Staying in or moving out? Justice and the abolition of the dark ghetto

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Abstract
Tommie Shelby articulates a nonideal theory of black US ghettos that casts them as consequences of an intolerably unjust institutional structure. I argue that, despite some of its significant merits, Shelby’s theory is weakened by his rejection of integration as a principle for reforming disadvantaged ghettos and correcting structural injustices in the US. In particular, I argue that Shelby unwarrantedly downplays the socio-economic efficiency of integrationist policies and fails to consider some of the ways in which integration might count as a duty of (corrective) justice.

Keywords
Basic social structure, ghetto abolition, integration, redistribution, social justice

A significant number of mostly African-American citizens in the US live in ghettos affected by racial segregation, high poverty rates and multiple forms of socio-economic disadvantage. When compared to the general population, ghetto residents have a substantially lower life expectancy, are more exposed to both physical and mental pathologies, have a less structured family life experience, suffer from considerably higher unemployment rates, are less politically active and find themselves disproportionately imprisoned. As a crude example, life expectancy in Cleveland is 88 years in Lyndenhurst, one of the city’s well-off suburban neighbourhoods, and 64 years in Hough, the ghetto situated a few miles away in midtown Cleveland.¹

Tommie Shelby’s (2016) aim in Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent and Reform is to examine these ‘metropolitan neighborhoods visibly marked by racial segregation and multiple forms of disadvantage’ (p. 38) from the standpoint of justice. His central thesis is that black ghettos should be examined within
a ‘systemic-injustice framework’ (p. 3). Shelby’s theory of the ghetto stresses the priority of justice construed as fairness and reciprocity, emphasizing Rawls’ equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity principles, and uses the basic structure as the unit of normative analysis. More specifically, Shelby is interested in showing how the structural injustices that permeate the main social and political institutions of the US – the constitution, the (criminal) legal system, the healthcare system, the economy, the family and educational institutions – explain why the poverty and disadvantage that characterize black ghettos are oppressive and unjust. The problem of the dark ghetto, thus understood, is the broader problem of an unfair basic structure.

In highlighting the importance of justice, Shelby ultimately intends to offer a ‘normative nonideal theory of ghettos’ (p. 14) that puts forward ‘a set of values and principles that should inform the next ghetto abolition movement’ (p. 278). This background abolitionist project comes out most forcefully in the epilogue of the book, where Shelby reviews different approaches to ghetto abolitionism and sees himself as ‘renewing ghetto abolitionism’ through his work in political philosophy.

Shelby contrasts his approach with what he calls ‘the medical model’ (p. 2). The medical model views ghettos as specific problems generated by clearly observable social phenomena – for instance, joblessness or segregation – that can be eliminated through ‘a cost-effective solution’ – say, ‘a jobs program or an integration initiative’ (p. 2). For Shelby, the main drawback of the medical model lies in ignoring that the problem of the ghetto is not the ghetto itself, but the unjust basic structure behind it. Following his medical analogy, ‘just as physicians take basic human anatomy as given when treating patients, policymakers working within the medical model treat the background structure of society as given and focus only on alleviating the burdens of the disadvantaged’ (p. 2). The focus on ‘narrowly targeted and empirically grounded interventions’ (p. 2) renders supporters of the medical model unable to understand that considerations of structural (in)justice should inform any policy directed at ghetto abolition.

More specifically, Shelby targets ‘new integrationism’ (pp. 49, 62–78, 95), which he takes to be a salient instantiation of the medical model. Integrationism emphasizes residential, economic and social integration as the central solution for ghetto abolition. Shelby counts Elizabeth Anderson, Orlando Patterson, Sheryll Cashin, Michelle Adams and Owen Fiss as the main representatives of the integrationist approach (p. 290). Methodologically, Shelby criticizes the ‘new integrationists’ (p. 49) for wanting to find a unique, locally defined technical fix to ghetto disadvantages, as well as for their failure to highlight the structural social injustices that underlie these disadvantages.

Substantively, Shelby’s main disagreement with the new integrationists lies in his denying that residential and economic integration – that is, moving out of the ghetto to neighbourhoods that are economically better-off – is a necessary or adequate ‘instrument of corrective justice’ (p. 63) in dealing with ghetto disadvantages. Shelby argues that we should ‘not [be] treating residential integration as a policy goal’ (p. 278) and that ‘justice cannot require neighborhood integration’ (p. 59).
Shelby’s reasons for rejecting integration as a principle and policy of corrective justice are both empirical and normative. On the empirical side, he draws attention to the fact that integration policies do not guarantee that racial inequality will be effectively undermined (pp. 72–73). This is to say that the prospects of integration are considerably uncertain. On the normative side, Shelby notes that integration would expose former ghetto residents to the burden of various secondary injustices – like ‘racial discrimination, hostility, harassment, and even violence’ (p. 73) – committed by the inhabitants of their new (mostly white and middle- or upper-class) neighbourhoods. Moreover, Shelby worries that, in insisting that members of the black minorities move out, integration policies:

would reinforce the symbolic power that whites hold over blacks by encouraging whites to see their relationships with blacks not as intrinsically valuable forms of interracial community but as an avenue for blacks to share in (not abolish) white privilege. (pp. 69–70)

Moving out, on this account, is the same as being unjustly assimilated into the mainstream white culture and life-style.

Shelby treats the problem of ghetto injustice as an epiphenomenon of the primary problem of an unjust social basic structure. This is, as I see it, the central contribution of Shelby’s nonideal theory of the ghetto. Its merit lies in reminding us that, in dealing with ghettos, we are ultimately confronted with everyone’s problem, not simply with the problem of the ghetto residents themselves. Following Shelby’s formulation, US citizens ‘are all implicated in the perpetuation of ghettos. The ghetto is not “their” problem but ours, privileged and disadvantaged alike. The ghetto is a sign that our social order is profoundly unjust’ (p. 275).

Shelby’s systemic approach is also methodologically attractive, in that it allows him to construct an integrated account of the injustices to which the ghetto poor are exposed. Shelby underlines that the existing US basic structure is particularly unjust in the way it generates unequal life prospects – in terms of education, income, health, housing conditions and general well-being – between ghetto residents and the rest (pp. 36–38, 41, 171–172). The three main parts of the book can be read as the critical examination of this unjust basic structure. Part I looks at the effect that unjust urban and economic policies (and, most notably, segregation) have on ghetto poverty. Part II examines the way in which different family and economic policies – for example, welfare programs or (un)employment schemes – account for the unjust social disadvantages experienced by ghetto residents. Finally, Part III evaluates the relation between criminal law enforcement and ghetto injustice.

More generally, Shelby enriches the philosophical conversation about the role of nonideal theory and its relation to ideal theories of justice. Shelby understands ideal theory as the reflection on idealized standards for evaluating injustice (p. 12). Nonideal theory, he argues, should be seen as the part of justice theorizing ‘which specifies and justifies the principles that should guide our responses to injustices’ (p. 12). For Shelby, a nonideal theory of justice relies on four types of
principles: 1. *principles of reform and revolution* that guide the transition from unjust social schemes to more just ones; 2. *principles of rectification* dealing with remedies that are due to victims of injustice; 3. *principles of crime control* that apply to noncompliance and law-breaking; and 4. *principles of political ethics* that inform the way individuals should act in a context of social injustice. The first two types of principles form ‘a theory of corrective justice’ (p. 12), which directs the rectification and reduction of current injustices and, more positively, guides the ‘collective efforts to establish a society regulated by a mutual commitment to justice’ (p. 13).

Read in the context of its underlying conception of nonideal theory, Shelby’s reflection on the black ghetto advances three propositions. The first one is that, given that they are victims of injustice, the duties of justice that ghetto residents have for supporting the transition towards a more just social scheme should be relaxed. Concretely, this means that ghetto residents are justified in refusing to leave the ghetto in search of better economic prospects or, more radically, that they are sometimes permitted to break the law – for example, by engaging in petty theft – as a response to the absence of any decent employment or living conditions within the ghetto.

Shelby’s second proposition is that integration is ‘not a requirement of corrective justice and should not be viewed as a solution to ghetto poverty’ (p. 49). This is because integration involves an unfair mechanism for allocating the costs of just (corrective) reform. As indicated, integration exposes ghetto residents to the risk of being further victimized without the guarantee of acquiring socio-economic equality and it imposes almost no (comparable or unfair) costs on the economically well-off white majority. Because the costs of corrective justice ‘should be paid largely by those who have most benefited from the unjust basic structure, as they have profited most from the injustices of the social scheme’ (p. 55), integration cannot work as a demand of justice.

Shelby’s third proposition is that we should think about corrective justice in terms of an ‘egalitarian pluralist vision’ (p. 67). This strategy for achieving corrective justice does not demand integration, but ‘requires desegregation, social equality, and, importantly, economic fairness’ (p. 67). In particular, Shelby’s take on corrective justice requires policies that enforce a substantive ‘investment of public funds and significant transfers of resources from the affluent to the disadvantaged’ (p. 68). The strategy also calls for ‘renewed efforts at urban community development’ (p. 76), more jobs and better housing being created in the ghetto and better transportation from the ghetto to the working place (p. 77). The point of this ‘“pure” redistributive scheme’ (p. 78) is to avoid a situation where ghetto residents are forced to move out – which is one of the implications Shelby imputes to the integrationist view (p. 76) – and to refocus reform around ‘crea[ting] black communities that are not disadvantaged’ (p. 74). As a matter of corrective justice, Shelby’s position, then, is that we should give at least an equal weight to a (staying in) strategy that promotes ghetto reconstruction over a predominantly integrationist (moving out) strategy. This pluralist approach to corrective justice does not entirely exclude integration, but, in pushing for a fairer reform policy, sets it on a par with ghetto reconstruction (p. 67).
In what follows, I will provide a critical examination of Shelby’s case against integration. I will do so by focusing on what I take to be his two main arguments against it, namely, (1) the uncertainty that integration will actually secure economic justice and social equality for the ghetto residents, and (2) the injustice of integration when pursued as a prioritized reform policy. I find Shelby’s rejection of integration problematic, and his account of corrective justice weakened because of it. I will argue that Shelby does not construct a conclusive case against integration as defended by the integrationists, and suggest that his theory would stand to win in adopting a stronger integrationist component.

The uncertainties of integration

Shelby notes that ‘there is much disagreement about whether and how much integration would reduce [racial] inequality’ in the socio-economic domain (p. 72). He substantiates this claim by pointing to the essays edited by Hartman and Squires (2010) on the ‘integration debate’, and by highlighting the negligible to null impact of the Moving to Opportunity (MOT) integration experiment conducted in the 1990s (p. 293). This looks like an overstatement of the degree of disagreement on the empirical prospects of integration. Only two out of the 17 essays cited by Shelby are critical of integration and one of the two does not reject integration as such. Shelby also fails to note the positive impact MOT had on the housing and safety conditions of the experimental groups and ignores that the null effect of the program on educational outcomes can be explained by the fact that three-quarters of the children in the experimental group attended the same schools as before the experiment. Moreover, Shelby does not consider recent findings showing that MOT had a positive economic impact on young children in the experimental group, but that this impact is subject to a time lag effect (Chetty et al., 2016).

More generally, there is good evidence indicating that integrationist policies have been mostly successful in securing socio-economic benefits. This evidence is carefully reviewed by Anderson (2010), Fiss et al. (2003) and Patterson (1997). For example, a 1990s review of the results of the 1970s Gautreaux integration program shows that the employability of adults who moved out increased by 50% as compared to their peers who stayed in the ghetto, that 75% of the children who moved were employed, whereas only 41% of ghetto youth were and that, overall, those who decided to leave had a better education and better pay than those who stayed (Rosenbaum, in Fiss et al., 2003).

The available evidence does not show that integration is an infallible policy tool. It is not. But the evidence does warrant optimism about the overall efficiency of integration. Note also that the positive evidence has been mostly generated by isolated local integration programs and that a state (or, more ambitiously, national) integration policy like the one advocated by integrationists would be better placed in securing the expected socio-economic benefits. One of the advantages of such an encompassing policy is that it could better prevent at least part of the white flight phenomenon that currently works to the detriment of integration initiatives.
The efficiency of integration should also be evaluated by comparison with other strategies and, in particular, with policies designed to foster local urban community development. Such a comparison would favour integration over local reconstruction reforms. As Fiss et al.’s review of the literature (2003: 9–26) shows, attempts at abolishing the ghetto by rebuilding it into well-functioning neighbourhoods have often been ineffective, take considerably more time than integration policies and might be less stable in their effects (thus increasing the duration of exposure to disadvantage) and are unable to address, let alone curb, the broader socio-economic dynamics that have generated the ghetto in the first place.

Shelby argues that integrationists like Anderson unwarrantedly treat the evidence on integration as ‘decisive’, thereby ignoring that, when it comes to studying the efficiency of integration, ‘such empirical studies are rarely, if ever, conclusive’ (p. 72). Support for integrationist policies cannot be neatly inferred from the evidence on integration. This is correct, but it overlooks the fact that all policy proposals in the socio-economic domain are typically advanced under conditions of uncertainty. From a strictly empirical standpoint, what counts as decisive is which has the least uncertain positive outcomes when compared to the alternatives, not which policy that grants the certainty of those outcomes. On this more modest (and, I think, realistic) account, integration’s advantage is decisive when compared to the alternatives.

Integration and the demands of corrective justice

Focusing on the empirical record of integration misses Shelby’s strongest argument against it. That argument is not that, on strictly empirical grounds, integration might not work best (or, better put, least badly). Rather, it is that, when pursued as a prioritized or unique policy for dealing with ghetto disadvantage, integration cannot be justified by principles of corrective justice. This brings me to Shelby’s second main argument for rejecting integration. The argument is that, in accepting the integrationist invitation, ghetto blacks would be uncertain about the risk of the secondary injustices – for example, ‘racial discrimination, hostility, and even violence’ (p. 73) – that they could suffer at the hands of their new white neighbours.

In the current context of systemic social injustice, the risks of secondary injustice that accompany integration are sufficient grounds for not considering it as a duty of justice. Shelby defines a duty of justice as a duty to support just institutions that is pro tanto binding for all of us (p. 3). Under conditions of injustice, this duty takes the form of a ‘duty to help correct [the] injustices’ that are inimical to establishing just institutions. In asserting that integration is not a duty of justice now (p. 73), Shelby is relying on two distinct arguments. First, he argues that the state is not justified in pursuing integration through coercive means. Second, he argues that moving out is not binding for the ghetto residents. Neither argument, I think, suffices for rejecting integration as defended by the integrationists.

Shelby does not criticize integrationists for upholding integration by means of coercive threat. This would be expulsion, not integration, and integrationists are against it. What Shelby worries about is not coercive integration as threat, but
coercive integration as unfair conditional offer. When ‘the only options are the
ghetto as is or moving to a more advantaged but white neighborhood’ (p. 76),
the state actually pressures the ghetto residents into accepting the integrationist
offer. To avoid such a ‘choice under duress’ (p. 76), the state should also provide
‘ghetto denizens [with] the option of staying put but with renewed efforts at urban
community development’ (p. 76). In short, integration can be just only when alter-
native ghetto reconstruction programs are also available.

This argument is problematic. First, integrationists are not opposed to ghetto
reconstruction as such. Even Owen Fiss, who is arguably one of the staunchest
supporters of integration, agrees that, with enough funds, a reform package that
offers both a moving out and a staying in option is preferable to one that contains
only the former. What integrationists like Fiss insist on is that, given the current
scarce budgetary resources that the state can rely on, we should allocate most of
those resources to integration (Fiss et al., 2003: 118–119). Integrationists do not
argue that integration is the most suitable policy instrument in all possible unjust
worlds. They only argue that integration should be prioritized in the unjust world
we live in here and now.

The second problem is that Shelby’s argument for the pluralist package that
contains integration and ghetto reconstruction does not apply to the same social
world as the one targeted by the integrationist policy proposal. For Shelby’s
pluralist package to be meaningfully available to us, we would have to live in a
world that is already more redistributive – and therefore more just (or less unjust) –
than the one we live in now. In pushing for such a pluralist package, Shelby offers
corrective recommendations for a world that is different from ours or, to put it in
Shelby’s own terms, does not apply to us ‘now’ (p. 73). The only way in which the
pluralist package would be applicable to our actual unjust world – i.e. without
demanding a fairer redistributive scheme – is if the resources for ghetto abolition
were more or less equally divided between integration and reconstruction. However, as Fiss et al. (2003) note, such a proposal would present the double
drawback of preventing some of those who would want to move out from doing so
and might be insufficient for securing the financial basis needed for effective recon-
struction programs.

Put differently, the problem is that the case for the pluralist strategy is incom-
plete as long as Shelby does not offer a fuller account about how the more redis-
tributive scheme needed for reconstruction-cum-integration could be pursued
under current conditions of injustice without resorting to policies that prioritize
integration and encourage ghetto residents to move out. Such an account might be
available by pursuing more revolt- or even revolution-prone approaches to correct-
ive justice. But, as I suggest towards the end of this section, that might fit badly
with Shelby’s political ethics and, in particular, with the limits he sets on the ghetto
residents’ duties of justice.

The third problem is that ghetto reconstruction is not immune to the risk of
secondary injustices. Reconstruction is not feasible without the active local involve-
ment of social groups, organizations and private businesses from outside
the ghetto. No matter how much control ghetto residents would have on
reconstruction programs, some secondary injustices – say, racially hostile acts or attitudes – are likely to happen as a result of interactions with these outside actors. Moreover, for reconstruction to succeed in a way that grants ghetto residents control over it, a sufficient number of ghetto residents would have to become full-time social workers dedicated to rebuilding their local communities. It is therefore plausible to say that, at least for these ghetto residents, working towards corrective justice from within the ghetto might turn out as burdensome as moving out of it. This is arguably also an unfair burden, since ghetto residents would end up doing most of the work needed to correct the wrongs whose victims they are. Factoring these additional injustices and (unfair) burdens as costs involved by ghetto reconstruction should draw our attention to the fact that the pluralist strategy might not be (significantly) less unfair than the predominantly integrationist one.

Kenneth Clark already noted in the 1960s (and Shelby would probably agree with him today) that, because ‘there are insufficient economic resources in the ghetto to support its future development’, any reconstruction policy ‘must be supported and developed from without’ (Clark, 1965: 29). If Clark is right on this point, the state will need to provide various economic organizations and individuals who have the required policy expertise with the incentives – for instance, tax deductions or otherwise attractive working conditions – that will motivate them to move to and remain in the ghetto. It is plausible to suppose that some (if not most) of those who will thus be prompted to relocate to the ghetto will belong to the groups that have benefited from the social and economic injustices of the basic structure. This would mean that, in trying to make reconstruction effective, the state will sometimes (if not often) grant a premium for correcting injustices to those who have benefited from them in the past. This seems unfair, and highlights another potential trade-off between the efficiency of reconstruction programs and their amenability to reasonable demands of justice.

Shelby does not fully assess the hardships with which ghetto residents will have to cope in enduring the intensive policing required to address the crime patterns inside the ghetto, in accepting the changes in life habits that some rehousing reforms might entail or in adapting to the working culture that newly relocated businesses might require. More generally, as Fiss et al. (2003) points out, reforming the ghetto from the inside ‘would require so many deep interventions (...) that it would profoundly disrupt, if not actually destroy, preexisting communal ties’ (p. 34).

The upshot of this discussion is that Shelby should be less quick to dismiss integration as the state’s duty of corrective justice. But Shelby seems to be on safer ground when he argues that integration is not a binding duty of justice when considered from the standpoint of the ghetto residents themselves. This is because ghetto residents do not owe it to their fellow citizens or to the state to do the most they can in order to correct the unjust social structure whose victims they are. Arguing that integration is correctly binding on the ghetto residents is the same as saying, more generally, that victims should do as much as possible to correct the wrong committed by their wrongdoers. This argument is unacceptable.
However, the argument might not be sufficient for concluding that any view that casts integration as a duty of justice of the ghetto residents is untenable. Though ghetto residents do not owe it to the state or to their well-off fellow citizens to move out in search of better life prospects, they might owe it to their own children. If we grant that it works in the medium and long run, integration can be seen as a duty ghetto residents have towards members of future generations who would be otherwise exposed to ghetto injustice. To put it in general terms, victims of injustice might not have duties of justice towards their wrongdoers, but they might hold such duties towards other potential victims. This is both a tentative and provocative view, and needs more argument than I can offer here. In particular, it will have to work its way around difficulties related to the nonidentity problem and to questions about whether there are special duties victims have qua victims. Even so, I think the view would capture some of the central moral judgments that have motivated ghetto residents to move out. If that is the case, then the view is at least worth exploring as a way in which integration might count as a duty of justice from the ghetto residents’ standpoint.

As I see it, there are two replies open to Shelby at this point of the argument. One is to revise his rejection of integration as a particularly weighty principle of reform and to accept that, under current conditions of injustice, prioritizing integration is compatible with the requirements of corrective justice. The other reply would be to articulate an alternative comprehensive proposal for achieving corrective justice in a way that is more convincing than the one suggested by the pluralist strategy. To bring about the required redistributive scheme, such an alternative proposal would probably prioritize principles of revolution over principles of reform. Shelby is sometimes tempted by such an argument, as when he notes that ‘it will almost certainly take a social movement’ (p. 113) to achieve the changes needed for moving closer to justice, but he refrains from fully embracing it. This is because, as he notes, a revolution would not be able to preserve the existing ‘reasonably just components’ (p. 225) of the current basic structure. But, as I see it, it is also because a call for revolution would be hard to reconcile with Shelby’s political ethics and, in particular, with his point about not imposing excessive costs on the ghetto residents as part of our strategy to move closer to justice. Revolution is an extremely costly and so potentially unjust mechanism for achieving social change. Its costs may be individual, associated with violence or stress and trauma, or collective and focused on dysfunctional institutions and polarization and social tension.

**Conclusion**

I have argued that, for all its merits in renewing the debate on ghetto disadvantage by bringing it closer to concerns of justice, Shelby is too quick to dismiss the central role that integration should play in correcting current ghetto injustice. I have provided some considerations that might deflect Shelby’s worries about prioritizing integration as a nonideal principle of reform. I have also suggested that, if Shelby wants to maintain his case against integration, he might have to offer an account
that is more supportive of revolutionary movements as a means of achieving corrective justice. This move would bring Shelby closer to his acknowledged black radical liberalism (p. 11), but would also require revising his account of the political ethics of the ghetto oppressed.

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Notes
1. For more specific statistics, see Ansel (2017: 26–41).
2. As indicated, there are other reasons why Shelby worries about integration, namely the disrespect that it might express in condoning processes whereby the oppressed black minority is assimilated into the culture of the oppressive white majority. For reasons of space, I cannot fully address this worry here, but I think it can be largely alleviated by the integrationists' critique of integration qua assimilation. This critique is particularly well articulated by Adams (2006: 302) and Anderson (2010: 113), and answers some of the worries that integration will undermine black social and cultural solidarity. For integrationist strategies that oppose assimilation, see Patterson's (1997: 103–105) analysis of cultural appropriation. Note also that Shelby's anti-culturalism might internally limit (at least some of) his worries about cultural assimilation.
3. Pitched at this inclusive level, integrationism promises to end ghetto disadvantage faster than alternative policies. To be sure, some ghetto residents might refuse or be unable to move out, so integration might have to be marginally complemented with other policies (like reconstruction and community development). But this leaves the case for prioritizing integration intact.
4. For a critique of ghetto reconstruction and community development as stand-alone reform, see also Filion (1998). Note that my argument is not that the evidence on community development is sufficient to discard reconstruction, but that it is sufficient for raising doubts about it being as effective as integration.
5. For example, Fiss et al. (2003) defends only a 'voluntary relocation strategy’ (p. 28) and Anderson (2010) makes a case for ‘voluntary integration programs’ (p. 189).
6. I use the concept of ‘social world’ with its rough Rawlsian understanding, that is, as a ‘scheme of basic institutions’ (Rawls, 1993: 77).
7. The ghetto reconstruction option per se does not say anything about how redistribution would be achieved. Nor should it, but Shelby owes us a more comprehensive policy proposal that would explain how the redistributive scheme needed for adding reconstruction to integration would be achieved without prioritizing integrationist policies. For better or worse, integrationists have something to say about how integration could work in favour of redistribution – for example, by putting more electoral pressure on politicians and making the interests of the black minority more salient and thus potentially more compelling to the white majority (Anderson, 2010: 102, 133–134).
8. For such a proposal, see Hochschild, in Fiss et al. (2003).
9. For an account of duties of justice incurred by victims *qua* victims, see Vasanthakumar (2016).

10. On this view, integration would also have to be a duty of justice that is intergenerationally dischargeable by the currently self-segregated rich (and mostly white) class. The rough argument here would be that whites should not force their children into the position of agents that benefit from injustice *and* should not frustrate the future creation or preservation of just institutions. This additional consideration would make integration a duty of justice that applies to everyone in relation to future generations.

**References**


