of a solution that proved effective under similar conditions. In that case, upon the return from Germany, a guarantee was given by the non-recognised Soviet authorities to the German authorities that the objects would remain in situ at the Monastery in Estonia, as the place with the closest cultural-historical ties. Admittedly, given the political context, this might be a major challenge in the current time frame.

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96 Article 15, para 1 (a) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
97 See e.g. the Report of the Independent Expert in the Field of Cultural Rights (Farida Shaheed), submitted pursuant to resolution 10/23 of the Human Rights Council, 22 March 2010 [UN Doc A/ HRC/14/36].