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Corinna Jentzsch

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Auxiliary Armed Forces and Innovations in Security Governance in Mozambique’s Civil War

Corinna Jentzsch

Institute of Political Science, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands

ABSTRACT

Who rules during the civil war? This article argues that the concept of armed group governance must be expanded to include auxiliary armed forces linked to rebels or the government. Comparing the organization of rebel and government auxiliaries, the article demonstrates that security governance during war is never static, but evolves over time. Evidence from the civil war in Mozambique (1976–1992) shows that the auxiliary’s origin shapes its initial level of autonomy. Second, auxiliary contribution to battlefield success of one side may induce innovations adopted by auxiliaries on the other. Both have distinct consequences for the nature of governance.

Introduction

Who rules during civil war? Given the limits of many states to address security threats and other governance challenges under wartime conditions, alternative, localised arrangements often emerge through which those in power coordinate the implementation of policies with other actors, delegate tasks to them or merely tolerate their involvement in service provision and conflict resolution (Arjona 2014, Staniland 2012, 2017). This multi-actor, multi-layered nature of wartime governance empowers non-state actors and nurtures opportunistic political and economic interests, which may pose significant challenges to state- and peacebuilding (Seymour 2014).

A good illustration of this dynamic is the case of Somalia. In response to the absence of a central government, ‘informal systems of adaptation, security, and governance’ emerged in local communities that tried to ‘adapt in a variety of ways to minimise risk and increase predictability in their dangerous environments’ (Menkhaus 2007, pp. 74, 75). Business leaders, civil society organisations,
and other (armed) actors develop an interest in prolonged warfare, lawlessness, or state failure and, as a consequence, act as potential ‘spoilers’ in the peace process. The way in which those in power nurture, respond to, coordinate or undermine such alternative governance systems is crucial to understanding successes and failures in state- and peacebuilding.

Struggle in the domain of security governance is the focus of this article. By security governance, I mean arrangements between and amongst state and non-state (armed) groups to maintain territorial control. Such arrangements entail a ‘fragmentation of power and authority’ in the security realm (Krahmann 2003, p. 20) and devolution of responsibilities within a network of actors (Abrahamsen and Williams 2008, p. 545).

Research on fragile statehood and civil war has explored the fragmentation of armed groups (Sinno 2008, Bakke et al. 2012), the emergence of alliances between armed actors to influence war outcomes (Christia 2012, Seymour 2014), ‘wartime institutions’ that govern civilians (Arjona 2014) or ‘armed politics’ that shape how states and armed groups interact (Staniland 2017). I build on this research to analyse change in alliances and their implication for security governance. The fragmentation of authority in the security realm is often shaped by what state and non-state actors learn from their opponents on how to secure territorial control. However, empowering armed actors to assist with security governance may intensify the conflict by inciting more violence (Clayton and Thomson 2014), which in turn may militarise security governance further. This dynamic is the focus of this article. I show that even though initial conditions influence how security governance is organised, they evolve through processes of experimentation, innovation, and learning that largely respond to dynamics on the battlefield; hence the notion that governance during civil war is dominated by a military logic (Wood 2008).

Auxiliary armed forces play a crucial part in that innovation process. These groups consist of civilians with little to no military training and limited access to weapons. They are frequently referred to as self-defense forces, vigilantes and militias that are either aligned with the government or the rebels, or attempt to remain independent. I use the term ‘auxiliary armed forces’ for two reasons. First, it is neutral enough to include auxiliaries both on the government and rebel side. In contrast, previous work defines ‘militias’ as counter-insurgent armed groups who emerge to protect the local population from rebels (Jentzsch 2014). Second, the term ‘auxiliary’ emphasises that such forces assist the rebels or the government in their efforts to control the local population. The kind of relationship and division of labour that emerges between the principal group and the auxiliary influences wartime governance.

In this article, I compare the organisation and evolution of auxiliary armed forces on the rebel side with those on the government side in order to demonstrate that security governance during war is never static, but evolves over time.
Using evidence from the civil war in Mozambique (1976–92), I contrast the alignment between state armed forces and auxiliaries with that between rebels and auxiliary armed forces. Both the Renamo (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique) rebels and the Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government aligned with auxiliary armed forces to function as a liaison to the civilian population and support the fight against the other. Renamo created the *mujeeba* in the central and northern regions as a separate force from regular combatants. The mujeeba lived amongst the population and were responsible for vigilance, collecting food from the population for the base and enforcing rebel rule. In 1988–89, Frelimo aligned with a grassroots movement in the Centre and North, the *Naparama*, which had emerged independently amongst the displaced. Naparama took over policing and military tasks. The Naparama posed such a severe threat to Renamo that Renamo elites decided to form a stronger auxiliary armed force (an ‘enhanced mujeeba’ force) in 1990–91. Its role was more offensive than that of the prior mujeeba and focused on defeating the Naparama. With this renewed effort, Renamo managed to gain the upper hand again and made significant military advances in central and northern Mozambique, shortly before the signing of the peace agreement in October 1992 that ended the war. This article traces this learning process and points to critical junctures that influenced innovations in these multi-actor, multi-layered governance systems and their consequences for governance outcomes.

The article proceeds as follows. I first provide a short introduction to political order in civil wars, rebel governance and militias. I then analyse Renamo’s relationship with civilians and the role of auxiliary armed forces in security governance in rebel-held zones. I discuss how civilians in the government-held zones responded to Renamo’s threat, and in turn how Renamo reacted to increased pressure from civilian-based militias. The evidence for this paper comes from interview and archival data, collected during 14 months of fieldwork in Mozambique between 2010 and 2016, and secondary sources.2

**Security Governance and Auxiliary Armed Forces in Civil War**

Auxiliary armed forces are crucial for both the state and armed groups to create links between them and the local population they control. First, civil war does not necessarily create disorder, and violence is not the only way rebels interact with civilians (Weinstein 2007, Mampilly 2011, Arjona et al. 2015, Arjona 2016, Huang 2016, Terpstra and Frerks in this issue). Rebel groups (re-)create norms and institutions to optimise their control over the local population and occupied territory, gain access to resources and in most cases, especially in secessionist wars, govern (Reno 1998, Jackson 2003, Mampilly 2011, Kasfir 2015, Malejacq 2016). Rebels’ relations with civilians vary with respect to the degree to which civilians are involved in the administrative and decision-making processes, how
responsive armed groups are to civilian preferences, and to what degree armed
groups regulate civilian life (Kasfir 2015, Weinstein 2007, Arjona 2016, Terpstra
and Frerks in this issue). While some armed groups take people’s needs into
account and provide extensive public services to create their own quasi-state,
such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka (Mampilly 2011, Terpstra and Frerks in this issue),
others limit their interactions with civilians and focus on resource extraction,
such as Renamo in Mozambique (Vines 1991, Weinstein 2007).

In both cases, once rebels occupy territory, they need to engage with the
local population in order to solidify territorial control (Weinstein 2007, p. 164,
Kalyvas 2006, p. 107). In Sri Lanka, for example, the LTTE was supported by
three civilian auxiliary units of several thousand men that were recruited from
the local peasant population (Richards 2014, p. 29). In South Sudan, the White
Army, a loose network of self-defense units composed of civilian youths, has
in recent years provided a liaison for the SPLA-in-Opposition, led at the time
by Riek Machar (Breidlid and Arensen 2014). Auxiliaries of the FARC and ELN in
Colombia organised the population in urban areas, with a special focus on the
political education of the masses (Dieterich 2016, Velasquez 1995). These auxilia-
ries shape rebel interactions with civilians, as they help to solve the ‘identification
problem’ (Kalyvas 2006, p. 107). In irregular war, rebels (and their supporters)
tend to hide amongst the population. Local intelligence is necessary to distin-
guish between supporters and defectors and can be provided by auxiliaries
with close contacts with civilians. Despite their crucial function in the internal
organisation of rebel groups and systems of rebel governance, rebels’ auxiliary
armed forces have so far received little attention in scholarly research. Most
recent work on armed group fragmentation focuses on competition between
different armed groups or units on the rebel side (Bakke et al. 2012, Christia
2012, Sinno 2008). In contrast, this article analyses how different units within
the same organisation complement each other.

Research on auxiliaries on the government side has increased over the last
few years, with significant advances in identifying the causes and consequences
of their formation and collaboration with state security forces (see e.g., Carey
2014, Jentzsch 2014, Jentzsch et al. 2015, Biberman 2016). Within the broader
framework of ‘armed politics’ (Staniland 2017), state auxiliaries are those armed
groups with which states align themselves. States can either mobilise such forces
themselves (top-down mobilisation) or co-opt existing forces (bottom-up mobi-
lisation) (Jentzsch et al. 2015). In Sierra Leone, for example, the Kamajor formed
as local defense forces, which were later co-opted by political elites and became
a professional armed force that even substituted for the state army (Hoffman
2011). Governments frequently delegate tasks to such forces to increase access
to intelligence, multiply manpower, and/or avoid accountability (Carey et al.
2013, Mitchell et al. 2014). In Sudan’s Darfur region, the government outsourced
violence against the rebellion to local Janjaweed militias to avoid being held accountable (De Waal 2004).

Auxiliary armed forces can have defensive, offensive or purely logistic purposes. Their primary purpose is to provide assistance in population control, information gathering, resource extraction and logistics to their respective ‘senior’ partner. I argue that two factors – a structural and a dynamic one – influence the division of labour between auxiliary and senior partner in particular, and security governance more broadly. First is the origin of the auxiliary. If the auxiliary emerges independently of the senior partner, and cooperation between the two is ad hoc, auxiliaries tend to have more autonomy and take on a variety of tasks. If the senior partner is involved in the formation of the auxiliary, responsibilities tend to be limited and clearly defined, as they fulfil concrete tasks in a well-organised system of governance.

Second, given the military context in which governance emerges, successes and failures on the battlefield may lead to ‘tactical innovation’ and ‘tactical adaptation’, which may initiate auxiliary armed group formation and co-optation in the first place, or increase the auxiliaries’ autonomy, and change and expand their activities as a consequence. This process is similar to what scholars in policy research have labelled ‘learning’, the updating of previously held beliefs to make policies more effective (Dobbin et al. 2007). Armed groups can learn from a rival’s tactics and adopt them to improve their own system of security governance. This dynamic has implications for governance outcomes for non-combatants, as protection and the enforcement of rules may become more militarised and violent if armed groups are more involved in the governance of civilians (Wood 2008).

I develop and explore these arguments with evidence from the civil war in Mozambique (1976–92). The advantage of this case is that the conflict had two main parties – the incumbent versus the insurgent. Over the course of the war, both sides developed similar tactics and came to resemble each other in people’s post-war narratives (Bertelsen 2016, pp. 73, 74, 83). Crucially, both on the rebel and the government side, auxiliary armed forces supported governance efforts. I focus on the war in the central and northern provinces of Nampula and Zambézia where Renamo was more involved in governance and its violence tended to be less atrocious than in the South, where Frelimo aligned with grassroots auxiliaries, and where the interaction between the auxiliaries of the two sides can be well observed. I specifically focus on the effect of auxiliaries on governance outcomes; violence perpetrated by Renamo and Frelimo combatants lie outside the scope of this article.
Security Governance in Mozambique’s Civil War

Auxiliary Armed Forces in Rebel-held Areas

Renamo was formed with the help of the Rhodesian intelligence service in the late 1970s (Vines 1991). Armed activity began in the centre of Mozambique, but then extended, over the course of the 1980s and with the support of Apartheid South Africa, to the south and north of the country. The overall goal of Renamo attacks was to reverse Frelimo’s socialist policies after independence by destroying state infrastructure and communal villages – a prime symbol of Frelimo’s socialist vision of society, economy and government (Vines 1991, Coelho 1998). When the rebels began to occupy rural areas, they reversed Frelimo’s secularist policies, as this respondent outlined: ‘They told us: if there’re Christians [among you], then worship, if there are chiefs [among you], then pray to the spirits […] and conduct [your] ceremonies.’

Despite these political goals, Renamo made limited attempts to mobilise the people and recruit volunteers, though there was some variation in political indoctrination across provinces (Schafer 2007, p. 66). Discontent with Frelimo by marginalised traditional leaders and the rural peasantry and local conflicts increased support for Renamo (Geoffray 1990, Lubkemann 2005, Roesch 1989). However, Renamo’s main strategy of recruitment was the abduction of young men, including many children (Hanlon 1984, p. 229, Schafer 2007, pp. 58, 68, Bertelsen 2016, p. 30). Promises of economic and political benefits, threats of punishment and a process of ‘resocialization’ convinced the abducted to stay with the rebels (Vines 1991, p. 95, Schafer 2007). Traditional leaders often decided to side with Renamo for the same reasons (Roesch 1992, Geoffray 1990, Pereira 1999b).

The rebels’ limited political structure and efforts of mobilisation led analysts to conclude that ‘Renamo was first and foremost a military organization’ (Finnegan 1992, p. 74). The nature of the group’s organisation supported this claim. While Renamo’s political organisation was relatively weak, its military organisation was strong. The organisation had a centralised military hierarchy, which was supported by South Africa’s supply of a sophisticated radio network (Vines 1991, p. 82). Afonso Dhlakama was the commander-in-chief, assisted by a 15-member military council composed of three chiefs-of-staff for the northern, centre and southern zones, 10 provincial commanders, and Dhlakama’s personal staff. Provinces were subdivided into two to three regional commands. One regional command consisted of a brigade, which consisted of several battalions (each about 250 men), companies (100–150 men), platoons (30 men) and sections (10 men). The construction of Renamo bases reflected the group’s centralised military hierarchy. In the central and northern regions, where discontent with Frelimo was higher, Renamo was able to establish more permanent bases. Renamo’s bases in the South, where support for Frelimo was strong, were more mobile.
(Roesch 1992). Amongst these bases were ‘regional’ or ‘provincial’ bases, in which the commander of that geographical unit resided. Casa Banana in Gorongosa district in Sofala province was Renamo’s headquarters until the Zimbabwean re-capture of the base in 1986.

The areas in which Renamo established military bases were part of the rebels’ ‘control zones’, in contrast to ‘tax zones’ and ‘destruction zones’ (Gersony 1988). In Kalyvas (2006) framework, these zones correspond to areas under full, partial or contested territorial control. Control zones were areas in which the population was involved in food production for Renamo and assisted in the transport of supplies to the base. ‘Tax zones’ were areas in which Renamo combatants collected food contributions from the population and abducted people. ‘Destruction zones’ experienced frequent Renamo attacks until they were completely destroyed and their residents had fled.

Governance was most common in control zones, though Renamo’s provision of services in exchange for supplies remained limited (Gersony 1988). Some of the former Renamo combatants I spoke with had been trained as nurses, but they appear to have treated combatants only.11 Some refer to schools that existed within areas under Renamo control,12 but as one respondent said, ‘they were constantly burned down’, presumably by Frelimo forces.13 As Vines (1991, p. 93) argues, the only reciprocity that Renamo offered was ‘religious tolerance, access to ICRC emergency food aid and the opportunity to remain alive’. Military priorities would always override concessions to civilians. This is why Weinstein (2007, p. 186) states that Renamo governance was ‘unilateral’ and relied on ‘limited participation’. He found little evidence that noncombatants were involved in political decision-making and demonstrates that governance benefitted mostly the armed organisation, and not the civilians living under its control.

The evidence I collected leads me to a similar conclusion, despite the existence of a system of indirect rule through civilian administrators and traditional authorities (Geffray 1990, Pereira 1999b). Below Renamo’s military hierarchy existed an administrative hierarchy that included traditional authorities, mambos and their assistants, mujeeba, (also called mujuba, majiba, madjuba or madjuhba).14 The empowerment of traditional authorities implied a significant recognition of their power to settle community conflicts and regulate daily life (Geffray 1990, p. 118). In the words of a mambo in Nampula, they were in charge of ‘the health of the family and the community’.15 The mambos’ tasks included the redistribution of the population in the area held by Renamo, the establishment of advance posts, the maintenance of surveillance and intelligence networks, and the recruitment of local auxiliaries, the mujeeba, and, in the North, a local police force, which Geffray refers to as capeceiros (Geffray 1990, p. 119).16 My respondents spoke of civilian administrators (‘delegados’) in Renamo strongholds such as Namarrói in Zambézia who were tasked with counting and controlling the population, while mambos focused on dispute resolution and the collection of food for the base.17
The involvement of civilians and empowerment of traditional authorities represented an attempt to legitimise Renamo rule. At the same time, however, it implied a strict separation between civilians and combatants, which was ensured through the geographical location of military bases away from the population and the rigid regulation of combatants’ interactions with civilians. Military bases were situated in deep forests and close to rivers for water supply. Control posts limited access to the centre of the base where the main commander resided. The civilian population did not have access to the base, but lived in concentric circles around it, thus serving as a disguise for the base, a ‘human shield,’ and informers (Geffray 1990, Vines 1991, p. 91). When civilians sought to contact combatants, they went to the nearest control post (Geffray 1990, p. 118). Strict rules regulated combatants’ interactions with civilians (Schafer 2007, p. 70) and combatants’ movements were closely controlled.

In order to keep close control over the population without being engaged in policing themselves, Renamo formed a separate force for that task, the mujeeba (‘informers’). Mujeebas were responsible for the collection of information, food and taxes from the population. Mujeebas were clearly distinguished from regular combatants. They had limited access to weapons and training and were only allowed to carry cutting instruments (in contrast to combatants’ access to AK-47s) (Vines 1991, p. 92). Renamo officials did not consider them part of the group’s fighting forces and did not completely trust them. While regular combatants often fought in areas far away from their homes (Wiegink 2013, p. 115), mujeebas lived amongst the population in their area of origin. They were not allowed to come close to the base as, in case they fled to government-held areas, they might take Renamo ‘secrets’ with them (Geffray 1990, pp. 117, 118). Mujeebas recruited mujeebas, voluntarily or by coercion, from local youth or from amongst those captured during raids (Vines 1991, p. 92).

The mujeeba’s role as Renamo’s local intelligence and enforcement agents created an oppressive form of governance. In the first public account of the mujeeba in 1985, Renamo Secretary General Fernandes considered their access to information and local knowledge as the most crucial characteristics: ‘The mujeeba is our representative at the village level. He knows everybody in his village. Nobody can come without being known. Then nobody also can betray us because he surveys the area.’ A former Renamo combatant in Nampula showed that the mujeebas’ role was that of a vicious secret police and strict enforcer of Renamo rule:

The work of the mujeeba among the people was mainly the work of secret police agents. Where people would go, to church, [the mujeeba] would be there. In order to control the population and those who might be against Renamo. Those [who were against Renamo] they arrested and took to the base. And there were also people in the neighborhoods that seemed [mentally ill] and spoke badly of Renamo; the base sent mujeeba there as well. To arrest them. They were all arrested. And when the combatants went to the bush to stage attacks, [the mujeeba] carried material and assisted the combatants. They were also sent to collect food from
the population to bring to the base. They went to search for chickens, [and often took them] by force. And pigs. That’s how it was. And women, and everything. To take to the base. So these were assistants to the base. They were the most dangerous people.26

The excerpt shows that the primary task of mujeebas was to ensure discipline, arrest any infiltrators and prevent people from fleeing.27 In cases in which people attempted to escape, mujeebas were tasked to search and kill the defectors (Hall 1990, p. 57, Vines 1991, p. 93).28 As the excerpt shows, mujeebas also collected food from peasants to bring to the base (Gersony 1988, p. 24, Vines 1991, pp. 92, 93, Pereira 1999a, p. 45). Contrary to what Secretary General Fernandes claimed in 1985 in the same interview quoted above, food collection was largely a coercive endeavour; some respondents report that those who refused to provide food to the mujeebas would be killed.29 Mujeebas frequently abused their powers and took not only food, but also women by force.30 Respondents who lived in government-held areas during the war claimed that it was the mujeebas who did the killing, pillaging and raping in the villages, not the regular Renamo combatants.31

Mujeebas also went on missions to infiltrate government-held areas to collect information about troop movements and planned operations.32 As a consequence, Frelimo used the term ‘mujeeba’ for any displaced people arriving in government-held areas, labelling them as potential Renamo collaborators.33 Accusing the displaced of spying gave Frelimo troops a reason to punish them, or at least prevent them from entering Frelimo-held areas to seek refuge (Lemia 2001, pp. 47, 48). In a war in which it was difficult to identify who belonged to the other side, peasants in contested areas were considered potential collaborators, ‘mujeebas’ (Vines 1991, p. 99).

Overall, Renamo’s delegation of tasks to auxiliary forces represented its strict separation of military from social and political affairs, and served its major strategic and military interest to enforce control over the population and occupied territory. Renamo did attempt to legitimate its war in the centre and north by appealing to traditional sources of power. Re-instating traditional authorities and mobilising traditional spirit mediums to support Renamo combatants were two strategies in this regard (Wilson 1992). I agree with Weinstein (2007, p. 182), though, when he concludes,

Although the reappointment of régulos [traditional authorities] was an effective political appeal, it was also a strategy aimed at centralizing political control in a hierarchical structure and limiting both the participation of civilians and their capacity to shape the trajectory of the organization.

Furthermore, Renamo appealed to traditional religion in order to develop a ‘cult of military prowess’ to further military interests rather than forge a link between combatants and the local population (Wilson 1992). Renamo did not have a monopoly on ritual sources of power and was soon challenged by Frelimo’s auxiliary armed forces that also appealed to traditional religion.
Governance in rebel-held areas, then, was primarily coercive and unilateral in nature and organised to ensure the military success of Renamo. Renamo’s strict control over the formation and organisation of the auxiliaries reduced their role to population control in a system of security governance that served first and foremost the rebel’s military agenda.

**Auxiliary Armed Forces in Government-held Zones**

Governance was different in Frelimo-held rural areas, where the political and military structure became increasingly decentralised and disorganised in light of Renamo’s threat. That resulted in the emergence of grassroots movements for people’s self-defense, which, when aligning with Frelimo, enjoyed a higher level of autonomy by comparison to the mujeeba.

The most important auxiliary armed forces on the government-side, the Naparama, formed in the late 1980s in the border region between Zambézia and Nampula after a large Frelimo counter-offensive failed to stop Renamo advances and restore stability. The force reached, between 1988 and 1992, a size of several thousand combatants. Renamo entered Zambézia in August 1982 (Legrand 1993, pp. 91, 92) and Nampula in April 1983 during a second offensive across Zambézia (Do Rosário 2009, p. 305). Both provinces experienced an escalation of violence in late 1986 when Renamo joined a local opposition force and occupied several district towns along the border to Malawi and the provincial border between Zambézia and Nampula. Frelimo feared that the rebels would take control over the north and cut the country in half along the Zambezi valley, the southern border of Zambézia province (Finnegan 1989, p. 62). In late 1986 and early 1987, the Mozambican military, together with allied forces from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, began a counter-offensive. This operation returned all district towns to Frelimo control by July 1988, but did not create enduring stability.

Naparama’s emergence and diffusion was fuelled by Frelimo’s inability to protect the population from violence and displacement (Jentzsch 2014). The main Naparama leader in Zambézia, the traditional healer Manuel António, offered people an effective way to defend themselves. He claimed that he had received a divine mission from Jesus Christ to liberate the Mozambican people from the suffering of the war and learned of a medicine to turn bullets into water. He mobilised followers by ‘vaccinating’ them with this medicine. The effectiveness of the medicine depended on the respect of certain rules. For example, Naparama combatants were not allowed to look back, only look ahead; no one was allowed to be in front of the other; no fighting in the shade, always in the sun; if the enemy was in the shade, we were not allowed to be in the shade as well; (…) we could not retreat when we heard shots, we had to go there where they [Renamo] were.

All deaths amongst the Naparamas were explained by pointing to rule violations.
Learning from Renamo’s references to spiritual power, Naparama exploited Renamo combatants’ belief systems and formed an innovative, collective response to the rebel threat (Wilson 1992). By continuously advancing, often while singing, Naparama created such fear amongst Renamo combatants that it rarely came to a direct confrontation between the two forces. Renamo combatants fled as soon as they heard Naparamas approaching.

Although Frelimo was at first sceptical, it soon co-opted the Naparama. Worried by events in war-torn Angola, where two insurgent movements were challenging the government, Frelimo officials feared that Naparama would evolve into a second insurgent force. Moreover, the local administration was concerned about Naparama’s potential demands for support and compensation during or after the war. Before Manuel António could work in Mocuba district, for example, he had to ensure the local administration that his goal was not money or political power, but only the protection of the population.

When local officials realised that Naparama was loyal and could contribute to removing the military stalemate, most of them supported Naparama’s recruitment efforts and some even agreed to joint military operations. The decision to co-opt was thus based on pragmatic calculations to further local power interests, and not a change in the official party ideology of scientific socialism that despised anything ‘traditional’. Frelimo officials on the provincial and national level never officially acknowledged the cooperation with Naparama, although the party abandoned all references to Marxism-Leninism at its party congress in 1989 and changed its attitudes towards traditional authorities in the early 1990s.

This ambivalent stance towards the auxiliary forces – the need to outsource policing and military tasks in order to multiply forces yet the hesitation to support a ‘traditional’ force – and the ad hoc character in which Frelimo collaborated with Naparama created distinct conditions in which the group was able to operate relatively autonomously. The group quickly diffused across districts and expanded its tasks from nightly patrols and food distribution to independent military operations. This is in stark contrast to Renamo’s strict control over the mujeeba and their functions within the indirect system of rule, which separated them from the military forces and operations.

The Naparama’s primary task was to support Frelimo local governance, which ‘increasingly came to rely on war tactics – military control – and the use of community villages as counter-insurgency devices’ similar to governance in Renamo-held areas (Buur and Kyed 2007, p. 109). The Naparama took a prominent role in the ‘recuperation’ of people from Renamo-held areas and settling them in Frelimo-held villages. In fact, some people joined the Naparama in order to bring back family members who had been captured by Renamo. However, the resettlement of people often occurred coercively, and Naparama forces made sure that people, once in Frelimo-held areas, would not flee and defect to Renamo-held areas:
We brought people [to Frelimo-held areas] and handed them over to the [local] government. In some cases, these people fled and returned to the bush. We had to go and search for them again. If the same person was recuperated more than four times, we had to harm her to intimidate her.43

A Naparama combatant in Mecubúri in Nampula province confirmed that those who did not want to return with the Naparama to Frelimo-held areas were killed.44 Some people stayed in Frelimo-held areas only because they feared being killed if they attempted to return to the areas from where they were displaced.45

However, in contrast to Renamo’s mujeeba, Naparama did not only serve Frelimo, but, as a grassroots movement, the people as well, and was therefore much more involved in protecting the population. For example, Naparama was tasked with nightly patrols to warn of imminent attacks.46 They also gathered information in surrounding areas, partly by collaborating with local hunters that were discontent with Renamo’s treatment of the population.47 Naparama also accompanied peasants to their fields outside the village for the collection of food.48

Little oversight by the provincial government and an increasingly difficult military situation for Frelimo facilitated the expansion of Naparama’s activities over time from more defensive to more offensive tasks. In the district of Alto Molócuè, Manuel António first worked on improving road security by treating bus passengers with his medicine for their own protection, and then formed small groups to attack Renamo strongholds in the northern part of the district (Pereira 1999a, p. 86). Respondents frequently reported that Naparama came to replace the army. A former Naparama combatant in Nampula reported that after a successful operation in Mecubúri, the armed forces stationed in that district ‘decided that they would hand over their weapons to us and stop going into battle until the time when the war ended’ .49

Overall, by tolerating Naparama’s activities, Frelimo hoped to overcome a military stalemate that had emerged around 1988 and substitute a weak and ineffective national army from which many soldiers had deserted. As a grassroots movement that built significantly on local belief systems, however, it did not only serve the government, but was also involved in protecting the population under Frelimo control, which made its activities less arbitrary than the mujeeba’s and created a form of security governance that was different from the coercive and oppressive one in rebel-held areas.50

**Tactical Adaptation and Innovations in Security Governance**

The success of the Naparama forces did not last long. Soon they were challenged by their opponent’s learning and ‘tactical adaptation’ (McAdam 1983, p. 736), the adoption of Naparama’s mobilisational technique. In addition, the main
Naparama leader, Manuel António, was killed in December 1991, which severely weakened the Naparama in its main area of operation, Zambézia province.

Probably towards the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, Renamo leaders in Nampula and Zambézia provinces realised that they had to respond to Naparama with a similar force in order to regain supremacy on the battlefield. They decided that collaboration with traditional healers for ritual protection would be the most promising response, essentially creating their own Naparama force. Leaders identified traditional healers capable of initiating members of Renamo’s existing auxiliaries – the mujeeba – to empower them to successfully respond to Naparama’s threat. Although Renamo’s strict control over the auxiliaries initially limited mujeebas’ autonomy, developments on the battlefield required them to expand mujeeba tasks to respond to Naparama’s threat.

One of the first anti-Naparama forces was formed in Nampula, where traditional healers in the Renamo base of Namilasse in Murrupula district treated youths with a vaccine to fight against Naparama and the Frelimo army. The vaccine supposedly had the same effect as Naparama’s medicine. The group, known under the name Mutapassa, used spears, but also had a few firearms. Mutapassa combatants followed similar rules as the Naparama regarding prohibited food, but their main rule was that they were not allowed to shoot unless others did first.

In Zambézia, another anti-Naparama force emerged in the early months of 1991, led by the traditional healer Mulelepea (or Mulelepeya/Malelepea), which may even have led to the defection of some Naparama combatants (Legrand 1993, p. 103). Renamo leaders chose between several traditional healers when struggling to respond to Frelimo’s counter-offensive and finally settled on one whose powers resembled most closely those of Naparama initiators:

Frelimo had intensified their attacks here in Nauela. This was when Renamo hired Mulelepea of Namixaxen. However, there was another man called Namukhotxen of the area of Nanthupa. Renamo asked the latter how they could solve the critical situation provoked by the enemy, and Namukhotxen answered that he was capable to help because he could transform himself into a lion and decimate the enemies. Renamo didn’t accept his proposal. By contrast, Mulelepea said that he would use magic, vaccinating the warriors so that Frelimo’s bullets didn’t penetrate their bodies. He was authorised to recruit men, usually youths called ‘anamavaka’ [spear users], to be vaccinated. They began their military operations. Renamo’s guerrilla fighters advanced in the second line and the ‘anamavaka’ in the first line of offense.

Mulelepea was an elder of about 70 years and claimed that he had learned how to transform himself into a child to escape detention by the cipaios (Portuguese colonial police). When Mulelepea heard that there were Naparama in Nauela, he claimed that Manuel António’s vaccine was weak and went to Nauela to put his abilities into practice (Pereira 1999a, p. 95). He traveled to other bases in other districts and also reached the regional base Maquiringa in Namarrói district.
In contrast to Naparama’s largely voluntary mobilisation, most of the Mulelepea combatants were forcefully recruited from amongst the mujeeba. In other regards, however, Mulelepea’s forces resembled those of Naparama. The combatants had to follow similar rules of conduct as the Naparama. Moreover, similar to the way in which Naparama conducted joint operations with Frelimo, the Mulelepea combatants advanced in front of the regular Renamo units to make use of their special forces to clear the area.

Mulelepea’s warriors succeeded in posing a significant threat to Naparama and Frelimo units. The forces confronted each other for the first time in April 1991 in Nauela, during which 25 Naparama combatants died (Pereira 1999a, p. 98). Mulelepea’s followers were called ‘Khonkos’, which means the strong and powerful (Pereira 1999a, p. 98). A former Frelimo soldier in Murrupula claimed that ‘Khonkos’ denotes people who are ‘crazy’ and ‘don’t like to joke around’. This demonstrates that Frelimo soldiers considered these forces as unpredictable, which increased their threat on the battlefield. Naparama were more afraid of the Khonkos than of Renamo combatants, as they claimed that Mulelepea’s forces were difficult to catch with bare hands and – in contrast to regular Renamo fighters – were able to kill Naparama with their spears (Pereira 1999a, p. 100).

In sum, Renamo’s response to Naparama brought new momentum to the war in Zambézia province, after Frelimo seemed to have gained the military advantage. Similar to Frelimo’s initial learning process that led to its (indirect) support of the Naparama, Renamo was influenced by failures on the battlefield that gave the other side a military advantage. Tactical adaptation led to an expansion of mujeebas’ tasks, who began to accompany Renamo combatants on military operations. Although Renamo exploited local belief systems by forming an ‘anti-Naparama’ force, however, the strict logic of strategic delegation – rather than popular participation – in the formation of this new force resulted in the same violent and arbitrary effect on security governance as the prior mujeeba force.

**Conclusion**

The article has argued for a revision of the concept of armed group governance to account for the multi-actor and multi-layered nature of security governance. Security governance in civil war is characterised by the fragmentation of armed actors and delegation of responsibilities. The formation of auxiliary armed forces such as self-defense forces, militias and local patrols, is not only a ‘tool’ for state actors to outsource violence and benefit from local intelligence, but also for rebel groups, shaping the senior partner’s relationship with civilians. When resources are strained in a long and intense war, fragmentation of authority occurs, as armed groups in power delegate tasks to other actors.
However, security governance may differ between rebel-held and government-held zones. These differences have consequences for the relationship between those in power and the local population. As the evidence has demonstrated, the less involved civilians are in the formation of the auxiliaries, the less autonomy an auxiliary has to shape its activities.

The rebel auxiliary forces in Mozambique were formed by Renamo and largely focused on population control and resource extraction, which supported the group’s focus on military objectives. In contrast, the auxiliary armed forces in government-held areas, which were characterised by decentralised centres of power, formed as a grassroots initiative and were more autonomous in expanding their activities over time, in some cases even substituting for the state army. This had distinct consequences for relationships with civilians. Civilians in rebel-held areas perceived the auxiliaries and the system of governance they enforced as exploitative and violent. In contrast, civilians in government-held areas were actively involved in the formation of the auxiliaries, and so the protection of the local population was a primary function of these new forces. This shows that Renamo outsourced much of the violence to auxiliaries and considered them to fulfil a distinct function within their system of governance. For Frelimo, the auxiliaries complemented their efforts, but did not replace repressive functions of the state (Bertelsen 2016, Macamo 2016).

However, developments on the battlefield can lead to learning and innovation in security governance, and an expansion of tasks. Both the Frelimo government and the Renamo rebels learned from each other and adapted their tactics when they realised that their prior tactics did not provide them with any military advantage. Creating, supporting or adapting auxiliary armed forces was a way to gain that advantage. As a consequence, security governance further militarised.

This article has made three main contributions. First, it demonstrates that auxiliary armed forces contribute significantly to armed group governance and shape the interactions between those in power and the local population. Second, the evidence highlights that governance in government-held areas evolves during wartime in important ways. Too often, studies of political order during wartime are focused only on rebel-held areas and do not sufficiently study how governance in government-held areas is affected by the war. Lastly, it has shown that in Mozambique, rebel and government forces used the same governance ‘tools’ in the form of auxiliaries, but that their implementation was characterised by important differences.

Future research should explore further the role of auxiliary armed forces in other cases in order to facilitate comparisons and conclusions about how widespread the formation and uses of auxiliaries are and what effect they have on armed group governance during civil war.
Notes

1. See the Introduction to this Special Issue.
2. Fieldwork for this project was conducted in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2016 in the capital Maputo, the provincial capitals Nampula and Quelimane, Mecubúri and Murrupula districts in Nampula province and Lugela, Namarrói, and Nicoadala districts in Zambézia.
3. The term comes from McAdam's analysis of tactical innovation and adaptation during the civil rights struggle in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s. The formation of auxiliary armed forces could be understood as a tactical adaptation in civil war that responds to tactical innovations on the opponent's side. See McAdam (1983).
4. For an overview of the differences of wartime developments across regions, see the introduction in Englund (2002) and Cahen et al. (forthcoming). For a history of the war, see Robinson (2006) and Emerson (2014).
5. For a critical re-evaluation of Renamo violence, see Schafer (2007). On the role of violence in Frelimo state formation and during war, see Macamo (2016) and Bertelsen (2016).
6. Interview with male resident (2011-11-28-m22, Murrupula-Chinga, Nampula). In order to protect the identities of the respondents, the interview citations indicate date, location, the interviewee's role during the war, and gender of the interviewees: N (Naparama); F (Frelimo combatant); R (Renamo combatant); M (militiaman); P (religious leader); L (local leader including traditional and other community leaders); H (traditional healer); G (government representative); m (male); f (female). Frelimo had abandoned the system of traditional authorities immediately after independence, accusing traditional leaders of having collaborated with the colonial state. Frelimo sought to abandon what it called ‘obscurantism’ in society – all types of religion including traditional religion and traditional healing. Alexander (1997) shows though that traditional authorities continued to influence local politics after independence.
7. There is an intense debate over the origins of the war in Mozambique and the extent of popular support for Renamo. While scholars largely agree that without external aggression from Rhodesia and South Africa, the war might not have happened, domestic discontent and local conflicts increased support for Renamo and fuelled the war. See, for example, Roesch (1989), Minter (1994), Cahen (2000), Lubkemann (2008, Chapter 3) and Jentzsch (2014).
8. 4334 Renamo soldiers (19.7 per cent of total ex-Renamo fighters) and 3073 government soldiers were aged between 10 and 14 at the time of their abduction and can be considered child soldiers (Barnes 1997, p. 17).
9. Former Renamo combatants made frequent references to radios in bases and advance posts in interviews with me.
10. The structure below the regional commanders is not as clear as the higher command and there might have been regional variations (Vines 1991, p. 81).
11. Interview with former Renamo combatants (2012-03-08-Rm14, Nicoadala, Zambézia; 2011-10-15-Rm2, Mecubúri, Nampula).
12. Interview with former Renamo combatant (2011-10-23-Rm3, Mecubúri, Nampula).
13. Interview with male resident (2011-11-28-m22, Murrupula, Nampula).
14. Geffray (1990, p. 120 fn. 3) notes that the term mambo probably originated in the Ndau region in central Mozambique, where most of Renamo’s officers come from. The origin of the term ‘mujeeba’ seems to come from the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Renamo learned the role and function of mujeebas from the Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA), as the Rhodesians trained
early Renamo members in ZANLA methods and techniques (Wilson 1992, p. 541). While the mujeeba were most prominent in the central region, across the border from Zimbabwe and the heartland of Renamo activity, evidence from secondary sources and my own interviews demonstrate the crucial role of mujeebas in Zambézia and Nampula as well.

15. Interview with former mambo (2011-10-23-m7, Mecubúri, Nampula).
16. I have not seen this term used in other research on the war and my own sources have also not referred to such a category of local officials. This is probably due to regional variations in systems of Renamo governance.
17. Interview with former Renamo civilian administrator (2012-06-22-Rm20, Regone, Zambézia).
18. Interview with former Frelimo combatant (2011-09-13-Fm1, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
19. Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm4, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
20. Interview with former Renamo combatant (2012-03-08-Rm14, Nicoadala, Zambézia). Vines (1991, pp. 92, 93) notes that this version of a base is a regional variation of Renamo’s bases in the north. In southern regions, where bases were more mobile, combatants lived farther away from the population.
22. Interview with former Renamo combatant (2011-08-18-Rm1, Maputo, Zambézia).
23. Interview with former Renamo combatant (2011-10-23-Rm3, Mecubúri, Nampula).
25. Interview with Renamo Secretary General Fernandes in 1985, quoted in Hall (1990, p. 50).
27. Also see Pereira (1999a, p. 46). This was again similar to ZANLA’s mujeeba, who often punished people for not respecting and listening to the guerrillas (Maxwell 1993, p. 374).
28. Some scholars assert that mujeebas were recruited amongst former cipaios (‘native police during the colonial era’), which would have provided them with experience in policing and intelligence (Hall 1990, p. 56).
29. Interview with a group of community leaders who lived under Renamo control (2012-06-14-Gr-Lm4, Lugela-Tacuane, Zambézia).
30. Interview with community leader (2011-10-17-Lm11, Mecuburi, Nampula).
31. Interview with community leader (2011-10-17-Lm11, Mecuburi, Nampula); Interview with local government official (2011-11-10-Gm13, Nampula); Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-11-04-Nm37, Murrupula, Nampula); Interview with male resident (2011-11-06-m11, Murrupula, Nampula). Also see Hall and Young (1997).
32. Interview with community leader (2011-09-23-Lm3a, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
33. Frelimo’s suspicion reflected a more general sentiment that the mujeeba were easily corrupted and often worked for both sides of the conflict. Interview with community leader (2011-09-21-Lm1, Nicoadala, Zambézia).
34. After independence, Frelimo mobilised civilians into ‘popular militias’. Once Renamo became a severe threat in the early 1980s, militias were tasked with vigilance. These militias, lacking in supplies and morale, did not manage to build
a successful defense against Renamo attacks in Zambézia and Nampula and so community residents developed their own forms of protection. See Jentzsch (2014).

35. The number of Naparama combatants is difficult to ascertain. Its main leader in Zambézia, Manuel António, claimed to have about 14,000 fighters in May 1991 (Waterhouse 1991, p. 14). However, the journalist Gil Lauriciano, who covered the war in Zambézia extensively, estimates that the group did not have more than 2000 members (personal communication, July 2010). Based on my interviews with former Naparama members that indicate that many districts had about 200 Naparama, which only included those in the main district town, I estimate the size to about 4000–6000 members across both provinces, Zambézia and Nampula. The current Naparama leadership claims to have registered 4438 former Naparama in four districts, which are Inhassunge, Nicoadala, Namacurra and Mopeia (Interview 2011-08-23-Gr-Nm1, Quelimane, Zambézia). As a comparison, Renamo was estimated to have about 20,000 combatants.


37. Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm2, Nicoadala, Zambézia).

38. Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm2, Nicoadala, Zambézia).

39. Interview with provincial government representative (2011-10-10-Gm7, Nampula).

40. Interview with former Naparama leader (2012-06-06-Nm46, Lugela, Zambézia).

41. Due to this strict denial of Frelimo-Naparama cooperation on the national level, Naparama was not considered a party to the conflict during the peace negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo and was therefore not included in post-war demobilisation programs (Coelho and Vines 1992).

42. Six respondents in Nicoadala, Zambézia, said they joined to bring back family members and friends. E.g., Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-09-Nm4, Nicoadala, Zambézia).

43. Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-09-14-Nm10, Nicoadala, Zambézia).

44. Interview with Naparama combatant (2011-10-16-Nm25, Mecubúri, Nampula).


46. Interview with local leader (2011-09-23-Lm3a, Nicoadala, Zambézia); Interview with female resident (2011-09-26-Lf1, Nicoadala, Zambézia); Interview with Naparama commander (2012-06-10-Nm46, Lugela, Zambézia); Interview with male resident (2011-10-02-m5, Nicoadala, Zambézia).

47. Interview with Naparama combatant (2011-09-14-Nm10, Nicoadala, Zambézia).

48. Interview with Naparama commander (2012-06-10-Nm46, Lugela, Zambézia).

49. Interview with former Naparama combatant (2011-10-22-Nm27, Mecubúri, Nampula).

50. There is some regional and temporal variation in Naparama’s perpetration of violence, which I cannot discuss here due to space constraints, but as Naparama became more successful over time, it seemed to also become more violent against civilians, especially in Renamo-held areas. See Jentzsch (2014).

51. Interview with male resident (2011-11-24-m18, Namilasse, Murrupula, Nampula). Other interviewees identified the traditional healer as Sabala from Taveia in Ribáuê district in Nampula who had treated youths in Ribáuê-Sede. See Interviews
with male resident (2011-11-28-m22, Chinga, Murrupula, Nampula) and former
Frelimo combatant (2011-11-28-Fm13, Nampaua, Murrupula, Nampula).
52. Interviews with male residents (2011-11-24-m18; 2011-11-24-m19, Namilasse,
Murrupula, Nampula).
53. Interviewee cited in Pereira (1999a, p. 94). Translation from Portuguese by the
author.
54. Interview with former Renamo combatants (2012-06-22-Gr-Rm3, Rumala,
Namarrói, Zambézia).
55. Interview with former Renamo combatants (2012-06-22-Gr-Rm3, Rumala,
Namarrói, Zambézia).
56. Interview with former Frelimo combatant (2011-11-28-Fm13, Nampaua,
Murrupula, Nampula).

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Notes on Contributor

Corinna Jentzsch is assistant professor of international relations at Leiden
University in the Netherlands. Her research focuses on civil wars and the emer-
gence of informal institutions of security governance, community mobilisa-
tion against insurgent violence in Mozambique and conditions of successful
peacekeeping in African conflicts. Her work has been published in the Journal
of Conflict Resolution and the African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, and she
is a contributor to Africa is a Country.

ORCID

Corinna Jentzsch http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0936-6984
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