CHAPTER THREE

ASSESSMENT OF IDEAS AND MESSAGES PRESENTED IN THE IIIT PUBLICATIONS

In this chapter I will examine ideas and statements on certain issues contained in the publications of the IIIT. The respective ideas and statements will be analyzed and placed in the context of the broader spectrum of the trends in modern Islam.

In undertaking this task, the discussion will be focused on: (1) the elaboration and analysis of the typology of trends and movements within modern Islam, and (2) the examination of certain ideas and statements presented in the IIIT publications. The discussion will analyze how the ideas and viewpoints promoted by the IIIT scholars through their publications fit in with the broader spectrum of trends, and whether the IIIT puts forth anything new.

3.1. TYPOLOGY OF ISLAMIC TRENDS AND MOVEMENTS IN MODERN ISLAM

This section aims to discuss Islamic trends and movements from a historical, theoretical and empirical perspective. The study will examine Islamic trends and movements drawing on examples and cases from different periods of Muslim history. The objective of this study is to arrive at some conclusions about the history, nature and causes of these trends. For practical reasons the study limits its discussion only to the trends within the Sunni Islam.

It is important to mention here that this study is not intended to create a new typology.\(^1\) The purpose of this study is to contribute to a better

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\(^1\) Insofar as I am concerned, a number of scholars have provided some kind of typology. To mention some, Fazlur Rahman (1979 and 1981) and William E. Shepard (1987) wrote interesting studies in this specific area, both of whose works I use for this discussion.

Thorough discussions on this subject can be found, for instance, in the works of Leonard Binder, 1964, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York: John Willey, pp.31-40; R. Stephen Humphreys, 1979, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
understanding of the typology previously provided by scholars and to establish possible connections between one type of trend and another, and also, to some degree, to make critical remarks. The other purpose, which is the main one, is to provide a clear account of the entire spectrum of Islamic trends, so as to establish a foundation for the analysis of the ideas and viewpoints of the IIIT scholars and how they fit in with these trends. The ideas of the IIIT scholars will be examined in the next section.

In writing about modern Islam today, scholars cannot avoid using certain labels to refer to specific Muslim groups or movements or to characterize trends. It is believed that the use of such labels complicates one's understanding of the actual people and tendencies involved, because they often express an implicit bias, and moreover the labels are often used without any explicit definition. However, in talking about something as complex as the Muslim world, the use of labels is unavoidable. I agree with Shepard when he says that the question is not "whether we use labels, but how we use them."²

So far, many labels have been used by Islamic scholars (Muslims as well as non-Muslims) to characterize trends or movements in the Muslim world. Scholars have regularly created various different labels or terms to describe the same phenomena; this makes the subject under discussion more complicated. In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on labels or terms commonly used by Islamic scholars to refer to Islamic trends.

Charles Kurzman³ has established three different traditions of socio-religious interpretation in the Islamic world in the past two centuries: (1) customary Islam, (2) revivalist Islam, and (3) liberal Islam. Customary Islam is "characterized by the combination of regional practices and those that are shared throughout the Islamic world" and this tradition tends to be justified in local terms along with distinctive characteristics of identity, prudence and linkages to the past. On the other hand, revivalist Islam rejects locality and customary interpretation of Islam, and urges bringing Islam back to its purity. Meanwhile, liberal Islam is a tradition of inter-

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³ Charles Kurzman is a Professor at the Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
pretation critical of both customary and revivalist Islam, as those traditions have hindered Muslims from living in and benefiting from modernity. 4

Many terms have been employed by scholars to explain Islamic trends. On the basis of Kurzman's categories, I am inclined to say that under the customary Islam, we have (1) traditionalism and (2) neo-traditionalism, under the revivalist Islam (3) fundamentalism (reflected in Wahhabism), (4) neo-fundamentalism (reflected in the Muslim Brotherhood), (5) Islamism or Political Islam, and under the liberal Islam (6) Islamic modernism, (7) neo-modernism, and (8) Islamic liberalism. Finally, (9) secularism, falls outside any of these categories.

3.1.1. CUSTOMARY ISLAM

3.1.1.1. Traditionalism

In fact, traditionalist positions cannot be said to involve ideology in the strictest sense. A traditionalist is defined by Shepard as "one whose allegiance is to what many would consider the particular 'mix' of Sharia and non elements characterizing his area on the eve of the Western impact, and who has not significantly internalized the Western challenge, that is, who has not felt the attraction as well as the threat of Western ways, and thus has not fully appreciated the depth of the threat." 5 Thus, traditionalists can be seen as "otherworldly" compared to other types of trends. Nevertheless, it can be said that even the traditionalists can be slightly "modern," as long as they have responded to the Western challenge. Those who have made no response at all are called "traditional." 6

It is imperative to find out from which segment of society traditionalists come. During the nineteenth and the twentieth century, the traditionalist orientation has generally come to characterize large parts of Muslim societies, such as (1) the ulama and other traditional elites, (2) the Sufi orders, and (3) the lower classes, especially the peasants.

The traditionalists are not homogeneous. They can be classified into two groups, the "rejectionists" and the "adaptationists." 7 Shepard de-

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7 Shepard, 1987:318. The rejectionists are those who, in the nineteenth century, provoked resistance against the colonial powers, or violently opposed the reform efforts of the
scribes the most conservative elements in Saudi Arabia as traditionalist, and those who opposed the introduction of modern technology, such as television, as rejectionist traditionalist. Furthermore, the fact that Saudi Arabia does not even have a constitution, in the modern sense, is considered to be an argument to call it traditionalist.8

The traditionalists are often accused of being rigid conservatives (ju-mud). However, such an accusation might not always be fair. Shepard points out that the traditionalists have had their own methods to cope with changes. "Even if the gate of 'absolute' ijithad had been closed, ijiti-had within the framework of tradition has always been possible."9 The rigidity of the traditionalists is seen as a reaction to the modernizing pressures put upon them by outsiders.

3.1.1.2. Neo-Traditionalism

Instead of being static, traditionalism to some extent is dynamic. When the traditionalist starts to understand more of the Western challenge then he becomes a "neo-traditionalist". There are two types of neo-traditionalism, "rejectionist" and "adaptationist".10

The neo-traditionalist differs from the traditionalist in his outlook on modern technology. He accepts the need for modern technology, but selectively. He tends "to give it less symbolic, as distinct from functional, value." He is moreover less tended to internalize other Western ideas and values, especially "the idea of progress and the 'Weberian' work ethic."11

The neo-traditionalist tends to attribute more positive value to local tradition than to Western ways and the Islamic model promoted by the neo-fundamentalist, although he recognizes that certain local traditions are non-Islamic and non-modern. Compared to the more modern types, the neo-traditionalist attributes more value to "the depth and complexity

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Westernizing Muslim rulers, but did not make considerable attempts to reform the understanding of the Sharia. They neither wanted to expand the practice of the Sharia to other areas of life, nor did they affirm its relevance to particularly modern issues. Meanwhile, the adaptationists are those "who have gone along or at most used delaying tactics." Their outlook is "that the times are inherently corrupt, due to the distance from the ideal time of the Prophet," and hence regard it a necessity to make the appropriate adaptations.

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of the past Islamic tradition as represented by the learning of the ulama and the wisdom of the Sufi sheikhs.\textsuperscript{12}

Concerning the neo-traditionalist constituency, it includes many ulama and members of Sufi orders in Egypt and the Hamidiyya Shadhiliyya order.\textsuperscript{13} Ahmad Sya‘fi Maarif\textsuperscript{14} points out that neo-traditionalism has a strong tendency toward Sufism and philosophy. He mentions figures like Fritjof Schuon (Isa Nuruddin), Hossein Nasr, Hamid Algar, Martin Lings (Abubakar Sirajuddin) Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, and Roger Garaudy as among the intellectuals of this tradition.\textsuperscript{15} These intellectuals are of the opinion that Sufism and philosophical tradition in Islam are valid sources for Islamic understanding.

Nevertheless, the term cannot always be applied stiffly. For instance, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the biggest Islamic organization in Indonesia that was founded in 1926 to defend the interest of traditional Islam and counter the threat of modernism, is often referred to by scholars as traditionalist-conservative. However, one of its leaders, Abdurrahman Wahid\textsuperscript{16}, is a modern, urban, liberal Muslim intellectual. He promotes a progressive Islam which is inclusive, democratic, pluralistic and tolerant. He endorsed a cosmopolitan Islam which is the product of creative reinterpretation of reformulation, responsive to the demands of modern life. He also rejects the idea to put shari‘a into practice and that Islam should form the basis for the legal and political system of the state.\textsuperscript{17} Likewise, many young generations of the NU are active in what is called the Liberal Islam Network to promote and disseminate the concept of liberalism in Indonesia and to counter the influence of militant and radical Islam in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{18} I think it would be misleading to characterize such people as

\textsuperscript{13} Shepard, 1987:320.
\textsuperscript{14} Ahmad Sya‘fi Maarif, born 1935 in West Sumatra, Indonesia, is a former leader of the modernist Islamic organization Muhammadiyah. He received an MA degree in history from Ohio University and a Ph.D. from Chicago University in 1983.
\textsuperscript{15} Ahmad Sya‘fi Maarif, 1993, Peta Bumi Intelektualisme Islam in Indonesia [the Map of Islamic Intellectualism in Indonesia], Bandung: Mizan, pp.12-13.
\textsuperscript{16} Abdurrahman Wahid (also known as Gus Dur) (born August 4, 1940) educated in Indonesia and Egypt (al-Azhar University), was a widely-respected populist Muslim cleric and leader of the Nahdatul Ulama before being elected President (1999-2001) by the Indonesian parliament.
\textsuperscript{17} John L. Esposito, 2002, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 139–140.
\textsuperscript{18} See the Islam Liberal Network’s website, <www.islamlib.com>
conservative-traditionalists. In general, they oppose literalist views of radical Islam or Islamic fundamentalism.

3.1.2. REVIVALIST ISLAM

3.1.2.1. Islamic Fundamentalism

The term “Islamic fundamentalism” is a controversial one. Many Muslim scholars object to its usage for the labeling of Islamic movements for different reasons. Some consider it derived from Christianity and claim it may result in the reading of Christian ideas into Muslim phenomena. Others object that the term is being used in an all-encompassing manner, including under it ideas and groups that many would not think of as fundamentalist or extremist. Hassan Hanafi, for example, prefers to use the term “Islamic awakening or revival”, rather than fundamentalism.19

Wahhabism: Its history and nature

Wahhabism (Arabic, wahhabiya) is a reformist movement of Islam originating in the eighteenth century in Saudi Arabia. The name Wahhabism derives from the fact that it was led by the Saudi Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). It should be noted that members of this movement never call themselves Wahhabis, but identify themselves as al-Muwahhidun (the monotheists). The term Wahhabi is used only by their opponents. The Wahhabis claim to hold the way of the “salaf al-salih” (the pious ancestors) as propagated by Ibn Taimiya (1263-1328) and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Hence, they are also known as Salafis.20

Why did Wahhabism emerge in a Muslim society, notably Saudi Arabia? This reformist movement came into being as a reaction to what was perceived as laxity when Muslims turned their back on Islam. It is said that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was irritated by what he saw as the moral corruption of the society in which he lived. He insisted on purifying Islam from what he perceived to be superstitions, innovations (bid‘ah) and de-

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viances. He called for a return to monotheism. This is a movement entirely from within. Fazlur Rahman characterizes the nature of revivalist movements, such as Wahhabism, with the following common traits:

i) a deep and transforming concern with the socio-moral degeneration of Muslim society; ii) a call to 'go back' to original Islam and shed the superstitions inculcated by popular forms of Sufism, to get rid of the idea of the fixity and finality of the traditional schools of law, and to attempt to perform *ijihad*, that is, to rethink for oneself the meaning of the original message; iii) a call to remove the crushing burden of a predeterministic outlook produced by popular religion but also materially contributed to by the almost ubiquitous influence of Ash'arite theology; iv) a call to carry out this revivalist reform through armed force (*jihad*) if necessary.

Wahhabis do not follow any specific school of thought (*maddhab*) but they claim to follow Prophet Muhammad directly and use four main schools of thought for reference. However, they are often associated with the Hambali *maddhab*, as they likewise condemn Sufism. The Wahhabis take the Qur'an and hadith as the basic texts and make use of explanations of the Qur'an and hadith from the Companions of the Prophet and scholars such as Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.

Other characteristics that can be associated with Wahhabism are its orthodox outlook, such as its strong condemnation of the use of musical instruments, photographs, pictures, video, and paintings. It outlawed the celebration of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. Wahhabism also regards many religious practices as heresies, which therefore should be banned, such as calling upon any prophet, saint or angel other than God in prayer, since this is believed to be polytheistic in nature. Likewise, they condemn the practice of grave worshiping, even of the prophet's grave. However, opponents of Wahhabism argue that such practices have their origin in the Qur'an and hadith, and were accepted by the Sunni scholars of the early days of Islam. They see grave worship as intermediation (*ta-wassul*), which is accepted in Islam. Furthermore, Wahhabism is often

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attacked by adherents of Ash’ari and Maturidi as being anthropomorphist.  

Modern scholars often understand Wahhabism as literalist, that is, demanding strict adherence to the literal meaning of the scripture without any interpretation. In fact, however, this movement, as stated in the quotation above, encourages people to perform *ijtihad* and prohibits *taqlid*. However, the Wahhabis’ strong attitude toward eliminating anything inconsistent with the strict and literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the Sunna, does make this movement attractive to literalists.

Wahhabism has also been termed “fundamentalist”. Those who apply this label believe that the phenomenon has parallels to that current found in Christianity. However, this characterization is misleading. According to Fazlur Rahman, “the fundamentalism in Christianity, which does involve strict adherence to what is perceived as the literal meaning of the sacred texts, is a reaction against Modernism in the West,” which is quite different from Wahhabism, since this was not directed against any modernism but rather “against what were seen as degrading beliefs and practices in the popular religion.” Furthermore, “Christian fundamentalists do not demand *ijtihad* but oppose it,” whereas Wahhabism endorses *ijtihad* (original thought) and condemns *taqlid* (blind following of tradition). Therefore, the argument continues, “the application of the ‘Christian’ term ‘fundamentalism’ to the Muslim pre-modernist reformist movements [Wahhabism] is to this extent, at least, illegitimate.” Rahman thus disagrees with the use of the term “fundamentalism” to refer to Wahhabism.

Wahhabism seems to be inconsistent in its attitude. Even though it espouses *ijtihad*, at the same time it discourages intellectualism. “Mistrust of intellectualism, involving not only philosophy but also speculative theology, had been endemic to the Hanbali school, to which Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers belong.” Furthermore, by refraining from speculation and philosophy, Wahhabism cannot truly be called the heir to Ibn Taymiyya, whose teachings inspired Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, for Ibn Taymiyya was a great scholar of theology capable of arguing against philosophy with philosophical arguments. Rahman emphasizes the importance of philosophy for Muslims. “[A]ny religious stance one takes has to

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be articulated coherently and is thus no more and no less than a thought-system, that is, philosophy." 27 Rahman lamented the Wahhabists for denouncing philosophy.

Despite its insistence on *ijtihad* the contribution of the Wahhabi movement to a renaissance of Islam is considered to be insignificant. This is so because it was not aware of the wider problems of its environment, being "the form and content of education that was being imparted" in the societies. Rahman says, "The traditional educational system of Islam had become so narrow, barren, and starved of any originality that it was inconceivable that any great problems would be posed or any new intellectual adventures undertaken." On the contrary, what Wahhabis did was only simplifying the curriculum of its prevalent educational system, that is, "purifying it from the intellectual disciplines developed over the medieval period" and preserving only the Qur’an and the hadith. Developing methodology of how the Qur’an should be taught and understood in relevance to a society’s condition was left undone. All this would only represent retrogression from the medieval *madrasas*. The inability of the Wahhabi movement in developing any substitute for the traditional mode of education was considered to have led Muslim societies to “a much greater intellectual starvation than that of the conservative medieval ulema” 28

**The expansion of Wahhabism doctrine**

Wahhabism began its movement in Saudi Arabia with a number of reforms seeking to regain orthodox Islam from innovation by various sects of Sunni Muslims. It is characterized by a strong stance against any departure from the dogmatic interpretation of Islam it advocates.

In its early development Wahhabism spread in Najd along with the expansion of the Saudi State under Muhammad Ibn Saud and his successors. 29 It is said that the Wahhabist doctrine would have remained marginal within Islamic thought if it were not for the friendship Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had made with the family of Saud in 1745. From that time onwards, the ideas of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the political fortune of the Saud family were said to be closely tied. Eventually, when ‘Abd al-Aziz

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Ibn Saud succeeded in unifying the tribes of Arabia under his control and created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. Wahhabism became “the state-sanctioned ideology and code of behavior” of the country. In terms of audiences, Wahhabism is said to have remained restricted to Saudi Arabia until the early 1970s.  

It was in the early 1970s that the doctrine of Wahhabism began to spread outside the peninsula of Arabia. This had to do with the economic growth of that country. It is said that following the 1973 oil boom, the Saudi regime embarked on a major endeavor to spread the Wahhabi ideology outside the country. The undertaking was in part out of conviction, but to a certain degree also “to counter the appeal of ideologies that it perceived as a threat to its national security.”

According to Guilain Denoeux, in this effort to propagate the Wahhabi doctrine abroad, Saudi money was instrumental, for instance, to build religious facilities such as mosques, madrasas, and Islamic centers, which are spread from Lahore to London, and from Morocco to Malaysia. There, the Wahhabi message was presented to ever-expanding audiences. This was followed by attempts to counteract its competitor Iran, which after the revolution of 1979 strove to export the Shi'i revolution abroad. And, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan at the end of that year Saudi Arabia, came into Pakistan to spread the Wahhabi views. This process is said to have resulted in the birth of the Taliban phenomenon.

3.1.2.2. Neo-Fundamentalism

Neo-fundamentalism became known in Muslim societies in the first half of the twentieth century. Different from Islamic modernism, which seemed to consist of “individual cases of Islamic liberal thought”, neo-fundamentalism was more organized. It was mostly established in the form of socio-political movements. These movements took place in such

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31 Denoeux, 2002:60.
33 Rahman uses the term “neo-revivalism” in his earlier writing (1979) and “neo-fundamentalism” in his later writing (1981). William E. Shepard (1987) uses the term “radical Islamism” in his typology. Other scholars such as Oliver Roy (2004) use the term “neo-fundamentalism”. For practical reasons, the term “neo-fundamentalism” is deployed in this study to avoid ambiguity.
regions as the Arab Middle East, the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent and Indonesia.\textsuperscript{34} Hasan al-Banna with his Muslim Brotherhood (\textit{al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun}), Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi with his \textit{Jamaati Islami} and the writings of Sayyid Qutub can be seen as representatives of neo-fundamentalism.\textsuperscript{35}

Neo-fundamentalism is a modern and richer version of fundamentalism. It responds to foreign influence and pressures. Neo-fundamentalism may be defined as “An Islamic bid to rediscover the original meaning of the Islamic message without historic deviations and distortions and without being encumbered by the intervening tradition, this bid being meant not only for the benefit of the Islamic community but as a challenge to the world and to the West in particular.”\textsuperscript{36} From this perspective then, neo-fundamentalism can be understood as a therapeutic power, liberating the mind from centuries of tradition and from the intellectual and spiritual domination of the West.\textsuperscript{37}

Neo-fundamentalism shared Islamic modernism’s principle that Islam is a total way of life that guides all aspects including “social, political, and economic facets, as well as both individual and collective dimensions”. Neo-fundamentalism has also been influenced by Islamic modernism in supporting democracy and believing in and practicing a modernized form of Islamic education.\textsuperscript{38} Neo-fundamentalists also agree with modernists on the flexibility of Islam and of eliminating un-Islamic superstitions. They also accept the need for absolute \textit{ijithad}. However, unlike modernists, neo-fundamentalists grant it less scope and “it must be done in an authentically Islamic way and not as a covert means of copying the West.”\textsuperscript{39} Mawudi asserted, “The purpose and object of \textit{ijithad} is not to replace the Divine law by man-made law. Its real object is to understand the Supreme Law.”\textsuperscript{40}

It is said that neo-fundamentalism is trapped in controversy with Islamic modernism, in which the former is assumed to have no clear idea of

\textsuperscript{34} Rahmam, 1979: 322. Rahmam does not mention any specific name of a group or political party belonging to this movement.

\textsuperscript{35} Shepard, 1987: 314.


\textsuperscript{37} Rahmam, 1981: 33.

\textsuperscript{38} Rahmam, 1979: 322.

\textsuperscript{39} Shepard, 1987:314.

its own goals, and no methodology to be developed to materialize its goals. There is no indication that neo-fundamentalists will be able to overcome this bad situation since they are not capable of developing "the necessary intellectual tools for finding and defining their own position more or less clearly."\(^{41}\)

According to Rahman, neo-fundamentalists will remain trapped in an "intellectual fog", unless they perceive their connection with two groups: (1) traditionalist Islam and (2) modernity and Islamic modernism. In their reaction against modernism, neo-fundamentalists are said to be in the same position with traditionalists. Both assign and accept the authority of the past generation. Despite their denunciation of authority, neo-revivalists, argued Rahman, accept it \textit{de facto} because they accept "the 'consensus' of the earlier generation".\(^{42}\) This attitude is in contradiction with the stance of modernists, which reject authority.

Sayyid Qutub emphasizes that Islam is "flexible" but not "fluid" and "if there is an authoritative text (\textit{nass}), then that text is decisive and there is no scope for \textit{ijithad}. If there is no \textit{nass}, then comes the time for \textit{ijithad}, in accordance with the established principles of God's own method."\(^{43}\) Consequently, neo-fundamentalists tend to accept more of the \textit{ijithad} conducted by past generations (\textit{al-salaf}). This attitude is consistent with their contention that the pre-modern community was less erroneous, while modernists suffered the distortions caused by Western colonialism.\(^{44}\) Rahman seems to neglect this aspect.

Neo-fundamentalists tend to distinguish themselves from modernists, whom they accuse of being westernized because they identify Islam with certain Western concepts.\(^{45}\) Mawdudi, for example, strongly opposes those who want to identify Islam with Western concepts such as democracy, on the grounds that such identifications are caused by the idea that Muslims can earn no honors unless they are able to show that Islam bears a resemblance to modern doctrine.\(^{46}\) The distinctiveness of Islam is emphasized by neo-fundamentalists.

In agreement with their concern for authenticity and distinctiveness, neo-fundamentalists put less stress on apologetics. Mawdudi and Qutub,

\(^{41}\) Rahman, 1979: 323.
\(^{42}\) Rahman, 1979: 323.
\(^{44}\) Shepard, 1987: 314.
\(^{45}\) Rahman, 1979: 323.
for example, see an “inferiority complex” in modernist apologetics. Notably, they tend to be uncompromising on the issue of non-Muslim minorities. Mawdudi explicitly attacks “equality before the law” as a shame and defends the Islamic provision of the dhimmi status.\[47 More than others, neo-fundamentalists insist on the imposition of the Sharia law by the state, since they believe that it is not only ideal, to be known and admired, but also a law to be put into effect and obeyed.\[48 Concerning the concept of jihad, their understanding differs from that of the modernists. Mawdudi regards it as a “revolutionary struggle”.\[49

Rahman criticizes neo-fundamentalism for not having developed any methodology, as a consequence of which little can be done when asserting certain isolated issues, such as: (1) bank interest is unlawful, (2) the unveiling of women and family planning are cardinal sins, and (3) intellectualism is dangerous. Neo-fundamentalists identify these issues with the West, and they are one with conservatives and revivalists (fundamentalists) in opposing them.\[50 Asserting these issues neo-fundamentalists differentiate themselves from the West as well as from modernists.

Concerning the notion of progress, the attitude of neo-fundamentalists cannot be called negative. It is important to note that the enthusiasm of neo-fundamentalists in following the Sunnah of the Prophet is very often misunderstood as “wanting to turn the clock back to seventh century Arabia.” In fact, they do not reject the idea of progress but accept it and insist that Islam is the way to ensure it. As Mawdudi asserts, “We can accelerate the onward march to progress only on the strength of the moral values enunciated by Islam.” Thus, it is the fact that neo-fundamentalists accept the idea of progress. That neo-fundamentalists want to disengage many of the effects of Western-style “progress” is unquestionable, but it is not equivalent with “wanting to turn the clock back”\[51

Like Islamic modernism, neo-fundamentalism has a tendency to urge a “Weberian” work ethic. In addition, it also has a tendency to “simplify” the Islamic symbolic system by concentrating on certain basic elements. The difference lies in its motivation. In simplifying the symbolic system, neo-fundamentalism emphasizes the interest of authenticity, while mod-

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ernism emphasizes the interests of “flexibility.” Bearing in mind the idea that the fundamentals are under threat, it desires to reinforce them and relate everything more firmly to them. “In fact, its long-range tendency may be more to “rationalize” than to simplify the symbol system.”

In fact, neo-fundamentalists are modern. Their tendency to view Islam as a “system” can be seen as a modern phenomenon. Since traditionally “the political provisions of the Sharia were understood as commands incumbent on the ruler rather than as a ‘system’ in the usual sense of the term.” The other “modernity” of neo-fundamentalism is the fact that in the Sunni world neo-fundamentalists have tended to be “laymen,” and thus possibly not so aware of “the complexity and resources of the past tradition,” as are the ulama. Neo-fundamentalism is basically a function of laymen, many of whom are professionals—lawyers, doctors, engineers. This is considered by Rahman to be the shortcoming, for neo-fundamentalists will get rid of all traditions once they determine “to get rid of traditional encumbrances.”

Rahman assessed that the reaction of neo-fundamentalists against modernists was “healthy” as long as it was intended to correct this “‘Westernist’ aspect of Islamic modernism, not in the sense that Muslims should close the door to the West and Western ideas, “but in the sense that Islam cannot, under any conditions, be simply identified with the West.” Unfortunately, however, neo-fundamentalists had gone to the other extreme by discarding all theses of modernists except their acceptance on the premise that Islam is related to all aspects of life.

A Problematic Term

Some scholars deem the expression “Islamic fundamentalism” unsatisfactory, given that the word “fundamentalism” originated from another cultural context (American Protestantism at the beginning of the twentieth century), which is very distant from Islam. For example, what was supposed to set Protestant fundamentalists apart from other Protestants was their conviction that the Bible was the true word of God and that it should be understood literally. Thus, the term “fundamentalism” comes with certain connotations that may be misleading when applied to Is-

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55 Rahman, 1979: 324
56 Rahman, 1979: 324.
Islam. All believing Muslims, however, are expected to regard the Qur'an as the literal and reliable word of God, and such a principle lies at the very core of Islam. Seen from this perspective, therefore, all Muslims are "fundamentalists" because they believe that the Qur'an is "a verbatim record of God's revelations to Prophet Muhammad."56

Some may argue that Islamic fundamentalists are Muslims who want to go back to "the fundamentals" of their faith. Such an argument, however, is weak because the vast majority of Muslims agree on the fundamental creed of their faith. In addition, those usually referred to as "Islamic fundamentalists" do not, in fact, go back to the "fundamentals" of Islam. Instead, they selectively accentuate some of those presumed fundamentals while underestimating others. Furthermore, within their supposed "fundamentalist thought," those elements that are selected from the sacred tradition are very often amalgamated with ideas and practices that have no clear link with the Islamic past. It is also problematic that fundamentalism suggests a monolithic movement, whereas one should really speak of "fundamentalisms" because fundamentalist thought is diverse and its modes of expression extremely varied. And, most importantly, to a certain extent Islamic fundamentalists do not necessarily claim to have a political project and do not enter the political arena. Highlighted from this perspective, the term "fundamentalism" is not well-suited to "analyzing those movements that use Islamic referents to wage political battles." To explain this phenomenon and to refer to hybrid ideologies that combine concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition and ideas that are more particularly modern, scholars have come to use instead the expressions "Islamism" or "political Islam."57

3.1.2.3. Islamism or Political Islam

The term "Islamism" is relatively new. It was coined during the 1970s to refer to the increase of movements and ideologies drawing on Islamic referents--terms, symbols and events taken from the Islamic tradition--in

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57 Denoeux, 2002:58.
58 Denoeux, 2002:58.
order to articulate a distinctly political agenda. Hence, the expression "political Islam", which is seen as synonymous with Islamism.\(^6^0\)

The Islamism project provides an all-inclusive assessment of the existing order. It enthusiastically challenges and desires to change the existing order. "It addresses the social, political, economic and cultural challenges faced by contemporary Muslim societies and claims to provide solutions to them." It makes a more or less sustained and persuasive effort to reflect on what an "Islamic economy" or "Islamic society" might look like. In short, Islamism may be defined as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition."\(^6^1\)

It is instructive to uncover the general character of Islamism. Denoeux describes the defining character of Islamist movements, organizations and ideologies as "their two-sided relation to modernity and the West." On one side, at the heart of Islamist ideology exist a powerful and wide-ranging evaluation of the West and criticism of what Islamists see as "the corrupting political and cultural influence of the West on Middle Eastern societies." The Islamists' dependence on concepts drawn from the Islamic tradition also indicates a wish to abandon Western terminology.\(^6^2\)

On the other side, Denoeux explains, Islamism is a definitely modern phenomenon in at least two significant aspects: the profile of its leaders and its reliance on Western technology. It is said that the cadres and ideologues of Islamist movements have been products of the modern secular educational system in Western Europe or North America. The Islamists also rely on the Western modern technology, such as the internet, cellular phones etc., in order to achieve their goals.\(^6^3\) Considering its character, Hizbut Tahrir might best be put in this category.

**Islamism versus fundamentalism**

Islamism and fundamentalism share certain characteristics but they differ in several key aspects. Denoeux points out that they are the same in

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\(^6^0\) Denoeux, 2002:58. See also Martin Kramer, 2003, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?" *The Middle East Quarterly*, 10:2. Internet.

<http://www.meforum.org/article/541>

\(^6^1\) Denoeux, 2002:58.

\(^6^2\) Denoeux, 2002:61.

\(^6^3\) Denoeux, 2002:62.
"an idealized view of early Islamic history, a desire to restore the original purity of the faith, and the call for a return to a strict interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna." However, they clearly differ from each other on several issues. To put it shortly, Islamism is much more engaged in politics. To them Islam is "more a political blueprint than a faith, and the Islamist discourse is to a large extent a political discourse in religious garb", while fundamentalists are typically concerned primarily with ideas and religious exegesis. Fundamentalists are more concerned with issues of morality and personal behavior, or with theological issues. Islamists, on the other hand, are more concerned on the capture of the state or the Islamization of society, and "aim to bring about a radical transformation of political, social and economic relations within modern society."

Other aspects in which Islamists and fundamentalists differ, are their attitudes toward the shari'ā (Islamic law) and women.44 Fundamentalists insist on the strict implementation of the shari'ā and argue that all laws should be based exclusively on it. They believe it is the only way of making society more truly Islamic. Meanwhile, Islamists, although in favor of an Islamization of laws, have a different opinion. To them "full implementation of the shari'ā makes sense only after a genuinely Islamic order has been created (through the capture of political power)". In short, what distinguishes fundamentalists and Islamists on this issue is the question as to "the most effective way of making individuals" more "virtuous."45

3.1.3. LIBERAL ISLAM

3.1.3.1. Islamic Modernism

Islamic modernist reform became visible in the Muslim world in the mid-nineteenth century.66 Unlike revivalist (fundamentalist) movement such as Wahhabism that did not deal with Western culture but driven by internal conditions of Muslim societies, Islamic modernist reform was inspired, influenced and challenged by Western ideas. It addressed problems from Muslim societies as well as from Western culture.

66 Denoeux, 2002:63-64.
45 Rahman, 1979-319.
Islamic Modernism: Its figures and characteristics.

Islamic modernist reforms in the Muslim world were initiated by figures such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d.1898) in India, Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d.1897) in Afghanistan, and Muhammad ‘Abduh (d.1905) in Egypt. These modernists assumed that the bases of their reform had already been created by the revivalists (Wahhabism) in the previous century. This is the case, because Ahmad Khan had come from a revivalist background, while Afghani and ‘Abduh were heirs to the Muslim tradition of rational philosophy.⁶⁷

One of the characteristics of modernism is the view that Islam “provides an ideological base for public life.” As a consequence of this view, the modernists tend to put emphasis on the flexibility of Islam and to use this flexibility to interpret Islam in terms harmonious with one or more Western ideologies. This condition would lead Muslims to reopen the “gate of ijtihad” and to keep them from taqlid and relying on the “medieval synthesis” represented by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Then, in order to obtain a fresh interpretation and synthesis for modern times Muslims must go back directly to the Qur’an and hadith. Like revivalists, modernists also insisted on removing superstition from local cultures.⁶⁸

The modernist reform was in line with revivalist (fundamentalist) in terms of supporting ijtihad and rejecting taqlid. The difference is that the modernists extended the content of ijtihad based on the problems facing Muslim societies. The mental environment of modernists was also different from that of fundamentalists. Modernists engaged their mind with nature of reason and its relation to faith. Unlike fundamentalists, these modernists had been in contact with Western thought and society. Consequently, they had also been exposed to certain ideas coming from the West. They were occupied with issues such as the status of women in society and modernizing the educational system. Reform in politics, such as constitutional and representative forms of government, also became the concern of modernists.⁶⁹

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In the effort of reinterpreting Islam modernists employed a different method than revivalists. The modernists based their reinterpretation of Islam just on the Qur'an and on the "historical Sunna" and not on the "technical Sunna." In general, modernists relied little on hadith, partly because they found contradictions in hadith on certain points, and partly because sometimes it is incompatible with Qur'an. Among the modernists, Sayyid Ahmad Khan was said to be extreme in refusing hadith, and Muhammad 'Abduh was reported to be very cautious in using hadith. This kind of attitude is quite different from the attitude of the revivalists who put hadith almost at the same level as the Qur'an. The other thing is that the revivalists, as in the case of Wahhabism, tend to assign authority to the consensus of early generations (al-Salaf), while the modernists tend to reject authoritativeness in traditional Islam.¹

It is important to mention that modernism achieves flexibility in three main ways. Firstly, modernists had a strong tendency to confine "the specific and detailed content of the authoritative tradition as much as possible by limiting it to the Qur'an and the authentic Sunnah and then possibly limiting the latter by a radical hadith criticism." This tendency does not mean that modernists ignore the later tradition but it is used very selectively.² This could be seen as the kind of flexible approach modernists stand for.

Secondly, modernists gave a more or less radical reinterpretation to the authoritative sources. This reinterpretation concerned predominantly the Qur'anic texts on the hadd punishment, polygamy, jihad, and the treatment of unbelievers, which were seen to be in disagreement with "modern" views. It is said that in some cases modernist reinterpretations find considerable support in the text. For example, in the issue of hadd, the argument is forwarded that it requires four witnesses to an adultery allegation. This may lead to the cancellation of the hadd in practice. Regarding polygamy an argument was found that "the Qur'anic permission of four wives is conditioned on the ability of the husband to treat them fairly, which ability is denied by another passage." Another argument states that "the Qur'an at legal level limited the number of wives to four but affirmed monogamy as an ideal toward which the community should

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¹ Rahman made a differentiation between "historical sunna", that is, "the biography of the Prophet as it shows his historical conduct" and the "technical sunna", that is, the one "as contained in Hadith works".
strive.” Concerning jihad, modernists tend to interpret it as defensive war, and regarding the treatment of the unbeliever they emphasize on “the texts that call for tolerance.” These all underscore that shari’ah is flexible. It allows polygamy because the situation sometimes requires it, but “provide a clear impetus toward monogamy.”73 Thirdly, modernists developed an apologetic thinking which links Western ideas and practices with aspects of Islamic tradition. This kind of thinking may assert that “the Western practices in question were originally derived from Islam”, for example, in the identification of modern democracy with Islamic “shura”.74 This apologetic may be regarded by some as being not merely “a matter of identification”; because Islam is considered superior to other ideologies it can add “a spiritual dimension to what in the West is a purely materialist institution.” Nevertheless, many scholars have attacked the apologetic attitude of modernists as “superficial, tendentious, and even psychologically destructive.”75

Rahman sees the modernist effort to create a link between Western concepts and institutions, such as democracy, women’s status and education, and Islamic tradition as a creative one. He gives his credit to the modernists for this creativity and considers it a great attainment. The modernists’ use of the Qur’anic verses on egalitarianism and justice, for example, Rahman views as contributing to the reception of a democratic system. Likewise, the attention paid to women and to the guideline of relationships between the sexes is claimed to have “direct relevance for human welfare in general and the increasing role of women in today’s Muslim society.” Then, on the subject of monogamy, in which modernists had been attacked by neo-fundamentalists and conservatives as blatantly “sacrificing Islam to the Western social values”, their treatment of the Qur’anic teaching is seen by Rahman as “original” and “valid”. Thus, despite their apologetic the modernists have been of great service to Islam and Muslim societies.76

Modernist reforms in Muslim society, such as the one pioneered by Jamaluddin al-Afgani are often referred to as “Salafi”. Al-Afghani strug-
gled to reform Islam in order to adapt it to the challenge of colonization and westernization. Al-Afghani’s call to return to the true tenet of Islam was intended to criticize the backwardness of the religious establishment and not to demand the implementation of shari’a. In fact, the contemporary Salafi movements have little in common with their forerunners, but much in common with Wahhabism, which is fundamentalist in nature.77

3.1.3.2. Neo-Modernism

Islamic neo-modernism was proposed by Fazlur Rahman as a method for Muslims to perform *ijtihad* more comprehensively and systematically, as a correction to efforts of *ijtihad* encouraged by earlier modernists, which suffered from two weaknesses, namely (1) a lack of explanation of its method and the implications of its basic principles, and (2) their engagement with specific issues which became issues in and for the West.

The modernists have, in fact, played a double role, as reformists vis-à-vis the Muslim society and as apologetic vis-à-vis the West. Such a position might prevent modernism from embarking on a systematic and comprehensive interpretation of Islam, and, instead of that, it engages specific issues that are important in the West, such as democracy and the status of women in society, which offered by the West to be adopted in Muslim societies. As a result, modernists were accused of being “Westernized and Westernizer” by the neo-fundamentalists.78

Rahman maintained that the *ijtihad* that Muslims should practice must not “piecemeal and ad hoc”, but “systematic, comprehensive, and long range.” Instead of an *ijtihad* of a single person, it should be “multiple efforts of thinking minds—some naturally better than others, and some better than others in various areas—that confront each other in an open arena of debate, resulting eventually in an overall consensus,” since this is the way of *ijtihad* carried out by earlier generations of Islam, and the only way open to Muslim now.79

To avoid arbitrary *ijtihad* Muslims must establish “a sound methodology” for interpreting the Qur’an and the Sunna, as Rahman puts it,

The moral teachings should be systematized first, on the basis of both the general principles stated explicitly in the Qur’an and those that lie embed-

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78 Rahman, 1979: 324.

79 Rahman, 1979: 325.
ded in the legal enunciations of the Qur’an, [...] Then, the actual legal prescriptions of the Qur’an should be understood and interpreted in the light of these moral teachings in order to derive systematic legislation from the Qur’an.

It is equally important to keep in view the socio background in order to see how these moral objectives and principles were concretely embodied in legislative form in the Qur’an. Then, the present situation has to be studied just as conscientiously and precisely in order to determine where it differs from the situation of the Qur’anic legislation and where it is the same. The final step shall be to interpret the Qur’anic legislation—through the process of understanding outlined here—to yield new laws for the present situation.80

Rahman affirms that this is exactly what is meant by the rule of analogical reasoning (qiṣṣaṣ). He laments those who have misunderstood the legal dictum “ijtihad shall cover new situations and not those covered by the Qur’an and the Sunna”. This slogan is often misinterpreted by Muslim who claim that ijtihad cannot be applied to issues that had been covered in the Qur’an, such as the question of the value of women’s evidence. Rahman explains that “the law must be interpreted not only in light of the moral objectives and principles of the Qur’an, but also in terms of the change of the social situation.”81

However, because these conditions have not always been met, many issues in the Qur’an can be misunderstood. Many Muslims do not really understand what the riba was historically, why the Qur’an denounced it as a cruel form of exploitation and forbade it, or what the function of bank interest is today. Thus, according to Rahman, the big challenge confronting Muslims today is “how to recover Islam from the debris of history and make it a living force not only among Muslims but in the world at large.”82

Criticizing fundamentalists (like the Wahhabis) and neo-fundamentalists (like the Muslim Brotherhood), who command the performance of ijtihad on the basis of the Qur’an, Rahman suggests studying the Qur’an “in its total and specific background” and not “verse by verse” separated from its context.83 By this method Rahman reconstructs a more

81 Rahman, 1979: 326.
critical and contextual interpretation and understanding of Islam based on a systematic study of Islam in a historical context. The method developed by Rahman is known in Islam as neo-modernism. It is shared by many Muslims and in its later development it is known and identified as liberal Islam or Islamic liberalism.84

3.1.3.3. Islamic Liberalism

The term liberalism in this discussion does not signify what it commonly does in social or political terms, but liberalism in the context of Islamic thought in the Muslim world. In modern times there have been a number of liberal movements in Islam. In general, these movements designate religious outlooks which depend largely on *ijtihad* or the reinterpretation of scriptures. Liberal Muslims interpret the Qur'an and hadith from their personal perspective. Liberal Muslims claim that they go back to the principles of the early Muslim community, arguing that the medievalists have diverged from true Islam through their focus on the literal word rather than the ethical purpose of scripture.

The term “liberal Islam” was coined by Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee (1899-1981)85 in his book *A Modern Approach to Islam* (1963). In this book, Fyzee strongly endorses a critical reinterpretation and reexamination of *sharia* (Islamic law) and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) to make them relevant to contemporary modern life. He named this new trend “liberal Islam”; as he puts it, “We need not bother about nomenclature, but if some name has to be given to it, let us call it ‘Liberal Islam’.”87 The term has become more familiar to western audiences after Leonard Binder88 pub-


85 In this study the terms “Islamic liberalism” and “Liberal Islam” are used interchangeably and intended to denote the same meaning.

86 An Indian-born jurist, Fyzee was professor of law, and former Vice Chancellor of the University of Jammu and Kashmir as well as a former visiting professor at Cambridge University and the University of California Los Angeles.


88 Leonard Binder is an internationally known specialist on Middle East politics and Islamic political thought at UCLA. He is a founding member and has served as President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA).
lished his book *Islamic Liberalism* in 1988. Binder uses the term “Islamic liberalism” or “liberal Islam” interchangeably. For him, all traditions in the interpretation of Islam, which are based on human reasoning or rational discourse, can be labeled Islamic liberalism. In contrary to the traditionalists, who perceive the language of the Qur’an as the basis for absolute knowledge of the world, Islamic liberals believe that “the language of the Qur’an is coordinate with the essence of revelation, but the content and meaning of revelation is not essentially verbal.” The liberals are of the opinion that Muslims should strive to understand what is beyond and what is represented by the revelation, because not all meanings of the revelation are encompassed by the words of the Qur’an. Liberal Muslims tend to refuse *taqlid* (blind following) of earlier Muslim doctrines and to answer the challenges of modernity with *Ijtihād* (creative interpretation) based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

Charles Kurzman, in elucidating the variations within the Islamic liberalist tradition, proposes three different modes of liberal Islam. The first mode is the “liberal *shari’a*”, which “holds that the *shari’a* is itself liberal, if interpreted properly.” Kurzman believes that this mode is the most influential form of liberal Islam, as it is derived solidly from orthodox Islamic sources, based on the argument that the liberal position is also divine command, and a powerful rhetorical strategy by which to resolve the inferiority of Muslim vis-à-vis Western society.

The second mode is the “silent *shari’a*” which argues that *shari’a* lacks explanation on some topics. The fact that *shari’a* is silent on certain topics does not mean that divine revelation is incomplete, but that it left room intentionally for humans to choose. In this mode, the argument against the idea of Islamic states is based on the fact that “of some 6000 Qur’anic verses, only 200 have a legal aspect” and “the Qur’an does not dictate the adoption of any particular form of government.” Anponent of this mode is ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, who rejected the notion that promotes the caliphate as the religious regime, arguing that Islam does not specify any form of government and therefore allows Muslims to establish democratic government.

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The third mode is the “interpreted shari’a.” This is the one closest to Western liberal thinking as it “holds that the shari’a is mediated by human interpretation.” Based on the belief that the shari’a is divine, but that human interpretation is fallible, proponents of this mode argue that interpretation and re-interpretation of shari’a is a must for the good of Muslims, as “the Qur’an is malleable, capable of many types of interpretation.” They also argue that variation in the interpretation of shari’a is the hallmark of the Islamic tradition and useful for the development of Muslim communities, and that the proper understanding of religious truths can be achieved best through dialogue. An example of this mode can be found in the work of Hassan Hanafi, who wrote that “there is no one interpretation of a text, but there are many interpretations given the difference in understanding between various interpreters.” This third mode suggests that religious diversity is inevitable, not just among religious communities but also within Islam itself.

Among the issues with which Islamic liberals are concerned, one finds: refusing theocracy, promoting democracy and separating religion from the state, championing women’s rights, encouraging freedom of thought, defending the rights of non-Muslims, and promoting human progress. In brief, the argument forwarded in each issue is that both the Muslim and religious piety itself would benefit from reforms and a more open society.

The discussion about the form of government has generated much debate among Muslim intellectuals. Unlike fundamentalists who maintain that democracy contradicts Islam, liberal Muslims tend to argue that Islam is compatible with democracy. Bassam Tibi, a moderate liberal scholar, rejects the notion of Hakimiyyat Allah or the concept of Islamic state as an authentic Islamic concept, as it cannot be found in the Qur’an and hadith. As an Islamic state is not a genuine Islamic formula, he favored the democratic system. Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) argued

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98 Nurcholish Madjid is a key advocate of pluralism and moderation in Indonesia. He obtained his Ph.D. in Islamic studies from the University of Chicago USA in 1984. He was founder and rector of the University of Paramadina in Jakarta, an Islamic institution open to all.
that the idea of an Islamic state is driven by an inferiority complex.\textsuperscript{99} Hamid Enayat also points out the possibility of synthesis between Islam and democracy for the benefit of Muslim societies.\textsuperscript{100} Liberal Muslims maintain that the Islamic concepts of shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), and ijithad as the three most important elements of Islam in its relation to democracy.\textsuperscript{101}

Liberal Muslims also maintain that the Qur’an guarantees a number of individual freedoms, such as hurrirah al-ra’y (freedom of opinion), hurrirah al-qaww (freedom of speech), hurrirah al-takfir (freedom of thought), and hurrirah al-ta’bir (freedom of expression or interpretation).\textsuperscript{102} Nurcholish Madjid noticed that the freedom to think and to express one’s opinion is the most valuable among the freedoms of individuals, referring to the saying of the Prophet that differences of opinion among the Muslim community are the mercy of God.\textsuperscript{103}

Concerning women’s rights in Islam, liberal Muslims reject the views generally held by conservatives and fundamentalists. Fatima Mernissi\textsuperscript{104}, for example, argues that “the Qur’an and other Islamic sources have systematically misinterpreted the subject of the position of women.” She brilliantly examined the hadith, “Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity!” According to Mernissi, this hadith was attributed to Abu Bakra (d.671 CE), who held a high position in Basra, and reported it 25 years after the Prophet’s death. There was no other source for it. Mernissi argues that, although this hadith was included in Imam Bukhori’s collection, it is suspect for two reasons. Firstly, when placed in context, Abu Bakra’s relation of the hadith seems self-serving. He was trying to save his life after the Battle of the Camel, when “all those who had not chosen to join ‘Ali’s clan had to justify their action.


\textsuperscript{100} Hamid Enayat, 1982. Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 126. Enayat was Professor of Political Science at Tehran University where he chaired the Department of Politics.


\textsuperscript{103} Madjid in Kurzman, ed., 1998:287.

\textsuperscript{104} Fatima Mernissi (Morocco, 1940) is a feminist and sociologist, formerly professor at the University of Mohammed V in Morocco.
This can explain why a man like Abu Bakra needed to recall opportune traditions, his record far from satisfactory, as he had refused to take part in the civil war. ...[Although] many of the Companions and inhabitants of Basra chose neutrality in the conflict, only Abu Bakra justified it by the fact that one of the parties was a woman."

Secondly, Abu Bakra had once been flogged for giving false testimony in a court case. According to the rules of hadith scholarship laid out by Imam Malik ibn Anas, one of the founders of the science of hadith studies, lying disqualifies a source from being counted as a reliable transmitter of hadith. Mernissi suggests that "if one follows the principles of Malik for fiqh, Abu Bakra must be rejected as a source of hadith by every good, well-informed Maliki Muslim." In this respect Mernissi has shown that the hadith is misogynistic. In fact, many misogynistic hadith have been lifted out of their context by Muslims to support their position against female competitors in the political and social arena. Although some Muslim countries have had women heads of state, this fact does not do justice to the extent to which Muslim women have been marginalized from the Muslim public sphere.

There is a growing awareness among Muslims of the need for peaceful multi-religious co-existence, which can be called Islamic liberalism. It should be added here that liberal Islam, although it is still a minority view and often accused of being treason and inauthentic—mainly by fundamentalists—seems to be growing in the Muslim societies.

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107 Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Khalida Zia of Bangladesh, and Megawati Sukarnoputri of Indonesia are the best examples of this.
108 M.A. Muqtedar Khan, 2002, American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom, Bestville, Maryland: Amana Publication, p. 90. Khan also suggests producing more women scholars who can eventually understand and advance their own understanding of Islamic sources, since the interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith and Islamic juristic traditions are based on a masculine perspective. See Khan, 2002: 89.
109 Looking back at the history of Islamic thought in Muslim society, one finds many Muslim intellectuals became victims because of their creative and liberal thinking, such as Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, Hassan Hanafi, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid in Egypt, Fadzur Rahman in Pakistan, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Nurcolish Madjid in Indonesia. The most recent example is the case of Ull Abshar-Abdalla, a young Muslim intellectual from Nahdatul Ulama (NU) in Indonesia and coordinator of Jaringan Islam Liberal/JIL (the Liberal Islam Network),
3.1.4. Secularism

Secularism became visible because of the pressure of conservatism and Islamic modernism. Secularism in Islam is "the acceptance of laws and other social and political institutions without reference to Islam, i.e. without being derived from, or organically linked with, the principles of the Qur'an and the Sunna." The term "secularism" is applied to "any view that would openly follow an ideology other than Islam in most areas of public life." Today, secular outlooks and actions are a major reality in the Muslim world, since the real mechanisms of the governmental institutions in all Muslim countries are secular. Secularism is not uniform. It can be radical or moderate. Radical secularism tends to substitute Islam in all areas of private as well as public life. An example of this type can be found in Marxist Albania, where the constitution practically makes no reference to religion and the government has closed mosques and churches. Moderate secularism, which is more influential, tends to separate religion from all areas of public life, including politics. The adopted ideology is generally nationalism. In the constitution of a moderate secularism, "Islam is not the religion of state and sovereignty is not vested in God but in the 'nation' or the 'people'". Turkey, which in 1928 removed from its constitution the clause that made Islam the religion of state, is the best example of this type. Another example of moderate secularism can be found in the Indonesian constitution, which affirms belief in "One, Supreme Divinity" as the first point of its "Five Principle" (Pancasila), but not Islam. Shepard labels the Turkish type as "neutral secularism" and the Indonesian type "religious secularism".

It is worth noting that in the area of legal reform, secularism has substituted the sharia in all aspects of public law with other codes (of Western origin) and has made "citizens of all religions in principle equal before who received death threats resulting from a fatwa issued by a Bandung-based group of Muslim clerics called Forum Ulama Umat Indonesi/PUUI (the Indonesian People's Ulama Forum), who regarded his liberal views as insulting to Prophet Muhammad and Islam. See Ulil Abshar-Abdalla et al, 2003, Islam Liberal & Fundamental: Sebuah Pertarungan Wacana [Liberal Islam and Fundamental: A Battle of Discourse], Yogyakarta: Elsag Press.

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law", such as in the Turkish legal reform of the 1920s. In fact, other Muslim countries have also done the same thing in many areas, excluding those which are more "sensitive" such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. This is also considered "secularism" as far as "it establishes substantial areas where Sharia does not apply."\(^{114}\)

Concerning the motives of adopting secularism, there are two possibilities. The first motive "involves a concern for 'progress' and national strength." This corresponds to the Turkish type. The other motive is "a concern for national unity where there is a significant non-Muslim minority." This corresponds to the Indonesian type.\(^{115}\)

Shepard maintains that to speak of secularism as "separation" of religion from public life is misleading. This is so because, according to him, "Muslim secularism has not involved a separation of 'mosque' and state in the pattern of the American separation of church and state." In reality, secularist governments support and control religious teaching and institutions. They also appreciate Islam as cultural heritage and a necessary component of the national identity. Basically, Shepard emphasizes, "secularism has meant state control of religion and state effort to use religion in the service of its nationalist and developmental goals."\(^{116}\)

3.1.5. Conclusion

From the elaboration and discussion presented above some conclusions can be drawn on the following points. In the history of religiosity of Muslim communities, several trends have developed. These trends have not arisen in a vacuum circumstance, but rather were influenced by several factors, both internal (such as decadence in religious practices) and external (such as the introduction and adoption of new ideas and institutions from Western culture). All these factors have significantly contributed to the embodiment of certain trends or movements. Broadly speaking, Muslims, in understanding and expressing their religiosity in relation to both personal and public life, are discerned into three big tendencies, as Shepard points out:

1. Those who tend to reject Islam as reference or guide, and even as "religion" in public life. This is best represented by secularism.

\(^{114}\) Shepard, 1987:310.

\(^{115}\) Shepard, 1987:310

\(^{116}\) Shepard, 1987:310
2. Those who accept Islam as religion but reject it as guide to public life. This is clearly symbolized by modernism.
3. Those who insist that Islam is both religion and ideology governing all aspects of life. This is best characterized by fundamentalism, neofundamentalism and Islamism or Political Islam.
3.2. METHODOLOGY AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED

3.2.1. Methodology

First of all, it should be mentioned that for practical purposes in this discussion I employ the term "scholars of the IIIT" or "the IIIT scholars" to refer to all scholars who have contributed to the IIIT publications. It should be made clear here that the IIIT scholars cannot be seen as one unit of individual scholars working together on the same level. Instead, they work on different levels of capacities and contributions. For practical reasons, I have divided the IIIT scholars into three categories, as I have explained in chapter two, i.e. the classification of the contributors. The three categories, as has been explained, are key figures, regular and occasional contributors. Details on who they are have also been presented in that chapter. In order to find out and justify the standpoint of the IIIT in the context of Islamic trends in modern Islam, opinions of the IIIT scholars from these three categories on each selected issue will be investigated and analyzed.

3.2.2. Justification of the issues to be examined

For the purpose of this study I have chosen three topics or issues to be examined. The selected issues are: (1) the Islamization of knowledge, (2) democracy and the implementation of the shari'ah, and (3) Muslim/non-Muslim relations. I have chosen these three important topics or issues because in my opinion they are quite representative of the type of Islamic traditions (traditionalist, liberal or fundamentalist) the IIIT scholars have adopted and intend to promote. This should be enough in order to be able to define their place on the map of Islamic trends in modern Islam. The first issue, i.e. the notion of Islamization of knowledge, is chosen because it has become the slogan of the IIIT; therefore, I consider it important to investigate it intensely. For the second and the third issues, I was inspired by discussions in Charles Kurzman's Liberal Islam. They have also been somewhat discussed to some degree in my presentation of the typology of Islamic trends. The choice of the three topics is explained in detail below.

3.2.2.1. The Islamization of Knowledge

The IIIT is famous for its program of the Islamization of knowledge, therefore it is important to analyze in depth the perspective of the IIIT
scholars concerning this issue. The IIIT has invested a lot of energy to popularize and propagate the program of Islamization of knowledge. A large number of books and articles pertaining to this subject have been produced, and numerous seminars at the institutional, national and international levels concerning this issue have been organized. In addition, the agenda of the Islamization of knowledge has been made known to a large audience of scholars by the IIIT. Furthermore, concepts or ideas contained in the literature concerning the issue of the Islamization of knowledge can be studied to discover the tendency of the IIIT scholars in interpreting or presenting their perspectives on Islam. This will enable us to determine their position on the map of Islamic trends within modern Islam (traditionalist, revivalist or liberal Islam). Therefore, it is worthwhile to discuss this issue in depth.

3.2.2.2. Democracy and Implementation of the Shari‘ah

Intellectuals from the revivalist tradition oppose the adoption of a Western style of democracy by Muslim countries, since it is seen as secular by nature. They prefer to promote the concept of shura (consultation) which, according to them, is more Islamic because it is rooted in the legacy of Islam. For revivalists the concepts of shura is not the same as democracy, therefore they condemn modernists and liberals who equalize modern democracy with Islamic shura (see 3.1.2.2.). Meanwhile, modernists with an apologetic approach tend to link Western concepts and practices with aspects of the Islamic tradition, such as the identification of modern democracy with Islamic shura (see 3.1.3.1.). In the viewpoint of the liberals shura does not mean merely consultation but the legislative power of representative bodies. Some liberals go further by criticizing that the concept of shura by itself is vague and provides insufficient justification for democratic practices. In the early period of Islam, it only prescribed shura (consultation) as a method for making a choice. Now, the Muslim ummah should be able to exercise its free will in choosing the ruler. The actual procedure is left for the community to determine, and may therefore differ from time to time and from one place to another. It is obvious that disagreements exist among the Muslim intellectuals in approaching this problem. It is of crucial importance to investigate the stance of the IIIT scholars in this matter, to verify whether they support modern democracy, like the modernists and liberals do, or whether they oppose it as the revivalists do.
The issue of implementation of shari'ah has provoked intense debate among Muslim intellectuals. Scholars from the revivalist tradition, i.e. neo-fundamentalists (see 3.1.2.2.) believed that the shari'ah is not only an ideal to be known and admired by Muslims, but more than that a law which must be put into effect. Therefore, they insist upon the imposition of the shari'ah law by the state. This would lead to the establishment of theocracy. Such a contention however, is rejected by scholars from the liberal tradition. In the opinion of Muslim liberal thinkers, the Qur'an emphasizes only a just society and not an ideological state; the form of state is left for human construction (see 3.1.3.3.). Therefore, Muslims should regard the Qur'an as a moral construction rather than a code of law. In addition, the liberals regard those who call for the implementation of shari'ah law as misunderstanding the status of shari'ah. Shari'ah is understood as a path, not a ready-made system of law, which is waiting to be practiced. The revivalists' reducing of Islamic law to a handful of symbolic elements, such as outlawing usury, is seen by liberals as removing the context which provided its original justification. Meanwhile, although with different motivations, the traditionalists tend to be in line with liberals in terms that they do not intend to put shari'ah into practice in daily life (see 3.1.1.2.).

Thus, the issue of the implementation of shari'ah by the state is no doubt an interesting topic. For these reasons it is singled out for examination in this discussion. The outlook of the IIIT scholars pertaining to this subject must be explored to determine what their position is. Do they support the imposition of the shari'ah law, as the revivalists do? If so, what is the reason behind this? Or, are they against the implementation of the shari'ah law, and do they prefer a secular state system, as the liberals do? If so, what arguments do they put forward?

3.2.2.3. Muslim/Non-Muslim Relations

In an open, pluralistic and multi-religious society the issue of inter-religious relations has become a crucial concern which is fiercely debated among Muslims, be they intellectuals or common people. Among the intellectuals there will always be disputes about how to deal with non-Muslims. Scholars from the liberal tradition prefer to construct arguments around the more general Islamic themes of tolerance and diversity, and maintain that discrimination based on religion is unwarranted (see 3.1.3.3.). They tend to challenge intolerant elements of the shari'ah, specifically on the penalty for apostasy. However, scholars from revivalism
tradition regard the issue differently. As discussed earlier (see 3.1.2.2.), Mawdudi and Qutb, two prominent neo-fundamentalist thinkers, tend to be uncompromising on the issue of non-Muslim minorities. They insist upon defending the Islamic stipulation for the dhimmī status. Mawdudi even attacks the principle of “equality before the law” as a shame for Muslims. Today, the uncompromising attitude of the revivalist scholars is practiced by many militant Islamists, not only in dealing with the issue of inter-religious dialogue but also in inter-Islamic dialogue.

It goes without saying that in dealing with the issue of Muslim/Non-Muslim relations the opinion and the stance of Muslim intellectuals cannot be called homogenous. It will be interesting to establish the opinion of the IIIT scholars concerning this matter. Through their publications, I intend to investigate their perspectives and arguments. This will lead to a conclusion as to whether their position, in this particular aspect, is closer to the liberal tradition or revivalist tradition.
3.3. EXAMINATION OF THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE IIIT SCHOLARS ON THE SELECTED ISSUES

First of all, it should be mentioned here that it is impossible to examine every IIIT scholar regarding each specific issue, for they may have different interests (for instance, the interest of scholar A may be in economics and, therefore, his contributions to the IIIT publications deal only with economic issues, i.e. bank interest and *riba*; this scholar will be excluded when examining political issues, such as democracy and *shura*, etc., and so on). Thus, the examination is applied only to the scholars who addressed the particular issue under concern. The presentation is arranged according to the division of IIIT scholars into key figures, regular contributors and occasional contributors.

3.3.1. Perspectives of the IIIT Scholars on the Issue of Islamization of Knowledge

In the following paragraphs I will elucidate the perceptions of the IIIT scholars concerning the idea of Islamization of knowledge or Islamization of disciplines. The discussion will examine the ideas on this topic presented in the IIIT publications either by key figures, regular contributors or occasional contributors. The idea of the Islamization of knowledge in general or the Islamization of specific disciplines in particular has been promoted intensely by the IIIT since its inception in 1981. It is important, therefore, to examine its nature and to study what kind of civilization the IIIT intends to project by this enterprise. Specific questions raised in this discussion are: (1) what is their viewpoint concerning the notion of the Islamization of knowledge in general, or the Islamization of specific disciplines in particular? (2) Why is it necessary to Islamize knowledge? What is the reason behind it? (3) What kind of civilization is going to be achieved or idealized by projecting such a notion? These questions are vital in order to discover the IIIT scholars’ attitude on the issues concerned.

3.3.1.1. Viewpoints of the key figures

Al-Faruqi can be considered to be the strongest proponent of the Islamization of knowledge movement. In his view, Islamization of knowledge can be described as re-conceiving and rebuilding the modern disciplines (humanities, social and natural sciences), by providing them with a new foundation consistent with Islam. He confirms the necessity of Islamizing knowledge, when he says: “[a]s disciplines, the humanities, the social sci-
ences and the natural sciences must be re-conceived and rebuilt, given a new Islamic base and assigned new purposes consistent with Islam. Every discipline must be recast so to embody the principles of Islam in its methodology, in its strategy, in what it regards as its data, its problems, its objectives, and its aspirations. 

Furthermore, he suggests that every discipline must be “remolded” to incorporate the “relevance” of Islam along a triple axis constitutive of tawhid, namely (1) the unity of knowledge, (2) the unity of life, and (3) the unity of history. By doing so he hopes there will be no more categorization of sciences into aqlī (rational) and naqlī (traditional), value-full and value-free, and individual and social sciences. These methodological categories of Islam, he urges, must replace the Western categories and determine the perception of reality. Likewise, he maintains that the Western values should be replaced by the values of Islam in every aspect of the learning activity. The Islamic values concern: “(a) the usefulness of knowledge for man’s felicity, (b) the blossoming of his faculties, (c) the remolding of creation so as to crystallize the Divine patterns and values of Islam, (d) the building of culture and civilization, (e) the building of human milestones in knowledge and wisdom, heroism and virtue, piety and righteousness.”

Al-Faruqi suggests that because Islam is relevant to all aspects of life, this relevance must be reflected in the textbooks of each discipline. Therefore, for him, the Islamization of knowledge involves producing university level textbooks for each discipline to be Islamized. Fundamentally, the relevance of Islam to each area of modern thought should be established. If this can be achieved, he writes, then a creative synthesis can be estab-

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1 Al-Faruqi, “Islamization of Knowledge: Problems, Principles and Prospective”, in IIIT, 1998, Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge, Herndon, VA: IIIT, pp. 16-17. The ideas on the Islamization of knowledge were presented in many publications of the IIIT. The monograph Islamization of Knowledge, which is referred to often by later Muslim scholars in developing their own ideas on Islamization, was presented in three editions. The first edition was presented by al-Faruqi and published by the IIIT in 1982. The second edition, which is an expanded and revised version of the first edition and contains new additional materials, was presented by al-Faruqi and AbuSulayman and published by the IIIT in 1989. The third edition has the same contents as the second one, and was presented by AbuSulayman and published by the IIIT in cooperation with International Islamic Publishing House (IIPH) Riyadh Saudi Arabia in 1995. There is still another edition, presented by al-Faruqi alone and published by the Hijra Centenary Committee, Islamabad, Pakistan in 1983. It has the same contents as the first edition. In this study I make use of them all.


lished by "eliminating, amending, reinterpreting and adopting its components as the world view of Islam."\(^4\) Islamizing knowledge or in concrete terms, Islamization of the disciplines, also means producing university-level textbooks recasting the disciplines in accordance with Islamic visions to be used in the Muslim universities.\(^5\) Thus, in al-Faruqi's concept, Islamization of knowledge should include two points: to recast knowledge from the viewpoint of Islam, and to produce textbooks.

In al-Faruqi's opinion, the Muslim ummah is in a state of malaise today, the core of which lies in the prevalent educational system. This malaise can only be treated by an epistemological injection. The ummah, therefore, is advised to give priority to solving the problem of education. He strongly believed that a genuine revival of the Muslim ummah can only be done by correcting its educational system. That is to say, the present dualism in Muslim education, i.e. its division into an Islamic and secular system must be abolished. The two systems must be infused with the spirit of Islam, which must function as an integral part of its ideological program.\(^6\)

Thus, the task confronting the Muslim ummah are firstly to unite the two systems of education and secondly to instill the vision of Islam. Al-Faruqi suggests that Muslim youth should be instilled with the vision of Islam by introducing compulsory study of Islamic civilization. In fact, this point has been raised by other Muslim scholars. However, it is in the "Islamization of modern knowledge", which is part of the whole scheme of revamping the Muslim educational system, that al-Faruqi's contribution comes to fore:

The task of Islamizing knowledge (in concrete terms, to Islamize the disciplines, or better, to produce university level textbooks recasting some twenty disciplines in accordance with the Islamic visions) is also the most difficult. No Muslim has yet contemplated it enough to discern its prerequisites, or to articulate its constitutive steps and measures. All that our previous reformers had thought of was to acquire the knowledge and power of the West. They were not even aware of the conflict of Western knowledge with the vision of Islam. It is our present generation that first discovered the conflict as we lived it in our own intellectual lives. But the spiritual torture the conflict has inflicted upon us caused us to wake up in

\(^4\) Al-Faruqi, 1982:18.
panic, fully aware of the rape of the Islamic soul taking place before our very eyes in the Muslim universities.\footnote{Al-Faruqi, 1982:14}

Al-Faruqi further suggested recasting the whole legacy of human knowledge from the standpoint of Islam, the Islamization of knowledge endeavor. In order to undertake this task he proposed a methodology and a work-plan consisting of twelve steps.

The methodology that al-Faruqi suggested in the interest of Islamizing knowledge are: (1) the unity of Allah, (2) the unity of creation, (3) the unity of truth and the unity of knowledge, (4) the unity of life, and (5) the unity of humanity, which he called the “principles of Islamic methodology”.\footnote{See al-Faruqi, “Islamization of Knowledge: Problems, Principles and Prospective”, in HITT, 1988, *Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge*, pp. 39-49.} It can be understood from al-Faruqi’s conception that to recast the disciplines under the framework of Islam is to subject the theory and the method as well as the principles and goals of the disciplines to the principles of Islam.

However, Al-Faruqi was criticized by Sardar, who regards the principles of methodology proposed by al-Faruqi as pious statements of belief, but not developed enough to provide guidance in the “thorny terrace of the epistemological landscape”, especially when it concerns the assertion of “the unity of Truth and the unity of Knowledge”. Sardar argued that if “Truth” and “Knowledge” are indeed one and the same, as asserted by al-Faruqi and many other Muslim scholars, then Muslims are in trouble, because, as most scientists will admit, there is a great deal of knowledge that could easily be proved false in the near future.\footnote{Ziauddin Sardar, 1985, *Islamic Futures: The Shape to Ideas to Come*, London: Mansell, p. 96.} Sardar’s criticism is not unique, since many scholars who support al-Faruqi also raised the same point.\footnote{See, for instance, Shafiq, 1994.}

As mentioned above, to recast knowledge from the standpoint of Islam or to Islamize modern knowledge, al-Faruqi provided a program of action. His work-plan for the Islamization of knowledge has the following five objectives:

(1) To master the modern disciplines.

(2) To master the Islamic legacy.

(3) To establish the specific relevance of Islam to each area of modern knowledge.
(4) To seek ways for creative synthesis between the legacy and modern knowledge.

(5) To launch Islamic thought on the trajectory which leads it to the fulfillment of the Divine pattern of Allah.11

These objectives are to be achieved by twelve systematic steps which would eventually lead to the Islamization of knowledge. This twelve-step work-plan, according to Masudul Alam Choudhury12, is the "most important" part of al-Faruqi’s Islamization of Knowledge.13 Following the logical order and priority of each step made by al-Faruqi, the twelve-step work-plan is as follows:

Step 1: Mastery of the Modern Discipline: Categories Breakdown. Al-Faruqi asserts that modern disciplines have to be broken down into categories, principles, methodologies, problems and themes—the breakdown reflecting the “table of contents” of the classical textbook.

Step 2: Discipline Survey. Once the categories of the disciplines have been broken down, a state-of-the-art survey should be written on each discipline. This is necessary to ensure that Muslim scholars have mastered each discipline.

Step 3: Mastery of the Islamic Legacy: the Anthology. Islamic legacy has to be mastered in the same way. What is needed here are anthologies on the Muslim heritage pertaining to each discipline.

Step 4: Mastery of the Islamic Legacy: the Analysis. Once the anthologies are prepared, the Islamic legacy has to be analyzed from the perspective of the problems of the present.

Step 5: Establishment of the Specific Relevance of Islam to the Disciplines. This relevance, al-Faruqi asserts, can be established by posing three questions and finding their answers: (1) what was the contribution of the Islamic legacy to the whole range of issues envisaged by the modern discipline, (2) how does the contribution of the Islamic legacy to the discipline contrast with the achievement of the discipline, and (3) given the issues in which the Islamic legacy has given nothing, in which direction may Muslim effort be exerted in order to fill the discrepancy, to formulate the problem and enlarge the vision.14

12 Masudul Alam Choudhury is Professor of Economics, University College of Cape Town, Nova Scotia, Canada.
Step 6: Critical Assessment of the Modern Discipline. Once the relevance of Islam to each discipline has been established, it should be assessed and analyzed from the standpoint of Islam.

Step 7: Critical Assessment of the Islamic Legacy. Similarly, Islamic legacy's contribution in each field of human activity must be analyzed and its contemporary relevance discovered.

Step 8: Survey of the Ummah’s Major Problems. A systematic study must be made of the political, social, economic, intellectual, cultural, moral and spiritual problems of the Muslim people.

Step 9: Survey of the Problems of Humankind. A similar study, this time concentrating on the whole of humanity, should also be made.

Step 10: Creative Analysis and Syntheses. At this stage, Muslim scholars would be ready to synthesize the Islamic legacy and modern disciplines and to “bridge over the gap of centuries of non-development”. From here on the legacy of Islamic learning would “become continuous with the modern achievements and start to move the frontiers of knowledge to more distant horizons than the modern disciplines have envisaged”.

Step 11: Recasting the Disciplines under the Framework of Islam: the University Textbook. Once equivalence between Islamic legacy and modern disciplines has been achieved, university textbooks should be written to recast modern disciplines into Islamic moulds.

Step 12: Dissemination of Islamized Knowledge. The intellectual work produced from the previous steps should be used to awaken, enlighten and enrich humankind. Al-Faruqi suggested that the product of this work-plan be presented to the universities in the Muslim world to be adopted as required readings of instruction. In addition to this work-plan, he also recommended holding conferences and seminars as well as workshop and other necessary aids to the Islamization of knowledge.

For a better understanding of the twelve-step work-plan for the Islamization of knowledge proposed by al-Faruqi, one can have a look at the following schema, as provided by Sardar.

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Twelve-step work-plan for the program of Islamization of knowledge.

1. Mastering Modern Discipline
2. Disciplinary Survey
3. Mastering Islamic Legacy
4. Analysis of Islamic Legacy
5. Establishing Relevance of Islam to Disciplines
6. Assessment of Modern Disciplines
7. Assessment of Islamic Legacy
8. Survey of Ummah’s Problems
9. Survey of Problems of Humankind
10. Analysis and Synthesis
11. Recasting the Disciplines: Textbook
12. Dissemination of Islamized Knowledge

Al-Faruqi’s work-plan for the Islamization of knowledge has received considerable support. In the United States, it has led to the establishment of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Washington, D.C., devoted exclusively to implementing the twelve-step program. Sardar gave credit to al-Faruqi for his vision of conceiving and carrying out such an ambitious program. Unfortunately, Sardar considers al-Faruqi’s program for the Islamization of knowledge “fundamentally flawed and somewhat naive.” Sardar considers the program of Idris as a better one.

Criticism of al-Faruqi’s work-plan

Al-Faruqi was criticized by some scholars for not providing in his Islamization of Knowledge an analysis of secularism or the process of secularism as it evolved in the West. Yasien Mohamed, for instance, states that it is the secular elements in the discipline which make it un-Islamic. Without an analysis of secularism, how can one de-secularize the modern disciplines and Islamize them? It is impossible to combat secularism unless it is first clear what secularism is.

Mohamed wonders whether the sequence of steps posited by al-Faruqi’s work plan is warranted. In his work-plan, as shown in the schema above, al-Faruqi made mastery of the modern discipline the first step, whereas mastery of the Islamic legacy was placed only in step 3 and 4, and this is attained by the help of traditional scholars who have to prepare the anthologies from the Islamic legacy. Al-Faruqi holds that the traditional scholars, because of their ignorance of the modern disciplines, are not able to establish “the relevance of the [Islamic] legacy to the modern disciplines.” Therefore, it becomes the responsibility of the Western-trained Muslim scholar to familiarize the traditional scholar with the modern discipline. Hence, his first step for the Islamization of knowledge is mastery of the modern discipline.

Most probably, when determining the logical order of his work-plan al-Faruqi was influenced by his own background. He addressed Muslim scholars trained in Western social sciences, such as modern educated Muslim professionals in the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS). If this was the case, al-Faruqi ignored the fact that social scientists who already master at least one social science discipline, are inclined

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18 Yasien Mohamed, Researcher at Department of Arabic Studies University of the Western Cape, University of the Western Cape, Bellville, South Africa.
19 See Yasien Mohamed, 1991, “Knowledge in Islam and the Crisis in Muslim Education”, MEQ, 8:4, p. 26. However, this task has been somewhat fulfilled by other Muslim scholars, such as Naquib al-Attas and Hossein Nasr in their work. See al-Attas, 1993, Islam and Secularism, Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC; and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 1981, Knowledge and the Sacred, Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.
to bring their naturalistic bias to bear upon their analysis of the Islamic legacy.23

The first step of his work-plan, as Mohamed suggests, should have been mastery of the Islamic legacy, and then mastery of the modern discipline from an Islamic viewpoint to determine what relevance the modern discipline has for the Islamic discipline. In responding to modern knowledge, Muslims must make the Qur’an and the Islamic legacy their point of departure. Therefore, to begin with the modern disciplines, as suggested by al-Faruqi, without questioning their underlying philosophical assumptions, is to be content with “half measures”.24

Al-Faruqi placed the main task of the Islamization of knowledge (step 6-11) in the hands of the modern scholar who will critically assess the modern discipline (step 6) and the Islamic legacy (step 7). It is also the task of the modern scholar to make a creative analysis and synthesis (step 10). The task of assessing the contribution of the Islamic legacy in a particular field of human activity must therefore fall upon the shoulders of the experts in that field. Of course, they should be assisted by the experts in Islamic legacy in order to guarantee that their understanding of that field is correct.25 Al-Faruqi regards modern scholars as being trained in scholarly research, able to analyze, criticize and initiate alternative paradigms in a language which is understandable to the modern mind. Such a training is important in order to make a creative synthesis. The traditional scholar, however, does not have such training.

Fazlur Rahman26, however, had a different perspective on this matter. According to him, the reconstruction of disciplines of Islamic legacy is an important step to be taken and the traditionalists have a significant role to play in this task. “[I]t is the upholders of Islamic learning who have to bear the primary responsibility of Islamizing secular knowledge by their creative intellectual efforts.”27 Thus, for Rahman, a mastery of the Islamic legacy is a prerequisite in the process of Islamization of knowledge. Contrarily, al-Faruqi considers the traditionalist scholars as playing only a subsidiary role: preparing the Islamic anthologies for the modern scholars (step 4 of his work-plan).

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23 Mohamed, 1993:34.
24 Mohamed, 1993:34.
26 Rahman was Professor of Islamic thought in the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago.
In Rahman’s view, the work-plan proposed by al-Faruqi is no more than just a building bridge that does not lead towards genuine integration. Genuine integration can only come about if there first come into being “first class minds who can interpret the old in terms of the new as regards substance and turn the new in service of the old as regards ideals.” Certainly, this should be followed by the writing of Islamic textbooks on every discipline.

Al-Faruqi places the assessment of the modern discipline at step 6 and the Islamic legacy at step 7. He does not make the assessment of the Islamic legacy a prerequisite for the evaluation of the modern disciplines. Rahman suggests that a Muslim must first criticize the Islamic legacy in the light of the Qur’an, because the Qur’an is the only criterion to judge, and only afterwards will a Muslim be able to examine the modern disciplines. Rahman emphasizes that one can criticize Muslim thinkers of the Islamic legacy as one also can criticize the assumptions of Western thinkers which appear incompatible with the principles of Islam. In order to provide a critical response to modernity a Muslim should first construct a critique of the Islamic tradition. Afterwards, one can examine the Western tradition and study critically the body of knowledge created by modernity. Thus, Rahman’s approach is the reverse of that of al-Faruqi.

It goes without saying that al-Faruqi wants to “Islamize” Western social science: economics, political science, sociology, psychology and anthropology, for he believes that these disciplines are Eurocentric and promote the Western notions of nation-state and ethnic identity. For Sardar however, such a notion is not quite correct. Sardar maintains that while the world may be structured according to how Western social sciences perceive human reality, it is has not been developed by them. Rather, it is science and technology that maintain the social, economic and political structures of the world. Scientific and technological knowledge are the prime tools of Western epistemological imperialism. For these reasons Sardar suggests that it is the epistemology of Western science that has created the modern world which must be tackled by any program on the Islamization of knowledge.

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29 Rahman, 1982:139.
31 Sardar, 1985:100.
Sardar regards the notion of the Islamization of disciplines, as proposed by al-Faruqi, as fundamentally suspect, since it assumes the disciplines as a given reality, from which one must start and infuse Islamic elements into them. By doing so one has accepted the “conventions, theoretical constructs, methodologies and analytical tools” of Western disciplines. Consequently, Islamized disciplines will accept a de facto position of minority sub-disciplines. Contrary to what al-Faruqi may have believed, Sardar maintains that disciplines are not “made in heaven”. Disciplines are born within the matrix of a particular world-view and subordinated to that world-view. Sardar writes:

Disciplines do not have an autonomous existence of their own: they develop within a particular historical and cultural milieu and only have meaning within the world-view of their origin and evolution. The division of knowledge into various disciplines as we find today is a particular manifestation of how the Western world-view perceives reality and how the Western civilization sees its problems. For example, the discipline of Orientalism evolved because Western civilization perceived Islam as a “problem” to be studied, analyzed and controlled.

Likewise, disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, psychology and economics emerged within the post-enlightenment materialistic world-view. These disciplines have developed within this intellectual heritage, and evolved to solve the particular physical, material and intellectual problems of this tradition. Since these disciplines were evolved within Western paradigms they cannot be stripped of their values and metaphysical assumptions, which have constituted their paradigms. For these reasons, the whole notion of the Islamization of disciplines is, for Sardar, irrelevant to Muslim societies. Sardar suggests that the only course open for Muslim social scientists is “to evolve their own paradigms and to innovate appropriate disciplines within them”. What should be emphasized for Muslims is not “on Islamizing disciplines but on how to innovate the new ones within the conceptual categories and value framework of Islam.”

To accept the disciplinary divisions of knowledge as they exist in Western epistemology is to subordinate the world-view of Islam to Western civilization.

Certainly, the subordination of Islam to the Western civilization is not what al-Faruqi wants to achieve. However, when al-Faruqi asserts that

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one of the objectives of his program of Islamization of knowledge is “to establish the specific relevance of Islam to each area of modern knowledge”, it seems, as Sardar notices, that he is putting the cart before the horse. “It is not Islam that needs to be made relevant to modern knowledge; it is modern knowledge that needs to be made relevant to Islam. Islam is a priori relevant for all times.” Sardar then suggests that the whole process of Islamization of knowledge starts from given concepts and basic axioms of the worldview of Islam, and not from given disciplines.36

It is argued that the problems of sociology have no counterpart in Muslim society, because sociology, as Ba-Yunus points out, has not developed to tackle the problems of Muslim civilization. This contention is shared by Sardar. He views that molding and reshaping sociology, as suggested in the effort of Islamizing discipline, is not going to solve the problems. This is because the problems of Muslim societies require an altogether approach, which is “a different discipline that must emerge from the worldview and cultural milieu of the Muslim civilization itself.”37

Criticism to al-Faruqi also came from S. Parves Manzoor. Manzoor attacks the linear and mechanistic nature of al-Faruqi’s work-plan for the Islamization of knowledge. Considering al-Faruqi as having no awareness of the modern debate on the sociology of knowledge, Manzoor writes:

[T]he interrelationship between worldview, disciplines and teleology is also not given due attention in his Islamization [of knowledge] plan [...] To call for Islamization of secularized disciplines is indeed to be content with half-measures. Islamizing disciplines that are infused with a materialistic metaphysics and secularistic ethics, is tantamount to plastic surgery, a cosmetic epistemological face-lift and nothing more. If it may accomplish anything at all, it would be the perpetuation of the dichotomy of secular and Islamic knowledge. Moreover, even at the practical level, the task of Islamizing so many disciplines, especially if one follows al-Faruqi’s comprehensive scheme in its execution, is such an onerous and time consuming task that, best possible intentions on the part of a few intellectuals to the contrary, it is hardly likely to arrive at anything beyond a few half baked monographs.39

39 S. Parves Manzoor is Professor of Linguistics, Stockholm University, Sweden.
It might also be worth noting here that opponents of the Islamization of knowledge often argue that all knowledge belongs to God. For example, the Laws of Relativity were not created by Einstein but merely discovered by him. The Laws existed right from the emergence of the universe. Likewise, Newton's did not create the Laws of Gravitation: he only discovered them through his research. Problems might appear if knowledge is used to create a certain technology. In other words, it is the technology, not the knowledge, which must be Islamized. Moreover, all knowledge is basically Islamic, as is stated in the Qur'an (16: 48-50).\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, it is wrong to launch the Islamization of knowledge, as it should be a campaign for the Islamization of technology.\textsuperscript{41} Such an explanation however, is not sufficient for the proponents. The proponents argue that, as regards applied and practical natural sciences, the arguments against the Islamization of knowledge are valid to some extent. But when entering the social and imaginative sciences, they are not always clear-cut and simple.\textsuperscript{42}

According to Sardar, al-Faruqi's plan has cast the discourse on Islamization of knowledge strictly within the boundaries of Western logical positivist thought. Sardar questions al-Faruqi's plan, claiming that it needs to be justified in scientific terms, while the issue of the normative and value-laden nature of social science remains unsettled.\textsuperscript{43}

As is common among other scholars engaged in the Islamization of knowledge, Sardar tends to hold the view that science cannot be free from value. This is because, for him, modern social science disciplines have evolved within the Western worldview and cultural milieu to serve the needs of Western society and increase the understanding of how it behaves and works for the Western man. Sardar bases his judgment on three basic facts of human nature, namely:

1. Perception, rather than being conceptually neutral, is structured by both linguistic categories and the mental attitudes and interests of the ob-

\textsuperscript{40} The translation of these verses is as follows: "Do they not look at Allah's creation. Among things, how their shadows turn round, from the right and the left, prostrating themselves to Allah, and that in the humblest manner? And to Allah doth prostrate all that is in the heavens and on earth, whether moving creatures or the angels: for none are arrogant (before their Lord). They all fear their Lord, High above them, and they do all that they are commanded." See The Holy Qur'an: English Translation of the meanings and commentary, The Presidency of Islamic Research, IPTA, Call and Guidance, King Fahd Holy Qur'an Printing Complex, Madinah al-Munawwarah, 1411 H., pp.745-746.

\textsuperscript{41} Journalis Uddin, 1993, "Problems of Islamization of University Curriculum in Indonesia", MEQ, 10:2, p.15.

\textsuperscript{42} Uddin, 1993:15.

servers; (2) The categories in terms of which experiences is organized and, in turn, known, as well as canons of truth and validity, reflect the values and interests of different groups at different times in history; (3) Man does not encounter reality as an uninterpreted given but rather something mediated or constructed by conceptual schema (Kant), ideologies (Marx), language games (Wittgenstein) or paradigms (Kuhn).44

Probably, it is for these reasons that Sardar questions the purpose of infusing Islamic values and spirit into modern disciplines “that are shaped by Western perception, concepts, ideologies, languages and paradigms”, as suggested by al-Faruqi in his work-plan. Such an action, for Sardar, does not constitute Islamization of knowledge, but rather the Westernization of Islam.45

As it is believed that modern disciplines have been born within the matrix of the particular worldview of their origins and culture of their evolution, to which they are hierarchically subordinated and on which they depend for their meaning, Sardar asserts, “the task of Muslim social scientists is thus not to Islamize disciplines of Western social sciences, but to evolve disciplines relevant to the worldview of Islam and geared to fulfilling the needs of Muslim societies and culture.”46

Let us now look at the perspective of other scholars who have also been engaged in the Islamization of knowledge discussions. Since the IIIT scholars do not hold the monopoly on the Islamization of knowledge enterprise, it is instructive to compare al-Faruqi’s viewpoints on this matter with that of another scholar who claimed to have nothing to do with the IIIT, namely Syed Muhammad Naqib al-Attas. It seems that al-Faruqi’s concept differs from that of al-Attas. In his conception of Islamizing branches of knowledge, al-Attas suggests to first isolate and remove the foreign or secular elements from every branch of knowledge and afterwards imbue them with Islamic elements and key concepts.47 Meanwhile, al-Faruqi seems to ignore this aspect, he does not even define in his dis-

45 Sardar in Sardar, ed., 1989:32. Sardar emphasizes that disciplinary activities for Western social scientists are carried out within what they consider to be normal science. For this reason, he maintains, anyone coming from outside (including Muslim social scientists) has to conform, like the Western scientist, to the dominant paradigm, otherwise the activity does not make sense to other social scientists. Sardar continues by asking how Muslim social scientists, working within a somewhat different paradigm, are supposed to synthesize their disciplines with those of Western social scientists, whether this should be a synthesis of concepts, values, ideologies or paradigms. Ibid.
47 Al-Attas, 1991:43.
cussion what the secular elements are. Al-Faruqi's notion of the Islamization of knowledge is addressed to the acquired sciences (humanities, social and natural sciences), as opposed to the revealed sciences. This opinion is shared by al-Attas.\textsuperscript{48}

Al-'Alwani, another key figure, also presented his viewpoints on the Islamization of knowledge. He examined the present state of thought of the Muslim people, the present state of knowledge, the present state of Muslim education, and the present civilizational state of the Ummah, before proposing an alternative form of Islamic thought, and to propound the idea of the Islamization of knowledge in particular. In general, al-'Alwani was not satisfied with the condition of the Muslims in the fields mentioned above.\textsuperscript{49} Therefore, he promoted an alternative form of Islamic thought by revising Muslim thought as a whole and re-evaluating its methods.\textsuperscript{50}

With regard to present Muslim thought, Al-'Alwani criticizes both the traditionalist and modernist approach, because the former could not prevent the ummah from decline and the latter could not protect the ummah from disastrous effects. Although not quite frankly, he tends to suggest adopting the eclectic approach, that is, to select what is most sound from traditional thought and what is correct from modern thought.\textsuperscript{51} Meanwhile, al-'Alwani regards the condition of Muslim education in the Muslim world at the present time, which consists of two systems, Islamic and secular, as "a means of dividing the Ummah and draining its energy."\textsuperscript{52} The contemporary social sciences and the technical and applied sciences are regarded as having been formed by the Western mentality "through its religious and intellectual framework, philosophy and background.

Every aspect of this knowledge is, in his view, closely bound to the western form of civilization.\textsuperscript{53}

These aspects led al-'Alwani to believe that there is a necessity for Muslims to reform their way of thought, including the redefinition of knowledge in terms of an Islamic epistemology. He disagrees with the

\textsuperscript{48} According to al-Attas, the acquired sciences which he refers to as "the rational, intellectual, and philosophical sciences" must be Islamized. He says that "each branch must be imbued with Islamic elements and key concepts after the foreign elements and key concepts have been isolated from its every branch." Al-Attas 1991:43. See also al-Attas 1993:164.


\textsuperscript{50} Al-'Alwani, 1989b:5.

\textsuperscript{51} Al-'Alwani, 1989b:1-2.

\textsuperscript{52} Al-'Alwani, 1989a:3, al-'Alwani, 1995b:4.

\textsuperscript{53} Al-'Alwani, 1989b:2.
concept of knowledge adopted by the UNESCO, which says that every piece of knowledge is subject to tangible experiment, and, therefore, tends to reject Revelation as a source of knowledge. It was also hard for him to accept the fact that UNESCO considered the empirical method to be the only means of gaining scientific knowledge, since, for him, the Islamic theory of scientific knowledge confirms that it has two sources: (1) Revelation, and (2) the tangible universe. Apparently, the majority of the Muslims have adopted the modernist concept of knowledge, as exemplified by the UNESCO. As Al-'Alwani is unhappy with this condition, he has suggested reform. The notion on the Islamization of knowledge, advocated by the IIIT scholars, including al-'Alwani, must be put in this context.

Now, what is Islamization of knowledge for al-'Alwani, and why does he deem it necessary? First of all, it should be made clear that al-'Alwani identifies people concerned with the issue of Islamization of knowledge as forming a school of thought, "the Islamization of Knowledge school". Most probably, whom he has in mind are the scholars in the IIIT. He emphasizes that the idea of the Islamization of knowledge should be understood as "an intellectual and methodological outlook rather than as an academic field, a specialization, an ideology, or a new sect." He also maintains that the school seeks to view issues of knowledge and methodology from the perspective of reform, inquiry, and self-discovery without any limitations on its intellectual horizons. Furthermore, the school asserts that the Islamization of knowledge is not to be understood as "a set of axioms, a rigid ideology, or a religious movement," but rather should be seen as "designating a methodology for dealing with knowledge and its sources or as an intellectual outlook in its beginning stages." It is stated that the preliminary articulation of the Islamization of knowledge undertaking and the work-plan were produced in general terms. In the beginning the focus was claimed to be on "presenting a criticism of both traditional Muslim and western methodologies and then introducing the Islamization of knowledge and explaining its significance." The principles and the work-plan of the Islamization of knowledge undertaking were elaborated in the first edition of the Islamization of Knowledge.

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54 Al-'Alwani, 1989b:7. Apparently it is for this reason that he emphasizes, "all knowledge is derived either from Revelation, reason, perception, or experiment." Ibid.
Al-'Alawni claims that there has been a wide acceptance for the new ideas contained in the *Islamization of Knowledge*, since they represent a new intellectual effort, and many scholars are said to have been quick to support them. Al-'Alwani rejects opinions from other scholars who consider the Islamization of knowledge as "a naive attempt to replace knowledge with knowledge that had somehow been Islamized." He also disagrees with critics who view the Islamization of knowledge undertaking as an endeavor by Islamic fundamentalists to transform culture and the world of ideas into tools for the achievement of political power. He opposes those who see the undertaking as "a manifestation of the Islamists desire to control everything in the state and society, including secular knowledge or the social sciences and humanities" by making scholarship their exclusive domain and to assume authority on anything related to Islam. He refutes them by stating that "such ideas never occurred to any of those involved in the beginning of the Islamization of Knowledge undertaking." Al-'Alwani aims at assuring skeptics that the Islamization of knowledge movement is an epistemological or methodological discourse, and not an ideological one.\(^5\)

What kind of civilization should be achieved by the Islamization of knowledge enterprise? It seems from al-'Alwani's conception that reformation of the Muslims' thought, including re-assessment of their understanding of knowledge should lead towards an Islamic concept of civilization which would "enable the Muslim to work seriously toward building the Ummah and achieving its goals and objective."\(^6\) From this, it can be inferred that the Islamization of knowledge endeavor has been designed to build an Islamic civilization, as an opposition to the secular modern civilization.

With regard to the ideas of the Islamization of disciplines, it is worthwhile to draw attention to a contribution authored by al-Faruqi entitled *Toward Islamic English* published by the IIIT in 1986, in which the author attempts to clarify terms, phrases, words and concepts whose meanings have become distorted because of what he calls "faulty translations and transliterations". In this book al-Faruqi uses the expression "Islamic

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\(^5\) Al-'Alwani, 1995:82.

\(^6\) Probably al-'Alwani's statement is in response to other scholars, such as Bassam Tibi. Tibi is one of those of the opinion that the Islamization of knowledge project is part of the fundamentalist movement. See Bassam Tibi, 1995, "Culture and Knowledge: The Politics of Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist Claim to De-westernization", *Theory, Culture & Society*, 12:1, pp. 1-24.

English" to signify a modified form of English which enables the English language "to carry Islamic proper nouns and meanings without distortion, and thus to serve the linguistic needs of Muslim users of the English language." He goes on to state that the concept of "Islamic English" raises three questions. Firstly, who are the Muslim users of English? Secondly, how does one clarify the nature of the linguistic distortion that is said to exist? Thirdly, what is the content of the desired correction? To answer the first question, al-Faruqi points at Muslims in Europe, North America and Australia, whose native language is English. He also includes Muslims residing in those countries in Asia and Africa where English is the official language, and Muslims who use English in reading, writing, communication and/or research. He emphasizes that the rules he would like to introduce regarding translation as well as transliteration apply to all languages written in the Latin alphabet. He claims that the number of people targeted in his approach is far greater than the number of non-Muslims who speak English as their mother tongue.

Elaborating on the second question al-Faruqi stipulates that the situation of English is chaotic when expressing matters pertaining to Islam and its culture. He maintains that this has constituted a disaster both spiritually and intellectually. Referring to cases where names of Allah, His divine attributes (sifat), names of the Prophet, or Qur'anic terms expressing Islamic values are spelled incorrectly, he sustains that this was irritating as well as blasphemous. Al-Faruqi maintains that this could happen because Arabic words can be transliterated in many different ways. However, he claims that the present systems of transliteration are all incomplete and do not help English speaking Muslims.

Al-Faruqi's idea is concerned not only with the spelling but also with the pronunciation of names. He maintains it would be equally blasphemous to misspell or mispronounce it. He gave as an example 'Abd al Haqq (servant of the Truth—Allah). To spell this as 'Abd Hakk (servant of scratching) is, in al-Faruqi's opinion, violating a divine name and, therefore, blasphemous. Al-Faruqi maintains it is also a serious offense to drop 'Abd, (as a popular abbreviation technique), and leave the divine name standing alone. It is blasphemy, for, according to him, no man may be called by a divine name. On the other hand, and for the same reason of abbreviation, it is also mistaken to drop the divine name and be left with

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the Arabic name of ‘Abd ("servant", without any specification of master).63

The third question concentrates on the distortions of the meaning of Arabic words introduced through translation. Al-Faruqi provides several examples. One is the translations and meanings given to the term zakat. In his opinion, English translations such as charity, alms, and alms-giving are not correct translations of the word zakat, instead they correspond to the Arabic term sadaqah. He defines zakat as a “public welfare tax, with the specific amount of 2½ per cent of appropriate wealth beyond a certain minimum” and emphasizes that “its payment is religiously and publicly obligatory for all Muslims without exception".64 Consequently, zakat cannot be translated. It must be understood in its Arabic form. Al-Faruqi maintains that the same considerations are applicable to other vocabularies of Islam.

Words like taqwa, huda, dalal, qist, wahy, siyam, hajj, fiqh, usul al-fiqh, Hadith, etc. have much more meaning in their Arabic form than their English approximations are ever capable of carrying. To give an English translation of them is to reduce, and often ruin, those meanings. To the scholar in general, intellectual loyalty to English form has no right to assume priority over loyalty to meaning. The latter is the realm of truth; and truth must take precedence over all other values -- let alone the value of a convention of the English speaking people. A fortiori, for the Muslim, loyalty to "the King's English" must never assume priority over loyalty to Islam, to its meanings and concepts.65

Al-Faruqi emphasizes that the English translations of these terms are reductions. Thus, the English translations do not carry the true meanings, fields of associations and connotations of the Arabic words. In addition, the Arabic forms are to be seen as superior to their English translations, simply because they are the actual words of the Qur'anic text. They represent the ultimate truth and could not be replaced by any "ordinary" language. The Arabic language and its Islamic terminology is, in al-Faruqi’s view, part of an organic structure. In the end, distorting the language of the Qur'an, the word of God, would endanger the very existence of the Islamic religion. This view is based on the argument that loyalty to Islam

64 Al-Faruqi, 1986:12.
65 Al-Faruqi, 1986:12. The Arabic words in the quotation can be translated as follows: taqwa (piety), huda (guidance), dalal (error, straying from the true path), qist (justice, fair-mindedness), wahy (revelation), hadj (pilgrimage), fiqh (jurisprudence), usul al-fiqh (the principle of jurisprudence).
cannot be alienated from loyalty to the Qur'an, and the latter cannot not be separated from Arabic, its language and form. Al-Faruqi emphasizes that the Arabic language has never changed nor developed over the past fifteen centuries. The consistency of the Arabic language has saved the Qur'an from the hermeneutical problems troubling the Bible, as well as the Hindu and Buddhist scriptures.\textsuperscript{66}

Al-Faruqi insists on proposing the creation of an Islamic English for English-speaking Muslims. Islamic English, based on the addition of "the terms of the religion, spirituality and culture of Islam, together with a few pertinent rules of Arabic grammar [to the English language], is a worthy, creative and beneficial support".\textsuperscript{67} Al-Faruqi concludes the chapter by declaring that, in a modern context, the English language in general needs the values of Islam, which, in his view, can only be provided by the Qur'anic language. This process of development of the English language is considered to help English-speaking Muslims to protect themselves from the "onslaught of materialism, utilitarianism, skepticism, relativism, secularism and hedonism". Finally, it might provide English-speaking Muslims with the means to end their predicament in modern times.\textsuperscript{68} Al-Faruqi maintains that his proposal to create Islamic English is not a violation against English, but rather an enrichment of it.\textsuperscript{69}

AbuSulayman, another key figure of the IIIT, is also a strong advocate of the Islamization of knowledge undertaking. He contends that the current decadence and backwardness of the Muslim ummah is caused fundamentally by the crisis of thought in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{70} He believes that knowledge is the basic cause of progress and development of the Ummah. AbuSulayman maintains that, in its beginning, the ummah was built upon the basis of knowledge acquired through proper sources: Divine revelation and active reason.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, like al-Faruqi and al-'Alwani, AbuSulayman strongly contends that revelation is a legitimate source of

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\textsuperscript{66} Al-Faruqi, 1986:13
\textsuperscript{67} Al-Faruqi, 1986:14.
\textsuperscript{68} Al-Faruqi, 1986:15. Other parts of Toward Islamic English (1986), are chapters concerned with the transliteration of letters and words, lists of Islamic words and concepts, terms and expressions relevant to the Islamic sciences, Islamic devotional and social terms and expressions. See al-Faruqi 1986:10-64.
\textsuperscript{69} Al-Faruqi, 1986:12.
\textsuperscript{71} AbuSulayman, 1985, "Islamization of Knowledge with Special Reference to Political Science", AJISS, 2:2, pp. 263-264.
knowledge. This contention seems to oppose the modern Western methods which do not recognize revelation as a source of knowledge.

AbuSulayman is critical to Western scholarship. He points out that the West is superior in the realm of knowledge and thought in as far as it is purely intellectual and has nothing to do with divine revelation. However, Western scholars, AbuSulayman maintains, "cannot deny maladjustment and imbalance in the Western society." He regards such a condition as a result of "the inapplicability of empirical methods to conflicting societal welfare" and "the pursuance of personal desires and interests." This is the case, because, in his understanding, human reason alone is unable to reach the ultimate truth and full understanding of "what is desirable for humanity in this life and the life hereafter." Furthermore, he characterizes Western civilization as being lost in chaotic and contradictory theories so that "it is unable to arrive at one single theory or confidently resolve any problem." At the same time, he sees no problem in the Islamic source of knowledge, revelation and reason. The only problem for him is how Muslims should define and understand the relationship between revelation and reason on a concrete level.72 AbuSulayman underscores that reforms in Islamic thought require the Islamization of knowledge in general and the Islamization of political science in particular. Because, without proper insight in this field, he contends, it is impossible to reconstruct the ummah and prepare its cadres for leadership.73

AbuSulayman emphasizes that the genuine solution to the crisis of Muslim thought is the Islamization of knowledge, which is, for him, "the critical examination of modern disciplines in light of the vision of Islam and the recasting of them under categories consistent with that vision." In order to accomplish this task he recommends mastering the modern disciplines and mastering the Islamic legacy of thought.74 It seems that he supports the work-plan propounded by al-Faruqi for the execution of the Islamization of knowledge.

3.3.1.2. Viewpoints of regular contributors

Like the key figures, Safi is also concerned with the issue of the Islamization of knowledge. In his The Foundation of Knowledge75, he examines research methods and methodological approaches related to mainstream

72 AbuSulayman, 1985:269-270.
73 AbuSulayman, 1985:289.
75 Louay Safi, 1996, The Foundation of Knowledge: A Comparative Study in Islamic and Western Methods of Inquiry, Selangor: IUM Press and IITT.
scholarship, both in the classical Muslim and modern Western scientific traditions. According to him, both methods contain inadequacies. Western methods are, on one hand, useful in analyzing social interaction, but they present Muslim intellectuals with a serious problem, because they do not recognize Revelation as a proper source of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, classical Muslim methods are, for Safi, concerned more with understanding the Divine text, but show little interest in studying social actions that do not fit into the revealed norms.\textsuperscript{76}

Safi is critical of Western methodology. He argues that Western scholarship has been able to completely eliminate revelation as a source of knowledge. Although this elimination, he points out, was caused by the conflict between Western scholarship and revelation in its biblical form, a Muslim scientist will not be able to incorporate revelation into social scientific research when relying on modern Western methodology.\textsuperscript{77} Being aware of the shortcomings of the classical Muslim and modern Western methods, Safi contends the necessity of creating an alternative methodological approach capable of transcending the limitations of both.

Safi gives credit to al-Faruqi for introducing an "Islamic methodology" in his monograph Islamization of Knowledge. However, Safi criticizes al-Faruqi's twelve-step work-plan for achieving the objective of "Islamization". For Safi, al-Faruqi's work-plan is "lucid and thorough" on the level of theoretical requirements, but it "exceedingly complicated" on the level of practical implementation. Safi regards the plan as ignoring two practical considerations: logistical and psychological. In Safi's view, if one is to follow al-Faruqi's twelve steps as literally successive steps, this means that one step must be completed before the next step is taken.\textsuperscript{78}

Safi contends that the time frame for completing the task of Islamization would be delayed into infinity without the presence of a large scientific Islamic community interested in and trained to undertake the "Islamization of knowledge". He adds that the task becomes more burdensome since the practical motivation determining the project is placed at the very last step of al-Faruqi's work-plan. Safi maintains that the psychological drive behind the project is contained in steps 5 and 11, respectively "establishing the relevance of Islam to the discipline", and "producing university textbooks", and he considers it unfortunate that these points were not given more prominence in the chain of steps.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{76} Safi, 1996:ix.
\textsuperscript{77} Safi, 1996:5.
\textsuperscript{78} Safi, 1996:7.
\textsuperscript{79} Safi, 1996:8.
After criticizing al-Faruqi’s work-plan Safi proposes his own schema, which is simpler than that of al-Faruqi. It consists of two steps: “mastery of substantive knowledge” and “mastery of methodological knowledge.” He claims that his diagram “brings into sharp focus the crucial role played by methodology in the project of Islamization of knowledge. It shows that the production of an Islamized knowledge is contingent of the emergence of Islamic methods.” Thus, although disagreeing with al-Faruqi on some strategic points regarding the execution of the task of Islamizing knowledge, Safi, basically agrees with him in terms of developing an Islamic methodology and in undertaking the project of the Islamization of knowledge. The difference between them merely concerns the strategy by which to materialize it.

Not only is Safi concerned with the notion of Islamization of knowledge in the context of building a new paradigm, but he also presents a discussion on a specific discipline, i.e. psychology. He highlights the problem of what he calls “modern secular psychology.” In his opinion modern psychology with its antireligious origins depends only on a limited ontology of human nature which excludes human volition as well as its transcendental and unchanging elements. Safi tends to perceive modern psychology, just like other disciplines of the social sciences, as isolating psychological phenomena from their transcendental roots. He points out that by rejecting the fact that the “mental world is the manifestation of a transcendental mind, mainstream Western psychology gave rise to a deterministic conception of man in which the ideas of ‘human will’ and ‘individual responsibility’ are negated.” After analyzing Freud’s metaphysical assumptions and Skinner’s conception of human nature, Safi disagrees with both Freud’s psychoanalysis and Skinner’s behavioralism, which, for him, have substituted a concept of human nature that emphasizes human volition with one in which “human behavior seems to be affected by uncontrollable forces from within and from without.”

It is not surprising, therefore, that Safi turns to the ideas on psychology embedded in the works of classical Muslim scholars, because for him, Islamic psychology is based on volition and sublimation. In Safi’s perception, although Western psychology could provide human beings with im-

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82 Safi, 1998:118.
operative insights into human nature, it could never give them "a complete system of psychological ideas that [could] be meaningful." Because of that he deems it a necessity to develop an Islamic psychology or undertake the Islamization of psychology. Then, regarding how to develop this and where to start he recommends starting by examining the psychological views of early Muslim scholars. He mentions that al-Mawardi's Adab al-Din wa al-Dunya and al-Ghazzali's Ihya' Ulum al-Din are filled with psychological insights and wisdom.  

Mona Abul-Fadl, another regular contributor, links the "Islamization" process, which began in the mid-seventies, with the emergence of awareness of the Islamic cultural identity among the Muslim ummah worldwide. She regards this process as a wide-ranging cultural movement that wants to improve the energy of the Muslim community by recovering its heritage. She shares with other IIIT scholars the view that the Muslim ummah today suffers from intellectual inertia. To recover the ummah from this state of malaise, she proposes the tawhidi paradigm of knowledge through Islamization. She regards Islamization as constituting the "process of reforming and revitalizing the current underlying structures of thought and perception by means of their exposure to a radical critique in the light of an integrated set of cognitive, affective, and symbolic values derived from the Islamic Tradition."  

Abul-Fadl contends that the matrix of the tawhidi paradigm of knowledge, unlike the secular one, is stable and coherent, because it originated from an "incoercible source". This source, while accessible to the human cognitive circuit, originated beyond that circuit. She contends that in the Islamic paradigm of knowledge, the human intellect interacts within a cognitive setting which takes this integral transcendental source for its starting point. It must also be added that beyond the cognitive merits of the tawhidi paradigm of knowledge, as Abul-Fadl pointed out, lies an ethical imperative reinforcing the "median culture." Knowledge,
in her view, is qualified with intrinsic morality, and is therefore not amoral or neutral.\footnote{Abul-Fadl, 1988:174.} It is obvious that Abul-Fadl, like other IIIT scholars, perceives revelation as a legitimate and ultimate source of knowledge.

Abul-Fadl emphasizes that as an intellectual current and cultural movement, Islamization should not be confined in its appeal only to the Muslim ummah. Rather, it should become the general concern of everybody with a stake in the moral well-being of a sane society and sober civilization. This, in her perception, could include a wider audience.\footnote{Abul-Fadl, 1988:179.}

### 3.3.1.3. Viewpoints of occasional contributors

Jaafar Sheikh Idris\footnote{When writing the article on "the Islamization of the sciences" published by AJS in 1987, Jaafar Sheikh Idris was professor at the 'Aqidah School of Usul al-Din, Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud, Saudi Arabia. Originally he is from Sudan.} can be considered one of the strongest proponents of the Islamization of knowledge undertaking. According to Sardar, he was the first Muslim scholar to attack the cultural bias of Western social sciences at the annual convention of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) in June 1975.\footnote{Sardar in Sardar, ed., 1989:29. Sardar, however, did not provide information on the date and place of this conference.} At this meeting Idris stated that Western science was based on a "faulty ideology", and that science is not a merely a method, and a body of facts, but also an ideology which delineates scientific boundaries, and determines the nature of its theories of explanation and even its usage. For these reasons Idris urged Muslim scholars to bring the perspective of Islam within their academic domains and work towards the evolution of Islamic social sciences.\footnote{Sardar in Sardar, ed., 1989: 29-30. Sardar did not specify the name of the organization and the date of the meeting.}

Then, at another meeting of Muslim intellectuals and academics, Idris is said to have argued that the efforts of Muslim academics and professional social and natural scientists should be geared towards a specific goal, Islamization. Idris defined the process of Islamization as an "organized and gradual effort which will culminate in the realization of an (Islamic) society."\footnote{Abul-Fadl, 1988:173.} However, Idris was criticized by Daud as not deeply "preoccupied with the more fundamental and difficult challenges of
Islamization of modern sciences and knowledge. In Daud's view, what Idris defines as Islamization is no more than a "socio-political program." Daud's analysis of Idris is based on the following statement of Idris in his work *The Process of Islamization*, delivered in August 1975 at the 13th Annual Convention of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) of the United States and Canada:

The aim of the Islamic movement is to bring about somewhere in the world a new society wholeheartedly committed to the teachings of Islam in their totality and striving to abide by those teachings in its government, its political, economic and social organization, its relation with other states, its educational system and its moral values and all other aspects of its way of life. Our organized and gradual effort which shall culminate in the realization of that society is the process of Islamization.

Daud criticized Idris for not explaining how to create such a movement and such a society, and for not elaborating the guiding ideas of the movement and society. Idris refuted this criticism of Daud in an article in *AJISS* in 1987.

Idris maintains that what people call knowledge today is "knowledge within the framework of the atheistic materialistic philosophy now prevailing in the West." He believes that these philosophical frameworks could influence the Muslims' concept of truth, of evidence and of facts as well as influence on the choosing of priorities etc. In his opinion, this materialistic philosophy is based on false assumptions. Therefore, he propagates to replace it by an Islamic world-view. For these reasons, then, Idris desires to Islamize knowledge in two ways: (a) resting it on the solid foundations of Islam, and thus widen its scope, purge it of falsehoods masquerading as truths, discover new facts and see old ones in the light of the new world-view, and (b) abiding by Islamic values in our

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99 See Jaafar Sheikh Idris, 1987, "The Islamization Of The Science: Its Philosophy And Methodology", *AJISS*, 4:2, pp. 201-208. Listen also to his lecture on "the Islamization of science", Audio CD, "Islamization of Science" produced by the Center of Islamic Information and Education, JSI-7, Copyright 2002. I bought my copy of the audio CD by Jaafar Sheikh Idris in the ADAMS center after the Friday prayer occasion. I was lucky because it was the last one at that occasion. In this lecture Idris explains that the modern sciences are constructed within a secular world-view, and, therefore the Muslims should be critical of their formula. He also sees a need to Islamize the modern sciences.

search for it, in our choice of field research, in our priorities, and in the use we make of it.” Idris declares that Islamized knowledge is not tinted with prejudice that happens to be called Islamic. Rather, it is knowledge conducive to man’s material as well as spiritual development. Idris proposes a program of eleven steps to materialize the Islamization of the sciences. The program, as summarized by Sardar, includes “accepting all rationally and empirically discovered facts; adding in various fields and relevant places facts stated in the Qur’an and sunnah; researching Qur’anic and sunnah laws under which these facts can be explained, as well as developing new theories; stripping off ‘non-Islamic philosophical assumptions and statements of Western scientists’; and placing all these facts, laws and theories in an Islamic framework.” He argues that this program will enable Muslims to see a new light and infer new facts which otherwise would have no relevance within the current Western materialistic framework.

The steps propounded by Idris are somewhat different from the steps proposed by al-Faruqui. According to Sardar, Idris’ plan is much simpler and more intellectually manageable than the one proposed by al-Faruqui. However, there are some shortcomings in it, because Idris does not explain how all the gathered facts and theories should be put within an Islamic framework.

Another occasional contributor, Akbar S. Ahmed, examined the discipline of Anthropology. When writing his article “Toward Islamic Anthropology” published by AJISS in 1986, Ahmed admitted that it was a speculative study concerning a difficult and complex subject. According to him, this task was complicated further because it defended a metaphysical position, served a moral cause and advanced an ideological argument. Ahmed defines Islamic anthropology as “the study of Muslim groups by scholars committed to the universalist principles of Islam, humanity, knowledge, and respectful tolerance, and relating micro village tribal studies in particular to the large historical and ideological frames of Islam. Islam here is understood not as theology but sociology.” Thus, the definition, as Ahmed points out, does not exclude non-Muslims. Merryl

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102 For the details of the steps proposed by Idris, See Idris, 1987:205-108.
105 Akbar S. Ahmed, 1986, “Toward Islamic Anthropology”, AJISS, 3:2, p. 181. This article was republished in the IIIT, 1989, Toward Islamization of Disciplines, Herndon, VA: IIIT, pp. 199-247, with no change at all in its content.
Wyn Davies, however, rejects the notion of “Islamic anthropology”. She proposes what she calls *ilm al-umran*, as a discipline which studies both Muslim and non-Muslim societies.

In his recommendations Ahmed notices that Muslims cannot discharge Western scholarship. If Muslims are to object to such scholarship, Ahmed added, they can do so only by creating their own scholarship rather than by berating Western scholarship. He also thinks that a great store of anthropology exists in the writing of the classical Muslim scholars. Ahmed seems to advocate the creation of an Islamic anthropology.

Fazlur Rahman can also be singled out as contributor in this category, since he wrote an article entitled “Islamization of knowledge: A Response”, published by the IIIT’s journal *AJISS* in 1988. Rahman seems to have a different opinion than the other IIIT scholars on this matter. He seems to be pessimistic about the Islamization of knowledge undertaking. Although he believes that the modern world has been structured upon knowledge which cannot be considered Islamic, he thinks that there is nothing wrong with knowledge, except that it has been misused. In his conclusion, Rahman expresses his opposition to the notion of “making maps and charts of how to go about creating Islamic knowledge.” Most probably this comment is intended as a response to al-Faruqi’s work-plan for the Islamization of knowledge. Instead, Rahman urges the Muslims to invest their time, energy and money in the creation of minds with the capacity to think constructively and positively.

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107 Merryl Wyn Davies is one of *Ijmali* thinkers. *Ijmali* is a group of independent scholars and thinkers who have championed a future oriented critique of contemporary Muslim thought. For further details on the *Ijmali* see Leif Stenberg, 1996:41.


111 Fazlur Rahman (1919 - 1988) was a well-known scholar of Islam. He got his Ph.D. degree from Oxford University where he wrote a dissertation on Ibn Sina. Afterwards, he began a teaching career, first at Durham University, and then at McGill University until 1961. He moved to the University of Chicago in 1969.


113 Rahman, 1988, pp. 10-11. Rahman’s involvement in the debate on this issue can be traced back to 1982, when his *Islam and Modernity* (published NOT by the IIIT) appeared. In this book, he commented rather extensively on the effort to Islamize the education of Muslims (not the Islamization of knowledge), that is, “to inform it with certain key concepts of Islam.” This strategy involves two interrelated aspects: first, to mould the character of the student with Islamic values for personal and collective life, and second, to imbue higher fields of learning with Islamic values. This might be regarded by him as a means to produce
Mohammad Arif is also an occasional contributor to the IIIT. He supports the work-plan proposed by al-Faruqi. According to Arif, the plan is "thoroughly scientific in the sense used by modern historians and philosophers of science." It is argued that al-Faruqi's plan follows the same pattern as Imre Lakatos' scientific research program, developed in defense of Popper's position, as "a special kind of operational paradigm". As such, it should draw parallels from theoretical physics, and the main purpose of the researchers working on Islamization of knowledge should be "to explain the compatibility between the scientific method and the truth: to determine the limits where the scientific method alone is incapable of explaining the entire truth and needs the guidance and support of Revelation." It is said that since Islamization of knowledge, just like physics, is concerned with totality of truth, it should follow the methodology of stratification of scientific systems proposed for theoretical physics by Einstein. The methodology is said to entail "drawing a number of 'layers' from a set of logical proposition derived from immediate experience until one arrives at a system of generalized conceivable unity." In this matter Arif states:

"[T]he social scientists engaged in the Islamization of knowledge are the ones who recognize the fact that truth is a unity, and whatever is knowable through our sense is only part of the whole truth. This, in my view, is the unique characteristic of their methodology, and by using the philosophical foundations of Islam, they can now embark on the first task of paradigm building: namely, the stratification of primary concepts in their respective disciplines."

Arif argues that since scientific truth is universal the methodology adopted by the Islamization of knowledge will also produce universal results. Accordingly the long-range scientific implications of the plan are significant.


114 When writing this article in 1987, Arif was a doctoral candidate in economics at Clark University. He is also the cochairman, Research Group for Economics, Association of Muslim Social Scientists.


3.3.1.4. Analysis and conclusion

From the previous discussions, a number of conclusions can be drawn:

1). The majorities of the IIIT scholars are in favor of and advocate the notion of the Islamization of knowledge. Except for an occasional contributor like Fazlur Rahman, they promote the idea of the Islamization of knowledge and encourage Muslim intellectuals to undertake this task in their specialization. In short, the Islamization of knowledge as propounded by the IIIT scholars can be depicted as an attempt to re-conceive and rebuild the modern disciplines, be they humanities, social or natural sciences, by infusing into these disciplines a new foundation consistent with Islamic visions. Every discipline is to be recast to embody the principles of Islam in its methodology. The notion of the Islamization of knowledge also includes the production of university level text books for each discipline to be Islamized, to be used in Muslim universities.

2). The IIIT scholars deem it necessary to Islamize knowledge, because they regard modern knowledge or disciplines as being constructed on and developed from a secular and materialistic philosophy, which does not recognize the Divine revelation as a source of knowledge, and is prevalent in the West. This is viewed as contradictory to the Islamic vision of knowledge. The Muslim intellectual apathy is perceived as being caused by their adoption of and reliance on modern knowledge based on Western methodology. For these reasons, they want to establish an Islamic methodology, through the Islamization of knowledge effort.

3). By encouraging Muslim intellectuals to undertake the Islamization of modern knowledge or disciplines the IIIT scholars want to replace the secular materialistic world-view with an Islamic world-view. Based on the Islamic paradigm of knowledge it is hoped that the Islamic concept of civilization can then be materialized. In other words, the project of Islamization of knowledge is equal to the project of creating an Islamic civilization.

In reality, however, the notion of the Islamization of knowledge has generated strong opposition. Disagreement with the Islamization of knowledge program comes from both Muslim scholars having a background in the social sciences, and those with a background in the natural sciences.
From the social sciences, Bassam Tibi\textsuperscript{120}, who is trained in political science and sociology, for instance, can be singled out. Tibi interprets the Islamization of knowledge program as a form of indigenization, integrally linked to the cultural strategy of Islamic fundamentalism. Tibi states that "the Islamization of knowledge" is a basic formula in this fundamentalist agenda. He describes it as the "revolt against the West." This revolt is not merely against Western domination, as was the case during the decolonization period, but the revolt is directed against Western norm and values as such. Tibi understands the Islamization of knowledge as a "battle against unbelief." It is thought of as a de-westernization, a reassertion of the local against the global knowledge and the invading civilization related to it.\textsuperscript{121}

Believing the Islamization of knowledge is based on an Islamic dismissal of the European project of modernity, and of its principle of subjectivity\textsuperscript{122}, Tibi regards the Muslim fundamentalists (including the proponents of the Islamization of knowledge) who reject "alien knowledge" but simultaneously approve the adoption of alien instruments, such as modern science and technology, as ambivalent and as being involved in what Tibi calls the "Islamic dream of semi-modernity."\textsuperscript{123} Tibi considers it as "the basic dilemma of contemporary Muslims in regard to their attitudes towards modern knowledge." The Muslim fundamentalists seek to adopt modern knowledge as an "instrumentality", but reject its underpinning rationale, that is the "cultural modernity." Tibi criticizes the attitude of separating the achievements of modernity from the knowledge

\textsuperscript{120} Bassam Tibi (Syrian-German, born, 1944) is Professor of International Relations at the Center for International Affairs, the University of Götttingen. His latest publications include The Challenge of Fundamentalism (California University Press, 2002).

\textsuperscript{121} Bassam Tibi, 1995. "Cultural and Knowledge: The Politics of Islamization of Knowledge as a Postmodern Project? The Fundamentalist Claim to De-Westernization", Theory, Culture & Society, 12:1, February 1995, p. 2, 15, 18. Tibi’s view, however, has been rejected by proponents of the Islamization of knowledge, like Wan Mohd. Nor Wan Daud, who supports al-Attas in ISTAC, Malaysia, to develop his own conception of Islamization of knowledge. Both Daud and al-Attas claim to have nothing to do with the IHT’s program of Islamization of knowledge. Daud argues that Islamization of knowledge is of a dual nature. It "transforms certain fundamental aspects of the particular to fit a certain universal spiritual and intellectual vision and practical program while it simultaneously retain or even fortifies certain particular elements that are not contrary to its vision." Therefore Daud regards it wrong, to interpret Islamization of knowledge merely as an indigenization, as expressed above by Tibi, without emphasizing its more important dimension of universalization. See Daud, 1998:414-415.

\textsuperscript{122} Tibi, 1995:5.

\textsuperscript{123} Tibi, 1995:3. 9.
that led to them and that made them possible.\textsuperscript{124} It seems that in Tibi's understanding, the Muslims’ rejection of the philosophical dimensions of Western sciences deemed incompatible with the Islamic vision of reality and truth, should also mean rejecting the resultant technology.

Rejection of the call for the Islamization of knowledge in order to create an Islamized science also comes from Muslim scholars with a background in the natural sciences, like, for instance, Abdus Salam\textsuperscript{125} and Perves Hoodbhoy.\textsuperscript{126} Salam contends that “[t]here is only one universal science, its problems and modalities are international and there is no such thing as Islamic science just as there is no Hindu science, no Jewish science, no Confucian science, nor Christian science.” According to Salam, attempts of Muslim intellectuals to call for a religiously “Islamic science”, greatly disservice science in Muslim countries. He shares Hoodbhoy’s contention that Islamic science, as set out by the late President Zia of Pakistan, was a fraud and that its practitioners should be ashamed of what they have produced in the name of science.\textsuperscript{127}

Like Salam, Hoodbhoy rejects any effort to establish Islamic science. In his opinion, an Islamic science of the physical world is impossible. Any attempt to create this kind of science is seen as a waste of energy that will only dishonor the religion of Islam. He shares Sayid Ahmad Khan’s view, who argued that the purpose of religion is to improve morality rather than specify scientific facts.\textsuperscript{128} Hoodbhoy considers it pointless to create a new physical science based on religious principle. To support his standpoint he puts forth three arguments. (1) Islamic science does not exist. All efforts to make an Islamic science have failed. (2) Specifying a set of moral and theological principles does not permit one to build a new science from scratch. (3) There has never existed, and still does not exist, a definition of Islamic science which is acceptable to all Muslims.\textsuperscript{129}

Hoodbhoy insists that establishing Islamic science is impossible because of the fact that science has its own internal logic which cannot be interfered from outside, and even the scientist himself has sometimes no choice. He takes Galileo and Newton as examples of scientists who were devout Christians and had little desire to change the beliefs of their times.

\textsuperscript{124} Tibi, 1995:9.
\textsuperscript{125} Professor Abdus Salam (Pakistan, 1926 – 1996) is a Nobel Laureate in Physics (1979).
\textsuperscript{126} Perves Amirali Hoodbhoy (Pakistan, born, 1950) is Professor of Nuclear Physics, at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
\textsuperscript{128} Hoodbhoy, 1992:76.
\textsuperscript{129} Hoodbhoy, 1992:76-80.
However, when Newton was deeply troubled by the conflict with Christian dogma he opted ultimately for objectivity. Ultimately, their discoveries led to the scientific growth which swept away the power of the Church. To put it shortly, religiously-based science is, for him, unsound and negates the spirit of universalism. It goes without saying that Hoodbhoy strongly opposes all efforts to establish Islamic science, which he regards as a fake science, something that was not practiced by the early Muslim scholars.

Tibi regards the approach to the Islamization of sociological knowledge in particular, and the humanities in general, as "an ideologically inspired approach which remains reassertive and thus too vague." Tibi regards the Islamization of knowledge as a claim to de-Westernization which Muslim fundamentalists use to challenge modernity that can hamper the development of Muslim society. "The attitudes of Islamic fundamentalists toward modern science and technology do not contribute to the accommodation of modern knowledge that Muslim people urgently need for the development of their societies." Naturally, this concern of Tibi is not unique, and shared by many Muslim thinkers from the liberal tradition.

All opponents of the Islamization of knowledge agree that science which is the study of fact, is objective, independent of peoples, cultures or religions, and must be separated from values. Al-Faruqi himself, as the main advocate of the Islamization of knowledge movement, was not unaware that there would be opposition from other Muslim scholars to such an endeavor. He wrote, "[T]here are hundreds of thousands of M.A.’s and Ph.D.’s, but few among them are those who are even aware of the problem of Islamizing the disciplines; and legions are those whose brain-

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130 Hoodbhoy, 1992:78.
131 Hoodbhoy, 1992:83. Hoodbhoy strongly believes in the neutrality and objectivity of science. He states that scientists, despite their varied beliefs, who work in the field of the physics of elementary particles, will be judged by only one standard: does it or does it not, meet the challenge of experiment? It is not surprising for him that a scientist who believes in God and one who is atheistic reach the same conclusion, like in the case of Abdus Salam and Steven Weinberg, two physicists who shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics for having unified the weak and electromagnetic forces existing in nature. Salam is an affirmed believer and Weinberg an avowed atheist but they conceived the same theory of physics. Hoodbhoy, 1992:78.
132 Hoodbhoy, 1992:149.
washing by the West has been so complete as to make them committed enemies of Islamization."\textsuperscript{135}

The notions of Islamization of knowledge, envisioned first by al-Faruqi and developed later by other Muslim scholars attached to the IIIT, have been made known to wider audiences around the world through the IIIT's publication of a large number of books and articles on this subject. Ideas contained in the publications concerning this issue can be considered as, in the words of one of its advocates, a "revivalistic response to intellectual modernity."\textsuperscript{136} Tibi's assertion that the Islamization of knowledge program was interconnected with the cultural strategy of Islamic fundamentalism seems sound, since campaigns against Western values and norms prevalent in modern science have always been emphasized in the IIIT publications on this issue, whether they were written by key figures, or by regular or occasional contributors advocating the Islamization of knowledge program. Thus, in this thought-provoking issue the standpoint of the IIIT scholars very clearly articulates the perspective of Islamic fundamentalism in a gentle manner.


\textsuperscript{136} Yasien Mohamed, 1994, "Islamization of Knowledge: A Critique", \textit{AJISS}, 11:2, p.282. Yasien Mohamed, Department of Arabic Studies, University of the Western Cape Bellville, South Africa.
3.3.2. Perspectives of the IIIT scholars on the issues of democracy and the Implementation of the shari‘ah

In this section I will examine the viewpoints of the IIIT scholars in dealing with the issues of democracy and the implementation of the shari‘ah as the law of the state in a country where Muslims form the majority. The main objective of this examination is to discover their standpoints on the issues concerned and then to qualify them in the light of the typology of Islamic trends as presented earlier in this chapter. In undertaking these issues a number of questions are raised, such as:

Concerning democracy: (1) what is their opinion concerning modern democracy? Is it compatible with Islam or not? (2) Is modern democracy the same as Islamic shura or not? (3) Ideally, which form of democracy and shura should a Muslim country adopt? (4) Is the concept of shura applicable to today’s situation, which is different from that in the early days of Islam?

Concerning implementation of the Shari‘ah as the law of the state: (1) Is it necessary to make the Shari‘ah the law of the state, and what arguments are given for its justification? (2) Is it not better if Muslims adopt a secular state, as the revelation did not command the creation of an ideological state with the Shari‘ah as its constitution? (3) On a concrete level, which form of state should Muslim society adopt? Is it a modern nation state or a transnational khilafät?

3.3.2.1 Viewpoints of key figures

Democracy

AbuSulayman takes a critical position towards modern democracy. He considers the concepts of democracy and sovereignty as unknown to Muslim culture and therefore un-Islamic. He laments Muslim scholars who argue that those concepts are in harmony with the teachings of Islam and therefore must be adopted into Islamic political systems.\(^1\) Needless to say that in this matter AbuSulayman opposes the viewpoints of liberal Muslim thinkers who advocate adopting democracy in Muslim societies.

AbuSulayman defines “democracy” as a term deeply rooted in Western civilization. He views it as not merely the procedural measures of choosing political leaders but more than that, democracy is:

[A] natural extension of the materialistic philosophy that regards man as a physical entity whose value is measured in terms of the pragmatic or utilitarian sense of his usefulness to the 'state', society, and the world. The spiritual aspect of man's existence, which is his real value, is not stressed in the system. In essence, democracy is no more than an amalgamation of individuals who, by forming a majority, assume the right and the power to propagate their thoughts and achieve their personal interests, while making minimal concessions to minorities.²

It seems that AbuSulayman understands the democratic system as an order which represses the rights of minorities and does not appreciate human's spiritual values. Thus, it can be deduced that in AbuSulayman's view democracy is not compatible with Islam. Therefore, he urges that an Islamic political science must find another concept rooted in Islam, namely the shura. In his opinion the shura is different from democracy, even though both aim at achieving similar goals, to choose the proper leadership, establish control and reach decisions. He defines shura as follows:

By definition, al-shura, derives from a philosophical perception essentiality different from that of democracy. This difference lies in the notion of justice as a concrete fact of existence which man arrives at through his own nature and Divine revelation, and which he endeavors to attain irrespective of his personal desires and interests. As a method, the system of al-shura provides the procedure whereby Muslims sit together and deliberate upon important matters to arrive at and be bound by conclusions in the light of the philosophical concept of justice. If the issue under consideration does not concern justice but a case of preferring one to the other, there is no harm in adopting measures such [as] voting, abiding by the point of view of the minority, etc. The same measures could be resorted to if the discussion reached a deadlock in the absence of an authentic analogy.³

In view of the authority of the revealed justice, AbuSulayman thus maintains that in the system of shura the processes of developing and executing decisions are different from those of the Western democracy. He warns against the danger of blind Westernization, such as adopting the Western style of democracy which leads to catastrophic results. To AbuSulayman, the secular foundation of democracy is disturbing, because it does not include a higher reality above the level of the human being.

³ AbuSulayman in IIIT, 1988:114.
That is, the system of democracy is not subordinated to another system based on the word of God – the Qur’an.  

Abu Sulayman compares the situation of minorities in a contemporary democracy to the situation of minorities in the ideal and Islamic system. The justice of the *shura* system is founded both on the nature of mankind and on revelation. The term *shura* itself is considered to imply a method. In general, *shura* is translated as “consultation” and Muslims sometimes stress that the word expresses an ideal manner in which human beings should conduct their affairs. The expression “authentic analogy” is probably meant by Abu Sulayman to refer to the legal principle of *qiyaṣ* (deduction by analogy). According to him, the possibilities of the method of *qiyaṣ* should be exhausted before one turns to measures such as voting. The study of a term such as *shura* is said to bring about knowledge of the Islamic political system and such knowledge can be used to develop a system containing processes and modes for executing decisions.

*The implementation of the shari‘ah*

One of the most controversial issues amongst Muslims from different traditions is the form of government which they should adopt. In this respect, opinions of Muslim scholars vary. For instance, on the one hand, Islamists advocate the notion that the Muslim *ummah* should be governed under the *khilafah* system, ruled by one *khalifah* as was the case in the period of *al-khulafa‘ al-rashidun*, while, on the other hand, liberal Muslims strongly oppose this idea arguing that there is no injunction in the Qur’an and the *sunnah* regarding the specific form of government; thus Muslims are free to choose according to their actual conditions.

Before discussing the views of the IIIT scholars on the form of government or state the Muslim *ummah* should adopt, it will be better to first identify who the Muslim *ummah* are, according to them. Isma‘il Raji al-Faruqi (1921-1986), one of the IIIT leaders, defines the *ummah* as “a universal brotherhood which knows neither color nor ethnic identity.” He emphasizes that “in its purview, all men are one, measurable only in

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5 The word *shura* appears once in the Qur’an in verse 42:38. Sura 42 is entitled *ash-shura*. In the Qur’anic context the word is translated “consultation”. There are also various levels on which “consultation” can be conducted, such as consultation between man and wife or between rulers and ruled. For an example of interpretation of the term see the commentaries to the verse in Yusuf Ali’s translation of the Qur’an.
terms of piety. It is an order of human beings who opt to govern their lives, and seek to govern the lives of all other humans, by the ummatic values and principles. In al-Faruqi's understanding, the notion of the ummah is in contradiction with the notion of the modern state. For him, the ummah is not limited and based on race, territory, language and past history. Rather, it is based on Islam. Therefore, al-Faruqi views whoever decides to make Islam his/her religion and to govern his/her life by its law (shari'ah) is “ipso facto a member of the ummah.” Thus, it is clear that in al-Faruqi’s view the membership of the khilafah or ummah is not restricted to any geographical border like a modern state, and it is also obvious that he advocates the ummah to apply the shari'ah law for governing their lives. Naturally, this suggestion is recommended when Muslims assume the position of majority in the land where they live.

As a consequence of his view that the ummah is not limited to any geographical border, al-Faruqi considers that Muslims are free to live anywhere on earth and may pledge loyalty to laws of the land where they live, as long as they do not contradict the shari'ah in the areas which affect the Muslim’s life. However, al-Faruqi argues, when the laws of the residential territory influence the Muslim’s life in a manner adverse to Islam, he or she should immigrate to an Islamic territory. It seems here that al-Faruqi is still influenced by the notion of classical jurists, which divide the world into dār al-Islām on the one hand, and dār al-kafr, or what he and other IIIT scholars prefer to call dār al-da'wah, on the other hand. Although he avoids using the term dār al-kafr, in fact, he still divides the world into two divisions: the Islamic territory and the non-Islamic territory.

The identity of the Muslim ummah as projected by al-Faruqi being clear, how should this ummah be governed? What form of government or state should the ummah adopt? Is it a secular or an Islamic state? 'AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, one of the IIIT leaders, expressed his preference for the khilafah system, "The khilafah system is an ideal for which every Muslim must strive." He warns Muslims not to be misled by people who do not respect the Islamic identity and reminds them that the struggle requires "perseverance, determination, and originality." AbuSulayman seems to regard the khilafah as an Islamic identity. His preference to

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7 Al-Faruqi, 1992:142.
8 Al-Faruqi, 1992:142.
10 AbuSulayman, 1994:35.
the khilafah system can also be understood as a sign that he insists on taking the form of the Islamic state rather than the secular state.

Al-Faruqi seems to have had the same outlook. He advocated the notion of al-khilafah to be applied to Muslim society. He said, “[T]he ummah is equally the state, in the sense of sovereignty, and all the organs and powers which exercise of sovereignty requires.” He goes further by stating that “the ummah should be referred to as al-khilafah rather than al-dawlah”. In his opinion al-khilafah is closer to the Islamic tradition and to al-tawhid; of which it is a direct Qur’anic deduction. This deduction is based on the fact that the Qur’anic verses use the terms khilafah, khulafa’, khala’if, yastaakhilifukum etc., while al-dawlah is, to him, a modern notion which “stands at the farthest remove from the Qur’anic idea of vicegerency which is the very raison d’etre of the ummah.” Al-Faruqi also emphasizes the difference between the khilafah or ummah and the Western notion of the state.11 Here, it is also clear that al-Faruqi proposes the adoption of the khilafah by Muslim societies instead of the modern nation-state promoted by the Western countries.

In reality, many Muslim countries have adopted the Western concept of the nation or the state. Al-Faruqi criticizes it as being caused by a lack of vision among Muslim leaders to build the Islamic citizen, who is committed to the ideology of Islam. He writes:

The great majority of constitutions of Muslim countries state that Islam is the state’s religion. Only one, Saudi Arabia, takes the statement with seriousness, the sign of which is the implementation of the sharīah. A number of other states, such as Pakistan, Kuwait come next with a claim for Islam as raison d’etre of state and ummah but add to it the Western descriptive notions that they are nations or states because they combine a people, a territory and sovereignty—a consideration which at once assumes Islam to be inadequate as raison d’etre. A third class like Egypt, Morocco, the Sudan, etc., regards Islam as necessary icing on top of the cake whose internal structure and texture are molded by Western rather than Islamic notions.12

Al-Faruqi then maintains that the Muslim ummah at the present time should strive for the embodiment of al-khilafah, which does not exist in any Muslim state today. In order to materialize it, in his opinion, al-khilafah should mobilize the whole Muslim world and call it to march at

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any cost. Once the Muslim ummah stands in readiness, al-Faruqi argues, al-khilafah will be on hand again.\textsuperscript{13} It seems that al-Faruqi strongly endorses the establishment of al-khilafah, but, surprisingly he does not explain how and where it should be established, and what condition should be fulfilled by the head of the expected khilafah.

Al-'Alwani, the former president of the IIIT, held the opinion that Muslims must strive for the establishment of al-khilafah as it was exemplified in the early period of Islam. He supported the notion that the Muslim ummah should now establish a state like the one founded by the Prophet in the city of Medina and that Muslims need constant mobilization in order to make that dream a reality.\textsuperscript{14} In al-'Alwani's opinion, the contemporary Islamic discourse has remained imprisoned by the hope of establishing such a state and the imagined circumstances reliant on it.\textsuperscript{15} It must also be stressed that the desire to attain political power and "establish the state" had become the norm. The fall down of the Ottoman Empire is seen by al-'Alwani as having brought about the mobilization of all potentials in every Muslim society, including religious beliefs, to oppose colonization. In turn, al-'Alwani believes, that this phenomenon led to a sharp improvement of the status and role of the Islamic tradition, while strengthening the mood of discarding all that was associated with the enemy.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, from this short presentation it can be concluded that al-'Alwani, just like AbuSulayman and al-Faruqi, is also dreaming of the creation of the khilafah which will govern the Muslim ummah. In turn, one can logically assume that the expected khilafah should apply the shari'ah law in governing the ummah, as has been clearly suggested by al-Faruqi.

3.3.2.2. Viewpoints of regular contributors

From the regular contributors, the opinion of Louay M. Safi regarding the issue of the implementation of the Shari'ah may be singled out. In his article, "The Islamic State: A Conceptual Framework", published by the IIIT's journal, AlJISS, Safi elaborates three aspects of the Islamic state: (1) the purpose of the Islamic state, (2) the source of political legitimacy, and

\textsuperscript{13} Al-Faruqi, 1992:155.
\textsuperscript{14} Al-'Alwani, 1996, Missing Dimension in Contemporary Islamic Movements, Herndon, VA: IIIT, p.32.
\textsuperscript{15} Al-'Alwani, 1996:32.
\textsuperscript{16} Al-'Alwani, 1996:32.
(3) the scope of state power. Unfortunately, he does not relate his discussions to the issue of modern democracy.

Safi deems it necessary to define the Islamic state. He seems to disagree with the approach which distinguishes the state from other political systems by three elements: population, authority, and sovereignty. For him, defining the state in terms of these three components does not help in identifying the essential elements which distinguish the Islamic state from other types of states. According to him, the Islamic state “should be identified with the system of rules that determines the quality of life in the political community as well as the political organs necessary for the realization of the Islamic ideals.” This is important in order to avoid misunderstanding between the concept of state and that of ummah, as for him, the two concepts are different in their moral significance and their territorial boundaries. Morally, he argues, the state and the ummah operate on a different plane, and territorially, the geographical boundaries of the Islamic state need not coincide with those of the ummah.17

For Safi, the Islamic state “is not a political community whose population is mainly composed of Muslim individuals, but rather one whose legal order is based on and derived from the principles of the Shari'ah.” Concerning the purpose of the Islamic state, he emphasizes that it is not to impose a narrowly defined code of behavior on society, because tolerance in difference of beliefs is an established Islamic principle. According to him, the purpose of the Islamic state is “to establish the general conditions that will facilitate the realization of the human mission (khalifah).” Furthermore, Safi differentiates between the role and purpose of the Islamic state and those of the ummah. While the ummah is claimed to promote “the Islamic character and help the individual grow morally and spiritually, allowing him/her to define his/her role and objectives in life within the general framework of the Shari'ah,” the state is said to endeavor running the ummah’s activities in ways that will enable a society “to cope with economic and political challenges and to enhance the quality of life in the community.”18

However, in Safi’s opinion, these differences should not be taken to mean that the one could be separated from the other, for both are closely interconnected. In his view, the creation of the Islamic state presupposes the emergence of a society committed to Islamic principles and norms, or in other words, it presupposes the existence of the ummah. He goes fur-

ther with the statement that "although the ummah qua moral Islamic order could exist and has existed without an Islamic state, the creation of the state is imperative if the ummah qua the legal Islamic order is to be realized. As such, the Islamic state is indeed a supreme moral goal, because Islamic moral life can never be complete in the absence of the Islamic state." From this quotation it can be inferred that Safi, like the key figures of the IIIT, also idealizes and supports the notion of establishing the Islamic state.

However, Safi tends to differ from them when examining the form of government. This can be seen from his statement, "Clearly, the political model of the Islamic state is secondary to the principle which justifies it, and it should therefore be modified and even changed when it fails to realize the principle which justifies its existence." He further argues that in fact, the classical jurists "were willing to endorse different variations of the model so long as these variations continued to reflect the fundamental principle." Thus, unlike the IIIT key figures, who take the viewpoint that the khilāfa system is the institution to be chosen for the ummah's governance as exemplified by the four rightly-guided caliphs, Safi seems to be more flexible in this case.

With regard to the source of political legitimacy, Safi maintains that the ultimate source of political power is the ummah, as the bearer of divine revelation. He also maintains that the head of state needs the community's approval for legitimating the state actions. When talking about the scope of state power, Safi considers the head of state indeed "supreme on the executive side." Nevertheless, he is never an absolute ruler, because he is subordinated to the Shari'ah and limited by its principles. In Safi's understanding, the ultimate source of law of the state is the Shari'ah, and the members of the Muslim community as well as the jurists can act as a check on the ruler in their capacity as trustees of the divine revelation. Safi maintained that believers were religiously obliged to obey the ruler only if the ruler abided by the Shari'ah's rules. Once again, it is evident that Safi, like the IIIT key figures, supports the idea of establishing the Islamic state which implements the Shari'ah, although he does not specify the form of government.

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Other contributors to IIIT publications, such as Hisham al-Talib and Tahir Amin can also be singled out. Al-Talib, for instance, utilizes the term “shura” instead of democracy. As he puts it, “Shura is the first principle of Islamic leadership. The Qur’an has made it clear that Muslim leaders are obliged to consult those who have knowledge or those who can provide sound advice.”

Although al-Talib in this study did not explore the concept of shura in connection with the Islamic state or government since his study was intended for a specific purpose and a different context, it is quite interesting that he prefers to use the Islamic term shura, while avoiding its equivalent, democracy.

On the other hand, Amin expresses the view that Muslim people belong to one global community, the ummah. The difference of race, language and color is seen as accidental. Amin has an outlook similar to that of the key figures of the IIIT concerning the necessity to adopt the system of shura. In his understanding, Islam recognizes “shura (mutual consultation) in the community as the hallmark of its political system but sovereignty belongs to Allah rather than to king, or the dictator, or even the people.” He further argues that the freedom of the ummah to make decisions is “circumscribed by the set of principles laid down in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet.” Amin claims that justice and balance between the role of individual and community promoted by Islam is better than in the systems of Liberalism and Marxism. In his epilogue, Amin states that “the emergence of Islamic communitarian internationalism represents both a reaction against the two Western traditions, Liberalism and Marxism, as well as the affirmation of its identity.” In this study, Amin does not explicitly express his support for the imposition of the Shari’ah, but his statement that the community’s decision is restricted by the set of principles laid down in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, as shown in the quotation above, indicates that he advocated such a notion.

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25 Hisham al-Talib is one of the IIIT directors and a senior research scholar of the IIIT.
24 Tahir Amin is Professor at the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University. He holds Ph.D. in Political Science from MFT, Cambridge, USA.
3.3.2.3. Viewpoints of occasional contributors

From the occasional contributors, it is instructive to highlight the contribution of Zafar Ishaq Ansari.\textsuperscript{28} Ansari maintains that in its history Islam has struggled with the problem of competing loyalties. He stated that Islam has faced the challenge of ‘asabiyyah, which is “the moving spirit of the pre-Islamic social order” in the past and the nationalism at present. In his understanding, the idea of ‘asabiyyah is similar to that of nationalism, because ‘asabiyyah denotes supreme loyalty to the tribe and nationalism denotes supreme loyalty to the nation. He feels that the Arab motto of the sixth century “Help your brother [clansman]: right or wrong” resembles the motto of the nationalists “My nation: right or wrong” in the present age. Ansari argues that the tribal ‘asabiyyah is strongly condemned by Islam, and that Islam becomes “the major unifying force, the primary basis of communal cohesion.”\textsuperscript{29}

Opposing the idea of tribalism and nationalism, Ansari supports the idea of establishing “a universal entity based on common devotion to the One True God,” for he believes that this relates to the basic mission of the Muslim ummah. He argues that the Muslim ummah has not been raised to pursue its own group interest, i.e. to fulfill its economic and political ambitions; rather, it has been raised “for all mankind”. He goes further to emphasize that they have a mission to “uphold the word of God, to be witnesses of truth and justice, to constantly endeavor to promote good and oppose evil.” Nevertheless, he claims this does not mean that entities other than the Muslim ummah will never support what is good and oppose what is evil. For him, to support what is right, to uphold what is just and to oppose what is evil constitutes the essential mission of the Muslim ummah. It is the pursuit of this mission, according to him, which calls for the establishment of brotherhood among the Muslim ummah.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite his opposition to the tribal ‘asabiyyah, Ansari was convinced that Islam did not want to destroy tribes or clans, nor did it ask the Muslims to completely split their ties with those entities. In Ansari’s understanding, “Islam cultivated in the Muslims an attitude of mind that would make them transcend rather than destroy tribes or clans.” He explains that Islam asks the Muslims to destroy ‘asabiyyah which might be trans-

\textsuperscript{28} Zafar Ishaq Ansari is Director General of the Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
\textsuperscript{29} Ansari, “Foreword” in Tahir Amin, 1991: xiii.
lated as tribal chauvinism. This is so because, as he argued, Islam opposes the exaggerated loyalty to the tribe in sixth-century Arabia, which put the loyalty to the tribe so much above everything that even the consideration of truth and falsehood were subordinated to tribal interests. Naturally, for Ansari, Islam did not approve the attitude of mind which considers the tribal tie to be more important than the religious tie that binds all Muslims into one ummah.31

Ansari maintains that in the early period of Islam when Muslims appeared on the stage of history, they were a single political entity. This situation continued during the first century of Islam. But gradually the Muslim world split into a number of political entities. However, even when a multiplicity of states had become known realities of Muslim political life, Ansari affirms, many Muslim thinkers never ceased to yearn for the unification of dār al-Islam. They generally kept up the ideal of establishing a unified political framework in the form of a single Islamic state that would embrace all Muslim lands.32 Without mentioning the thinkers by name Ansari claims that many Muslim scholars are still idealizing the creation of an Islamic state.

The hope of establishing an Islamic state and implementing the Shari‘ah, as articulated by the key figures of the IIIT, strongly echoes the ideals of the Islamists. The Islamists insist on the implementation of the Shari‘ah because they regard it as God’s law and, therefore, above a constitution, which is a product of the people. To support their position the Islamists forwarded several arguments that the Shari‘ah is not compatible with a man-made constitution.

Nadirsyah Hosen,33 another occasional contributor to the IIIT publications, discusses this issue in his article. He notices that four arguments are forwarded by the Islamists, or what he calls “authoritarians”. Those arguments, as pointed out by Hosen, can be summarized as follows:

**Argument 1**: The Shari‘ah is immutable because the authoritarian, divine, and absolute concept of law in Islam does not allow change in legal concepts and institutions. This position is not compatible with the nature of a constitution which can be amended, modified, reformed, or even replaced. **Argument 2**: The Shari‘ah is based on God’s revelation. Thus, the

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33 Nadirsyah Hosen is a research scholar at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. He obtained his Master of Laws in comparative law from the Northern Territory University, Australia.
source of Islamic law is God’s will, which is absolute and unchangeable. In other words, real power lies with God. This condition contradicts the nature of constitutionalism, which is based on the people’s will. **Argument 3:** Constitutionalism is not drawn originally from Islam; rather, it is a western product and part of western hegemony. **Argument 4:** The Shari’ah is perfect, for it is based on the Qur’an (5:3) and therefore covers broad topics (e.g., ritual, social interaction, criminal law, and political law) and can answer every single problem.\(^{34}\)

It is argued that the Islamists do not believe the compatibility of the Shari’ah with constitutionalism in the modern, legal, and secular sense. Instead, the Qur’an and the Hadith literature should be seen as the Islamic constitution.\(^{35}\) Hosen’s purpose in presenting this argument is to show its contrasts with the perspective of the secularists who believe that the Shari’ah cannot be taken as the constitution of a state. In this contribution Hosen rejects both the viewpoints of the Islamists (which he calls “authoritarians”) and the secularists. Instead, he proposes to take “the substantive Shari’ah approach” which holds that the Shari’ah should be reinterpreted in line with democracy and constitutionalism. Since this substantive approach is, according to Hosen, based on the belief that any understanding of the Shari’ah cannot be static and final, “it can be amended, reformed, modified, or even altered – as long as its fundamental basis is not neglected.” Thus, in Hosen’s view the Shari’ah is changeable and adaptable to social change, and thus follows the dynamics and the characteristics of human beings. His view is based on the ground that “revelation is divine, whereas interpretation is human, fallible and inevitably plural.” At the end of his conclusion Hosen states that “the Shari’ah is compatible with constitutionalism,” and, therefore, the Shari’ah’s principles could be a formal source for a constitution.\(^{36}\) Hosen’s view that the Shari’ah is compatible with constitutionalism seems to indicate that he advocates the implementation of Shari’ah law by the state.

### 3.3.2.4. Analysis and Conclusion

In conclusion, the IIIT scholars’ viewpoints on the issues of democracy and the implementation of the shari’ah can be summarized as follows.

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\(^{34}\) Nadirsyah Hosen, 2004, “In Search of Islamic Constitutionalism”, AJISS, 21:2, pp.3-5.

\(^{35}\) Hosen, 2004:5.

\(^{36}\) Hosen, 2004:19.
Concerning democracy. The IIIT scholars regard democracy as a Western concept rooted in Western civilization and therefore alien to Islam. Logically, it can be deduced that in their perspective modern democracy is not compatible with Islam. Therefore, they prefer to propagate the Islamic concept of shura, which, for them, is different from that of democracy, to be practiced by the Muslim societies. In the perspective of the IIIT scholars, the present situation of Muslim countries requires that the shura be adopted and implemented. Nevertheless, they do not specify how it should be practiced, especially in this modern time.

Concerning the implementation of the shari'ah. The IIIT scholars insist on the imposition of the shari'ah as the law of state when the Muslims assume the majority position. The application of the shari'ah as the law state means the creation of an Islamic state and abandoning of the secular state. They also idealize the creation of the khilafah (caliphate), after the example practiced during the four rightly guided caliphs, to run the government of the Islamic state. Seemingly, however, they do not have a clear view on how the caliphate should be operated in the present time.

It can be said that with regard to the issue of democracy, the IIIT scholars' view, as presented in the above discussions, reflects the standpoint of the Islamists, which according to my typology presented earlier falls under the category of fundamentalist Islam, rather than liberal Islam. As discussed in the previous section, fundamentalists are against the ideas and concepts imported from the West like democracy; instead they prefer to utilize the concept of shura taken from Islamic heritage. On the contrary, the liberals are in favor of adopting modern democracy, because it is in line with the spirit of Islam and is equal to the concept of shura. Seen from this angle the IIIT scholars are fundamentalists in tone.

Meanwhile, concerning the issue of the implementation of the Shari'ah, it can be concluded that the IIIT scholars support the notion of the imposition of the Shari'ah as the state law. Their preference to adopt the Shari'ah as the state law for running the government is in line with the outlooks of the Islamists. The Islamists believe that the Shari'ah, as God's law, is above the constitution. The Shari'ah is sufficient to meet the Muslim's needs, therefore, they do not need a man-made constitution. To the Islamists the Shari'ah has provided a unique system of government or politics, and, therefore, they oppose the notion that Shari'ah is compatible
with a man-made constitution. The Islamists advocate the ideological state of the Shari’ah.

Most probably, the IIIT scholars are inspired and influenced by ideals promoted by *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, including the ideal of establishing an Islamic state. The influence of *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* on the IIIT scholars’ thought is certain in view of the relations between them and *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*. Haddad, for instance, pointed out that al-Faruqi, who is a key figure of the IIIT, had an ideological link to organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) and to the ideas of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. These men are qualified by Esposito as “neo-fundamentalists” in the sense that they return to the sources of the fundamentals of Islam and reinterpret those sources in response to the challenges of the modern world.

Al-Faruqi’s involvement in the Muslim Students Association (MSA) during his student years can also be taken as evidence that he was a supporter of the Brotherhood. In this respect, Ba-Yunus states, “Ismail’s presence among the student population gave a much needed enhancement to the image of the Muslim Students Association on this continent [America] and overseas. Soon he became an advocate for the Muslim Students Association (MSA) and one of the most sought after speakers in its ranks.” It is obvious that al-Faruqi was deeply involved in the MSA, which was one of the means through which the Brotherhood had been disseminated.

It is said that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami disseminated their message through, among others, mosques, publications, and student organization. According to Poston, one of the possibilities through which the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami came into North America was by way of the Muslim Student Association (MSA).

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The ideology of Hasan al-Banna was directly integrated into the objectives and philosophy of the organization.\(^\text{44}\)

Al-Faruqi’s conception that the Muslim ummah encompasses the whole nation of the Muslim world, which is fundamentally different from the conception of the modern state, is probably influenced by writings of Hasan al-Banna (d.1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Banna, like other Islamist thinkers, emphasized that Islam is not merely a creed of the Muslims but also their fatherland and nationality. Al-Banna affirmed that the Islamic fatherland includes all Islamic lands. He also strongly emphasized the idea that all Muslims form one collective and inseparable identity; as he put it, “Islam does not recognize these geographical boundaries and these racial and blood differences. It regards all Muslims as belonging to the same nationality and considers the Islamic fatherland one fatherland.”\(^\text{45}\) He maintained that “every piece of the earth where lives a brother who follows the faith of the Qur’an is a part of the common Islamic fatherland.”\(^\text{46}\) On this ground al-Banna supported the ideal of liberating all Muslim lands, not only Egypt or Arab world, from foreign domination. He also held the opinion that aggression against one part of the Muslim world was aggression against the whole Muslim world.\(^\text{47}\) However, this does not mean that al-Banna was unaware of the loyalty to his country, Egypt. In his opinion, the Muslims have two nationalities: first, the Islamic nationality (which is the fundamental and vital one), and second, their particular nationality. Thus, according to al-Banna, Muslims are bound by two duties: general duties to the Islamic nationality and a particular duty to the people among whom they live.\(^\text{48}\)

Although Hasan al-Banna opposed the nationalist ideology, “he was emphatic about some of those objectives which the nationalists also seek to achieve.” In this respect, al-Banna, as Ansari pointed out, coined a number of terms and expressions which indicate the shared area of objectives between him and the nationalists. For instance, al-Banna made it clear that he did not oppose the notion of "wataniyat al-hanîn" (the patriotism of love) by which he meant the love for one’s country. He regarded

\(^{44}\) The MSA was founded in 1963 at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, the founding members were Dr. Ahmad Sakr, Dr. Ahmad Totonji, and Jamal Barzinji, all members of the Muslim Brotherhood. See Poston 2002:79.


such love as one ingrained in human nature. He also agreed with wataniyat al-hurriyah wa al-izzah (the patriotism of freedom and glory) as well as wataniyat al-mujtama’ (the patriotism of social welfare).\textsuperscript{46} Al-Faruqi seems to follow al-Banna’s steps in this respect, as well.

In the preface to his book \textit{al-Tauhid: Its Implication for Thought and Life}, al-Faruqi elaborated on some presuppositions underlying this book. When presenting the second presupposition he examines \textit{al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun} by stating:

It [\textit{al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun}] had a wonderful beginning but could not keep the pace. Besides the tragedy of allowing itself to be sucked into a battle it could not win – its minor fault the graver tragedy was its inability to crystallize the vision of Islam as relevant to every moment of human life, every shade of modern human activity. The vision was at its brightest in the mind of the late Hasan al-Banna; but it was somewhat confused and less clear in his followers. Unfortunately, the great Muslim minds kept themselves busy elsewhere. They did not rise to fill the task left over by al-Banna, of elaborating the principles of Islam as those of a modern and viable experience. Thus the movement could grow in numbers but not in ideational depth which is the requirement of change prescribed by the divine decree.\textsuperscript{47}

Al-Faruqi seemed to admire the brilliant vision of al-Banna and lamented Muslim scholars who did not persist in elaborating the principles of Islam as those of a modern and viable experience, the task not yet completed by al-Banna. The quotation above indicates that al-Faruqi has been inspired by \textit{al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun}. It is most probably, then, that al-Faruqi was eager to materialize the ideals of al-Banna.

As shown in the above discussions, the IIIT scholars tend to follow and support the viewpoints of the Islamists in idealizing the establishment of an Islamic state and then the implementation of the Shari‘ah as the state law. However, such ideals have not remained without opposition. Rejection of the idea to make the Shari‘ah the constitution of a state came from Muslim thinkers from secular or liberal traditions.

These liberal scholars strongly rejected the idea of implementing the Shari‘ah in public life, because the Shari‘ah has never been the constitution of the traditional Islamic caliphate. Therefore, the Shari‘ah cannot be

\textsuperscript{46} Ansari, “Foreword” in Tahir Amin, 1991:xxii.

enforced through a constitution, as affirmed by a liberal Muslim thinker, such as 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq.48

48 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966) was the most controversial Islamic political thinker of the twentieth century. His book, Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, written in 1925, provoked great criticism within the Muslim world. He was then condemned and isolated by al-Azhar's 'ulama council, dismissed from his position as a judge, and prohibited from assuming a position in the government. Raziq disagreed with many 'ulama, who considered the establishment of the khilafah as obligatory and therefore regarded it sinful if it were not carried out. Raziq could not find a strong foundation to support this belief.
3.3.3. Perspectives of the IIIT Scholars on the issue of Muslim/non-Muslim relations

This section talks about the viewpoint of the IIIT scholars in dealing with the issue of Muslim-non-Muslims relations. Their opinions concerning points such as: (1) how to take care of non-Muslim minorities and what rights they are entitled to exercise in a Muslim community under Muslim rule, as well as how Muslims as a minority in non-Muslim countries should live, (2) how to deal with apostasy in a Muslim society, and (3) their opinion regarding the age-old concept of dār al-Islām and dār al-harb will be presented and discussed in the following paragraphs.

3.3.3.1. Viewpoints of key figures

Al-Faruqi unequivocally states that Islam acknowledges the non-believer religiously. To be acquainted with how the issue of Muslim/non-Muslim relations is perceived by al-Faruqi, one must first know how he views the position of Islam pertaining to it. In al-Faruqi’s understanding, Islam has recognized the non-believer on three distinct levels: that of humanism, revelational universalism, and historical revelation. In short, these three levels can be described as follows. Firstly, on the level of humanism, Islam, says al-Faruqi, has introduced the concept of din al-fitrah to affirm its judgment that “all men are endowed at birth by God with a religion that is true, genuine and valid for all time.” Since all men are creatures of God they are equal in their creatureliness and their natural ability to recognize God and His law. Therefore, so goes the argument, no one is excused from not knowing God as his Creator, because every one has been equipped with the means required for such knowledge at his birth. Al-Faruqi says that Islam differentiates between natural religion and the religions of history. In the case of the latter, they are derived either from basic endowment or come from sources such as revelation.

Secondly, on the level of revelational universalism, quoting verses from the Qur’an, al-Faruqi points out that Islam articulates that “there is no people but that God has sent them a prophet or warner” (al-Fātir: 24); and that “no prophet was sent but to convey the same divine message, namely, to teach that God is God and that man ought to serve Him” (al-

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This is understood by al-Faruqi to mean that what nature has
given to man is not enough and that Islam adds the contribution of his-
tory. In history, every people has been sent a messenger in order "to teach
them in their own language" (Ibrahim: 4), and "none has been sent in
vain" (al-Nisa': 64). Al-Faruqi argues that every messenger conveyed the
same message from God whose core is the acknowledgment of Him as
God and the service of Him through adoration and obedience. Therefore,
in al-Faruqi's point of view, all men are possessors of divine revelation.
Certainly, the revelations fit their context of history and language, "but all
[are] identical in their essential religious content." In this context, Mus-
lims and non-Muslims are seen by al-Faruqi as equal by the fact that they
have been objects of divine communication.

Thirdly, on the level of historical revelation, al-Faruqi argues that Is-
lam identified itself with much of the historical revelation of Judaism and
Christianity, for it acknowledged the prophets of these religions as genu-
ine prophets of God, accepted them as Islam's own and taught Muslims to
honor them and memorize their names. With the reception of the Jewish
prophets and Jesus Christ, Islam, says al-Faruqi, reduced every disparity
between itself and these religions to a domestic difference, which may be
due to human understanding, rather than to God. It must be admitted
that there are many dissimilarities between Muslims and non-Muslims,
but Islam, argues al-Faruqi, "relegates these differences to personal un-
derstanding, not to the religions concerned as such." Al-Faruqi further
asserts that the Muslim "is required to begin by assuming that any Jew
and Christian adheres to the same faith as that of Islam on the three lev-
els." He bases his argument on the verse: "O People of the Books, let us
rally together, around a noble principle common to both of us, namely,
that we shall serve none but God; that we shall associate naught with
Him, and shall not take one another as Lords besides God" (Ali 'Imrân:
64), and another verse: "Those who believe (the Muslims) and those who
are Jews, Christians and Sabaeans — all those who believe in God and in
the Day of Judgment and work righteousness, shall have their reward
with God. They shall have no cause for fear, nor for grief" (al-Baqarah
2:62). Thus, al-Faruqi contends that religiously Islam recognizes the
non-believer. Every non-Muslim is granted "religious privilege" and rel-
gious dignity by virtue of his sharing the natural religion and divine reve-

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3 Al-Faruqi, 1992:47
loration in history. And, in the case of a Jew or a Christian, adds al-Faruqi, he is granted another privilege and dignity, namely, that of sharing in the tradition of Islam itself. Al-Faruqi maintains that this privilege, granted by God in the Qur’an to the Jews, Christians and Sabaeans was extended by the Muslims to adherents of all the religions of the world when they came into contact with them.\(^6\)

With regard to the rights of non-Muslims, al-Faruqi discusses this matter within the context of non-Muslims who are given the status of dhimmi, that is, “non-believer in the Islamic state, or covenanter in the Pax Islamica.”\(^7\) The non-Muslims here are seen as a minority group living under the rule of an Islamic state. To put it short, al-Faruqi contends that the non-Muslim has, in the religious realm, the right to be convinced, the right to be non-convinced, and the right to convince others.

As far as religion is concerned, the non-Muslim is entitled to be convinced of the truth by the Muslim. However, one cannot misunderstand it as compelling someone to another conviction. The Muslim, argues al-Faruqi, is obliged by his faith to present Islam to the non-believer, or to do da’wah (calling people to accept Islam). It is up to the non-Muslim to make up his mind concerning accepting or rejecting what is presented to him. Al-Faruqi asserts that the Muslim must not press the matter once the presentation has been made, for God has warned His Prophet: “There shall be no coercion in religion. The truth is now manifest; and so is falsehood. Whoever rejects evil and believes in God has attached himself to the most solid of bonds” (al-Baqarah:256).\(^8\) Furthermore, al-Faruqi warns the Muslim practicing da’wah to argue in the manner commanded by God, and not to take men’s rejection too much to heart, as God has warned.\(^9\)

Al-Faruqi emphasizes that in doing da’wah the Muslim must not bring to bear anything irrelevant to the argument, for that would be to deteriorate the process of da’wah itself. Neither is any other kind of interference,

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\(^7\) Al-Faruqi, 1998:295.


\(^9\) The verse reads: “Call them unto the path of your Lord through wise argument and fair preaching; and argue with them (the non-believers) with arguments yet more fair, yet more becoming” (al-Nahl 16:125).

\(^10\) The verses read: “Had your Lord willed it, all the people of the earth would be believers (But He did not). Would you then compel the people to believe?” and, “O Men, the truth has come to you from your Lord. Whoever wills, may be guided by it; whoever does not will, may not” (Yunus 10:95, 108).
bribery or coercion allowed, since a decision arrived at through coercion is not a decision sought. Such a decision, argues al-Faruqi, is illegitimate and from the standpoint of shari’ah, “the decision to convert to Islam is null and void to the subject, and a prosecutable crime for the da’iyah.” ¹¹ Al-Faruqi contends that da’wah should be performed with comeliness and better arguments.¹²

In addition to the right to be convinced, the non-Muslim, according to al-Faruqi, has the right to be non-converted. Al-Faruqi suggests that if the non-Muslim is not convinced by the presentation of the truth of Islam, his decision must be respected. Al-Faruqi takes an example of how the Prophet maintained respect towards the Christians of Najran. After the Prophet made a presentation to them, some converted but others did not. However, the Prophet continued to give them the hospitality due and received their offer to join the Pax Islamica. Then, the Prophet sent them back to their homes protected by his own guards and accompanied by a trusted Companion in order to advise them in their affairs. The free conscience of a man should be respected, so that if a man decided to accept Islam he did so by his own free-will. It should also be added that da’wah, in al-Faruqi’s opinion, is an eternal process and must not stop despite the non-believer’s rejection.¹³

Besides the foregoing rights, the non-Muslim, says al-Faruqi, enjoys the third right, that is, the right to convince others (the Muslim) of his views whatever they are. Al-Faruqi proposes two reasons to justify this right of the non-believer under Islam. First, convincing is a two-way affair; it is a process of argument and counter-argument. Al-Faruqi argues that this process cannot take place except in a free dialogue between two conscientious persons or parties. Second, it is only natural that if the Muslim is entitled to present his case, that the non-Muslim be equally entitled to do so. This reciprocal right, affirms al-Faruqi, is not affected by either party’s abuse, since it belongs to each of them by virtue of their humanity.¹⁴ The Muslims need not be worried about the exercise of this right by the non-Muslim. The only thing to be worried about according to al-Faruqi is treason against the Islamic state or ummah as a whole. Certainly, such treason is illegal under the Pax Islamica which the non-believer has agreed to, and of course it is prosecutable under the law of

state. However, if no agitation is involved in the non-Muslims' effort to convince the Muslims of their views, there can be no trial and no constraint of the exercise of the right to convince others. Al-Faruqi asserts, any honest presentation, be it from a Muslim or non-Muslim, must be allowed to proceed without any barrier from any source. From the preceding discussions it is clear that in al-Faruqi's perception, the non-believer is granted several rights in the religious realm.

The non-Muslim also has the freedom to be different from the Muslim in many aspects. According to al-Faruqi, in cultural, political and economic areas the non-Muslims have the right to perpetuate themselves, the right to work, and the right to joy and beauty.

Being tolerated in his unbelief, the dhimmi or the non-Muslim, consequently, in al-Faruqi's view, should enjoy the right to bring up his children in his own faith, and the right to perpetuate himself. Besides the right connected with the actual exercise of ritual worship, this implies the right to educate, to assemble, to organize activities. It should be added that according to al-Faruqi, the dhimmi's right to educate his children concerns religion only, not the public life of the Islamic state as a whole of which he is a member. The Islamic state, therefore, should grant children of the dhimmi or non-Muslim the right to lessons to their religion at public school. Al-Faruqi adds that the non-Muslim may not object to his children receiving lessons in Islam in the public school because, in so doing, they are instructed in the ideology of the state which is Islamic, and thus satisfying a condition of political integration and loyalty.

In the field of economics, the right to work of the dhimmi or non-Muslim is highlighted by al-Faruqi from the record of history of the Islamic state. According to him, the dhimmis have always enjoyed unrestricted freedom to perform all professions. In all cases they were in a better position than the Muslims, and their share of the gross national product has always been larger than that of the Muslims. Al-Faruqi affirms that the dhimmis may also work in any government service to which their personal training has prepared them, including the defense of the Islamic state. The only position which may be unavailable to them is that where the decisions to be made require personal commitment to Islam, such as the position of the executive entrusted with the making of general policy of the Islamic state. Certainly, al-Faruqi maintains, the head of

state and his viziers could not be dhimmis, because of the importance of
the judgments they make for the security of the state as a whole.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to the abovementioned rights of the non-Muslims, Al-
Faruqi contends that the dhimmi is also entitled to actualize all the social
and cultural values pertaining to his identity. The dhimmis have the right
to joy and to express themselves in works of art for their own consump-
tion on the condition that they do not undermine the public morale. Al-
Faruqi emphasizes that no dhimmis’s exercise of his right to joy and
beauty may infringe upon the moral sentiment of the public, such as tending
cy of modern women’s fashions toward greater nudity, for Islamic
morality has a definite stand on it, and the dhimmi’s right to use alcohol
and pork, and to eat and drink in the public areas during the fast of
Ramadan. However, when carried out in private, al-Faruqi explains, they
fall under the prerogatives of the dhimmi granted by the Islamic state.\textsuperscript{18} It
is clear that from the foregoing presentations al-Faruqi, in dealing with
the issue of Muslim-non-Muslim relations, tends to give more attention
to the Muslims as majority and he conceives a state with a Muslim major-
ity as an Islamic state.

Now, what about the relationship when Muslims occupy a minority
position in non-Muslim countries? This matter has been dealt with by
another IIIT scholar, Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani. It is imperative to note that in
recent decades Muslims have settled in many countries outside Islam’s
historic and geographic sphere, i.e. in Western Europe and North Amer-
ica. According to al-‘Alwani, “these Muslims find themselves in a sea of
confusion” when facing different opinions among jurists. Some cite dif-
ferences between life in Muslim and non-Muslim societies (so called dār
al-Islām and dār al-harb), while others compare the present and the past
and ignore the enormous social and historic changes that have hap-

Examine the rule in Muslim relations with others, al-‘Alwani cites
the Qur’an, verses 8 and 9 of surat al-Muntahanah\textsuperscript{20}, as the “golden

\textsuperscript{17} Al-Faruqi, 1998:298-299.
\textsuperscript{18} Al-Faruqi, 1998:300.
\textsuperscript{19} Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, 2003, Towards a Fiqh for Minorities: Some Basic Reflections,
\textsuperscript{20} The verses read: “God does not forbid you to be kind and equitable to those who have
neither fought you on account of your religion nor driven you from your homes. God loves
the equitable. But God only forbids you to be allies with those who have fought you because
of your religion and driven you from your homes and abetted others to do so. Those that
make friends with them are wrongdoers.” (Al-Muntahanah:8-9).
rule" defining the relationship between Muslims and others. To support his view al-'Alwani quotes the opinion of ibn al-Jawzi who says that the verse gives permission to Muslims to establish association with "those who have not declared war against the Muslims and allow[ed] kindness towards them, even though they may not be allies," and the opinion of al-Qurtubi who says that the verse is "a permission from God to establish relations with those who do not show hostility towards the believers or wage war against them," as well as the opinion of ibn Jarir al-Tabari who points out that the verse refers to "people of all kinds of creeds and religions who should be shown kindness and treated equitably" without exception.21

According to al-'Alwani, "the two verses set out the moral and legal foundation principle with which the Muslims must comply in their dealings with people of other faith: kindness and justice towards all non-belligerent communities. All developments and new situations must be judged according to this principle." He further emphasizes that Muslim-non-Muslim relations cannot deviate from "the main framework and essential purpose for which God has revealed His words and sent His messengers," that is, "the establishment of justice in the world."22

It seems that in dealing with Muslim/non-Muslim relations al-'Alwani does not want to confine only himself to the opinions of the classical jurists, since they were closely associated with the historic circumstances where they were developed. Al-'Alwani considers those opinions of the classical jurists as part of their own time and space which cannot be applied to other substantially different situations. He emphasizes that those opinions can only be considered as "a precedent to be examined, noted and studied in order to discern the principles" upon which those opinions were based.23

In one of his arguments for proposing a new methodology, al-'Alwani regards the thought of classical Muslim jurists with respect to the geopolitical world map as being influenced by contemporaneous historic convention. In al-'Alwani's view, they overlooked the Qur'anic concept of the world and human geography. Therefore, al-'Alwani argues, their works tended to be "localized and provincial."24 He also compares the world in which the predecessors lived with the world in which Muslims

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22 Al-'Alwani, 2003:27.
live today, which is characterized by "its interacting cultures and global-village atmosphere." Al-'Alwani regards their world as made up of separate "islands," with limited cohabitation or understanding of one another. In such situations, according to him, the "fiqh of conflict" was the prevalent. On the contrary, al-'Alwani claims that what is needed by the Muslims today is a fiqh of "coexistence" which suits the Muslims world of today in spirit as well as in form.25

Al-'Alwani suggests to adopt the Qur'anic concept of geography as one of the principles to build up fiqh rule for minorities as well majorities. He says that "the whole earth belongs to God and Islam is the religion of God." In reality, he argues, "every country is either a land of Islam (dār al-Islām) as a matter of fact, or will be so in future. All humanity is the community of Islam (ummat al-Islām), either by adopting the faith or as a prospective follower of it."26

Based on the statement of the Qur'anic verse that describes the Muslim community as the "best nation ever raised for mankind" (Ali 'Imran:110) al-'Alwani maintains that the qualities of the Muslim nation have been raised by God to lead mankind out of the darkness into the light, and from servitude to man to submission to God. He cites the opinion of Ibn Kathir who says that "Muslims are the best of nations and the most obliging towards other people." Al-'Alwani tends to argue that with such qualities the role of the Muslim nation is not limited by land or restricted in space, but has to reach out to others to convey the message of God. Thus, al-'Alwani argues that "all references to dār al-kufr or dār al-Islām or dār al-harb, as geographical entities, become superfluous and restrictive."27

It seems that that al-'Alwani does not follow the division of the world into dār al-Islām and dār al-harb as advocated by classical jurists. He tends to think that "Islam knows no geographic boundaries," for him, "dār al-Islām is anywhere a Muslim can live in peace and security, even if he lives among a non-Muslim majority," and "dār al-kufr as wherever Muslims live under threat, even if the majority there adhere to Islam and Islamic culture."28

To support his rejection of the division of geography into Muslim and non-Muslim land, al-'Alwani cites the viewpoint of al-Kāsānī who demon-

strates the agreement of Hanafi scholars that “dār al-kufr could become dār al-Islām once Islamic law is applied there”, and that of Qādī Abū Yūsuf and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, who state that dār al-Islām “becomes dār al-kufr if non-Islamic law is implemented.” Al-Māwardi’s statement that “if a Muslim is able to practice his religion openly in a non-Muslim land, that land becomes dār al-Islām by virtue of this settling there”, is also used by al-’Alwani to support his position. Likewise, al-’Alwani seems to be in favor of al-Shāši’s view, which has introduced “an excellent alternative to the classification of lands.” Al-Shāši describes the whole world as dār al-da’wah (the land of propagation of Islam), instead of dār al-harb, and dār al-Islām as dār al-iābah (the land of compliance). He also classifies the non-Muslim as ummat al-da’wah and the Muslim as ummat al-iābah.⁵⁰ Al-’Alwani seems to be in line with this attitude. He is of the opinion that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims should be based on the moral principle of kindness and justice towards all non-belligerent societies. Al-’Alwani maintains that Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim countries should obey the law of that land as long as it does not contradict their faiths. His promoting of Fiqh al-Aqāliyyat is intended to provide guidelines for them.

3.3.3.2. Viewpoints of regular contributors

From this group, Louay M. Safi, the Former Director of Research at the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), could be singled out. Like al-Faruqi, his viewpoint concerning the non-Muslim could be qualified as communitarian. This can be seen from his outlook in dealing with problems such as whether Islam recognizes individual freedom of conscience, i.e. whether people are free to accept or reject Islam, and how Islam should deal with the apostates?

In Safi’s perception, people have the freedom to choose whether to believe or not to believe in Islam. He bases his argument on the principle of the freedom of belief that has been established in two Qur’anic verses: “If it had been the Lord’s will, all those who are on earth would have believed; will you then compel mankind, against their will, to believe?” (Yūnus: 99), and “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error” (al-Baqarah: 256). Safi tends to follow the commentary of al-Qurtubi who quoted Abu Ja’far’s interpretation of the latter verse, “the meaning of ‘let there be no compulsion in religion’ is that no

one is to be forced to accept Islam. The *al* has been added to the word *din* so that their combination *al-din* would indicate Islam.”\textsuperscript{30} Safi takes this argument to support his standpoint.

However, some commentators of the Qur’an contended that this latter verse had been abrogated (*mansūkh*) by another verse, “Fight those who believe not in God nor the last day, nor forbid what God and His Messenger forbade, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the ‘People of the Book’, until they pay the *jizyah* with willing submission and feel themselves subdued” (*al-Taubah*: 29). This is perceived by some classical jurists as abrogating (*nāsīkh*) the verse of *al-Baqarah* 256, and giving permission to the Muslim to fight the “People of the Book”. Concerning this matter, Safi tends to follow opinions of others ascertaining that it has not been abrogated.\textsuperscript{31}

In Safi’s understanding, verse 29 of *al-Taubah* is not all-inclusive, and, thus does not provide a general rule (*hukm āmm*). The verse suggests four criteria for those who are to be fought among the “People of the Book”, they are: (1) those who do not believe in God, (2) those who do not believe in the day of judgment, (3) those who do not uphold that which is forbidden by God and His messenger, and (4) those who do not recognize the religion of truth (Islam). The verse, argues Safi, has not been phrased in a way that would implicate the “People of the Book” as a whole. Rather, it was put in a manner that set aside a particular group of the “People of the Book.”\textsuperscript{32} Thus, Safi maintains that the verse provides a particular rule (*hukm khās*), that is, the war in this verse is prescribed against a particular group of the “People of the Book”, because of the four criteria cited above. He then concludes that “the extension of the application of these criteria to the ‘People of the Book’ as a whole is not based on textual evidence (*nass*) but on reasoning and argumentation” and, as a matter of fact, the interpretation of classical jurists is subject to debate.\textsuperscript{33}

Safi also contends that the verse cannot be abrogated by the *hadith*: “I have been commanded to fight people until they say: ‘There is no god but God!”, for he believes that the *hadith* embodies a particular rule (*hukm khās*) which is applicable only to the Pagan Arabs who lived at the time of the Prophet. Concerning the reason why the Pagan Arabs had to be co-

\textsuperscript{31} Safi, 2001:16, 29.
\textsuperscript{32} Safi, 2001:16.
\textsuperscript{33} Safi, 2001:17.
erced into Islam, Safi explains that it was because they were hostile to the Muslims and had disregarded their oaths and plotted against the Islamic state in Madinah. The only way to counteract these people was by dissolving the cultural basis of their hostility and infidelity, which could only be done by forcing them into Islam.

If one would hypothetically treat the hadith as a general rule, argues Safi, it could not be used to abrogate a Qur’anic verse. Safi based his argument on the consideration that the hadith is a hadith āhād and therefore uncertain (zannī al-dalālah), while the verse is extensively narrated (mutawaddīr) and therefore certain (qāti’ al-dalālah). Meanwhile, there exists a regulation: when incongruence exists between certain (qāti’) and uncertain (zannī) rule, the certain rule prevails. Safi also refers to the opinions of leading jurists such as Imam Shafi’i and Ibn Taymiyyah who contend that a Qur’anic verse can only be abrogated by another Qur’anic verse.

Thus, the claim of abrogation is seen by Safi as unsound, for he believes that both verses represent firm rule (muhkam). The first verse, argues Safi, demonstrates in clear style that it had not been God’s will that mankind should be forced to believe, while the second verse gives more enlightenment as to why people should not be coerced to accept Islam by pointing out that “truth stands out clear from error.” Safi then concludes, “Because God’s will is not subject to change, and because truth stands always clear from error, the two verses are not, therefore, subject to abrogation.” It is clear from the foregoing discussion that, in Safi’s perception, the general rule is that no one is to be compelled to accept Islam.

If the principle of non-coercion in accepting a religion is accepted as the general rule, then how should Muslims deal with the question of apostasy? Concerning this matter, Safi argues that when dealing with the problem of apostasy one should differentiate between two different cases. First, when a group of people revolt against the Muslim authority and

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37 Safi, 2001:30.
38 The firm rule (muhkam) is defined by Muslim jurisprudents as a statement whose meaning is clear and unambiguous so that it is not a subject of ta’wil. See ‘Abdul Wahhab Khalaf, 1968.
39 Safi, 2001:30. According to Islamic jurisprudence, a firm rule (muhkam) is not subject to abrogation.
refuse to obey the law of Islam, as was the case of the apostates who refused to pay zakah to the Caliph Abu Bakr and mobilized their forces to prevent him from collecting it, they are to be fought, not because of their rejection of Islam, but because of their rebellion and disobedience of the law. Thus, the war against them, in Safi’s perspective, is considered to be a law-enforcement war. Second, when an individual refuses to accomplish his public obligation, i.e. to pay zakah to the Muslim authority, he is to be forced to pay it, not to be fought or killed. Only when he aggressively opposes the Muslim authority and uses forces to prevent them from fulfilling their duties and exacting the law, Safi argues, can this apostate be fought against.40

Thus, for Safi, an individual apostate could only be killed if he revolts against the Muslim community. To put it another way, if he commits the apostasy quietly there is not enough reason to give him the death penalty. However, when the individual’s desertion is used as a political tool for instigating a state of disorder or revolting against the law of Islam, Safi argues, the individual apostate can be put to death as a just punishment for his betrayal of the Muslim community.41 Thus, it is clear that in the opinion of Safi, the war against the apostates is carried out not to force them to accept Islam, but to enforce the Islamic law and maintain order.

It is imperative to find out how Safi views the concept of Islamic geography and the division of the world into Muslim and non-Muslim land. In this respect, Safi strongly opposes the classical jurist’s division of the world into two spheres: dār al-Islam and dār al-harb. Such a doctrine has indiscriminately classified all non-Muslim communities under one category, dār al-harb, and advocated a permanent state of war against them, and insisted the Muslims not to establish peaceful relation unless they accept Islam or pay jīzah.42

Safi refutes the traditionalist attitude which divides the world into two spheres by referring to the peaceful relationship between Abyssinia (now, Ethiopia) and the early Islamic state. In his view, Abyssinia could not be considered a part of Islamic territory (dār al-Islam), for Islamic rule had never been enacted there, nor would it be considered a part of the territory of war (dār al-harb), since there had never been any attempt to force it into the pale of Islam or to declare a permanent war against it.43

Safi's view, such a doctrine, which reflects the factual relationship between the Islamic and non-Islamic states during the Abbasid era, "fails to take into account the total principles as well as the real objectives of the Islamic ummah."\(^{44}\) Considering all non-Muslims under one label and declaring a permanent state of war against them all is regarded by Safi as "completely wrong and unjustified."\(^{45}\)

4.3.3.3. Viewpoints of occasional contributors

From this group, the opinion of Yusuf al-Qaradawi in his book *Islamic Awakening between Rejection & Extremism*\(^{46}\) may be singled out. Al-Qaradawi denounces religious extremism, including bigotry and intolerance, as dangerous characteristics. He characterizes extremism as an act manifested "in harshness in treatment of people, roughness in the manner of approach, and crudeness in calling people to Islam". Calling people to Islam, here, can also be implied as propagating Islam to non-Muslims (da‘wah). He condemns this activity if it is carried out with harshness and considers it religious extremism. According to him such action is contrary to the teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah which command the Muslim to call people to Islam with amicability.\(^{47}\) Such a view is shared by another IIIT contributor, Aisha B. Lemu, who considers the "ill-mannered treatment of people, and a crude approach to calling people to Islam" will frighten them away rather than draw them closer.\(^{48}\) Thus, it can be inferred that in their perspective the Muslim should always pay respect to the non-Muslim.

With regard to the non-Muslim's rights, al-Qaradawi contends that the non-Muslim living under Muslim government should receive protection from the authorities. He puts the non-Muslim under the category of "ahl
"dhimmah", who is therefore obliged to pay jizyah to the government. He emphasizes that as a citizen the non-Muslim has the same rights as the Muslim, which should be respected, such as the right to protection for his life or security, his honor, his property, and the right to practice his belief freely. As dhimmis, the non-Muslim also has the right to work at government institutions, the only limitations for the non-Muslim, according to al-Qaradawi, are certain posts, such as commander of the army, head of court, and of course head of state or khalifah.49

3.3.3.4. Analysis and Conclusion

From the foregoing discussions, a number of conclusions can be deduced in the following points:

1) In dealing with the issue of the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, the IIT scholars approach it from the normative perspectives based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, as well as from an historical precedent in the early days of Islam. In the perspective of the IIT scholars, in taking care of the non-Muslims living in a Muslim society, they are given the status of dhimmis which should be protected by the Muslim government. Under Muslim rule the dhimmis are entitled to exercise all their rights in the realm of religion, politics, economy and culture. Their belief should be respected, and da’wah toward the dhimmis should be carried out in the proper way based on the Islamic teaching “no coercion in religion”. The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims should be based on the moral principle of kindness and justice towards all non-belligerent societies. Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim countries should obey the law of that land as long as it does not contradict their faiths. Fiqh al-Aqaliyyat provides guidelines for them.

2) Concerning the ruling on apostasy, the IIT scholars, as shown by Safi, hold that the punishment for apostasy should be inflicted only when the apostate is a cause of harm to society. In cases in which an individual simply changes his religion, the punishment is not to be applied. It is instructive to mention here that in this respect the attitude of Muslim scholars has been classified into three categories: (1)

the "conservative", (2) the "liberal", and (3) the "moderate" attitude. The conservative attitude holds that apostasy is a major crime and that it constitutes a hadd offence which is punishable by the death sentence. The liberal attitude argues, however, that "the shari'ah in its traditional form contains some contradictions with the norms of international law and Human Rights and that in order to get it in harmony with them new methods and novel techniques shall be implemented in deducing the ruling text." The moderate attitude holds that apostasy could be punished by ta'zir punishment, which, however, is not to be applied for peaceful apostasy. Referring to this classification, Safi's view may be qualified as closer to the moderate attitude rather than the conservative one. It is worth noting that this moderate attitude seems to be very much influenced by some of the early modern scholars such as Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, who while classifying apostasy as a hadd offence, emphasized strongly the violent acts that are usually associated with it as being the main cause for the punishment of this hadd. Rida also emphasized that Muslim judges are commanded not to apply the hudud


51 According to Shabana, representatives of this attitude are scholars such as Sheikh Abdel Haleem Mahmoud and Sheikh Gad al-Haq Ali Gad al-Haq.


53 Shabana 1999:19. This attitude is advocated by scholars such as al-'Awa. According to al-'Awa, among the three kinds of punishments recognized in the Islamic penal system: hadd (fixed punishment), qisas (retaliation), and ta'zir (discretionary punishment), apostasy would fall under the ta'zir rather than hadd punishment. This is the case, because, for him, nothing in the Qur'an can be taken as a justification for the death penalty as a hadd punishment for apostasy. Al-'Awa regards the Sunnah cited to support the death penalty as not valid, since it refers to the case of hirabah by its very words. Accordingly, he concludes that apostasy is to be punished by ta'zir punishment.
punishment in the case of the absence of clear evidence and that this rule is most likely to be applied with regard to the hadd of apostasy.  

3) Concerning the concept of division of the world into dār al-Islām and dār al-harb, the IIIT scholars, as shown by al-'Alwani and Safi reject the traditionalist viewpoint and propose their own perspective. In this subject the attitude of the Muslim scholars varies. W.A.R. Shadid54 and P.S. van Koningsveld55 in their analysis observe four different attitudes. They are: (1) the pragmatic attitude which “rejects the classical dichotomy while taking the existing division of the world into nation-states as its point of departure.” (2) The idealistic attitude which “does not discuss the old dichotomy, but which introduces the (classical) concept of the Ummah to refer to the ideal of the transnational and universal unity of all Muslims in the world.” (3) The attitude which “aims at reinterpretation of the Islamic tradition in the light of the prevailing conditions of the modern age.” This viewpoint rejects the validity in the present time of the ancient dichotomy of the concepts of a dār al-Islām and dār al-harb and tries to replace it with a new terminology, such as dār al-da'wah (territory of preaching). (4) The traditionalist viewpoint which “adheres the old dichotomy of the world into dār al-Islām and dār al-harb,”56 The viewpoint of the IIIT scholars seems to be close to the first and the third attitude, as shown by Safi and al-'Alwani.

The purpose of examining the viewpoints of the IIIT scholars in this study, as has been mentioned earlier, is to qualify them in the light of the typology of the Islamic trends presented earlier in this chapter.

In dealing with the issue of Muslim/non-Muslim relations, the IIIT scholars’ standpoint may be qualified as reflecting the position of revivalist or fundamentalist Islam. This is obviously reflected in their giving the status of dhimmis to the non-Muslim minorities. Indeed this echoes the viewpoint of neo-fundamentalists like Mawdudi, who explicitly rejects the

55 Professor at the Catholic University of Brabant, The Netherlands.
56 Professor of Islamic Studies and Director of Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (IISR), Leiden University, The Netherlands.
notion of equality before the law between Muslims and non-Muslims and advocates the provision of dhimmī status for non-Muslim minorities. Likewise, the viewpoint of the IIIT scholars concerning the rule on apostasy, although it sounds moderate, could be qualified best as reflecting the viewpoint of Islamist, or fundamentalist Islam rather than liberal Islam.

Another point is reflected in al-Faruqi’s perspective. It is interesting to note that in al-Faruqi’s understanding, as shown in the preceding discussions, a state with a Muslim majority is conceived as an Islamic state. This viewpoint is clearly in disagreement, for instance, with the viewpoint of Muslim liberal thinkers, such as Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993) of Indonesia who in 1955 urged Muslims to accept the secular Indonesian state despite the fact that Muslims form the majority. Al-Faruqi’s tendency to attribute any country with Muslim majorities as an Islamic state instead of a secular state deserves to be analyzed. His viewpoint concerning the Islamic state is most probably influenced by the Society of Muslim Brotherhood (Jāmi‘yat al-‘Ikhwān al-Muslimīn)⁶⁰, a religious and political movement established by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) in Egypt in 1928. The Brotherhood advocated the establishment of an Islamic state through the imposition of the sharī‘a. It is said that during the period between 1970-1981, under the regime of President Sadat, the Brotherhood’s main political demand was the application of the sharī‘a law, to which the government responded by reviewing Egyptian law to harmonize it with the sharī‘a, which led to the amendment of the Egyptian constitution in 1980, with the statement that sharī‘a “is the main source of all legislation”. Haddad has pointed out that al-Faruqi has an ideological link to organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and to the ideas of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.⁶¹ These two men are neo-fundamentalist in the sense that they return to the sources of the fundamentals of Islam and

reinterpret Islamic sources in response to the challenges of the modern world.\textsuperscript{63} Needless to say that al-Faruqi was very much influenced by the Brotherhood's ideology, including his attitude on the notion of Islamic state. Thus, seen from this perspective al-Faruqi can be rightly qualified as neo-fundamentalist or Islamist which, according to the typology presented earlier in this chapter, falls under the category of the revivalist or fundamentalist Islam.

This qualification also holds true for the IIIT scholars' position on the old age concept of dār al-Islam and dār al-harb. While rejecting the traditionalist attitude concerning the division of land into dār al-Islam and dār al-harb and creating a new terminology, dār al-da'wah, the IIIT scholars, as shown by al-'Alwani, can still be qualified as reflecting the position of the fundamentalist Islam rather than liberal Islam. This position is also very much influenced by the society of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jam'iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimūn). The following arguments could be forwarded to justify this qualification. It is said that the Brotherhood, under the regime of President Mubarak from 1981 until the present, has been tolerated to a certain degree, though officially remains still illegal, just like it was under Sadat. However, the Brotherhood advocated a reformist outlook which pursues a long-term, gradualist approach to the establishment of an Islamic state with popular consent, by reforming society from the bottom up, using persuasion and other non-violent means.\textsuperscript{64} Perhaps this change was caused by the fact that it had lost some of its power as the local regimes in the Middle East repressed its members. The Brotherhood has changed its strategy from being engaged in violence in the 1970s, undertaken by its military wing, called the secret apparatus, created in 1940,\textsuperscript{65} to advocating actions in peaceful ways. Jiāhad is now replaced by da'wah, but still in the context of championing its ideal, that is, the establishment of an Islamic state through the Islamization of society. It is stated that in 1976 the Brotherhood was allowed to publish its monthly newspaper, al-Da'wa (calling to Islam) before it was shut down in 1981.\textsuperscript{66} The present author regards the Brotherhood's change of strategy as a necessity in response to the current challenges.

\textsuperscript{66} See Wickham, 2002:65, 96.
This changing seems to have been advocated by the majority of the members of the Brotherhood, many of whom had since the early 1960s moved to Europe and North America. The adoption of a new terminology like dār al-da'wah instead of dār al-harb or dār al-kafr, to refer to the traditionally non-Islamic geographical areas such as Europe and North America, as advocated by al-'Alwani with his creation of Fiqh al-Aqaliyyat (fiqh for minorities), may be seen as reflecting the attitude of the "Neo-Brotherhood" which emphasizes more on the da'wah and peaceful manners instead of jihad and violence.

It is worth mentioning that Muslims are often referred to by the IIIT scholars as one ummah (community). The use of the word ummah in texts originally written in English has given rise to a derived form of the word, the ummatic. The term ummatic was developed further by al-Faruqi. He says that ummatism has the purpose to "make actionalism collective". The idea is founded on the understanding that the ideal society is "a society properly speaking in the Gesselschaft sense of the term, not in the Gemeinschaft sense". The "Gesselschaft" society promoted by al-Faruqi can be understood as a society based on associations. The basic association between individuals in such a society is the bond shaped by Islam. According to al-Faruqi, the ummatist theory is different from the political theories of liberalism. The ummatist theory is "one where government governs most, not least, and where sovereignty belongs to God and His law, not to the arbitrary will of the majority; and where the ultimate good is the divine pattern, not the eudaemonia of the members." Al-Faruqi goes on with emphasizing that as "a member of the ummah the individual Muslim is not a conscript, but a volunteer for life, perpetually mobilized to bring about actualization of the absolute on earth. The ummah is a society where actionalism is totalistic, not totalitarian, authoritative, but not authoritarian." Thus, it can be understood that in al-Faruqi's perspective a society founded on ummatism is a society where arbitrary decision-making does not exist and where the will of the members of the society is subordinated to a divine pattern. Also, to be a Mus-

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68 Al-Faruqi, 1992:76
70 Al-Faruqi, 1992:77.
71 Al-Faruqi, 1992:77
lim is to promote the divine pattern. It is also obvious that al-Faruqi views actionism as completeness but not totalitarianism, and that it has an authority without being authoritarian. Apparently, the ummatic society encouraged by al-Faruqi is not a society in line with the liberal traditions in Europe and North America.

With regard to the creation of fiqh al-aqalliyyat, which is defined by al-'Alwani as “a specific discipline which takes into account the relationship between the religious ruling and the conditions of the community and the location where it exists,” it applies to a specific group of Muslims living under particular conditions. Fiqh al-aqalliyyat aims to “project minorities as representative models of examples of Muslim society in the countries in which they live.” It can be understood that fiqh al-aqalliyyat tends to regard Muslims living in the Western countries as a minority group which should be provided with a specific guideline. It is worth mentioning that some Muslim scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi (who is also one of the contributors to the IIT) argues that Muslims living in the West should assume the form of a group (al-jamā'ah), especially when taking their political decisions. It is encouraged for Muslims to act as a group because a Muslim is weak by himself but strong through his group. It goes without saying that the IIT scholars tend to regard Muslims in the West as a minority group. It is logical to assume that as a minority group it may demand the equality of civil and political rights as well as the recognition of the right to be different in belief, values and personal status from the majority group. This communitarian approach, however, may create a problem when it demands, for instance, the application of the Islamic family law, instead of the civil law of the country concerned. What happens if a Muslim in the West chooses to adopt the civil law of the state instead of Islamic family law? What happens if he prefers to define himself as a citizen of the state concerned, just like other fellow citizens, instead of being a member of his group? As a matter of fact, this communitarian attitude may also be seen as a barrier for the process of integration with the native citizens. The creation of fiqh al-aqalliyyat, promoted in North America by al-'Alwani and in Europe by Tariq Ramadan in order to provide guidelines for the Muslim ummah,

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can be regarded as the Brotherhood's strategy, and their goal, in Vidino's words, "may not simply be to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be, but rather to extend the Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States." Thus, seen from this perspective it is obvious that the IIIT scholars echo the viewpoint of the Brotherhood, which, on the basis of the typology presented earlier in this chapter, falls under the category of the fundamentalist Islam, but of a moderate and peaceful type.

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24 See Vidino, 2005, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe".