The politics of Japanese nationalism: how Shinzo Abe’s kokuminshugi is redefining Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’

“How does examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift towards kokuminshugi through the concept of ‘Japaneseness’ breakdown the continued influence of memory politics on the inclusion/exclusion debate within Japan?”

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Abstract:

The aim of this thesis is to investigate and examine Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japanese nationalism from minzoku shugi to kokumin shugi, and to place this redefinition within Japan’s larger historical inclusion/exclusion discourse through the redefining of Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’.

The first part of this thesis explains the theoretical framework in which this thesis investigates its research aim. This framework is composed of Foucault’s governmentality, Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’, the IR theory of Constructivism and Takeo David Hyman’s ‘theory of the ‘Politics of Memory’. The purpose of this theoretical framework is to breakdown the distorted and contested memories that are used to shift the boundaries of Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’. This framework is furthered by examining the various theories of the Homogenous Nation theory, Mixed Nation theory, and National Polity theory and how they were used within Japan to (re)define the concept of Japaneseness.

In the second part, this thesis examines how this constantly shifting concept of Japaneseness was used to assimilate different minzoku into the Japanese empire. This is initially done by examining how the Ainu and Okinawans were made a part of the Japanese consciousness and how this was achieved through the use of distorted memories. The breaking down of Japan’s distorted narratives is further progressed by examining Japan’s contemporary form of ‘memory politics’ through examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japan’s nationalism. This thesis argues that while Shinzo Abe’s redefinition towards kokumin shugi can be seen as an attempt to move ‘towards a beautiful country’, it should instead be seen as Abe’s attempt to escape the colonial and post-war narratives that still plague Japanese nationalism today.

In conclusion, this thesis argues that Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japanese nationalism is not a new phenomenon but instead apart of a larger historical trend within Japan. This trend consists of the boundaries of Japan’s Japaneseness being (re)shifted in order to accommodate Japan’s political aims and agendas of the time. Consequently, the constant redefinition of Japan’s Japaneseness creates the situation where the existences of these minorities (Ainu, Okinawans, Zainichi Koreans, etc.) become distorted in the imagined history of the Japanese nation-state and are blurred into a singular ethnography.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

On the eve of Shinzo Abe’s premiership in 2006, Abe released his book ‘Utsukushii kuni e’ or ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’, wherein he not only introduced Japan to himself as a person but he also introduced Japan to his political ambitions and set the tone of both his 2006 and later 2013 - present premierships. While ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ outlined Abe’s thoughts on defense, the economy, and Japan’s aging population, it is Abe’s ideas on Japanese nationalism that are particularly striking.

In order to move ‘towards a beautiful country’, Abe proposed that Japan should redefine Japan’s nationalism in a bid to become more inclusive (Abe 90). The reason that this new definition is so striking is that prior to this, the manner in which an individual was determined to be included as a member of the Japanese nation-state was through ethnic or blood ties. This form of nationalism or ‘minzokushugi’ places the focus on individuals being of the same ethnicity/ ‘minzoku’, but can be more closely translated to the German word ‘volk’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 80). This new form of nationalism that Abe proposed called ‘kokuminshugi’, where kokumin means nation or citizen, places an emphasis on the relationship between the state and the national. Thus, kokuminshugi or civic nationalism ‘locates the people as those who give allegiance to the flag and anthem of their country, not those who share the same blood or descent’ (K. M. Doak 271). It is the last half of this quote that proves to be the crux of the shift in Abe’s new nationalism, namely a shift away from association by blood and towards association through the state.

This move away from ethnic relations and towards an association through the nation-state presents the possibility of allowing the integration of new people into the nation-state; such a development could present an answer to Japan’s issue of a decreasing population coupled with its low fertility rate (shoushikoureika). However, it also allows for the further integration of disparaged minorities such as Ainu or Zainichi Koreans by focusing less on ethnic ties and more on a national identity.

It is this ethnic nationalism that has hitherto dominated Japan’s understanding of what it means to be ‘Japanese’ and how the state determined who is and is not included as a member of the nation-state. However, when the use of the terms civic versus ethnic nationalism within Japan is further investigated, Shinzo Abe’s pragmatic understanding of who is Japanese and who is included in the nation-state is not uniquely a part of Shinzo Abe’s political views.

Eiji Oguma in his work ‘A genealogy of “Japanese” self-image’ historicizes the changing understanding of what it meant to be Japanese after the opening of Japan by Matthew
Perry in 1853. In addition, Oguma outlines the various theories and narratives that would be used to include or exclude individuals from being part of the Japanese population. Oguma called this complex, fluid and ever-changing understanding of what it meant to be Japanese ‘Japaneseness’. This concept of Japaneseness has been in a state of constant evolution based on the theory that is relevant at the time, be it the Homogenous Nation theory, Mixed Nation theory, or the National Polity theory. However, what is striking about this concept of Japaneseness and the various theories that have influenced it, is that there always seemed to be a political motive behind the transition from one theory to another and thus also a political motive behind the changing of Japaneseness’ understanding. The political aims behind these shifts, be they the resistance against western domination or the imperial aspiration, shifted the concept of Japaneseness and the very boundaries of the Japanese nation-state.

Therefore, when Abe’s proposed definition shift from minzokushugi to kokuminshugi is viewed through the concept of Japaneseness, it seems that this proposed redefinition is yet another step in the ever-shifting inclusion/exclusion narrative within Japan. However, while Abe’s understanding of kokumin on the surface appears more inclusive, has sparked a debate about whether one’s relations to the state and the flag should be the only qualifications to being a kokumin. With minority groups such as the Ainu and the Zainichi Koreans who were born and raised within Japan falling outside this new understanding of kokumin, this shift towards kokuminshugi raises questions over why Abe would propose such a shift and brings into question the understanding of what a kokumin is.

Thus, this thesis shall investigate the complex and ever-changing concept of Japaneseness and how the genealogy of the use of the concept Japaneseness can help break down the reasons why Abe would propose a shift to kokuminshugi and the complications that arise from its proposal. In order to do so this thesis shall address the research question “How does examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift towards kokuminshugi through the concept of ‘Japaneseness’ affect the continued influence of memory politics on the inclusion/exclusion debate within Japan?”

While it is possible that a Japanese version of this type of research has already been conducted, there is not to my knowledge such a type of work done within the English academic community. Therefore, this thesis’ aim is to place Shinzo Abe’s redefinition of Japanese nationalism within a historiographical understanding of the evolution of the concept Japaneseness, it secondly looks to open up this discussion the English-speaking community in an effort to broaden the debate.
1.2 Methodology:

The methodology that will be used to investigate the proposed research question will be centered around analyzing the third chapter of Shinzo Abe’s book ‘utsukushii kuni e’. Within this chapter, Abe outlines his thoughts on nationalism and what is important about his proposed shift in how nationalism is defined. Takeo David Hymans’ concept of ‘the politics of memory’ and Foucault’s concept of governmentality will make up an important part of my theoretical framework. Foucault's concept of governmentality helps understand how ‘governments try to produce the citizen best suited to fulfill their policies’ (Mayhew, oxfordreference.com). This concept of governmentality helps to explain why there was so much debate amongst Homogenous Nation scholars such as Inoue Tetsujiro, Hozumi Yatsuka and Kato Hiroyuki and Mixed Nation theorists such as Taguchi Ukichi, because it raised questions of how far Japan could justify its imperialist actions and how far its governmentality could go (Oguma 90).

This theoretical framework shall be further developed through Hymans’ concept of ‘politics of memory’. This theory is the application of Thomas Hobbes concept of gain, safety and reputation but applied to an East Asian political context (IIAS 3). This theory states that the memories of a nation-state can and will be changed for the purposes of ‘gain’, ‘safety’ or ‘reputation’ (IIAS 3). Hymans’ use of ‘Gain’ refers to how nation-states increase their power, be it soft or hard, relative to their regional competitors by distorting their memories in a manner that is beneficial towards their agendas (IIAS 3).

I shall build upon the theoretical framework by examining how the International Relation theory (IR theory) of constructivism and Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘Imagined Communities’ will help break down the distortion of memories used to change how Japaneseenesness has been defined. This constructivist theory proposes that national identities are based upon the social, historical, political and economic context in which that nation is set in (176, Hopf). This theory shall be combined with Anderson’s notion that nations are socially constructed communities that are defined by the individuals who perceive themselves to be member of these specific communities (6, Imagined communities). These two theories shall assist in analyzing the nation building process from both a political and social perspective. Ultimately this will assist in tackling this multiple layered question and build a strong foundation for further investigation.
The key primary source for this thesis is Shinzo Abe’s ‘Utsukushii kuni e’. The rest of this thesis shall be based on secondary sources. While the theoretical background sources have already been outlined and defined, the key secondary sources that shall be used in this thesis will include Eiji Oguma’s ‘A genealogy of Japanese self-images’, Eiji Oguma’s ‘The Boundaries of ‘the Japanese’: Vol. 1: Okinawa, 1818–1972: Inclusion and Exclusion’, Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s ‘Reinventing Japan’ and Kevin M. Doaks ‘A history of nationalism in modern Japan’.

The importance of understanding the differences between the Homogenous Nation theory, the National Polity theory and the Mixed Nation theory and why Japan shifted between these theories to justify its imperialist ambitions is crucial as it illustrates the dominance that race and the defining of races played in the building of the Japanese nation. Once that understanding is built, then it is important to analyse why Shinzo Abe had endorsed kokuminshugi.

While this thesis is investigating how the term nationalism has been dealt with within Japanese academia, it is important to note that due to the scope of this thesis definitions such as kokkashugi\(^1\) will not be discussed. Thus, this thesis is only examining the use of the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nationalism within Japan’s identity discourse. The rationale for reducing these different theories into either the ethnic or civic variant is because when theories such the Homogenous Nation theory, National Polity theory, Mixed Nation theory, etc. are considered; they all place a large emphasis on the ethnic differences (or lack of) to justify the inclusion or exclusion of a group of people. In contrast, Abe’s proposed kokuminshugi hyper-corrects itself to have a civic form of nationalism. Thus, to focus and provide an easily digestible contrast, I have settled upon using ethnic and civic nationalism.

However, while this thesis does acknowledge that this phenomenon is far from a simple ‘black or white’/ethnic or civic contrast, this thesis will still aim to highlight the issues presented when memory politics are used to reduce such a complicated concept as nationalism down to two contrasting variants. While this study is nowhere near long enough to discuss nationalism within Japan in its entirety, it does hope to add to the study of ‘Japaneseness’ by investigating its more contemporary form and provide a proper springboard for further research into how Japaneseness is contemporarily defined.

\(^1\) Statism or state nationalism
Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1 The Tools of Distortion

This chapter shall initially construct a general theoretical understanding of memory politics and the discourse and processes that go into this identity building process. It then develops this further by describing Japan’s inclusion/exclusion debate that took place during the Meiji era (1868-1912) that spawned the creation of the Homogenous Nation theory, and forced national polity theorists to incorporate Mixed Nation theory concepts in order to stay relevant.

When addressing the use of hierarchical power over a group of people for the means of control or political aims, an important concept that needs to be first understood is Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality. While the concept of governmentality, much like many of Foucault’s concepts have been used and adopted in different academic fields and taken on different meanings, this work shall use the definition given by Foucault in ‘The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality’. In this recorded lecture, Foucault defines governmentality as ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures analyses and reflection, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (102).

While Foucault’s lectures tended to focus on governmentality within 16th century Europe, the general questions and themes that Foucault addresses in this work can be applied in a more universal setting. One of the most important questions that Foucault addresses is ‘what is governance’ and what is ‘good’ governance’” (87). Thus, when addressing governmentality and how the logic of governmentality is seen in ‘good’ governance, it is important to ask ‘how does one govern oneself, how is one governed, how does one govern others, by whom will the people accept being governed, and how does one become the best possible governor?’ (87). The latter questions present an interesting dichotomy where the relationship between the governed and the governor and the manner in which we define this relationship can heavily influence whether a situation has good or bad governance. Foucault explains this dependent view on governance through Guillaume de La Perriere’s ‘Miroir Politique’ (1567) where Perriere describes how the vocabulary we use to define a relationship impacts said relationship.

La Perriere explains that governor and governed can be used for a multitude of different relationships, from an emperor and his subjects, a monarch and his kingdom, a lord and his county, a judge and the prisoners that are being judged, a parent and his/her child(ren), etc.
Therefore, simple vocabulary changes such as monarch and parent portray entirely different expectations on what type of governance would be needed and what would constitute good governance in this different relationship (91).

While the previous description explains the relationship between the definition of governance and the governed, La Pierre’s concept does not explain its relationship to governmentality nor the previously given definition. If Foucault’s definition is broken down, the section ‘that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power’ gives an important defining characteristic of what governmentality is, namely the various mechanisms, ideals and techniques used in the production of citizens (Mayhew). Foucault goes on to describe how this process takes place by stating ‘the means that the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all in some sense immanent to the population, it is the population itself on which the government will act either directly through target scale campaigns or indirectly through these techniques’ (Foucault, Governmentality 100). Thus, through governmentality, governments gain the ability to enhance, (re)define, and enforce certain narratives, perspectives, and/ or characteristics that facilitate in the production of citizens. However, while governmentality is the means in which governments can produce citizens, it still does not explain why nation-states would engage in this act.

Two important pieces of literature that can help show why actors participate in this process are Benedict Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ and the IR theory of ‘constructivism’. Benedict Anderson’s groundbreaking work ‘Imagined Communities’ reveals that nations are not primordial or destined entities but rather that nations are socially constructed communities where the individuals who perceive themselves as members of these communities are the creators of them (Anderson 6). This means that the social constructions that define these communities can be changed as the community changes.

However, this theory, with its heavy focus on the social construct of a nation, only explains part of the fluid nature of the term Japaneseness as this phenomenon is not just a matter of social construction. Therefore, while Anderson’s theory is important to note, the IR theory of constructivism provides the proper breadth needed to fully understand this phenomenon.

The IR theory of constructivism and Anderson’s theory of ‘Imagined Communities’ follow very similar logic in that they realized the importance of social construction in the creation of a ‘people’. However, constructivism also proposes that nations and national identities are entities that are socially, historically, economically and politically constructed (Hopf 176). Therefore, unlike the neorealist approach, constructivism does not assume that an
actor’s identity is at its core a self-interested state, but instead changes across time and space (Hopf 176). This understanding of nation building and the identity building process presented by constructivism is better suited than theories such as neo-realism and/or Anderson’s ‘Imagined Communities’ to breaking down the fluid nature of Japan’s Japaneseness, as it understands the ever-changing state of an actor’s identity in regard to its historical, political, economic situation.

While an actor’s identity is based on these previously stated variables, an actor’s identity is also dependent on the structure in which an actor is set (Hopf 172). A structure can be defined best as a narrative or discourse in which an actor works within. For example, the US projects a ‘great power’ identity and therefore within this structure, actions such as ‘appeasement’ do not fit in as well as ‘military intervention’ would (Hopf 173). Therefore, if a nation-state wishes to incorporate another country into their nation, this nation-state first needs to create a framework in which this action is acceptable.

2.2 ‘The Politics of Memory’

An essential component to the identity building process is that a collective identity can be built on a set of commonalities\(^2\) or memories between people that can be distorted to create citizens. Takeo David Hyman in his work ‘The Politics of Memory’ investigated why actors engage in the distortion of these commonalities by focusing on what he described as a ‘distortion’ of collective national memories for the profit of political gain (Hymans 3). Takeo David Hymans’ concept of the politics of memory is a reapplied version of Thomas Hobbes concept of ‘Gain, Safety, and Reputation’ but with an East Asian focus (Hymans 3). The initial arrow of this three-pronged method of distortion starts with the concept of what actors gain by distorting collective national memories.

The concept of gain, as described by Takeo David Hymans is that actors in order to grow their political power, engage in the act of distorting collective national memories towards a more ‘friendly’ or advantageous narrative (Hymans 3). Takeo Hymans illustrates this process through the example of China’s memory politics in which ‘Beijing has found in the legacy of invasion and atrocity a moral club to beat down its rival. Around the region, competing versions of the war buttress claims to territory and energy reserves disputed by Japan, Russia, the PRC and South Korea’ (Hymans 3). Therefore, ‘gain’ can be thought of as the arrow of memory

\(^2\) Be they historical, political, economic or social
politics that manipulates memories to deal with international competition and/or regional relations to gain a competitive advantage.

Hymans’ concept of ‘safety’ tackles this issue by manipulating a nation’s collective memories and narratives and using them to bolster one’s legitimacy within a nation and gain the crucial support needed for future political endeavors (Hymans 3). An example of this process at work would be in Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power, ‘Deng Xiaoping raised the stakes on Japan’s whitewashing of history in 1982 to bolster legitimacy for himself and his reform agenda because the ‘old guard’ in the People’s Liberation Army – still in position to block Deng’s final consolidation of power – were blasting his pragmatism as harmful to ideology’ (Hymans 3).

While the concept of ‘safety’ and ‘gain’ are two important arrows in the ‘politics of memory’ distortion, the most important arrow, at least in terms of Japan’s inclusion/exclusion discourse is the arrow of ‘reputation’. The final arrow of ‘reputation’ carries greater impact than the previous two, as the ‘reputation’ arrow defines and forms the discourse that allows the previous two arrows to function as they do. The concept of ‘reputation’ deals with the national discourse, or what can be included inside a nation’s national collective narrative (Hymans 3). This differs from the previous two as the concept of ‘gain’ and ‘safety’ work within the discourse created by the reputation arrow. Hymans’ states that as ‘Moral authority is essential to political power; governments want historiography to foster pride in the nation and loyalty to the state.’ (3). This means that a nation-state wants and needs a collective history that allows its citizens to be proud of the nation-state and thus stay loyal. However, because governments need history to foster pride and loyalty in the nation-state, this presents the question of what if a nation’s history does not allow for citizens to gain national pride?

The short answer to this is that nations create the narrative needed for citizens to gain pride and loyalty in the nation-state because ‘Getting history wrong is an essential part of being a nation’ (Hymans 3). Thus, through the distortion of memories into a new historical narrative, the reputation arrow creates the narrative necessary for the previous two arrows to function in. This process of nation-state discourse building lays at the foundation of Japan’s inclusion/exclusion discourse.

2.3 Japan’s Memory Politics

Now that a general theoretical framework has been defined and set, it important to move into the more nation specific debate that raged in Japan in regard to the inclusion or exclusion
of newly acquired regions or areas that Japan wished to expand to. This debate was a continuous and evolving debate that spoke to the very nature of what it meant to be Japanese. During the initial years of the Meiji era (1868-1912) the concept of how to define Japaneseness was a heavily contested subject. The initial theory of the origins of the Japanese nation-state is that of the ‘Homogenous Nation theory’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. xxviii). This theory outlines that the Japanese nation-state is a primordial entity and by extension the Japanese people are an entity that are also primordial in its being.

With this Homogenous Nation theory came a certain understanding of what constituted the Japanese population, namely as a united ethnic group descended from the Tenson race (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. xxviii). The Homogenous Nation theory comes with its own built in assumption that the Japanese people and nation are unique in nature and therefore superior because of its uniqueness (a quality that come back in later ideologies).

This understanding of the Japanese nation-state and population is a very primordial view of Japan’s origins. However, this Homogenous Nation theory was an academic response to initial ‘mixed nation’s theory’ studies that were being popularized in Western academia to the origins of the Japanese ethnic population. Philip Franz von Siebold after his 1823 trip to Japan published his theory that Japan was in fact a mixed nation. This Mixed Nation theory explains that the Japanese ethnic group is combined from the indigenous Ainu and Tartar invaders who claimed dominance over what is now Japan (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 4).

Western theorists looked to Japanese mythology in the Kiki myths to justify these claims. The Kiki Myths contain stories of how the Emperor’s ancestors descended from heaven and how the first Emperor of Japan Jinmu, and Prince Yamato’s conquered the Kusamo native population (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 4). This story was seen by Western scholars as a metaphor for the creation of the Japanese nation. Therefore, ‘god was equated to man’ and the invasion by Prince Yamato equated to the Tartar nation’s victory over the native Ainu and conquest of the islands of Japan (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 4). The Mixed Nation theory was a Western understanding of how the Japanese nation came to be and that was imported to the Japanese populace. However, it was exactly this Western dominance in the field of Japan’s origins that spurred the Homogenous Nation theory.

With the growth of the Japanese Empire came the new movement of people in and out of the Japanese borders. This interaction brought about a new issue of the Japanese interior and the Japanese national’s place within the Japanese nation-state. As stated previously, Japan perceived strength and security came from the notion that the nation was built upon one ethnic
group that was united under the Emperor. However, with the opening of Japan and the immigration of Westerners, the question of Japan’s superiority/inferiority complex came into question (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 23). Scholar Inoue Tetsujiro worried about this ethnic mixing of the Japanese interior as he felt that the Japanese race was of an inferior one. By the mixing of a superior race (Westerners) and an inferior one over a long-term period would cause the superior race to assume control, much like the Tartar nation did with the native inhabitants of Japan (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 22).

Inoue, much like Homogenous Nation theory scholars found that Japan’s strength lay in its homogenous nature. Therefore, due to Japan’s strength stemming from its ‘uniqueness’, Inoue suggested that Japan and by extension the Japanese people should not live outside the borders of Japan. He went on to explain that ‘The only place in the whole world where the Japanese can live is Japan and Japan alone […] Under these circumstances, if we allow foreigners to live with us, the people of Europe and America will enter Japan and will take possession of our land’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 23). Thus, the essence of Inoue’s argument is that Japan should once again shut its borders to foreigners and preserve what he perceived to be the strength and core of the Japanese nation-state. However, while the Japanese Empire did perceive itself as ‘weak’ compared to its Western counterparts, the Japanese Empire took the opposite route that Inoue suggested and began looking outwards to solve its inferiority issues.

The Japanese Empire’s growing ambition to expand to neighboring countries can be seen in the annexation of Taiwan in 1895 and the steady vassal state relationship that Japan held over Korea until annexation in 1910. This ambition to expand the Japanese Empire through the colonialization of its neighboring countries presented an issue with both the justification of Japan’s core strengths and the definition of what constituted Japan. As previously stated, scholars such as Inoue Tetsujiro or Hozumi Yatsuka both viewed Japan’s strength in its uniqueness, which stems from its general homogenous nature. Both these scholars along with Kato Hiroyuki reaffirmed Japan’s uniqueness by stating that Japan is a family-state and that the Japanese people were like children who were united under their father or the Emperor (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 35). This family-state under the Emperor came be known as kokutai or National Polity theory.

While the National Polity theory did bring a new consensus on what constituted Japan, it did limit and grind to a halt Japan’s colonial ambitions. The reason for this halt was because if the boundaries of Japan are defined as a family-state under the Emperor, what right did Japan have to subjugate its neighboring states as colonies? Tessa Morris Suzuki best summarized this
issue by stating ‘Was Japan’s right to rule the colonies based upon the innate racial superiority of the Japanese rulers vis-à-vis their colonial subjects? Or was it based, on the contrary, on racial or cultural commonalities between rulers and ruled? Or did it derive from the fact that Japanese society embodied a more advanced form of a single modern civilization?’ (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 87). Faced with these questions, Japan was left with a few options on how to move forward under kokutai. Firstly, it could abandon the idea of a homogenous nation and continue its assimilation of neighboring countries. Another opinion was that it could continue the assimilation process but have to openly admit that its colonialization was merely an attempt at growing its power and that kokutai was not a natural structure for the Japanese state. Lastly, it could follow Inoue Tetsujiro’s advice and close off the borders of Japan and focus on its own uniqueness to find strength (A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 51).

While the structural features of kokutai created issues with Japan’s colonization, the manner in which this problem was solved strikes at the heart of Japan’s fluid understanding of what constitutes being ‘Japanese’. Scholars such as Hoshino Hisashi and Kume Kinitake both did not view kokutai’s understandings of the Japanese population as an issue as they viewed the ancient alien Korean Koryo nation as the alien Tartar nation that was described in the Kiki myths (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 65). Through this understanding of common ancestry that Hoshino and Kume had proposed, the argument for invading Korea became more justifiable. Hoshino even went on to saying that ‘since Japan and Korea used to be one region, the Imperial Family’s arrival from the peninsula was little more than a domestic trip within a single country’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 68). Linguist Kanazawa Shouzaburo proceeded to further Hoshino’s and Kume’s claim by examining the commonalities between the Japanese and Korean languages and stating that ‘The language of Korea belongs to the same family as the language of the Great Japanese Empire […]’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 74). However, despite this apparent justification, national polity theorist and nativist theorist alike heavily criticized the common ancestry theory.

For National Polity theorists, the suggestion that the Imperial Family could have come from anywhere other than Japan was in line with treason and was seen to be unpatriotic. (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 67) Nativist scholars such as Mootori Norinaga also rejected this theory and called it ‘the words of a mad man’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of 'Japanese' Self-image. 65). The strong objection towards the common ancestry theory stems

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3 the ancient Korean nation from folklore
from the same inferiority/superiority complex defined by Inoue Tetsujirō. Namely that ‘Koreans were a different race from the ‘Japanese’ […] at the extreme, might also provide an excuse for Korea to annex Japan’ (Oguma, A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-image. 69). This view largely aligns with Inoue’s notion that Japan was a weak nation that was vulnerable to the Western nations and surrounding Asian nations. Yet after victories in the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war, the narrative of the National Polity theory and narrative of Japan as a weak nation began to change.

The unique relationship that the National Polity theory presented between the Emperor and the Japanese subject was one of genuine affection. However, with the incorporation of Taiwan, the annexation of Korea and the beginning of a more multicultural empire in the Taisho era (1911-25), the National Polity’s understanding of the relationship between subject and sovereign began to lose relevancy. This problem was solved by reexamining the general understanding of the ‘family state’ and not focusing on blood family but that of ‘adopted families’. This view was addressed in the journal Toa no Hikari or ‘The Light of East Asia’ (1918). Oshima Masanori suggested that these alien nations should be treated as ‘foster family or adopted children’ to the Empire (Oguma, A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-image. 119). This concept presented a unique opportunity to national polity theorists as it allowed them to keep the Emperor as the head of the family state and integrate new nations.

This new formation of the National Polity theory matched far better with the mix nation theory proposed by Kita Sadakichi wherein he outlined that the Japanese people were a mixture of indigenous Ainu, that the Northern Japanese descended from mainland Chinese and Koreans, while Southern Japanese descended from the Negeriods and Malay of Southern Asia (“A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-image” 98; “Re-inventing Japan” 91). Thus, Kita saw Japan more as a ‘melting pot’ of different people and refuted the notion that Japan was very a homogenous nation. Kita instead argued that ‘many people of different lineages have lived together in this archipelago for long periods of time and in the process have intermarried, adopted one another’s customs, merged their languages and eventually forgotten where they came from’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 91).

Kita, who spent much of his career researching the subject of Japan’s racial hybridity, saw Japan’s ability to incorporate the various ethnic groups into one minzoku as one of the strongest qualities of the Yamato Minzoku⁴ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 91). However, Kita felt it was the imperial family that played a central role in uniting

⁴ The term Kita used to describe the inhabitants of Japan
the *Yamato Minzoku*, Kita argued that ‘the strongest bond uniting the *Yamato Minzoku* was the presence of ‘a single imperial line existing from time immemorial’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 91). Thus, the understanding of Emperor as the head of the national ‘family’ was not abandoned but instead reinterpreted to be the metaphorical head instead of a biological one. Therefore, the Emperor was no longer seen as a blood relative of all Japanese, but ‘the descendent of ancestors who role had been to unite the diverse people of Japan into a single political and cultural community’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 91).

Torii Ryuzo in his book *Yushi izen no Nippon* (pre-historical Japan) reconfirmed Kita’s notion that the Japanese people are a mixture of the indigenous *Ainu* who were conquered by the Chinese and Korean mainlanders in the north and Malay and Negeriods of South Asia in the south. This was done by comparing the pottery and physical features of the people that live in North/South Japan to their respective areas (Oguma, A Genealogy of Japanese Self-image. 130). Therefore, according to Torii this is the reason why you have Japanese with ‘Mainland’ facial structures and then people who are darker in complexion, with hairier arms, faces, etc. (Oguma, A Genealogy of Japanese Self-image. 130). The timing of Torii’s reconfirmation of the common ancestry between Japan and Korea shows the degree of fluidity of concept of ‘Japaneseness’ can be.

When looking back on how the concept and understanding of Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’ has changed, be it from its initial Homogenous Nation theory or the Western understanding of a mixed nation to Inoue’s National Polity theory, and finally towards the imperialistic understanding of National Polity theory, it can be seen that this constantly changing concept has been defining and redefining itself along with Japan’s then-current situation. The logic of Foucault’s governmentality, and La Pêrriere’s concept of governed/governor can be seen in Japan’s constant (re)defining of what constitutes a Japanese subject.

It was Takeo Hymans’ concept of ‘the politics of memory’ that ultimately explained why nation-states engage in distorting memories. Thus, through Hymans’ three arrows, Japan was able to adjust the definition of Japaneseness to justify its imperial ambitions. However, at the same time because of the fluid nature of the concept Japaneseness, Japan was simultaneously able to keep the National Polity’s core value of the Emperor/subject relationship being based in one of love and understanding and not of one based on domination/power. Therefore, the final imperialistic form of the National Polity theory is a logically step in Takeo Hymans’ three arrow’s concept. Nevertheless, this was not the only type of memory politics that Japan participated in, the following chapter will explain how even the
conceptualization of provinces such as Okinawa and Hokkaido bring into question the conceptualization of the nation.
Chapter 3: The building of a nation

In chapter two, the theoretical framework that this thesis will be working under was explained. Along with this, chapter two historicized the progression of the various theories that influenced the conceptualization of what constituted Japaneseness and how this was used to justify expanding the Japanese Empire into countries such as Korea. This fluid and adaptable concept of Japaneseness was also used in distorting the understanding of what constitutes the modern Japanese citizen. Unlike Korea, which has its own post-colonial memories and narratives that make the breaking down of Japan’s wartime distortions ‘clearer’, it is nearly impossible to conceptualize contemporary Japan without including the minority group of the Ainu and the province of Okinawa. Nevertheless, even this fundamental understanding of what constitutes Japan is built upon distorted narratives. Therefore, this chapter argues that when the origins of the Ainu’s and Okinawan’s Japaneseness are deconstructed, the inclusion of the Ainu and Okinawans as fundamentally Japanese is a result of more distorted narratives.

When considering the contemporary conceptualization of Japan, it is nearly impossible to consider Japan without thinking of the main islands that form it, namely Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido and Okinawa. However, the inclusion of these last two islands as fundamental parts of Japan’s Japaneseness presents a unique paradox, in that when the people of these islands were added to the Japanese Empire, they were viewed as fundamentally different from the rest of the Japanese minzoku. An example of this can be seen in 1875 after the establishment of the Ryukyu\(^5\) domain. Articles such as one in the Yochi hochi shimbun began criticizing the Japanese government for uselessly spending labour and capital on subordinating the Ryukyu domain, and that they should abandon the Ryukyu domain and sell off Yezo (Hokkaido’s former name) to focus on Japan’s domestic affairs (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 17). This perspective of the Ryukyu\(\text{an/}\) Ainu people as outsiders instead of being a part of the domestic people contrasts with the official government position.

Even amongst the general public there seemed to be divided opinions concerning whether the Ainu belonged amongst the core or the periphery. In 1901, under the ‘Rules for Former Native Children’s Education’, Ainu language, history and culture were abolished. In the 1930s, Ainu children were taught through the ‘Ordinary Elementary School National History’ which placed the Ainu people within the history of the Japanese Empire (Yoshimi

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\(^5\) The Ryukyu kingdom after its abolishment went on to became the Ryukyu domain and later the province of Okinawa
Due to the Ainu’s place within this historical narrative, many *wajin* (ethnic Japanese) students and teachers began to discriminate against Ainu children for ‘being descendants of *traitors*’ who had not submitted to the Emperor’s rule (Yoshimi 128). The denotation of the Ainu as ‘other’ and foreign was reinforced by the very notion of the Japanese *minzoku*. With an increasing consciousness of what Japan (*Nihon*) was, came also an increasing tendency to link the Japanese national identity with that of the Japanese *volk* (*minzoku*) (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 32). However, it also created the issue where *Nihon* had become not only the signifier of a nation-state, but also an ethnonyms of the *Nihonjin* (Japanese) (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 32). This placed the Ainu in a unique junction within Japanese society, where they were considered enough a part of society to be *traitors* to the Emperor but yet still foreign enough to be outsiders within Japanese society.

The deep contrast between the public’s position and that of the government’s is furthered when the initial conflict between the Qing dynasty and the Meiji government over under who’s rule the Ryukyu domain should belong is considered. In 1871, in response to Ryukyuans drifting ashore to Taiwan and being killed by Taiwanese aboriginals, the Japanese government responded by dispatching troops two and a half years later under the pretext of ‘protecting its own citizens’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 22). This spurred the Qing Dynasty to question the legitimacy of Japan’s claim on the Ryukyu kingdom, as China and the Ryukyu Kingdom had a long-standing vassal state relationship. However, the Japan’s government’s position was that the people of the Ryukyu domain were ‘until the bitter end Japanese’. Thus, to attack the Ryukyuans was to attack the Japanese people and it falls under the Japan’s jurisdiction not the Qing dynasty, to dispatch troops to protect their nationals (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 22). This understanding of Ryukyuans as Japanese gave Japan the proper justification to protect its ‘citizens’.

This position was not however reciprocated by the Japanese people, let alone by other department of Japan’s government. Okuma Shigenobu and Kido Takayoshi, who were a part of a faction against the deployment of troops to Taiwan, stated that their positions on Ryukyu’s status was ‘Only the people of the so-called outer domains, surprisingly, are not as our people’ and ‘there should be a difference in the degree of intimacy between the domestic populace and themselves’ respectively (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 22). Despite this opposition, it seemed that it was more important for the troops to be deployed to
Taiwan so that Japan could officially claim control over the Ryukyu domain than it was for the general opinion of whether the Ryukyuans were Japanese to be taken into consideration.

Japan’s public opinion that the Ryukyuans did not belong as a part of the domestic populace and are of a different race is one that was also held by the foreign diplomats that visited Japan. Matthew Perry upon his visit in 1853, was also struck by the differences in physical and linguistic characteristics between the Japanese and the people of the Ryukyu domain (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 31). Perry’s belief in the difference between the Ryukyuan and Japanese was so strongly held that it was a view that persisted up until the American invasion after the Pacific war. (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 31). This left Japan as the only nation advocating that the people of the Ryukyu domain were Japanese at their core and Japan did not let the international or domestic perception of the Ryukyu domain change this fact.

This did not change the view of individuals such as disposition officer Matsuda Michiyuki from showing the racial and linguistic similarity between the Ryukyuans and Japanese minzoku (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 28). Matsuda stressed the Ryukyuan’s Japanese identity by stating ‘the Ryukyu race is of our Satsuma race skeletal structure and body […] upon hearing Ryukyuan peoples tone of voice, it is purely our country’s tone of voice, [while] the speech sounds are those of Satsuma’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 28). However, while this use of memory politics to justify Japan sole occupation of the Ryukyu domain presents complications to an already distorted narrative, it is not until the formation of the Okinawan province that Japan further distorts the quality of Japanese to separate Okinawa from the Ryukyu Kingdom.

The distortion of the Ryukyuans’ place within Japan was further complicated once the Ryukyuans were subjected to mandatory education by the Japanese Empire. This process started in 1887 when the sovereignty debate had been settled and the Ryukyu domain had been annexed by the Japanese Empire and promptly renamed the Okinawan prefecture (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 47). In support of the mission of reminding the newly minted Okinawan people that they have always been Japanese since ‘ancient times’ but they had ‘simply forgotten they deserved to be Japanese’, the Japanese government published the ‘Journal of Ryukyu education’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 47). The education of the Okinawans on their ‘Japanese identity’ was intended to enforce Japanese ‘normality’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 27).

This notion that there was a set of recognizable ‘Japanese’ norms that the Okinawans needed to mimic in order to assimilate became widespread amongst Okinawan intellectuals
(Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 28). Some Okinawans thought that the enforcement of ‘normality’ needed to be taken so far as to mimic the manner in which the *wajin* sneezed (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 28). The Japanese government viewed this education as returning the Okinawans to their natural state of Japanese and not a form of national identity creation in that it would propose an unnatural process.

The reintroduction of the Japanese consensus cannot only be seen in the introduction of the Ryukyu education but also in the process of ‘restoring’ Okinawa to its proper name. Nitta Yoshitaka a teacher in the Okinawa Prefectural Ordinary Teacher’s Training School has stated that Okinawa was the area’s ancient name and that the ‘crafty’ Chinese had changed it to Ryukyu over hundreds of years of influence (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 50). This Chinese influence on Okinawa is further described by Nitta, ‘the name Ryukyu is the name of ‘the unchaste woman called dual subordination, who lowered her head to China […] Okinawa was the name restored to the chaste woman who would give birth to the sons of Japan’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 51). This invocation of national consensus that had been distorted or lost due to foreign influences did not end at suggesting that Okinawa had lost it way.

Nitta proceeded to explain the distinction between Okinawa and the Ryukyu Kingdom by explaining that ‘Okinawa being in all respects the Okinawa islands of our Japan, … the country of Ryukyu has its own separate land’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 51). Nitta proceeds to justify separating the Okinawa and Ryukyu from each other by using Sui Dynasty documents that saw the Ryukyuans as a barbaric race that were believed to take part in cannibalistic practices. However, unlike the barbaric Ryukyuans, the Okinawans were Japanese who were ‘racially Japanese, Japanese compatriots, with common ancestry with Japan’ and would not partake in such savage traditions as eating human flesh (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 51). This attempt to establish a historical claim over Okinawa while at the same time dismissing the Ryukyu Kingdom as a perversion of history memories shows the extent of Japan’s memory politics as it creates a Japanese island (Okinawa) that was lost in time and distorted into a shell of itself (Ryukyu Kingdom).

The distortion of memories used to separate the identities of the Ryukyuans from the Okinawans placed both on a dichotomy; namely associating the Ryukyuans as barbarians and the Okinawans as civilized *Japanese*. However, this distortion was not only seen in the ‘restoration’ of Okinawa’s name but also in ‘restoration’ of the Okinawan people’s ‘proper’
Japanese names. During the Edo period (1603-1868), the Satsuma domain forbid the Okinawans from adopting Japanese sounding names in order to proudly show the shogun that they ruled over a ‘foreign land’ (Yoshimi 121). However, in 1937 the Okinawa Education Association’s ‘Committee to Investigate the Revision of Surname Pronunciation’ sought to spare the Okinawans from being discriminated against for being perceived as a different ethnic group than that of mainland Japan (naichi) by restoring them with their ‘rightful’ Japanese names (Yoshimi 121). Thus, this further distanced the civilized Okinawan people from the ‘barbaric’ Ryukyuans and brought the Okinawans closer to the naichi.

Nitta attempts to further this distinction between the Ryukyuans and the Okinawans by presenting a peculiar and still ironic parallel between the barbarism of the Ryukyuans and a later Japanese colony, Taiwan. Nitta explained that to think of Ryukyu was to think of Taiwan, in that they are both barbaric nations and he wished to save Okinawa the shame of being seen in the same light as Taiwan (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 52).

During the early 20th century, when Japan’s rule over Taiwan was consolidated, there was a growing need for the Taiwanese subjects to be integrated into the Japanese minzoku. Japan’s use of the Doka policy showed the logic of governmentality at work within Taiwan, in that it constructed schools (kogakko), forced individuals to adopt a Japanese name, promoted the speaking of Japanese, and banned the learning of Chinese classics (Tsurumi 620). While this thesis does not focus on to which extent the Doka system succeeded, it is important to understand the rationale behind why the Doka system was adopted.

The reason why the Doka system was adopted can be seen in its alignment with the National Polity theory. As previously explained the newer imperialistic National Polity theory stated that Japan was composed of individuals who came from mainland Asia (China and Korea), however this is also expanded to include Taiwanese coming to Japan through Okinawa (Hsu 7). Thus, the rationale behind using the Doka system is that ‘The Taiwanese and the Yamato 大和 nation were the same people with an identical script and race’ (Hsu 7). When Japan’s understanding of its relationship with Taiwan is compared with that of Okinawa or Korea, a trend is further developed of an ever expanding and fluid historical narrative that justifies Japan’s political and colonial aims.

This pragmatic historical view becomes clearer when Japan’s earlier stance on how the Ryukyuans and Taiwanese were ‘barbaric’ tribes and could not be decedents of the civilized Japanese. Consequently, Japan’s view of Taiwan highlights how Japan’s understanding of Japanese is reconstructed and deconstructed towards their needs by memory politics.
However, unlike Ryukyu and Taiwan, Okinawa was Japanese at their core but had lost their way and their insufficient consciousness of being ‘Japanese’ stems from the Okinawans ‘lagging behind in their progress’ (Oguma, Okinawa 1818-1972: Inclusion and Exclusion Vol 1 49).

This argument, namely that there is a temporal trajectory that a civilization undergoes towards their ‘true’ form and thus the difference between people is merely that one civilization is further developed than another, brings about a new understanding of ‘how’ Japanese one could be. Tessa Morris-Suzuki explains this understanding as an effect of Social Darwinism and how it placed these various countries on a continuum, with Japanese consciousness being something that Okinawans or Ainu have not yet learned in their progression towards civilization (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 86). However, it should not be misunderstood that this ‘space’ and ‘time’ understanding of one’s Japaneseness replaced the understanding of race and/or by common ancestry, but instead that these various mechanisms of distortion were interwoven into a more complex distortion mechanism.

With the addition of the spatial and temporal understanding of how the Ainu and Okinawans fit within the framework of Japaneseness, Japan was able to show this temporal progression through racial sciences. Thus, because the Ainu were seen as both the original inhabitants of Japan in Kita’s Mixed Nation theory and also seen as temporally lagging behind, this sparked a complex racial debate over the relationship between these ‘ancient Japanese’ and the ‘modern’ Japanese (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 86). This prompted an anthropological skull measuring between the Ainu and ‘modern’ Japanese to illustrate the evolution of the Japanese minzoku. However, the results of these racial studies did not create a more unified minzoku that was separated only a temporal lag. Instead such studies generated crude images of the Ainu physical characteristics which furthered the internal racism that the Ainu felt within the Japanese society (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 86). Thus, by adding this temporal and spatial component to defining the boundaries of Japan’s Japaneseness, a narrative was created where these minority groups instead of being considered ethnically different, are excluded from the minzoku based on their racial ‘backwardness’ compared to the majority.

The contemporary image of Japan cannot be seen complete without the inclusion of the islands Hokkaido and Okinawa. However, the inclusion of these islands and its inhabitants, namely the Ainu and the Okinawans as fundamental parts of the Japan nation-state is not a natural state but instead a result of memory distortion. This chapter has shown that initially when these minority groups were brought into the Empire, many Japanese felt they were a part
of the exterior, and therefore should not take importance over the ‘interior Japanese’. However, just as in Korea; the narrative in which the Ainu or the Okinawans were situated within Japan changed. These changes were not used to better assimilate these ‘foreign’ groups but instead used to show these minority groups how they were ‘without a doubt’ Japanese.

Thus, the Ryukyu kingdom came to be seen as a distortion of the Okinawan’s Japanese memories and that by restoring their Okinawan identity they were ‘liberating’ the Okinawan people from their years of oppression. Soon after the distortion of the Okinawan and Ainu narrative was furthered through stating that these minority groups were simply lagging behind in progress towards civilization and because of this, had not yet reached their natural state of being a Japanese citizen. This temporal understanding of who is included/excluded as a member of the Japanese Empire adds an additional layer of distortion to the concept of Japaneseness by allowing an individual’s Japaneseness to be something that can be developed over time.
Chapter 4: Building on a Legacy

The previous two chapters have sought to explain the ambiguous and fluid concept that is ‘Japaneseness’ and place this phenomenon in a historical context. The progression of Japan’s distorted memories from Homogenous Nation theory to the National Polity theory and the adoptability of the inclusion/exclusion of nations and people is fundamental when addressing Shinzo Abe’s proposed redefinition of Japanese nationalism. When Shinzo Abe’s redefinition of nationalism towards *kokuminshugi* is examined through this term Japaneseness, the term *kokuminshugi* can be seen as the contemporary form of the term Japaneseness being redefined for political objectives. Therefore, this chapter shall address Shinzo Abe’s proposed nationalism shift with reference to historical antecedents. This will be accomplished by examining how minority groups such as the Zainichi Korean create issues with *kokumin* more inclusive redefinition and the historical revisionism that is created by this redefinition.

Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift of nationalism from *minzokushugi* to *kokuminshugi* and the linguistic rationality behind this shift needs to be examined in light of Japan’s political/economic situation during which Abe’s book was published. In 2006 when Abe published his book ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’, there were several problems that the country that was once predicted to overtake the United States as the world’s biggest economy faced. The biggest of these problems being Japan’s stagnating economy mixed with its problem of *shoushikoureika*.\(^6\)

Japan was only six years removed from what was called the ‘lost decade’ or the time following the bursting the Japan’s asset bubble where Japan’s GDP between 1995 - 2006 plummeted from US$ 5.45 trillion to US$ 4.53 trillion (Worldbank.org). Along with this decline, the average wages in Japan had been steadily decreasing, while at the same time the average costs of goods had been steadily increasing (Waging a new war). However, the worst of these issues was Japan’s *shoushikoureika*, where Japan was facing an aging workforce/population which was over 20% of the total population in 2006 and a decreasing fertility rate which had fallen to 1.32 children per woman\(^7\) (Japantimes.co.jp; Worldbank.org). This put Japan in a unique situation of suffering from both decreasing economic production and at the same time a decreasing workforce; inhibiting one of the mechanisms in which one can tackle the problem of decreasing economic production.

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\(^6\) A state of low fertility and a rapidly aging population  
\(^7\) The number of children required per woman to keep a population from decreasing or the replacement rate is 2.1 children per woman.
These problems only seemed to worsen as time progressed, and by Shinzo Abe’s second term (2013) as Prime Minister and the republishing of his book as ‘Towards a New Country’, it seemed that a new solution would be needed to solve these problems. This need for a new solution can be seen in the parallel between Japan’s need for new labour and the redefining of Japanese nationalism. Japan has become more open to importing labour from foreign countries in recent years with Central Bank Governor Haruhiko Kuroda stating that ‘more foreign labor is essential for Japan to achieve sustainable long-term growth’ (Curran and Cislo). However, with the large influx of unskilled labour, the government had also taken the stance these unskilled workers were not ‘immigrants’, but guest workers who will be providing temporary services within Japan (Curran and Cislo). Nevertheless, to facilitate this need for new labour, Abe has promised to make Japan’s process to acquiring citizenship one of the fastest in the world (Curran and Cislo). With the road to Japanese citizenship becoming more relaxed and an influx of new citizens/ labourers, the question of how does one assimilate or integrate this new wave of people into Japanese society arises.

Under this objective and framing, the reason why the redefinition of Japan’s nationalism began to take shape. When reexamining the concept of ethnic nationalism and the previously outlined theories of Homogenous Nation theory, National Polity theory, a significant emphasis is place on being of a similar ancestry or ethnic lineage. Thus, for the sake of this analysis the term minzokushugi will be used to describe the focus of how nationalism has thus far been defined and viewed to a large extent. This understanding of ‘Japaneseness’ outside the realm of colonialization no longer allows for inclusion and integration of new citizens and labourers. Abe’s redefinition towards a kokuminshugi framework however, presents a framework that allows for the integration of these people. Abe addresses this in his book ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ when discussing Brazilian born football players Ruy Ramos who played for the Japanese national team in the 1993. Stating ‘We really have to see that this sense of belonging to the community is found in this consciousness that anyone who fights under the Hi-no-Maru flag, regardless of his country of origin, is one of us’ (Abe 85). This description is a core understanding of what Abe’s kokuminshugi is; namely being Japanese at heart regardless of one’s origins.

4.1 Zainichi Korean

The case of Ruy Ramos best presents this new form of nationalism, as Ramos came to Japan in 1977 and took on Japanese citizenship in 1989 (‘Former Japan’ Japantimes.co.jp).
According to Abe, the most remarkable thing was Ramos sense of nationalism. Abe stated that ‘At the “Doha tragedy” of 1993, when Japan failed to qualify for World Cup ‘[Ruy] Ramos shed tears of disappointment along with the Japanese’ (K. M. Doak 271). This sense of nationalism for Japan shown by a new national is how Japaneseness should be defined according to Abe, by their loyalty to the nation-state. However, even this definition presents complications when the cases of minorities within Japan are considered.

With Abe’s focus on the very curiously named ‘civic’ nationalism and one’s allegiances towards the nation-state and the flag, it seems that Abe has neglected minorities in Japan such as the Zainichi Korean or internalized Koreans, who present a complication to the validity and execution of the kokuminshugi framework. Zainichi Koreans are a minority group of ethnic Koreans which chose to stay in Japan after the Pacific war and after Korea gained its independence. This group of ethnic Koreans find themselves in a legal grey area in Japan, as many of them do not hold Japanese citizenship even though most if not all of the second and third generations were born and raised in Japan. Instead of being defined as kokumin or Japanese nationals, most Zainichi Koreans hold a permanent residency status (eijuken) (Chapman 61). It is this very definition of permanent resident that highlights the inconsistent application of kokumin and shows the logic of Foucault’s governmentality at work to include/exclude specific populations from Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’.

When examining the case of Ruy Ramos, the use of kokumin as proposed by Abe becomes quite appealing, as it describes an open society where one is accepted regardless of an individual’s ethnicity. However, the juxtaposed position between the Zainichi Korean’s residency status, identity and societal integration show that in practice this ideal kokumin is not as black and white. Professor Suh Yong-dal of Momoyama Gakuin University speaks on this subject, saying ‘I would like the notion of kokumin to be expanded to include both Japanese who hold Japanese nationality as well as resident foreigners who have foreign nationality and for both to be included as Japanese kokumin (Chapman 60). This addresses the biggest problem of the use of distorted memories to create a collective narrative that defines/ redefines nationals that are included or excluded by the nation-state, namely that identities are complex narratives intertwined with not just the broader kokumin status but also the ethno, social, and cultural aspects that make up the inner core of one’s identity. Thus, to focus only on the kokumin aspect of identity and ignore the other aspects does creates the opportunity for the inclusion of more people, however it also creates the situation for the exclusion or prejudice of another, much like in the case of the Zainichi Koreans.
When examining the case of the Zainichi Koreans, Abe’s focus on an individual’s relation to the state being the defining characteristic to whether one is a kokumin or not becomes rather problematic. This problem stems from the fact that by only focusing on one’s relation to the state, aspects such as cultural and social norms are ignored. For example, the second and third generation Zainichi speak Japanese as their first language, received their primary and secondary education through the Japanese educational system and were raised within the same Japanese society and thus by the same societal norms as residents of Japan. In addition to this, Koreans are not always readily racially identifiable from Japanese, and their taste for or lack of taste for Korean food is not a defining characteristic. Tessa Morris-Suzuki rather finds that the ‘difference’ between the minority and the majority is not an innate set of behaviors or beliefs, but instead a symbolic understanding of difference (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 196). This symbolic understanding of the difference between the Zainichi population and Japanese residents is that the Zainichi identify themselves as Zainichi and that they are also identified as Zainichi by the residents of Japan (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 196).

Nevertheless, the differences between the Zainichi population and the ‘Japanese citizens’ does not only stem from their acknowledgement of these differences but it is also important to examine how these differences are preserved within Japan’s organizational structures. Morris-Suzuki best describes the issue that arises from this understanding, namely that it ‘is not a simple question of whether the “minority” should become the same as the “majority” or should be allowed to remain different. It is a question of the way in which boundaries are maintained, shifted, and reinterpreted in the process of struggles over the nature of the state’ (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 197). It is this statement that the logic of Benedict Anderson’s theory of ‘Imagined Communities’ can be seen, namely that these Zainichi communities are socially constructs created by the community themselves but reinforced by the Japanese nation-state to more clearly create a distinction between the kokumin and the non-kokumin. Therefore, Zainichi Koreans best highlight this struggle over the identity that is (not) included within the term kokumin and how (non) inclusive it can be.

Irrespective of whether the Zainichi population can be considered culturally or socially kokumin, they are still dealt with as foreigners; be it in their kokumin status or employment discrimination. In the 1970s, a prime example of employment discrimination against the Zainichi population is illustrated by the Hitachi company case. The court case concerned Pak Chong-sok who applied to the Hitachi company under this Japanese name (which he considered his real name at the time), and was accepted. Upon being unable to provide a birth
certificate and a family register which all Japanese citizens had, he was told that his position was no longer available because ‘Hitachi did not employ foreigners’ (Chapman 34). While Pak did ultimately win his court case in 1974 against Hitachi for racial employment practices, this court case does document the curious change in the way that Korean citizens were viewed within Japan. In 1947, when the amendments to the Japanese constitution were ratified, the Japanese population went from being imperial subjects to Japanese kokumin (Chapman 68). At the same time this meant that Korean citizens moved from being essentially Japanese through their common ancestral ties, to being foreigners.

Despite the Zainichi population being the highest naturalizing population within Japan, with nearly 9,000 – 11,000 Zainichi naturalizing per year, it does not seem to change the discriminatory practices in Japan (Shipper 71). Kim Tong-Myung saw naturalizing as deeply concerning and ultimately a waste of time as Kim felt that the Japanese society did not make a distinction between the non-naturalized and the naturalized and that both were discriminated against equally (Chapman 54). Chong Yong Hye raised an equally important point in that ‘to place oneself too firmly within the predefined category of ethnic minority’ is, in effect to validate existing stereotypes about the homogeneity and purity of the majority’ (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 197). By that logic identifying oneself as either ‘purely’ Korean or ‘impurely’ Korean means there is a ‘purely’ Japanese or ‘impurely’ Japanese as well (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 197). This type of identification creates a false dichotomy and reinforces the notion of a singular kokumin and ignores that identity lives on the ‘borderlines’ of different narratives.

The change of Koreans within Japan from imperial subjects that shared common ancestry to adopted members of the Japanese ie⁸ to internalized foreigners who do not belong as a part of the Japanese kokumin, further shows the impact that La Perriere’s concept of how the governed/ governor relationship is defined has (refer to pg. 9). However, La Perriere’s concept shows the issues with using kokumin in the way that it is defined now. As kokumin requires to some extent that the kokumin show loyalty to the nation and the flag, and has a very limiting understanding of what can be a part of the Japanese national identity. Ultimately, it is the state that plays the crucial role in defining the various range of identities that are available to its citizens. This is because the state needs to determine which people amongst those who live within its borders are citizens without ‘renouncing crucial parts of their symbolic heritage’ (Morris-Suzuki, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 201). It is by determining these

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⁸ House, referring back to the Japanese society being seen as a family
boundaries and markers of citizenship that minorities such as the Ainu and Zainichi can determine the boundaries of their own communal identities as well.

The justification of why nation-states set these boundaries can be seen back in Hymans’ second arrow of ‘safety’, however instead of focusing on an individual, the focus should be on the nation-state’s safety. Morris-Suzuki has stated that ‘in the language of national identity, there is a profound and almost unquestioned image of society as fragile entity which, without a powerful center of gravity is liable to fly apart into chaos (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 202). Therefore, the nation-state through using distorting commonalities and/or collective memories, defines the boundaries of the state and ensures its stability. This is what Morris-Suzuki states the function of a minority group is, namely that ‘it is useful for the national population to encompass small groups that fail the test of belonging because it is only through the visible failure of defined ‘minorities’ that the state can repeatedly reassure itself of the invisible homogeneity and loyalty of the majority (Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation 204). Thus, it is through the logic of Foucault’s governmentality that it can be seen that by defining the ‘boundaries’ of a society, Japan can more effectively (re)construct that notions of what constitutes being a kokumin.

4.2 A Contest History of Nationalism

While examining Shinzo Abe’s ideas on nationalism, it can be seen that they are highly contested and less inclusive than initially proposed, however some scholars still feel that Shinzo Abe’s attempts at redefining Japanese nationalism are misunderstood. Kevin Doak, a Professor at Georgetown University has been quoted in saying that he feels that Shinzo Abe wants to shift the focus away from the ‘bad’ nationalism of the wartime period and towards Abe’s new kokuminshugi (Morris-Suzuki, Re-Branding Abe-Nationalism). Doak states that this is the reason why Shinzo Abe does not use the word minzoku in his book ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ but instead only uses kokumin (Morris-Suzuki, Re-Branding Abe-Nationalism). Thus, Doak argues that Abe’s nationalism should not be seen as a negative concept.

While Doak has published a work outlining the history of nationalism within Japan, what is most troubling is his quite unique understanding of the role that minzokushugi had within Japanese history. Doak has stated that ‘Ethnic nationalism has appealed to the left in

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postwar Japan for many reasons, most importantly that it provides a socio-cultural identity that need not find expression in laws and political institutions […] But ethnic nationalism has also been positioned as “Asian nationalism” at least since the 1955 Bandung Conference; in contrast, civic nationalism has from its very beginning in modern Japan and throughout East Asia been seen as the favorite of pro-Western governments, Christian minorities and intellectuals thought to be tainted by Western ways of thinking’ (Japan Chair Platform: Shinzo Abe's Civic Nationalism). Doak goes on to state that minzokushugi was given a boost within Japan by the fall of the Japanese Empire and that in the last few decades kokuminshugi has be gaining traction within Japan (Japan Chair Platform: Shinzo Abe's Civic Nationalism). The issue that these statements present stem from Doak’s oversimplification of what minzokushugi is and how it was used. From the manner in which Doak refers to minzokushugi it seems that he equates minzokushugi to ‘ethnic purity’, instead of this complex string of theories and narratives that have been used to construct Japan’s ‘Japaneseness’.

Another issue that is presented by Doak’s understanding of minzokushugi is that he paints Japanese nationalism into too much of a black and white issue. An example of this can be seen in his statement that minzokushugi can be equated to ‘Asian nationalism’ and kokuminshugi can be equated to ‘Western’ nationalism (Morris-Suzuki, Re-Branding Abe-Nationalism). Such an approach is problematic as Doak generalizes something as complex as nationalism into a regional variety such as ‘Asian nationalism’ and then expects this term to be able to explain the nationalistic trends in a region with such a diverse historical, social and cultural background. A second problem with Doak’s understanding is best summed up by Morris Suzuki where she states, ‘it assumes that the phenomenon of nationalism can be neatly separated into an “ethnic” and a “civic” variant, with the second being morally superior to the first […] the notions of race, culture, tradition and citizenship bound up in nationalism are far too complex to be captured in this easy formula (Re-Branding Abe-Nationalism). It is Doak’s focus on the moral superiority between minzokushugi and kokuminshugi that inevitably presents this slanted understanding of how minzokushugi was used defining Japan’s Japaneseness.

Morris-Suzuki in her article ‘Re-branding Abe-nationalism’ went on to make a statement that is at the heart of what this chapter is explaining, that ‘Abe’s core goal inherited from Kishi, clearly set out in Towards a Beautiful Country, and echoed in the manifestos of groups like the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership, is to “escape from the postwar regime”’ (nautilus.org). However, I would argue that Abe is trying to escape more than just the postwar regime through his proposed redefinition of Japanese nationalism, but that he is also
trying to escape the effects of Japan’s colonial history as well. The reason why Abe is trying to escape the colonial and post war narratives is because that ‘the nationalized memories of the war are intricately enmeshed in narratives of decolonization and liberation’ (Fujitani, White and Yoneyama, Perilous memories: The Asia-pacific war(s) 9). However, for Japan these memories of decolonization and liberation do not inspire nationalistic pride nor unity like it did in Korea or Taiwan, but instead brought about national shame. Thus, Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift from ethnic nationalism to civic nationalism shows the logic of Hymans’ reputation arrow where states must get history wrong to foster pride in the nation-state being used in order to escape Japan’s post-war national shame.

Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift in how Japan should define its nationalism can be viewed from many different perspectives. First there is the more obvious economic incentive of having a more inclusive form of nationalism in that Japan, as this will allow Japan to deal with it declining economic production by attracting foreign labour instead of relying on its declining population. However, when Shinzo Abe’s redefinition is more closely examined in regard to Shinzo Abe’s nationalistic views, this redefinition can be seen as Abe’s attempt to separate Japan from consequences of its imperial past. Thus, Abe’s attempts at making nationalism more about being a kokumin instead of being about of one minzoku can be seen as the contemporary form of changing the boundaries of Japan’s Japaneseness in order to achieve Abe’s political and economic incentives. But when the current kokumin status of the Zainichi Koreans is considered, Abe’s form of kokuminshugi seems less to have to do with being more inclusive and more to do with removing national guilt about colonial atrocities from Japan’s collective national identity.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

In 2006, Shinzo Abe’s book *utsukushii kuni e* or ‘Towards a Beautiful Country’ introduced the world to both Abe’s personal views through his anecdotes about his up-bringing. More importantly it also presented his political views and his ideas of nationalism. Abe’s ideas of not only how to help Japan’s stagnating economy but also how to solve Japan’s demographic issues presented Abe with the ideal situation to showcase his redefinition of Japan’s form of nationalism. The redefining of Japan’s nationalism from *minzokushugi* to that of *kokuminshugi* is seen as an attempt to open up Japan’s definition of Japaneseness that would spur further immigration. However, when Abe’s actions of redefining who is included and excluded in Japan’s Japaneseness is viewed from a historical perspective, a trend of Japan constantly changing the boundaries of Japaneseness is revealed.

In the second chapter, the theoretical framework in which Japan justified shifting the boundaries of their Japaneseness was explained. It was shown that at the heart of Japan’s memory politics was Foucault’s concept of governmentality. The logic of governmentality showed that Japan’s memory politics was changed at various different points to more efficiently aid in the creation of Japanese ‘citizens’, be these individuals from Korea or the interior. This concept of governmentality was then expanded by examining why Japan engaged in memory politics by examining Takeo David Hyman’s theory of ‘the politics of memory’. Takeo David Hyman’s fluid and complex theory explains that nation-states engage in memory politics for the purpose of ‘gain’, ‘safety’ and/or ‘reputation’.

In the case of Japan, their ‘politics of memory’ was on full display when Japan’s conceptualization of what constitutes Japaneseness through the transition between the Homogenous Nation theory, Mixed Nation theory and then the National Polity theory is examined. The concepts of gain, safety and reputation in relation to why Japan transitioned between these different frameworks shows that the conceptualization of Japan under frameworks such as the National Polity theory did not justify the colonial ambitions that the Japanese Empire had. Thus, to justify these ambitions without having to change this family-state discourse, a new form of the National Polity theory mixed with the Mixed Nation theory shifted the boundaries of Japaneseness to allow Japan to engage in its colonial ambitions.

In the third chapter, the theory of memory politics was shown not only to have influenced the historical memories between itself and other neighboring nations such as Korea and Taiwan, but that Japan’s memory politics is still distorting the contemporary conceptualization of Japan today. This was shown through how Japan incorporated and
assimilated both Hokkaido and Okinawa into the very fabric of what constitutes Japan. However, even this was a contested transition, with the Ryukyu domain and Yezo being viewed as foreign entities and part of the Japanese exterior. However, once these islands were taken in as provinces, the ‘prerogative to get history wrong’ narrative explained by Hymans’ reputation concept began to take prominence. This distortion of history and the conceptualization of what constitutes Japaneseness could be seen in how teachers such as Nitta Yoshitaka stated that the Ryukyu Islands were separate entities from Okinawa. This creates a problematic framework that Okinawa was merely locked in a temporal and spatial deficit in relation to the ‘interior’ but the mere action of separating these two terms created the false understanding Japan’s historical progression.

The fourth chapter brought this historical perspective forth into a contemporary conclusion by examining how Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift in how nationalism should be defined was an extension of (re)defining Japaneseness to achieve the political and social agendas of the time. This redefinition, when viewed through the previously described economic and social issues followed the same pragmatic understanding of Japan’s Japaneseness. However, the case of the Zainichi Korean population showed the problems with memory politics and problems that arise with this shift towards kokuminshugi. While the concept of kokuminshugi itself presents a positive ambition of seeing a society that is not determined by ethnicity or blood lineage and more by an individual’s relation to the state, the context in which this redefinition is proposed presents an issue.

While the first generation of the Zainichi population can be seen as being a legacy of Japan’s colonial behavior, the second and especially the third generation present an initially different dichotomy to the understanding of Japaneseness. As almost all third-generation Zainichi were born in Japan, speak Japanese, have Japanese friends and have almost no relationship with the ‘homeland’ of Korea, an important question is raised of if one is born in Japan, speaks Japanese, understands the social and cultural norms and values of Japan but still do not belong under the term kokumin, who does? This complex and multilayered issue presents to some extent the issues with a state sponsored form of nationalism in that it creates the in and out groups based on political agendas and objectives.

Although scholars such as Kevin Doak argue that Shinzo Abe’s redefinition of nationalism is ‘misunderstood’, this thesis must agree with Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s analysis of Kevin Doak’s argument, namely that it is impossible to separate something as complex as nationalism in to neat categories of either ethnic or civic nationalism. By doing so, Doak creates
a false dichotomy where one is presented as a more moral form of nationalism and the other a more ‘Asian’ form.

When considering the question ‘How does examining Shinzo Abe’s proposed shift towards kokuminshugi through the concept of ‘Japaneseness’ breakdown the continued influence of memory politics on the inclusion/exclusion debate within Japan?’ and who is included as a part of the nation-state, it can be seen that there is indeed a historical trend of pragmatisms in how Japan’s Japaneseness has been defined and quantified, leading to the inclusion or exclusion of a group of people based on the political motives of the time.

The contemporary example of Japan’s Japaneseness being (re)defined shows that Shinzo Abe is not only advocating kokumin for the economic gain of more foreign labourers, but that he is also attempting to escape the Japan colonial history and the post-war consequences of these actions. However, it seems that by attempting to redefine the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state, Abe raises such questions as ‘who is already included, who should be included and who can decide these boundaries?’. The exclusion of the zainichi population from the term kokumin is the literal representation of these internalized questions.

In conclusion, when actions such as Abe’s proposed redefinition of nationalism are being examined it’s important not to just place them within their contemporary context but also to look at the historical placement of these actions in order to better understand why these actions are taking place. But, the constant redefinition of Japan’s Japaneseness creates the situation where the existences of these minorities (Ainu, Okinawans, Zainichi Koreans, etc.) become distorted in the imagined history of the Japanese nation-state and are blurred into a singular ethnography.
Bibliography:


