The European Union and the development of a Common Strategic Culture

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Abstract: Due to the increasing security issues recently developed in and outside the EU a common transnational answer to these issues is needed. In June 2016 an answer was provided in the form of the European Global Strategy but is this the real answer for European collaboration in security? Is any real common EU strategy even possible without a common strategic culture that provides the context wherein policy choices are made? This thesis topic has relevance within the scientific debate around the possibility of an EU that serves as a security provider, particularly in the current era characterized by (home grown) terrorism, destabilized neighbouring regions and rising populism. This thesis researches the evaluation (if any) of a European strategic culture by the analysis of the main strategic EU documents, namely the European Security Strategy (ESS), the European Global Strategy (EUGS) and its related key policy documents. These documents lay out the plans for EU security and defence collaboration but do they incite the formation of a strategic culture? The presented strategic documents are researched and compared using document analysis on the basis of Biava, Herd and Drent’s provided Strategic Culture analytical framework. This document analysis will help to place the conducted expert interviews (n=9) that sketch the drafting process of the ESS and EUGS in perspective. These interviews are conducted with in particular Dutch experts in the field divided through two main branches: Policy Making (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, EU) and Think Thank.
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Introduction: the need for an European Global Strategy?


At the start of this century the European Union (EU) project seemed to be heading towards a promising future thanks to its well-functioning single market, monetary union and the emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Two decades later it seems the EU has not progressed towards the bright prospects as perceived at start of the 21st century. The EU is currently involved in three crises of sovereignty: a money, a border and a security and defence crisis (Howorth, J. 2016. p. 389). Additionally to these crises, other recent developments have also seemingly eroded the fundamentals of European Integration, namely, the Brexit vote of last June, rising populist politics promoting Euroscepticism in the member states, and the Ukraine crisis, exemplary of Russia’s readiness to achieve their national interests. This troubling context in which the EU finds itself has made observers describe EU’s plight as a ‘Perfect Storm’ (Krop, M. Clingendael. 10-5-2017). The above quote of the German Bonds chancellor Angela Merkel can therefore be seen as an example of one of the key member state’s wishes for the EU, but also that at this time not all necessary factors are present to fulfil those wishes. Factors such as political will, shared understanding, and a shared sense of urgency to really undertake action on European security collaboration are consequently required in order to fulfil these wishes. The question remains, do the two European security strategies lay the foundation for a shared European strategic culture where in these factors thrive?

This thesis focuses upon one of the EU’s three current crises, namely the security and defence crisis. An illustration of this crisis is the substantial terrorist threat in the EU, especially after the attacks in Paris, Brussels and recently Manchester. These attacks caused extensive damage and are prominently present in the EU’s collective memory. Other uncertainties are the ambivalent policies of president Trump in regards to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the question of whether America even still wants to function as the EU’s security guarantor. These issues increase the sense of urgency for European self-reliance in defence and security matters (Clingendael, 2016. p.15). Together with the belief that the EU was encircled by an ‘arc of instability’, which also affected the stability of the EU itself, a revision of the European strategy and security policy was highly needed (Koenders, B. 2015 & EUGS. EC. 2016. p. 4).
The result was a request of the European Council to Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), to draft in consultation with the member states a new EU strategy for foreign and security policy (The Hague Institute for Global Justice. 2016. p. 2).

With this request, the entirety of the EU’s foreign and security policy was back on the policy drafting table for revision until last June when the European Global Strategy (EUGS) was published. However, throughout the history of EU integration, security policy already has been institutionalized within a number of treaties and policies. However, the degree of urgency awarded to this issue has been fluctuating. To illustrate these historical developments a short introduction of EU foreign and security strategy integration is described later in this paper. The starting point of the EU’s current security policy was in the signing of the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, which stipulated the establishment of the ESDP. In 2003, Europe’s security policy shifted towards a more strategic policy with the drafting of the European Security Strategy (ESS), wherein key security issues and their political implications were identified. Since then, there has not been a total revision of the EU strategy, with only a partial revision in 2008 with the Treaty of Lisbon, when the ESDP became the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and received a higher priority label (Keulere & Delreux. 2015. p. 172).

These past efforts were intended to shape the EU into a more self-reliant, responsible, capable and assertive security actor within the international community (ESS. EC. 2013. p. 11-12). Despite these policies, the EU finds itself in an increasingly unstable and insecure situation vis-à-vis its neighbouring regions. With the Western Balkans, seemingly on the brink of returning to political and ethnic division and persistent instability in the Sahel region as latest examples. Despite these security threats, the EU’s CSDP policy until now still does not deliver the multilateral defence collaboration that meets the requirements it stipulated (Clingendael 2016. p. 3). These disappointing deliverables from the European Security Strategy and the CSDP is partly awarded to the fact that the EU is hampered in taking action in defence collaboration due to the variety of strategic cultures that its member states represent (De France, O. & Witney, N. 2013. p.1). Can the European foreign & security strategy really be effective if 26 (28 minus England and Denmark) member states have a different strategic culture and do the strategic policy contribute in forming a strategic culture?
In this thesis, the question of whether the EU actually has developed a common strategic culture over the last ten years wherein the ESS and EUGS has been published is researched with the following guiding research question:

‘Has the EU developed from the ESS to the EUGS a Common Strategic Culture?’

If this is the case, it perhaps could ease the path to powerful comprehensive security collaboration in the EU. The goal of this thesis is to map out the evolution of the EU strategic culture with the help of key strategic documents to determine if a common strategic culture can be spoken of. As described above the urgency for this real collaboration is more relevant than ever concerning the instability in and surrounding Europe.

The following section describes the historical context of EU strategy-making and defence collaboration by identifying its main developments, to clearly comprehend the foundations of key events in EU-security and defence integration. To further identify EU strategy, the underlying theoretical approach applicable to this topic, the concepts of strategy, strategic culture theory and constructivism is further explained. Subsequently the methodology and methods are addressed to outline how the research question is answered via document analysis and interviews. Eventually the analysis of the ESS, EUGS and key documents is outlined to be able to reflect on development of EU strategic culture incited by the strategic policies. Finally, with the use of the expert interviews a reflection on the drafting processes and the practice of EU strategy is analysed and discussed.
How did EU security and defence integration come about and what is the core of the development of EU strategic culture? The process of identifying new threats, the requirements for their subsequent implementation in an institutional capacity and capability to manage these threats within the CSDP framework is, according Biava, Drent and Herd 2011, a key driver of EU strategic culture development. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the CSDP section of the EU strategies also because of the general belief that the EU is setting a higher priority for the development of the EU’s “hard” security capabilities next to its already existing soft-power instruments (Biava, A. Drent, M. & Herd, G. P. 2011. p. 10). Although the CSDP is the most recent policy framework of the EU’s defence and security policies, it is also a product of a long history of defence and security integration, which started in the 1950’s. The CSDP currently represents the part of the EU strategies that (should) provide on ‘the operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets’ that contribute to ‘missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter’ (Missiroli, A. 2016. P. 45). The following section briefly addresses the historical context of the EU’s defence and security integration, to clearly sketch the key developments around EU defence and security integration. A clear overview is important because of the complexity of the institutional context. This complexity is mainly caused by the incremental way of policy-making within the EU, considering that there is no agreed upon design made in advance where all policy efforts perfectly fit into, due to the evolution of policies over time (Missiroli, A. 2016. p. 6).

The aftermath of the Second World War made clear that European states urgently needed to cooperate to ensure that another outburst of violence was prevented. The US was extensively involved with Europe’s reconstruction after the devastation of the war due to the Marshall aid plan (1947). Within the Marshall plan, the concept of ‘European Self-Reliance’ was an important condition that envisioned European integration on a broad scale. This concept envisioned the maintenance of peace by dint of integration, creating a greater interdependence between European states that would discourage these states from inciting conflict (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 34-36). A maintained order of peace and security in Europe could ensure that the US would eventually be able to withdrawal as Europe’s security guarantor (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 34). The 1951 signed Paris Treaty formally institutionalized EU integration with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which radically altered the way Europe conducted interstate affairs and conflict resolution (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 37-38).
The end of the Second World War and the start of European integration did not necessarily eliminate all possible security threats for Europe. The Cold War between the Soviet Union (SU) and the US evoked growing discrepancies between the Eastern and Western ideologies, thereby increasing distrust and warlike tensions. To jointly face Cold War threats, Western liberal and democratic states established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. With the concept of collective defence enshrined in article 5 of the treaty, NATO was informally perceived as the US’s security guarantee for Europe (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 39). For the US, the concept of ‘European Self-Reliance’ remained an important condition for European integration thus the US kept pushing for intensified European defence efforts. In response to this request, the European Defence Community (EDC) was established in 1952. The EDC was to include a common EU defence budget and institutionalize a trans-national European military force. This, however, never became reality due to the improvement in East-West relations and the vote against the EDC from the General Assembly in France, that decided to not ratify the treaty as states feared losing sovereignty (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40). This development kept EU defence policy from taking place within the framework of NATO. Consequently, any further effort to institutionalize supranational EU defence integration became a taboo subject, mainly over concerns of compromising member states’ sovereign right to determine their own military forces. (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40; Rogers, J. 2009. p. 841).

Other efforts to integrate European defences were taking place but as described before within the NATO framework: a prime example is the Western European Union (WEU), stipulated in the 1954 Brussels Treaty and primarily reliant on NATO military capabilities and hence not a framework for European self-reliant defence cooperation (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40; Rogers, J. 2009. p. 841). Transatlantic ties intensified over the decades partly due to Europe’s dependence on US defence capabilities. This dependence kept European defence integration off the policy drafting table (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40). However, sentiments regarding European defence integration changed in reaction to the EU’s lack of military capabilities to contribute towards conflict resolution during the Balkan wars (Fiott, D. in Missiroli, A. 2016, p.10). Awareness of the importance of a sufficient crisis response power and common military capabilities grew within the EU. In 1993, the Maastricht treaty formulated an answer to this by instating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40). The CFSP was modified after the establishment of the treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Saint-Malo agreement (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 40) in order to launch the ESDP as an integral and operational part of CFSP and to establish the HR/SG office that has been responsible for the coordination of external relations for the European Council (Missiroli, A. 2016, p.14 -18).
This step toward further integration was made possible due to the fact that some areas of tension between the EU member states had been balanced out, namely: the tension between European Integration-focused member states and Transatlantic-focused member states; and the tension between civilian power-focused member states and Military power-focused member states (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 52). These areas of tensions are quite similar to Howorth’s (2002) formulation of divergence in national strategic cultures (Howorth, J. 2002. p.92). These above developments created the conditions for independent EU security and defence collaboration but also show where the bottlenecks are in creating strategic coherence in the EU (Biava, et al. 2011. p.5).

The 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, its resulting geostrategic shocks especially invoked by the Iraq war and its ramifications regarding global security evoked a renewed sense of urgency to revise the EU’s external policies, especially given the incipient enlargement of the EU in 2000, with the addition of 9 new member states. These external and internal developments caused for an overhaul of basic foreign policy objectives, principles and the formulation of key security threats in the form of the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003. In this new geostrategic context, the initial EU strategy for the first time described an overall approach and a new position for the EU to tackle new security threats (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014. p. 60). As addressed in the introduction, the second latest key European defence integration development was the Lisbon Treaty that changed the ESDP into the CSDP (Missiroli, A. 2016 p. 16). The Lisbon Treaty also changed the role of the HR/SG into the HR/VP that would now function as the face and the voice of the EU’s external policy of the European Council and European Commission. Additionally, the European External Action Service was established which the HR/VP would also coordinate (Missiroli, A. 2016. p. 27). The figures below provide a short overview of key dates in European Foreign Policy Planning mentioned here above.
The Lisbon Treaty instigated a framework for European defence integration, offering a supposedly comprehensive approach with more priority. This resulted in an increase in deployment of European military and civilian missions (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 172). The functioning of these missions, however, relies on voluntary contributions and is not necessarily related to territorial defence. This practice makes the CSDP subject to the political will and perspectives of member states (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 195). Does this mean that the CSDP within the EU strategy is not merely than the sum of its part, dancing to the tune of the member states political will? The CDSP structure infographic below provides brief information about the functioning and key elements/players within the CSDP framework. Political will concerning security and defence is largely influenced by the various strategic cultures of the EU member states causing differences in their preferred approaches (France de, O. & Withney, H. 2013, p. 2). The inability to really provide the comprehensive approach and abilities it promises is partly attributed to the diversity of strategic cultures in the EU (Clingendael, 2016; France de, O. & Withney, H. 2013. Biava, A. et al. 2011. p.3). This thesis researches if an EU strategic culture has been developed over the last ten years.
Introduction - CSDP structure

**HR/VP**
- Responsible for the shaping and carrying out of the EU foreign and security policy (CFSP and CSDP)
- Since treaty of Lisbon also Vice-President of the European Commission thus responsible for trade, development, neighborhood policy, and humanitarian aid.
- Building consensus between the 28 EU member states and their respective priorities
- Representing the EU internationally

**CPCC & CMPD**
- Responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations
- Under political and strategic direction of the PSC
- Ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission-related tasks

**PSC**
- Preparatory body for the Council of the EU
- Meets at ambassadorial level
- Keeping track of the International situation
- Helps define policing within the CFSP and CSDP
- It prepares a coherent EU crisis response
- Exercise political and strategic direction of crisis response

**EUMC**
- Highest military body within the Council
- Meets at the level of Chiefs of Defence of the Member States
- Provides the PSC with advise and recommendations on military matters

**EDA**
- Agency that assists member states in improving defence capabilities in support of the CSDP
- Meets at the level of defence ministers
- Fosters defence cooperation among member states (except Denmark)
- Including cooperation in research and technology, procurement or training, armaments cooperation and strengthen European defence, technological and industrial base

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**Organisation chart CSDP structure European External Action Service**

[Diagram showing the structure of the CSDP including positions and responsibilities of various bodies and individuals involved in CSDP operations]

Theoretical Framework

This section provides an insight in which theoretical framework is used to find an answer on the question whether the EU developed a common strategic culture. This framework is chosen to analyse the strategic policies and the interviews because the policies ought to represent the EU strategy. Therefore, the concept of strategy and strategic culture theory is addressed. Constructivism is a logical addition to the theoretical framework because this thesis researches culture which is a concept strongly related to constructivism that focuses on the cultural, historical and social constructed aspects of international relations.

Strategy and Strategic Culture Theory

Firstly, the concept of strategy and strategic culture needs to be addressed in order to answer two questions: do different strategic cultures in the EU hamper action on foreign and security policy?; and has a common EU strategic culture been developed over the last 10 years? Strategy is used in multiple ways in different fields of work. Below, the concept of strategy relevant for this thesis is elaborated upon.

Strategy is within international relations defined in multiple ways and has evolved over time. From the well-known first authors such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, who described strategy from a merely military perspective, to more contemporary authors such as Gray, Betts and Ortmann & Whittaker, who have expanded the concept to a more extensive application. In *On War*, Clausewitz defines strategy as ‘the use of engagements for the object of war’ (Clausewitz, C. 1976. p. 178). Gray subsequently expands this strict operational-orientated definition by pointing out that ‘engagements’ could be understood in different ways, and therefore broadens the applicability of the concept. The expanded definition of strategy is explained by Gray in the following way; ‘the use of tacit and explicit threats, as well as of actual battles and campaigns, to advance political purposes’ (Clausewitz, C. 1976. p. 178). It is however not bound by only the use of military instruments, but ‘engagements’ that can be understood in the sense of all ‘relevant instruments of power as threat or in action, for the objectives of statecraft’ (Gray, C.S. 1999. p. 17). Ultimately, Gray defines strategy as; ‘The use that is made of force and threat of force for the ends of policy’ (Gray, C.S. 1999. p. 17).
This eventual definition according to Gray should be understood as grand strategy instead of solely military strategy because of the broad conception of ‘engagements’ that do not necessarily have to be military means. Betts’ perspective on strategy is more military focused according the following definition: ‘a plan for using military means to achieve political ends’ (Betts, R.K. 2000. p. 6). This is an example of a parochial concept of strategy focused on force and the variety of threats of force employed to achieve political objectives. Grand strategy prescribes a more complex and comprehensive understanding of strategy. For this thesis both explanations of strategy (grand strategy and military strategy) are relevant because of the comparison of the EU’s two grand strategies on foreign affairs and security, wherein a broad range of policy areas are addressed and a comprehensive approach is emphasized (Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 10).

Within International Relations, grand strategy is understood as a state’s plan to achieve its national interests in the global area via the prioritization of various aspects of policy. In light of these interests and priorities, grand strategy prescribes the economic, military and diplomatic instruments that are to be used to ensure or protect these interests (Ortmann, S & Whittaker, N. 2011. p.300). A grand strategy therefore helps to provide the context wherein difficult political decisions are made about resources and power projection. Another comprehensive definition of the role of grand strategy is provided by Basil H. Liddell Hart; ‘The role of grand strategy is – higher strategy – is to coordinate and direct all the resources of a nation or of a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy’ (Hart, B.H.L 1967. p. 322). Strategy however can essentially be brought back to the fact that a nation’s (grand) strategy should help to achieve national interests by mapping with which instrument it should play to engage in zero-sum transactions on the international stage. Ortmann and Whittaker emphasise this realist character of grand strategy wherein states are the highest authority within a system that is determined by mutual competition and power struggle (Ortmann, S & Whittaker, N. 2011. p.304). The problem with this interpretation of grand strategy in relation with the EU is twofold;

1. The EU is not one nation state that has to answer to a clearly demarcated constituency, as it is comprised of 26 member states (in the area of EU external relation policy) and split between its two principal institutions (the European Council and the European Commission) which both have a voice regarding security policy. The CSDP is an intergovernmental framework, and therefore to maintain its legitimacy, it would never become a centralised supranational authority due to sovereignty issues (Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 4).
2. The decentralized political structure of the EU means that the executive authority that decides over means and ends of security policy are the member states, meaning that progress on decision-making can be made difficult if a consensus is not achieved. (Baun, 2005; Toje, 2005, p. 10 in Biava, A. et al. P. 2011. p. 5).

Yet there are authors that question the solely realist nature of strategy and strategic behaviour. This idea started to gain ground during the Cold War where the two major powers of the US and the SU opposed each other with vast differences in ideology. International Relations scholars such as Jack Snyder (1977) started to publish about the idea that culture can influence strategic behaviour (Poore, S. 2003. p. 279). This idea emerged because of the difference approaches in strategy between the SU and the US seemingly caused by a difference in ‘national styles in strategy’ (Booth, K. 1979. p. 114). Snyder argued that “by identifying these historical and organizational factors, the strategic culture approach attempts to explain the origins and continuing vitality of attitudes and behaviour that might otherwise seem to American observers inscrutable, wrong-headed, or peculiar,” implying that the behaviour of the individual is influenced and socialized due to cultural factors (Snyder, J.L. 1977.p. 5). The general definition of strategic culture is “the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it (Klein, 1991: Duffield, 1999 in Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 2).

Constructivism prescribes that social reality is ultimately founded upon culture, and constructed upon the power of ideas, knowledge, norms and resulting rules that eventually shape states’ identities (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 150). Building on that explanation strategic culture can be defined as the socially constructed framework wherein strategic discussion and choices are made. This is different from Snyder’s conception, which strongly linked strategic culture with strategic behaviour by claiming that strategic culture determines behaviour due to cultural, ideational and normative influences (Johnston, 1999). Gray describes strategic culture as the context that shapes strategic behaviour besides other material forces that also shape behaviour (political, geography, balance of power and structure of international system) (Gray, 1999). The framework is determined by culture consisting of historic, political structural, technologic, defence organizational and geographic factors (Lantis, J.S. & Howlet, D. 2011. p. 87). A strategic culture therefore prescribes a nation’s political morale that consequently determines a nation’s principal beliefs regarding democracy, individual freedom, security etc. (Lantis, J.S. & Howlet, D. 2011. p. 86).
The above interpretation of strategic culture essentially shows how culture is the context that shapes the processes of strategic thinking, choices and eventually strategy making (Gray, C.S. 1999, p. 55). Considering this it seems that a shared strategic culture therefore is essential for the successful formation and implementation of grand strategy, the basis of the concept lies within the realm of the state. The state, in strategy-making, has to formulate 'state interest' and national decisions regarding power projection. The political identity of states is what the concept of grand strategy (partially) ignores, while on the contrary the concept of strategic culture centralizes political identity.

The importance of a shared strategic culture and political identity seem to be key for successful strategy making. However, strategic norms and values are also influenced by changing threat perception (Meyer, C.O. p.14). Especially when there is a rising amount of perceived threats, the more deep and resilient norms will be concerning protective and strategic measures against these threats (Meyer, C.O. p.14). According to Meyer especially the norms in regards to goals and cooperation with the use of force are affected. It depends which type of threats are perceived as urgent but a stronger regard to (military) alliances as the only answer to the more powerful threats is a possibility (Meyer, C.O. p.14).

Nonetheless the fact that strategic culture is an under-researched concept, in the methodology section an operationalization of strategic culture and analytical framework is address to elaborate how it is researched within this thesis (Poore, 2003. p. 279; Meyer, C.O. p.2).
Constructivism

Constructivism is understood as a reaction to Neoliberalism and Realism, as Constructivism criticizes some of the core assumptions and ‘features’ of both of these grand theories. Constructivism rejects the assumption within (neo-)realism and (neo-)liberalism that social reality is a given which never alters and that states have fixed interests in power and wealth (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 150). These main interests are informed by factors like geography, distribution of power and military force, material factors which effectively determine the behaviour of states (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 150-151). Within these ‘traditional’ approaches the assumption that state behaviour and interests are defined by ideas and norms is not workable.

Constructivism proposes an alternative approach that ‘believes’ that social reality (and therefore society) is constructed and shaped through the interpretation of language, ideas, norms, rules social identities and processes of learning (Snyder, J. 2004. p. 55). The school of Constructivism was developed in the 1980’s as a part of the growing interest in social, cultural and identity theory which was initiated by the end of the cold war (Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007. p. 3). Constructivism is founded on the work of theorists like Wendt, Katzenstein, Adler, Wendt & Duvall (among many others) that all contested the dominant core assumptions of structuralist approaches like (Neo-)Realism, (Neo-)Liberalism and Marxism (Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007. p. 3). Within the school of Constructivism, the notion developed that the structure of international politics constructs the identities and interests of states, (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 151) which are not necessarily fixed structures, but transformable by interpretations, global-historical forces, non-state actors and societies that influence individuals (Barnett, M. in Baylis, J. Steve, S. Owens, P. 2011. p. 152 & Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007. p. 3).

Constructivism assumes that institutions have a role in shaping this behaviour through the shared norms and values that these institutions represent, which, as a result, forms institutionalized socialization. (Risse, T. 2004. p. 147; Meyer, C.O. p. 18). This stands in contradiction with the prescriptions of (neo-)realism and (neo-)liberalism, as Constructivism prioritizes ideational factors such as norms, values and identities over material factors. Ideational factors and their influence on patterns of socialization determine the perception of a state’s capacity for power (Snyder, J. 2004. p. 60-61). As Wendt (1992) states “Anarchy is what states make of it,” thus international relations are not de facto governed by the structure of the global system but rather upon how states perceive each other (Wendt, A. 1992. pp.391–425).
Constructivism is a prescriptive approach to exploring the EU’s common strategic culture by its focus upon the ideas, norms and identities that underpin state behaviour, and the manner in which these factors are enshrined and communicated via language and rhetoric. Through the analysis of language, patterns that can be connected to ideas, beliefs and identity within an institution can be identified that indicate how the institution perceives the world, itself and its stakeholders (Klotz, A. & Lynch, C. 2007 p.21). Furthermore, through the use of the qualitative methods of interview and document analysis, the development of strategic culture in the EU can be outlined. The close examination of official EU strategies and documents that communicate the political and strategic goals of its institutions allows the study of the EU’s strategic culture. Constructivism is the suitable approach to serve this study of the EU’s strategic culture because it recognizes that institutions are shaped by shifting ideational factors and in turn, have a socializing power (Meyer, C.O. p. 17-18). This stands in contradiction with structuralist theories (Realism and Liberalism) that disregard historical context, social identity and the interests of member state governments and societies (Risse, T. 2004. p. 146). In order to place this analysis within the broader domain of IR, academia concerning the historical context of EU security and defence cooperation has been reviewed above.

With the theoretical framework based upon strategic culture theory and constructivism, the argument concerning the question if the EU developed a common strategic culture is that over time the EU should have formed a common strategic culture due to the considerable amount of security and defence policy making in the EU. Policies that represent shared strategic ideas, norms and practices which eventually should foster collaboration. These policies on their turn should institutionalize these shared ideas, norms and practices that ultimately establishes a common strategic culture (Meyer, C.O. p. 17-18. The initial fascination in regards to EU defence and security collaboration is as mentioned before because there are a broad range of policy guidelines but in practice these policies do not seem to be carried out as they are intended.

Methodology & Methods

How can the development of EU strategic culture in the last 13 years be mapped and uncovered? This section addresses the methodology and methods used to answer the question: ‘Has the EU developed from the ESS to the EUGS a Common Strategic Culture?’.
In this section, the pillars of strategic culture are described in order to operationalize the concept of strategic culture. In the theoretical framework, several definitions of strategic culture have been expounded. From Snyder to Gray to the most recent characterizations from Biava et al, the common denominator of these definitions is the broad view on culture encompassing everything from beliefs, ideas, history, norms, habits of mind, assumptions and worldviews (Snyder, 1977; Gray, 1999; Lantis, J.S. & Howlet, D. 2011; Klein, 1991; Duffield, 1999 in Biava, A. et al. 2011). The eventual definition by Biava, Drent and Herd inspired by the Meyer definition of 2006 is the best fit for exploring the EU strategies due to the ESS’ and EUGS’ multi-faceted character (multilateral and comprehensive approach): ‘Strategic culture comprises the identity-derived norms, ideas and behaviour about what is appropriate and legitimate concerning the use of military and civilian instrument for security goals’ (Biava, A. et al. p.8. 2011).

Within this definition, four drivers of the EU’s strategic culture are identified by Biava et al (2011. p. 9). These drivers represent the operationalisation of Strategic Culture that is used to analyse both of the EU strategies and the CSDP key documents to the ESS and EUGS considered in this research. (Biava et al. 2011. p. 9, p. 11)

1. “The EU’s recognition of new threats and the subsequent adaption of its institutional capacity and capability to address the threats and then the political will to launch CSDP operations”.

2. “The operations themselves and the learning process they engender (lessons identified and learned)”.

3. “The shared norms with regards to using appropriate instruments, military force included, to tackle security challenges, and the processes by which these norms are institutionalized”.

4. “The common development understanding and convergence of CSDP norms around an increasingly more robust strategic culture that links the use of force within a more comprehensive toolbox of policy instruments with both civilian and military aspects of CSDP”.

Despite the variety of definitions of strategic culture, the concept is under-conceptualized (Poore, 2003. p.283), thus a limited number of analytical frameworks are available to choose from in order to analyse strategic culture (Poore, 2003. p. 284).
Biava, et al (2011. p.15) provided on the basis of the four strategic culture drivers an indicative analytical framework, which they used to research the EU’s strategic culture up to including 2011. Which not to mention also was designed for further research, this thesis therefore expands the framework up to and including the EUGS (Biava, A. et al. p.3. 2011).

Methods

Document analysis & analytical framework

The selection of documents is based on if the documents solely represent the EU’s foreign and security strategies. Therefore, only the two ‘real’ strategies of the EU are analysed but related key documents that represent the review or the implementation of strategies are also included in the research. The ESS and the EUGS are the true key documents that represent the narrative about the EU’s identity concerning the internal/external division (Mälksoo, M. 2016. p. 376). The ESS is key to comprehended the EU’s understanding of the crucial threats at that time and how they should be addressed (Biava, A. et al. p. 9. 2011). The EUGS represents according to Nathalie Tocci, the HR/VP’s closest advisor and executive on the document, a two-year process of consultation and strategic reflection among member states and EU internally (Tocci, N. 2016. p.470). Therefore, both strategies can be understood as the EU’s assessment of self as (security/political) actor in relation with its uncertain and ambiguous surrounding. Thus, the ESS and EUGS can be read as the EU’s ‘autobiographies’ (Mälksoo, M. 2016. p. 376). The other related key documents that represent the review or the implementation of the strategies are also included in the research because the strong connection with the initial strategies.

On the basis of Biava et al’s drivers of strategic culture and the indicative analytical framework provided in their article the strategies and key documents content are coded on how the drivers of strategic culture are represented. Within thesis this he initial framework created by Biava et al is updated and adjusted to the current status of EU security and defence policies. The framework functions as a tool to map out the drivers of strategic culture and outline the development of strategic culture in the last 13 years. The main differences and similarities are discussed in the next chapter. The first driver can be linked to the strategic threats section concerned about threat perception. The second driver regarding the CSDP operations is taken out of consideration because the focus on non-material factors instead of material factors like military force. The third driver is connected to the section on shared norms that create ‘legitimacy for acting’. The fourth
driver applies to two sections in the analytical framework the military and civilian tool building and institutional machinery sections (Biava, A. et al. 2011).

All six documents are coded according the labels in the below table that together represent three of the four main drivers of strategic culture. The coding software used is NVivo software that supports qualitative and mixed methods research. The analysis from ESS up to the EUGS is conducted by first creating the codes in NVivo then a close reading of all six documents and attaching the codes to the corresponding content to eventually fill in the sections in the below framework. The coded documents are sent in a file accompanied with this thesis.

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<td>ESS</td>
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<td>– 2008</td>
<td>ESS implementation review</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>EUGS</td>
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<td>– 2016</td>
<td>Implementation plan on security and defence (SDIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>– 2016</td>
<td>European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>– 2016</td>
<td>Implementation EU-NATO joint declaration</td>
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(based on Biava, A. et al. 2011. p.15)

**Interviews**

The interviews that are conducted with experts in the field of European strategy making and implementation are an important source of data to discover the daily practice concerning the creation of the ESS and EUGS. Interviews are a qualitative research method that provide insight into the attitudes, values and opinions of individuals to understand how the individuals understand and operate within the world (Silverman, 1993, p. 167).
Important to note here is that data obtained from interviews are less objective/natural data than data obtained from the document analysis of key EU strategy documents. However, the interviews bring the necessary depth and exclusive insight into the process of EU strategy making and the EU’s strategic culture, especially given that such a direct method of analysis can provide answers reflective of the current political climate among policymakers within the EU. The stages of the EU strategy-making are being addressed to eventually describe and trace the process of the ESS and EUGS from its inception to the present day. Some respondents requested that their quotes are referred to their function and not to their full name. This will mean that some quotes will appear without the name of the respondent.

The interviews have a semi-structured design, enabling the research to yield more information about the topics addressed or deviate from the set themes. This means that during the interview it is possible to improvise and provides the respondent the ability to lead the discussion. See the appendix for the latest version of the topic list, the topic list has been adjusted after the first interview that served as a pre-test interview. Information is richer, more detailed, focused on individuality and the individual experiences within the world (Silverman, 1993, p. 162. In appendix A, the topic list with the themes certainly addressed in the expert interviews are described. In appendix B, the respondent list with the experts their according background and profession is displayed. The expert interviews are divided according to their background in the following way:

- Policy (Staff in Brussels and the Netherlands)
- Ministry of Defence (3x)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2x)
- External Action Service & EU (2x)
- Academic - Think Tank (2x)

After the interviews were conducted, a short interview report was written, noting any significant quotations obtained in order to extract the core message out of every interview. Due to access issues and time limitation, the respondents interviewed only represent the Netherlands the interviews therefore give a Dutch biased perspective on the processes concerning the ESS and EUGS. Nonetheless because of their diverse backgrounds and because the respondents were key players in the (Dutch) processes of the ESS and the EUGS and that the Netherlands was a key ally in the process a good overview of the process can be traced and described (Tocci, N. 2016. p. 467). The combination of document analysis and interviews allows an analysis of the EUGS and ESS through multiple methods and perspectives strengthening emerging results and findings.
In this section, the results of the document analysis of the ESS, the EUGS and its related key documents are presented and discussed. All six EU strategy and policy documents are analysed on three selected drivers of strategic culture that are divided into four labels. In order to discover the development of a common EU strategic culture from the ESS up and including the EUGS. An important note to make is the that the factor of time is of big influence, the world during publication of the ESS is not the same as the world during the publication of the EUGS. For example, the first sentence of the ESS about the EU being "never so prosperous secure and free" is to date an excuse for policy makers to taunt the credibility of the 2003 strategy (European Council. 2001. p.1). Nonetheless, the ESS was the first EU document laying out key threats and creating a precedent for EU foreign and security policy. Another important difference that needs to be pointed out is how the two strategy documents differ in length. The ESS consists out of 14 pages while the EUGS consists out of 56. It seems that with the EUGS the EU and its member states needed four times more space to balance out the areas of tension concerning EU security and defence collaboration. However, there is also another reason for this difference that is further discussed in the section where experts give an insight into the drafting process of both documents.

**Strategic Threats – Driver 1**

The recognition of threats and the perception of threats are as mentioned a factor that is of influence on strategic culture, it can function as a catalyst for defence cooperation (Meyer, O.C. 2005. p. 14; Biava et al. 2011. p. 9). The ESS was the EU’s first strategic assessment that indicated key threats which covered half the document (see table 1). In the 2008 ESS implementation review additional threats were defined to match the new context the EU was in, but also to stress that the EU still need to be “more capable, more coherent and more active” (European Commission. 2008. p.2). In the EUGS 13 years later there is actually no mention of key threats. Instead the document focuses on key priorities supplemented by the definition transnational dangers like “terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity” (EU HR/VP. 2016. p.19). These dangers are not elaborated further on in the document. The EUGS is instead primarily focused on establishing key priorities and creating a common narrative for the EU wherein the words “unity” and “united” are strongly represented (see table 2; European Commission. 2017. p. 25). However, in the EUGS follow-up documents strategic threats are defined as shown in the table below but never labelled as key threats (see table 2 and
3). The base of the EUGS is thus more focused on common priorities than, in the case of the ESS, common threats.

Military and Civilian Tool-Building – Driver 4

With this driver, the actual proposed military and civilian tools for the use of force are selected out. It is an important driver of strategy and strategic culture because it represents the agreed upon means (of force) to address the identified threats (Biava et al. 2011. p.9). As described means are a crucial element of strategy. The main context difference between the ESS and the EUGS is that the proposed means of the EUGS are yet to implement. Nonetheless the intention of which means to use to achieve the defined policy goals can be made up out of both documents. However, the ESS lacks in detailed defined civilian-military tools to tackle the asessed threats (table 1). Exemplary for this is; “when at that time, the HR/SG Solana was asked by the council to implement the ESS he replied that he couldn’t implement it, that was not his aim with the ESS” (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017). Instead it focal point is creating the narrative of a comprehensive approach on the basis of multilateralism and the need for a European strategic culture (European Council, 2003. p. 11; table 1). The EUGS is also indented to create a narrative mainly focused on unity and action on defence. Because of the emphasis on action the suggested civilian and military tools are therefore clearer defined especially in the follow-up implementation and action documents (table 2 and 3). “It is being said that in the last 2 years more has been done on the field of CSDP than the last 10 years” (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017; European Commission. 2017. p. 20).

Institutional Machinery – Driver 4

This driver is one of the most important factors in fostering a strategic culture. As argued through strategic culture theory and constructivism, institutions represent ideas and norms that are institutionalized through their practices. With this driver, the proposed institutional machinery in the selected policy documents is identified and altogether this is a representation of the framework wherein EU strategic decisions are made in (table 1,2, and 3). According to dr. Nathalie Tocci ‘the main institutional success of the ESS was the establishment of the EDA and the headline goals’ (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017). Another evidently important institutional instrument is the European Neighbourhood policy that was funded in the narrative of “the importance of a ring of well-governed countries at the border of the EU” (European Commission. 2003. p. 7).
Nonetheless the institutional machinery presented in the EUGS and its follow-up documents is of a vast difference in comparison with the ESS in terms of follow up time and quantity. In one year time the EUGS, EDAP and SDIP got published wherein especially the last two documents outlined a detailed set of institutional machineries (see table 2). Which is significantly faster than during the ESS. This shows the higher level of priority given to CSDP and the intensity with which the institutional framework is modified and designed.

**Norms – Driver 2**

Norms is the last but presumably the most important driver of strategic culture. This driver represents the shared understanding concerning the (institutionalizing) instruments, including use of force, that address security issues (Biava et al. 2011. p. 9). As argued norms are a key component of the strategic culture wherein decisions are made (Klein, 1991: Duffield, 1999 in Biava, A. et al. 2011. p. 2). The fundamental norms of the EU transcend the topic of strategy making and EU defence collaboration. However, these fundamental norms are obviously reflected within these policies. The focus on democracy, security, rule of law and multilateralism based within the UN system are norms which are inherently linked to the EU. In both strategy documents these norms are reaffirmed (see table 1 and table 2). The greatest difference is the change of tone in regards to these norms. In the ESS the EU and its norms are presented as a beacon of prosperity, development and democracy that spreads its example through enlargement. This Eurocentric narrative is toned down and the realization has come to the EU’s mind that space is needed for “different regional experiences” and “reciprocal inspiration” (EU HR/VP. 2016. p. 32). Another shift in norms is the emphasis on the need for hard power which is according the EUGS essential to exert soft power (EU HR/VP. 2016.p. 4; table 2). Therefore, in the first-year emphasis was put on a push for the defence and security aspect of the EUGS (European Commission. p. 6). This resulted in the EDAP, SDIP and the joint declaration NATO-EU. All these three documents are in line with the presented norms in the EUGS (see table 2 and 3).

As a whole all these above described drivers are present in the analysed policy documents. Components of strategic culture are thus represented throughout the era of strategy making in the EU. Main differences are shift of eurocentrism, detailed proposed instruments to reach policy goals and the pace wherein policy is made. The following section will provide an insight in the practice behind the analysed documents and explain how these differences arose.
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<tr>
<td>2003 (EU HR. 2003)</td>
<td><strong>European Security Strategy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key Threats</strong>: Terrorism; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Regional Conflicts; State Failure; Organised Crime</td>
<td>European Arrest Warrant; Arms Control Regimes; Assistance Programmes; Conditionality; Target Trade; Systematic Used of Pooled and Shared Assets; Joint Disarmament Operations</td>
<td>Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency; strengthening OSCE &amp; Council of Europe; Developing strategic culture fostering early; rabid and robust intervention; Focus on Berlin plus; bring together EU assistance programme &amp; development fund; effective transatlantic relationship</td>
<td>Strong international rule-based order based on ‘effective multilateralism’ within the UN system. Nation-building with spread rule of law and democracy; counter-insurgency; preventative engagement; EU as economic power thus global player; promote ring of well-governed countries; sustainable development through peace and security</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 2008 (European commission. 2008.)</td>
<td><strong>ESS implementation review</strong></td>
<td><strong>Additional Formulated Threats to ESS</strong>: Cyber security; Energy Security; Maritime Security; Climate Change</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Coordinator; Tighten Coordination of Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism; Deployment of Judicial; Police and Border Management Expert; EU Special Representatives; Battlegroups; Civilian Response Teams; CPCC Civilian HQ</td>
<td>WMD Strategy 2003; Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference 2010; Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs; The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy; European Neighbourhood policy (ENP); Black Sea Synergy; Association agreements; European Defence Agency; European Security and Defence College</td>
<td>Additional norms to ESS: EU as Anchor of Stability; Enlargement Policy Spreads Democracy and Prosperity; Preventing Radicalisation and Recruitment; Human Security Approach; Sovereignty Entails Responsibility</td>
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(based on Bava, A. et al. 2011. p.15)
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<tr>
<td>2016 (EU HR/VP. 2016)</td>
<td>European Union Global Strategy</td>
<td>Key priorities: The Security of our Union; State and Societal Resilience to East and South; An Integrated Approach to Conflicts; Cooperative Regional Orders; Global Governance for the 21st Century Additional priorities: Internal and External Existential Crisis; Transnational Crime; Terrorism; Hybrid Threats; Climate Change; Energy Security; Economic Volatility</td>
<td>CSDP mission collaboration with EU border &amp; coastguard and special EU agencies; Broader partnership civil society; Private sector; Development funds; Improving Reception and Asylum Capacities; Full-Spectrum Land, Air, Space and Maritime Capabilities</td>
<td>Deepen transatlantic bond with NATO; SDG’s; Synchronisation and a adoption of national defence planning cycle; Support Defence Research and Mutual Cooperation; Full use of EDA; Strategic Communication; ENP; Strengthen Civilian and Military Structures Cooperation; Join Meetings and Taskforces of EEAS and Commission</td>
<td>A Strong Union; Strategic Autonomy; Principled Pragmatism; Foster Inclusive Governance; Soft Power and Hard Power Go Hand in Hand; Weakness of Neighbours and Partners is EUs Weakness; Peace and Security; Prosperity; Democracy; a Rules-Based Global Order; Preventing Conflict; Multilateralism Enshrined in UN; Credible European Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 2016 (Joint declaration EU-NATO. 2016)</td>
<td>Implementation EU-NATO joint declaration</td>
<td>Unprecedented Challenges Emanating from the South and the East; Hybrid Threats</td>
<td>First Step Parallel and Coordinated Exercises for 2017 and 2018.</td>
<td>Sharing of Maritime Situational Awareness; Better Coordination and Mutual Reinforcement of Activities in the Mediterranean and Elsewhere; Facilitate a Stronger Defence Industry; Greater Defence Research and Industrial Cooperation</td>
<td>A Stronger NATO and a Stronger EU are Mutually Reinforcing; Enhancing Neighbours’ and Partners’ in Accordance with Values; As Enshrined in the UN Charter; Contributes to Security and to Sustainable Peace and Prosperity.</td>
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<td>2016 (European Commission. 2016)</td>
<td><strong>European Defence Action Plan</strong></td>
<td>Inadequacy to Provide in Necessary Critical Defence Capabilities due to Lacking Investment; Decreasing EU Defence Collaboration that Leads to Duplication and Inefficacy;</td>
<td>Joint acquisition; Development and Retention of the Full-Spectrum of Land, Air, Space and Maritime Capabilities; Expand Copernicus Capabilities</td>
<td>European Defence Fund; Strengthening Defence Single Market; Foster Investments in Defence Supply Chain; Coordination Board (HR; EDA; Member States; Commission; Industry; Programme Committee; Strengthen Support EU Funds (ESIF; ERDF); European Network of Defence Related Regions; European Defence Skills Alliance</td>
<td>EU as Soft and Hard Security Actor; Increase Defence Cooperation and Spending; Defence Investments Remains the Prerogative and the Responsibility of Member States; Defence Research is Key to Safeguard Europe’s Strategic Autonomy; Security of Supply Fosters Defence Single Market;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td><strong>Implementation Plan on Security and Defence</strong></td>
<td>Hybrid Threats; Cyber security; Terrorism and Radicalisation; People Smuggling and Illicit Trafficking; Irregular Migration Flows; Arms Trafficking and Organised Crime; Rising Costs Defence Technology</td>
<td>List of Generic Civilian CSDP Tasks and Requirements; CDP; Reinforce INTCEN and EUMS INT link; EEAS Strengthening Rapid Response toolbox; CDSP Civilian Mission and Military Operations; Civilian and Military Experts; High-Level Meetings to Address External Security and Defence Issues; Single and Inclusive PESCO</td>
<td>CSDP; CFSP; TEU article 43; 42.7; TFEU article 22; EEAS Revising Feira Priority; Advancement of EDA Concerning CDP; Coordinated annual Review on Defence; Review Athena Mechanism; European Council Conclusion (Dec ’13; Jun ’15); CSDP Council Conclusion (Nov ’13; Nov ’14 &amp; May ’15); European Defence Fund</td>
<td>Strategic Autonomy Strengthens EU and Strategic Partners (EU; NATO; OSCE; AU)</td>
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After exploring the theoretical and policy aspect of strategy making this section addresses the practice of the ESS and EUGS. By interviewing nine experts in the field an insight is gained into the drafting process and the views on EU strategy making and CSDP.

Drafting process
The ESS drafting process was one behind closed doors without a broad consultation among all the member states, civil society and EU institutions; “Everyone agreed that a strategy needed to be drafted, but it was a great challenge to get everyone on the same page. Solana solved that trough writing the strategy with a very select group and asses only with key member states the important points and bottlenecks” (Osch, T. personal communication. June 12. 2017). This resulted in the fact that smaller member states felt that all of a sudden, the EU strategy was established. This process of a very select assessment without consultation rounds did not favour the support for the ESS. “Also at the time of the 2008 implementation review the process was the same as in 2003 without any consultation rounds” (Osch, T. personal communication. June 12. 2017). However, according to mr. van Aubel it is important to take in mind that this process was also possible because the different age in 2003. As described in the introduction the pressure for the EU to act as security actor nowadays is higher: “Because of threats outside Europe becoming increasingly intertwined with internal and external security and world positions are changing. Others are not going to solve these problems for us, the position of the EU is also changing, which is because of the changing world order. Besides being an economic actor the EU also needs to be a security and political player” (van Aubel. J.P. personal communication. June 22. 2017).

During the EUGS the drafting process was entirely different with points of contacts in every member state, numerous rounds of consultations per chapter of the EUGS and a broad external outreach (Tocci, N. 2016. P 463-466). This was also affirmed by the different government officials that were interviewed for this research. Between the EU and the member states was a strong commitment and good cooperation but also between the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Staaij, W., Earle. G. Camerik, L. personal communication. June 2, June 8, June 30. 2017. This inclusive and extensive process eventually fostered the positive reception and readiness for action in regards to the EUGS. Illustrative for this is the following quote: “The big advantage of the EUGS was that we were involved from start to finish. Including the member states that were somewhat more doubtful. … The level of involvement and agreement in regards
to the EUGS in particular on defence and security has been politically outlined through the drafting process of the EUGS” (Claringbould, S. personal communication. June 21. 2017). According to Mrs. Earle from the Ministry of Defence and responsible for CSDP implementation in the Netherlands; “Now it will not depend on the EU, but on the member states. It is their turn to act” (Earle. G. personal communication. June 8. 2017)

Several respondents also highlighted the fact how the ESS was merely a threat assessment than a strategy. As described the majority of the ESS was focused on security and describing the threats. The described means in the ESS that should address those threats are vaguely elaborated. On the other hand, the aim for the EUGS was to be a grand strategy that transcends the subject of security and defence, covers global topics and unites the EU. Thus, a more extensive writing process is inevitable and that is also one of the reasons why the EUGS had more pages to fill. PMG chair van Aubel affirmed this in the interview the following way “Where in 2003 we solely focused on security, we are now aiming for a global strategy that is broader than security and defence. That focuses on economy, reconstruction and conflict prevention instead of resolution” (van Aubel. J.P. personal communication. June 22. 2017).

View on strategic culture

The view on the development of a EU strategic culture by the experts is quite consistent, which is that the EU is still at the initial phase of forming a strategic culture. In the last 13 years, the first concrete steps to institutionalization of security and defence collaboration are made. The main aim for the ESS was in, time of the Iraq war, to reunite the main member states and redefine the narrative of EU external policy (Tocci, N. personal communication. July 13. 2017). Despite that those aims were achieved, it is evident it takes more to foster a common strategic culture. It needs a real grand strategy, which as shown in the analysis is more than just a threat assessment. A real grand strategy includes clearly defined tools and norms that facilitate the implementation of that strategy. These are the preconditions of a strategic culture and the ESS only started the first steps toward these conditions. According to the Dutch point of contact the EU strategic culture is still partly in its infancy (Claringbould, S. personal communication. June 21. 2017). In addition, Dr. Tocci argued that for the EU to have a strategic culture it starts with mutual solidarity for each other’s threat perceptions, because it is evident that these differ in such a diverse community as the EU. The EUGS is a starting point by creating common key priorities and a normative institutional framework to uphold the agreed upon set priorities.
Conclusion and Discussion

Conclusion

This research mapped out EU defence and security collaboration through the analysis of the EU strategies, key documents and expert interviews. To uncover the development of shared EU strategic culture. Because a common EU strategic culture can provide the shared framework that facilitate and ease strategic decisions. The urgency for shared decisions and action is pointed out by discussing the historical background of this cooperation and assessing the current security context. Strategic culture theory and constructivism provided the basis of the argument that shared norms, practices of institutions and understanding of threats are powerful drivers, which foster a strategic culture. However, the document analysis and expert interviews showed that EU is still in the onset of creating a shared strategic culture. In this research, it turns out that the ESS was the first real threat assessment and the EUGS is the first grand strategy of the EU. Despite the fact that not yet there can be spoken of a common strategic culture the EU made important steps with the EUGS and its key implementation documents. The coming years will show how the implementation of the EUGS turns out and if a higher degree of solidarity, unity and a common strategic culture are established in the EU.

Discussion

European security and defence collaboration is a comprehensive subject, which can be compared to a ball of yarn. Every time you think you have the beginning of the yarn and working to the end you have to check again. In this research, difficult choices had to be made to keep it comprehensible. For future research, it is recommended to include the key council conclusion on ESS, EUGS and CSDP because in this research the political perspective is missing. However, the selection of documents used in this research provide a broad perspective on the policy side of the ESS, EUGS and CSDP. Another crucial recommendation for future research is to assess the implementation phase of the EUGS according the analytical framework provided in this research. In the end the EU will keep progressing and developing in this field, because if one thing is certain it is that security will always be an issue that needs to be addressed.
Appendix A: Topic List

Introduction: focus on the comparison of the two EU grand strategies on foreign affairs and security. To distinguish if the EU developed over the ten years a common strategic culture. These expert interviews should serve as an insight in the daily practice around the EU global strategy, the Common Security and Defence Policy and the existence of a common strategic culture in the EU. These questions serve as a guide for the interview, it is however possible to deviate from this set question in order to match more with the interviewee’s background or answers.

Name respondent:

Position respondent:

Topic list in English:

Expertise

– Could you describe your role / involvement regarding The European Security Strategy, the European Global Strategy and / or CSDP?

– Since when are you involved in this topic?

– In which area of expertise are you the most experienced: the ESS or EUGS (this will be more or less the focus of the rest of the interview)?

Position from (expertise) organization

– Could you describe from your organization / expertise point of view how the CSDP policy of recent years has been received?

– Can you explain from your organization point of view how the new EUGS was received?

– What is your role in relation to the EUGS and CSDP regarding its implementation?

– How would you describe the EU’s strategic culture?
Drafting process EUGS / ESS
- Can you explain from your expertise/organization how the process of the creation of the EUGS / ESS went?

- How where all Member States input tried to be included in the creation of the EUGS / ESS?

- What were the main points of your organization and role in the creation of the EUGS / ESS?

- Can you describe what the role / position was from EU colleagues from other Member States?

- What we’re regarding to these other EU colleagues the biggest similarities and differences with the point of view from the Netherlands / organization?

Own perspective on European security integration strategic culture
- How would you assess the success of European security and defence cooperation?

- When in your opinion could be the EUGS seen as a successful strategy?

- How do you see the future of European security and defence cooperation?
# Respondents list

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<th>Name of Expert</th>
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<th>Label - Affiliation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lt Gen (ret) Drs. A.G.D. Ton van Osch</td>
<td>Former director general EU military staff perspective, Security Consultant</td>
<td>Policy - Ministry of Defence &amp; EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martijn Hagoort</td>
<td>Senior Policy officer - GVDB</td>
<td>Policy - Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgina Earle</td>
<td>Senior policy advisor – EU/GVDB</td>
<td>Policy - Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lilian Camerik</td>
<td>Former director general EU military staff perspective, Security Consultant</td>
<td>Policy - Ministry of Defence &amp; EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachi Claringbould</td>
<td>Senior policy officer Directorate-General for Political Affairs, Point of Contact EUGS Netherlands</td>
<td>Policy - Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wouter van der Staaij</td>
<td>Policy officer Directorate-General for Political Affairs, Assistant of Sachi Claringbould (implementation EUGS)</td>
<td>Policy - Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Pierre Vanaubel</td>
<td>PMG chair</td>
<td>Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Margriet Drent</td>
<td>Senior research fellow at Clingendael Institute International security, EU as Security Provider, Security Identity</td>
<td>Academic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Nathalie Tocci</td>
<td>Director of Instituto Affari Internazionale – advisor Frederica Mogheimni – Executive EUGS</td>
<td>Academic - IT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDP</td>
<td>Capability Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>Economic Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESIF</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
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<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/SG</td>
<td>Higher Representative/Secretary General (Council)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>Higher Representative/Vice President (Commission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTCEN</td>
<td>European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>PMG</td>
<td>Permanent Military Group</td>
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<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>SDG’s</td>
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<td>Western European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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</table>
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