The EUs post-Lisbon foreign policy identity:

A role theory analysis over space and time

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ABSTRACT:

Using an existing framework, it is argued that the EUs identity is quantifiable, with the use of role conceptions (RCs), allowing the comparison of the EUs identity development over time and space, by capturing the values, interests and objectives of the EU, as expressed by consecutive High Representatives of the EU. The complex institutional structure, the highly international nature of the EUs foreign policy making machinery, and to some extent public opinion and security concerns are found to define the EUs foreign policy identity. Seeing as the Lisbon Treaty changes and solidifies the quasi-constitutional foundations of the EU, expands its foreign policy capacities by creating the EEAS and the dual hatted position of High Representative of foreign policy and Vice President of the European Commission), permitting increased foreign policy action and legitimacy, it is thought to change the overall balance of RCs, construing the overall identity of the EU. Using an existing role-set presents many challenges, which this thesis tries to overcome by developing a set of rules and expanding the framework. The results show that the EUs identity changes significantly from Solana to Ashton, increasing the representation of the Stabiliser and Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RCs, and shifting from RCs emphasizing leadership roles to ones emphasizing international cooperation from Ashton to Mogherini. It is argued that these results show that the Lisbon Treaty develops the capabilities to pursue an increasingly active foreign policy, which allows the EU to respond increasingly to its objectives outlined therein. Policy implementation in relation to providing sustainable solutions to conflict, solving the migration crisis and fighting climate change, through international cooperation correlate to the shifts in the EUs identity.
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1. **INTRODUCTION**

The Lisbon Treaty advanced the powers that the EU could foster in its foreign policy and saw the expansion of its institutional mandate, the changing of the mechanisms by which it functions, and also importantly the creation of the EEAS, with at its helm, the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security and the Vice President of the European Commission¹ (Troszczynska-Van Genderen 2015; Paul 2008). The development of the portfolio and the creation of a dedicated diplomatic service indicate an expanding focus on foreign affairs. This thesis sets out to answer how the EU’s foreign policy identity has changed since the Lisbon Treaty? The role of the EU as a foreign policy actor has been a topic of some contention over the course of the years, having been argued to be a civilian power (Duchene 1973; K.E. Smith 2000), an ethical power (Aggestam 2008), a soft power (Nye 2005) and a normative power (Manners 2002), amongst other grand theoretical assumptions based on the capabilities with which, and the values by which, it engages with the world (Gerrits 2009, 2).

While these works have provided tremendous insight, with regards to its overall behavioural norms and its constitutional limitations, it provides little indication as to its immediate foreign policy priorities and neither does it reveal the factors that may influence its direction. Manners moreover states that research into the EU’s identity often suffers from a singularity and atomism, focusing on case studies in particular fields, rather than providing a holistic overview of its identity (Manners 2011, p.244). With the help of a pre-existing framework previously defined by Jimmy Persson (2005) this thesis sets out to quantify the EU’s foreign policy identity on a year-by-year basis, since the initiation of the EEAS and the expansion of the HRs mandate, from 2011 to 2016, permitting an all-encompassing holistic analysis of the EU’s identity.

K.J. Holsti developed a role theoretical perspective in foreign policy analysis that identified the different role conceptions (RCs) that policymakers held for their states. RCs are the foreign policy makers’ perceptions of their nations positions in the

¹ From hereon in referred to as HR, except when the dual-hatted role is purposefully emphasized.
international system (Wish 1980), the commitments, responsibilities and duties expressed in official foreign policy speeches (Aggestam 2006, 25). Following developments in the global political arena Le Prestre (1997) developed a post-Cold War framework of RCs, which provided the basis for Persson to assimilate ten RCs as expressed by the EUs High Representative Solana from 2000 to 2005.

This paper builds on those results and subsequently then sets out to assimilate how the EUs RCs have developed from 2005, to 2016, by discerning the RCs that have been expressed by both HR Ashton and HR Mogherini in their foreign policy speeches between 2011 to 2016. Aggestam states that “A European role conception thus reflects the norms about the purpose and orientation of the EU as an actor in the international system” (Aggestam 2006, 25). The assimilation of RCs thus captures the developing identity of the EU, and allows speculation about the main influences on the EUs identity. The results also indicate that the EU is increasingly pursuing the objectives captured in the Lisbon Treaty as contained in Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), with the Stabiliser RC remaining a continuously dominant representation of the EUs increasingly active involvement in preventing the deterioration of crisis situations. The fluctuations in the overall role-set correlate strongly to policy implementation, with most evident policy movements being implemented in an effort to stem the migration crisis.

By forming an understanding of the EUs identity changes, it will be possible to improve our understanding of the direction of the EUs foreign policy as it has been argued that identity guides political action and basic worldviews (Tonra and Christensen 2004, 82). This is made possible by study the changes of salience in European RCs, with the help of the previously conducted study by Persson (2005), as a tool by which to understand the direction of the EUs foreign policy development. The total balance of RCs thus constitutes the EUs total identity. Identity is understood as fluid, capable of change and subject to certain influences, and rigidly held together by values captured in the Lisbon Treaty. This paper looks at how the identity has changed since HR Solana, seeks to explain what has caused these changes, and discovers the utility of applying an existing framework in measuring an agent’s identity. The meta-trends, or overall average representation of RCs between HRs will be discussed. A more
specific analysis is also conducted on an annual basis, in the post-Lisbon timeframe, where there is a clear shift in role representation from year to year.

1.1 Is there an EU foreign policy?

Considering the post-Westphalian nature of the EU (Manners and Whitman 2003, 399; Tonra 2011, 1197) there is a need to consider first of all, what is meant by foreign policy, as Smith finds reason to draw into doubt whether the EU has a foreign policy of its own (Smith 2008, 53). The member states have for a great part maintained full power over their foreign policies (Smith 2008, 10) and have been reluctant to develop an EU military (Smith 2008, 11), which from a capabilities perspective draws some doubt on whether the EU even has a foreign policy of its own. The definition of foreign policy as defined by Valerie M. Hudson is: “The strategy or approach chosen by national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing” (Hudson 2008, 12).

Even though it is a rather state-centric definition, one might argue, that the EU is a strategy or an approach chosen by member states to achieve their goals on the global arena. The states have ceded certain powers to the degree that the EU may conduct a foreign policy in their collective interest and on their behalf with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) implemented by the HR and the EEAS. The ever-shifting nature of the political environment has made the EU increasingly willing and able to climb Brighi et. al’s five step ladder of escalation (Brighi et al. 2008, 132-133), as it is capable of wielding all five steps: diplomatic powers, the ability to impose positive sanctions, negative sanctions, the power to intervene politically (propaganda, subversion, interference) and also has military power since the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, although in a peacekeeping function. The Lisbon Treaty has developed the EUs ability to conduct a foreign policy by increasing its capabilities with the creation of the EEAS (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2015; Paul 2008).

Karen Smith (2008) adopts a more EU centric definition of foreign policy, for all intents and purposes a more suitable guideline: “Foreign policy is defined widely here, to mean the activity of developing and managing relationships between the state (or, in our case, the EU) and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values
and interests of the state or actor in question. Foreign policy can entail the use of economic instruments but its aims are explicitly political or security related, in contrast with foreign economic policy, whose objectives and means are economic.” (Smith, K. 2008, 2). Taking after Karen Smith’s analysis, this paper will limit its analysis to the CFSP, as the HR does not determine commercial policy, neither does she have the possibility of influencing it as the agenda-setter of the other Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) meetings, as in those cases it is presided by the rotating President of Council of the EU (Art. 16.9 TEU). It moreover seeks to investigate what the EU promotes abroad. With the help of role analysis, general foreign policy speeches by the HR will be analysed but will not code for references that are made to trade policy. These definitions however do not account further for our understanding between the foreign policy and the EUs identity, which is why the definition used by Wallace is more suited and further permits the enquiry into the EUs identity: “... foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad.” (Wallace 1991. p. 65).

Allowing the adjustment from national to European, means that studying the EUs foreign policy permits the studying of the EUs identity through the use as RCs, as this captures what RCs stand for. The European’s foreign policy identity has been argued to be but a weakly instantiated reflection of the EU member states’ combined foreign policies (Tonra 2011). Nonetheless it could be argued that the cumulative political pressure that 28 member states can exert together, is arguably a weightier tool than any single country could exert solemnly (Smith 2008, 13). This thesis argues that with the use of role theory the EUs identity development can be measured and the effects of the Lisbon Treaty thereupon can be assimilated.

1.2 Determining the EUs identity

Establishing the EUs foreign identity is of interest to us, as this provides us with an understanding of what factors shape its foreign policy (Hebel and Lenz 2015, 473; ____________________

2 Original parentheses, as in Smith 2008.
Wallace 1991, 65;). The discussion on what sort of animal the EU is has seen the coming and going of theories without agreement being formed on what the most useful theoretical approach is (Hyde-Price 2004, 99). Holland states that: “Like the debate over a common Community foreign policy itself, there is no agreement among academics on the most useful theoretical approach for comprehending this activity.” (Holland 1994, 129). What the dominant identity discussions such as ethical, civilian and normative power Europe fail to capture is that identity is a constant process of creation and reproduction through socialization including the interaction of different actors and structures (Hebel and Lenz 2015; Thies 2012; Checkel 2005). Carlsnaes emphasises that explanations of a states’ behaviour should not overlook that “all foreign policy actions – small or large – are linked together in the form of intentions, cognitive-psychological factors and the various structural phenomena characterizing societies and their environments.” (Carlsnaes 2008, 96). One of the main tenets of constructivism is that identity is not a given but rather a process of self-identification with others (Tulmets 2011, 5). Member states are consistently in a process of reorganizing their interests and preferences, in reaction to domestic circumstances and external events affecting their foreign policy, of which the EU is a vehicle. The EU can thus be understood as being in constant reorganization of its interests and preferences. While the above-mentioned approaches have contributed significantly to our understanding of the EUs foreign policy, role theory is deemed an appropriate approach with which to measure the changes in the EUs foreign policy priorities and thereby to assess what effect the Lisbon Treaty had on the EUs foreign policy identity.

The EU was said to predominantly have soft powers (Nye 2004), an assumption which provided the base from which several different approaches would be developed. Manner’s normative power Europe has arguably become the most relevant, indicating a set of norms contained in its treaties upon which the EUs foreign policy is based (Manners 2002, 242). Various theoretical assumptions tend to lack a framework that permits analysing the on-going development of the EUs identity however, which role theory permits through quantifying the changes in its priorities over an extended period.

Role theory originates from socio-psychological academia and aims to understand an individuals’ interests through studying the roles that people socially
ascribed to (Holsti 1970, 237). K.J. Holsti introduced the role theory into the world of political analysis, as a means by which to improve our understanding of the international arena and the role of the states therein (Holsti 1973, 1980: Walker 1987; Le Prestre 1997). He argues that “foreign policy decisions and actions (role performances) derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment” (Holsti 1970, 243), which are captured in their official speeches. One of the large benefits of role theory is that it is capable of analysing the agent and the structure, whereas other theories tend to address one or the other (Wendt 1987). Instead, role theory allows the analysis of internal and external variables (Le Prestre 1997, 6). National role performance, or national role, is the general foreign policy behaviour of governments and is influenced by the national role conceptions (Holsti 1970, 245). Le Prestre moreover states, that “A role reflects a claim on the international system, a recognition by international actors, and a conception of national identity.” (Le Prestre 1997, 5). Role conceptions will therefore constitute the basis with which a European identity will be further understood, allowing the analysis of changing priorities, as it develops across time and space, and moreover facilitate insight into the foreign policy identity creation process.
2. MEASURING A CHANGING IDENTITY FOLLOWING LISBON WITH ROLE THEORY

Role theory has evolved from a tool to conduct system level analyses to single case studies, facilitating a better understanding of actors’ perceived roles in the world, as expressed by a leading policymaker. Holsti’s study compiles 170 states’ self conceived roles, deducted from foreign policy speeches and statements made by leading policymakers, providing a blueprint of 18 roles which nation-states represented (Holsti 1970). Knowing what roles states’ leading foreign policy makers hold for their constituency, can help predict their actions and it can also improve our understanding of the international arena. According to Holsti: “A national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their image of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment” (Holsti 1987, 12). Holsti (1987) thus finds that the policymakers’ own opinion of their country’s role in the international arena, plays an important part in influencing the foreign policy of a state, or the role performance. Holsti advocates the use of time and space in researching an actor’s foreign policy direction, so that inferences may be drawn over longer periods. Attempting to ground the purpose of role theory, Walker (1987) finds that role analysis has descriptive, organizational and explanatory value allowing cross-level analysis, facilitating insight to the policymakers influence, the domestic influence, and the relationship amongst states on the global level (Walker 1987, 2-3).

Le Prestre revitalized role analysis, following an under appreciation of the method due to the popularity of other approaches, the stable nature of the international system and a concern for finding immediate theories that would help build a direct link between role and behaviour (Le Prestre 1997, 5). Rather than focusing on a large sample size, he attempts to understand the sources of role conceptions by focusing on a single actor at a time, and finds that sources have internal or external origins and become part of the identity of the state (Le Prestre 1997). Following the single state study format, Persson makes an original attempt at amassing the EUs identity with RCs,
applying quantitative and qualitative role theory perspectives to the study of the EUs foreign policy (Persson 2005). In so doing he establishes a framework of RCs that were regularly expressed by HR Solana, from 2000-2005. The RCs include Stabiliser, Promoter of Multilateralism, Partner, Regional Leader, Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security, Defender/Promoter of “EU” Values, Developer, Model, Global Leader, and Liberation Supporter. Descriptions of the RCs will be provided before the analysis of the results, but are not essential to the purpose of the thesis until then. These RCs make up the EUs identity and by measuring their occurrence it is possible to assess what characteristics are dominant within the EUs identity. Persson finds a total of 312 role expressions in 80 speeches over five years, with Stabiliser being the foremost conceived role with 18% of total representations, Promoter of Multilateralism with 14% and Partner, Regional Leader and Defender Promoter of Peace and Security with 13% of the total share, with the rest following in descending order (Persson 2005). Persson observes that the rise of the Stabiliser role was accompanied by the launch of the ESDP in 2003 (Persson 2005). Policy implementation is thought to be potentially important influencer of EU foreign policy, as this can lead to the development of capabilities.

2.1 Defining the scope of the analysis

Having established the meaning of a RC and its relation to the EUs identity, the next step is to ground its importance in the creation of a foreign policy and to understand what its sources are. It is argued that the RCs reveal an important aspect in the process of foreign policy making and can also reveal what influences the RCs (Thies 2012; Aggestam 2006; Holsti 1970). Do the institutional actors, the member states, the external environment or the HR play the largest role in defining the EUs priorities? The sources of EU RCs, as expressed by the HRs can be understood by taking a closer look at the HRs mandate, the institutional changes and other potential sources of the RCs. In so doing it might be possible to ascertain explanations for role change. The total amount of

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3 In Appendix 7.3. p. 74: “Table 1: EUs Roles, 2000-2005 (absolute and relative (%) frequencies) of role conceptions” - as appears in Persson (2005, p. 29).
RCs expressed, amounts to a role-set (Persson 2005, 18), to capturing the complete identity of the EU, as presented by the policymaker, or the ego. In this case, the ego will be represented by HR Ashton and HR Mogherini. These RCs held by the ego, along with the role prescriptions from the alter, are traditionally thought to play a factor in creating role performance, which, refers to the decisions and actions, resulting in foreign policy output (Persson 2005, 20; Holsti 1987, 11).

The sources of the RCs that the ego holds and expresses are traditionally thought to be shaped by several factors such as the constituent’s capabilities, socio-economic needs, ideology and the public opinion (Persson 2005, 20; Holsti 1987, 11). Factors such as other international political actors and the system structure, general legal principles, treaty commitments and world opinion constitute the alter (Ibid), which prescribes roles onto the foreign policy actor in question. Considering that the EUs foreign policy is a vehicle with which MSs conduct a unified foreign policy, these sources are still considered to be relevant considering that action by member states on the European level are taken with domestic political repercussions in mind. The EUs complex institutional structure requires many levels of socialization at national and European level. It therefore takes into account many aspects of the alter’s position, having a direct effect on the HRs definition of RCs. The traditional structural differentiation between RCs and role prescriptions therefore does not hold for the EU. The role creation process can rather be discerned through a distinction between institutional and international role expectations, both influencing the creation of RCs to a varying degree (Aggestam 2006, 26).

The institutional structure is defined by the Treaties, clearly defining the purpose of the HR. Having rules clearly outlined, the HR is left with a limited amount of independence, but instead has a clearly defined purpose and is responsible for representing the Union on matters related to common foreign and security policy (Art. 27.2 TEU). The HR has a contract to abide to, otherwise risking to lose her position. On the other hand, any changes to the international structure that may effect the EU must also be appropriately acted on, in order to maintain an optimal foreign policy for the EU. The HR plays a large part in identifying European goals and implementing foreign policy (Art. 27 TEU; Art. 29 TEU; Art. 30 TEU). Any changes to either the institutional structure or the international setting, can therefore have an effect on the expression of RCs. A
closer look at the mechanism of foreign policy making in the European Union and the HRs role therein, including her obligations to these institutions can further explain the potential sources of RCs, which might explain any changes to the overall balance thereof, and help to explain the EUs foreign policy identity development since the Lisbon Treaty.

2.2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AS SOURCES OF ROLE CONCEPTIONS

Considering the sources of the EUs RCs more specifically can provide indications as to any fluctuations that will be perceived, when conducting an analysis on the fluctuations of the EUs role-set. Rather than focusing on the general outline of what constitutes the sources of RCs of states, the sources of the EU RCs, will be explored. As the HR represents the positions agreed upon in the CFSP, a close look is required at what influences the institutions involved in the foreign and security policymaking process. Having responsibilities to the Commission and the CFSP is encapsulated by her dual-hatted role as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission. The responsibilities to the decision-making institutions are where she derives her legitimacy and power. These institutions are also influenced by other factors such as external events and domestic public opinion however, which are also considered to play an important factor in perceiving external events and making them salient topics domestically. Nevertheless the HRs responsibility to ensure foreign policy coherence and as the only party engaging with all the institutions directly in relation to foreign policy creation; she has the significant responsibility and power of framing the issues, and potentially socializing the Council of Ministers further towards a European grand strategy (Rogers 2009, 854).

First of all the HR must like in any job meet the legislative delineation of the position (Holsti 1970, 237), which in the case of the EU are largely defined under Articles 18 and 27 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The HR can however set the agenda in the FAC and advise the European Council on foreign policy issues. The Treaty of Lisbon importantly delineates a set of norms and values that should guide the
EUs foreign policy and thereby provides direction to the institutions, which consequently constrains or determines the actions of the individual (Aggestam 2006, 15). Despite being steeped in an institutional structure, personal preference and professional aspiration of the HR may also influence the expressed RCs. By looking at two separate HRs, that have worked under the same mandate might also discern the extent of their agenda-setting powers, by distinguishing whether or not there is a noticeable difference in their role conceptions. This section also argues however, that due to the decision-making hierarchy, the HR is obliged to enact decisions from the European Council, and while she can influence the agenda of the FAC agenda, is also obliged to implement their decisions. While the HR is likely to put things into her own words, the decisions made and rhetoric used by these institutions are likely to be found in the HRs foreign policy statements. All institutions have the objectives, norms and values as captured in the Lisbon Treaty as guidelines (Art. 21 TEU).

The European Council is construed of 28 member states, which all take decisions based on their economic prosperity, public opinion, immediate security concerns, as well the Treaty of Lisbon, with Article 21 TEU in particular providing guidelines. It might be argued that the external environment influences domestic priorities, as threats to the sovereignty of the EU member states, tends to come from beyond the EUs borders. External threats can affect public opinion, especially in the age of rapid communication, which subsequently leads to the issue at hand becoming a salient topic in domestic politics. Domestic public opinion, or transnationally organized actors have been said to exert influence on EU foreign policy (Aggestam, 2008, 15). Any member state, the HR, or the Commission may make a proposal to the European Council (Art. 22 TEU), upon which the European Council decides unanimously (Art.24 TEU), and outlines the strategic interests of the EU (Art.26 TEU). In modern day politics it may also be argued that there is rarely such a thing as an external problem, because issues such as poverty, conflicts, climate change and migration tend to be trans-regional or even global problems, meaning that external problems are rapidly internalized, in the domestic political landscape. Once a problem affects the majority of the EUs member states and becomes a salient European issue, it is likely to influence policy decisions on the European level. On the other hand, groupings of states may also lobby for concerted
action amongst member states to complement their own foreign policy priorities (Aggestam 2006, 14).

The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is construed of all the member state defence ministers, development ministers and trade ministers who meet on a monthly basis to define and implement the EUs foreign and security policy, on guidelines provided by the European Council (Art.16.6 TEU). The HR chairs the FAC, contributing to the CFSP with proposals and to ensure that the decisions are properly implemented (Art. 27.1 TEU) When foreign policy issues are discussed the HR thus has the ability to set the agenda, upon which the ministers then decide by unanimity what the EUs actions should be, pertaining to the matter at hand, except when the European Council decides otherwise (Art.31.1 TEU). The Lisbon Treaty has introduced the passerelle clause, which means that the FAC can decide on issues by QMV, if so decided on by the European Council (Art.31.2 TEU; Paul 2008, 14). Yet the FAC have abstained from using these exceptions, instead maintaining their preference for unanimity (Troszcynska-Van Genderen 2015, 9-10). The FAC’s task is to ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the EUs external action, along with the HR (Art. 26.2 TEU), which the HR and the EEAS are tasked with implementing.

The European Parliament does not have an active role in defining foreign policy action but takes on a revisory role, obliging the HR to regularly inform the Parliament’s suggestions on foreign policy and to consider the advice given by the Parliament (Art.36 TEU). As the only EU institution with democratically elected officials its duty is to represent its demos, arguably making it the representation of public opinion on the EUs foreign policy. The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy states that: “Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad.” (EEAS 2008, 12), acknowledging the importance of public opinion. The Parliament moreover controls the budget of the CFSP, which therefore requires the decision making and implementing institutions of the EU to take into account the Parliament’s comments, which is increasingly a player in the foreign policy making process (Paul 2008, 32).
As Vice President of the Commission the HR is also responsible for ensuring that the tools for external action that fall under the community umbrella are properly coordinated with the CFSP responsibilities (Mix 2013, 1-3). The Commission’s mandate to ensure internal security is closely linked to ensuring threats cannot enter the EU, resulting in the Commission’s legal involvement in foreign affairs. The HR is assisted in all her tasks by the EEAS (Art. 27.3. TEU), which acts as an autonomous institution and also assists in the preparation of the acts for the HR, the Commission and the Council (Gatti 2016, 148).

2.3 Why the Lisbon Treaty presupposes a changing identity

The expectations before the research are that the change in HRs, a strengthened foreign policy mechanism, changes in member state and EU leadership roles, on top of a rapidly changing external environment, are likely to have changed the salience of role conceptions significantly from Persson’s findings and moreover, that they will fluctuate amongst the High Representatives. Persson’s findings suggest that policy implementation affected the overall balance of RCs most drastically (Persson 2005), therefore affecting the balance of the EUs identity. Manners (2002) also assumes that the *acquis communautaire* prescribes the norms by which the EU functions and are therefore defining of its identity. The EUs developing capabilities and newly defined objectives suggest a shift in the EUs foreign policy identity might result from the Lisbon Treaty. “The Lisbon Treaty (2009) explicitly enshrined, for the first time, as one of the objectives of the EU’s external action “to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security […]” (Art.3 TEU). This is an overarching objective that shall be pursued by all EU external policies, instruments and tools, while respecting their respective primary/specific objectives.”⁴ (European Commission 2014, 4). Being an agreement amongst the 28 MSs to pursue these goals, the Lisbon Treaty provides a strong mandate to pursue these wide goals to its institutions and its member states. The extension of the EUs institutional foreign policy operations, with one of the fundamental

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⁴ Original punctuation as represented in European Commission 2014.
changes being the creation of the dual-hatted role of the HR/VP, at the helm of the EEAS, the Lisbon Treaty can potentially provide a renewed impetus to a European foreign policy which might now be more streamlined. The changing of the voting mechanism to allow for QMV to be used in some area where the European Council so decides (Art.31 TEU), the FAC can take decisions requiring a smaller majority and this may result in the quicker adoption of roles. The Lisbon Treaty provides a renewed impetus to the EUs foreign policy priorities and has the potential to give it a stronger mandate in certain areas, giving more legitimacy to its institutions to take action in defining a foreign policy. The creation of the dual-hatted role at the head of the European External Action Service (EEAS) moreover exemplifies this. The potential effects on the overall role representation will be subsequently discussed.

2.3.1 THE HRs POSITION AND WHAT THIS MEANS

The HR represents the positions agreed upon by European Council, the FAC, and acts as Vice President of the Commission, playing a part in every step of the foreign policy implementation process, and is therefore considered the most appropriate actor to study when establishing the EUs identity and foreign policy direction. Due to the position as chief diplomatic representative, the HR controls the EUs foreign policy narrative, which is ‘the articulation of identity that is derived from discourse’ (Tonra 2011, 1194). The HR furthermore has the right to put forward policy proposals and controls the formal agenda of Council meetings (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013). Having the HR as a permanent chair in the FAC has also been an attempt to abet foreign policy leadership problems, with the rotating Presidency chair previously setting the agenda (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013, 1316). Ashton is said to have made use of this new mandate to keep certain issues of the agenda, but is also said to have lacked the experience to entice institutional and state cooperation, in order to get policies through (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013, 1328-29). Following some familiarisation with expanded the position, subsequent HRs may find institutions and member states more cooperative. By controlling the EUs foreign policy discourse she has the ability to guide MSs towards a certain position formally as well as informally. Due to being involved at every step of the foreign policy making process, the HRs ability to iron out
differences or answer questions that are raising eyebrows may be able to circumvent some of the bureaucratic processes required to come to decisions at a quicker pace.

Not only does the High Representative represent the collective identity of the EU, but she also has the right to prioritize issues (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2015). This is primarily done through setting the agenda for Council discussions, but may also be done in foreign policy speeches. Leading policymakers represent their constituency and express its orientation in the international system and while the HR must represent decisions by the FAC and the European Council, she may also express inclinations that she perceives to be required in order to harmonize the EU's foreign policy. As the public spokesperson and head of the EEAS, the HR might be said to have the capacity to encourage the EU – either the member states, or the FAC - to come to a conclusion on an issue high on her agenda, as if it were lobbying them through foreign policy statements. The ability to speak from an authoritative position of unity has the ability to be a powerful force (Rogers 2009, 854). By expressing a role, the HR is expressing the values, principles and commitments, which are perceived to be most important for the EU (Aggestam 2006, 19-20), in respect of the limitations that are institutionally imposed. The regularity with which the HR, or her speechwriters choose to express the RCs, reflecting the norms and values associated with RCs, is the decision of the HR however. That permits the reflection of personal preference and the attribution of importance to different RCs. In so doing the HR can urge member states towards a decision on an issue.

The developed capabilities, exemplified by the creation of the EEAS, might also be a precursor to changing RCs, as an expansion of capabilities may mean that objectives can be more vigorously pursued. A network of 140 delegations and a scaling back of national diplomatic services in 2011, are part of a strategy to be “increasingly present and active in all major foreign policy arenas” (EEAS 2011, 2-4). Increased presence and activity could result in a higher involvement in crises and a reorganisation of aspirations, that can rebalance the role-set. The expansion of the HRs powers might be represented by role shifts, depending on the extent of agenda-setting powers and the difference in opinion to previous RCs. Rogers’ (2009) claim that the HRs expanded agenda-setting powers will lead to a more unionized foreign policy provides a claim which can be tested with role theory. Quantifying the set amount of roles expressed
over the past few years by HR Ashton and HR Mogherini provides data, that can indicate whether there were any sudden changes in foreign policy priorities when HR Mogherini took over from her predecessor. Sudden changes could indicate that the HR has rather strong agenda-setting powers. The new powers attributed to the HR in combination with the creation of the EEAS are specified as significant indicators that the EUs global power narrative might be gaining traction, as a formal foreign representation at an EU level signifies a political movement of togetherness and that the HRs power of discursive framing can put a great deal of pressure on member states (Rogers 2009, 854). Rogers moreover finds that the European discursive framing has the power to influence the development of a European grand strategy (Rogers 2009, 852). The consequences of having a dedicated foreign policy machinery may also result in an increasing amount of policy creation, as the HRs dual-hatted role facilitates inter-institutional coordination. When there is a significant role change, the adoption of new policies with a significant budget or expected impact will therefore be considered as a possible reason.

2.3.2 ALTERNATE INDICATIONS OF ROLE CHANGE

Interpreting Persson’s (2005) findings suggests that still perhaps most importantly the EUs RCs changed most sporadically following the adoption of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 1999 the European Council decided on the need to develop the capabilities for a rapid reaction force, which would result in the European Security and Defence Plan (ESDP) (Smith, K 2008, 40-541 setting the first steps towards a European military force of 50,000 to 60,000 capable of deploying within 60 days. Policy implementation often results in the expansion of capabilities. As a next step in European foreign and security policy integration, it is logical that this also finds expression in the foreign policy statements, which represents the overall changing of identity. Path dependence states that integration is a likely precursor to further integration (Greener 2005). The Lisbon Treaty represents an important integration move in the EUs foreign policy, since changing its objectives and the way that it pursues its objectives, making it probable that it has also altered the EUs foreign policy identity definitively and might facilitate it into the future.

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The supposed agenda-setting powers (Rogers 2009) of the HR might also affect the representation of the RCs between Ashton and Mogherini. The expansion of the HRs powers to include the ability to set the agenda means that the HR has the right to decide the discussion points in the FAC (Art. 18 TEU), in line with the broad decisions taken by the European Council (Article 16 TEU). The FAC “shall elaborate the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is consistent” (Art.16.6 TEU). It is possible that the two different worldviews find expression in the salience of role representation, if they hold strong and differing worldviews. If the HR has real agenda-setting powers, a variation between the expressed RCs between Ashton and Mogherini can be expected, as the ever-changing nature of the international system and the development of the EUs foreign policy mechanism presupposes changing opinions. If however there is little or no change, the HR is unlikely to have significant agenda-setting powers.

On the other hand it may be argued that changes in the EU MS leadership, as represented in the European Council may affect these changes. Due to the differentiating nature of terms of heads of state across Europe, on top of the relative importance of EU foreign policy as a salient topic on their political playbook, along with reason to believe that the major states such as Germany, France, and the UK are the three most influential countries in creating a European foreign policy (Lehne 2012, 1-2), the HRs ability to control the systematic repetition in foreign policy speeches is still thought to be a valuable topic to be scrutinized. It should be noted that the HR is voted in by the European Council by qualified majority and is thus found to be the best candidate to represent the European Council's conclusions, as well as the Treaty's values. One of the assumptions upon which this research rests is that the creation of a fully-fledged diplomatic entity in the EEAS as well as the expansion of the powers of the High Representative, might result in a stronger expression of RCs of a more active and impact-oriented nature to the international political arena. The Regional Leader, Global Leader, Developer and Stabiliser RCs are thought to express a willingness to be more actively involved in international politics, than the Promoter of EU Values, Transition Supporter, Defender and Promoter of Peace and Security, and Model RCs and are therefore expected to increase in importance.
The member states are the composers of the EUs foreign policy, which would suggest that whatever changes the member states identities’ must also affect the EUs projected foreign policy. That having been said, the member states national role conceptions and therefore also national interests are often different (Krotz 2001). Rather Tonra finds that “sets of respectively hegemonic national foreign policy narratives are intersecting at European level and only a weakly instantiated European exceptionalism is being reflected back” (Tonra 2011, 1198), in part due to a poorly instantiated public space where the public is not engaged in creating a strong European narrative. What results is an elite EU narrative that is isolated from the publics’ influence and fails to take hard choices (Ibid.) The demonstrations against the Iraq War are discussed as occasions where a European public space may have developed, but that the EU did not have the power to act on this narrative (Tonra 2011, 1199). A lack of leadership in EU foreign policy is being addressed with the public role of the HR, who chairs the FAC and is Vice President of the Commission (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2015, 1). Any changes in member states’ held RCs does not per se mean that the EUs foreign policy RCs will change according to the proportion of the changes in the member states’ identities. Considering that the Council of Ministers take the bulk of the decisions, voting on the basis of a representative majority, on the EUs foreign policy, the elite narrative argument might well be justified. The elite narrative argument holds that the European-level foreign policy bodies are capable of constructing foreign policy without any real political repercussions, due to their insulation from public opinion (Tonra 2011), which can be said to specifically apply to the HR and the FAC.

Holsti assumed external factors to be a constant and to omit little influence on a nations national interest, as it was too soon to speak of an international society (Holsti 1970, 243). Later researchers have argued that the status of a political entity also depends on the external environment (Aggestam 2006, 25; Wish 1980). Thus factors that might affect the EUs interests, such as threats in its direct neighbourhood or a violation of its values globally as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Arab Spring are expected to change the salience of roles expressed across the years. Threats in its environment are likely to be acted upon and therefore will once again find expression in the form of policy decision. Alexandrova notes that: “In the post-Lisbon period, the European Council took a predominantly reactive approach to foreign affairs. Attention
to both general foreign policy matters and specific domains with an external dimension (e.g. defence, civil rights, or immigration) was activated foremost by focusing events. The institution confirmed its inclination to react to conflicts in the neighbourhood (Arab Spring, Ukraine crisis, Syrian Civil War, Israel-Gaza conflict).” (Alexandrova 2015, 7)

Nonetheless, MS leaders will represent their nations’ interests first, even in the European Council.

When a problem arises that affects the majority of the member states they will seek to find a solution at the European level. Migration from North Africa and the Balkans route represented such a problem as it no longer affects solely the Mediterranean countries but has become a European-wide problem. It has incited public protests and caused political fragmentation across Europe, resulting in far right leaders using the EUs inability to handle the problem, following an already damaging economic crisis, to spearhead a surge in protectionist and xenophobic sentiment. This has resulted in a response from EU leaders, responding with foreign policy action such as EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia ⁵, starting in 2015. Tardy states that “Finally, EUNAVFOR Med is the first CSDP operation with a potential openly coercive mandate which, if implemented, would lead the EU to engage in ‘peace enforcement’-type activities” (Tardy 2015, 1). This is evidence that the EU has the potential for hard power and might be said to represent a move towards more active involvement in the international arena of a coercive nature, when there is consent in the European Council, disrupting the widely held conception of a soft Europe.

The ease with which information is spread in the social media age has undoubtedly had a large influence on the public’s access to information and ability to organize en masse, following shocking images of drowned migrants on European shores made headlines across the continent and resulted in public outrage. These factors are making policymakers such as the heads of state increasingly judged for their actions on the European level. Moreover, the HR must “regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP and the CSDP and inform it of how these policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are

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⁵ Also known as EUNAVFOR MED
duly taken into consideration.” (Art.36 TEU). Finally, HR Mogherini acknowledged the importance of foreign policy on the lives of European citizens, unveiling the European Union Grand Strategy where public opinion is said to play an important part “It is about making a European public opinion on foreign policy and security emerge.” (Mogherini 2015). External events and public opinion are therefore also considered to explain role change.
3. **RESEARCH METHOD: APPLYING A SOUND FRAMEWORK**

When setting out to analyse the EUs foreign policy RCs, the preliminary research indicated that an analysis of the EUs RCs had already been conducted by Jimmy Persson, analysing Solana’s expressed RCs in official foreign policy speeches, during his time as high representative of the EU from 2000 to 2005 (Persson 2005). Being able to adapt an existing role set for the EU, allows the measuring of the change of these roles over time. “Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding.” (Stemler 2001, 1). Considering the Lisbon Treaty, changes in EU leadership, the changing of the internal and external political landscape and importantly the development of the EUs foreign policy machinery, there are reasons to believe that the distribution of roles as envisaged by Persson may have altered, or that other roles replaced the EUs original role-set. Times of internal and external change present a good opportunity to note changes to role conceptions as these are often times that change nation-states identities and priorities (Le Prestre 1997). Having tested the role conceptions on a sample group of speeches by HR Ashton and HR Mogherini however, the role conceptions were still deemed relevant and applicable, making the framework replicable for this research. The framework is expanded slightly, to include for the Promoter of a Union Approach RC and the expansion of the Liberation Supporter RC.

3.1 **USING AN EXISTING FRAMEWORK:**

Adopting Persson’s (2005) framework consisting of ten RCs permits the analysis of the changes in the EUs foreign policy identity as presented by the consecutive HRs, that have occurred since 2005. According to Zhang et. al. (2015) the coding unit – in this case referred to as framework, or role set, constitutive of all the RCs - is said to be “one of the most fundamental and important decisions” in content analysis (Zhang et al 2005, 3; Weber 1990). By employing a predetermined framework this challenge is largely overcome. The ten RCs, as developed by Persson are used in order to code the HRs speeches, based on the representation of these themes throughout the speeches. The examples vary in their physical representation, in accordance with Zangh et al’s
representation that “you might assign a code to a chunk of any size, as long as that chunk represents a single theme or issue of relevance to your research question(s)” (Zhang et al. 2005, 3). Words or acronyms such as ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘EU’, ‘Europe’, ‘European Union’, were used as referential units (Thibault and Levesque 1997, 18), with which to enquire into the “conceptions of commitments, responsibilities and duties, hence the EUs perceived meaning of external action” (Persson 2005, 22). When deciding upon the physical boundaries that a RC had to be expressed in, it was clear from the examples provided by Persson that a role could be expressed in a reference, a sentence, a paragraph, or an even more substantive section of text. It is also known as the “sampling unit” and varies depending on how the researcher attributes it with meaning (Stemler 2001, 2).

In order to ensure the fair representation of roles, some rules were designed to establish in what cases a role should be re-counted, based on physical boundaries and thematic shifts. A second counting of the role in quick succession was permitted to ensure it was fairly represented, if there was a change in emphasis between the first and the second expression of that role, and they both covered one or more paragraphs each. Secondly, if there was a clear reaffirmation of that role, capturing all the necessary factors contained in the description, if divided by a short physical boundary such as a change in topic. Thibault and Levesque (1997, 18) moreover found that multiple assertions can be identified in the same sentences – a finding supported by Zhang et. al.’s general study of qualitative analysis techniques (Zhang et. al. 2005, 4) – and was thus duly considered in the data collection process.

The HRs speeches, or statements, sourced from the EEAS online database were selected semi-randomly. In order to ensure the foreign policy speeches were adequately general, speeches that made specific reference to one country in the title, or issue, were avoided due to the likelihood that they would be specifically fitted towards certain role expressions and would therefore skew the data. Speeches were deemed sufficiently general when held at an international conference, or organization, or in relation to an EU meeting. These are occasions to profess ones most important beliefs and orientations. These speeches tend to have a global orientation rather than an actor, or issue specific orientation, as is often the case in bilateral instances or conferences addressing one specific topic.
3.2 ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF AN EXISTING FRAMEWORK

Applying a similar framework to the same political actor under different leadership nonetheless presents a set of complications. Interpreting a pre-existing framework where only short descriptions of the role concept are provided, along with one to three examples of what represented that role, meant that its practicality had to be assessed. After preliminary readings of several randomly selected general speeches between 2010-2016, it became evident that the way in which roles were represented differed to the examples provided by Persson (2005) under Solana, in style. Speeches are a highly personal form of political expression, giving the opportunity for the speaker to use their personal style to deliver a message to the world. The change in leadership is therefore also considered to influence the way in which roles may be expressed and can partially account for the change in style. Another factor that might account for the change in style is institutional change, as the High Representative has been given more responsibilities since the Treaty of Lisbon and also has more capacities at her disposal. Such changes may also affect the style of the narrative, as it may allow for a more authoritative form of speech. Nonetheless, the preliminary readings also indicated that many sentences or groupings of sentences related strongly to the descriptions of the RCs as provided by Persson (2005, 24-28). The examples were thus only used as guidelines and the descriptions were used as the defining architecture for the research method.

Having established the utility of the framework, selecting the data sources followed. Previous research into RCs selected between eight to twelve general speeches per year, by leading policymakers (Le Prestre 1997, Holsti 1970). Persson however, sourced between 7 to 20 sources for his research per year (Persson 2005, 31). This research opted for 8-13 sources per year, depending on their availability. As can be seen in Table 3, HR Mogherini’s speeches in 2014 were also noticeably shorter and led to fewer role expressions in total and across the spectrum. Years with a relatively low

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6 In Appendix 7.1.3, p.72: “Table 3: Distribution of EUs RCs per year, 2011-2016 (2014 counted twice, once for HR Ashton and once for HR Mogherini): absolute and relative (%) representation.”
amount of available general speeches also led to the inclusion of more issue-specific speeches in order to meet the sample size. This is not considered to affect the results, as it also adds to a general representation of the EUs foreign policy activity. The varying sample size is not considered essential, as meaning is deducted from the overall averages of role expressions between HRs and the yearly fluctuations, rather than the absolute occurrence of speeches.

Le Prestre addresses the criticism that speeches are primarily instrumental and are often not written by the speaker, arguing that while speakers will be constrained with regards to the message that they will deliver they often define the content of the speeches and will rely on speech writers to “lend technical expertise rather than forge content” (Le Prestre 1997, 13-14). Intercoder reliability is also identified as a possible problem in role theory when two coders work on the same project (Le Prestre 1997, 13). As the data was collected and interpreted by one individual it can safely be said that inter-coder bias was not possible. The speeches were analysed repeatedly, during which rules for the attribution of roles were developed so as to ensure consistency throughout. Some rules that prevailed in order to properly assimilate how the RCs would be assigned, were vigorously checked in the process. The nature of qualitative research however, does not exclude minor inconsistencies, that can be attributed to human error. All efforts to minimize human error were taken however, and where error did occur it is likely that this inconsistency did not alter the research in such a way that it lost the purpose for which it was designed. The salience of roles should not be interpreted as perfectly representative of the priorities of the EU, but can be indicative of trends and generally held beliefs, backed up with further analysis. Human error might also be considered to be a constant and is therefore not thought to play a determining factor in the interpretation of the results.

That having been said, when comparing the findings with previous research employing the original role framework there is a risk of inter-research incompatibility. Qualitative content analysis has been described as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systemic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns.” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 1278). Le Prestre (1997) identified that having each analyst develop their own categories – RCs – inductively, limited the comparability of the data, while also stating that an external
template – framework or role-set – would have forced too many subjective choices, rendering the results meaningless (Le Prestre, 13). The risk entailed with developing one’s own dataset and comparing it is overcome by adapting an existing one, and instead has the ability to establish comparability between data, while also making it replicable (Zhang et. al. 2005, 4). It is possible that the application of the role descriptions may vary with how the original researcher, would have applied it to the same texts, as “qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive, and interpretation represents your personal and theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study.” (Zhang et. al. 2005, 5). By providing a sound description of the research process, this research aims to minimize the possibility of biased interpretation and application of the role-set. All efforts have been taken to interpret the speeches as critically as possible. Regular consultation of the framework and the examples, taking notes to ensure consistency of the coding and constantly comparing the coding throughout, the possibility thereof was minimized.

3.3 ROLE EXAMPLES

An overview of examples of the role conceptions as they appear in the speeches, along with a short description for each role conception is provided below. The RCs uncovered in all of the speeches were of a similar nature to the ones listed below, heavily inspired by Persson’s framework containing 10 RCs in total (Persson 2005). The descriptions of the RCs are developed in some cases, to ensure they have enough analytical capabilities. By measuring the variations of these RCs, it is possible to discern the changing values, which the HR perceives for the EUs identity development as a foreign policy actor. The inclusion of the Promoter of a United Approach role is also explained and is found to capture one of the HRs extended powers, in her responsibility to ensure coherence in European foreign policy. The examples provided may in some cases also be interpreted under another RC, as previously stated. The emphasis is however thought to relate mostly to the RC under which it is listed.

Regional Leader: The Regional Leader RC “refers to duties and responsibilities that the EU perceives for itself in its relation to states in the region” and “refers to the
EUs commitment to embrace the region” (Persson 2005, p.26). Here, the EUs region is considered to indicate the countries targeted in its neighbourhood policy7 (European Commission 2015b). Topics that often appear in relation to this role are EU enlargement and leading the countries in its neighbourhood to a better future. In large, the EUs regional leadership role refers to adopting a responsibility towards actors in its neighbourhood.

“But I want also to talk about what happening in our Eastern Neighbourhood. Our aim is a common future that will ensure prosperity, security and guarantee long term stability. To bring our partners as close as possible to the European Union.” (Ashton 2013e, 3)

“At the moment we are worried about the situation in our own neighbourhood, especially Ukraine and Egypt. We feel a special responsibility to help these countries to find a way out of their current difficulties.” (Ashton 2014, 6)

**Global Leader Role:** This role is closely linked to the Regional Leader RC, but is distinguished by geographic scope, only counting references outside the EUs neighbourhood as previously delineated, clearly referring to a global scope, or emphasizing its leadership in an issue that is essentially borderless such as digital security. The global role refers to “commitments, duties and responsibilities related to the promotion of international peace, security and prosperity” (Persson, 25).

“But also how we engage globally. Europe has always been outward looking and open. We have consistently influenced the way the world thinks - about trade, the environment, climate change, the death penalty, the International Criminal Court, and many other important issues. I am convinced that Europe must remain actively engaged around the world. And equally that our international work can help to underpin our economic recovery.” (Ashton 2012, 1)

“The EU needs to remain a credible security and defence player on the world stage. It needs to be able to act, and to do so decisively, to carry out its missions successfully.” (Ashton 2011, 2)

7 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.
Promoter/Defender of EU Values: This RC can be perceived as the expression of all the values upon which the EU is based, as captured in the Lisbon Treaty. “The objective conceived of is to defend and promote a set of rights and values such as democracy and human rights” (Persson 2005, 28). ‘Promoter/Defender of EU Values’ was regularly expressed alongside the leadership roles, but emphasizes values.

“Our European beliefs about democracy naturally become our European actions in supporting it all over the world. - So the work that we do in our neighbourhood and across the world matters hugely in terms of supporting and promoting these values.”

“We believe that long term stability and security go hand in hand with respect for human rights and freedoms. Respect for human rights and international law are key factors for peace and stability and a guiding principle for the EU. - There is no stability without democracy. There is no security without human rights. Stability and security cannot exist without a fair trial system, a serious commitment towards good governance, the rule of law and the fight against corruption. Stability versus democracy or security versus human rights are false dilemmas. We should never fall into this trap.” (Mogherini 2015c, 2)

Promoter of Multilateralism: Expressions related to the EUs dedication to multilateral approaches, which is often expressed through the EUs affiliation with the UN are coded as an expression of this role (Persson 2005, 28). It also refers to “a general commitment to encourage others to cooperate within the framework of multilateral initiatives.” (Ibid.). Working with the UN is seen as a reaffirmation to the multilateral approach. Due to being a participating member in the UN; and the UN being the primary multilateral body in global politics, working with the UN is coded under the Promoter of Multilateralism RC.

“By doing this, I would like to reiterate the strong commitment of the European Union to support and work for effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at its core, in search of lasting solutions to critical international peace and security challenges.”(Ashton 2014, 1)

“It is a world where influence is, can be, and should be shared. This and the fact that

8 Catherine Ashton, A233/11, “Speech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the 6th Ministerial Conference of the Community of Democracies in Vilnius”, Brussels 1 July 2011, p.2
the challenges we face are joint challenges sometimes global challenges makes cooperation even more crucial.” (Mogherini 2015a, 3)

**Partner:** Due to political actors often referring to their close partnership (Persson 2005, 28; Holsti 1987, 24) the coding of this role is only accounted for when there is “a firm statement of commitment towards the other actor” (Persson 2005, 28). References to the UN as a partner are excluded from the Partner RC, due to such expressions rather being perceived as being supportive of multilateralism across the wider political spectrum.

“Let me conclude by saying that the partnership between the European Union and Georgia is a strong one, and it will become even stronger in the coming years as we implement the agreement for the benefit of Georgia and the EU.” (Mogherini 2015d, 2)

“The TransAtlantic partnership has already broken a world record. The longest lasting and strongest partnership in history. Our challenge is that of collectively together breaking a new record, insuring that he shift from the actual global disorder to a new global order based on cooperation and partnership will not only be successful but also a peaceful one.” (Mogherini 2015a, 4-5).

**Transition/Liberation Supporter:** This RC is built on the Liberation Supporter role as previously outlined by Holsti, which is to “support liberation movements without assuming any formal responsibility” (Persson 2005, 27; Holsti 1987, 22). In addition it includes specific reference being made to the support for countries to transition to a democratic form of governance, following the Arab Spring, but staying away from any active involvement, as this is closely linked to supporting the revolt against an oppressive movement (Persson 2005, 27) An extended explanation for the expansion of the Liberation Supporter RC is provided at the end of this chapter.

“It will be equally important to engage on planning for the future and to closely involve the Syrian Opposition Coalition in the process. The EU will support a political transition with effective measures on the ground, institutional and economic recovery, post-conflict accountability and needs/disaster assessment.” (Ashton 2013f, 6)

“The objective is not the recognition of the Palestinian State. The objective is the Palestinian state.” (Mogherini 2014, 4)
**Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security:** This RCs refers to the commitments, duties and responsibilities related to the general promotion of peace (Persson 2005, 25). It moreover has strong ties to the idea of sustainable development, which “is dependent on participatory democracy and free-market economic policies” (Persson 2005, 25).

“And there is no reduction in the need for Europe to be able to act. If anything, I would argue, its increasing. We face new challenges, cyber and maritime security to name but two. And increasingly we need to deal with regional conflicts – I think of Libya and Mali. It is crucial that we are able to act on these challenges.” (Ashton 2013b, 1)

“You will always find Europe ready to work for peace. Actively, quietly, humbly but stubbornly. We will be there. – Peace is something you shouldn’t give up to. We are starting to find this whole situation normal, it is not. And it is a risk no one can run. In Israel, in Europe, in America. If we want peace – because we know that only peace will bring security for all – we need to start building it. We have a responsibility.” (Mogherini 2016b, 7).

**Promoter of a United Approach:** The Promoter of a Union Approach role is added to this framework as one that captures the extended role of the HR. It relates to the promotion of the EU as a more effective actor if the member states capabilities are united, and often refers to the ‘pooling and sharing’ of foreign affairs, security and defence capabilities. This RC reflects the EUs responsibility to continue integration in its foreign policy to present a stronger front in the international arena. An more in-depth explanation regarding the expansion of this RC is provided in the final section of this chapter.

“And that’s why one of the main focuses of my job is the coordination and cooperation of our defence capabilities – what we in the European Union call Pooling and Sharing. We need to make sure that our capabilities are preserved and that can only be done through cooperation.” (Ashton 2013c, 2)

“We need to become less dependent, and stand on our own two feet. The question is how to deliver these capabilities – none of which comes cheap. — The answer is through cooperation. I was pleased that the European Council endorsed defence cooperation. This is not a luxury, or some sort of diplomatic weasel word it’s a necessity. In todays – and probably tomorrow’s – Europe of continually squeezed defence budgets, cooperation is the only way to acquire and sustain capabilities that are out of reach individuality.” (Ashton 2014a, 3)
**Model:** The Model role conception reflects the story of European integration and reconciliation (Persson 2005, 25). It often refers to the historical events that took place, upon which the European Union was built.

“Those who are closest want to join us, those who are further away want to imitate us. With the AU, with Asian countries, many conversations I have across the world are about trying to create something new in an economic sense to begin with, but more and more often in a political sense. Look at how the Asian nations have tried now to develop a human rights strategy. Look at the developments in the AU where they model themselves largely on us.” (Ashton 2013d, 2)

“We realized that our culture is Greek and Jewish, Roman and Anglo-Saxon, Christian and Arab, Latin and Slavic, French and German, Mediterranean and Scandinavian, religious and secular. It was not isolation but openness that made Europe such an incredible place and project. A project of integration that the world considers – still – as a model.” (Mogherini 2016, 1)

**Stabiliser:** The Stabiliser role reflects an active involvement in settling crises (Persson 2005, 27). This is reflected by efforts related to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian as well as development aid (Ibid.). It often refers to one or more tools of the entire foreign policy toolbox in order to bring about a peaceful solution (Ibid.).

“We are already taking a strong role in supporting the NTC, easing sanctions now and making more assets available in line with their requests, working closely with the UN coordination with the need assessment and making sure that we are able to offer support on everything from democracy building to security sector reform.” (Ashton 2011b, 3)

“It is also vital that we provide political and humanitarian support to the government in Iraq and to the Kurdish authorities. The EU will continue to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, to work to ease the suffering of all those caught up in the fighting in Iraq and Syria, and to assist the neighbouring countries, especially Jordan, which are doing so much to help refugees.” (Ashton 2014b, 2)

**Developer:** This RC is coded for when specific reference is made to the EUs financial assistance or the EUs leading role as a developer in the world, representing a duty to provide development aid (Persson 2005, 26).

“We support these concepts in all our development cooperation initiatives around the
world, convinced that development efforts can only take root within a framework of accountability and responsible action by public authorities towards their citizens.” (Mogherini 2015b, 2)

“At the same time, we can be so much stronger as a Union of half a billion people; as the greatest humanitarian donor and the biggest development actor and a strong and responsible security provider. Always, always working for peace.” (Mogherini 2016c, 2)

3.4 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: COMPLICATIONS IN APPLICATION

While applying the roles to the speeches it became evident that there were reoccurring references in the speeches that may be interpreted in several ways. This section sets out to explain the thought process behind the role attribution, discussing some of the main stumbling points and some of the rules that developed over the course of the readings to ensure a proper application of the role-set and correct representation of references therein. In so doing, this section discusses some key relationships amongst the RCs and reoccurring terminology. It moreover explains why the framework required the expansion of the Liberation role to include the role of Transition Supporter, as well as the introduction of the completely new Promoter of the United Approach RC.

3.4.1 THE DISTINCTION DILEMMA

The preliminary readings presented reoccurring references in the HRs speeches to the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach was regularly mentioned over the course of the years and refers to the idea that in the EUs external policy should draw on “the full range of its instruments and resources - to make its external policy more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (European Commission 2013, 2). In some cases the concept was referred to, in other cases an explanation of the concept was provided. In other cases still, the comprehensive approach was accompanied with concrete examples, indicating where the approach was being used or was going to be
implemented. Due to the varying nature in which the comprehensive approach is presented and finding that it could be coded under the RCs in the current framework, the comprehensive approach is diligently coded amongst the existing roles, rather than creating a separate role for it. Even though it refers to the use of the entire toolbox of foreign policy activity (Ibid.) this does not mean it is an active role (Persson 2005, 27), which would classify it as a Stabiliser role and thus a mere description of, or reference to the comprehensive approach is coded as a ‘Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security’ RC. An expression is only perceived as active when there is specific reference made to the means of the intervention and the location or parties involved. Merely raising the wrongdoings of an actor and generally advocating for values is not coded as active.

The definition of an active RC as indicated by Persson (2005, 27) is expanded to include reference to a specific, past, ongoing or future foreign policy mission, where one or more tools of the entire range of foreign policy tools at the disposal of the EU has been, is being or will be employed. Such an effort can refer to facilitating any sort of event pertaining to resolving or preventing conflict, providing aid (except in instances when it is only referred to as development aid), training or assisting local forces, engaging in diplomatic solutions through political dialogue or negotiations, sanctions, or a combination thereof. Thus when the comprehensive approach was listed, directly followed by an example where the EU was, is, or will be employing it; it was included as an expression of the Stabiliser RC.

The Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RC however, is attributed when there is merely an expression pertaining to a universal approach to international peace and security, including references to sustainability, as Faria writes: “The need for comprehensive and coordinated responses by the EU to address sustainable development, peace and security, especially in complex fragile situations, is widely accepted. However, despite progress in a number of areas, EU’s track record in seeking agreement and implementing comprehensive approaches is a long history of unfinished business, postponed priorities and failed attempts.” (Faria 2014, 1). Mentioning an approach thus does not necessarily equate to the implementation of that approach. One of the HRs major powers is the ability to control the narrative of the EU’s foreign policy (Rogers 2009), which alongside her responsibility to create a coherent European foreign policy, means that she is likely to advocate a comprehensive approach; without
having the competence to decide what approach is best suited for the means of conducting a foreign policy, as ultimately policy decisions are taken by the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Thus, when reference is made to the comprehensive approach, without an example of engagement, it did not suffice as proof of the EUs active involvement and is thus classified as a Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RC, seen to be advocating for peace and security more passively.

3.4.2 Expanding the Framework with New RCs

After the initial readings enough reason was found to expand the role-set. Firstly the Liberation Supporter RC is expanded to include references indicating references to supporting transition. Secondly, the Promoter of a Union Approach is included, which captures the HRs role-setting powers; indicating the benefits of pooling foreign, security and defence resources and is indicative of the HRs role-setting powers. By expanding one RC and creating a new one this framework is said to maintain its capability of registering a changing identity, through understanding its changing and developing goals, all the while maintaining comparability.

Firstly, the Liberation Supporter role is mostly obsolete, as Persson found it to be the lowest ranking role conception after Developer. Secondly, the terminology can be said to be outdated, as it is a role that Persson (2005) adopts from Holsti (1987). The liberation of countries is strongly related to the removing of Soviet influence in these countries. A more general understanding might be the support of the removal of a foreign influence in another country. It was however deemed similar enough to the Transition RC, as it more generally refers to support for the removal of an oppressive regime (Persson 2005, 27). Although this widens the role, it also enriches the data set, which is not an uncommon procedure when using a pre-existing model (Zhang et. al. 2005, 4). Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, there are clear and reoccurring references made to supporting the transition of countries towards democratic states. The terminology is reflective of the priorities, that the EU perceives for itself in the world order and also reveals something about the international political system at the current time.
The second notable reoccurring expression that is included in the role framework is the Promoter of a United Approach RC. Through the Promoter of a United Approach role, the HR advocates the harmonization of foreign and defence resources. The narrative is about the economic benefits of having similar military equipment rather than about the operational advantages of using the same equipment, which is a major obstacle in working towards a viable European military. It captures the HRs ability to present a new narrative. Persson intentionally excludes the role “Promoter of EU Influence” from his framework. The reason therefore is that it symbolizes the expression of an ambition, rather than a commitment, responsibility or duty (Persson 2005, 30). That having been said, Persson also states that “speeches are an instrument to generate support, reveal intentions, and to persuade other actors on the world scene” in order to explain the rise in the Stabiliser role (Ibid.). It is therefore considered, that revealing ones ambitions is also a way of generating support, thereby enticing others to an idea, by proposing it and exerting pressure on MSs by arguing it in such a way that the current situation seems less beneficial than how it could be. By revealing intentions the HR is setting an agenda, whereby she is not only trying to persuade other actors (Persson 2005, 30), but also the EU member states, of the EUs real potential. It is constitutive of a new direction in EU foreign affairs as it indicates a priority for the HR, acting on her mandate of creating a coherent foreign policy (Art.21.3 TEU) and can be a precursor to revealing increased militarized intentions in the future. Therefore the Promoter of a United Approach is added as an extra role in this framework.
4. RESULTS:

Besides looking into the trends in the EUs identity, this paper also looks into the utility of role theory in its application to the EUs foreign policy, in order to measure changes in its identity. Having established that RCs are constitutive of, and manage to capture the changing identity of an actor, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty is thought to change the identity for a number of reasons; amongst which a refined set of objectives, capabilities and a changing internal and external political landscape. The added factor herein lies that, rather than one HR, this study has applied it to two consecutive HRs in order to distinguish whether a change in leadership also means a change in expressed RCs, which in their extended mandate might be expected. The following section analyses the overall trends in salience of the RCs between Persson’s study of HR Solana (Persson 2005) to HR Ashton, as well as developments in the EUs overall identity between HR Ashton and HR Mogherini. Where stark differences among these overall trends are uncovered, reasons are sought through a yearly analysis in order to explain changes in relevance of RCs. Policy implementation such as the comprehensive approach, resulting from broad guidelines set out in the Lisbon Treaty are found to have a real impact on the overall identity. The same can be said for external events, to which the policies are often catered. One of the inferences that may be drawn is whether the HRs agenda-setting powers are relevant, or that the RCs are dictated by the institutional structures. The results moreover validate the inclusion of the Promoter of a Union Approach role and provide some indication that HR Mogherini’s Global Power Europe initiative changed the EUs foreign policy identity. The results show an increasingly active player on the international setting; willing and able to pursue sustainable peace. They show HR Ashton, as being more willing to exhibit the EU as a

9 All three analytical Tables can be found in the Appendix:

7.1.1. p.70: “Table 1: EU Roles from 2011 to 2014, under HR Ashton”;
7.1.2. p.71: “Table 2: EU Roles, 2014-2016, HR Mogherini”;
7.1.3. p. 72: “Table 3: Distribution of EUs RCs per year, 2011-2016 (2014 counted twice, once for HR Ashton and once for HR Mogherini): absolute and relative (%) representation”
leader in the international arena, whereas HR Mogherini focuses more on the importance of cooperation and multilateralism.

4.1 Observed Trends

While it is impossible to say with absolute certainty what the reason is for the changes in RC salience, due to the high amount of variables involved, the identified sources of RCs and role change can infer speculation about what affects the EUs identity. Noticeable changes from HR Solana’s role-set to that of HR Ashtons’ expressed RCs include the rise of two RCs, the fall of two RCs, and the introduction of a new RC. The changes of salience regarding the remaining roles are insignificant in comparison, although will be briefly discussed. Internal changes, as well as external changes are found to be explanatory of the developments in the EUs identity over the course of time.

4.1.1 A Change of Mandate: From Solana to Ashton

Comparing the salience of RCs held by HR Solana and HR Ashton provides a basis by which to analyse what effect the Lisbon Treaty has had on the EUs foreign policy identity. Persson’s assimilation of data (Persson 2005, 29) is compared with the data collected in Persson (2005, 29)10, by which any changes can be discussed. The Stabiliser RC increases in total representation to capture 5% more of the total representation, than under Solana, remaining the most expressed RC as shown in Table 111. The other changes such as the rise in the Global Leader role by 6% and the introduction of the Promoter of the Union Approach role (Table 1)12, are representative of a renewed

10 Due to the extensive research conducted, the entirety of all the speeches from which data is sourced is included in the Bibliography 2. Some of the sources referred to therein are also to referenced in Bibliography 1, as they are referenced in-text, in the Examples of RCs section.

11 In Appendix 7.1.1: “Table 1: EU Roles from 2011 to 2014, under HR Ashton”, p.70

12 Ibid.
foreign policy identity under HR Ashton, reflecting the changes in discourse. The Treaty of Lisbon is argued to have played an important role in these changes.

One explanation for the rise in the Stabiliser role is that the developing capabilities of the EU as a foreign policy actor allows it to play a more active role in settling conflicts, as Ashton invested most efforts in capacity-building during her spell in office (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013, 1328). Regular references to the comprehensive approach can also be found throughout the speeches, as the EU wishes “to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (European Commission JOIN 2013, 2) “by drawing on the full range of its instruments and resources” (Ibid.). The implementation of the comprehensive approach in 2013 also coincides with a sudden jump of importance in the Stabiliser RC in the same year, as seen in Table 3. The comprehensive approach is a direct result of the Treaty of Lisbon, which called for a consistent approach of external action in the pursuit of the objectives set out in the treaty (European Commission JOIN 2013, 2). It is important to note that not all references to the comprehensive approach are coded as a manifestation of the Stabiliser RC, as there had to be clear reference to active participation in conflict areas. Seeing as references made to the comprehensive approach without concrete examples being given of participation active participation in resolving crises, might also explain the rise of the Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RC under HR Ashton, accounting for 3% more of the total RCs mentioned since HR Solana. Rogers mentions that academic discussions on the EUs identity have not represented the securitization of western politics, following the terrorist attacks at the beginning of the 21st century (Rogers 2009, p.833). This analysis does represent the rising and staying preoccupation with security in the EUs foreign policy with the rise of the Stabiliser role and that of Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security.

This trend may also be explained by a higher amount of conflicts in 2011 than in 2005, with the UN reporting that conflicts have almost tripled from 2008 to 2015

13 Jumps from 21% in 2012, to 35% in 2013. In Appendix 7.1.3: “Table 3: Distribution of EUs RCs per year, 2011-2016 (2014 counted twice, once for HR Ashton and once for HR Mogherini): absolute and relative (%) representation”, p.72

14 In Appendix 7.1.1: “Table 1: EU Roles from 2011 to 2014, under HR Ashton”, p. 70
(Report by the UNSC, 2), although not precisely correlating, it reflects an increasingly unstable global political arena, particularly in relation to Africa and the Middle East. Many migrants, fleeing crises in these areas attempt to make it to Europe. That may have resulted in more involvement in crisis management and conflict resolution as the Treaty emphasizes the importance of countering this (Art.21.2 TEU). This trend is reflected in EU military operations with the EU having finalized six missions between 2005 and 2016 - AMIS, EUFOR RD CONGO, EUFOR TCHAD RCA, EUFOR Libya - with another six still ongoing - EUFOR ALTHEA, EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, EUTM SOMALIA, EUTM MALI, EUNAVFOR MED, EUTM RCA – (EEAS 2016) of which three were launched under Mogherini.

Equally notable, is the extended reach of the EUs foreign policy machinery. In the year 2014 the Stabiliser role jumps from 22,6% to account for 35 % of all RCs, as can be seen in Table 3\textsuperscript{15}, which coincides with the launch of the new Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF). The adoption of the new MFF may have led to an increased emphasis on the tools that the EU can provide, in Ashton’s discourse. The MFF re/launched many instruments pertaining to providing external aid amongst which several more notable instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) receiving € 15.4 billion, Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) receiving € 19.6 billion (European Commission 2013a) and € 6.6 billion put away for the Humanitarian Aid instrument (European Parliament 2015). Launched as part of the MFF is the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) in March 2014 (Regulation (EU) No 230/2014), in an effort to prevent conflict and to respond to crises rapidly, by making € 2.3 billion available from 2014 to 2020 (DG for External Policies Report, 14).

External factors are also considered, as the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, resulted in € 16.5 million support package, in order to bring about stability to the country’s economy, to aid in the political transition and to bring about reforms (European Commission 2014a). This may also have resulted in renewed emphasis in

\textsuperscript{15} In Appendix, 7.1.3: “Table 3: Distribution of EUs RCs per year,, 2011-2016 (2014 counted twice, once for Ashton and once for HR Mogherini): absolute and relative (%) representation”, p.72
speeches, on the EUs active capabilities. The annexation may have forced the EU to emphasise that it will not allow aggressive acts in its neighbourhood, which could have found expression in the Stabiliser RC, but also in the sudden rise in the Regional Leader RC in 2014, up to 18%. The annexation of Crimea was in violation of international law and has created instability in the EUs region. The EU is likely to strongly oppose aggressive acts in its region and to lead the region towards its own values.

The high representation of the Stabiliser RC may also account for the low representation of the Developer RC. Considering that development spending has increased in the EU, it may be that the EU is representing itself increasingly as a partner in aid, actively providing, rather than merely donating aid. This may also explain why the Developer role is no longer as prevalent in the role-set as it has been integrated with more tools focused on aiding vulnerable communities, rather than merely framing assistance as financial aid.

A second notable rise from HR Solana is that of the Global Leader role, which rises by a total of 6% of total manifestations, since Solana (Table 1)\textsuperscript{16}. This change might be explained by the expanded capabilities of the EU, increased legitimacy and perhaps a show of force. As one of the largest diplomatic services in the world, with an increasing amount of missions and a strong history of peace and economic strength, the EU can offer leadership and legitimacy to many challenges around the world. The rise in the Global Leader RC may perhaps also be perceived as a show of strength to stand up to other rising powers, with Ashton situating “her role in the wider context of the EU as a soft power and the rapidly changing international context of emerging powers” (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013, 1328). An expanding portfolio of challenges, such as cyber-security, energy security, climate change, and piracy and the proliferation of weaponry (European Commission 2014, 4), is also likely to play a part in the increased representation of the Global Leader RC. Acknowledging the increasing connectivity of problems in the world, the expansion of the portfolio of challenges to the EUs security, on a global scale is likely to have resulted in an overall increase in mentions of the Global Leader role. The Treaty states that EUs actions should seek to advance the

\textsuperscript{16} In Appendix 7.1.1: “Table 1: EU Roles from 2011 to 2014, under HR Ashton”, p. 70
values that inspired its own creation in the wider world, setting out a clear list of values and objectives pertaining to activities in relation to crisis management and the rule of law (Art. 21 TEU).

Somewhat contradictory, the Promoter of Multilateralism role, as well as the Partner role, dropped by 5% of total representations each (Table 1). Vanhoonacker and Pomorska note that HR Ashton failed to invest much effort in mobilizing possible partners due to being preoccupied with internal problems in establishing the EEAS (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013, 1329).

As the only new RC, the Promoter of a United Approach RC goes from 0.8% of mentions in 2011, to 2.9% mentions in 2012, to 4.5% mentions in 2013 (Table 3)\(^\text{17}\). The appearance and rise thereof is once again closely linked to European Council decisions. In December 2012 “The European Council invites the High Representative, notably through the EEAS and the EDA, as well as the Commission, all in accordance with their respective responsibilities and cooperating closely as required to develop further proposals and actions to strengthen CSDP and improve the availability of the required civilian and military capabilities, and to report on such initiatives, at the latest by September 2013, with a view to the December 2013 European Council. Member States will be closely involved in this process” (European Council 2012, 9), in a roadmap to complete the Economic and Monetary Union. The European Council conclusion from 2012 refers to conclusions made in 2008, when firm affirmations were made towards “strengthening and optimizing European capabilities in the years ahead and emphasize the EUs desire to work for the cause of international peace and security, while making a tangible contribution to the security of our citizens.” (European Council 2008, 11).

The first observation is that there is no decision on how European member states are to unify the capabilities, but it instead refers to finding a way in which the EU can play a more active role in general securitization. The cost effectiveness argument of pooling defence resources is thus developed at a later stage or through the involvement

\(^\text{17}\) In Appendix, 7.1.3: “Table 3: Distribution of EUs RCs per year, 2011-2016 (2014 counted twice, once for Ashton and once for HR Mogherini): absolute and relative (%) representation”, p.72
of the Commission. The precise role of the HR in advocating a single market approach cannot be ascertained, but the double-hatted nature of the HR would have allowed close coordination with the Commission in order to present as strong as possible an argument, for unifying capabilities under the scope of the Economic and Monetary Union. Spill-over is a key component of Haas' theory on European integration, stating that EU integration occurs as integration in one policy area concurrently necessitates the integration of other policy areas (Haas 1958). Thus the planning of a proposal may have led to only one mention of the Promoter of the Union role in 2011, before the issue developed further in 2012. In 2013 however, the RCs jump to 4.5% of total mentions (Table 3). This can be explained by a further commitment in the European Council, linking an effective Common Security and Defence Policy to the EUs ability to contribute to peace and stability throughout its region and across the globe (European Council 2013, 1), arguing that: "Defence budgets in Europe are constrained, limiting the ability to develop, deploy and sustain military capabilities. Fragmented European defence markets jeopardise the sustainability and competitiveness of Europe's defense and security industry." (Ibid.).

4.1.2 From Ashton to Mogherini

The first striking point is that role representation between Ashton and Mogherini is very stable (Table 2)\textsuperscript{18}. Mogherini’s overall representation appears to place more emphasis on cooperation rather than leadership, while maintaining a strong emphasis on peace and security. The Partner and Multilateral roles rose to capture an increased amount of 2% and 3% of the total representations respectively (Table 2), which may be explained by the fact that the EEAS had been established and more streamlined, permitting an outward focus. Seeing as Treaty emphasizes multilateralism and international cooperation as some of its main objectives, having established the EEAS as a functioning global machinery, the emphasis could be shifted. On the other hand, it might also reflect something about the priorities, which the HR perceives for the

\textsuperscript{18} In Appendix 7.1.2. “Table 2: EU Roles, 2014-2016, HR Mogherini”, p.71.
EU, in which cooperation plays a more important role. The Supporter of Multilateralism RC peaks in 2015 however (Table 3), which is also the year of the Paris Climate Accords in 2015. A global problem, the EU has always been a strong proponent of fighting climate change, which is also a key objective in the Lisbon Treaty and a priority adopted by the European Council (Art. 21.2 TEU). It did however fail to keep a unified negotiation position during the Copenhagen negotiations in 2009, casting doubt on the EUs cohesiveness and leadership abilities in climate change (Groen and Niemann 2013). It may also be explained by the migration crisis, which saw an unprecedented amount of irregular migrant casualties at sea and making the way to Europe through the Western Balkans (Frontex 2016, 19). Other role increases are the rise of the Model role by 3% and the Developer role by 2% of total representations (Table 2). Emphasizing the historical implications that led to the creation of the EU may have been an attempt to remind MSs of the importance of the European mission. It may also be in extension of the emphasis on cooperation and multilateralism, considering that the EU is the first intensively cooperating regional organization in the world, resulting in the longest lasting peace in the continent known to history.

The Paris Agreement, that was ratified in 2015, may be a reason for the increasing representation of the Promoter of Multilateralism (Table 2). Climate change is clearly indicated in the Treaty of Lisbon as one of its primary foreign policy goals (Art. 21 TEU). Manners notes that “Partnership, not EU unilateralism, is important for building global consensus and ensuring success in multilateral institutions.” (Manners 2009, p.14). This statement is particularly truthful statement for a global problem. The Supporter of Multilateralism RC peaks in 2015, the year of the Paris Climate Accords, reaching 21% of total representations and drops off to 17% in 2016 (Table 3), still significantly higher than any of the years under Ashton. The remaining high representation may also be attributed to an afterglow of this agreement, as the agreement now needs to be implemented. Continued reference to it is therefore of importance. The concluding of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the E3+3, where HR Mogherini played an important role in the process, may have also played an important part in emphasizing a multilateral approach. A further point that may explain the rise of this RC under Mogherini, may be the implementation of the Multi-Annual Financial Framework in 2014, resulting in an incredible influx of spending on foreign
policy tools over the course of several years, allowing the EU to contribute more sporadically to UN missions, associated with the Multilateral RC. The increase in funds may also play a part in the rise of the Developer RC under Mogherini, as it becomes particularly dominant in 2016 when comparing to the other years, reaching 7% (Table 3). 2016 is also the year that the EU agrees a deal worth 3 billion EUR with Turkey, in order to stem the flow of migrants across the Western Mediterranean route and the Balkan Route (European Commission 2016).

Being faced with a rise of other powers may also have led the EU to renew its efforts to ensure that the existing balance of power remains through multilateral institutions and partnerships across the board. Nonetheless the Regional Leader RC accounts for 25% of all representations of RCs in 2014, the year of the annexation of Crimea. It was also the year of the publishing of a communication on the ‘Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015’ (European Commission 2014b), focusing on reform in potential countries of accession. Such a topic is likely have also featured high on the political agenda of the HR.

Under Mogherini, the Promoter of a Union Approach reappears in 2015 at 3.8% (Table 3). The Promoter of a United Approach role is strongly linked to the resulting European Defence Action Plan in 2015, the Commission’s proposal to move “Towards a more competitive and efficient defence sector” (European Commission 2015, 1). The appearance of the Promoter of a United Approach role is reflective of the extended powers of the HR and her ability to influence member states with her control of the European narrative (Roger 2009). The HRs extended powers may have permitted the HR of setting a narrative as is indicated by Rogers (2009). While the results suggest the move towards enhancing military cooperation in the EU was set in motion in 2008 by the European Council (European Council 2008, 11), the Lisbon Treaty clearly contains objectives aimed at intensifying and improving European military cooperation and defence capabilities (Art. 42 TEU; Art. 45 TEU; Art. 46 TEU); and may also be seen to facilitate a more rapid development of solutions through facilitating higher levels of institutional cooperation (Art.21.3).

The relatively small changes in salience of the RCs since HR Ashton, might be seen as evidence that the HR does not have a large influence in deciding the priorities of
the EUs foreign policy. It appears that the European Council mostly decides the direction of the EUs foreign policy based on cross-national European issues, in pursuit of achieving the Lisbon Treaty’s objectives, aims and values. The institutional actors, amongst which the Commission is the proposing power, subsequently seek to implement these strategies (Art. 21.3 TEU). This is clear in the case of implementing a comprehensive approach, resulting in a dominant Stabiliser RC. This is in accordance with the notion that the EUs prime principle is sustainable peace, followed by freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2011, p. 244). Another point that can be taken away from this analysis is that all three HRs start their term with very high representations of Promoter of EU Values RCs, with it representing 18%, 19.7% and 19.5% for Solana’s, Ashton’s and Mogherini’s respective first years in office, before declining. This is understood to be representative of the importance leaders attach the introducing their vision to the world and to outline their priorities, in their first year.

4.2 GLOBAL POWER DISCOURSE?

Looking at the frequency of the roles mentioned in Persson’s work it is evident that Persson finds far fewer role expressions, finding between 25-89 absolute role mentions per year, averaging at 62 roles per year, having used between 7 to 20 sources per year, over five years (Persson 2005, 31). This research on the other hand finds a variation of 36-164 role conceptions per year, using 8-13 sources per year, averaging at 118 roles per year (Table 3). It is believed that the difference in role appearance does not cripple the value of comparability as the trends are in the end interpreted by percentage of appearances. When comparing two studies it is imperative to discuss what may have caused such anomalies in role appearance. Possible difference in speech length, increased capabilities, and levels of involvement are considered as possible reasons.

There are several reasons why such a clear difference in absolute role appearances might occur. One of the main reasons presented here is the possible difference in speech length. It is thought that the longer the speech the more likely it is
to capture more RCs. Due to having no data on the length of the speeches from which Persson sources his data, this analysis relies on the data collected from HR Ashton and HR Mogherini’s speeches in order to draw conclusions about the effect that the length of the speech has on role appearance in a source. By comparing the year in which the least amount of roles are expressed, to the year when the most role expressions are found, to the average amount of pages for each year, inferences can be drawn about the relation between average speech length and role expressions. The lowest number of role expressions are found in Mogherini’s first year in office, 2014 (Table 3)\textsuperscript{19}, in which case the speeches were on average 1.2 pages long\textsuperscript{20}, significantly shorter than all other years for which data is amassed. The highest number of roles expressed is 164 in a year, in Mogherini’s second year in office, 2015 (Table 3)\textsuperscript{21}, where 3.25 pages per speech were recorded on average\textsuperscript{22}. This difference can be put down to longer speeches and significantly more depth to the speeches, touching upon a greater range of topics. The difference of length in speeches can be related to HR Mogherini only entering office in November 2014. Therefore the speeches only cover the months November and December. It is also assumed that her relatively late entering of office in the calendar year might have affected her ability to speak with authority on all matters. Lacking complete ownership of all topics may also have affected the amount of roles expressed in her speeches. As such, it might also be said that HR Solana’s mandate was comprehensive than Ashton and Mogherini’s, as the EU was not as advanced a foreign policy actor, thus explaining the lesser expressions of RCs.

\footnote{19}{In Appendix, 7.1.3: “Table 3”, p.72}
\footnote{20}{2014 HR Mogherini: 8 speeches in total: 9.5 total pages of speech, resulting in 1.19 page average, per speech. Where there was a noticeable change in font observed, this was also taken into consideration. Half pages of text were taken as measurement, rather than page numbers, as a speech sometimes begins lower down the first page, and might stop very early on the last page.}
\footnote{21}{In Appendix, 7.1.3: “Table 3”, p.72}
\footnote{22}{2015 Mogherini: 12 speeches in total: 39 total pages of speech, resulting in 3.25 pages per speech.}
Another reason might be found in the increased capabilities of the EU in the international political sphere. Holsti finds that a higher frequency of role expressions can also be understood as a will to exert more of an influence in the international arena (Holsti 1970, p.283). Holsti argues that there may be a link between the regularity of role expressions and a states involvement in the international arena, finding that: “The more highly a state is involved in the external environment (however that is measured), the more highly structured its national role conceptions are.” (Ibid.). As a foreign policy actor, the EU is a highly active member of the international community, as it represents the combined interests of 28 member states. The contrary can also be said, that states with no clear NRCs have no real foreign policies (Holsti 1970, 280). This also has some value in explaining a rise in total RCs expressed per speech, in the sense that the EU is a relatively young foreign policy actor, evidenced by the recently advanced foreign policy powers, creating a more streamlined foreign policy process (Paul 2008, 34), showing that it had not yet reached a state of finality. A novice actor is said to have the potential to be shaped by its environment but also to reshape its environment through socialization (Thies 2012, 33-34). Enjoying more capabilities might therefore be reflected in an attempt to shape one’s environment.

The European Neighbourhood Policy has been around since 2004 but in 2011, with the start of HR Ashton, “a new and ambitious Neighbourhood Policy” (European Commission 2011) was launched, with a total of EURO 6.95 billion being made available for 2011 to 2013 (Ibid.). On top of that the European Council accepted HR Ashton’s proposal to make EUR1 billion extra funds available for the MENA region, where annual lending could reach EUR2.6 billion per year by 2013 (Ibid.). Increased efforts in foreign policy may thus be represented through an increasingly structured expression of RCs in foreign policy speeches. The EU has significantly developed as a political entity between 2005 and 2011. A great deal of changes took place within the EU, as a result of the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, with regards to the institutional balance as well as the decision-making procedures. The creation of a dedicated foreign policy machinery in the EEAS is considered as one of the important developments over those years. The external environment also shifted, which is another factor often considered as having an effect on an actors role conceptions.
Finally it might be that the post-Lisbon HRs simply have more to discuss, because the EU is a more experienced foreign policy actor, more engaged on the world stage and therefore finding more reason to more assertive foreign policy statements. Having a larger diplomatic network means that it engages with more actors across the globe and consequently deals with more and newer issues. On the other hand, it may be that the descriptions of RCs had been too liberally interpreted and applied. As a result comparison between Persson’s results (Persson 2005) and the results found in this research might suffer somewhat in their comparison, but still maintain overall value. The above observations argue that the causes for varied role expressions can be several; and they include: speech length, expanded capabilities, being an established actor, and bias towards a pre-existing framework.
5. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY:

By using role theory this thesis set out to quantify the EUs changing foreign policy identity, since the Treaty of Lisbon, with the use of role conceptions. The fluctuations in the representation of RCs have permitted inferences about the EUs dominant characteristics of its identity and the potential sources of these changes. The results show that the Lisbon Treaty continuously affects the development of the EUs identity, with the objectives contained therein. These objectives are pursued to different extents, by its institutions based on its priorities in foreign and security affairs. One dominant pursuit appears to be that towards sustainable peace, which Manners argues facilitates the pursuit of the eight other principles, being freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance, upon which the EUs identity is based (Manners 2012, 244). The emphasis on providing sustainable peace solutions is reflected in the sum of representations in the EUs RCs, with the Stabiliser RC and Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RCs being the most salient representations. The results do not indicate erratic shifts in expressed RCs between HR Ashton and HR Mogherini, but has instead resulted in relatively few changes on average. The identity change between the two sees a trade-off between an emphasis on leadership roles and promoting multilateralism, respectively; but can not account for the importance of the HRs agenda-setting powers.

5.1 THE POST LISBON IDENTITY

The Lisbon Treaty has stabilised a set of roles, with the Stabiliser role being dominant and the Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RC also continuously high. As the RC with the most active connotations, referring to the implementation of all the tools in the toolbox in crisis assistance, it reveals an emphasis on the creation of peace by providing sustainable solutions to these matters. The Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security RC on the other hand advocates for the protection of these values and advocates the tools the EU possesses to pursue these values, which may be a manner of socializing the international arena to these ideas. The role-set still fluctuates on a year-
by-year basis, according to the priorities of the institutional machinery setting the EUs foreign policy. An accumulation of external events that already do, or are expected to in the near future affect the EUs security situation, public (European-wide) opinion, and political pressure at domestic and European level (European Parliament, HR, European Council) can result in foreign policy action, guided by the norms set out Lisbon Treaty. The major identity change that has occurred between HR Ashton and HR Mogherini is shifting the emphasis from leadership roles to ones emphasizing cooperation respectively.

It appears that the sources of the EUs RCs to a large extent originate from the external environment. The Lisbon Treaty provides the legal basis with which to resolve on-going or worsening global problems such as enduring conflict, migration, poverty, climate change and humanitarian disasters. As a result the EU is moving towards becoming an increasingly active normative power, with increasing military capabilities. Normative in this sense, in that the EU is pursuing the objectives and values set out in the Lisbon Treaty, in full respect of international law, but with the possibility of using military power. One might also argue that it is providing the basis with which to facilitate the development of an EU military, through shaping the discourse and providing an economic incentive to do so. The Promoter of a United Approach RC provides insight into this process, by tracing the development of the EUs policies increasingly moving towards developing real military capabilities, enabled by a single market, which will result in compatible equipment, facilitating European military cooperation. This trend is moreover reinforced by the first coercive activities through EUNAVFOR MED (Tardy 2015, 1), approved by the United Nations General Assembly on two separate occasions, adhering to the promise to declaration to multilateralism (Art. 21.2 TEU).

It is argued that incremental changes in the EUs priorities are reflected in the EUs observed role-set, on an accurate year-by-year basis, correlating to the implementation of policies or the forming of agreements. The role set reflects RCs with more active connotations as dominant to the EUs identity and the passive RCs, as less prevalent. Even though the EU is not a highly interventionist actor, one might argue that the EU is becoming an increasingly active foreign policy actor, heavily involved in major international events in the international political context such as the Paris
Agreement, trying to resolve the Mediterranean migration crisis, increasing its number of ongoing military missions and attempting to find solutions to conflicts with a global impact.

The dominant expression of these RCs may also be explained from a different perspective. As the lead diplomat for the EU, the HR might be socializing the world to the idea that this is the role that the EU is going to take on more in the future (Persson 2005, 30). In so doing, foreign policy action will not come as a surprise and the world is aware on what basis, and with what purpose the EU intervenes on the international stage. Seeing as the RCs have remained relatively stable, it may be argued that this aspect of the EUs identity is being accepted by the global political environment, or at least not being opposed to it. Interestingly, this also reveals something clear about the method of speech writing in the EU. The RCS appear to be highly reflective to the implementation of policies. The evidence suggests that the influence of the HRs narrative control on the EUs identity is not all that significant. The data strongly indicates causality between policy and expressed RCs. One observation that can be made is that, seeing as EU action in terms of the CFSP is enveloped in layers of legal multilateral agreements, from the Treaty of Lisbon, to a strict adherence to international law at the UN level, makes it difficult to oppose for a third country.

5.2 ASSESSING ROLE THEORY

Role theory analysis provides a more practical tool with which to assess the identity of the European Union and permits a more holistic approach. The benefits of having a replicable framework mean that the EUs identity development can be quantified. It is however very time consuming and must be accompanied and supported by a thorough and balanced analysis of prevalent theoretical discussions, a thorough analysis of policy adoptions and a wide ranging understanding of events featuring prominently on the European political landscape. Assessing the root causes of role change requires an understanding of the priorities of the actor studied. Still, it is impossible to say with complete certainty that a certain factor is the precise reason for role change, often due to the wide variety of factors under consideration, the scope of
actors involved in the foreign policy making process and the method employed in discourse analysis. This makes the results vulnerable to cherry-picking. While the topics identified in the speeches were instructive of priorities, future research could attempt to quantify the mentioned topics to make the data analysis more rigid.

Implementing the framework, due to difficulty in assessing the scope of a RC can also present challenges to the resilience of the data. The results may therefore be open to criticism as it is based on the subjective interpretation of the researcher. Nonetheless, the extensive publishing of conclusions, objectives and recommendations by the EU also permits a thorough understanding of its foreign policy objectives and priorities. As a result, finding a correlation between some of the EUs priorities and the research data, requires the data to be taken seriously and provides a rare insight into the diplomatic methods of the EU, the socialization process of the HR with the institutions and the external environment in general. One of the main challenges in using a pre-existing framework was to ensure that it was applied in a manner as close to the original use, in order to maintain comparability of the data sets. A lack of insight into the method for sourcing and coding the data is a major weakness in this regard, which this thesis tried to abet by developing rules with which to source data. By expanding the dataset, this thesis is capable of capturing a development in the EUs foreign policy identity. Despite the low representation of the Promoter of a United Approach and Transition/Liberation Supporter RCs, they provide an overview of the internal and external priorities the EU perceives for itself.

5.3 FURTHER AVENUES FOR RESEARCH

The development of the role-set is encouraged in future studies. A further avenue for research, which this framework ignores due to limiting itself to the CFSP, is trade and economic relations. Further research might look towards a way in which the different RCs relate to meta-theories by delving further into the activity-passivity of RCs, as first uncovered by Holsti (Holsti 1970, 259-261). It would appear that the activity of a RC relates more strongly to the possibility of hard power being used, whereas the passivity of a role conception relates to soft power. Roles that are more
active such as the Stabiliser, Developer, the Global Leader and Regional Leader roles might be roles where the association with hard power is more evident. Even though the Leader roles do not relate directly to hard power, having the necessary capabilities is important for international reliability as a leader. This thesis argues that the EU sees itself as a peace-oriented actor, increasingly capable of using hard power, with the Stabiliser RC being an active orientation; as well as the Promoter/Defender of Peace and Security role being a representation of the "comprehensive approach", signifying an increasing importance attached to issues which may result in the use of hard power tools. The Promoter of a Union Approach role relates to the development of capabilities that could transfer into hard power, rather than being a direct expression on the international arena. Roles low on the activity scale appear to be linked more to soft power and can find expression in the Model, Promoter of EU Values, Partner and Transition/Liberation Supporter RCs.

By assessing the EUs identity over time and space, this thesis argues that the EUs identity foundations are captured in the Lisbon Treaty. It argues that this supports the notion of normative power Europe, moving towards a value-driven and heavily regulated pursuit of these objectives with possible military power. When looking towards what might change the identity in the future, the guidelines laid out in the Treaty and the strategic agenda developed by the European Council provide indications as to what will take prevalence on their agenda. Migration, security, climate change and a strong neighbourhood are listed as foreign policy priorities that are to be achieved through international cooperation (European Council 2014). These points are issues that are likely to remain relevant for a longer period of time and are likely to remain key drivers in the EUs foreign policy, thereby shaping the EUs identity, as an actor seeking to find sustainable solutions to these issues. Global international trends, such developing proxy wars in the Gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the continuing humanitarian crises in Syria and Yemen and disruptive Trumpian actions dictating US foreign policy, are not likely to resolve any of these problems anytime soon, and might result in the EU looking to take more decisive action to resolve these issues. The Brexit is another factor that could affect the EUs identity. The UK has historically been quite a reluctant partner in integration (Perisic 2010; Schweiger 2007) and therefore its withdrawal might permit quicker integration. On the other hand, losing one of its
historically most influential actors in global politics, may also adversely affect the EUs ability to exert itself on the world stage. Only time and space will tell.
6. BIBLIOGRAPHY


Aggestam, L. (ed.) 2008a, ‘Ethical Power Europe”, special issue of International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1


Manners, I. 2006 “The symbolic manifestation of the EUs normative role in world politics”, in Elgstrom, O and Smith, M (eds.) *The European union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis*, pp.66-84. Routledge, Oxon.


Mogherini F. 2015b, ‘Speech by the HRVP Federica Mogherini at the CELAC Summit’ *EEAS Reference 150128_04*, 28/01/2015, Brussels. Available from:


### 7. Appendices

#### 7.1 Tables:

#### 7.1.1 Table 1: EU Roles from 2011 to 2014, under HR Ashton

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<td>81</td>
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<td>Global Leader</td>
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<td>9</td>
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</tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoter of United Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N.E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition/Liberation Supporter</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
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<tr>
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### 7.1.2 Table 2: EU Roles, 2014-2016, HR Mogherini

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Leader</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defender/Promoter of EU Values</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Leader</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporter of Multilateralism</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
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<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoter of United Approach</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition/Liberation Supporter</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
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<td>+2</td>
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N=30
### 7.1.3. Table 3: Distribution of EUs RCs per year, 2011-2016 (2014 counted twice, once for HR Ashton and once for HR Mogherini): absolute and relative (%) representation

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<td>2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>9.6</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<td>12.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
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<th>100</th>
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<th>100</th>
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<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
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7.2 Acronyms

ESDP = European Security and Defence Policy

HR and HR/VP = High Representative of European Union Foreign and Security Affairs and Vice President of the European Commission

RC = role conception

RCs = role conceptions

EU = European Union

EEAS = European External Action Service

FAC = Foreign Affairs Council

TEU = Treaty on the European Union

TFEU = Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
### 7.3 Referenced Table:

Table 1: EUs Roles, 2000-2005 (absolute and relative (%)) frequencies of role conceptions - as appears in Persson (2005, p. 29).

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<thead>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defender/Promoter of “EU” Values</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developer</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Global Leader</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Liberation Supporter</td>
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7.4 SPEECHES FROM WHICH THE DATA WAS SOURCED

7.4.1. SPEECHES BY HR ASHTON BETWEEN 2011-2014

2011: (10 in total)


SPEECH/11/161.


A 117/11


SPEECH/11/202


SPEECH/11/326

6. Ashton, C. 2011e, 'Remarks by HR/VP Catherine Ashton at the 10th ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting', Brussels, 6 June 2011

A 225/11


A 225/11

8. Ashton, C. 2011g, 'Remarks by HR Catherine Ashton following the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg, 10 October 2011', Luxembourg, 10 October 2011

A 405/11

A 511/11


SPEECH/11/885

2012


A 30/12


SPEECH/21/64

3. Ashton, C. 2012b, ‘Speech on EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers’, European parliament, Brussels, 1 February 2012

SPEECH/12/56


A113/12


A 186/12


- Ashton, C. 2012f, 'Remarks by HR Catherine Ashton after the first meeting of the EU-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Islamabad', 5th June 2012, Brussels, 5 June 2012

A 251/12

A 288/12

A 402/12


A 495/12

2013

MC.DEL/33/12

A 56/13

A 82/13

A 157/13
4. Ashton, C. 2013c, ‘Speech by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the opening session of the 7th Ministerial Meeting of the Community of Democracies’, Ulaanbaatar, 29 April 2013

6. Ashton, C. 2013e, “Defending national interests, preventing conflict’ Speech delivered by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Shangri-La Dialogue” Singapore, 1 June 2013


9. Ashton, C. 2013h, 'Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton to the Interparliamentary Conference (IPS)', Vilnius, 5 September 2013

10. Ashton, C. 2013i, ‘Speech by EU HR Catherine Ashton on the latest developments in the common foreign, security and defence policy’, Strasbourg, 23 October 2013


2014

102110/04

140211/02

4. Ashton, C. 2014c, ‘Address by EU HR Catherine Ashton at the UN Security Council on the cooperation between the EU and the UN on international peace and security’
140214/02

114027/05

140403/03

12062/04

140722/02

140815/02

10. Ashton, C. 2014i, ‘Remarks by EU HR Catherine Ashton at the end of the Informal meeting of European Union Foreign Ministers (Gymnich)’, Milan, 30 August 2014
140830/01
7.4.2. Speeches by HR Mogherini between 2014-2016

2014

1. Mogherini, F. 2014, ‘Remarks by HR Federica Mogherini following her meeting with NATO Secretary general Jens Stoltenberg’, Brussels, 5 November 2014

141105/03


141117/02


141117/03


160503/3

5. Mogherini, F. 2014d, ‘Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the end of the visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina with Commissioner Johannes Hahn’, Brussels, 5 December 2014

160509/3


141218/06


141222/02


141218/01
2015

150120/03

150128/04

3. Mogherini, F. 2015b, ‘Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the Global Conference on CyberSpace’, Brussels, 16 April 2015

150511/03

150413/01

151116/03


15031/02

150219/01

10. Mogherini, F. 2015i, ‘Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the opening session of the EU-CELAC Civil Society Forum’, Brussels, 19/03/2015
150319/01


151020/01

12. Mogherini, F. 2015k, ‘Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the UN Security Council: cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional organisations’, New York, 9 March 2015

2016

150309/01

1. Mogherini, F. 2016, 'Remarks by the HR/VP Federica Mogherini upon arrival at the meeting of EU heads of state or government with Turkey', Brussels, 7 March 2016

160307/02


160406


160420/03


160606/02


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