Copper, Borders and Nation-building
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The Kantagese Factor in Zambian Political and Economic History

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Introduction

Two Copperbelts, Two Histories?

The Copperbelt is a geological zone known for its copper deposits and associated mining and industrial development. This comparatively small strip of land – some 450 km long and 260 km wide – has, for about a century, formed the economic backbone of the two countries that host it: the Republic of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Yet, there exists no integrated history of the Copperbelt, its distribution over two countries creating an artificial division in the eyes of many observers. This tendency to see the Copperbelt as not one but two entities, Luise White contends, has to do with two factors: a ‘disinclination to mix the history of Francophone and Anglophone regions’ and the fact that ‘the two histories do not provide a good chronological or comparative fit’ (White 2000: 274). As a result, distinct academic traditions, one English-speaking and the other French-speaking, have had the tendency to occult the actual interplay that existed between the Zambian and Katangese Copperbelts. This interplay is what the present narrative proposes to investigate.

1.1 A Joint History

Even at first glance, it is apparent that, despite their separateness, there are many similarities in the histories of the two Copperbelts. Crucially, both became major economic hubs, though it happened earlier in the case of the Congolese Copperbelt. By the early 1960s, Katanga – the Congolese province in which the Copperbelt is located – accounted for about 8 per cent of the world’s total supply (Le Katanga économique 1961: 15) and Katanga’s largest company, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), ranked third among the world’s copper producers.1 Zambia, far from falling wide of the mark, was leading copper supplier with an annual output of 633,000 tons

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1 The UMHK was also the world’s largest producer of uranium and one of the world’s biggest producers of cobalt, exporting more than 60 per cent of the world’s supply in 1960. See Hempstone (1962: 53); Gérard-Libois & Verhaegen (1961: 223).
valued at £164,300,000 at the time of its independence in 1964 (Parpart 1983: 22). A second key similarity, related to the first one, is the fact that both Katanga and Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia was known before independence) started their ‘careers’ as colonial territories as the property of companies rather than a colonial state. When Leopold II of Belgium grabbed for himself a territory eighty times larger than his own country, he did not have the means to administer it, let alone develop it. He consequently entrusted the administration of Katanga to the Compagnie du Katanga on 15 April 1891. Until 1910, it was under the aegis of this company that the initial stages of the development of the Katangese mining industry were overseen. In practice, this lack of state control resulted in a semi-official, semi-autonomous status, which endured even after Katanga became the responsibility of the Belgian state in 1910. Until 1933, the administration of Katanga was entrusted to a Vice Governor General (Lemarchand 1962: 409), which allowed Katanga to function as a company territory practically independent from the rest of Belgian Congo. As for Northern Rhodesia, it took until 1924 for it to come under the control of the Colonial Office. Prior to this, the all-powerful British South Africa Company (BSAC) oversaw the Province’s administration and the development of its mining potential. Local officials were appointed either at the BSAC’s recommendation or by the BSAC directly, which means the colonial Secretary of State had limited influence in Northern Rhodesia. (Phiri 2006: 10). Finally, also largely thanks to the mining industry and its recruitment policies, both Copperbelts became the home of a ‘cosmopolitan’ community. By the 1930s, Copperbelt towns in Katanga and Northern Rhodesia were fast-developing towns bringing together workers from all over central Africa and there was increasing talk of African ‘urbanisation’ and ‘detribalisation.’ At the same time, a comparatively large community of independent-minded white settlers also developed on both sides of the border. Although the Katanga was the least populated area of the Congo at the time, it claimed 31 per cent of the total European population of the Congo in 1956. As for Northern Rhodesia, although it was not originally expected to become a settler colony, the development of the Copperbelt attracted more and more white migrants (many of whom came from South Africa) reaching a total of 65,277 in 1956 (Phiri 2006: 12). The significance of such overwhelming concentrations of economic and human resources, all of which can be traced to the presence of copper, cannot be underestimated. They had profound political implications for both Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Copper was the determining factor in the division of the Copperbelt. The fact that that area of central Africa was copper-rich was well known long before the first European adventurers set foot in it. Copper had been mined for hundreds of years by local African societies and was probably at the root of the appearance of major centralised societies, most notably the Luba and Lunda empires, which exported copper via Portuguese traders to the Atlantic coast (Cornevin 1993: 224). In this context, it was not long before the Copperbelt attracted the attention of non-African explorers and colonists alike and soon found itself at the heart of a competition between two would-be colonising powers: the United Kingdom and Belgium. The outcome was an artificial and funny-shaped border drawn across the Copperbelt: the result of a negotiation that aimed to ensure that both King Leopold II and the United Kingdom received their share of the copper jackpot (Potts 2005: 584). Locally the effects of that division were very significant. An article published in the *Times of Zambia*, on 30 November 1964, i.e. just over a month after Northern Rhodesia became an independent nation, vividly illustrated this point:

Most of Zambia’s tribes came originally from the Congo. The largest group, the Bemba-Lunda-Lovale, arrived here around the beginning of the 18th century from the great Luba-Lunda kingdom of Mwata Yamvo.

At its height, the Luba-Lunda empire controlled most of the Kasai and Katanga provinces of the Congo, and large areas of Angola and Zambia. The Luba, senior partners in the alliance, mined copper at Kipushi, and made the copper crosses that were the first form of coinage in Central Africa.

The name Mwata Yamvo (“Great Chief”) was used as a title, handed down from father to son. This is at variance with the present system of inheritance employed by the Bemba, by which brother succeeds brother, and when the generation is extinct, the inheritance goes to their sister’s son.

Legend declares that the Bemba were the followers of a certain Mwata Yamvo’s sister’s son, which may account for the Bemba custom of inheritance. The Lovale system of tracing descent is similar.

The Lunda of Luapula Province are the descendants of the followers of Kazembe Pa Nchinda, the third son of a Mwata Yamvo, who settled in the lands to the east of the Luapula River.
The Lunda of North-Western Province are likewise the descendants of Mwata Yamvo’s fourth son. Other sons established groups of Lunda in Angola, near Solwezi and elsewhere.

The Bemba, second largest tribe in Zambia, were led from Mwata Yamvo’s domain by a man called Chiti Muluba (“Chiti the Luban”). Later Bemba chiefs were given the title “Chitimukulu” (The Great Tree). [...] This clearly shows that close contact between the Bemba and the empire of Mwata Yamvo must have existed at one time. Even today, sections of the Bemba, Lunda, Aushi and Ndembu tribes live in the southern Congo.4

This article points at two elements that will be of great importance in the present narrative. Firstly, it suggests that the creation of the border not only resulted in the splitting of a geological ‘pie’, but also in the splitting of a culturally homogeneous region. Secondly, it introduces the idea that migration and population movements are an important feature of the region’s history. In fact, ‘migration’ is a word that is generally closely associated with the Copperbelt. The rise of the copper industry stimulated the emergence of a system of organised migrant labour to supply the mines that were, for the most part, located in areas with low population density. This, in turn, caused people of all origins to crisscross the border between Belgian and British Africa in search of waged employment (Perrings 1977: 40-1). Thus, the region of the Copperbelt, which had already been the scene of many population movements in pre-colonial times, saw the appearance of new patterns of movement, ones that were spurred by purely economic dynamics and therefore brought into contact people who would not have otherwise met.

If the Copperbelt was originally inhabited by peoples who were culturally akin and who shared longstanding trade relationships, and if, even when separated, the growing copper industry induced renewed population movements and economic exchange, then the tendency to study the developments on either side of the border separately seem counterintuitive. This tendency can, as suggested at the outset, partly be explained by the fact that, in academia, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo tend to belong to separate (French and Anglo-Saxon) research traditions. Perhaps further colouring our understanding is the existence of a series of distinct paradigms that are associated with each of these countries.

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1.2 ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Paradigms for the Copperbelt

1.2.1 Modernism and its Failure

According to Deborah Potts, ‘Zambia has something of an iconic status in African urban studies’, a ‘special interest’, which, she argues, ‘stems in great part from the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) set up by the British Government in 1937 to undertake social research in British Central Africa’ (Potts 2005: 583). The RLI research that acquired the most visibility was that which focused on the development of urban centres in the Copperbelt region. The RLI approach to African urban life was based on the general idea that tribal rural Africans were rapidly being transformed into fully fledged members of an industrial society, living lives that were both modern and urban. RLI studies gained momentum at the time of Zambia’s independence. In the 1960s, Zambia was described as the country that was urbanising – and therefore ‘industrialising’ and ‘modernising’ – at the fastest pace in Southern Africa. Thanks to its growing industrial success, as well as the rapid social and economic transformations that accompanied it, Zambia and its industrial core, the Copperbelt, epitomised ‘emerging Africa’ (Ferguson 1999: 4). As James Ferguson put it in his influential *Expectations of Modernity*:

> Zambia at its 1964 independence was a highly urbanised nation and newly so. The mining towns that had sprung up on the Copperbelt symbolised newness in a way that older cities could not. Here, unlike many other parts of Africa, the very idea of cities was a “modern” one. And “urbanization” was understood to involve not simply a movement in space but an epochal leap in evolutionary time *(Ibid.)*.

Indeed, by 1964, it seemed certain that large-scale copper mining was to lead the nation firmly to a state of what was referred to as ‘modernisation’. ‘Over the heart of a poor and primitive continent, civilisation has laid a fin-

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5 See Potts (2005: 583-585). It should be noted that the narrative of transition, as was pioneered by the RLI, is still contested and has been for over 60 years. As late as the early 1990s, the debate around the Zambian Copperbelt was reiterated over five issues of the *Journal of Southern African Studies* in an argument developed between the anthropologist James Ferguson and the historian Hugh Macmillan. While Ferguson challenged the RLI idea that urbanisation, industrialisation, economic growth, etc. consisted of unilinear processes, Macmillan argued that RLI paradigms were informed by a cyclical view in which world economic swings affect urban trends in the Copperbelt and elsewhere. See Ferguson (1990), parts 1 and 2; Macmillan (1993).

6 By the 1980s, Zambia was among the most highly urbanised countries of southern Africa. Over 50 per cent of its population was urban, living in the Copperbelt towns and Lusaka for the most part. See Phiri (2006: 2).
ger of steel; it has stirred a hundred tribes together; it has brought them new wealth, new ambitions, new knowledge, new interests, new faiths and new problems, was the way Godfrey Wilson, head of the RLI from 1938 to 1942, put it (Wilson 1941, cited in Ferguson 1999: 2).

It is easy to forget, because of the long period of unrest that followed, that around the time of independence, levels of optimism were similarly high in the Congo. In the 1950s, the Congo had progressed at a very fast pace. From 1950 to 1956, industrial output tripled and annual reports evidenced the colony’s rapid economic growth (Reno 2006: 45). Like in Zambia, such rapid industrialisation was accompanied by profound transformation in the society, as Africans moved to towns to work in new enterprises. Although no institution similar to the RLI was set up, the emergence of ‘detribalised’ Africans was of no less concern to the colonial authorities. In the Congo, this challenge was met by encouraging the creation of a politically content and economically productive workforce, one that would be happy to embrace progressive change. This fostered the appearance of an urban elite, called the ‘évolués’, who spoke French, had accepted European values and patterns of behaviour, and usually held white-collar jobs. These ‘évolués’ were treated as a privileged group by the colonial administrators and out of it emerged the first rulers of the independent Congo (Kadima-Tshimanga 1982: 25-49). Therefore, with rapid industrialisation and a growing middle class, there was no reason to doubt that independence would usher in an extended period of economic growth for the Congo. Even the initial period of trouble that Congo went through after independence (discussed further in Chapter 4), though it did dampen enthusiasm, did not entirely crush it. Nor did the 1965 coup d’état by arch dictator Joseph-Désiré (later Sese Seko) Mobutu. By 1962, industrial output had returned to its pre-1960 heights and economic reforms in 1967 and fiscal austerity reassured foreign investors that Mobutu’s state, despite its blatant clientelism, at least had the promotion of the country’s economic growth at heart. As a result, in the words of William Reno, ‘by the mid-1960s and into the 1970s the country was once more being held up as an example of rapid modernisation’ (Reno 2006: 43-7).

Soon thereafter, the modernist discourse gradually gave way to ‘Afro-pessimism’ and its gloomy predictions for the future of the continent. This was due in no small part to the steep economic decline that Africa went through in the 1970s. The repeated collapses of the copper price in the 1970s, the oil crises, and the almost exclusive reliance on mineral extraction for their economies led to the severe economic decline of both independent Congo and Zambia. Zambia, despite a post-independence history devoid of bloody
conflicts, was one of Africa’s biggest growth losers much of the early decades of its independent history (Melhum, Moene & Torvik 2006: 1). As Ferguson put it, ‘the script of Zambian “emergence” via industrialization has been confounded by more than two decades of steep economic decline […] leaving Zambia near the bottom of the World Bank’s hierarchy of “developing nations”’ (Ferguson 1999: 6). As for the Democratic Republic of Congo, the end of its period of economic ‘bliss’ was followed by a period of such economic and political decay that, to this day, it is regarded as a paradigmatic case of state failure. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has always ranked in the top 10 of the Fragile States Index (formerly known as the Failed States Index), which since 2005 has been published annually by the research institute Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy. It has been in the top 5 since 2009.7 As for President Mobutu, by the 1980s, he had become a paradigm of personal corruption and predatory rule (Reno 2006: 48). Paradoxically, the Congo, which had once been praised as a ‘colonie modèle’ and one of the most promising economies in Africa, became known as one of the poorest, most conflict-ridden and most volatile places on the planet. As such, it was widely seen as the epitome of the ‘Paradox of Plenty’ or ‘Resource Curse’, a thesis which posits that states with abundant resource wealth, specifically non-renewable resources like minerals and fuels, tend to perform less well than their resource-poor counterparts in terms of development, economic growth, and peace-keeping (Ross 1999: 297). Resource abundance and dependence is therefore frequently associated with corruption and weak state institutions, authoritarian rule, as well as general economic decline and poverty, and is also presumed to stir up violence, conflicts and even war (See Basedau & Mehler 2005). The Democratic Republic of the Congo has often been held up as the confirmation that such a curse exists, due to its constant history of corruption and war, from the extended crisis of the 1960s to the protracted conflict, sometimes referred to as the Great War of Africa, that claimed an estimated three million lives between 1998 and 2003.8

The point here is not to discuss the validity of such ‘labels’, but rather to point out the powerful paradigms that they created or reflected, and the way they still inform general visions of these countries. According to such paradigms,

8 The existence of a ‘resource curse’ is not universally accepted. As Matthieu Basedau contends, potential effects of natural resources on socio-economic development, state institutions, democracy and peace are interrelated and therefore difficult to separate out. According to Basedau, the necessary theoretical explanations for the resource curse are therefore most likely found in country-specific contexts. See M. Basedau (2008).
the history of Zambia can be summarised as that of the failure of modernist revolution, and that of the Congo as the slow disintegration of a promising economy into anarchy. It is, however, revealing that, in both cases, main trends of theorisation had a lot to do with mineral wealth and macro-economics. Since mineral wealth stands prominently in the histories of both countries, this is not surprising. Yet, there is a danger that overemphasis of one paradigm, prominent though it may be, might leave little room for nuance or indeed for the exploration of altogether different paradigms. Therefore, though copper and macroeconomics will play an important role in the present narrative, the two main concepts that will be juggled with are transnationalism and nation-statism.

1.2.2 Nation-Statism and Transnationalism

Perhaps the most important paradigm that the present study will strive to challenge is the tendency in academia, but also generally, to think in terms of a ‘nation-state framework of analysis’. Not only do the authority and sovereignty of the nation state enjoy a near sacrosanct quality internationally, but also, in history and political and economic sciences, the nation state is more often than not taken as the basis for intellectual enquiry. As W.I. Robinson put it: ‘The nation-state is still taken as the basic unit of analysis, and transnationalism and globalization are seen as merely some new stage in international relations or in cross-national comparative studies’ (Robinson 1998: 562). In Africa, like in the rest of the world, the nation state is understood to be living a severe crisis, at the root of which is the supposedly new and worldwide phenomenon of globalisation (Bislev 2004: 281). Indeed, one can see how, with its emphasis on the idea that national borders should be defined in terms of movement of capitals rather than political boundaries, the concept of globalisation and that of the nation state are at odds with each other. Yet, according to Frederick Cooper, not only is the demise of the nation state greatly exaggerated, but one should also not assume that in the past, the nation state enjoyed a period of ‘unchallenged salience and unquestioned reference for political mobilisation’ (Cooper 2001: 195). To be sure, for Basil Davidson it is not globalisation that constitutes Africa’s greatest challenge but the nation state itself; or, to be more precise, the crisis of institutions brought about by the inherent illegitimacy of the African nation state. ‘Nation-statism’ was a product of the rising nationalism of independence-aspiring Africa. ‘Nation-statism,’ Davidson argues, ‘looked like a liberation, and really began as one. But it did not continue as a liberation. In practice, it was not a restoration of Africa to Africa’s own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe’ (Davidson 1992: 10).
Similarly, I. Ll. Griffiths bemoans the way in which the current ‘ills of Africa’ – including famine, civil war and boundary bickering, as well as plummeting economic performance – are too easily attributed to ‘immediate causes’. Instead, he argues, ‘the immediate causes of African misery must be put in the context of basic structural defects, both economic and political, deriving from the comparatively recent and short-lived colonial period when almost the whole of Africa was divided between European powers’ (Griffiths 1995: 1-2). Though he recognises that this context is by no means the sole cause of Africa’s plight, the colonial inheritance is, in his opinion, ‘crucially important and not easily disowned’ (Ibid.). The key to the impact of colonialism on Africa was the division of the continent into colonial territories. For, when the European powers partitioned Africa between themselves between 1885 and 1914, the partition, solely dictated as it was by European politico-economic interests, was imposed on the continent with little regard to the distribution of peoples or pre-colonial political units. Crucially, this European-originated partition survived African independence almost intact, with two basic, non-Africa-generated, concepts surviving with it: ‘nation states’ and ‘boundary lines’ (Ibid.: 3). There have been numerous examples of disputes over borderlines erupting in civil war and violence. One such example was the boundary dispute between Libya and Chad over the Aouzou strip, a region in the north of Chad that is reputedly rich in minerals. When the dispute was submitted to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Judge Ajibola quickly came to the conclusion that the dispute between those two states could be traced to the legacy of artificially delimited boundaries bequeathed by European powers:

For about a century, […] Africa has been ruefully nursing the wounds inflicted on it by its colonial past. Remnants of this unenviable colonial heritage intermittently erupt into discordant social, political and even economic upheavals which, some may say, are better forgotten than remembered. But this ‘heritage’ is difficult, if not impossible to forget; aspects of it continue, like apparitions, to rear their heads, and haunt the entire continent in various jarring and sterile manifestations: how do you forget unhealed wounds? (Ajibola, 3 February 1994).

Moreover, there is another way in which current interpretations of nation state and the crisis that the latter is supposedly going through are misleading. ‘In contrasting a present of flows with a past of structures,’ globalisation, Cooper argues, ‘misreads the ways in which a 400-year-long process defined both Africa and the Atlantic-centred capitalist economy’ (Cooper 2001: 189). Indeed, according to Cooper, Africanists, when discussing processes of glo-
balisation, should be particularly sensitive to their historical dimension, given the manner in which ideas, cultural movement or migrant networks spread across the boundaries of social units in the past. The very notion of ‘Africa’ has never existed in a vacuum, having been instead shaped by a history of interrelations not only within the continent, but also across oceans and deserts: by the trans-Saharan and Atlantic slave trade and by cultural exchanges and economic networks across the Indian Ocean (Cooper 2001: 190-1), to cite the most obvious examples. Yet, specialists on Africa have been drawn into the globalisation paradigm, positing globalisation as a challenge that Africa must meet, as tensions between ‘a past of territorial boundedness and a present of interconnection and fragmentation’ are apparently increasingly felt (Tornimbeni 2004: 107). In contrast, Cooper contends that historical analysis presents a ‘more back-and-forth, varied combination of territorializing tendencies’ (Cooper 2001: 191). In this way, he argues for ‘more modest and more discerning ways of analysing processes that cross borders but are not universal, that constitute long-distance networks and social fields but not on a planetary scale’ (Ibid.: 189). In other words, he argues in favour of a focus on ‘transnational’ relations as a way of thinking about African history but not necessarily by means of a ‘global’ framework.

Transnationalism, however, is a rather multifaceted concept, as it has never been given an adequate theoretical framework of analysis. As Rainer Bauböck describes it: political transnationalism covers ‘a wide range of phenomena and can be studied using a variety of approaches’ (Bauböck 2003: 700), its specificity being the fact that it ‘creates overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities’ (Ibid.). S. Vertovec, in his ‘Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism’ argues that: ‘To the extent that any single “-ism” might arguably exist, most social scientists working in the field may agree that “transnationalism” broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (Vertovec 1999: 447). In the latter reading, borders must necessarily represent long-established power relations, and transnationalism, as underlined by Katharyne Mitchell, ‘embodies an inherently transgressive quality’ (Mitchell 1997: 101). It is considered that communities have been able to ‘erode’ inconvenient borders by developing concrete transnational links across them (Tornimbeni 2004: 110). Taking the argument to another level, Bauböck argues that such interconnections affect conceptions of membership as well as the institutions of each interconnected country (Bauböck 2003: 701). Nonetheless, Corrado Tornimbeni warns that fluidity must not be exaggerated, and that the extent to which the presence of an international border has become enmeshed in the social life and in historical developments
since the colonial times must not be underestimated (Tornimbeni 2004: 110). As Georges Balandier contended as early as 1951, conquest itself created a ‘colonial situation’, defined by external coercion and racialised ideology within a space marked by conquest boundaries (Balandier 1951: 44). Underlining the historically artificial nature of state boundaries in Africa, therefore, does not mean that they never gained significance over time since ‘once conceptualised, [boundaries] are given meaning and sentiment by those who reside within them’ (Basch, Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994: 67).

1.3 Objectives

In the light of what has been set out, this thesis will endeavour to put the significance of the Katango-Zambian border in its historical context by retracing how transnational identities developed and consolidated on the one hand (Chapters 1, 2 and 3), and by examining the geo-socio-political significance of such identities for Zambian state-building on the other (Chapter 4). It will also be demonstrated that patterns of migration and exchange changed over time, as did their raison d’être. The copper industry in particular, stimulated a new and politically significant type of migration: labour migrations. Not only did its scale dwarf any other population movement that had taken place before, but it was also entirely and solely economically-induced, thus it could transcend cultural boundaries in a way that no previous sizeable migrations could or did. In addition, it will be shown that it was not only people that transcended boundaries. The various mining companies active on the Copperbelt did not develop separately but were instead linked across the colonial border by their overlapping capital, infrastructure and labour practices, making the two Copperbelts economically interdependent.

In this way, I aim to show that the international boundaries between Zambia and DR Congo were ‘eroded’ while, at the same time, these boundaries came to be of great significance socially, economically and politically. This thesis has two closely related objectives: one that is purely historical – retracing historical developments that have been understudied – and another that is paradigm-based – to challenge the standard idea that the ‘nation state’ is necessarily a logical, or even valid, framework of study.
Map 1.1
The Copperbelt as it stands across the Congo-Zambia border.
The Setting

Lorsque les premiers explorateurs blancs découvrirent cette partie de l’Afrique que l’on nomme le Katanga, ils y trouvèrent 3 monarchies qui étaient non seulement unies par des liens familiaux, économiques et sociaux mais aussi, et ceci est de loin le plus important, dont le destin historique était lié depuis des siècles. [...] Lorsque les Belges et les Anglais, les uns au nord et les autres au sud, essayèrent de faire main basse sur le Katanga, les chefs des Balubas, des Lunda et des Bayeke, solidaire face au nouveau danger qui menaçait leur souveraineté, luttèrent de toutes leurs faibles forces.

Extract from the speech of Moïse Tshombe, President of the short-lived secessionist state of Katanga (1960-1963), made at the occasion of the second anniversary of Independence on July 11 1962 (cited in Yakemtchouk 1988: 24-5).

The above-quoted statement has clear political connotations. President Moïse Tshombe here hints at the supposed durability and endurance of the Katangese nationalist sentiment. He does so by emphasising not only the cohesion of the region, but also the ‘ancientness’ of that cohesion. Yet, for all Tshombe’s aplomb, perhaps the only statement that can be made with confidence about pre-colonial central African history is that it is not well known. The rarity of written testimonies and the exclusive reliance on sources such as oral tradition and archaeology make its study a rather delicate matter. Jan Vansina, who is generally regarded as the foremost authority on the pre-colonial history of the peoples of central Africa, admitted in the introduction to his influential Kingdoms of the Savanna that ‘the gaps in the data are little short of appalling and because of that any synthesis is out of the question’ (Vansina 1966a: v).

Until the 1870s and 1880s, the central African interior escaped any direct contact with the slave and ivory trade moving in from both the Atlantic and Indian coasts. This means that the pre-colonial history of Katanga and Zambia, compared to that of any region located on the coast, is very ‘African’. But it also means that it escaped the attention of literate observers. As a result, for all but the past century and a half, written records are few and far between.
From the end of the seventeenth century there are occasional reports from Portuguese traders, and for the nineteenth century there are some travellers’ books, such as David Livingstone’s, but even for that period, written African records are virtually non-existent (Reefe 1981: 197; Roberts 1976: xi-xv). This dearth of written accounts forces the historian in the direction of a diverse set of sources and methodologies that are, at times, still subject to debate. Paramount among those is the treatment of oral traditions pioneered by Jan Vansina, who, in his Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology published in its English version in 1965, offered a guide on how to collect and criticise different types of African traditional stories. In this book, he described African traditions as ‘unwritten sources couched in a form suitable for oral transmission,’ and therefore as ‘not necessarily untrustworthy’ historical sources despite their ‘special nature’ (Vansina 1965: 1). There has been much work done on oral tradition since – Vansina published a substantial revision of his own views – and the debate on the validity of oral tradition as valid historical sources will probably never reach a definite conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no space here to go over this complex debate, but nor is it the point of this chapter. Suffice it to note that for certain points in history in that particular area of the world, these myth-like stories are virtually the sole source of information available to the historian. Even oral tradition, however, only goes so far back in the past. It is only from around AD 1500 that, through the study of oral and cultural traditions, as well as linguistics, patterns of political and social change begin to be identifiable and it is not before around AD 1700 that a chronology of events begins to appear. For earlier periods the historian is almost entirely dependent on archaeology, which, though useful to trace changes in material culture, does not tend to be as helpful as far as identifying social and political organisation is concerned.

What follows, therefore, is a summary of the broad processes of interactions, in terms of the movement of peoples, cultural diffusion, commercial exchanges and state expansion, which took place in and around the Copperbelt region from the appearance of stratified societies to the eve of European penetration in the late nineteenth century. In other words, this chapter will strive to explore how far the description of Katanga – and by extension northern Zambia – as an interconnected whole, consisting of kingdoms ‘united by familial, economic and social bonds’ as Tshombe so confidently claimed, is justified.9

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9 It should be noted that the present chapter will not be bringing forward any new information. For a more comprehensive overview on the present state of knowledge on the history of pre-colonial central Africa, see the works of Andrew Roberts, Jean-Luc Vellut as well as the extensive list of publications by Jan Vansina on the subject.
2.1 The Archaeological Evidence

Archaeological evidence suggests that the area that is now divided between Katanga and north-eastern and central Zambia was not only occupied from an early date, but also showed a considerable degree of homogeneity in terms of pottery and economic practices, including the cultivation of crops, the herding of cattle and the use of metal artefacts (Phillipson 2005: 249). Unfortunately, the archaeology of central Africa is a very under-investigated field. Most of our knowledge about the early occupation of the region comes from a series of cemeteries, most notably Katoto in the valley of the upper Lualaba in Zambia and Sanga in Katanga. The cemetery at Sanga is one of the most excavated and best-known Iron Age sites in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is located near Lake Kisale in the Upemba Depression, a 200 kilometres long basin located in southeast Democratic Congo. The Upemba Depression is notable for providing the opportunity to study continuous socio-economic and political developments reaching as far back as the fifth century AD. But it is even more notable for providing convincing evidence for the emergence of kingship, or at least a marked degree of social stratification, early in the second millennium (De Maret 1978: 358). Significantly, the Upemba Depression is also where certain oral traditions have placed the origin of Katanga’s very first kingdom: the Luba Kingdom. In turn, the Luba kingdom and culture is where many kingdoms of the central African savanna trace back their origin (Connah 2001: 273; De Maret 1977: 321). Consequently, it occupies a prominent place in the history of central Africa as well as that of the Copperbelt area.

During excavations undertaken in Sanga in 1958, a series of tombs, dated to the late first millennium, were discovered. These tombs’ occupants were often adorned with copper, iron and ivory jewellery, and were frequently equipped with weapons, pottery, tools and the remains of animals (Cornevin 1993: 221; De Maret 1977: 322-3). The presence of such items in burials is not insignificant. Firstly, they indicate that the occupants of these tombs belonged to a society endowed with an economy that was able to support the existence of craftsmen in ceramics and metallurgy. Secondly, they suggest that these goods served a purpose that was not purely practical. Instead, they seem to have become associated with one’s position in society and therefore constituted symbols of status. Furthermore, the same 1958 excavations revealed fragments of single iron bells, dated to between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries (De Maret 1977: 334), as well as iron gongs and ceremonial axes, all of which have long been known to be symbols of chieftainship in the Congo basin. Similar bells have been found in two other sites: Ingombe...
Ilede (Zambia) and Great Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe). These two southern sites are slightly more recent, from around the fourteenth or fifteenth century, and include extended burials and a mass cemetery of a type that is reminiscent of the Sanga site. For these reasons, Andrew Roberts argued, the distribution of iron bells and other ‘prestige’ grave goods may be taken as evidence for the diffusion of some sort of chieftainship (Roberts 1976: 83). The bells were not, however, the only grave goods that suggested the widening of the Upemba Depression’s sphere of influence. Besides the chiefly symbols, the burials yielded at least two more types of goods that are worth mentioning. Firstly, during excavations run in 1975 in Kamilamba (another Upemba Depression site), the archaeologist Pierre de Maret identified an Early Iron Age pottery tradition that dates from the middle of the fifth century AD to the beginning of the ninth century AD and has close affinities with the Chondwe ware of Zambia: an Early Iron Age pottery tradition that can be found along the Copperbelt and south to the Zambezi river. This suggests that the culture of the Upemba Depression was propagating southwards from as early as about 450 AD (Cornevin 1993: 223; De Maret 1977: 329, 1978: 243-58). Secondly, some later burials, dated to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, yielded a great number of ‘copper crosses of the type that had become a form of currency by the sixteenth century’ (Huffman 1989: 171). Their presence, in addition to that of some cowries and glass beads, in a wide range of places, is a useful indicator of how interregional trade developed over time. The fact that the oldest samples were discovered in Kasanshi and Kipushi on the Zambia/Congo border – which were both to become important copper mining centres in the twentieth century – could perhaps suggest a cause-effect relation between the presence of resources, trade and state formation (De Maret 1977: 334-5). What all these elements – bells, copper crosses, pottery – taken together indicate is the early southwards diffusion of better iron technology, trading contacts and political symbols (Roberts 1976: 83). That diffusion could well have originated in the Upemba Depression since, as T.Q. Reefe suggested in his study of the Luba kingdom, it is likely that ‘in a situation of continuity and slow historical evolution, what occurred in the Upemba Depression influenced the evolution of adjacent dry-land societies’ (Reefe 1981: 71). The spread of the goods, such as copper work, that occurred in the early millennium BC strongly suggests that 1) by this time the area was dominated by some form of ruling group who had accumulated some wealth, and that 2) the influence of this group was spreading in a southward direction.

Interestingly, the eleventh century saw accelerated cultural change in the interior of central Africa, which was particularly visible in the marked and seemingly sudden changes that occurred in pottery styles. It is believed that
this change is linked to the establishment of several major kingdoms in the interlacustrine region further to the north and the new diffusion stream that this might have created and activated (Phillipson 2005: 292-5). Zambia, is a notable exception to this and, though sharp changes in pottery did occur, there is no evidence that the eastern pottery style ever spread there. Instead, by the twelfth century, central and north-eastern Zambia was predominantly inhabited by a people whose pottery belonged to a common ‘Luangwa’ tradition, which differed sharply from the Early Iron Age pottery that previously dominated the area. It has been suggested that the makers of this Luangwa pottery belonged to a ‘distinct group of people, who had entered the country from elsewhere’ (Roberts 1976: 36-7). In turn, the archaeologist D.W. Phillipson argued that the differences between Luangwa pottery and the pottery found in virtually every other area of east-southern Africa suggest that,
by then, there was not one but two clear separate ‘streams’ of cultural diffusion: a western one, centred in Zambia and south-eastern Katanga and an eastern one found in the remainder of eastern and southern Africa (Phillipson 2005: 251-2). In turn, archaeologist Thomas N. Huffman’s interpretation of the two-stream directions, based on a study of motifs and typology, places the origin of the twelfth century spread of ‘Luangwa’ pottery from somewhere to the north-west of the modern Copperbelt – i.e. in south-eastern Katanga (see Huffman 1989). This abrupt change in pottery has often been described as having accompanied, from around the eleventh century, important migrations of people into central, northern and eastern Zambia (Phillipson 2005: 294-5; Roberts 1976: 38). If such a movement of people did take place, it is not yet possible, from the archaeological evidence, to identify these people or know where they came from for certain. However, as Andrew Roberts notes, ‘the known distribution of Luangwa pottery indicates some eastwards and southwards process of dispersal from the Shaba region’10 (Roberts 1976: 38). In addition, he argues, ‘the striking uniformity of the Luangwa pottery over so much of Zambia is in itself some indication that its makers were relatively mobile, travelling far and fairly fast in the course of migration and trade’ (Ibid.).

Three points emerge from this discussion. One is that the southern Congo basin seems to have contributed significantly to the cultural development of a large part of central Africa during the second millennium AD, and that seems to be particularly the case in Zambia. This view is reinforced by oral traditions, which, as we will see in the next point, place the origins of the ruling dynasties of many states in Zambia and adjacent regions in the Congo basin.

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10 Between 1971 and 1997, the Katanga province was known as Shaba, following the authenticity campaign launched by President Mobutu Sese Seko.
The second is that political centralisation, the spread of its symbolic imagery and the interplay of several cultural traditions are all ancient processes. Copper seems to have played an essential role in these processes through its use not only for functional objects, but also for items imbued with less utilitarian purposes: status display (jewellery), symbolism (bells), or exchange (crosses). Lastly, these are only small fragments of information about very ancient and badly-known processes. Archaeology for this period remains virtually unknown, which means that, in reality, very little is known about the early occupation of central Africa.

2.2 The Luba and Lunda According to Oral Tradition

2.2.1 The Birth of the Luba and Lunda ‘Empires’

According to oral tradition, the area between Lake Tanganyika and the upper Kasai originally consisted of a myriad of small chiefdoms, among which were the Bungo, the Bena Kalundwe, the Kaniok and the Hemba (Vansina 1966a: 71). Luba traditions have it that, in the mythical past, an immigrant called ‘Kongolo’ appeared in the area and became the founder of the ‘first Luba kingdom’ (Reefe 1981: 24). Kongolo’s supposed origins are unknown, but it is said that he and his successor, Kalala Ilunga, embarked on a policy
of expansion, subduing the southern part of their kingdom. Kalala Ilunga's accession to the throne and his expansion campaigns inaugurated what has been called the 'second Luba Kingdom' (Vansina 1966a: 72). At its apogee in the mid-nineteenth century, the Luba would control most of the region between the Lubilash River and Lake Tanganyika and between the forest and the northern part of the Copperbelt (Wilson 1972: 575). After Kalala Ilunga, however, fraternal struggles for the ‘throne’ seem to have become rife. Though expansion continued, albeit at a slower pace, it seems to have consisted more of the gradual absorption of communities living in the periphery of Luba influence than in actual military campaigns. No real attempts at expansion are recorded before King Mwine Kadilo, who is thought to have reigned around 1700. The recorded sources do not throw light on why expansion slowed down (Vansina 1966a: 156-9). It may be that the Luba kingdom now had to contend with the influence of a new state, both a neighbour and an offspring: the Lunda kingdom.

Oral tradition suggests that the Lunda nation's point of origin was an area in the valley of the Nkalaany, or upper Bushimaie River in the west of Katanga. It seems that in the mythical past, Lunda land was already a loosely-tied political unit, ruled by successive generations of brother-sister couples. A more precise dynastic genealogy only appears with a man named ‘Mwaaku’ or ‘Mkwaakw’, whom Edouard Bustin refers to as the man ‘who may be said to serve as a bridge between the myths of origin and the “historical” past’ (Bustin 1975: 6). Mkwaakw had a son named Nkond. Nkond had three children: two sons, Kinguri (also spelled Cinguud or Tshinguli) and Cinyama (also spelled Cinyaam or Tshiniama), and a daughter Rweej (also spelled Lueji). Kinguri and Cinyama, who were cruel and indolent, quarrelled with their father. Because of this quarrel, Nkond named Rweej his successor instead of his sons. Rweej became queen of the Lunda when he died and married a Luba named Cibinda Ilunga, brother of the then Luba king, Ilunga Walwefu. Cibinda Ilunga then became the rightful king of the Lunda by virtue of marriage (Bustin 1975: 7; Miller 1972: 553-554; Vansina 1966a: 78). It is generally recognised that this story metaphorically portrays the introduction of some kind of Luba influence in the Lunda state, as symbolised by the marriage of Rweej to Cibinda Ilunga. Vansina interprets this myth as a euphemistic account of the conquest of the area by the Luba kingdom, a hypothesis he sees strengthened by the fact that ‘many Lunda titles are derived from Luba land’ (Vansina 1966a: 78). The Lunda kingdom, however, functioned as a kingdom in its own right and supposedly grew into an ‘empire’ under the successors of Cibinda Ilunga. In particular, Cibinda Ilunga's grandson, Mwaant Yaav Naweej, put
an emphasis on a successful programme of expansion. He also reorganised and consolidated the system to such an extent that his name became a generic title for Lunda kingship, as *Mwaant Yaav* or *Mwata Yamvo* (Bustin 1975: 10-11).

The interpretation of these stories and the dating of the actual events they describe (or are metaphors for) rest on rather shaky ground. The drawing of a chronology for Lunda history after the reign of Naweej, for instance, is crippled by significant irreconcilable discrepancies that are present in sources for that period (Bustin 1975: 12). But it is the date of the creation of these kingdoms and of the appearance of kingship that is especially disputed. Kongolo’s foundation of the Luba kingdom has been dated to c.1500 and Kalala Ilunga to c.1600, with Vansina placing the conquest of the Lunda area by the Luba kingdom in or around AD 1600. These dates are calculated from the sum of kings’ reigns (approximated to 20 years for each king), counting back from the only event whose date is known with some certainty. This single, datable event was the invasion of the Mbundu regions of northern Angola by Lunda-led armies, manned with warriors known as ‘Jaga’ or ‘Imbangala’. This event was recorded by Portuguese observers in the early seventeenth century (see point 2 below). However, according to J.C. Miller, the dating of the origins of Luba kingship to the sixteenth century is based on too literal an interpretation of the traditional evidence. In his opinion, not only should many of these stories be taken much more metaphorically but most names mentioned in traditional stories are more likely to refer to titles rather than actual persons, in which case one name could actually refer to multiple people. Reinterpreting the traditions as chronicles of named positions, rather than individual rulers, means making significant adjustments to the dating of the entire complex of early Lunda and Luba states in Katanga and would push the beginnings of kingdoms in this part of Africa to ‘the thirteenth century or perhaps long before’ (Miller 1972: 573). This, incidentally, would coincide with the evidence of the Upemba Depression. Thus, early Luba and Lunda oral history could conceivably be regarded as representing memories.

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11 According to Vansina, during the reigns of Cibinda, and his two successors, Mwaant Lu-seeng and Mwaant Yaav Naweej, the Lunda Kingdom expanded ‘from the valley of the Nkalaany to the whole area between that river and the Kasai in the west and to the springs of the Lulua in the south’. Vansina (1966a: 79).
12 For more details about his chronology reconstruction efforts, see Vansina (1962a & 1966b).
13 The descendants of these invaders, known as ‘Imbangala’ rather than ‘Jaga’, claimed to have reached Angola under the leadership of a man called Kinguri. Kinguri is supposedly Rweej’s brother. See point 2.2; Miller (1972: 549).
of political structures much older than what a literal interpretation of their semi-mythical royal genealogies would suggest.\textsuperscript{14}

\subsection*{2.2.2 Migrations of Lunda Groups}

The Lunda influence was not limited to its traditional heartland in western Katanga. Indeed, its ramifications spread far and wide thanks to the many smaller Lunda-ised groups whose appearance it sparked off. According to Bustin, ‘oral traditions of the Lunda themselves’ suggest that much of the initial Lunda expansion towards eastern Angola and northeast Zambia in the seventeenth century took ‘the form of migrations involving segments of the original population (under circumstances that remain far from clear)’ (Bustin 1975: 6). These migrations supposedly found their origin in the fact that Rweej’s two brothers, though they had accepted her as queen, refused to plead allegiance to her Luba husband. As a result, they left Lunda land to migrate in different directions. Kinguri’s migration eventually led to the foundation of the Kasanje kingdom, home to the Imbangala, on the Kwango River in Angola, and to contacts with the Portuguese (\textit{Ibid.}: 7). Though Kasanje is of lesser interest to the history of the Lunda, as it always stayed outside of the Lunda’s direct sphere of influence, its contacts with the Portuguese traders provide our first possibility to establish a tentative date for an event. As a result, Kinguri’s original departure from Lunda, has been placed sometime around 1490 (Bustin 1975: 7; Miller 1972: 571). For his part, the second brother, Cinyama, migrated to the south, into the area situated between the upper Kasai and upper Zambezi, in modern Zambia, to bring Lunda rule to the Lwena. This second thrust is even less well known than that of Kinguri as its inland direction made it escape the attention of external observers (Bustin 1975: 10). Other groups, from whom the Cokwe, the Minungu, the Shinje and the Songo supposedly hail from, are believed to have left Lunda at about the same time (\textit{Ibid.}). However, it is again largely uncertain whether or not these migrations were part of the two major currents of dispersion identified above, or indeed if they took place at all.

Yet another migration, some traditions have it, was that of the Luba followers that Cibinda Ilunga brought with him from his native Luba land when he married Rweej. These followers reportedly founded the Bemba nation and settled between lakes Tanganyika, Mweru and Bangweolu, where they set out to bring different parts of the country under their control. In that par-

\textsuperscript{14} For more discussions on central African chronology based on Imbangala history, see Vansina (1962a); Miller (1972) and Birmingham (1965).
ticular instance, therefore, it is difficult to identify the origins of the Bemba as either Luba or Lunda (a fact that gave rise to some scholarly quarrelling). At several points along the way, several parties decided to stay behind and leave the bulk of the group. These split-away groups founded the Bisa and Lala chiefdoms.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, new ‘tribes’ and chiefdoms were initiated through a process of settlement by (Lunda-originated) ‘Luba’ immigrants, but without mass migration (Bustin 1975: 10; Vansina 1966a: 88–92). This has led Vansina to argue that ‘the names of the present day “tribes” may reflect not any real cultural differences but the vicissitudes of the implantation of chieftainships’ (Vansina 1966a: 92). A similar evolution, he says, seems to have occurred in all other parts of eastern Zambia and Katanga (Ibid).

This, then, is the summary of the first Lunda expansion through extensive migrations rather than centralising military conquests. What emerges from oral traditions, is that, from the first half of the sixteenth century, a stream of Lunda/Luba migrants left the heartland to move towards the west and the south until they gradually occupied or subdued large portions of territory. The story of these migrations is a rather tangled one. Firstly, it is possible that migrations, as suggested by archaeological evidence, had taken place before. Secondly, instead of two migratory thrusts led by the two brothers as the legend described, there would have probably been a series of small-scale migrations, none of them involving large numbers of people (maybe a hundred at a time or even less) (Bustin 1975: 7; Vansina 1966a: 85). Thirdly, they might not have been migrations at all, at least not in the sense in which this term is usually understood. There has been a tendency, especially among historians of the 1960s, to interpret traditional migration stories quite literally and therefore to ascribe political and cultural change to population movements. According to Miller, this has led to a tendency to view African state formation as dependent ‘on the arrival of skilled outsiders who imposed fully-developed state institutions on less skilled peasants with little subsequent alteration in the basic political structures established at the ‘conquest’’ (Miller 1976: 5). This tendency has since been widely criticised, being described as ‘part of an intellectual tradition that sought to explain cause and effect by discrete, discernible events, denying the complex interplay among processes that are quite impossible any longer to give shape to’ (Henige 1982: 61). Since the early 1970s, the migration hypothesis has been replaced by an emphasis on local developments. In the case of the Lunda expansion, ‘migration’ might have consisted of the transfer of the Lunda title from one neighbouring state to another without necessarily involving any Lunda individuals (Miller 1972: 552).

\textsuperscript{15} For more details on the origins of the Balala, see Verbeek (1987: 229-51).
If it did involve individuals, their ‘migration’ would have taken a much longer period of time and followed a more complex evolution than the conventional model of a ‘migration’ by a single group of people going from a point A to a point B. Migrating groups would have split, settled, integrated some of the elements of the culture that they encountered, then split again, and moved on again having acquired a slightly new identity. These migrations therefore did not necessarily imply that real political control from the Lunda heartland was established over these far-flung areas that were integrated within the Lunda sphere of influence. They should primarily be understood as instances of cultural diffusion. In any case, by the turn of the seventeenth century, the grasslands south of the Katanga lakes and the north Zambian plateau were occupied by peoples sharing very similar cultures and many clans among them. Most of them traditionally claim Luba origins, regardless of whether a real historical basis for that claim truly exists (Roberts 1976: 86-91).

2.2.3 The Eighteenth Century: Two Migratory Thrusts

The first half of the eighteenth century saw two further waves of Lunda expansion, which will be described as ‘thrusts’ for lack of a better word. One ‘thrust’ took place in a southerly direction and supposedly involved three ‘Lunda-ised’ chiefs, Musokantanda, Kanongesha and Shinde, each of whom grabbed a chieftainship in the upper basin of the Zambezi. Before their arrival, that area was occupied by a number of smaller kingdoms analogous to those of the Luba, including Lwena and Kaonde. Musokantanda subjugated the Kaonde. Kanongesha established himself in the area of Mwinilunga and Shinde settled farther to the south. These ‘Lunda-ised’ intruders called themselves ‘Ndembu’, so that they and their subjects collectively came to be known as the Ndembu. Though the Ndembu regarded the Mwata Yamvo as their ‘suzerain’ and sent him tributes, in effect the Mwata Yamvo could not effectively control the newly acquired lands in the south and had to create the office of sanama or governor to administer them (Bustin 1975: 12-13; Roberts 1976: 94; Vansina 1966a: 161-165).

It was, however, in the Luapula valley that the Lunda Empire left its most lasting mark on Zambia (Roberts 1976: 94). Lunda expansion to the East was arguably a ‘thrust’, in the sense that it was relatively abrupt and conquering in spirit (Macola 2002: 36). This eastward thrust, which seems to have been triggered by a search for salt, gave rise to two semi-autonomous kingdoms located on the upper Lualaba and the Luapula, respectively: the Kingdom of Kazembe of the Lualaba and the Kingdom of Kazembe of the Luapula. The former controlled salt and copper deposits and the latter was a much larger
state, reaching its maximum extent between the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century, which later traded extensively with the Portuguese (Bustin 1975: 12; Roberts 1976: 94). This thrust was conducted under the leadership of a man called Nganda Bilonda, who was rewarded with the honorific title of ‘Kazembe’. Around 1740, his successor, Kazembe II, invaded the lower Luapula valley and established a capital near the south end of the lake Mweru (Roberts 1976: 94). With increasing instability and a dynastic feud raging in the Lunda heartland, the then Mwata Yamvo, King Mukanza, eventually had to recognise the virtual autonomy of the Kazembe. In practice, this gave the Kazembe full control over all the regions of Lunda conquest east of the Lualaba and made him the Mwata Yamvo’s near equal (Vansina 1966a: 166-167). More than its southwest counterpart, the effect of the Lunda eastern thrust was quite quickly felt. As an independent state, according to Vansina,

the kingdom of Kazembe was probably the greatest in size and the strongest kingdom of all the Luba and Lunda states. From 1750 to 1850 it was paramount in southern Katanga and parts of the northern Zambian plateau. It brought security to the local populations, who suffered from raids by the Luba clans established further north, and it brought change and novelties to the area (ibid.: 174).

These two thrusts are of great importance in Zambian history as they constitute the first real penetration of Lunda power into the territory of what is now modern Zambia. In this way, they greatly contributed to the shaping of what would be the political landscape of the north-eastern, Copperbelt and the north-western provinces in the twentieth century.

2.3 The Socio-Political Organisation

Traditional stories therefore suggest that chieftainship was well implanted in Zambia by the sixteenth century and that influences stemming from the Luba and Lunda might have played an important role in this implantation. Yet, even if these stories contain some truth, they should not be taken at face value. As Hugues Legros put it: ‘ces récits doivent être considérés comme des “clichés”. Ils prennent la forme d’épisodes stéréotypés qui renvoient avant tout à la manière dont la société produit et pense son passé’ (Legros 1996: 9). Consequently, he continues, these stories should be thought of as ‘mythes de transfert,’ which could refer to a ‘véritable migration, mais aussi à des transferts d’idéologie ou d’identité ou à des contacts politiques ou commer-
ciaux entre deux régions’ (Ibid.). Similarly, Andrew Roberts points out that the main purpose of these myths ‘is not to record what really happened, but rather to explain and justify the customs and institutions of the present day’ (Roberts 1976: 63). In that sense, they are meant to provide a sense of unity and political identity more than to relate real historical events. Undeniably, customs found in northern Zambia are suspiciously similar to those of the Lunda/Luba traditions. Firstly, there is a great number of technical similarities ‘in the vocabulary of political institutions, and in the insignia of chieftainship, such as iron bells and bowstands, and wooden slit signals, or ‘talking drums’ (Ibid.: 82). More importantly, there are many similarities in political ideas.

Luba political organisation is not well known and only a rough sketch can be drawn. The most important political idea of the Luba was their approach to kingship and authority. Luba kingship was underpinned by the concept of bulopwe, a ‘sacred quality’ that was transmitted from father to son and gave chiefs their legitimacy to rule (Vansina 1966a: 74). The king was at the centre of a supple form of government that combined: some degree of centralisation in the form of a central government; some degree of decentralisation; and some degree of flexibility in incorporating peripheral leaders and cultures within its ranks. This system had two cornerstones. The first was the emphasis put on control over the payment of tributes and its redistribution. The second was the development of an ideology and institutions that could be exported to all tributaries in the kingdom and which not only enabled the king to claim a degree of loyalty from them, but also contributed to creating a general sentiment of cohesion (Reefe 1981: 5; Vansina 1966a: 72-4). In broad terms therefore, the main concepts introduced by the Luba were, on the one hand, loosely centralised kingship surrounding a hereditary monarchy, and on the other, mechanisms of integration of alien groups in the Luba structure, notably through the use of a tribute system. In contrast to the Luba, the Lunda did not consider that political office necessarily needed to be vested in the blood. Instead, the royal family associated non-royal officials and did not cower from giving non-Lunda important positions in the Lunda kingdom. This they achieved thanks to two central concepts: one was the ‘clear-cut distinction between rights in land and authority over men’ (Bustin 1975: 2), and the other, the interacting notions of ‘positional succession’ and ‘perpetual kinship’ (Roberts 1976: 85). The notion of perpetual ‘kinship’ and the related custom of ‘positional succession,’ perhaps the most important concept introduced by the Lunda, was the idea that a chief, or any other figure of authority, was considered a kin of all other chiefs and figures of authority. In this reading, regardless of their cultural or familial affiliations, a chief or headman
regarded specific other title-holders as ‘father’, ‘brother’ or ‘son’. They then
had to engage in the same fixed relationships of reciprocity that ‘fathers’ and
‘sons’ traditionally have to follow. This also meant that if one could inherit a
position by virtue of family ties, one could also effectively be appointed to a
position by being designated as the ‘son’ of the former title-holder. Thus, the
Lunda kingdom consisted of a ‘web of titled positions, linked in a hierarchy
of perpetual kinship’ (Ibid.). Secondly, an important feature of Lunda poli-
tics, which was, in fact, originally a Luba idea, was the clear distinction made
between land and political chiefs. When a territory was integrated within
the Lunda sphere, its chief might be left in control of his own chiefdom as an
‘owner of the land’ on condition of swearing allegiance to the Mwata Yamvo
and paying him tribute. Whether peaceful or forcible, the integration of the
various villages – or Ngaand – into the Lunda political network took the
form of the dispatching to a given area of a political administrator, the
cilool,
whose role was to collect tax but who had no authority over the land itself
(Bustin 1975: 2-4). Therefore, the chief of a local chiefdom, though nominal-
ly no longer the highest authority, could still, in practice, act as the absolute
boss of his own domain. As a result, these two concepts made assimilation
into the Lunda political and tributary network relatively easy to accept and
minimised the possibility of conflict between Lunda and local traditions. In
the words of Jean-Luc Vellut, extended Lunda society was an:

ensemble complexe où l'on peut distinguer deux niveaux d’organisation
économique et politique : celui des communautés villageoises groupées au-
tour de l'un ou l'autre lignage, parfois mais non nécessairement Lunda, et
celui de la superstructure politique présente à des degrés divers dans tout
l’empire, et dont l’expression la plus pure est la cour (Vellut 1972: 70).

The kingdom of Kazembe is an illustration of the efficiency of these tactics.
Between the mid-eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, the burgeon-
ing kingdom of Kazembe managed to absorb all the peoples of the lower Lua-
pula valley (Macola 2002: 79). The important ethnic variation present within
this territory constituted the ideal breeding ground for inter-community ten-
sion, while at the same time the sheer size of the kingdom meant there was
no means to enforce Kazembe’s authority directly, militarily or otherwise.
Kazembe was essentially a conquest state. As a result, it was necessary for
its rulers to ‘legitimise’ themselves in the eyes of the local populations or, in
other words, to make Lunda higher authority acceptable to them. To achieve
this, the rulers of Kazembe drew on the Lunda cultural resources and elab-
orated ‘a complex set of institutions of peripheral rule’ (Ibid.: 67). In keep-
ing with the Lunda government principles described above, Kazembe kings
deployed representatives to every district, the *bacilolo* (plural ‘Bembaised’ form of the Lunda term *cilool*), who were to propagate Lunda precepts and symbols to all subjects. The *bacilolo* appropriated for themselves the right to allocate land to new villages and settlers, but at the same time respected the original occupants of the valley as ‘owners of the land’ (*Ibid.*: 91). In this way, as summarised by Cunnison, ‘wherever governors went, a system of communications and tribute was set up between the outlying capital and the metropolis […] each district capital was a centre of Lundahood’ (Cunnison 1959: 180). In addition, the intruding Lunda also adopted the Bemba speech of their subjects, though Lunda survived as a court language (Roberts 1976: 96). Thus, this idea of a shared culture, as was created by the diffusion of a Lunda-centred history and ideology, combined into a decentralised respect for local authority and traditions contributed to unite rulers and subject peoples. Consequently, despite its great reach, the kingdom of Kazembe achieved a greater measure of cohesion than its western Lunda counterpart. Though its structure resembled that of Mwata Yamvo’s, the Kazembe Kingdom displayed an even higher capacity to coexist with, as well as contribute to, diversity among Kazembe’s people.

The existence of such flexible structures explains the breadth that the Luba and Lunda influence was able to reach (by the nineteenth century, Lunda/Luba governmental patterns were disseminated over an area ranging from Angola to Malawi). In fact, the term ‘empire’ that is usually attached to the names of Luba and Lunda, is in itself misleading. ‘Empire’ implies the existence of clearly defined boundaries and a strong central state endowed with an equally strong state apparatus exercising tight control over its territory. In reality, while all Luba, Lunda or Lunda-ised states consisted of a nucleus that was closely controlled by the central government, the power of that government increasingly diminished the farther one went from the centre. At some point, one would reach a point far enough for Luba/Lunda hegemony to be more cultural than practical. And even the phrase ‘cultural hegemony’, which I use consciously, is, to a large extent, misleading. Understanding the origins of any custom or institution simply in terms of diffusion from somewhere else would constitute very flawed thinking. As Roberts pointed out: ‘however important outside influences may be, they are unlikely to take roots unless local conditions are favourable’ (Roberts 1976: 84). Indeed, the fact that even at the height of their power, the Lunda were not able to subject the few groups that challenged their authority – as was the case with the Kongo

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16 For more details on the mythological narrative that provided the gel for the Kazembe Kingdom, see Chapter 1 of Gordon (2006).
or Sala Mpasu in the north in the mid-nineteenth century – goes some way
to show, as Vansina put it, ‘to what a great extent conquest depended on the
acquiescence of the conquered’ (Vansina 1966a: 162).

Therefore, we should think less in terms of invasion and conquest, and more
in terms of newcomers acquiring authority by virtue of practices that were
found to be both attractive and adaptable. And Lunda governmental practic-
es were indeed attractive and adaptable. So attractive and adaptable, in fact,
that Jan Vansina was able to argue that:

The crucial event in the earlier history of central Africa has been not the cre-
ation of a Luba kingdom by Kongolo and Kalala Ilunga but the introduction
of Luba principles of government into Lunda land under Cibinda Ilunga and
their transformation by the Lunda. The new political pattern which evolved
around 1600 in the Lunda capital could be taken over by any culture. Its dif-
fusion was to condition until 1850 the history and the general cultural evolu-
tion of a huge area. Even now its effects on the peoples of central Africa are
still discernible (Ibid.: 97).

2.4 The Importance of Trade Networks

In her review of the excavations carried out at Sanga in 1991, Marianne
Cornevin noted that ‘malheureusement la tradition orale se borne à trans-
mettre des noms et, dans les meilleurs des cas, des événements d'ordre mi-
litaire ou politique; elle « oublie » les facteurs économiques qui sont géné-
ralement à l’origine des transformations socio-politiques’ (Cornevin 1993:
224). Yet, from other evidence, it appears that trade played a vital role in state
expansion, cultural diffusion and perhaps even in the emergence of specific
types of state organisation. Trade in central Africa, was plentiful, varied and
multi-layered. Vansina distinguishes three different types of trade: the local
trade (‘from village to village within a given population’); the regional trade
(‘between culturally different peoples within a single state’) and the long dis-
tance trade, which was introduced with the arrival of European traders in
the fifteenth century (Vansina 1962b: 375-376). Richard Gray and David Bir-
mingham, on the other hand, contend that it is difficult to distinguish the
different phases of trade primarily on the basis of geographical scale or the
distances and commodities involved. For if one tries to draw such distinc-
tions, they contend, ‘the distinction between village and regional trade, de-
defined by Vansina, becomes blurred right at the start’ (Gray & Birmingham
1970: 2). Instead, it seems that all sorts of merchandises were being carried
across large distances and being exchanged between all sorts of communities from an early stage. Therefore, Gray and Birmingham prefer instead to distinguish ‘subsistence-oriented trade’ from ‘market-oriented trade’ (Ibid.: 3), which allow for flexibility of interaction between several types of trade. ‘In practice,’ they add, ‘the populations of central and eastern Africa lived in varying degrees of dependence on subsistence production and market exchange, and subsistence-oriented trade often continued to co-exist with an incipient, developing commerce’ (Ibid.: 5).

2.4.1 Pre-Long-Distance Trade in Central Africa

The misconception that trade in Africa only began when the Portuguese first came to find gold, ivory and slaves in the late fifteenth century has been a common one (Curtin 1984: 15). In reality, when the Portuguese arrived at the mouth of the Congo River, they stumbled upon a developed Kingdom endowed with a centralised commercial system: the Kongo kingdom (Thornton 1981: 183-184). The Kongo kingdom was by no means an isolated case. To many central African societies, including that of the Luba and Lunda, the long-distance trade was simply the latest stage of a long process of economic interaction carried out ‘inter-communally’ as well as ‘extra-communally’. It has been noted in the first section of this chapter that archaeological evidence points at the existence, at least from the beginning of the second millennium or even earlier, of extended regional trade systems thanks to which subsistence and prestige goods travelled widely. In turn, this extended regional trade seems to have contributed to the appearance of a high degree of specialisation (in metalwork, for example) and a complex system of tribute (Reefe 1981: 93-6; Wilson 1972: 579). Moreover, the importance of certain commodities may explain why the expansion of certain states went in a certain direction or why certain states became more centralised than others. Katanga, where – not incidentally – the comparatively highly centralised Luba state emerged, possessed all three highly-prized ‘prestige’ goods in great demand all over central Africa at the time: iron, salt and copper. No wonder, then, that Katanga should be highly coveted. It could be supposed therefore that the eastwards expansion of the Lunda in the early eighteenth century and the related growth of the kingdom of Kazembe had the ambition to secure access to the mineral resources of southern Katanga. At least, this is what is suggested by the fact that traditional accounts attribute great importance to the salt-producing district on the upper Lualaba River (Macola 2002: 44). The salt pans were located all around the Katanga lakes, and at Kiburi on the Upper Lualaba and Mwashya on the Upper Lufira. These were controlled first by the Mwata Yamvo, then by the Kazembe, whilst the Luba con-
trolled the salt and mineral mines north of the lake. From these Lunda and Luba strongholds, salt from the Mwashya and lake salt pans was apparently exported to eastern Katanga (Vansina 1962b: 386). As it happens, the main deposits of copper were located in the same area, at Mwilu near the salt pans of the Lualaba. The principal copper mines belonged to chief Katanga (after whom the province of Katanga was later named), and copper was exported in the form of bars or crosses, northwards, to the Luba, and southwards, to Kazembe (Ibid.). And indeed, most of the copper found by archaeologists in Zambia came from Katanga (Roberts 1976: 104). As Vansina argues, ‘the fact that copper was in use everywhere in the whole area suggests strongly that all of central Africa between the Kasai, the Zambezi and the great lakes had a single net of interlocking regional trade systems’ (Vansina 1962b: 387).

2.4.2 Long-Distance Trade in Central Africa

The first European contact with African shores south of the equator was made when the Portuguese encountered the Kingdom of Kongo in 1482. Trade started sometime after 1493 (Thornton 1981: 183), but it was not until the eighteenth century that the search for commodities such as gold, ivory and slaves was carried as far as the unknown country deeper inside the interior. By the 1650s, traders had reached Kasanje, the capital of the Imbangala near the upper Kwango. There, traders exchanged European goods for ivory and slaves with the Imbangala, who themselves organised caravans to the capital of the Lunda kingdom, and vice versa. Meanwhile, while contact was established between the main Lunda kingdom and the Atlantic coast, Kazembe was already in contact with the eastwards trade route and the Indian Ocean. The Kazembe kingdom had been active in long-distance trade since its inception in the early eighteenth century, collaborating for that purpose with neighbouring peoples, mainly the Bisa and the Yao. The Yao, who lived on the eastern side of Lake Malawi were by then well established as the leading African traders in east central Africa (Roberts 1976: 109-10; Wilson 1972: 579). At the same time, as soon as Kazembe’s suzerain had consistent access to European goods, which happened around 1740, some of these were sent to Kazembe’s capital in the East to be exchanged for salt and copper. By the later eighteenth century, Kazembe was also sending slaves to Mwata Yamvo.

17 The western trade route occasionally bypassed the western Lunda kingdom, especially when Kasanje was replaced by Bihe, capitals of the Ovimbundu as main trading town in the West around 1750. By 1795, a new pattern of long-distance trade passing through Bihe, rather than Kasanje, was well established and extended as far as Cokwelend, their direct neighbour, and made contact with the Lwena. By 1835, they had reached Loziland (western Zambia), the southern Lunda states and Katanga. See Vansina (1962b: 382-385).
who exported them on the Atlantic trade route. Thus, the east and west trade routes converged at Kazembe’s territory, thereby forming a single trade route that crossed the entire continent from east to west. This was made possible by the fact that the widely-spread territories of the Lunda Empire were connected by a complex web of tributary and trading networks, which was successfully recycled for the purpose of the long-distance trade. Since these tribute/trade routes also ran through the salt- and copper-producing districts of Katanga, where they intersected with the regional networks of the Luba area (Reefe 1981: 162-8; Vansina 1962b: 382-383), these items were easily available to be exported internationally. In this way, the two networks of economic exchanges not only interpenetrated, but also fed upon each other. Although it is problematic to posit that there was ever a clear-cut partition between regional and long-distance trade, it is probable that their amalgamation boosted the regional networks’ capacity and reach, and therefore stimulated the traditional economy.

2.4.3 Trade as Catalyst for Cultural and Political Expansion

Trade seems to have had a fluctuating effect on the politics of central Africa. The Bisa and the Yao, for instance, though they were known as trading peoples *par excellence*, never created any centralised state (Gray & Birmingham 1970: 13). The kingdom of Kazembe and the main Lunda kingdom, on the other hand, are examples of important states that grew out of, as well as maintained themselves through, their commercial supremacy. In the eighteenth century, the Lunda Empire became one of the most important suppliers of slaves for the long-distance trade, while Kazembe was the strongest power in southern Katanga and northern Zambia for most of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. One of the explanations for this disparity must lie in the type of the commodity that was traded. The trade in minerals, in particular, probably required a higher degree of organisation and control. Since mining is an activity that tends to be geographically limited, gold, copper, or salt mines could become the focal centre of an economic and political power. This could explain the centralised quality of the Luba state (*Ibid.*: 16). The regional trade did not bring about further expansion of the Luba state, but it did lead to improved communication between peoples and polities, thereby strengthening Luba authority in the region. In the case of the Luba therefore, trade and politics interacted, feeding upon one another (Reefe 1981: 102). Similarly, the growth of the Lunda kingdom did not take off until it was supported by a strong commercial network. The centralisation and the political growth of Lunda influence were processes that took place in parallel
to the expansion of trade to the Atlantic Ocean in the eighteenth century.\footnote{Although the initial political impulses from Luba probably reached the Lunda country in the first half of the sixteenth century, and although some external trading may have begun at a similar period, the Lunda kingdom did not emerge as a structured state before 100 years after that. See Gray & Birmingham (1970: 20).} It is easy to see how trade could be a channel for expansion and centralisation. Regional circuits were ‘dependent upon, and limited by, the existing political structures’ (Vansina 1962b: 388). There were no markets, and instead it was the court of chiefs that redistributed collected tributes (Roberts 1976: 101). For this reason, rulers usually tried to stay in full command of the terms of trade. In addition, in exchange for providing safe conditions for trade, by maintaining order on the routes and market, they demanded tolls and taxes from which they derived wealth and prestige (Vansina 1962b: 388). They invested this wealth and prestige in the strengthening of their political positions. The first Portuguese traders to visit Kazembe’s capital noticed that the latter ‘was very generous at times in giving slaves and pieces of cloth to his vassals’ (Macola 2002: 134). Ascertaining exclusive ownership and control over these alien goods was a way of strengthening links of political subordination \cite{Vansina 1962}. Thus, the dynamics of commerce and politics are hard to disentangle. The political history is very important for an understanding of the trade, while conversely the trade helps to explain certain relevant aspects of the political structures or even some actions of external politics, such as the seizing of a region where valuable materials were to be found. Not only did trade foster the establishment of a complex web of tributary networks but it also, at various points, certainly provided the incentive for expansion.

\section*{2.5 The Disintegration of the Central African States (1840-1900)}

After the middle of the nineteenth century, the patterns of history in central Africa changed suddenly. A period of increased violence and instability unsettled the equilibrium in which a set of stable kingdoms could cohabitate as semi-isolated entities in or around the vast Lunda Empire. The origins for these new patterns must be sought in the fact that, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the relationship and level of exposure of the peoples of Zambia and Katanga to external contacts took a different turn. Previously, contacts with a wider world, which had thus far been exclusively commercial, had mainly taken place through intermediaries: go-between groups such as the Imbangala. However, from 1840 onwards, there was a variety of new external pressures, coming from both west and east, in the form of newcomers, some of whom turned out to be conquerors. Incidentally, this period of
violent convulsions coincides with the beginnings of European exploratory interests in the region. By the time the first Europeans effectively worked towards setting the wheels of colonialism in motion, they were confronted with a different balance of power than had hitherto existed. In 1800, there had been four main ‘centres of authority’ in central Africa: the main Luba kingdom, the main Lunda kingdom, the kingdom of Kazembe and the Lozi kingdom.\(^{19}\) By 1900, all these kingdoms had, to all intents and purposes, fallen.

2.5.1 In the West: The Cokwe

In the western half of Katanga, in Kasai, and in the southern parts of the Kwango-Kasai area, those responsible for the disruption of Luba-Lunda patterns of life were the Cokwe. In a very short period, from about 1852 to 1887 according to Vansina, they had overwhelmed all the Lunda groups. Yet, until 1850 they had been the opposite of ubiquitous (Vansina 1962b: 385, 1966a: 216). They were originally a small group of hunting nomadic peoples who lived near the headwaters of the Kwango, Kwilu and Kasai rivers. They had been involved in trading ivory and wax, and arms-trafficking, among other activities, with the benediction of Lunda chiefs. In the process, they had been able to hold sway over a large stretch of territory, their expansion following the lines of the trade routes on which they were active (Bustin 1975: 16; Vansina 1966a: 216). By the mid-1860s the Cokwe virtually controlled a large corridor extending as far north as Tshikapa in Kasai in a way that cut off the Mwata Yamvo from the westernmost part of his empire. At the same time, in the 1870s, the Lunda aristocracy was undergoing serious dynastic troubles. The Lunda king was facing the growing insubordination of Mdumba, the then sanama (governor of the southern Lunda provinces). Mdumba eventually had the Mwata Yamvo killed, took his place and, with this act, inaugurated a period of dynastic strife that allowed the Cokwe to eat away at the Lunda homeland. In a series of invasions between 1885 and 1888, Lunda territory and trade networks were taken over by the Cokwe, leading to the complete collapse of the Lunda state (Bustin 1975: 15-18).

2.5.2 In the East: The Yeke

At the same time as the Cokwe were advancing in the west, both the authority of the Luba king and what remained of the Mwata Yamvo’s control over the Kazembe eastern domains were being shattered by the empire-building

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\(^{19}\) The Lozi Kingdom was located on the upper Zambezi, in the West of what is now Zambia. It had little contact with Mwata Yamvo. See Roberts (1976: 96-99).
activities of a new group, one that was to leave a deep mark on Katangese folklore: the Yeke. Appearing practically out of nowhere, the Yeke established a kingdom that, though short-lived – it existed from about 1856 to 1891 – became, for the duration of its existence, the most powerful state in south-central Africa (Hempstone 1962: 22-23). The Yeke were originally Nyamwezi traders who came to Katanga from north-western Tanzania, presumably to buy ivory to bring to the east coast (Wilson 1972: 581). By 1800, some Nyamwezi had already found their way to Kazembe’s capital, and from the 1850s onwards, one of these Nyamwezi traders, Msiri, obtained permission to settle permanently in Katanga. Once the permission was granted, Msiri and a band of followers made alliances with local neighbouring chiefs and soon started to extort ivory from them, eventually seizing control of the copper mines. Msiri also established close trade relations with the traders of both the Indian and Atlantic oceans, which allowed him to be constantly well supplied with firearms (Reefe 1981: 172-180). Thus armed, Msiri’s armies were able to incorporate all the possessions of Kazembe west of the Luapula into the new Yeke state between 1865 and 1871 while tribute collectors were placed next to all major Luba kings and chiefs (Vansina 1966a: 230-234). In this way, Msiri had obtained near absolute political power and a kingdom of his own. His type of kingship, though it borrowed from the Lunda-Luba type, was not legitimised through ritualistic or magical means. Instead, it rested solely on the principles of commercial supremacy and military abilities, used as tools to maintain a strong centralised and hegemonic state (Legros 1996: 197). From 1884 to 1887, Msiri was at the height of his power and his capital, Bunkeya, became the new epicentre of trade in central Africa (Reefe 1981: 181). For the Luba Empire and what remained of the Kazembe kingdom, the growth of Msiri’s conquest state was very bad news. Msiri had established his conquest state in southern Katanga, close to the south-eastern frontier of the Luba Empire, at a time when the Luba, like its neighbours, were coming under increased pressure from various sources. The Luba Empire had hitherto not been seriously affected by the development of a transcontinental economy, its location deep inside the interior protecting it from direct disturbances by this trade before the nineteenth century (Legros 1996: 108). Yet, international trade was the reason for the Luba kingdom’s ultimate collapse as traders gradually chipped away at the empire’s most distant client states. First, Arab-Swahili slave and ivory traders from the east African coast moved into the eastern regions of the Luba Empire, as well as into its north-eastern frontier zone, undermining the authority of the centre in those areas. Then, Ovimbundu slave and ivory traders coming from Angola did the same as they were penetrating the empire’s heartland from the southwest (Wilson 1972: 587). As a result of all these processes, by the time the first Belgian expeditions
reached Luba in 1891, the empire’s frontiers and heartland had already been disjointed (Reefe 1981: 159). As for the Kazembe kingdom, it too entered into conflict with its greedy Yeke neighbours. Not only had the Yeke’s invasion considerably reduced the territorial extent of the kingdom and effectively cut off Kazembe’s links with the Mwata Yamvo and Angola, the remnants of Kazembe’s territories were being further encroached upon by some of his former allies, trading partners or tributaries. In the northwest, Kazembe’s access to copper and ivory started being challenged by the Luba kingdom, which, in a last-ditch attempt at survival, was seeking to assert control over trading routes (Wilson 1972: 587). Meanwhile, to the south, the Bemba were also agitating. The Bemba, in contrast to other groups, had benefited greatly from the east African trade. Their infertile homeland had nothing to offer in terms of minerals or agricultural products but they hunted elephants and by 1880 they also exported slaves. This allowed the Bemba to become a larger and more cohesive entity, thereby making it difficult for a weakened kingdom of Kazembe to prevent Bemba slave-raiders from impinging on the north-eastern plateau (Roberts 1976: 120-123). Thus, the Kazembe kingdom, which in 1800 had been the most extensive and powerful in Zambia, had by 1870 seen its territories reduced and its authority greatly diminished.

2.5.3 Disrupted and Yet Never so Interconnected

By 1890, practically the whole of central Africa had been integrated in some way into the world economy. For old kingdoms such as the Lunda’s and Luba’s, this turned out to be an extremely unpropitious situation as they found themselves seized between what Edouard Bustin calls ‘the advancing tentacles of two giant exploitative systems reaching at them from opposite ends of the globe’ (Bustin 1975: 17). Yet, as was mentioned in the previous section, the long-distance trade had the effect of broadening, rather than weakening, the systems of interaction that already existed, at least until the Yeke invasion of the late nineteenth century. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Katanga had still not been entirely integrated into long-distance networks, even if they did export a few particular products. Commerce was dominated by salt and copper and was structured along two main routes: a north-south one dominated by the Luba kingdom, and a south-west one, dominated by Mwata Yamvo on the Atlantic side, and by Kazembe on the Indian side. Therefore, since these three main axes worked independently from each other, international commerce had a limited distribution in these areas (Legros 1996: 107-108). In turn, the long-distance trade contributed to the intensification of contacts between the groups controlling these axes. The rulers of the Kazembe kingdom, although politically independent and beyond the reach of the Mwata
Yamvo, were constantly in touch with the Lunda heartland throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a fact that is certainly due in no small part to the long-distance trade. The Portuguese trader Caetano Pereira noted in 1796 that Mwata Kazembe III Lukwesa Ilunga continued to send tribute to his ‘father’ in the form of slaves and copper from southern Katanga (Macola 2002: 43). As late as 1868, Mwata Kazembe VII Muonga Sunkutu planned to send a ‘tribute of slaves’ to his ‘paramount chief, Matiamvo,’20 while the latter reciprocated with a flow of trade items such as mirrors, cowries and beads (Ibid.).

The arrival of the Yeke had a profound impact on the way commerce and trade were approached in Katanga. The very foundation of the Yeke kingdom was commercial, and it drew much of its strength from the long-distance trade. The Yeke connected their newly conquered region to all the international trading networks that were operating at the time in their original Tanzanian region. For this purpose, they recycled the local exchange networks they stumbled upon. Through their settling in the Copperbelt region, they found themselves at the point where east and west trade routes met, so that they were able to establish connections between the two sets of long-distance trade networks that, until then, had worked separately. Consequently, Katanga found itself integrated into a structure essentially oriented towards the international market of which the long-distance trade was the principal component (Legros 1996: 109-118). In the first phase of their occupation, which lasted from c.1855 to c.1870, the Yeke busied themselves co-opting traditional Katangese trade based on salt and copper. During that phase the copper trade expanded considerably. By 1867, the leading Bemba chiefs bought copper from visiting Yeke traders from Katanga. Thus, north-eastern Zambia kept receiving copper, even though Kazembe had lost control of the Katanga copper trade by this time (Roberts 1976: 145). In the second phase of Yeke occupation, which culminated in the 1870s, copper was superseded by slaves and ivory. Unlike copper, whose trade requires some level of localisation, slaves and ivory required easy access to large stretches of land in which there was no political, social or economic opposition to tackle. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the adoption of the ivory and slave trade by the Yeke coincides with their expansionary activities in the 1870s (Legros 1996: 123-124). Therefore, the growth of the international trade and the arrival of intruders had the effect of increasing competition to capture or keep hold of the lucrative new

trade and bringing many regions in closer touch. This phenomenon led Andrew Roberts to argue that the later nineteenth century saw:

a marked expansion in the scale of social and political relations, in so far as peoples were drawn into the structures of larger kingdoms, and came within the orbit of long-distance trade. [...]. Ideas and skills circulated widely. [...] The lines of division between peoples were less marked than ever before; their political and cultural identities were increasingly merged in wider groupings. Yet there was no single focus for such imitation and assimilation; instead there were a number of different spheres of influence, which were linked to the outside world by routes which led in all directions (Roberts 1976: 146-147).

Conclusion

It is almost a truism at this point to say that a lot more research will be needed before any historian or archaeologist can hope to sketch a more precise picture of pre-colonial central African history. But several factors can be inferred from what is known, not least the fact that virtually all inhabitants of the studied region share many cultural ties whose origins stretch back centuries. All the available evidence, in any form, points to that fact. Archaeological research shows that the area that is nowadays bisected by the Katanga-Zambia boundary has been occupied from an early date. In particular, The Upemba Depression bears witness to the early developments of chieftainship, as well as the wide diffusion of cultural and commercial exchanges. Unfortunately, there is only so much that archaeology can tell us, and, on its own, it is certainly not enlightening when it comes to the sketching of a timeline of events. A considerable amount of research has been undertaken on the oral traditions relating to the kingdoms that flourished in this area, but it is not easy to correlate these results with those obtained by archaeologists. Many ‘tribal histories’ or ‘myths’ exist in Katanga and Zambia, most of which describe how a ‘tribe’ was founded by an adventurer (or several) arriving from Luba or Lunda country. However, there are limits to what can be inferred from genesis myths. There are undoubtedly many mythical stories of origins and migration that should strictly be interpreted as exactly that: mythical stories. They should not be taken as narratives about historical events and characters, nor can they safely be used to retrace the routes of previous population movements, however plausible they might sound. This is not to say that no information of value can be inferred from a story of founding individuals migrating from Katanga. It must simply be understood
that if such a story constitutes a symbolic account of the spread of peoples and ideas from that region, it may also well contract into a single episode events and processes that spanned decades or even centuries.

By the eighteenth century, in the area occupied by the Luba and Lunda in Katanga and Zambia, several ‘larger’ kingdoms had emerged or were in the process of doing so. Prominent among those, in both size and sphere of influence, were the Luba kingdom, the Lunda kingdom of Mwata Yamvo, and the kingdom of Kazembe. It is tempting to interpret the history of this period as that of a series of kingdoms that all achieved widespread domination, but also negotiated a balance of power between them. However, this interpretation does not square with the evidence. As Vansina argues: ‘There was no balance of power, there was no over-all domination of one state, there was no dichotomy between the states in a system of alliances – in other words, the area was not one supranational field for power competition’ (Vansina 1966a: 155). The Luba, Lunda and Kazembe kingdoms were not really ‘kingdoms’ in the sense that they were not endowed with clear boundaries, or with a ruler with all-encompassing authority over his lands and subjects. The expansion of these states was more cultural than imperialistic. This is not to say, however, that there was no formal system of interaction between different groups, or that there was never any rivalry between them for a piece of land or access to certain resources. From the early Iron Age onwards, trade had become an important feature of the region’s landscape. This is evidenced by the tools, weapons, and basic condiments found in many homesteads, which often came from an area that would have been far beyond the social and political reach of the peoples that used these items. The growing importance of trade soon took on a political dimension as ‘prestige’ goods were increasingly imbued with symbolism and used in the perpetuation of relations of subordination. At the same time, their wide circulation ensured that wider regions of central Africa were increasingly put into contact. For this reason, the trade routes help to explain why there are clear cultural similarities between different peoples living south of the equatorial forest. For with the goods travelled customs and ideas.

Trade routes, however, are only partly responsible for this phenomenon. Migration and political expansion must also account for such similarities, at least in part. The phenomenon cannot be understood if one of these two aspects is omitted. As a result, as Vansina continues, ‘boundaries between the states were vague, sometimes even overlapping, and there was little conflict of power between the states […]. Yet […] they shared common cultural and economic ties and probably influenced each other in other respects
than purely political ones' (Vansina 1966a: 156). Even the commotions and violence of the nineteenth century did not really change this logic of flexible interaction that had existed for centuries. If anything, it could be argued that the Atlantic and Indian trades broadened and quickened those exchange processes. Even the Yeke, despite having introduced the idea of extremely centralised kingship based on the military control of people and territory, did not change the essentials of the regional dynamics that existed. The Cokwe, for their part, did not even bother to alter the organisation of the Lunda kingdom, limiting themselves to replacing the Lunda ruling aristocracy with their own. So, if early central African history remains confusing and at times quite simply obscure, the picture that emerges is one of constant movement for the earlier centuries and one of a complex mosaic of states with adaptable organisations and flexible interrelations for later ones. It is certainly not one of hegemonic domination by one dictatorial state. Neither is it that of a tight web of kingdoms united in their fight against intruders, as was promoted by Tshombe.

In the meantime, elsewhere, the mechanisms of conquest were already ticking. While these developments were taking place in central Africa, and without the knowledge of its inhabitants, statesmen gathered in Berlin and partitioned a land that only a handful of white men had ever seen. Later, in the early twentieth century, when the Lunda were finally able to retrieve their homeland from the Cokwe invaders, they found that the ‘splendour’ of the old Lunda kingdom could not be restored. For that part of central Africa had acquired new rulers.
Between 15 November 1884 and 26 February 1885, representatives of all the major European powers, the Ottoman Empire and the United States, attended a conference held in Berlin. The purpose of the Berlin Conference was to agree on a European partition of the African continent, or the ‘gigantesque gâteau africain’ as King Leopold II of the Belgians colourfully put it (Stengers 1988: 229-246). It was also where and when the contours of what would become the infamous Congo Free State were defined. It was decided that the territory would cover the entire Congo River basin, which made a territory of some two million square kilometres the property of one man: Leopold II (Donaldson 2010: 100). The Berlin Conference was immediately followed by a period of rapid invasion, occupation, and colonisation of African territories by European powers. Some thirty years after the end of the conference, the political boundaries of colonial Africa were in place while most pre-existing forms of African political organisation had been eliminated. This period of intense colonial competition became known as the ‘scramble for Africa’.

According to Andrew Roberts, this comparatively sudden desire for African colonies can be seen as ‘the result of two distinct but converging processes: growing rivalry among the major states of Europe as they became fully industrial powers, and their increasing need for cheap raw materials from the tropical worlds’ (Roberts 1976: 149). The partitioning of Africa, therefore, was to be dictated by the presence of resources while the continent itself and its inhabitants were hardly taken into consideration. Lord Salisbury, on the occasion of a lecture he gave in 1890 at the Royal African Society, observed in jest that:

We are engaged in drawing up maps where no white man ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by a small impediment that we never know exactly where the mountains and rivers were (cited in Wilson 1977: 95).

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21 For a detailed description of the ‘scramble’ for Katanga, see Comité Spécial du Katanga (1950: 11-21).
Indeed, J.W. Donaldson argues, in his comprehensive study of the demarcation of the Anglo-Belgian boundary, that boundary demarcation was by no means a systematic or standardised process. Instead, it was ‘contingent on the way territory itself was perceived by the imperial powers who claimed sovereignty, most importantly through economic lenses’ (Donaldson 2010: 96). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Katanga and Zambia, during the late nineteenth century, were being brought into increased contact with a number of external spheres of influence: the Yeke, the Arabs and Swahili, the Portuguese, to name but a few. All of these ‘intruders’ had come to this area of the world in search of resources, mainly ivory and minerals. European interest in the same area was sparked for no other reason. In other words, to understand the reasons hidden behind the strange outline of the border between the Congo Free State and Northern Rhodesia, one must take two aspects into consideration: the wider context of European interests and rivalries on the one hand, and the development of British and Belgian interests in this specific region on the other. This chapter presents the story of that division and will explore the motivations and methods that shaped, both in the abstract and in reality, the partition of that part of colonial Africa. It will be seen that the presence of copper played a pivotal role throughout the entire process.

3.1 The Scramble

An interest in central Africa was first stirred up in the United Kingdom by the publication of David Livingstone’s Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (Roberts 1976: 151). In this account of his journey across Africa from 1853 to 1856, Livingstone made several references to the copper wealth of Katanga, describing the use of copper rings as jewellery by both men and women who were ‘otherwise in a state of frightful nudity’ (Livingstone 1857: 276). A few years later, in 1873, the explorer Verney Lovett Cameron noted that:

Copper is found in large quantities in Katanga and for a considerable distance to the westward […]. The natives too know of the gold, but it is soft and they did not value it, preferring the red copper to the white (Cameron 1877: 475-476).

But the mineral wealth of Katanga was in great part popularised – one could use the word ‘mythologised’ – by the Plymouth Brethren missionaries. One of them, Frederick Stanley Arnot, was the first westerner to spend a signif-
icant amount of time in Bunkeya, then the Yeke capital. In 1889, he published the story of his five-year-long stay in the Yeke kingdom under the title: *Garenganze or Seven Years Pioneer Mission Work in Central Africa*. Arnott’s *Garenganze* paints an almost idyllic picture of Katanga, thereby contributing considerably to consolidating all the rumours that already existed on the subject. Arnott describes Msiri’s welcome as ‘hearty’ (Arnott 1889: 175), the sights of mountains and rivers in Katanga as ‘majestic’ (*Ibid.*: 176), the ‘amount of peace and quietness that reigns’ over the kingdom as ‘remarkable’ (*Ibid.*: 193), and also notes that ‘copper, salt, ivory and slaves’ are available in abundance in Bunkeya (*Ibid.*: 235). The publication of Arnott’s book sparked a particular interest for Katanga in the United Kingdom, where an image of Katanga as a new ‘El Dorado’, overflowing with ivory, copper and gold, was gaining momentum. As a result, there seems to have been a growing desire, in governing circles, to see it integrated within the British sphere of influence (Legros 1996: 138). The General Act of the Berlin Conference and the ‘Declaration of Neutrality of the Independent State of Congo’ that followed, had made Katanga an integral part of the Congo Free State, which though recognised as a sovereign state, was run by King Leopold II as a private possession (Donaldson 2010: 101). The fact that Katanga was officially an integral part of Leopold’s territory did not dampen British enthusiasm, since one of the principal stipulations of the Berlin Conference General Act was that sovereignty over an area of Africa could only be claimed through ‘effective occupation’. ‘Effective occupation’ meant the presence of government officials, missions, traders, settlers, etc., none of which the Congo Free State could claim to have in Katanga in the late 1880s. Up to then, any right claimed by the Congo Free State over Katanga existed mainly on paper. Consequently, if some adventurer was to plant the British flag in these regions, not only would his action be legal, it could also establish a title that it would have been no easy matter for Leopold II – or anyone else for that matter – to dispute (Hole 1967: 249; Fetter 1976: 16).

In its quest for Katanga’s treasures, the United Kingdom found a powerful torchbearer in the person of Cecil Rhodes, a millionaire turned empire-builder. Rhodes, who had originally travelled to South Africa for his health, soon became aware of the profits that could be made from prolonging his stay in this part of the world. His rise was meteoric; by the 1880s, he dominated the South African diamond industry (Roberts 1976: 156), and in 1890, he was

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22 For a detailed description of Arnott’s stay in Msiri’s kingdom and the impact of the Plymouth Brethren missionaries on the latter, see Rotberg (1964).

23 For a more detailed discussion on the legal basis on which a new contestant could have claimed Katanga, see Legros (1996: 139).
prime minister of the Cape colony (Powdermaker 1962: 55). The wealth that he accumulated thanks to his South African ventures soon allowed Rhodes to ogle at more ambitious projects. He wanted to further British expansion in a northward direction, for which he had two main incentives. Firstly, he was spurred by a ‘Cape to Cairo’ dream: to expand the British Empire in Africa to the extent that British possessions would connect the north of the continent to the south (Berger 1974: 3; Powdermaker 1962: 55; Roberts 1976: 156). Secondly, he too had his eye on the mineral resources known to be present further north. In 1887, he invested heavily in gold mines on the Rand, which, though it was not a successful investment, allowed him to secure access to the goldfields north of the Limpopo River, in what is now Zimbabwe.24 In addition to the ‘second Rand’ he was hoping to find in that territory, Rhodes was rather keen to lay his hands on Katanga’s famed copper (Coleman 1962: 1; Macola 2002: 162). In 1889, Rhodes created the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and was able to persuade the British government to grant a ‘Royal Charter of Incorporation’ to his newly formed company. By virtue of this charter, Rhodes was allowed to use the authority of the British government to stake out claims to territory, which would then bar other European powers from doing the same. Once these territories were secured, the BSAC was to undertake the supervision of their finance and administration on behalf of the British government in return for economic privileges. This was to be achieved through the signing of treaties of ‘protection’ with African rulers. These treaties and their stipulations were what would determine the limits of Britain’s new ‘possessions’ (Macola 2002: 161; Roberts 1976: 157). In other words, the Charter of the British South Africa Company did not specify a northern limit to the Company’s area of operation.25

Within months of Rhodes obtaining the charter for his company, the Congo Free State and the BSAC were engaged in a fast-paced race for Katanga. Rhodes, especially, had no time to lose. Not only was the mineral wealth of the country well known and coveted, but every passing day increased the risk that the Belgians, Germans and Portuguese might seal off the route to the north.26 If his ‘Cape to Cairo’ dream was ever to come true, Rhodes urgently needed to claim territories as far north as possible. Consequently, Rhodes

24 This was known as the Rudd Concession. See Roberts (1976: 156-157).
25 The company’s sphere of operations was defined as the ‘region of South Africa lying immedi-
ately to the north of British Bechuanaland and to the north and west of the Portuguese Do-
ominions’. See Coleman (1962: 2) and Bustin (1975: 38).
26 The Portuguese were active in Angola and Mozambique; the newly formed Congo Free State supposedly belonged to Leopold II; and the Germans were laying claims on East Africa. See Roberts (1976: 156-159); Coleman (1962: 1).
sent out a number of expeditions to forestall the advances of Leopold and the Portuguese in 1890. Three of these had the task of securing territory north of the Zambezi, while one, led by a man named Alfred Sharpe, was entrusted with the specific task of making treaties with the maximum of African leaders in Katanga (Macola 2002: 162). Sharpe reached Bunkeya in November 1890 but failed to reach an agreement with Msiri, whom Arnot had warned, not without grounds, against concession-hunters (Hole 1967: 245). Despite his lack of success with the Yeke king, Sharpe did, however, establish treaties over the whole region between the lakes Nyasa, Tanganyika and Mweru, and had thus secured the major part of what would be north-eastern Rhodesia (Ibid.: 246). Most importantly, Sharpe had succeeded in securing the eastern half of the Kazembe Kingdom by exploiting the fact that the then Kazembe Kanyembo Ntemena was keen on obtaining support against Lunda rebels and their ally Msiri, and was therefore disposed to signing treaties. Through the two treaties he signed with Sharpe, Kanyembo promised to remain at peace with ‘the subjects of the Queen of England’ and to respect their freedom of movement and trade (cited in Macola 2002: 162) and pledged to acknowledge the ‘British jurisdictional superiority’ (Ibid.: 163). In virtue of the agreement, the BSAC acquired exclusive mining rights within the king’s territory, while, in return, the Company was to ‘protect the said King and nation from all outside interference or attacks’ (Ibid.). Meanwhile, neither of the two envoys that Rhodes had sent to the upper Zambezi managed to reach Katanga but secured a series of other treaties. Frank Lochner signed a treaty with the Lozi king, Lewanika, thereby securing what would be north-western Rhodesia. Rhodes’ third envoy, the explorer of East Africa Joseph Thomson, had to turn back long before making it anywhere near the Yeke king due to severe bouts of smallpox. He collected instead treaties from various chiefs among the Bisa, Aushi, Lamba, Lenje and Lala (Hole 1967: 245-249; Roberts 1976: 159). In this way, Thomson’s expedition, though it had failed to meet its initial goals, was by no means fruitless, as it had succeeded in joining the territories secured by Sharpe to the outskirts of Lewanika’s possessions.27

As for Leopold II, he too had been shocked into a sudden sense of urgency. The granting of a royal charter to the British South Africa Company with a northern limit left undefined had revealed how real the threat to the Congo Free State’s south-eastern corner was. At that point, it would have been obvious to Leopold II that he was facing a formidable opponent. In Edouard Bustin’s words: ‘The stakes were Katanga, the adversary was Cecil Rhodes –

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27 See Hole (1967:252) and Northern Rhodesia Mineral Rights (Copperbelt), 1949, PREM 8/1066 (Kew).
and behind Cecil Rhodes was Great Britain’ (Bustin 1975: 41). Therefore, no effort was spared to convert the Free State’s paper sovereignty into a real one. Immediately after Sharpe’s departure, a strong expedition was despatched to Msiri from the Upper Congo under Lieutenant Paul Le Marinel. Le Marinel failed to sign a treaty (Rotberg 1964: 292). A second venture under the command of M. Delcommune early in 1891 suffered a similar fate. The third expedition, led by an officer of the British army, Captain William Grant Stairs, led to a violent argument at the end of which Msiri was shot dead by one of the expedition’s members.28 When Msiri died his tribute and trade empire immediately disintegrated (Gordon 2001: 320), an opportunity seized on by Leopold’s men to cement the Belgian king’s authority over the area (Donaldson 2010: 103; Fetter 1976: 17; Hole 1967: 249-250). Thus, after more than two years and six expeditions (three Belgian and three British), it became obvious that Rhodes had lost the race to the mineral wealth of Katanga. It had irrevocably fallen into the grip of King Leopold and, by extension, the Belgian state to whom the Congo was eventually handed over in 1908. The bickering over border issues was, however, far from over.

3.2 The Demarcation of the Border

Once British claims to exclusive rights over central Africa had been fixed locally, recognition of these claims still had to be secured in Europe. This was done between 1890 and 1894 through a series of international treaties. These largely established the shape of the Zambian borders as they still exist in the present day. In 1890, Britain and Germany settled their various differences over eastern and south-west Africa.29 In 1891, Britain concluded a treaty with the Portuguese, which gave birth to Mozambique and Angola (Fetter 1983: 84). Negotiations over the Belgian Congo/Northern Rhodesia border proved considerably trickier. It also proved to be a considerably longer process as it dragged on for over three decades. It spurred the appointment of two international commissions as well as the signing of several agreements, while the

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28 The argument started when Msiri said he might accept an English banner but not the flag of the Congo Free State. Stairs planted the Free State flag on a hill overlooking Bunkeya. Then an altercation erupted between Msiri and Stairs’ envoy Captain Bodson ending with Bodson shooting Msiri and Bodson himself being mortally wounded by one of Msiri’s bodyguards. See Rotberg (1964: 292-293).

29 According to the treaty they agreed on, the frontier between German-owned and British-Owned East Africa ran from the south end of Lake Tanganyika to the north end of Lake Malawi. The same treaty met the German request for access to the Zambezi from South-West Africa by allowing them the ‘Caprivi Strip’: a narrow corridor of Namibian land tugged Angola, Bostwana and Zambia. See Roberts (1976: 161).
proximity of an artificial, unclear and disputed border generated constant tension between British and Belgian officials.

### 3.2.1 The 1894 Agreement

By 1890, the BSAC and British government seem to have considered their claim to sovereignty over the northern territories of Northern Rhodesia to be strong enough to start working on a bilateral boundary treaty with the Congo Free State (Donaldson 2010: 103). In reality, at the time when these negotiations were taking place, the major kingdoms along the border of the BSAC’s newly acquired northern territories – including the Lozi, the Bemba and Kazembe – had not yet yielded to European rule (Fetter 1983: 84). Notwithstanding, in 1890 the BSAC made an informal agreement whereby their border with the Congo Free State was to run eastwards along the Zambezi-Congo watershed up to the point where the Luapula exits lake Bangweulu. This was endorsed by the Anglo-Belgian boundary settlement of 12 May 1894, which defined the boundary as follows:

The frontier between the Independent Congo Free State and the British sphere to the North of the Zambezi shall follow a line running direct from the extremity of Cape Akalunga on Lake Tanganyika, situated at the Northernmost point of Cameron bay at about 8° 15’ South Latitude, to the right bank of the river Luapula, where this river issues from lake Moero [Mweru]. This line shall then be drawn directly to the entrance of the river into the lake, being however deflected towards the South of the lake so as to give the Island of Kilwa to Great Britain. It shall then follow the thalweg of the Luapula up to its issue from lake Bangweolo [Bangweulu]. Thence it shall run southwards along the meridian of Longitude of the point where the river leaves the lake to the Watershed region between the Congo and the Zambezi, which it shall follow until it reaches the Portuguese frontier (Peake 1934: 263).

This geographical jargon should not obscure the actual simplicity of the border’s outline. To put it in simpler terms, the boundary effectively comprised five distinct sections: (1) the Mweru-Tanganyika strip; (2) Mweru Lake; (3) the Luapula River; (4) the Mpanta Meridian Section; and (5) the Congo-Zambezi Watershed Section. The territorial limits defined in the 1894 Anglo-Congolese treaty were practically identical to those outlined in 1885.\(^{30}\)

\(^{30}\) The only differences between the boundary outlined in 1885 and that outlined in 1894 were more precisions about the section that runs between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Mweru, the deflection around Kilwa island in Lake Mweru and the naming of the Luapula River as the official boundary between Lakes Mweru and Bangweulu. See Donaldson (2010: 104).
The real novelty was that the 1894 treaty ensured that the delimitation of the boundary was legally recognised and bilaterally agreed boundary between two recognised sovereign States. Perhaps the most important effect of this border agreement was to create the ‘Katanga pedicle’, a long arm of Congo territory that effectively split the upper part of the BSAC territory, from then on known as Northern Rhodesia, into two sections. This configuration has been hampering transport and communication between the eastern and western areas of the country ever since (Donaldson 2008: 473; Roberts 1976: 162). Yet, while the 1894 Anglo-Belgian treaty established a legal territorial boundary, recognised by those in power in Europe, it did not make any phys-
ical difference to the local landscape. There was no visible marker – post, border checkpoint or fence – on the ground that could have indicated to the people living on either side of that imaginary (as well as poorly defined) line that they were now members of different countries.

3.2.2 The First Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission (1911-1914)

Until the 1900s, virtually no form of administrative supervision was established along the Rhodesian-Congolese boundary. Though this lack of presence allied to the artificiality of the boundary did lead to tensions, which were reported at times, they never garnered much attention. As a result, as J.W. Donaldson put it, ‘uncertainty as to the actual boundary position became increasingly problematic for local administrators in the border areas, as each side accused the other of territorial violations’ (Donaldson 2010: 109). A handful of reports dating from 1903 suggested that there were issues identifying certain villages along the boundary as either Rhodesian or Congolese, with the consequence that Northern Rhodesian villages near the border were raided by the Congo Free State Police (Donaldson 2008: 474). Similarly, in April 1907 a local Congo Free State official accused his British counterpart in the Serenji district south of Lake Bangweulu of harassing several chiefs who fell within the Congolese jurisdiction (Donaldson 2010: 109). Yet, until the summer of 1910, government attention to this issue remained almost non-existent. On 28 June 1910, the BSAC made an appeal to the Colonial Office:

Mr. Wallace [acting administrator of North Western Rhodesia and former surveyor general] states that it is particularly desirable that frontiers […] should be demarcated and beaconed since until this is done it is impossible for officials of the Administrations concerned to know with any accuracy the limits of their respective territories. Uncertainty as to boundaries is liable at any time to cause friction between neighbouring administrations, and the existence of considerable areas which must be regarded as debatable territory has a tendency to unsettle the minds of the natives who inhabit these districts.31

In 1911, after lengthy discussions between the British and Belgian Foreign Offices, an Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission was finally appointed. The commission was composed of five officers and five non-commissioned officers

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on both sides and was given the task of surveying and demarcating as accurately as possible those parts of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary that were sources of conflict (Donaldson 2008: 475; Musambachime 2003: 16-17). The commission was instructed to only demarcate the watershed section (section (5) on the map above) since the government were still negotiating adjustments in other sections, particularly the meridian section (4) and the Mweru-Tanganyika section (1) (Donaldson 2008: 475). Along the watershed, the commission was to erect beacons wherever they deemed it convenient to indicate ‘the direction of the frontier line adopted’ (Ibid.). The commission had to put a hold on triangulation work when the First World War erupted in 1914, but it had by then conducted enough survey work to produce maps covering much of the boundary. However, they had not managed to finish the demarcation of the easternmost end of the watershed. The Mweru-Tanganyika and the Meridian sections, for their part, had only been topographically surveyed but not demarcated in accordance with the original stipulations that the Commission was asked to work under (Peake 1934: 263). This, it was felt, was not a cause for much concern. The Director of Military Operations, Major General Wilson, had commented to the Colonial Office in May 1914 that the ‘country [where demarcation was not precisely undertaken] is uninhabited and covered with bush. It cannot be a matter of great importance to define the boundary on the ground with great exactness.’

Indeed, despite the erection of 46 pillars between 1911 and 1914, the exact position of the border would have been impossible to visualise right after the Boundary Commission discontinued its work in 1914 (Peake 1934: 266). According to J.W. Donaldson, ‘the work of the 1911-1914 Anglo-Belgian Boundary commission along the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary was indicative of other inter-colonial boundary commissions across southern Africa at the time, in that rigorous demarcation was much less a priority than survey and mapping’ (Donaldson 2008: 477). This tendency to prioritise mapping over demarcating was symptomatic of the general growth of geographical knowledge as a tool of European empire-building. The boundary could only be known by those who could read the maps on which it was inscribed. In that reading, mapping and gaining cartographic knowledge of the Belgian Congo-Northern Rhodesia boundary was sufficient an expression of sovereignty, known and recognised by other fellow imperial powers (Ibid.: 477-478).

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32 War Office, memo to H. Lambert (Colonial Office) dated 16 May 1914, NRA 1/1/13 (NAZ), as quoted in Donaldson (2008: 476).
After the First World War ended, it became increasingly obvious that the vagueness of the border outline continued to create difficulties on the ground. The pedicle was a particularly bothersome nuisance in that it impeded movement and communication between the eastern and western halves of Northern Rhodesia territory (Musambachime 1990: 652). As a result, both the BSAC and the all-powerful Belgian Company Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) were dissatisfied with the work of the first Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission. As a company that, at this point, was undergoing rapid expansion, it was crucial for the UMHK to know the extent of the territory on which it was possible to prospect. Concurrently, the BSAC had begun giving license to prospecting companies, such as the Rhodesia Congo Border Concession Limited (RCBC Ltd), to investigate the Northern Rhodesian side. When the RCBC Ltd, started doing prospecting work along the watershed section of the border (5), it found that the boundary line established by the 1911-1914 commission was now covered with grass and trees, which made it difficult to differentiate Congolese territory from Northern Rhodesian territory (Musambachime 2003: 18). In August 1923, a RCBC spokesman raised the issue with the Northern Rhodesia survey department: ‘We cannot,’ he said, ‘determine from any map or data in our possession the exact location of any boundary beacons of the Rhodesian-Congo boundary [...]. There are some rich mines on the Congo side, apparently very close to the border and the importance, therefore, of knowing the actual location of the boundary opposite to them is self-evident.’ It then turned out that the only map of the watershed boundary section in existence was one that had been produced by the Belgian members of the 1911-1914 Boundary Commission (Donaldson 2008: 487, 2010: 144). This fact did not fail to raise a few eyebrows, especially as it appeared that ‘the Belgians had taken full advantage of the situation so as to place the Border Congo as far south as possible at points where minerals were known to exist.’ Minerals Separation Ltd, of which the RCBC was a subsidiary, was particularly unimpressed with the situation, and its chairman Francis Gibbs sent a sternly worded letter to the Colonial Office on 14 March 1924. The relevant paragraphs of his letter are worth quoting:

The whole question of the boundary between the two countries is one of greatest importance from an Imperial point of view as well as from the point

33 R. Brooks, Rhodesian Congo Border Concession Ltd to the Chief Surveyor in Livingstone, 16 August 1923, A SEC3 291 (NAZ).
of view of my Company holding as it does a Concession of all the mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia. [...]. Several of the valuable mineral discoveries made on the Belgian Congo side undoubtedly run into Northern Rhodesia and now that my Company have fortunately been able to place before the Colonial Office our knowledge regarding the potential mineral resources of Northern Rhodesia, it seems very necessary that the boundary should be so definite that an absolutely fair division between the two countries should be arrived at [...] [to avoid] a dispute arising as to where the boundary between the two countries actually is. 

Indeed, the presence of copper outcrops along or close to a boundary line that was not clearly marked was recognised by at least one Government official as a recipe for conflict. On 6 April 1926 the Director of Survey backed mining companies’ pleas for further delimitation work:

I consider there is every likelihood of difficulties arising on the question of ownership of minerals owing to the lack of a well-defined boundary between the territories. The question of restricting new mining development in the vicinity of the supposed watershed boundary defined by the existing pillars is a difficult one to decide and it would be most probably a serious matter for the Mineral Companies concerned if such a restriction were to be made over a tentative strip and for any length of time. [...] Steps should be taken at the earliest to have the border properly demarcated and beacons.

Accordingly, since the presence of huge copper deposits turned every square metre of territory into a potential source of cash, precise demarcation of the watershed section became a priority. In late 1926, the British government once more approached its Belgian counterpart and, in 1927, Belgium and Great Britain agreed to appoint a joint Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission scheduled to begin work in July of the same year. The Commission was given two tasks. The first was to make the adjustments to the boundary line along the watershed 'as are necessary to avoid the troubles that might arise

36 The Director of Surveys to the Assistant Secretary in Livingstone, 6 April 1926, A SEC3 291 (NAZ).
37 Anglo-Belgian Agreement of 19 March 1927 with regard to the scope and composition of a mixed commission to carry out the demarcation of the boundary between Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo and to the instructions to be given to that commission, Government of Northern Rhodesia to British Government, 29 April 1927, p. 6 in A SEC3 291 (NAZ) and FO 93/14/113 (Kew).
from a literal interpretation of the treaty [of 1894].38 The second was to accept the position of the boundary pillar lying further than 200 metres from the ideal watershed and allow errors of position up to 500 metres in areas of no particular known economic value.39 Wherever there was encroachment, the commissioners were to be guided by the following principles:

1. Properties and enclosures which lie athwart the ideal watershed shall be left undivided as far as possible whether they be state, corporation, tribal or individual character and
2. The good faith and economic importance of an encroachment shall be taken into account.40

The work that the second Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission undertook from 1927 to 1933 represented was perhaps the most meticulous boundary demarcation that colonial Africa had seen until then. Not only did they replace the 46 pillars that the first boundary commission had erected, they also erected some 182 extra boundary pillars, each about five kilometres away from the other (Donaldson 2008: 488).

The Commission, as these types of exercise normally are, was supposed to be government-funded. Yet, the results of this second demarcation were of such commercial significance that not only the BSAC, but also the RCBC contributed to its cost (Donaldson 2010: 154). Lt. Col. E.R.L. Peake, who was in charge of the second Commission’s British team, frankly admitted that ‘if the best part of the watershed had not been found to be highly mineralised the probability is that the earlier demarcation would have held good for many more years’ (Peake 1934: 264). Another consequence of that fact was that only the watershed was given proper attention. The other contested sections, the Meridian (4) and Mweru-Tanganyika (1) sections, could not be agreed upon.41 The Northern Rhodesia administration still believed the Mweru-Tanganyika section should be demarcated but ‘in view of the uncertainty as to the result of negotiations which are now proceeding regarding proposed major exchanges and the fact that acceptance of the Belgian Government of

38 Anglo Belgian Agreement of 19 March 1927, 29 April 1927, p. 3 in A SEC3 291 (NAZ) and FO 93/14/113 (Kew).
39 Ibid.
40 Anglo Belgian Agreement of 19 March 1927, 29 April 1927, pp. 3-4 in A SEC3 291 (NAZ).
41 The details of the unfruitful negotiations over these two sections have been described in detail elsewhere and for the sake of fluidity, will not be repeated here. See J.W. Donaldson’s comprehensive section on the question (2010: 164-174). There is also a lengthy description of these negotiations in a letter dated 11 May 1960 from H.V. Conybeare (office of the Prime Minister and External Affairs) to Hope Sotherton, WPI/14/36, doc. 42 (NAZ).
such proposals [...] might now be agreed upon, it would be a waste of time and money to proceed further with the demarcation of that boundary.  

As a consequence, the Mpanta Meridian section remained unchanged while the Mweru-Tanganyika section was left blurry. This would feed many diplomatic disputes in the following decades.

3.2.4 Continuing Bickering

Despite the two commissions appointed to solve it, the complex dispute over the Northern Rhodesia/Congo boundary continued for many years. Difficulties that formed the bone of contention between the two colonial powers fell into two groups that, though often treated separately in correspondence, are connected to each other. First, there was what may be described as the general question of boundary adjustment, which mainly affected the stretch of frontier running from Lake Tanganyika to Lake Mweru (1). The borderland area along the Mweru-Tanganyika section had never been closely administered by Northern Rhodesia, a fact likely linked to that section’s lack of direct economic value compared to the copper-rich Watershed. In 1929, the District Commissioner of Chiengi in the Luapula, J.B. Thomson, found that many villages located within the border area in what was supposed to be British territory, were also being taxed by Belgian colonial authorities. In addition, Thomson noted that the tribes found in these villages were overseen by chiefs located in the Belgian Congo. Thinking that another Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission would soon tackle this section, Governor Maxwell informed the Colonial Office at the end of 1929 ‘that the matter be left in abeyance until the boundary is definitely fixed.’ Except, of course, that it was never fixed. As it happens, thirty years later this state of affairs had hardly changed at all. On 14 February 1961, H.V.G. Conybeare of the Office of the Prime Minister and External Affairs sent to the government of Rhodesia, several maps ‘marked to show the areas as at present administered by the local authorities on each side of the hypothetical border.’ ‘It is realised,’ he added, ‘that it must be extremely difficult to decide on the ground where a straight line boundary between the Lakes is supposed to exist since neither

42 Letter Kennedy (NR Chief Secretary) to P. Cunliffe-Lister (CO), 6 September 1932. para. 2, RC/1349 vol. I (NAZ), as quoted in Donaldson (2010: 171).
43 D. Williams (Commonwealth Relations Office, London) to J.B. Ross (Rhodesia House), WPI/14/36, doc. 24 (NAZ).
45 Letter Maxwell (NR Governor) to CO, 30 December 1929, RC/1355 (NAZ), quoted in Donaldson (2010: 169).
side is marked in any way. [...] I shall be grateful if you will [...] let me have your views on the situation from an administrative point of view in relation to the fact that no official boundary exists, and settlement being opened at the present time. The answer he received from the acting Secretary to the government of Northern Rhodesia was the following:

The population of the four enclaves carry Congo (Belgian) identity certificates and has for many years regarded itself as being subject to the Congo (Belgian). Congo Chiefs provide tribal control. [...] I confirm that at the moment, there are no administrative difficulties. [...] I note that there is no question of negotiation towards a definitive settlement of the boundary being opened at the present time. This is satisfactory as the de facto boundary is accepted by the people on both sides and presents no administrative problem.

Perhaps for that reason, the problem of the Mweru-Tanganyika Section stagnated. On 26 April 1960, i.e. practically the eve of Congolese independence, Bob de Quehen, head of the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau (FISB) was still wondering whether ‘it might be wise to get agreement and a defined boundary before the new Congolese Government comes into power,’ to which the Office of the Prime Minister and External Affairs replied that ‘the Lake Mweru-Lake Tanganyika boundary [...] remains undefined at the present time.’

The second part of the boundary problem concerned one small boundary adjustment on the south side of the Katanga Pedicle at a place called Mokambo. The Mokambo Strip was a small portion of Northern Rhodesia of about 50 acres (or 0.202 square kilometres), which formed a bulge into the Belgian Congo in such a way that the Belgian railway line in that area had to follow an awkward route. Starting in 1927, right after the second commission finished its work, the Belgians had repeatedly tried to gain possession of the area. In exchange, they offered an area of the Belgian Congo in the region of Nkana where the Northern Rhodesian Railways was encroaching upon Bel-

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46 H.V.G. Conybeare (Office of the Prime Minister and External Affairs) to the Administrative Secretary, Government of Northern Rhodesia, 14 February 1961, WPI/14/36, doc. 46 (NAZ).
47 D. Dalmagh for Acting Secretary to the Government of Northern Rhodesia to office of the Prime Minister and External affairs, 29 April 1961, WPI/14/36, doc. 47 (NAZ).
48 B. de Quehen (FISB) in Salisbury to the Office of the Prime Minister and External Affairs, 26 April 1960, WPI/14/36, doc. 40 (NAZ).
49 The Office of the Prime Minister and External Affairs to B. de Quehen (FISB) in Salisbury, 26 April 1960, WPI/14/36, doc. 40 (NAZ).
gian territory. However, the Northern Rhodesian government never agreed to exchange the two pieces of territory. The reason for this refusal is simple: the Mokambo Strip hosted an important copper orebody, whereas the region where the Rhodesia Railways had strayed into the Congo had, as far as anybody knew, no similar deposits of mineral wealth beneath its soil. At the same time, the Minister for External Affairs feared that a ‘blank refusal’ at Mokambo could make any negotiations over easing the traffic across the Katanga Pedicle, which was the source of much frustration on the part of Rhodesian travellers, more troublesome: ‘the Pedicle crossing is the subject of complaint now by private and commercial interests and we would wish to improve conditions. It seems logical that if we are uncooperative over Mokambo that the Belgians would have little desire to be co-operative over improvements in the crossing of the Pedicle.’ As a result, the entire question of the border had reached a stalemate and no amount of negotiations was ever able to solve it.

The Mweru-Tanganyika section and the Mokambo Strip spurred a great deal of discussion, correspondence, squabbling and nothing else. No agreement was ever reached between the two colonial powers on the Mweru-Tanganyika or, for that matter, on any other contentious area. This lack of agreement meant that 1) travelling across the pedicle was agonisingly difficult and 2) many villages along the Mweru-Tanganyika section were unsure of their nationality. The Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section, when compared with the other sections of the same boundary, highlights the disparate purposes of border definition. The clear emphasis put on the boundary along the watershed and meridian sections was tied directly to economic resources. The border area between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika did not possess any proven mineral resources and the only appeals for boundary demarcation came from the local administrators. The only perceived ‘value’ of the Mweru-Tanganyika

50 D. Williams (Commonwealth Relations Office, London) to J.B. Ross (Rhodesia House), WPI/14/36, doc. 24 (NAZ).
51 Many letters of complaints emanating from angry travellers reached the Ministry of External Affairs, but perhaps most telling is an article entitled ‘Congo customs red tape angers N.R. motorists’ that was published by the Rhodesia Herald on 11 July 1959: ‘An “iron curtain” has clamped down on roads to the Belgian Congo, complain Copperbelt drivers. Local businessmen have cancelled trips to the Northern Province through the Congo pedicle by way of Mokambo because it takes days to amass the necessary documents and clearances […]. To go through the Congo Customs barrier the official there can insist on an international driver’s license, yellow fever inoculation certificate from the district commissioner [and a] “morality certificate”. Article enclosed in WPI/14/18-424/6/1, doc. 24/6 (NAZ).
52 R.C. MacFarlane (Ministry of External Affairs) to S.J. Olivier (esq., Office of the High Commissioner for Rhodesia and Nyasaland), 14 January 1955, WPI/14/36, doc. 1 (NAZ).
borderland was as a bargaining chip for gaining the more ‘valuable’ area in the Pedicle, where any gain of land could not only represent a net increase in copper-derived benefits, but could also alleviate the transport issues between the two ‘halves’ of Northern Rhodesia.

3.4 Local Attitudes to the Border

3.4.1 Early Developments

Initial Administrative Neglect
Prior to 1900, the economic and administrative development of Katanga remained strictly limited, as both the BSAC and the Congo Free State were then concentrating on cementing their control over their new territories through the local rulers. From 1891 to 1900, Katanga’s management was entrusted to the Compagnie du Katanga, a concession company whose purpose was to deter any British claim to the territory but which had hitherto not troubled itself excessively with its supervision (Donaldson 2010: 105). No effective administration was set up until 19 June 1900, when the Compagnie du Katanga was renamed the Comité Spécial du Katanga as an administrative body separate from that of the Congo Free State. 53 Until then, European occupation of Katanga had been next to non-existent. In the words of one of the very few officials stationed in the area before the twentieth century, ‘there never were more than six Free State agents at any one time in Katanga. In 1896, there were three; in 1899-1900, only two [...] as for missionaries there were two [...]’. And when it comes to traders, they were so ‘elusive’ that none could ever be discovered in all of Katanga [...] until 1905’ (Delvaux 1950: 33). This neglect – paradoxical though it might seem considering the haste and effort that were taken in acquiring Katanga – finds its origin in the fact that Leopold II was facing more immediate challenges. These were twofold. First was the fact that Leopold’s drive for colonies was regarded with high suspicion and a soupçon of dread by his country’s Parliament and citizens, who tended to look upon Leopold’s grand design as ‘megalomaniac’ ravings (prompting Leopold’s famous retort: ‘petit pays, petit esprit’). 54 For that reason, Leopold had to prove the profitableness of his venture, and he had to do it fast. In the short term, this was more easily achieved through the collection of ready-to-be-commercialised items such as ivory and rubber. Both were

54 For Leopold’s personality and the lack of enthusiasm of his contemporaries for his enterprise in the Congo, see Stengers (1988: 229-246).
in high demand and required much less infrastructure than mining did. An armed force was all that was necessary for maintaining law and order and coercing labour, which, in turn, ensured the timely and unhindered exportation of goods. It is for this purpose that in 1885 the Congo Free State created the Force Publique, a force composed of African mercenaries performing both military and police functions (Musambachime 1990: 647). The harshness with which the Force Publique raided for ivory and enforced the compulsory collection of rubber has been widely documented, having famously triggered what is sometimes referred to as the first mass human rights movement: a lively propaganda campaign, led by British diplomat Roger Casement and former shipping clerk E.D. Morel and supported by such literary personalities as Mark Twain and Arthur Conan Doyle. The campaign eventually forced Leopold to relinquish control of the Congo and hand it over to the Belgian state in 1908.55

Another, more serious reason for the Belgians’ administrative neglect was the hostilities that erupted between the Congo Free State and Arab traders active in the east of the territory in 1892. This conflict, which was to last for a decade, was prompted by Leopold’s decision to establish a state monopoly over ivory, which threatened to deprive the Arab traders of one of their main money-making schemes. At the same time, starting in 1895, the Free State had to face a series of insurrections in Katanga spearheaded by the Luba, Bena Lulua and Tetela.56 In this way, Leopold’s fixation on the exploitation of immediately available resources as well as the conditions created by the uprisings were to keep the attention away from the Free State’s southern border and the populations that lived there. These two elements also explain why the Congo Free State’s concept of native administration, despite its harshness, was never systematic: authoritative rule was enforced solely in the places where it was needed, i.e. places that were either resource-rich or troublesome or both. Direct administration, rather than any sort of indirect rule, was the default policy – except, of course, where there was no administration at all. The treatment of the Lunda area is a case in point. Since there was no immediate incentive for Leopold’s agents to visit the area, no contact was established with the Mwata Yamvo before 1896. Though the Lunda heartland

56 Chief Kalamba of the Bena Lulua rose against the Free State assisted by the Cokwe in February 1895 but the rebellion was crushed by the end of June. On June 4 the Tetela and Luba recruits of the Force Publique mutinied at Luluabourg, followed in 1897 by another Tetela rebellion. See Bustin (1975: 43).
was agitated by a liberation struggle against the Cokwe in the last decade of the nineteenth century, this hardly received any Belgian attention at all.\(^57\)

On the other side of the brand new border, events were evolving at a surprisingly similar sluggish pace. In the first few years of its existence, Northern Rhodesia was in such a situation of widespread administrative neglect that up to 1896, it was for the most part completely undisturbed by, and unaware of, the fact that it was now part of the British Empire. Although British control over Northern Rhodesia had been recognised by European powers after 1891, it was just a notch above illusory on the ground. British presence in Northern Rhodesia was so weak that despite pleas from missionaries based in the area, the British were not in a position to prevent Bemba raids on the north-eastern plateau (Roberts 1976: 163). In the mid-1890s however, the pace of British occupation quickened. In 1896, company officials began to intercept trading caravans as they left Bemba country, by which they weakened the Bemba without engaging in a head-on confrontation (\textit{Ibid.}: 164), and by the end of the century, BSAC control over Bembaland was effective. The biggest difficulty for the BSAC came from Mwata Kazembe X Kanyembo Ntemena (1884-1904) who from 1895 to 1899 repeatedly went into conflict with the British. The reasons for the outbreak of hostilities are not clear, but it seemed to have been in part influenced by events in the Congo: ‘the successes of the rebels in the Congo Free State, with whom Kazembe is said to be in communication, and with whom he has certainly expressed his sympathy has had some share in inducing Kazembe his present attitude.’\(^58\) Though the power of Kazembe had been greatly diminished, he successfully kept the British at bay until 1899, at which point he had to admit defeat. Instead of surrendering, however, he decided to take refuge on the Belgian bank of the river. Alfred Sharpe, the governor of Nyasaland who was leading the contingent sent to face Kazembe (Gordon 2006: 63), described how they ‘received news that during the night a number of the chief’s headmen having deserted him, and a large number of his warriors having followed them, Kazembe himself had suddenly decided to flee, and that in the early hours of the morning the whole population of the town had fled, and had made for the Luapula.’\(^59\) Once the two great powers of the north east, the Bemba and the Lunda, had submitted, there was no one left in the area with any real power to challenge the white men’s rule.

\(^{57}\) For more details on the Lunda reconquest of their heartland see Bustin (1975: 46-49).

\(^{58}\) Codrington to Sharpe, 14 September 1899, enclosed in Sharpe to FO, 29 September 1899, PRO, FO 2/210 as quoted in Macola (2002: 185).

\(^{59}\) Sharpe to FO, 29 December 1899, PRO FO 2/210 as quoted in Macola (2002: 188).
Changes in Subordinate Relationships

The new Anglo-Belgian border not only cut straight through both the main Lunda Kingdom and the Kingdom of Kazembe but its awkward shape around the middle – the Katanga pedicle – effectively cut off Mwata Yamvo’s eastern Lunda from Kazembe’s western Lunda. Although the effects of the border were not felt straightaway, it eventually proved to be a lethal blow to the already battered Eastern Lunda ‘Empire’. While the bulk of the old empire heartland was now part of the Congo Free State, the western sphere of Lunda influence became part of Angola, while most of the southern Lunda (or Ndembu) found themselves south of the Northern Rhodesian border. Of course, one could argue that the real loss was that of the Western dominions, since the southern Lunda had already ceased to be Mwata Yamvo’s tributaries by the time of the Cokwe invasion. Similarly, direct contact between the heartland and Kazembe in the lower Luapula valley had already been severely reduced after the Yeke invaded the Mweru-Luapula in the early 1880s. That said, the border unwittingly drawn by European cartographers had, by making communication more difficult, the effect of emphasising the heartland’s de facto separateness from its former minions. Crucially, however, though pre-colonial links between the Mwata Yamvo’s state and the now Northern Rhodesian Lunda were never fully resuscitated, the historical and ethnic connection with the Mwata Yamvo remained in the consciousness of both Kazembe’s Lunda and Ndembu (Bustin 1975: 59; Macola 2002: 190-191, 227).

If the effective separation with the Mwata Yamvo was not a source of excessive concern for the Kazembe, the fact that his territories above the Luapula River were now part of the Congo Free State was probably one. At the time of colonial conquest, the Luapula River already served as some sort of implicit border and the Kazembe’s authority was no longer thoroughly established on its West bank. With a colonial border turning the implicit border into an explicit one, Lunda authority on the West bank was made all the more tenuous (Gordon 2001: 317). Despite this, the then Kazembe Kanyembo attempted on various occasions to reaffirm the eastern Lunda overrule of the western bank of the lower Luapula river, in areas that now belonged to the Congo Free State. These attempts inevitably ran against the inflexible rules of the Congo Free State concerning territorial sovereignty and trading monopoly. From the outset, the Congo Free State had ruled that ‘un chef étranger ne [pouvait] exercer aucune suzeraineté sur le sol congolais.’ At the same time, as part of their direct rule policy, they had started to appoint a great number of careful-

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ly chosen ‘colonial chiefs’, whose job was to control the areas that they were appointed to on behalf of the Congo Free State. Since Msiri’s death had left a power vacuum, all former Yeke/Lunda chiefs along the banks of the Luapula were left with a choice: to submit to their former overlord in Northern Rhodesia or to become chiefs in their own right with the help of the new colonial power. Unsurprisingly, some of them were more than happy to take full advantage of the situation to claim their autonomy from their former suzerain. Kiba, a former follower of Msiri who refused to pay tribute to the eastern Lunda king, reportedly asked the Congo Free State for help. Kiba was duly allocated guns and powder accompanied by the promise that he would get immediate support in the event of an attack by Kazembe (Gordon 2001: 321-322; Legros 1996: 131; Macola 2002: 174). Similarly, some owners of the land and Shila clans rulers were able to escape Kazembe’s authority and become colonial chiefs. In this way, colonial structures of governance, even when they were not yet fully established, destabilised the links of subordination that had until then been operating in the region (Gordon 2006: 64-65).

However, given the ‘ancientness’ of the relationship between the two banks of the Luapula, there was no way, in the absence of a constant Belgian presence, for the laws to be fully enforced and Mwata Kazembe X could not be prevented from encroaching upon Congolese land (Macola 2002: 175). Throughout the mid- and late 1890s, Kanyembo’s sway over the western bank of the Luapula endured, which was not to the taste of the Belgian officials in Katanga. However, from 1895, with the help of the newly formed and previously mentioned Force Publique, the obligatory payment of ivory and rubber was enforced and the Luapula’s main crossings were patrolled, thereby preventing commerce from reaching Kazembe (Ibid.). Kazembe’s final defeat by BSAC forces in 1899 marked the end of his revival efforts. More than a year after the event, the former inhabitants of the Lunda districts were still reported to be ‘scattered’ as a result of the BSAC ‘invasion’ (Ibid.: 189). As for Kanyembo, following his defeat of 1899, he started looking at what compensation he could possibly obtain on the Northern Rhodesian side of the Luapula so that he may secure a political future in the new colonial state. He and his successor successfully convinced the BSAC to choose members of the Royal Family as chiefs, thus allowing him not only to reconstitute his network within Northern Rhodesia, but even to strengthen it. Unlike Msiri’s, Kazembe’s kingdom was old and could boast a high degree of historical legitimacy. It also benefited from a resilient form of perpetual kinship that made it possible to reconstitute a network of subordinate chiefs by making them members of the ‘Lunda family’. These factors gave Kazembe leverage to negotiate his survival, and that of his kingdom. In this way, not only did Kanyembo escape
with his life, he, and his successors, succeeded in exploiting the structures
and policies of the British colonial state and recreating a local network of cli-
ent colonial chiefs (Gordon 2001: 321). Yet, there is no doubt that the Belgian
resolve to keep the Mwata Kazembes out of Katanga became increasingly
effective as the century progressed. In fact, as Giacomo Macola pointed out,
‘the erosion of their ascendancy over the territory to the west of the lower
Luapula may help to account for the determination with which Lunda royals
pursued a policy of self-aggrandizement along the eastern bank of the river,
the only region of which they remained officially in charge’ (Ibid.: 227).

3.3.2 Protest Migrations

Though the artificial border was often ignored in its early years, the advan-
tages of acting upon it also became increasingly clear. The existence of two
contiguous sovereign states, neither of which had authority over the other,
provided the people living along the boundary with new leverage. If a mea-
ure implemented on one side of the border was not to the liking of the in-
habitants of one or the other country, they could easily cross the border into
a territory over which their colonial government had no legal authority. This
was made easier by the lack of colonial personnel along the border. From
1891, a phenomenon of ‘back and forth migrations’ across the Anglo-Belgian
border gradually amplified as the colonial apparatus, such as the levy of taxes,
was more efficiently set into motion. ‘On one side was tyranny, on the other
was sanctuary,’ as M.C. Musambachime put it (Musambachime 1989: 148).
Which side was which depended on circumstances. These ‘protest migra-
tions’ were usually temporary in nature (though they did occasionally result
in permanent settlement) since, in the words of Bruce Fetter, ‘flight, however
pressing the stimulus, is a response rather than a permanent course of ac-
ton’ (Fetter 1983: 200). As such, they are a testimony to the way in which the
border came to serve a new and innovative function: one of self-protection.

The ‘Sentry System’ and its Abuses

In 1895, a sentry system, i.e. the posting of a sentry responsible for tax col-
lection in every village (Musambachime 1989: 149), was established along
the Anglo-Belgian boundary in order to control and limit cross-border link-
ages. Unfortunately for the colonisers, this measure had the unwitting ef-
fect of prompting massive movements of peoples across the very border they
were trying to protect. Dugald Campbell, who was a missionary at Johnston
Falls-Mambilima on the Lower Luapula, has left a graphic account of how
Katangese sentries, due to lack of supervision, quickly became tyrants:
I have made a journey myself to the copper hills in the west [and other places in Katanga] and found the sentries everywhere living like kings, plundering, killing and burning villages in the name of the State. […]. Every time I made representations they were declared impossible or the answer was “I shall ask my head sentry to make enquiries,” the head sentries being one of the worst blacks in the country. Nothing was ever proved. He could not believe that his soldiers could be guilty of such misconduct or “well, they must have carte blanche or the natives would not respect the State.” Sometimes “Might is Right” would be the curt reply. What could one say? There were no judges or court of appeals, and the officer, often at his wit’s end, would say “What can I do? I must get ivory. I have no law or regulation book. I am the only law and only god in Katanga” (cited in Morel 1919: 45).

Similar abuses were reported all along the border and in most cases generated the same response: flight across the boundary. On 14 August 1895, Lt. Clément Brasseur, then in charge of the Force Publique in Katanga, recorded in his travel diary that ‘pas mal de gens du Katanga [avaient] filés jadis s’installer chez Kanyembo.’61 As late as 1904, E. Stephenson, the Native Commissioner for Ndola reported that ‘many natives are crossing into this Territory (North West Rhodesia),’62 while Campbell was still reporting that:

[O]n the Luapula, similar abuses existed and women were raped and made to serve both white and black (soldiers) until many of the best and biggest villages crossed into British territory where they live in peace. The wholesale exodus is due to Belgian raiding, the sentry system and the maltreatment of natives (cited in Morel 1919: 45).

In 1908, the Belgian government took over Leopold II’s private colony and the ‘Congo Free State’ became the ‘Belgian Congo.’ Frontiersmen, and by extension their abuses, were unable to outlive the gradual stabilisation of colonial rule. In 1908, the Native Commissioner for Fort Rosebery was already reporting that:

Large numbers of natives have left this district and gone across the Luapula to Belgian territory. The natives have not done this on account of any grievance against the administration, they simply returned to their own country.

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61 C. Brasseur to D. Brasseur, 10 October 1895, Papiers C. Brasseur, HA-RMCA RG768/81.15 as quoted in Macola (2002: 177).
62 Stephenson to Administrator, 22 August 1904, BS1/70 as quoted in Musambachime (1989: 149).
from which they fled when the Belgian region was not as humane as present.63

The Hut Tax
From about 1903, the direction of migration reversed as a result of new economic measures taken by the BSAC. In an effort to achieve economic independence from the metropole, a three shillings hut tax, to be paid in kind or in coin, was gradually introduced in Northern Rhodesia in the first years of the twentieth century. In addition, the Company could, instead of coins or cows, demand that villagers pay their taxes in the form of forced employment, i.e. provide labour to build roads or work as porters, etc.64 These measures were not happily received, to say the least. Though the BSAC denied it, there is little doubt that the imposition of the tax involved brutality, with tax collectors reportedly resorting to such practices as imprisonment or burning huts (Macola 2002: 198). A British Colonial Office official once privately observed that ‘Mr Beak [British Consul in the Congo Free State] in one of his reports said that the NWR administration was as bad as the Congo Free State […] This officer appears to have flogged systematically, had several natives shot, and indulged in forced labour, all CFS methods65 To escape this, many inhabitants of the British-controlled territory crossed the border to take refuge in Katanga. On the western section of the boundary, the Native Commissioner of Mwinilunga Sub-District received reports of a massive exodus of people from the district to Angola and the Belgian Congo: ‘Not a village at all has stayed […] they have all fled in the night […] There is no doubt that it is the tax that they revolt from’ (cited in Musambachime 1989: 152). On the eastern half, the situation was similar. Harrington, Native Commissioner for Fort Rosebery, reported in 1906 that ‘whole villages decamped to the Belgian Congo to avoid payment.’66 By 1908, the same Harrington was reporting that the people in the border area had ‘huts on both sides of the Luapula River making it extremely difficult for him to collect taxes.’67 By 1906, the loss of subjects that these flights represented seems to have worried Mwata Kazembe XI Muonga Kapakata (1904-1919) enough to institute an unofficial

64 Although the practice of ‘tax labour’ was firmly forbidden as early as 1902 by Sir Clement Hill at the Foreign Office, the exaction of forced labour remained an importance source of grievance until at least 1920. See Henderson (1972: 16) & Macola (2002: 201).
67 Ibid.
patrolling system along the lower Luapula in order to prevent Rhodesian natives from settling in the Congo (Macola 2002: 199). This cannot have been entirely successful since, around the same time, the District Commissioner in charge of Mweru-Luapula, reported that more than half of the male population in Katanga was either fleeing from the hut tax or seeking employment to pay it. Even though tax evasion remained high throughout the first decade of the century, it is clear that growing numbers were eventually forced to come to terms with the colonial financial demands. Those who could not find employment locally began to seek wage employment in the white farms of Southern Rhodesia and, to a much larger extent, the developing copper mines of southern Katanga. As early as 1905, many inhabitants on the eastern bank of the Luapula were reported to be travelling independently to the mines of Kambove and Ruwe in Katanga in order to earn ‘les quelques shillings dont ils [avaient] besoin pour payer le nut taxe.’ In 1921, seven sub-districts, all in the eastern half of Northern Rhodesia, had sex ratios of less than 70 men per 100 women: Feira, Serenje, Fort Rosebery, Abercorn, Lundazi, and Petauke. Since these were the areas of most intense tax collection, these statistics confirm the relationship between labour migration and tax collection (Fetter 1983: 89). This is not to say that tax evasion stopped however. As late as 1934, one Native Commissioner reported that ‘there was a continued movement of Natives to and from the Belgian Congo […] a large number of natives have migrated from this district into Congo, the reason seems to be Tax.’

Sleeping Sickness Regulations
In the early twentieth century, a number of smallpox and sleeping sickness epidemics hit both Katanga and Northern Rhodesia. The spread of these diseases was clearly exacerbated by the important population movements that took place at the time. In Northern Rhodesia, the Mweru-Luapula was especially badly hit, probably being exposed to an infectious strain stemming from northern Katanga. Starting in 1907-1908, every time an epidemic of sleeping sickness was detected, the BSAC implemented a series of hated

71 Memorandum by legal advisor explaining the reasons for the new regulations restricting the movements of natives in sleeping sickness areas, encl. in Chas McKinnon, Acting Administrator to the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, 23 January 1914, A2/1/7, tag. 749 loc. 183, doc. 29 (NAZ).
measures that consisted of ‘restricting the movement of natives in sleeping sickness area.’

These new regulations stipulated that ‘all movements of natives from this [any North Rhodesian] territory into any part of the Congo state or from any part of the Congo State into the Territory are prohibited except under the permit signed by a magistrate or a native commissioner.’ Any native contravening these regulations was ‘liable upon conviction to a penalty not exceeding one pound shilling or to imprisonment with or without hard labour.’

In addition, these regulations also quarantined ‘infected areas.’ In 1907, this happened to an area lying to the east of the Luapula and Lake Mweru, and to the south of the north-eastern Rhodesia/Katanga border with the consequence that no-one was allowed to migrate in or out of there (Perrings 1979: 15). In addition, between 1908 and 1910, many villages were forcefully moved, which led to more people dying of ‘hunger and hardship than died of sleeping sickness,’ as was reported by an eyewitness. Given the rigours of the regulations, allied to their negative effect on economic matters, it is not surprising that they were not well received. These measures were, moreover, as useless as they were unpopular, since Northern Rhodesian efforts to contain epidemics were not reciprocated on the part of the Belgian Congo.

Since the Belgians had enforced no preventive regulation limiting the movement of peoples, many, once more, sought to evade the new regulations by engaging in mass migrations (Gordon 2006: 70). In April 1909, the medical officer at Fort Rosebery noted:

The opposite bank of the Luapula is thick with villages and more are being built (unfortunately it must be admitted that some of these at least are peopled with refugees form this side), and as long as these villages are allowed to

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72 Chas McKinnon, Acting Administrator to the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, 23 January 1914, A2/1/7, tag. 749 loc. 183, doc. 29 (NAZ).
73 Government Notice of 1914 regarding the restriction of movements of natives in sleeping sickness areas, encl. in Chas McKinnon, Acting Administrator to the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, 23 January 1914, A2/1/7, tag. 749, loc. 183, doc. 29 (NAZ). These regulations, though published in 1914, were virtually identical to the rules established in 1907 and only differ from them in that they provide for the punishment of those siding or abetting the movement of natives in and out Congo.
74 Ibid.
76 Memorandum by legal advisor explaining the reasons for the new regulations restricting the movements of natives in sleeping sickness areas, encl. in Chas McKinnon, Acting Administrator to the High Commissioner for Southern Africa, 23 January 1914, A2/1/7, tag. 749 loc. 183, doc. 29 (NAZ).
remain on the river bank affording every facility for fishing and the like, they will be a continual temptation and a continual menace to our own people.\footnote{W.H.T. Storrs to P.M.O. Fort Jameson, 10 April 1909, BS1/65 (NAZ) as quoted in Perrings (1979: 17).}

The sleeping sickness regulations were only lifted in October 1922, allowing the last refugees to return to their original villages along the border (Musambachime 1989: 155).

**Conclusion**

The partitioning of Africa into European colonies was largely the result of a large-scale diplomatic game between contending European nations. In 1929, the Commissioner of the Hilton Young Commission on the closer union in Eastern and Central Africa noted that:

> The boundaries separating territories are in effect historical accidents and not of any reasoned plan. They have grown up piecemeal as a result of the labours of early travellers who wandered at large, and of international diplomacy […] with little knowledge of geographical conditions and less ethnographical [information].\footnote{Report on the Commission on Closer Union in Eastern and Central Africa, 1929 (also called the Hilton Young Commission) Command Paper 3234 as quoted in Musambachime (2003: 16).}

The reports on the presence of copper, mixtures of rumour and fact though they were, had fuelled a stiff competition for Katanga. It is in this light that the actions of Rhodes and Leopold II in the 1880s and 1890s must be judged. To a great extent, it can be argued that the main factor determining the eventual shape of the border was the acquisition of valuable resources such as gold, copper, rubber and timber.

The case of the two Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commissions reveals that the presence of economic resources in borderland areas was also a key motivating factor in developing boundaries through localised demarcation. Although it would be too simplistic to contend that precise demarcation of the border was flouted until the growth of copper mining made it imperative (Donaldson 2010: 174), the pervasiveness of the influence of mineral deposits on boundary demarcation cannot be denied. There were few boundaries that necessitated the use of not one but two boundary commissions and fewer still that were demarcated with as much rigidity as the watershed section.
was. This is another clear illustration of how the economic value of African territory was an important catalyst in boundary development. Easing the administration of local ‘native’ borderland populations was not the priority for the commissions. Even though local administrators in Northern Rhodesia’s border areas continually implored their superiors to mark the boundary with Belgian Congo clearly on the ground, they were often left with just the opposite; widely-spaced pillars and a series of maps alongside zones, like that along the meridian section, which were left as blurry zones of non-interference. No other commission was ever established after 1933 and the beacons erected in 1927-1933 were not looked after either (Donaldson 2010: 183-189), so that the border stayed forever vague and remained a source of administrative difficulty and international incidents. In 1968, i.e. after Zambia had become an independent state, the District Secretary of Mporokoso, reported that ‘there are 13 Congolese villages on the Zambian side of the border. This state of affairs is inevitably causing administrative problems.’

On a diplomatic level, therefore, the presence of copper ores as well as a poorly defined border (one deriving to a large extent from the other) was a definite recipe for conflict not only between nations, but also between administrators and administrated.

The proximity to an utterly artificial international frontier not only generated constant tension between British and Belgian officials, it also affected relationships between groups that found themselves arbitrarily bisected by an imaginary line. In the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia, it was the Lunda especially who suffered from the outline of the Anglo-Belgian boundary. The western Lunda lost what was left of their control over the southern and western part of their original empire, while the eastern Lunda kingdom found itself divided in two by the River Luapula. However, contacts between the butchered parts of Lunda areas, instead of ceasing altogether, changed in nature. The ways in which colonialism affected the structure of the various Lunda groups depended largely on the respective styles of the colonial administrations. The Belgian administration was known for its harsh paternalism, while the British doctrine of indirect rule encouraged rule by pre-colonial elites, such as the Lunda paramount, on the condition that they fully cooperated with the British authorities. So when the Belgians established their own network of state-appointed colonial chiefs, many chiefs, who had traditionally been Kazembe’s subordinates, were quick to take this opportunity to cut ties with their overlord and become chiefs in their own right. On the Northern Rhodesian side, if some decentralised clan elders succeeded in

79 A.N. Chimuka, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Presidential affairs, June 1968, FA1/1/3, loc. 492, doc. 253 (NAZ).
escaping the rule of Eastern Lunda, the Kazembe was nevertheless able to rebuild a strong client network through collaboration with the colonial authorities. Opportunities for adaptation varied depending on what side of the border one stood, but these opportunities were duly identified and utilised.

On both sides, however, it took a while before there were noticeable effects on the ground. The full significance of external rule did not become clear until it had set up a local administration and had begun collecting tax. When that happened, the artificial boundary, which until then was treated as if it did not exist anywhere else than on paper (which arguably, until a rather late date, it did not), was turned into ‘leverage’. Cross-boundary movement was used as a form of political protest against governmental actions that were considered brutal, oppressive, or simply disadvantageous. In this way, local groups were able to adapt to their new situation and even capitalise on it through their creative use of the new border and the differences in colonial regimes on either side of it. The border was artificial, contested and porous, and it is what made such resourceful interaction possible. By the time the second Boundary Commission was sent to the field, the border was such an integral part of Northern Rhodesia’s political landscape that Governor Maxwell was able to justify his opposition to any adjustments along the meridian section on the grounds that:

> I can see no advantage in disturbing a boundary, artificial though it may be, which has become known to the native population and is accepted by them.\(^80\)

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80 Letter Maxwell (NR Governor) to Amery (CO), 28 August 1928, RC/1348 (NAZ).
The Copper Industry

Often when Zambia is mentioned or looked at in any detail in academic literature, the focus is on the Copperbelt, or, at the very least, the latter figures prominently in the narrative. The Copperbelt has been an object of study from as early as the 1930s, when the first miners’ strikes prompted the colonial government to create a research centre tasked with investigating the impact of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation on the local populations: the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI). The RLI sparked the trend of a distinct type of Copperbelt-related literature, one that focused on such topics as labour migration, the intermingling of people that it brought about, and the impact of these phenomena on the rural areas and traditional authorities. That the Copperbelt inspired such studies should not be surprising. In the mid-1920s, after forty years of colonial rule and relative obscurity, Northern Rhodesia emerged as a major supplier of copper. This, in turn, led to the rapid development of this sparsely inhabited, narrow strip of land (about 130 kilometres long) that was the Copperbelt. By the time Northern Rhodesia became independent in 1964, the Copperbelt had five bustling industrial centres, three smaller mining towns, and a population of about 544,000 people (Parpart 1983: 13). It hosted one of the most concentrated large-scale industries in Africa south of the Sahara, which, by 1960, employed 36,000 Africans and 7,000 Europeans. The Africans in this changing society belonged to about 70 different Bantu groups and 13 linguistics groups (Powdermaker 1962: 3-7). In this way, although high rates of migration and mobility predate the onset of the copper industry, as has been argued in the previous chapters, colonial capitalism in south-central Africa created new patterns of movements and residence. It is hardly a coincidence, therefore, that mineworkers should occupy a prominent place in Zambian academic literature.

This focus on labour migration, if understandable, has had an unintended consequence: the creation of an archetype story of labour migration, or as James Ferguson puts it, a ‘conventional wisdom according to which [...] spe-

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81 For a detailed study of the work of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the Twentieth Century, see Schumaker (2001).
cific studies are fitted into a larger picture’ (Ferguson 1999: 41). In his influential *Expectations of Modernity*, Ferguson shows how changes in the nature of migration and urbanisation in Zambia over the years have been described in terms of an ‘overarching, progressive narrative in which a “classic” migrant labour system featuring short-term migration by lone, male, rurally based migrants gradually gave way to a “permanently urbanized,” “fully proletarianized,” settled working class’ (*Ibid.*). This view has been progressively questioned as forty years of scholarship have shown that migrant miners tended to migrate from mine to mine, or from job to job, rather than going from periods of work to periods at home and vice versa. Conversely, Ferguson strongly argued that ‘rural-urban mobility was not always so orderly’ (*Ibid.*: 39) and that processes of mobility and urbanisation were more varied and more complex than was usually suggested. In addition, he argued,

already in the 1920s and 1930s, many Copperbelt mineworkers were much more used to long-term urban dwelling than the image of the cyclical migrant would suggest. Indeed [...] many of the early Copperbelt workers had long histories of urban employment at other labour centres in the region, especially the Katanga mines in the Belgian Congo and in the mining centres of Southern Rhodesia (*Ibid.*: 50).

Interestingly, while the role of Southern Rhodesia in this general process of large-scale population movement is both acknowledged and relatively well-known, Katanga’s role in the same process is less so. Indeed, the history of the development of the copper industry in Katanga has been seen as separate and distinct from that of the mines on the British side of the border, despite their being direct neighbours. This, according to Luise White, is partly due to the fact that ‘the two histories do not provide a good chronological or comparative fit’ (White 2000: 274). The main point of divergence appearing in the timelines of the two regions is that copper mining in Katanga began well before the First World War, whereas in Northern Rhodesia, it only really took off in the late 1920s. Another element that seems to set the two Copperbelts apart is the supposed discrepancy in labour policy. By 1926, before any copper mine in Northern Rhodesia had gone into full production, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) had begun to stabilise its labour force, whereas, on the Northern Rhodesian side, a family presence was not yet encouraged. This created the idea that labour was ‘stabilised’ in Katanga, while the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia still relied on a migrant system (*Ibid.*: 275). Thus, in White’s words, ‘with few exceptions, the threads that link the two copperbelts have been overlooked, and the fluidity with which African labour penetrated colonial and cultural borders has not been the source with which history was
written’ (*Ibid*). In this chapter, I will argue that the early development of the ‘two’ Copperbelts, far from being separate, was, in fact, defined by interdependence. Far from constituting two distinct economic entities, Katanga and Northern Rhodesia shared labour and managerial expertise from an early date, resulting in labour migrants crisscrossing the border well into the 1940s as they looked for better wages and cheaper or better goods.

4.1 The Katangese Copperbelt: A Joint Enterprise

4.1.1 Northern Rhodesian Disenchantment and Katangese ‘El Dorado’

Once it had secured Northern Rhodesia, the British South Africa Company found itself in the strange situation of not knowing what to do with it. Northern Rhodesia was, as Andrew Roberts put it, ‘an awkwardly shaped piece of debris resulting from Rhodes’s failure to obtain Katanga’ (Roberts 1976: 175). Ironically, considering the efforts that went into acquiring exclusive mineral rights over it, Northern Rhodesia seemed to have little to offer economically. Its soil was rocky and infertile, considered unsuited for largescale agriculture, and gold deposits that had seemed promising soon turned out to be insignificant. Consequently, the BSAC did little with Northern Rhodesia. In the words of Ian Henderson: ‘The gilt was […] missing from the gingerbread – if indeed there was any gingerbread at all’ (Henderson 1972: 10). For it became increasingly clear that, worse than not being profitable, there was a danger the colony might not even be self-sufficient. In 1899, at the end of his lengthy confidential report on the Anglo-German boundary between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, C.F. Close remarked that, though some parts of North East Rhodesia on the Lower Zambezi River (well south of the boundary with Belgian Congo) were fertile, the eastern plateau region between the lakes where the boundary ran was a ‘remote, unhealthy, unprofitable country,’ adding that ‘it is unlikely, unless the native population largely increases in the next generation, that the country will be able to pay for its own administration.’ Fifteen years later, in his official report on the Anglo-Belgian boundary commission, I. Walker made a similar point:

One can only hope that when N.E. Rhodesia is fully opened up to prospectors and exploration, minerals (above all tin) will be discovered in workable

82 In 1891, the Company assigned responsibility for its northern territory to the Commissioner in Nyasaland, Harry Johnston and concentrated its attention on the search for a ‘second rand’ in its territories south of the Zambezi. See Roberts (1976: 175); Parpart (1983: 13).
quantities, for without this incentive to progress, this country will remain a backwater of empire for several years to come.\textsuperscript{84}

Walker’s comment turned out to be quite prescient.

Prospecting in Northern Rhodesia began in the 1890s.\textsuperscript{85} Lead and zinc was discovered at Broken Hill (now Kabwe) and copper claims were staked at the ‘Hook’ of the Kafue River as well as at Roan Antelope, Rietbok and Bwana Mkubwa located further north in the area that was to become the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. In 1898, Rhodes granted a former associate, the Scottish engineer Robert Williams, a prospecting area of 2,000 square miles in Northern Rhodesia for a period of two years. For this purpose, Williams launched Tanganyika Concessions Limited (TCL) in January 1899 (Brion & Moreau 2006: 67; Perrings 1979: 9). TCL’s first expedition found copper deposits, as well as some gold, at Nkana, Kipushi and Kansanshi, just 12 miles south of the Congo-Zambezi watershed (Williams 1921: 248; Coleman 1962: 7). The following year, Robert Williams, persuaded that the copper deposits found near the watershed extended well into Katanga, obtained from King Leopold the opportunity to explore the Katangese Copperbelt (Coleman 1962: 8). It may seem surprising that Leopold should so easily welcome into his territory those he had so fiercely competed against. Actually, Leopold had little choice but to tolerate British involvement. Not only was the Congo Free State coming under increased international scrutiny because of the brutal practices of its agents, resulting in economic difficulties, but no Belgian financial group was ready to invest in a region that was far from the homeland and difficult to access (Brion & Moreau 2006: 69; Fetter 1973: 4, 1976: 18). In any case, letting Tanganyika Concessions Ltd do the preliminary work could only be to the advantage of the Congo Free State, as Albert Ochs, a stockholder of the Compagnie du Katanga, remarked in a letter to the Compagnie’s administrator, Albert Thys:

Le plan financier de cette compagnie vous fera plutôt sourire mais le groupe est actif et non sans influence. On suivra leur voie si ils trouvent quelque chose de vraiment bon. Je ne vois pas d’objection [à] accepter leur argent tout aussi bien que Rhodes le fait [dans sa] sphère.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Report by I. Walker on the Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission, 1914, RC/609 (NAZ).
\textsuperscript{85} Several prospecting companies were formed under the aegis of one of Rhodes’ associates: Edmund Davis. The Bechuanaland Exploration Company (1888) was founded first and was followed by a series of offshoot companies: the Northern Territories (BSA) Exploring Company, the Rhodesia Copper Company, the Rhodesia Broken Hill Development Company and the Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration and Finance Company. See Coleman (1962: 6).
\textsuperscript{86} Albert Ochs to Albert Thys, June 1899, as quoted in Brion & Moreau (2006: 67).
An agreement was consequently concluded between Tanganyika Concessions Ltd and the newly formed Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK), a semi-private concessionary company that had taken over the administration of the territory on behalf of both the state and the Compagnie du Katanga. Under this agreement, TCL was given exclusive prospecting rights over 60,000 square miles along the Katanga border for a period of five years, and the right to work any mine for a period of up to thirty years in return for a guarantee of 60 per cent of the profits of any minerals discovered (Williams 1921: 249; Coleman 1962: 8). By the end of the concession period, more than one hundred deposits had been located, including gold at Ruwe (now Mutoshi), copper and cobalt at Kambove, and carbonate deposits at the ‘Star of the Congo’ mine, close to which the future capital of Katanga, Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), was to be founded in 1910 (Coleman 1962: 9; Perrings 1979: 10).

By contrast, nothing of similar promise was found in Northern Rhodesia. Gold finds were almost insignificant and the numerous small copper mines in Kafue (Broken Hill) were failures. Though the mines discovered at the time in Northern Rhodesia presented plenty of signs of copper deposits, these consisted of oxide ores, which yielded 3 to 5 per cent copper at best, not a very profitable margin compared with the 15 to 25 per cent of the Katangese oxides (Coleman 1962: 9-14; Henderson 1972: 10). Therefore, not only were the mines of the Hook of the Kafue, Kansanshi, Ndola and Broken Hill hardly enough to build a colonial economy on, they were also no match for the ‘plenteous bounty’ of Katanga:

The engineer’s estimate is that he can turn out copper from the Star and Kambove at […] less than £30 a ton. There is not a mine in the world, with the possible exception of Rio Tinto, that can afford to sell copper below £38 a ton […] Given the railway and efficient management, Katanga should control the world’s copper supply and be the brightest spot in Africa.

Consequently, as attention was duly diverted from Northern Rhodesia, prospecting activities declined after 1906 (Coleman 1962: 14). By the end of the

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87 In May 1900, the Congo Free State and the Compagnie du Katanga agreed to divide the benefits derived from the territory and entrust its administration and exploitation to a new body: Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK). ‘Dans la proportion d’un tiers, tout ce qui se fera, tout ce qui se donnera, tout ce qui se récoltera sera la propriété de la Compagnie du Katanga, les deux autres tiers restant à l’Etat.’ See Brion & Moreau (2006: 68).
88 In 1905, TCL’s concession was extended for another year, and in 1906 for a further three years. See Perrings (1979: 10).
89 Livingstone Mail, 26 December 1908, as quoted in Coleman (1962: 14).
1920s, the Belgian Congo was the world’s third largest exporter of copper with 5.8 per cent of world output of smelter production (Ibid.: 20-23), while in Northern Rhodesia, though Broken Hill and Bwana Mkubwa both expanded their operations when the railroad reached them in 1900 and 1909 respectively, economic activity remained on a very small scale (Roberts 1976: 175). Katanga copper production increased exponentially over the years: 997 tons in 1911; 2,492 in 1912; 7,408 in 1913; and 10,722 in 1914 until they reached 80,639 tons in 1926. By contrast, Northern Rhodesia produced 589 tons of copper in 1908 and still only 708 in 1926 (Coleman 1962: 21). By 1924, Northern Rhodesia was nearing bankruptcy. Thus, the BSAC reached an agreement with the British government on 29 September 1923, by which the Crown agreed to take over the administration of Northern Rhodesia though the mineral rights remained attached to the company. Northern Rhodesia officially passed to the Colonial Office as of 1924 (Ibid.: 27).

4.1.2 British Interests at the Heart of Katangese Economics

Northern Rhodesia having proved a disappointment, it was not long before the BSAC turned its attention back to Katanga and the benefits that could potentially be derived from it. The economic health of the BSAC was to an extent linked to the fortunes of Tanganyika Concessions Ltd, in as much as, as Coleman pointed out, (1) the chartered company held a 35 per cent interest in the claims of TCL in Northern Rhodesia, (2) Rhodes himself possessed 2,000 £I shares, and (3) thanks to Williams’ agreement with Leopold, TCL was to enjoy 40 per cent of the profit of Katanga operations (Coleman 1962: 9). The BSAC, therefore, had direct interest in the development and smooth running of operations in Katanga. In turn, the Belgians were to become increasingly dependent on the United Kingdom for the production and export of its minerals. For a start, there was no connection between Katanga and a seacoast, which was an inescapable precondition for the export of copper on a large-scale. There was a project to build a railway line between Katanga and the Atlantic via the port of Lobito (near Benguela in Angola) but the line, whose construction had started in 1903, was not yet usable (and would not be until 1931) (Williams 1921: 253; Hance & Van Dongen 1956: 466). By contrast, the British railway line from Kimberley (South Africa) had reached Broken Hill in 1907 (Roberts 1976: 177; Williams 1921: 253). Both the BSAC and TCL recognised that it would be mutually beneficial to extend that line to Katanga. The final section of the line, financed by TCL and the BSAC, was extended to the copper-rich Congo border, from which point it reached Elisabethville in 1910 (Coleman 1962: 12; Roberts 1976: 177).
From that point on, coal and coke were exported to Katanga from a colliery just south of Victoria Falls, while Katangese copper along with the lead and zinc from Broken Hill, was exported via Rhodesia Railways to the Mozambican coast (Henderson 1972: 57; Roberts 1976: 177). In turn, the profits generated through the use of the Southern African railway were reportedly the means by which the British South Africa Company was able to keep afloat (Fetter 1983: 87). Writing to Owen Letcher in August 1931, Sir Robert Williams remarked:

Dr Jameson, when he asked me after Rhodes’s death to try to get a connection for the Rhodesia Railways to the Katanga mines, told me that unless I got this, the Chartered Company would go into liquidation as that Company, of which Dr Jameson was then the president, was losing £300,000 per annum under its guarantee of interest to the Rhodesian Debenture Holders.91

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90 See also the correspondence between the UMHK and the Wankie Colliery kept in the UMHK archives: UM I, 588 (AGR 2).
91 Robert Williams to Owen Letcher, August 1931, as quoted in Coleman (1962: 12).
This, however, was not the full extent of British involvement in Katanga. With mining in Katanga showing signs of great lucrative potential, Tanganyika Concessions Ltd and the Comité Spécial du Katanga initiated a new chartered company on 28 October 1906: the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) (Perrings 1979: 10). The UMHK took over all the CSK’s mining-related rights and obligations and, from 1906 onwards, became the real locus of power in Katanga. The fact that the UMHK was to be a joint venture between British and Belgian interests stemmed from necessity. Katanga was a Belgian territory but, in practice, Belgium’s experience as a colonial power – or, indeed, as any kind of ‘power’ – was limited, to say the least. There was no one in Belgium familiar, let alone experienced, with the mineral industry. Nor was anyone in Belgium familiar with Africa and its population. It is in recognition of that fact that the technical direction of the UMHK and the responsibility for recruiting labour were entrusted to TCL (Brion & Moreau 2006: 74). In return, Leopold II obtained a few concessions from TCL: that the UMHK would be known as a Belgian company; that at least half of the employees would be Belgian; that 60 per cent of the material necessary for the exploitation of copper should be imported from Belgium; and finally, that half of the mines’ produce would be exported to Belgium (Ibid.). Leopold also made sure that some prominent Belgian groups would be included in the shareholders so as to counterbalance British influence on the Katangese mining sector. Prominent among these was the Société Générale de Belgique, Belgium’s largest holding company. As a result, the first administrative council of the UMHK was composed of five British representatives, all of whom were attached to TCL, and five Belgians. Yet, despite Leopold’s precautions, actual power lay with the British side. In practice, the effects of British influence were ubiquitous, to the extent that English was the main language of communication in Elisabethville until the First World War (White 2000: 275). It was TCL that operated the mines, controlled the recruitment of labour and managed the compounds, while the British directors and engineers of the UMHK dictated most of the company’s decisions. Between 1907

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93 The five Belgians were: the Baron Baeyens, Governor of the Société Générale and President of the Council; Joseph Devolder, Minister of State and Vice-Governor of the Société Générale; Theodore Heyvaert, President of the Chemin de Fer du Katanga; Ernest Cambier, representative of the Compagnie du Katanga within the CSK; Henri Buttgenbach, representative of the Congo Free State within the CSK. The repartition of votes at general assembly and the participation of the different groups to the benefits were as follows: 45 per cent for TCL, 30 per cent for the CSK, 10 per cent for the Société Générale and 15 per cent for other Belgian groups. See Brion & Moreau (2006: 75).

94 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, doc.1 (NAZ), p.3.
and 1911, the company even had two European headquarters: a head office in Brussels, where the Belgian management met, and a ‘technical committee’ in London. The British possessed half of the capital and the expertise in terms of mining and metallurgy, they controlled the main means of access to Katanga, and they provided and controlled labour (Fetter 1973: 4). They were, as far Katanga is concerned, everywhere.

Given this context, it was not long before tensions between Belgian and British staff escalated within the UMHK. They reached a peak in 1911 when the mines first opened for business. That year, the Belgian managers of the UMHK accused their British counterparts, Robert Williams in particular, of not running the mines properly. An inquiry commission, headed by Jules Jadot, brother of the then President of the Société Générale, Jean Jadot, was sent in November of the same year to assess the state of operations. His report was less than enthusiastic regarding Belgo-British relations in Katanga:

L’Union Minière n’était qu’un mythe ou une formule vague dénuée de signification [...] Tout au plus considérait-on que les hasards de la politique ayant fait du Katanga un territoire belge, il fallait donner à l’affaire une étiquette belge et qu’on avait pour cela créé l’Union Minière, dont toutefois Mr. Williams était le maître comme de la Tanganyika. Les Belges qui commencèrent à arriver peu à peu devaient naturellement être considérés comme des intrus [...] Le résultat était forcé: tout devait marcher mal.95

Crossing the Congo in 1909, Prince Albert (who was to succeed to Leopold II that year) had also bemoaned the fact that Katanga was increasingly seen as an extension of Rhodesia, noting how the railway, once finished, would be:

un inappréciable moyen de pénétration économique dans la partie la plus riche de notre colonie. Nous ne disposons d’aucun moyen par le Congo même qui puisse nous permettre de leur faire concurrence et l’on se demande si nous avons été inspirés par le vrai souci de notre avenir colonial en aidant nos concurrents et leur chemin de fer. Le Katanga apparaît à tous les Anglais occupés à la mise en valeur de l’Afrique du Sud comme une vraie terre promise, ils parlent déjà avec des noms séparés du « Congo » et du « Katanga ».

96 Prince Albert of Belgium, as quoted in Brion & Moreau (2006: 76-77).
Unfortunately for the Belgians, the First World War made it impossible to take any step towards reclaiming absolute authority over Katanga. Worse, the demands of war led to a dramatic drop in the Belgian presence in Africa. In 1917, Belgians represented less than 25 per cent of the UMHK’s European employees, while the UMHK depended completely on the British and their control over southern Africa for the supply of provisions, labour and expertise.97 It was only after the war, by which time Anglophobia was rife in Elisabethville, that Belgium was able to pursue a policy of ‘nationalisation’ of its industry. In 1918, the then Procureur du Roi Martin Rutten, who spearheaded Belgian opposition to British domination over Katanga, had P.K. Horner, local overseer of UMHK operations, fired on the grounds of poor hygiene conditions in ‘native’ housing.98 Immediately afterwards, Rutten used the series of strikes undertaken by the South African employees in 1919 and 1920 to dismiss them and replace them with Belgians (Fetter 1976: 62-68). Then, still in 1918, the Union Minière created its own native labour department and took over the management of the compounds.99 In this way, between 1917 and 1920, many non-Belgians were successfully uprooted from their position of power in Katanga. This process was made all the easier by the fact that the Belgian franc declined in relation to the pound sterling after the war, making London less keen to invest in Belgian ventures. By the early 1920s, Brussels had come to replace London as the source of capital for the development of the Katanga Copperbelt, Tanganyika Concessions had become little more than a holding company, and the combination of British entrepreneurship and British capital that had been so important in the early development of the Union Minière had lost its importance. The UMHK was now Belgian in both name and reality (Fetter 1976: 75-78).100 Yet, the UMHK, and the Katangese copper industry in general, could not break away completely from its English-speaking neighbour. Firstly, if British presence in UMHK directorate

97 The Belgians obtained the closure of the UMHK headquarters in London while they also sought to strengthen links with Germany between 1912 and 1914 to counterbalance British influence. The war cut these undertakings short. After Brussels was taken by the German army in 1914, the head office was transferred back to London. See Fetter (1973: 5).
98 Anglophobia not only played out in a boardroom battle between directors. The Belgian settlers were also very active. Right after the end of the war they sent a set of statistics to the Colonial Ministry, which, they hoped, would demonstrate the degree to which the copper industry had fallen under British leadership. See Fetter (1976: 64).
99 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, doc.1 (NAZ), p.3.
100 Before the First World War, the major nations of Europe had all been on the gold standard, making their currencies freely interchangeable at a fixed rate. After the war, both Belgium and Britain left the gold standard, while at the same time, the Belgian franc declined in relation to the pound sterling. See Fetter (1976: 76-77).
was reduced it was by no means eradicated. British money continued to flow in and out of the Union Minière and British directors sat on the board until as late as the 1960s (Hughes 2003: 595). Secondly, the two territories were to continue to be economically interdependent for a while, not least in terms of infrastructure (of which the railway was the principal element), but also in terms of labour and trade.

4.2 Labour Migrations in the Early Twentieth Century (1910-1940)

4.2.1 A Rhodesian Workforce for Katanga (1910-1925)

When the BSAC realised that the low-grade ores discovered at Broken Hill and Ndola would not yield significant enough profit to fund the territory’s administration, the company had to find another way for the northern territories to be useful to the empire. If Northern Rhodesia was not to be a second Katanga, there was only one way in which this territory could prove to be of use: by acting as a labour reservoir for the mines of southern Africa, particularly those of southern Rhodesia (Henderson 1972: 12; Parpart 1983: 16). It is traditionally suggested that the principle aim of the three shillings hut tax was to force the Northern Rhodesian population to turn to migrant labour in order to earn money (Fetter 1983: 147). Though Ian Henderson, in an attempt to nuance that statement, contends that ‘taxation was not a necessary or sole cause of labour migration, but rather that it was one stage (though perhaps the most important one) in the process of the imposition of European control’ (Henderson 1972: 14), there is little doubt that tax and labour were closely linked. For most of the Northern Rhodesians, who numbered about one million at the time, engaging in wage labour outside the territory became the only possibility of paying their tax, since opportunities for employment within Northern Rhodesia were scarce (Roberts 1976: 177).

At the same time as these measures were being implemented in Northern Rhodesia, Katangese mines started operations and were – rather conveniently – in dire need of labour (Perrings 1979: 14). The labour policy in Katanga was to copy the South African model in which workers would typically stay for a period of six to nine months, work until exhaustion, be replaced by new recruits until they too succumbed to fatigue, and so on and so forth. The success of such a scheme necessitated an easy access to dense population clusters as sources of labour (Clegg 1960: 39; Fetter 1973: 12). Therein lay the rub. For not only was there no easy means, in the absence of good infrastructure, to carry potential recruits to the mines, but Katanga was also much less pop-
ulated than South Africa (Clegg 1960: 39). In 1912, at the time when the mining in Katanga was entering its industrial phase, Katanga was described as ‘[une terre] inhabitée, sans ressource aucune au point de vue main-d’œuvre et ravitaillement. […]. Entre Elisabethville et Kambove, sur 160 kilomètres, on ne rencontre que deux villages.’\(^{101}\) In addition, the few potential labour supply areas that Katanga did have were ecologically self-sufficient so that labour recruiters had to contend not only with a non-existent administration, but also with the comparative profitability of the local agriculture.\(^{102}\) In addition, the region was still bearing the scars left by the era of the Congo Free State, as was noted in 1928 by the Northern Rhodesian Department of Native affairs:

> In the Congo the main difficulties are (1) scarcity of native population (2) extreme difficulty experienced in persuading the male natives to come out as wage earners in industry. The reluctance to work for Europeans, it can safely be said, was caused by the ruthless methods practiced in the early days of the Congo Free State to exploit the rubber trade […]. The rubber trade is also responsible to a great extent for the sparseness of the population.\(^{103}\)

For want of any viable alternative, the UMHK started to look towards Northern Rhodesia for the recruitment of its workforce (Perrings 1979: 14). For this purpose, a subsidiary called the Robert Williams & Co., was formed. Robert Williams & Co.’s recruiters, using Fort Rosebery (now Mansa) as a base, recruited mainly in the area in Northern Rhodesia that was within a 200 miles radius from Katanga’s capital city, Elisabethville. In the early years, Robert Williams & Co. was the only labour supplier in Katanga and provided all the labour necessary to meet the needs of the UMHK’s three centres of operations – Ruwe, Kambove and the Star of the Congo (Brion & Moreau 2006: 81; Fetter 1976: 39).

Considering the BSAC’s stakes in Katanga, it was of interest to them that Robert Williams & Co. obtained a large measure of cheap labour. Yet, initially there seems to have been some concern about the fact that Katanga was making use of labour that would otherwise have been sent southwards towards

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\(^{102}\) The actual area of the Copperbelt mines was particularly sparsely populated with only the Sanga and Lamba peoples present there. Ruwe was near modern day Lualaba province where Luba, Lomotwa and Zela groups lived along the Lualaba below the Lufira junction. See Perrings (1979: 14).

\(^{103}\) Northern Rhodesia Department of Native Affairs in Livingstone to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1928, SEC1/1472, doc.1A (NAZ).
According to Charles Perrings, the bans on outward migration and labour recruitment that were enforced in 1905, ostensibly in response to the sleeping sickness epidemic in the Luapula valley, were, in fact, part of an attempt to prevent the movement of labour from north-eastern Rhodesia to Katanga.\footnote{See Chapter 2 for the measures enforced to fight the spread of the disease.} ‘There is little doubt,’ Perrings argues, ‘but that the appearance of sleeping sickness caused widespread alarm along medical men in both the Rhodesias and Katanga, but there is equally little doubt that the curative and preventive measures taken by the BSA Company administration were not actuated by that concern alone’ (\textit{Ibid.}: 15). Yet, the closure of the border did not curtail African mobility very effectively (Gordon 2006: 70). By December, the acting administrator was describing the closure of the river as a ‘dead letter’ and arguing that the ‘popularity’ of the Katanga mines was such that no system of patrol could be effective. ‘So long as the natives have no other lawful sphere of labour,’ he went on, ‘they will evade the restrictions on their movements.’\footnote{Acting Administrator of North-East Rhodesia to the Office of the BSAC in London, December 18 1908 as quoted in Perrings (1979: 17).} At the same time, in Katanga, though a new recruiting agency called the Bourse du Travail du Katanga (BTK) had been launched in 1910, it was unable to find enough recruits to meet the high needs of a territory undergoing an industrial boom (Brion & Moreau 2006: 81). These circumstances made it increasingly obvious to both BSAC and UMHK that a compromise had to be found. A conference was consequently held at Fort Rosebery in October 1910, during which the north-eastern Rhodesian administration agreed to allow a controlled flow of labour to the Luapula, on the condition that Robert Williams & Co. would still control recruiting operations inside north-eastern Rhodesia.\footnote{Perrings (1979: 21). In exchange for allowing Robert Williams & Co. to recruit freely in Northern Rhodesia, the North Rhodesian administration requested that the recruits should ‘cross the Luapula at Kalonga and proceed via Ndola and thence by rail,’ that they should be ‘medically examined first in the district where engaged and again at Ndola’ to avoid the spreading of sleeping sickness, and that no Northern Rhodesian should enter Katanga voluntarily without a ‘permit’. See letter of L.A. Wallace, Administrator’s Office, Livingstone, North Western Rhodesia, to the Vice Governor General, Elisabethville, 26 January 1911, M.O.I. A.34, 3551, Liasse 46 (Brussels African Archives).} Further agreements were clinched in May 1911, establishing that Northern Rhodesian workers had to return home at the end of their terms (six months renewable for six more). Then, finally, in a supplementary agreement reached in 1913, the Katanga government allowed the Northern Rhodesian government to appoint a permanent Inspector of Rhodesian La-
bour to be posted at the ‘Star of the Congo’ mine.¹⁰⁷ In this way, because of economic necessities, two colonial strongholds sat down together to find a compromise that would be acceptable to both. The Union Minière obtained a reliable supply of labour albeit at an increased price, while the BSAC gained a source of revenue, which, though modest, represented an important part of export earnings. According to Roberts, ‘in 1912, Northern Rhodesia’s total domestic exports amounted to only £70,000, which was little more than the total value of miners’ pay in Katanga’ (Roberts 1976: 179).

By 1920, despite a brief hindrance towards the end of the First World War, when Northern Rhodesia closed its border temporarily due to the bad quality of the labour camps in Katanga,¹⁰⁸ labour migration routes were well established and the volume of the movements along them had increased. The Rhodesians had built themselves a reputation in Katanga for their reliability and resilience and their accumulated experience played to their advantage (Henderson 1972: 46). Their accommodation was better than those of the Katangese from the surrounding area, and since they were paid in sterling rather than depreciating Belgian francs, they also enjoyed greater buying power. In 1926, the salary that the UMHK paid to Northern Rhodesians was the equivalent of twice what the Congolese received in francs (Fetter 1976: 81-85). The number of Northern Rhodesians in Katanga grew steadily over the years¹⁰⁹ with a particularly dramatic and sudden increase in 1920 and 1921 (which

¹⁰⁷ Fetter (1976: 39-41). It should be noted that the presence of a foreign inspector was not welcomed in Katanga, seen as it was a means of exerting a measure of control over Katangese affairs by the BSAC. Revealingly, in a letter dated 24 October 1911 addressed to the Minister of the Colonies, the Katangese ‘commissaire général de la direction de l’industrie et du commerce et de l’immigration’ openly discussed ways to avoid giving the Rhodesian authorities the information that they requested, warning that when the ‘industriels de la Rhodésie du Sud, qui se plaignent de la rareté de la main d’œuvre, auront connaissance de ces renseignements, ils amèneront l’Administration de la Rhodésie du Nord à prendre des mesures sévères pour empêcher l’exode vers le Katanga des indigènes de la Rhodésie du Nord, dont ils ont grand besoin pour leurs exploitations agricoles et minières. » His suggestions included playing on the wording of the agreement passed with the BSAC to the effect that only the Rhodesians employed by the UMHK should be reported on, rather than the entirety of the Rhodesians working in Katanga. See letter of Commissaire Général de la Direction de l’Industrie et du Commerce et de l’Immigration du Vice-Gouvernement Général du Katanga to the Ministre des Colonies, 22 October 1911, M.O.I. A.34, 3551, Liasse 46 (Brussels African Archives).


¹⁰⁹ In February 1919, there were 1,301 Northern Rhodesian natives employed by Union Minière. By January 1920, they were 5,752, and by 31 January 1921, 5,983. See Reports of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga for February 1919, April 28 1919, HC/1/3/53,
may be related to a rise in hut tax in 1920) (Ibid.: 81). In February 1919, there were 1,301 Northern Rhodesian natives employed by Union Minière. By January 1920 they were 5,752, and by January 1921, 5,983. In 1920 and 1921, Northern Rhodesians represented more than half (56 per cent) of the Union Minière’s workforce.¹¹⁰ The vast majority of the Northern Rhodesian recruits came from the Luapula area (the Awemba and Tanganyika Districts) in north-east Rhodesia. In December 1921, out of the 1,290 Rhodesian recruits that arrived that month, 1,069 came from North-East Rhodesia (158 came from Barotseland and 63 from other areas).¹¹¹ North-east Rhodesia did not have very fertile soils, and was riddled with tsetse flies, which handicapped agriculture as well as pastoralist activities. Nor did it have much to offer in terms of employment opportunities, apart from the small white settlement around Abercorn (now Mbala) (Henderson 1972: 42-44; Macola 2002: 215; Perrings 1979: 14-15).¹¹² Since they had few options to earn the few shillings they needed to pay their taxes, it is not surprising that Luapulans clustered in the advantageously located Katangese mines to the point of forming the largest part of the UMHK’s Rhodesian workforce.

From the mid-1920s, however, there was increased evidence that this status quo would not be sustainable. Firstly, Rhodesian recruits, despite their growing numbers, proved insufficient to satisfy the ever-growing need for labour of a fast industrialising region. By the end of 1924, the Governor General of the Belgian Congo, Martin Rutten warned the Minister of the Colonies that ‘a labour crisis was fast developing’ because of the ‘impuissance où est l’Union Minière du Katanga de maintenir ses effectifs ouvriers à la hauteur de ses besoins.’¹¹³ This crisis, he went on, would not be an easy one to resolve because at its heart lay a basic conundrum:

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¹¹⁰ In his PhD thesis entitled Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1953: A Study in the Limits of Colonial Power, I. Henderson calculated that workers of Northern Rhodesian origins went from representing 34 per cent of the UMHK workforce in 1917 (with 1,661 workers) to representing 56 per cent in 1921 (with 5,548 workers), based on the reports of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives. Numbers dropped the following year (2177 workers, i.e. 33 per cent of the UMHK workforce) but went up again in 1923 (4,267 workers, i.e. 43 per cent of the UMHK workforce). See Henderson (1972: 47).


¹¹² The Luapula supply areas, i.e. the great plateau of north-eastern Rhodesia along the Luapula between Lake Mweru and Bangweolu, comprised the Bemba, Bisa, Mambwe, Iwa, Namwanga, Lungu, Ushi, Chisinga, Ngumbo and Eastern Lunda peoples.

¹¹³ Cabinet du Gouverneur Général, S. Rutten, to the Ministre des Colonies, Boma, 2 December 1924 M.O.I. A 34, 3544, Liasse 3, (Brussels African Archives).
Plus s’accentuera l’occupation économique, plus se développeront les voies de transport, plus s’échelonneront le long de celles-ci les exploitations commerciales, agricoles, industrielles, petites ou grandes, plus deviendront précaires les conditions d’existence des grosses entreprises qui doivent recruter leur main d’œuvre au loin parce que fatalement elles verront se rétrécir de plus en plus le champ de leurs recrutements et cela en même temps que leurs besoins augmenteront.\textsuperscript{114}

In another letter dated 25 July of the same year, the same Rutten pointed at another growing concern, common among industrialists and administrators in Katanga. Though there was little choice but to employ foreign labour as long as Katangese transportation means and routes were not better developed, the combined effect of the escalating need for labour and the almost exclusive reliance on foreign labour constituted a dangerous sword of Damocles for the Katangese industry:

Il y a des réalités qu’il faut savoir regarder en face : Le Katanga c’est la grande industrie qui ne peut se développer, c’est à dire vivre, qu’en produisant toujours davantage. Pour cela il lui faut beaucoup de main d’œuvre, une main d’œuvre locale qui seule est assurée; celle du dehors est précaire et se dérobéra en nous ruinant dès que l’intérêt de concurrents voisins l’exigera.\textsuperscript{115}

Indeed, by the mid-1920s, that prediction was slowly beginning to materialise. At the same time as labour scarcity was once more becoming increasingly problematic, the UMHK also gradually ceased to be the sole mining power in the region.

4.2.2 The Rise of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt (1924-1931)

Until the early 1920s, Northern Rhodesia’s main task as a colony was to avoid becoming a financial burden for the colonial power, which was achieved mainly through the export of labour (Parpart 1983: 19; Roberts 1976: 185). However, within a few years the situation changed unexpectedly and dramatically thanks to the growth of the automobile and electrical industries that followed the end of the First World War. These new industries boosted global demand for copper exponentially, which, in turn, considerably boosted copper prices. This, combined with the success of the mines developed

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Gouverneur du Congo Belge au Ministre des Colonies, 25 July 1924, M.O.I. A 34, 3562, Liasse 84 (Brussels African Archives).
over the border in the Belgian Congo, prompted a change of policy on the part of the British South Africa Company. Towards the end of 1922, instead of granting individual prospecting licences as it had previously done, the BSAC began to grant exclusive prospecting rights to large mining concerns over extensive areas (Butler 2007: 14; Clegg 1960: 37; Coleman 1962: 32). Two fish were hooked: A. Chester Beatty, a London-based mining financier whose holding company, Selection Trust Ltd provided some funds in 1920; and Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, founder of the Anglo American Corporation, who joined forces in 1924. New prospecting quickly uncovered large sulfide deposits containing copper at workable depths near Ndola close to the Belgian Congo border (Parpart 1983: 20). By 1930, four large new mines were being developed on the Copperbelt: Roan Antelope (now Luanshya), Nkana (Kitwe), Mufulira and Nchanga (Chingola). The Rhodesian branch of Oppenheimer’s Anglo American Corporation developed the Nchanga and Nkana mine, forming the Rhokana Corporation Ltd in 1931 to manage the latter. Beatty’s Selection Trust incorporated the Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines in 1927 and 1930, respectively.116 In 1931, despite the worldwide Depression that led to the closure of the small Bwana Mkubwa mine, Roan Antelope and Nkana started operations; Mufulira began producing in 1933; and a refinery was opened at Nkana in 1934. As a result, the value of exports increased five-fold between 1930 and 1933 (Berger 1974: 5-6; Roberts 1976: 186).

Yet, despite this rapid growth, the new Copperbelt companies encountered difficulties in obtaining sufficient labour. One part of the problem lay in the fact that no local labour was available. As the Compound Manager of Nkana noted:

> The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt is a sparsely populated District, the supply of labour being totally inadequate to keep any large industry going and moreover the quality of the labour is very poor. It is thereof necessary to import labour from districts further afield.117

This lack of local labour source meant that the Copperbelt mines had little choice but to integrate the migrant labour system. When they did so, however, they encountered stiff competition. After two decades of labour migration, labour routes to other industrial centres were well established. In 1928,

116 The two same groups were to remain in control of the industry until 1 January 1970, when the Zambian government took a 51 per cent stake in the mines. See Berger (1974: 5-6; Roberts 1976: 186).
117 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, doc. 1 (NAZ), p.1.
it was reported that some 15.7 per cent of the male population of Northern Rhodesia was working outside the territory, in the mines of Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and even Tanganyika. To counteract this trend, the Copperbelt companies adopted a series of strategies. In December 1925, they convinced the government of Northern Rhodesia to put an official limit on the number of Rhodesians allowed to work in Katanga (Fetter 1973: 18). In May 1929, the two main Copperbelt companies and the governor of Ndola jointly established a new labour bureau: the Native Labour Association. By 1931, the Association had 27 agents throughout the territory. In this way, the mines secured the major part of their labour force by recruiting in distant regions, making it possible for the Northern Rhodesian mines to secure most of their needed labour. The best recruiting area was east of the Fort Rosebery, which also happened to be the area favoured by Katanga recruiters. To compete with them, Northern Rhodesian mines offered contracts for 180 days of work and, of course, wages were also forced up considerably, as each mine tried to outbid the other, as well as the Union Minière (Berger 1974: 13; Parpart 1983: 33-34; Perrings 1979: 93). These strategies were successful to an extent. It was reported that the ‘habit of going abroad to work is already losing its hold’ and that there was a noticeable decline in migration to the Katanga. At the same time, labour from Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia and beyond, was also increasingly attracted to the north. Early in 1927, there were about 8,500 workers on all the mines and concessions in the territory. At the end of 1928, the figure had risen to 16,073; to 22,341 at the end of 1929; to 29,689 at the end of 1930; and to a peak of 31,941 in September 1930 (Berger 1974: 13; Parpart 1983: 34). However, none of these measures succeeded in meeting the demands of the new mines and general labour scarcity continued to create difficulties. The companies struggled to offer conditions of employment comparable to those at neighbouring mines and therein, as noted by the Department of Native Affairs in 1928, lay the heart of the problem:

Our greatest and most serious problem is that the best of our labourers proceed to Southern Rhodesia, Congo Belge and even Tanganyika Territory in quest of employment in preference to working in our own territory because of the better conditions of employment and the better terms of wages offered them in these places. There is no reason to believe that this state of affairs will alter until Employers in Northern Rhodesia pay the same wages

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118 Northern Rhodesia Department of Native Affairs in Livingstone to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1928, SEC1/1472, doc. 1A (NAZ), p.6.
119 Northern Rhodesia, Department of Native Affairs, Annual Report, 1930 as quoted in Perrings (1979: 95).
as can be obtained elsewhere and conditions in respect of housing, feeding, medical treatment etc are improved.120

In the report on Rhodesian natives in Katanga for October 1929 a similar statement was made:

Doubtless many of the natives from the Mweru-Luapula districts who have been accustomed to work in the Katanga for a long time will continue to do so. Others will seek the work which is the most attractive, where their friends are working and where they receive fair treatment. […] The only thing which might attract natives to the Rhodesian mines from those districts would be higher pay. The Belgian manager of Katanga cement company who visits some of the mines in Northern Rhodesia from time to time informs me that he thinks that the scale of rations in Northern Rhodesia compares unfavourable with the existing scale in the Katanga.121

Major G.St.J. Orde Browne, an expert on colonial labour policy, remarked in 1933 that the extent to which the African worker travelled and compared conditions of employment was not generally realised (Orde Browne 1933: 120). News travelled rapidly along the established labour routes, and the disparity in conditions of life and work in the mines of Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, as well as Tanganyika were well-known. The general labour shortage of the 1920s in central Africa put skilled workers in a relatively good bargaining position in the labour market: jobs were plentiful and labour in high demand. Northern Rhodesians knew they could change jobs easily, which they did, sometimes even before the end of their contracts.122 The Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, as the newcomer, found it particularly difficult to compete with industries that were better established and could offer better deals.

It is no wonder, therefore, that when the Copperbelt mines began construction in 1926, Northern Rhodesians did not flock to them. Katanga was a tough act to follow, the standards of living of its mines having been described

120 Northern Rhodesia Department of Native Affairs in Livingstone to Chief Secretary, 22 December 1928, SEC1/1472, doc. 1A (NAZ), p.2.
122 Very high rate of desertions were reported every month on both sides of the border. In the mine of Luishia in Katanga in particular, desertions were described as ‘high’ in Report of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga for January 1921, 18 April 1921, A4/1/3, tag.824, loc.209, doc. 101 (NAZ).
as ‘positively amazing’ by Orde Browne in 1929.123 From 1926 on, to palliate the effects of the Northern Rhodesian government’s decision to restrict the number of Northern Rhodesians in Katanga, the Union Minière had decided ‘on an attempt to settle a native population on their properties and thus provide themselves with a permanent resident labour supply.’124 This meant that the UMHK was now after two things: more local and permanent sources of African labour, which would limit Katanga’s dependence on foreign labour on the one hand,125 and, on the other, a more stable and skilled workforce, since allowing workers to stay for longer periods of time meant reducing dependence on a constant large supply of unskilled workers.126 From 1927, the UMHK began to enlist workers on three-year contracts and increasing-

123 Report by Labour Commissioner by Major G. St. J. Orde Browne on his Tour through the Belgian Congo and Angola, August 1929, SEC1/1472, doc. 4 (NAZ).
124 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, doc. 1 (NAZ), p.4.
125 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, doc. 18 (NAZ).
126 The fact that Katanga mines were mostly open-cast mines meant that it was both possible and economical to use machinery on a large scale. This further enhanced the need for a skilled and stable workforce. It also meant that fewer workers were needed. See Roberts (1976: 189).
ly, though not exclusively, sought to attract men from within the Congo or Rwanda-Urundi.\textsuperscript{127} In order to attract settled labour, the Katangese mines dramatically upgraded African conditions of living by the end of the decade: the company built better houses and hospitals for employees as well as granted small salary increases and better food (Fetter 1976: 94).\textsuperscript{128} This made Katanga very attractive for Rhodesian workers and, even though the UMHK did indeed increasingly hire labour from within Congo, many Northern Rhodesians were still hired (Fetter 1973: 32; Parpart 1983: 32), as is apparent from the UMHK recruiting statistics in the 1920s (see tables 4.1 and 4.2).

\textsuperscript{127} In 1926, the government granted the company recruitment rights in the Maniema District of Orientale province as well as in the mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi. In 1927, these rights were extended to three territories of the Lomami district: Kabinda, Tshofa and Kan-da-Kanda. See Fetter (1976: 90).

\textsuperscript{128} The then governor General had put particular emphasis on the upgrading of the workers’ living conditions as part of an industrial strategy. ‘Hygiène, éducation et instruction: tel doit être notre leit-motiv,’ he wrote in 1924. See letter of 2 December 1924, M.O.I. A 34, 3544, Liasse 3 (Brussels African Archives).
From 1929 onwards, Northern Rhodesians are no longer listed as a separate category, indicating that the stability policy endorsed by the UMHK was starting to bear fruits.\(^{130}\)

In addition, it is likely that there were many more Rhodesians living in Katanga in this period than the number of UMHK employees may indicate. In 1924, J.P. McGregor, the British Vice-Consul in Elisabethville, estimated that his office looked after the interests of 10,000 Rhodesians, when only half that number was reported to be working for the UMHK at the time (Henderson 1972: 70). There are several reasons for this discrepancy. First was the fact that the UMHK was not the sole employer in Katanga. The expansion of the Katangese mines boosted other industries and by 1924 industrial and commercial employment in Katanga outside the UMHK accounted for an average of 12,000 men. The majority were employed by the railways but others were also employed by more recent undertakings such as the Charbonnages de Luena, the Société Coloniale de Construction, the Société Belge Industrielle

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\(^{129}\) UMHK Annual and Quaternary Reports for the years 1923, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928. See Bibliography.

\(^{130}\) UMHK Annual and Quaternary Reports for the years 1929, 1930, 1931. See Bibliography.
et Minière du Katanga and the Société Ciments du Katanga (Perrings 1979: 49). In addition, Northern Rhodesians were also engaged in non-industrial wage labour. They worked as artisans, shopkeepers and, more importantly as ‘houseboys’ as it was ‘a recognised fact that the Rhodesian natives are better servants. They are a pleasanter type and are bettermannered, though their manners soon deteriorate after they have been a little time in the Congo.’ Another element that explains the sudden increase in Northern Rhodesian presence in Katanga was the fact that, in 1923, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga decided to allow labour recruits to bring their wives and families to the mining townships, arguing that a man accompanied by his wife was more likely to be contented and, consequently, would stay longer and be a better worker. As a result, married Northern Rhodesian women also crossed the border with ease, and as it happens, so did unmarried ones: ‘Owing to the large number of men who flock to the mines both in Northern Rhodesia and the Katanga many of whom remain permanently or for long periods, the number of detribalised natives is increasing. The number of young men who remain in the villages is very small and the women are also flocking to the mines in search of husbands.’ In 1929, therefore, despite restrictions enforced by both Katangese and Northern Rhodesian authorities, the Northern Rhodesian community in Katanga had remained large, representing 37.5 per cent of the population in the UMHK’s compounds of the Elisabethville area and 44 per cent of the population of the Elisabethville district as a whole (Fetter 1976: 99). The most commonly-spoken language in the mines of Katanga at the time was Bemba (White 2000: 275).

4.2.3 The Change in the Direction of Labour Migration (1931-1940)

Inauspiciously, the time when Northern Rhodesia copper entered the world market in 1931 coincided with the onset of a severe global Depression. As a result, the price and demand for copper reduced dramatically, and mining companies in both southern Katanga and Northern Rhodesia reacted by curtailing production and reducing the size of their labour force. Recruitment for the Katanga mines in Northern Rhodesia, which had already been decreasing for some years, finally came to an end on 31 July 1931. In addition, more than

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132 W.J. Schriviner (Compound Manager at Nkana), Report on Native Labour as Affecting the Copper Industry of Northern Rhodesia, 17 August 1934, SEC1/1293, doc. 1 (NAZ), p.3.
134 In copper mining, the Depression years were 1929 to 1936, with copper prices starting to fall in mid-1930 and hitting bottom in 1932. Prices dropped precipitously from £112.635s per ton in 1929 to £27.25s per ton in February 1932. See White (2000: 282); Parpart (1983: 21).
two-thirds of the UMHK workforce was laid off – the African labour force was reduced from 16,000 to less than 5,000 between 1930 and 1932 – with the Northern Rhodesians being especially targeted (Fetter 1976: 123, 1983: 153; Perrings 1979: 101; Roberts 1976: 191). The number of Northern Rhodesians settled in Katanga drastically reduced from an approximated population of 20,000 in 1929 to an approximated population of 7,200 in 1932. In the meantime, due to the combined effect of the Depression and the repatriation of Northern Rhodesia-born miners from the Congo, workers started to flock in the Copperbelt mines in such numbers that recruitment was no longer necessary and was abandoned in 1932 (Ohadike 1969: 1). What had been the companies’ dearest hope just a year or two before, was now almost an inconvenience, as there were more voluntary recruits than the Copperbelt mines could realistically accommodate. In addition, the Depression eventually forced all the Copperbelt mines to close except the Roan Antelope and Nkana, and even these two remaining mines sharply scaled back production (Coleman 1962: 66). African employees in the mines, which had hit a peak of 31,941 at the height of the construction boom in September 1930, dropped to 19,313 by the following September, and to 6,677 at the end of 1932 (Ferguson 1999: 50; Ohadike 1969: 1). During 1931 and 1932, some 58 per cent of the workforce lost their jobs (Butler 2007: 18) and unemployment in the mines was subsequently widespread. Dismissed Africans were simply expected to go ‘home’ to their rural villages, but that was not practical. Many, having worked for some years on the Copperbelt or in other urban centres in Katanga, Southern Rhodesia, or South Africa had been away from the villages for a long time and ‘felt so out of touch they refused to return’ (Berger 1974: 21). Gradually, however, the Depression lifted and the mines began to recover. Mufulira reopened in October 1933 and production facilities expanded at all three major mines (Parpart 1983: 21). As the world moved towards war for the second time, the demand for copper rose briskly and prices followed suit. From then on the Copperbelt enjoyed a phase of sustained growth thanks to which Northern Rhodesia had established itself as one of the world’s major copper producers by 1945 (Coleman 1962: 143-146). Accordingly, between 1935 and 1941 employment on the mines rose from 13,734 to 27,602, which was still a few thousand less than at its peak in 1930 but reflected the resumption of operations at Mufulira, the reopening of Nchanga, and expansions at both Roan Antelope and Nchanga (Ohadike 1969: 1). At the same time, there were substantial improvements in underground conditions, so that in many mines the working conditions improved and remuneration for skilled labour

135 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, doc. 18 (NAZ).
increased, bringing about an era of increased stabilisation in the workforce (White 2000: 283). The Depression, despite the Copperbelt’s subsequent recovery, had rather profound effects on the African labourer. For, in just a matter of months, the latter had lost its leverage in the labour market and the balance of power had shifted to the mining companies. As employment opportunities dried up throughout southern Africa, miners clung fiercely to their jobs, which contributed to breaking the migrating cycle from mine to mine that had been common before.

Yet, despite the seemingly clear-cut situation that has just been presented, it is, in fact, difficult to time the changes in the direction of labour migration that took place during this period. It is even more difficult to assess how significant these were. Blurring the picture is the fact that official data on migrant labour for that period are scarce. The Northern Rhodesian government did not interfere with the issue of labour conditions until the first Copperbelt strike broke in 1935, and even then it took an additional few years before action was taken (Henderson 1972: 68). Orde Browne commented in 1938 that government annual reports largely ignored labour-related issues: ‘statistics of the movement of natives, analyses of contract, records of court cases under industrial legislation and similar particulars, are not to be found: wider aspects of the problem are hardly mentioned’ (Orde Browne 1941 cited in Henderson 1972: 69). This absence of information is a serious stumbling block to any attempt to quantify and analyse African labour before 1940. Henderson summarises the labour movements of the 1930s as follows:

If it is possible to generalise about the wage-labour activities of Africans in the 1920s and 1930s, one might say that labour migration continued unabated and uncontrolled by the government. The direction of the migration changed, but the volume continued unchanged except by the economic slump of 1931-33 (Henderson, 1972: 60).

Henderson adds, however, that the exact number of ex-Katanga mineworkers who went directly to the Copperbelt remains an ‘open question’ (Ibid.: 71). It is likely that the new market provided by the Copperbelt was seen as live-saving by many of the victims of Congo’s stabilisation policy, especially the inhabitants of the Mweru-Luapula who depended heavily on copper mining. In 1930, only 1,620 (or 25 per cent) of the 6,420 voluntary mineworkers from Mweru-Luapula Province were estimated to have migrated to southern Katanga while all the others were said to have gone to the Rhodesian Copperbelt instead (Macola 2002: 215). The dearth of information about labour issues before 1935 also means that the composition and provincial origins of
the original Rhodesian Copperbelt labour force is obscure. It seems that the bulk of the unskilled labour force came from Northern Rhodesia itself, especially the Bemba-speaking peoples of the northeast, while the rest mainly came from Nyasaland (Henderson 1972: 72).

As for the Rhodesian presence in Katanga, it would be wrong to think that it was wiped out. Even when the effects of the Depression were the most acutely felt, and despite the fact that, in the words of the Inspector of Rhodesian Natives in Katanga, ‘it is fairly obvious that the policy of the mines is to give preference to the natives of the Congo when engaging labour’, it was equally ‘obvious’ that ‘with a revival of trade and fresh undertakings in the Katanga, Rhodesian natives will no doubt again be gladly welcomed.’ Indeed, in 1947 it was reported that most men from Luapula, even on the Northern Rhodesian side of the river, looked or were recruited for wage work in the Belgian Congo, which was nearer and more accessible than the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt (Brelsford 1947: 12). Moreover, many Northern Rhodesians remained in Katanga throughout the 1930s. In 1933, though their number in the UMHK workforce had decreased almost to insignificance (there were 230 Rhodesian and Nyasaland natives employed by the UMHK at that time), it was also reported that:

There are some 3,000 male Rhodesian natives employed in the town itself, practically, if not all, domestic servants and office boys are Rhodesian. In addition there are between 350 and 450 Rhodesian natives who have settled in the villages round the town as market gardeners. They rent the ground from the Comité spécial and sell their produce in Elisabethville at the market which is held twice a week.

That said, it is undeniable that the Northern Rhodesian population in Katanga was noticeably reduced. The Rhodesians remaining in the mines – now representing only 5 per cent of the workforce – were reportedly ‘mainly skilled or trained workmen who have long periods of service with the Union

136 The manpower resources were strained to the limit. Merle Davis considered that as many as 60 per cent of the able-bodied Bemba men aged from 15 to 45 were away from their village in 1931. See Coleman (1962: 65).
137 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga Province, Belgian Congo for six months ending the 31st December 1931 by Inspector of Natives, Elisabethville, 4 February 1932, SEC2/165, doc. 11 (NAZ).
138 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, doc. 18 (NAZ).
139 Ibid.
Minière behind them and who have been retained for this reason. For the rest of the Northern Rhodesians, those who were unemployed, independent workers, or who, for whatever reason, were not as immovable as the qualified miners, life in Katanga was made increasingly difficult and precarious. Belgian administrators attempted to pursue the same policy as the UMHK of reducing alien presence in the native towns. Workers were expelled if they remained unemployed for more than a month. To cope with this situation, many jobless married men sent their families back to the villages, and many left Katanga altogether (Fetter 1976: 126-127). Yet, the fact that there had been a Northern Rhodesian presence in Katanga for two decades made sure that (1) those who left would be likely to come back if given the chance and (2) that there would be a significant number of Northern Rhodesian ‘visitors’ as workers would regularly come and gauge their working possibilities. In 1930-31 alone the British Vice Consulate in Elisabethville registered 4,480 Northern Rhodesian men who left Katanga, while 3,652 new arrivals took their place (Ibid.). The exact fluctuation in volume of Northern Rhodesian ‘visits’ is difficult to ascertain but their numbers reportedly went from 110 in 1931 to 1,335 in 1932. Even where numbers are lacking, the evidence of cultural exchange attest to the volume of cross-border migration. Religious movements, witch-finding movements, and new dance fads crossed the border regularly (White 2000: 276). Particularly telling is the ease with which Kitawala (or Watchtower), a millenarian movement widespread in Southern Africa, became widespread in Katanga to the dismay of the colonial administration. Conditions of insecurity and the constant threat of expulsion made Northern Rhodesians easy prey for Kitawala teachings. Even more revealing is the ease with which rumours spread across borders. Luise White offers a detailed study of how one such rumour relating to vampire men (known as banyamas in Northern Rhodesia and as batumbula in the Congo) gained momentum in both Copperbelts between 1930 and 1964. Following stories of ‘mysterious’ disappearances, strangers, European doctors, corpulent administrators, prospectors, surveyors and tourists were all highly suspected of being banyamas. In her Speaking with Vampires, White not only shows how these stories were to a large extent a symptom of the ‘mood’ of dissatisfaction and confusion among the African population in a period of deep economic recession, but she also points out how these stories, which were widespread in an area encompassing Katanga and all of the former BSAC territories, were

140 Ibid.
141 Report on Rhodesian Natives in the Katanga by the Acting British Vice Consul in Elisabethville as at December 31st 1932, 15 February 1933, SEC2/165, doc. 18 (NAZ).
142 For a detailed study of the development and impact of the Kitawala movement in Katanga and Southern Africa, see Higginson (1992).
also extremely similar in the way they were told and the elements that they comprised (See White 2000; Musambachime 1988). The prevalence, pervasiveness and similarity of these stories are another indicator of the extent to which people penetrated colonial borders at the time.

4.3 **Agriculture, Fishery and Markets**

In the wake of the burgeoning mining industry, another catalyst for migration and economic interdependence received an enormous boost: trade. Trade was not a colonial innovation. As noted in Chapter 1, the fact that trade predates the establishment of the copper industry is well supported by archaeological and literary evidence. Both point to the existence, from at least the beginning of the second millennium, of extended regional trade systems thanks to which subsistence and prestige goods – not least among which was copper – travelled far and wide. As for the ravages of the infamous trade in ivory, slaves and rubber, which peaked in the late nineteenth century, they too are well known and documented. Yet, these types of trade, extensive though they might have been, were of a different kind than the large-scale, institutionalised marketing that developed in the Copperbelt in the early twentieth century. The latter came about as a direct result of the creation of large clusters of population that were entirely dependent on rations or marketed food (Vellut 1977: 301). In other words, the growth and development of large-scale trade in African foodstuff in the Copperbelt was a by-product of industrialisation and urbanisation.

4.3.1 **Feeding Katanga: An Alternative to Migrant Labour**

Despite their (eventual) economic success, neither Katanga, nor Northern Rhodesia were renowned for the diversity of their economy. In a regional survey carried out in 1960, the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was described as ‘a compact economic oasis with seven springs, surrounded by a most extensive economic desert.’ Consequently, no real alternative source of profit existed in Northern Rhodesia besides the copper industry, as was noted in the same 1960 survey:

> Apart from copper, cobalt and uranium, lime and perhaps a little citrus, not much is produced on the Copperbelt for markets outside of the Copperbelt.

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143 Special Commissioner to Ministry of Land and Natural Resources in Ndola, Report on a Regional Survey of the Copperbelt, 1 February 1960, WP1/2/64, doc. 19 (NAZ).
In the early twentieth century, agriculture was particularly underdeveloped. Only very few areas were arable enough to produce some international market-oriented crops; tobacco was grown in the east of the country, in the Fort Jameson (Chipata) area, and small amounts of coffee were produced by plantation agriculture in the Abercorn (Mbala) area in the north-east (Clegg 1960: 36; Henderson 1972: 12). So if Northern Rhodesia was used a labour reservoir, it seemed to have little chance of becoming a grain one. And yet, for a while, it came to play just that role for the mines of Katanga.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, the newly opened mines of Katanga were in great need of large quantities of foodstuffs to feed their new workforce. However, the mining area of the Haut-Katanga, which consisted of a high-plateau area (1,200 to 1,800 metres) with sandy soils, was not suited for large-scale agriculture (Jewsiewicki 1977: 318). In fact, southern Katanga in general, though it did comprise small strips of fertile land, was characterised by what Bogumil Jewsiewicki calls ‘a near-absence of extensive areas capable of supporting large-scale mechanised agriculture’ (Ibid.). The nearest areas with agricultural potential were the Kamalondo plain in the north along the Lualaba River and the Mweru (Moëro)-Luapula plain in the
northeast. These, however, in the absence of river routes or railways, were too difficult to reach. There were some attempts to deal with the problem locally, such as the attempt to build up a substantial European farming community, but none proved to be successful. \footnote{In 1911, with the intention of boosting the settling process in Katanga, farms were created along the railway lines and Belgian settlers were sent live in Katanga. This was not as successful as it could have been mostly because farming and agriculture were still seen as less of a priority than the mining industry. Robert (1950: 124); Comité Spécial du Katanga (1950: 236).}

Eventually, it became imperative to find new food-supplying areas (Jewsiewicki 1977: 318-321). One of the most immediate candidates was Northern Rhodesia. Thanks to the BSAC railways, Northern Rhodesia had a straight line of transportation to Katanga starting in 1910, and since the Katangese mines were already tapping into Northern Rhodesian labour reserves, it was not much of a stretch to include foodstuffs into the deal as well. Accordingly, in March 1911, Robert Williams & Co. contracted the firm King and Werner in north-western Rhodesia to supply the mines with large quantities of grain and beef (Perrings 1979: 19). These were, for the most part, raised by white immigrants, mainly Afrikaners from South Africa, who had begun to settle in Northern Rhodesia in the years that followed the Boer War. They had established themselves along the railway that

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{livingstone_station_train_leaving_for_elisabethville_with_goods.jpg}
\caption{Livingstone Station: train leaving for Elisabethville with goods.}
\end{figure}
ran from Livingstone to Broken Hill, which happened to run through a tsetse-free and relatively fertile belt. The Katanga market expanded rapidly after the railway reached Elisabethville in 1910 and, between 1911 and 1915, the white farmers of Northern Rhodesia were supplying most of the foodstuffs – cattle and maize – that fed the miners in Katanga (Henderson 1972: 11-12; Musambachime 1989: 153-154; Roberts 1976: 177). In turn, Katanga, though it was never a very large market (exports to it from Northern Rhodesia averaged about 50,000 bags per year in 1911-15 and peaked at around 100,000 in 1927), became the main outlet for all Northern Rhodesian producers for nearly two decades (Vickery 1985: 215). A prominent settler commented in 1913 that the Katanga mines had been ‘the saviour of this country; but for them I don’t know what would have become of us.’

Africans, too, produced foodstuffs for Katanga, especially in the region where the bulk of the Katanga Rhodesian labour force came from: the Luapula. The Mweru-Luapula emerged as an important food supply area for the same reason that it emerged as an important labour supply area: its geographical proximity to the growing industrial sites of Katanga. Thus, using the border town of Kasenga either as a collection or transit point, hundreds of tons of agricultural produce, poultry and livestock, were taken from there to Elisabethville (Musambachime 1995: 57). However it was fish, both fresh

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146 Livingstone Mail, 5 December 1913, as quoted in Vickery (1985: 215).
and dried, that became the winning asset of the Mweru-Luapula. The Mweru-Luapula had no shortage of water, hosting or being adjacent to three lakes (Lake Mweru, Lake Tanganyika and Lake Bangweulu), two rivers (the Luapula River and the Kafue River) and the Lukanga swamps. As a result, the volume of trade between the lower Luapula valley and the Katangese mining towns increased substantially between 1912 and 1915 (Ibid.: 55-56). By 1927, the urban population of southern Katanga – the main market for Luapulan fish throughout the colonial era – reportedly consumed ‘some 500 tons of fish worth £5,000 and nearly the same quantity of native flour valued at £600.’147 The fishing industry was inherently unstable, since its success was

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determined by the law of supply and demand and therefore depended entirely on the prosperity of urban markets. Yet, it brought the lower Luapula valley a new relative prosperity in the late 1920s. The Depression and the abrupt reduction in the demand for fish was to affect this business rather badly but the Second World War, increasing as it did the demand for copper and consequently for fish, allowed fish exports to southern Katanga to return to the same level as the late 1920s. In this way, fishing became an alternative to wage employment for a growing number of Mweru-Luapulans and allowed them to vary the ways in which they could make a living (Macola 2002: 216; Gordon 2006: 68; Henderson 1972: 62).  

In the 1910s and 1920s, the volume of food supplies imported and consumed in Haut-Katanga rose steadily, concurrent with the number of industrial workers employed in the region. In 1917-19, food consumption in Haut-Katanga was around 8,000 to 10,000 tonnes, of which probably 40 to 50 per cent was

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148 For a detailed study of fishery in the Mweru-Luapula, see Gordon (2006).
produced locally, the remainder being imported (Jewsiewicki 1977: 320). However, the constant increase in the demand for food during the 1920s and the desire to make the Katangese economy less dependent on the Rhodesias, led the Katangese authorities to gradually review their agricultural strategy and search for new supplies areas within the Belgian colonies. One crucial development in this regard was the opening up of new railway lines. On 12 July 1928 the Chemin de fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK), which linked Bukama, near the copper mines, to Port-Francqui (now Ilebo) in the neighbouring province of Kasai, was inaugurated. Then, in 1931, the Tenke-Dilolo line linked the BCK to the Benguela railway of Portuguese Angola, and hence opened an access to Upper Lulua. These new lines, in addition to constituting a new export route for Katangese copper, not only enabled Kasai and Lulua, respectively, to send foodstuffs to the Haut-Katanga for the first time, but also contributed considerably to boosting agricultural production in Katanga itself. Throughout the 1920s, and culminating in 1928 with the appointment of a new Governor of Katanga, Gaston Heenen, practical measures were implemented with a view to making local food-production self-sufficient: experts were called out, cattle was imported, experimental farms were created and market gardens, cultivated and overseen by ‘agriculteurs indigènes’ were developed around Elisabethville, Jadotville, Lubudi, Albertville and Sakania (Comité Spécial du Katanga 1950: 243-261). The decisive turning-point came in 1934, when it was agreed that the province of Katanga should be divided into two zones agricoles (Tanganika and Upper Katanga). These new zones were, in turn, subdivided into regions économiques designated as producers of food for the urban centres. In theory, the Tanganika zone was to be self-sustaining, while the Upper Katanga zone would be supplied from Kasai and Lomami (Jewsiewicki 1977: 326-330). With the province so divided into ‘specialised’ (‘urban’ or ‘agricultural’) units, the scheme was successful in diminishing Katanga’s dependence on

149 To be noted that several minor railway lines were built between 1910 and 1918. In 1910, the Chemins de Fer des Grands Lacs Africains (CFL) brought a railway from Kindu, on the Lualaba River, to Kongolo further down the river which made the transport of goods to Bukama possible. Then the Kabila-Albertville line, which linked Lake Tanganyika to the Lualaba was completed in 1915, and the construction of a line from Kambove to Bukama in 1918 meant that the Lomami and Tanganika districts as well as eastern Katanga were reachable. In the period 1921-5, supplies from these areas increased by 18 per cent. There were no further extensions until 1928. See Jewsiewicki (1977: 319-322).

150 The Chamber of Commerce of Elisabethville described the project to the Minister of Colonies as follows: ‘Il s’agit de distinguer les agglomérations urbaines des agglomérations agricoles. Les premières grouperaient les travailleurs et artisans employés à la ville. Les besoins de cette catégorie spéciale d’indigènes influenceront la conception des agglomérations nouvelles et leur prêteront un caractère propre. Les secondes grouperaient les petits cultivateurs, qui jouiraient du lopin de terre qui leur sera concédé moyennant une certaine obligation de défrichement et de mise en valeur.’ See Dubois and Dewailly for the Comité de la Chambre de Commerce d’Elis-
southern African farmers. Imports of maize and maize meal from the south continued to create some competition, but, after 1930, Northern Rhodesian farmers, aware that they were losing the Katanga market, diverted their attention to the home market that the Copperbelt offered them (Vickery 1985: 215). In this way, while before the Depression neither the administration, nor the mining companies assume direct control over the food and labour markets, during and after the Depression the large commercial companies became much more domineering. In Jewsiewicki’s words:

The big companies in Katanga, wanted to lower the cost of living, and especially the total costs of the industrial Labour force, by a general lowering of agricultural prices and by offering high industrial wages, which would produce a supply of labour greater than the demand. In this way, the development of African market gardening, the first supplies of foodstuffs from Kasai all went hand in hand with the new labour-recruiting missions of the UMHK and the policy of labour stabilisation (Jewsiewicki, 1977: 324-325).

4.3.2 A Vibrant Sub-Economic Culture: The Market

The end of Katanga’s absolute dependence on Northern Rhodesia by no means put an end to cross-border commercial interaction. For the constant flow of travellers and the high concentration of population that the copper industry induced were accompanied by an automatic mushrooming of markets in every important mining town. Unsurprisingly, markets in Katanga predate those of Northern Rhodesia, but in neither case is there evidence of African markets existing much before 1930. In fact, there is no record of the existence of ‘native markets’ before the colonial Administration decreed their establishment.151 Northern Rhodesian regulations enforced in 1930 stipulated that ‘(1) all markets established in a municipality or township shall be under the control and management of the local authority’ and that ‘(2) all markets established by a native authority shall be under the control and management of the native authority.’152 With these clauses, Northern Rhodesian authorities sanctioned the creation of markets on a more or less spontaneous basis, leaving local authorities to decide the shape these markets would take and how they would be organised. Copperbelt markets were copied on
the Congo model in which inhabitants from the surrounding country could bring in dried fish, mealie, etc., for sale. By the 1940s, the Copperbelt(s) had become the home of one of the largest market complexes in Central and Eastern Africa (Miracle 1965: 698-699). I.D.S. Mackigan, the District Officer for Chingola, gave a vivid description of the market in Bancroft (now Chililabombwe) in 1954:

African life at Bancroft centres round the market, which stands close by the largest of the Contractor’s Compounds. Many African Traders from Kasompe African township, Chingola bring their wares here; and fish traders from the North and West, peanut vendors, salad oil sellers, men who boil up old bones and meat. All these traders operate in the open air or from small thatched booths. On a market day the scene is gay, animated and noisy, against a background of bright clothes for sale hung out upon lines or spread upon the ground.

The markets were the main, if not the sole, source of food for the African population in the mining towns. In 1960, a regional survey of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt revealed that there were 120,460 ‘natives’ in employment in all the towns of the Copperbelt, that their total number was nearing

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154 I.D.S. Mackigan, Chingola District Officer, Tour Report N.1, WP1/2/18, doc. 8 (NAZ).
300,000, and that approximately the same number did their shopping ‘on the Copperbelt itself’. In the same regional survey it was added that:

No space need be wasted in expatiating upon the food and food-processing trades which serve this market – butcheries, creameries, grain and flour milling, bakeries, sugar refining, beverages soft drinks factories and the distributing business connected with them. Perhaps one may comment that these have been slower to establish themselves than might have been expected, perhaps because of a feeling that their market would not be a stable one. By now however they constitute substantial businesses.

If markets were an important internal business, they were also very much an international one. In his social and economic study of the Copperbelt markets of 1947, V.W. Brelsford notes how the Copperbelt not only acted as a magnet to labour, but also attracted ‘traders of all types, even from as far afield as Senegal, Gambia and Nigeria’ (Brelsford 1947: 12). However, the most represented foreign group on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was, unsurprisingly, the Congolese. On a day a random count was operated in the largest market of the Copperbelt, that of Mufulira, it appeared that fourteen out of the twenty-four sellers were Congo natives (Ibid.: 93). In the same market, the Congo was also the main source of supply including many seasonal commodities such as mushrooms, shallots, cassava root and leaves, potatoes of several types, and wild roots. It was calculated that the Copperbelt market absorbed in a normal year about 3,000 bags of cassava, practically all of which came from the Congo (Ibid.: 44, 58, 93). This, Brelsford argues, is partly due to the fact that ‘Mufulira […] is the nearest market to the Congo, so that most of the village produce comes from over the border. The tribe in the nearby area of Katanga Province of the Congo is also Lamba and among them are settled a number of Northern Province Rhodesian Natives such as Chisinga, Ushi and Bemba’ (Ibid.: 93). Northern Rhodesians, too, made use of the Katangese markets. It was noted in 1933 that the Solwezi people, who were a bit more isolated from the Copperbelt economic centres than other groups still found ‘a ready market for produce of all kinds at Kapushi Mine in the Congo where a large number of natives are employed by the Union Minière.’ In the 1930s, the gradually improved network of roads in Katanga also made the travelling of people and goods easier, as was the expressed in-

155 Special Commissioner to Ministry of Land and Natural Resources in Ndola, Report on a Regional Survey of the Copperbelt, 1 February 1960, WP1/2/64, doc. 19 (NAZ).
156 Ibid.
157 Secretary for Native Affairs to the Chief Secretary, 25 September 1933, SEC2/263, Vol. I, doc. 56 (NAZ).
tention of the Katangese authorities that were keen to drain ‘à notre profit les activités neuves de la Rhodésie du Nord’ and to present the cities of Katanga as ‘les foyers du centre minier de l’Afrique’ by welcoming the ‘trafic des touristes et des gens d’affaires de la Rhodésie vers le Katanga et vice versa.’

As they expanded, markets generally showed an increasing degree of professionalisation of market skills, generating more and more movement across the border. Peddlers, hawkers and traders of all kinds, some of whom were European or Indian, carried goods across the border into Katanga and sold them for less than in Katanga’s newly opened shops. Fish, especially dried fish, from the Mweru-Luapula continued to be a convenience food much in demand on both Northern Rhodesian and Katangese Copperbelts, though the former was a much more important consumer than the latter. And 1930, African and Greek traders sold it to migrants on both sides of the border. Africans individuals also spontaneously travelled to the nearest market, no matter which side of the border it happened to be, to trade the products of their land. This phenomenon took such proportions that it occasionally became the source of friction. The fact that Africans could, to some extent, decide where to do their shopping, and usually did so where it was most advantageous to them, was not necessarily to the advantage of permanent shops, or indeed to the advantage of the national economies. Measures taken to deal with these issues could be really unpopular. Some sources suggest that one reason for the very first strike that broke out on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, in 1935, was that the Belgians had closed the border to Northern Rhodesian trade and produce the year before, ostensibly as protection against foot and mouth disease. This made Africans more dependent on income from wage labour and contributed to heightening dissatisfaction (more will be said about this in Chapter 4) (Perrings 1977: 40-41). This episode highlights the extent to which cross-border trade had become both voluminous and geopolitically significant. It was virtually the only economic activity taking place on Northern Rhodesian soil not to be directly part of the copper industry, though it was triggered and sustained by the latter. It gave rise to a whole new level (both micro and macro) of cross-border economic and population interaction.

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158 Dubois and Dewailly for the Comité de la Chambre de Commerce d’Elisabethville to the Ministre des Colonies, 1 June 1932, A.I., 1390, Dossier 2, II-B-11, annex (Brussels African Archives), p. 8.

159 Beef was more readily available in Northern Rhodesia. Therefore fish were not considered an essential item in worker’s rations, as they were in the Belgian Congo. See Gordon (2006: 70).
Conclusion

The extent to which the copper industries of Katanga and Northern Rhodesia were interdependent in the first half of the twentieth century is easy to downplay or overlook, quite simply because they cannot be made to fit a structured timeline of events. Developments on either side happened at different paces, sometime separately, sometimes not. The overall picture is confusing, being anything but a mosaic in which all pieces fit together neatly.

Until the 1920s, development on both sides of the border remained erratic. Prospects in Northern Rhodesia were initially unpromising, especially when compared with those of neighbouring Katanga. The latter, however, despite being referred to as a ‘geological scandal’ in 1906, was left largely unattended by the Belgians due to lack of funds, personnel and capital. Quick to jump on such an opportunity, British interests carried out the evaluation and initial development of copper deposits of the region, together with the development of the essential transport infrastructure. In return, the UMHK provided jobs and freight traffic on the BSAC railroad linking Katanga with South Africa. In addition, throughout the late 1910s and the early 1920s, at a time when Northern Rhodesia’s industrial economy was still stagnant, Katanga relied almost exclusively on Northern Rhodesian labour and foodstuffs. From the very beginning, therefore, Katanga and Northern Rhodesia were economically interdependent in terms of capital, investment, labour, trade and expertise. This status quo only changed in the late 1920s when the constantly rising labour and food needs of the Katangese mines coupled with the take-off of mining in Northern Rhodesia, led Katanga to take measures to limit its dependency on British Africa. Thanks to the policy of compulsory cultivation and the expansion of the Congolese railways, Katanga’s reliance on Northern Rhodesian labour and foodstuffs diminished until, with the onset of the Depression, it became marginal. At the same time, it appears that the Depression served to make the border more porous than it had been before. As employment opportunities dried up throughout southern Africa, people of all origins crisscrossed the border between Belgian and British Africa in search of better wages or better options of making money.

Unfortunately, neither the Belgian, nor the British colonial government seem to have concerned themselves excessively with the numerical details of African migration in those early years and, as a result, knowledge about the actual volume of labour migration in this period is sorely lacking. Yet, we may venture two large generalisations. First, the predominant master narrative of Copperbelt urbanisation, which posits a dual process of transition from an
initial migrant labour phase to an ultimate phase of permanent urbanisation, does not seem to be supported by the evidence. Instead, we are faced with complex shifts in patterns of mobility not only between urban and rural areas, but also between mining centres and between countries. Second, African migrants were by no means passive victims of the new economic system. As much as was possible, they chose their employer based on differences in wages and working conditions. This unwittingly caused African labourers to crisscross the border for many decades, which they did without following any set pattern. As Luise White put it:

These movements must be added to the picture of African labor – the jigsaw puzzle again – […] in which African workers’ gossip passed on the latest information about the safest working conditions, the best living conditions, the best wages. Such talk sent African workers across cultural and colonial boundaries to work and to make money, where they found themselves in worlds and seams and stopes that had different safety records, different standards of living, and different rates of remuneration (White 2000: 276).

Although the present narrative stopped around the middle of the twentieth century, it seems such interaction endured in later years. In 1955, the Kitwe District Officer described how the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt was ‘an enormous magnet drawing in not only Northern Rhodesian Africans but those from the Congo and Portuguese West Africa, in particular.’ On 30 April 1965, at least 9,900 natives of what had by then become the Republic of Zambia were registered in Elisabethville alone. Out of these 9,900, 7,272 came from the Luapula Province and 1,335 came from Northern Province. In 1967, the Zambian Consul General in Lubumbashi (as Elisabethville was known from 1966), mentioned a total figure of 250,000 Zambian nationals living in the Congo. This enduring Northern Rhodesian presence in Katanga was without doubt the result of several decades of Northern Rhodesians coming to work in Katanga. Although the region of the Copperbelt had already been the scene of many population movements in pre-colonial times, the allied effect of an artificial border and the implantation of two neighbouring and competing mining industries changed the nature and patterns of these movements. This new type of migration had, before anything else, an economic raison d’être and therefore went beyond and transformed cultural boundaries.

160 P.O. Bourne, Kitwe District Officer, Tour Report N.1, 1955, WP1/2/18, doc. 11 (NAZ).
161 Zambian Consulate in Elisabethville to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 1965, FA/1/24, loc. 495, doc. 39 (NAZ).
162 E.M. Mwamba (Consul General in Lubumbashi) to The Chief Immigration Officer and Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 April 1967, FA/1/67, loc. 503, doc. 127 (NAZ).
The Republic of Zambia was born on 24 October 1964 as Africa’s 35th independent state. Like most of its African sister nations, Zambia’s transition to independence spanned a rather short period. For the ten years preceding independence, Northern Rhodesia was part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: a Federation created and administered by men of European origins. During that time, it was treated as an extension of British-ruled southern Africa: its communications all went in a southerly direction while both policies and social attitudes were still dictated by the white-dominated South. Consequently, there was little doubt in the early 1950s that Northern Rhodesia was destined to be a ‘white’ country. Yet, as the decade advanced, the all-pervasiveness of white rule in Africa was increasingly being challenged from all sides. Starting in 1957 with the independence of Ghana, the fact that decolonisation was now an inexorable process was made clear by Harold Macmillan’s famous ‘Wind of Change’ speech of 3 February 1960.

In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. […] In different places it takes different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it (Macmillan 1972: 473-482, Appendix I. Emphasis added).

The speech signalled unmistakably the British Government’s intention to grant independence to many of its territories, which indeed happened subsequently, with most British possessions in Africa becoming independent nations in the early 1960s. Northern Rhodesia, for all the settlers’ efforts, was not spared by the wind of change. As late as 1958, only 11 Africans were registered as voters in Northern Rhodesia but within five years they were more than a million (Mulford 1967: 1). The history of the period of ‘freedom struggle’, spanning from 1958 to 1964, has often been portrayed as a time of
spontaneous unity of all Zambians against colonialism. A traditional account of the growth of Zambian nationalism reads very much like D.C. Mulford’s:

Half a century of white rule and all which that implied – contact with Christian education, the undermining of traditional authority and values, new opportunities for travel and exchange of ideas, racial discrimination, and exposure to the harsh realities of government administration and the workings of a cash economy – had given Northern Rhodesia’s Africans a measure of unity hitherto unknown. Reinforced by the colour bar, by dissatisfaction among Africans with their new position and above all by the threat of permanent white domination, this unity took root, producing among those diverse groups the beginnings of a common identity (Mulford 1967: 3-4).

This unity, as Ian Henderson candidly put it, ‘independent Zambia might well envy, if it had existed’ (Henderson 1972: 247). The genuine enthusiasm generated by national independence led to the production of a history that championed the nationalist movement as a ‘convergence into a united front of a number of heterogeneous organisations and areas of discontent spearheaded by the political party’ (Ibid.: 233). In fact this ‘political party’ – Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) – was instrumental in creating this image. As the party under which Zambia achieved independence, UNIP actively promoted a militant type of history, one that firmly portrayed the independence struggle as that of a ‘united Nation’ in the face of adversity. As such, it left little room for other interpretations or the acknowledgement of the existence of dissident voices. Giacomo Macola, the biographer of one such dissident voice – Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, head of the opposition party – noted that:

Feeding upon one another, the discourses of academics and party thinkers reached the same conclusion: UNIP did not merely serve the interests of the young nation; it was its embodiment. The existence of dissenting voices within the nationalist landscape […] was conveniently forgotten or treated as a minor “tribal” irritant destined to be swept away along the path toward full-blown nationhood (Macola 2010: 23).

In reality, throughout most of the colonial period the political destiny of Northern Rhodesia was far from clear. Even its very geographical position was politically ambiguous: it was situated between the territories of Southern Africa, dominated by Europeans, and those to the north, such as the Belgian Congo and East Africa, where white settlers had little political power and an eventual transfer of power to Africans was a conceivable, if dim, possi-
Northern Rhodesia's traditional association with Southern Rhodesia often overshadows the influence of these territories. Interestingly, the dates the Belgian Congo and Tanganyika obtained their independence – in 1960 and 1961, respectively – coincided with a period of more aggressive nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. In fact, there are many such 'coincidences' in the timelines of Congo and Zambia in the 1960s. 1960 was the year the Congo achieved independence as well as the year the copper-rich province of Katanga embarked on an ephemeral, though decisive, secession (Lemarchand and 1962: 404-416). It was also the year when the first ‘violent’ nationalist outbursts took place in Northern Rhodesia. 1963 was the year the Katanga secession ended. It was also the year the Federation effectively collapsed. In 1967, Mobutu, President of Independent Congo from 1965 to 1997, launched his notorious ‘Zairianisation’ campaign, which, as an effort to rid the country of the lingering vestiges of colonialism, entailed the creation of a strong centralised state and the nationalisation of the economy. By 1974, the Congo, now re-baptised 'Zaïre' was a nationalised single-party state. In April 1968, Kenneth Kaunda launched the Mulungushi Reforms by which he declared his intention to acquire an equity holding (usually 51 per cent or more) in a number of key foreign-owned firms. By 1973, the Republic of Zambia was a single-party nationalised state. These similarities in historical development are, most likely, not coincidental. In this chapter, it will be shown that the ‘Katangese factor’ is perceptible in Zambian nationalist development from its very beginning. By covering the entire period between the first spark of nationalist development in 1935 – when African miners rioted on the Copperbelt for the first time – to the establishment of the UNIP-dominated nationalised state in 1973, this chapter will explore Katanga's contribution to the development of Zambia as an independent political entity.

5.1 The Rise of Nationalism

5.1.1 The Strikes of 1935 and 1940

First African Disturbances
On 29 May 1935, the police opened fire on a crowd of strikers at Roan Antelope mine (Luanshya) resulting in the death of six African mineworkers, while 17 others were wounded. The strike had been triggered by the implementation of a new taxation regime, one that was supposed to be more 'equi-
table’ on a national level but entailed that tax levels on the Copperbelt should be raised. The strike was the first African-led disturbance of any kind to take place in Northern Rhodesia. Not only did the strike, which started in Mufulira, spread to every other mine of the Copperbelt like wildfire, but it was also a concerted and organised effort. The strike’s instigators were able to make use of the Mbeni Dance Society, a Bemba-based group which, though it had perhaps not originally been politically-oriented, disposed of an active network in all three producing mines. The strike, which had started on 21 May, was quelled by the end of the month. No tangible result was obtained by the strikers in terms of either tax reduction or rise in wages (Henderson 1972: 146-147; Larmer 2007: 31). Yet, the scale and suddenness of the disturbances convinced the colonial state of the need to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. Among the workers’ numerous complaints listed by the Commission were: insufficient wages and rations; the deductions from wages for mining material such as boots and lamps; high levels of unemployment; and the condescending manner in which they were generally treated. The report also concluded that ‘an important predisposing cause of the recent disturbances’ was the propaganda by the Watch Tower movement, described as ‘dangerously subversive,’ and further noted the manner in which traditional tribal custom and authority appeared to have collapsed because of industrialisation:

Here [in the Copperbelt] there are considerable numbers of natives concentrated in the compounds; without chiefs; with their tribal organisations being broken down by disintegrating influences; becoming accustomed to machinery and modern methods; feeling an increasing desire for luxuries.

This latter point caused particular alarm among government officials. Not only did the strikes decisively expose how neglected the African labour question had been, they were also the first sign that the government still ruled according to outdated views of the way Africans led their lives and what they aspired to (Butler 2007: 52). Colonial anxieties regarding the emergence of

164 Under the previous tax system, Africans had been taxed according to their area of origin. Under the new system, tax levels would be based on one’s current place of residence. In addition, it was decided to reduce the tax rates in the countryside but to increase them in the Copperbelt towns from 12/6 to 15/- . This meant that taxation levels for Copperbelt workers were increased by an average of 50 per cent. See Butler (2007: 52); Roberts (1976: 202); Perrings (1977: 32).
165 Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, October 1935, para.10, p.4.
166 Ibid., para.114, p.51.
167 Ibid., para.144, p.61.
such ‘detribalised’ urban Africans prompted the government to open up channels of communication with this unknown African community through the Native Industrial Labour Advisory Board (NILAB) and the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, both set up in 1935 in the wake of the strike (Hooker 1969: 423). This was not enough, however, to enable the government to head off a second strike, which started on 28 March 1940. The 1940 strike had, like the 1935 strike, an economic trigger, in this case the rise in the cost of living that had followed the beginning of the Second World War. This time, however, strikers framed their demands for higher wages in a larger protest against the discrimination against Africans in the industrial hierarchy. The strike lasted for a week and, like its predecessor, came to a bloody conclusion, when, on 3 April 1940, 16 African mineworkers were killed at Nkana mine (Butler 2007: 52; Henderson 1972: 137). The demands made by African miners in 1940 – which once again were not met (Henderson 1975: 91-94; Larmer 2007: 30) – were analogous to those of 1935: higher wages, better housing and better welfare facilities in order to enjoy similar standards of living as those of European employees. The 1940 Commission of Inquiry duly acknowledged the way in which the strike formed a protest against inequality in terms of pay and possibility of advancement:

The African strike and our subsequent inquiry brought to the surface a number of grievances in addition to that which had relation to their rates of pay […]. The African workers contended that they were doing a class of work which justified them in expecting higher wages, and indeed claimed that they were qualified to do the work normally done by the Europeans.

In that sense, this strike was a political challenge as it was a protest against the colour bar, which though not officially endorsed, had been in place, in a de facto manner, in all the mines (Henderson 1972: 156; Roberts 1976: 203). In fact, 1940 was the start of a continuous struggle for African advancement, which would last for a quarter of century.

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168 The initial spark was provided by another strike, which had taken place from 18 to 27 March and had been organised by the white mineworkers at Mufulira and Nkana. The success of this strike – white demands for higher wages were largely conceded – at once stimulated Africans at these mines to stage a strike of their own. See Henderson (1976: 156); Roberts (1976: 203).

169 Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, July 1940, p.12.

The Bemba Factor

If the findings of the Commissions are to be taken to the letter, the 1935 strike had essentially consisted of a tax revolt while the 1940 strike was a mass reaction against the colour bar. Yet, in reality, little is known about the strikes’ backgrounds and origins and the commissions did little to shed light on the issue. Instead, according to Perrings, ‘under a flood of accusations and counter accusations by industry and state,’ they ‘succeeded in thoroughly obscuring the fundamental causes of the actions’ (Perrings 1977: 34). Prominent among the elements overlooked by the commissions is ‘the dominant part played by the Bemba’ (Ibid.: 35). The ‘Bemba’ – an all-encompassing term used to refer to the peoples originating from the Northern and Luapula Provinces – were not only the largest single grouping among the labourers of the Copperbelt (Epstein 1958: 5-6), they were also, in the opinion of the authorities, the most ‘troublesome and coherent group in the Copperbelt labour force’ (Henderson 1975: 89). Not only was it the Bemba language, in the form of ‘Town Bemba,’ that served the *lingua franca* of the Copperbelt,\(^{171}\) but it was also through a Bemba dance association, the Mbeni, that news, rumours and instructions were circulated across the mining towns. The 1935 Commission did touch upon the fact that ‘the Wemba-speaking tribes took lead in the disturbances’ while the Mbeni organisation, a Bemba/Bisa-dominated entity, ‘was made use of to some extent for the purpose of furthering [the disturbances].’\(^{172}\) Yet, why this should have been so was not explored and the members of the Commission overlooked the fact that the Bemba had gone through important changes in their economic situation just before 1935. Perrings noted that it is ‘a point of immense significance that the 1926 Line of Rail Reserves Commission had deliberately taken the decision to isolate African producers from the main markets in the territory’ (Perrings 1977: 38). African commercial agriculture was negatively hit and by 1930, it had become barely viable. That year, because the large companies were for the major part being supplied by the large-scale white farmers, the demand for ‘native grain’ was falling rapidly. To make matters worse still, between 1934 and 1936, the Belgian Congo border was closed to all African produce in an effort to stop the spread of foot and mouth disease (*Ibid.*: 40). In other words, Africans could still cross the border as labourers, but no longer as traders. An annual report for the Native Affairs Department mentioned that:

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\(^{171}\) For a study of the use of Bemba and multilingual practices that were preponderant in Copperbelt towns, see Spitulnik (1999).

\(^{172}\) *Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt,* October 1935, para. 114, p.51.
restrictions imposed by the Government of the Belgian Congo on the transit of produce of every description across the Pedicle have for the time being practically killed the former flourishing fish trade conducted by natives of the Northern Province with the copper mines and the Congo. At Fort Rosebery, where it used to be a common thing to see large numbers of natives on bicycles laden with fish making for the copper mines, not a single permit was issued during the year.173

Under these circumstances, African dependence on wage labour grew enormously, so that many were pressured into entering the labour market as a last resort. As Perrings argues, ‘it would thus seem reasonable to suggest that what occurred in 1935 was indicative of the cumulative resentment of those who had experienced not one, but a series of major blows to their capacity for economic survival within a comparatively short space of time’ (Perrings 1977: 49). This, according to Perrings, was ‘a development of absolutely crucial importance’ (Ibid.: 40), one that was disregarded by the Commission.

Bemba-speakers were also suspected of having been the main instigators of the 1940 disturbances. T.F. Sandford, Secretary for Native Affairs, reported that: ‘I and the officials concerned felt that the main impetus came from Mufulira and that the main support came from the hot-headed natives of the Bangweolu and Luapula areas.’174 The 1940 Commission found that the ‘natives of the Fort Rosebery and Kawambwa districts’ were indeed ‘prominent in disturbances throughout the strikes.’175 Max Gluckman (head of the RLI from 1941 to 1947) argued that the significance of the Bemba did not lay in their numbers or visibility, but rather in the fact that they occupied many minor authoritative posts while the elite jobs were occupied by Nyasa and Lozi (Southall 1961: 74; Epstein 1958: 236). In this reading, the de facto Bemba leadership was less the direct result of their numerical preponderance than the result of the calculation on the part of men in top and middle range positions that the support of the unskilled population would be more easily secured by ‘identifying their cause as that of the Bemba’ (Henderson 1975: 95). However, there is yet another factor that contributed to the prevalence of Bemba leadership. Many Bemba had worked in the Katangese mines in large numbers from 1910 onwards (See Chapter 3) and, according to Sandford, ‘knew of the different [read: more liberal] attitude in that territory towards

173 Department of Native Affairs of Northern Rhodesia, Annual Reports (1934), pp. 21-22 as quoted in Perrings (1977: 49).
175 Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt, July 1940, para. 61, p.16.
the colour bar restrictions. The Bemba could therefore offer experience and leadership to those people who either, like the Lunda and Luvale, had not had any experiences with mining work until then, or like the Ngoni, had worked in the Southern Rhodesia mines, where labour policies were very restrictive (Henderson 1975: 95). ‘In other words,’ as Henderson put it,

the Bemba speakers were likely to be more politically conscious than the other groups, because of their history as migrant workers. This political consciousness was to be the basis of the Bemba’s claim to leadership on the Copperbelt, and later in Zambia. It cannot entirely be explained by their occupation as miners, or by the fact that they constituted a simple majority on the vital Copperbelt (Henderson 1972: 165).

**The Significance of the Strikes**

At first glance, the strikes of 1935 and 1940 are not that remarkable. In both cases, their scale was limited and Africans mostly failed to obtain what they had protested for. In addition, there were to be many more strikes on the Copperbelt in the following three decades. Still, these two stand out in Zambian history as landmarks in the development of African political consciousness, constituting, as they do, the first overt protestation of any kind against colonial rule in the country. As such, in the words of Henderson, they are ‘firmly embedded in Zambian political consciousness and form the conventional starting point for the popular history of the nationalist movement’ (Henderson 1975: 85). Their ‘romanticisation’ aside, the strikes had undeniable political effects. Firstly, the strikes, though they predated political nationalism by ten years, constituted the first hint of the central role the Copperbelt would play in the nationalist struggle. Whoever led the later political movement was unlikely to achieve success without the support of the Copperbelt miners. Another future aspect of Northern Rhodesian politics that was hinted at in 1935 and 1940 was the political militancy of the Bemba. If the strikes were not successful in creating a common front among the workers, they highlighted the fact that the Bemba speakers were quick to take the lead when action was needed. In spite of this, the strikes did not lead to the emergence of African leadership or any immediate African politicisation on the mines. Yet, the fact that the underlying grievances – the colour bar and differences in wages – were not made obsolete for a long time, ensured that discontent would always be brewing not far below the surface. Up to 1953, despite some wage rises for Africans, practically no progress was made in

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176 T.F. Sandford to Chief Secretary, 13 April 1940, SEC/LAB/78 as quoted in Henderson (1972: 165). For Katanga’s stabilisation policies, see Chapter 3 & Davies (1933: 170-77).
breaking the colour bar down.177 So long as the Africans were unable to exert political pressure on the government, this situation was unlikely to alter and, as a result, African advancement question found itself at the heart of the nationalist ‘struggle for independence and freedom.’ In that sense, the disturbances that rocked the Copperbelt in 1935 and 1940 became powerful symbols and, as such, can be counted among the most significant episodes of the interwar period.

### 5.1.2 Trade Unions and Political Parties

#### The Run-Up to Federation

The rise of African trade unions and political agitation, which has been the subject a fair amount of literature, is a process that is generally described as conjoined. Yet, if the development of African political parties and the increasing agitation of the urban labour force were undeniably closely paralleled, the popular idea that the trade union acted as vanguard of revolution simply does not square with the facts. If the mine companies, initially, in 1941-2, preferred to appoint committees of Tribal Representatives (TRs) rather than unions (Larmer 2007: 32), neither they, nor the colonial government obstructed their formation. Quite the contrary: they encouraged it. Henderson argued that, following the strikes,

> far from being mistrusted as subversive institutions, trade unions for colonial peoples were now regarded as something to be encouraged, which could help to develop an interest in local self-government and development. Not only paternal guidance from governments was to be available, but also fraternal encouragement from the labour movement in the United Kingdom (1972: 207).

Early in 1947, William Comrie, a Scottish unionist, was sent out to Northern Rhodesia by the British Trade Union Congress to help establish African Unions along ‘British’ lines, i.e. non-political associations tasked with negotiating wages and conditions. By 1948, there were African unions in all four mines. In 1949, the same year that the legal basis of trade unions was firmly placed on ‘a colour-blind footing’ (Roberts 2011: 16), these early trade unions were amalgamated in the Northern Rhodesia African Mineworkers’

177 There are many reasons for this stagnation. First, during the Second World War the need to produce copper for Britain and the Allies was far overriding the issues of inequalities on African mines. In addition, African job advancement had as a prerequisite, a policy of stabilisation in the towns, which meant large-scale investments. See Henderson (1972: 175-182) and Roberts (2011: 17).
Union (AMWU), which was followed by the creation of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in 1951. Both were headed by Lawrence Katilungu, a senior interpreter at Nkana who, as one of the few Bemba clerks in the mines and the grandson of the Bemba chief Chipalo, was popular among the Bemba (Epstein 1958: 92). AMWU membership rose from 50 per cent (19,000 members) of the 37,000-strong labour force in 1949 to 80 per cent in 1953. Between 1949 and 1953, 30 disputes and 12 strikes occurred, culminating in a peaceful three-week strike in October-November 1952, which succeeded in obtaining extensive wage increases (Henderson 1972: 207-229; Larmer 2007: 33; Roberts 1976: 205). 178

Meanwhile, the fear that African economic and social advance generated, stimulated Europeans to make new efforts to obtain more political power in the 1930s and 1940s. As European physical presence was negligible in Northern Rhodesia, it was felt that preserving white hegemony could be more easily achieved if Northern Rhodesia joined forces with its Southern sister state and broke away from the United Kingdom. With amalgamation, the white settlers would kill two birds with one stone: as well as strengthening their political power, they would also be able to lay their hands on the coveted copper revenues. A fierce campaign was waged in favour of amalgamation, led by Roy Welensky (later Sir Roy Welensky), an ex-professional boxer who had been elected to the Rhodesian Legislative Council in 1938. While this new drive towards political supremacy had largely been prompted by fears of African advance, the campaign for amalgamation had the unwitting effect of giving the first stimulus to an African political awakening throughout the territory (Roberts 1976: 206-208; Mulford 1967: 15-19). In 1948, the Federation of African Societies, which had been created in 1946 for the purpose of bringing together various work associations, etc., was transformed into an overtly political body: the Northern Rhodesia Congress (Mulford 1967: 14-16). In August 1951, Congress was renamed the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC) on the same day as Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, a London-educated teacher from Southern Province, was elected to be its President (Roberts 1976: 210-211). Nkumbula was known as a stringent advocate of African rights. From the early 1940s, he had been campaigning fiercely against amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and white domination in general, which is vividly illustrated by the ‘explosive’ letter that he wrote to the editor of the newspaper Mutende in early 1942:

178 Other African unions were soon formed, linked to the roads and railways and in the trade sectors, but none reached the power and scope that the AMWU was able to achieve.
We in Northern Rhodesia loathe the idea of amalgamating Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia which is dominated by Europeans. [...] The policy of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia is to make Southern Rhodesia a white man’s country.  

With Nkumbula’s accession to the presidency, the Congress increasingly started to resemble a mass movement. The Congress, under Nkumbula’s leadership, made opposition to the Federation the rallying cry under which all Northern Rhodesians could unite regardless of their origins. The idea was to provide the country with a sense of common purpose (Macola 2010: 29). The replacement of the party’s Secretary-General, the southerner Nabulyato, with the northerner Kenneth Kaunda, along with the election of three new politicians from Bemba-speaking regions to the executive of the ANC in August 1953, were probably undertaken with a view to supporting the image of ‘national party’ that the ANC was endeavouring to create (Ibid.: 48).

The ANC, however, failed to establish an effective link with the African trade union movement. This ultimately was probably its most fatal flaw. Though Katilungu was himself against Federation and eventually joined Congress, African trade unions were far from independent from the colonial state. In fact, they had increasingly come to rely on the latter’s assistance. So even if trade unionists were not officially barred from taking some personal political stance, there were strong reasons not to mix politics and trade union affairs (Mulford 1967: 26). In addition, as Henderson argues, ‘there was a genuine miners’ consciousness which did not necessarily rule out a wider political consciousness, but which was keenly aware that the miners owed nothing to the political elite’ (Henderson 1972: 230). In other words, the Copperbelt’s politics were not necessarily to be in harmony with so-called ‘national’ politics if it was felt there was no advantage to be drawn from it. The conflict came to a head when Nkumbula, as a culmination of the Congress’s campaign against the idea of federation, organised two days of national prayer that were to be supported by generalised industrial strikes. However, the AMWU refused to use the strike weapon in support of political objectives (Larmer 2007: 35; Mulford 1967: 26). Protests fell through and in March 1953, the proposals for Federation were approved by the House of Commons. For the next ten years, Northern Rhodesia was consequently part of a Federation that also included Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. The Federation’s capital was Salisbury.

179 Enclosed in letter from Bradley to Secretary for Natives Affairs, 19 February 1942 as quoted in Smyth (1984: 354) and Macola (2010: 13). It should be noted that this letter was never published. See Smyth (1984: 355).
(now Harare), its president from 1956, Roy Welensky and its economic and political dominant elite was the white settlers (Hughes 2003: 594; Mulford 1967: 19).

**Developments During the Years of Federation**

1953, unsurprisingly, was a negative breaking point for the growth of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia. Discredited to some extent by its failure to prevent Federation, the ANC quickly lost much of the popular enthusiasm it had been able to kindle. The ANC was in need of a new political agenda, new objectives and strategies, and struggled to do so. As a result, the movement entered what Mulford refers to as ‘a period of disintegration and decline characterised by inconsistent policies, petty bickering amongst officials, poor relations with the African trade-union movement, and apathy among the African public’ (Mulford 1967: 36). By 1958, however, Congress had revived, a resurgence that was likely owed to two main factors. Firstly, it was partly a response to economic difficulties as copper prices fell sharply in 1956 and stayed low for two years after that. Secondly, it was partly a result of the ANC’s increasing popularity among AMWU’s executives, which led to more active militancy on the Copperbelt. In January 1955, ANC-friendly leaders within the AMWU successfully pressured Katilungu to call a strike with political and economic aims: the new pay rate that the strikers would demand (10s 8d) would have qualified many African mineworkers for the income-related electoral franchise for the first time. The strike lasted nearly two months and was followed by twelve months of heightened tensions and strained negotiations. These culminated in the ‘rolling strikes’ of June 1956: a series of strikes that took such proportions that it led to the declaration of a State of Emergency in the Copperbelt in September (Larmer 2007: 35; Macola 2010: 55).

Despite the fact that AMWU involvement in nationalistic politics once more dwindled after these events, this was enough to renew the ANC’s visibility. In turn, this growing labour unrest on the Copperbelt triggered ide-

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180 In 1953 and 1954, the ANC spent most of its time and energy on a campaign against the colour bar in shops and other public places such as restaurants and hotels. See Macola (2010: Chapter 2).

181 In the early 1950s, the AMWU executive became divided between those who were now convinced that labour should play a political role, among whom were Robinson Puta (Vice-President of the ATUC and chairman of the AMWU branch of Chingola), Mathew Nkoloma (General Secretary of both ATUC and AMWU) and Dixon Konkola (President of the *Northern Rhodesia Railway African Workers’ Trade Union*), and Katilungu, who preferred to keep the union separate from politics. See Henderson (1972: 229–230); Mulford (1967: 42); Roberts (1976: 219).
ological divisions within the ANC. Throughout the 1950s, some elements within the ANC had been increasingly advocating for the idea of turning Northern Rhodesia into an independent African state, an aim which, in their opinion, could only be achieved by refusing to compromise with the Federal Political system. This newly popular ‘policy of activism’ was most vocally endorsed by Kenneth Kaunda. Nkumbula, on the other hand, was less enthusiastic about this tactic. In the summer of 1955, he had launched what came to be known as the ‘New Look Policy’, which promoted negotiation with the colonial authorities with the aim to obtain their ‘official recognition and respect’. As part of the ‘New Look Policy’, it was decided to abort an ongoing boycott in Lusaka in April 1956 and to engage in talks with MLC John Roberts: Welensky’s right-hand man in Northern Rhodesia. As a result, Kaunda, along with a few others including his friend Simon Kapwepwe, Secretary of the Kitwe branch of ANC, eventually formed their own new party: the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) (Macola 2010: 55; Roberts 1976: 220). From the outside the split seemed to have a strong ‘ethnic’ flavour. As Macola pointed out, it is tempting to interpret the split as a show-down between the party’s southern ‘Bantu Botatwe’ elements (Nkumbula) and its northern ‘Bemba’ elements (Kaunda and Kapwepwe both of whom were born in Chinsali, Northern Province). Indeed, Nkumbula seems to have interpreted the opposition from the ‘Kaunda group’ as coming from a specific ethnic nucleus (Macola 2010: 70). When Nkumbula reshuffled his party in 1958, more than one Bemba-speaking member were crossed out the party’s list. Yet, this should not obscure the nuances of the split’s circumstances. Macola noted that:

Of course, it would be disingenuous simply to portray (as much of the European press did at the time) the split within the ANC as the result of a Bemba tribal onslaught. For what Northern Rhodesia witnessed in 1957-58 was rather the clash between two ill-defined and ill-definable interest blocs structured around both ethno-linguistic criteria (Bemba-speakers vs. Bantu Botatwe) and different regional modes of incorporation in the colonial economy (roughly: waged work-force in the Copperbelt and its vast Northern hinterland vs. rural-based agricultural producers in the Southern and Central Provinces). In this latter respect at least, the militant – if, given the prominence of nationalist discourses and claims, always subterranean – ethnic

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182 Macola found that one of the two Kapwepwe loyalists whom Nkumbula removed from the executive council of the Western Province (i.e. Copperbelt) was the Bemba-speaking J. Mulenga, provincial president. The other provincial secretary Jonathan Chivunga, originated from the Eastern Province, but had also been a Copperbelt-based trade unionist. See Macola (2010: 70).
ideologies that underlay the ZANC/UNIP split were closely interwoven with contemporary politico-economic circumstances (Ibid.: 71).

The last two years of the 1950s witnessed increased confusion and frenzy in the Northern Rhodesian political scene. By this time, the British Government realised that it seemed increasingly doubtful whether the Federation could realistically survive as an amalgamated entity. This led to concessions in the form of a new constitution and elections, both implemented in order to increase African representation in the Legislative Council. In an attempt to eradicate the most subversive elements of its opponents, the colonial government banned ZANC in March 1959, less than five months after its inception and imprisoned Kaunda. Consequently, a new party, integrating former ZANC member and a few other ANC split-away groups, was formed in the later part of 1959: the United National Independence Party (UNIP). In January 1960, Kaunda was released, was greeted as a hero and was made the leader of the newly formed UNIP (Ibid.; Roberts 1976: 220). UNIP subsequently strived to assert its image as a national party and to increase their support base, with the miners and their unions being particularly targeted. Mineworkers joined UNIP in their thousands as did many younger AMWU members (Larmer 2007: 37-38). This was another devastating blow to the ANC, which had already suffered the loss of its Bemba-speaking leadership. This is the backdrop against which events unfolding in the newly independent Congo started to play an increasing and more direct role in the Zambian political struggle.

5.2 The Katanga Secession (1960-1963)

‘The Katanga story is not a pleasant one to tell. It is a tale of savagery, deceit, false morality, power politics, smugness and plain incompetence.’

Smith Hempstone, Katanga Report, opening statement

On 5 July 1960, a mere five days after King Baudouin of Belgium presided over the independence ceremony that transformed the Belgian Congo into the Republic of the Congo, the Congolese army, known as the Force Publique, mutinied against their white officers. Despite Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba’s efforts, the mutiny soon spread to the entire country. Before long, a substantial portion of the 100,000 Belgian citizens living in the Congo, frightened by the attacks on Europeans that had become widespread, had fled the country (Gondola 2002: 118; Dunn 2003: 63). This exodus robbed the Congo of the experienced people who had been supposed to remain as advisers or
technical experts and sent the country into a spiral of unrest and political chaos that would last until 1966 (Lefever 1965: 11-12). In this context of generalised unrest and anarchy, Moïse Tshombe, provincial president of Katanga, declared his province independent on 11 July 1960, thereby inaugurating a three-years long bitter and bloody feud between his government based in Elizabethville and the national government based in the capital, Léopoldville. Although its independence was never officially recognised internationally, the secessionist state of Katanga existed and functioned autonomously for exactly 30 months and three days. In its early days, it was the recipient of significant military and technical assistance from powerful Belgian financial and government circles (Van Bilsen 1962: 48). Lumumba immediately accused the Belgian government of having ‘minutieusement préparé [la] sécession du Katanga dans le but de garder la mainmise sur notre pays,’ and called on the United Nations to intervene. By the early hours of Thursday, 14 July, exactly two weeks after ‘Independence Day,’ the United Nations Security Council had launched the United Nations on what the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, soon described as ‘the biggest single effort under United Nations colours organised and directed by the United Nations itself.’ Still, frustrated by the way the situation stagnated, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, attracting the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the process. Though the Soviet Union only sent a few planes and some material to the Congo (Dunn 2003: 63), the ‘communist threat’ was considered real enough for President J.F. Kennedy to back the UN fully and on 14 January 1963, the United Nations troops, with substantial assistance from the United States, called the secession to an abrupt halt (Devlin 2007: 23; Hilsman 1967: 267). The repercussions of this period of extended turmoil, known as the Congo Crisis, can hardly be overstated. It brought about the downfall of Congo’s first elected government, cost the lives of some 100,000 people, led to the deaths of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, and culminated in Mobutu seizing power on 25 November 1965.

It is hardly surprising therefore that it should have attracted a fair amount of literature, most of which is French-speaking and contemporary to the events that it describes. And yet, as Matthew Hughes noted in an article

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183 Telegram from P. Lumumba and J. Kasavubu to the United Nations headquarters, as quoted in Le Soir, 14 June 1960.
185 The death of Lumumba, in particular, continues to attract popular and intellectual interest. Ludo de Witte, in his explosive De Moord op Lumumba (Leuven 1999), accused Belgian agents
Figure 5.1
The Secretary-General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld and the ‘Vice-Gouverneur Général du Congo Belge’ M. Lafontaine, in Leopoldville in 1960. Hammarskjöld was on a fact-finding tour of African countries in order to assess their needs and shape the UN vision for international cooperation in the wake of the decolonisation process.
entitled ‘Fighting for White Rule in Africa,' in all this voluminous literature, very little is said about the role played by the Federation. Most of the relevant works, such as J.R.T. Wood’s edition of Roy Welensky’s papers, concentrate on events that took place within the Federation itself, while Alan James’ *Britain and the Congo Crisis* focuses primarily on Britain (see Hughes 2003). The only exception is the interest shown in the death of Hammarskjöld. The UN Secretary-General died in September 1961 when he was on his way to Ndola where he was to negotiate a cease-fire with the leader of the Katanga secession Moïse Tshombe. The plane that was carrying him to Northern Rhodesia crashed in circumstances that have been deemed suspicious by many since the day that it happened. Amidst rumours that his plane might have been shot down, Hammarskjöld’s out-of-the-ordinary death did a great deal to arouse suspicions about the possible implication of Roy Welensky, or other white power enthusiasts, in the event. Some years later, Welensky would describe how ‘the wildest accusations were flung at the Federation and at me personally. In Léopoldville there was an immediate demand for war against Rhodesia as a punishment for the “murder” of the Secretary-General’ (Welensky 1964: 237). Yet, despite this comparative dearth of academic publications on the subject, the impact that the secession of Katanga had on both the crumbling Federal state and the nascent Zambian nation-building movement, should not be overlooked.

of murdering the Congolese Prime Minister in January 1961. The publication of De Witte’s book was followed by an official investigation in the circumstances of Lumumba’s death. The Commission of Inquiry, formed of several leading historians, arrived to the conclusion that the Belgian state was responsible in part for Lumumba’s death but denied that Belgium ordered his assassination. The CIA and MI6 were also finger-pointed. Many grey areas remain however. For the results of the Commission, see De Vos, Gérard, Gérard-Libois and Raxhon (2005). 186 The potentiality that the crash might not have been an accident was widely discussed in the press at the time. The Northern Rhodesian newspaper, *Northern News*, commented right after the event took place, that ‘sabotage is not ruled out. There is even some official speculation that the plane may have been shot down.’ See ‘Hammarskoeld dies in N.R. crash,’ *Northern News*, 19 September 1961. In March 2015, a fresh enquiry into the death of the Secretary-General was opened by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. This followed the publication of Susan Williams’ ‘Who Killed Hammarskjöld?’, which brought forward evidence that strongly suggest that the plane crash was the result of foul play. On 19 November 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution urging all Member States to ‘release any relevant records in their possession and to provide Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with relevant information’ related to the deaths of Hammarskjöld and the other passengers of the plane. See Williams (2013) and the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library, *I need information on the Independent Panel of Experts and investigations into the death of Dag Hammarskjöld*, 23 November 2015, accessed on 28 February 2016, www.incb.org.
5.2.1 Welensky and Katanga: Fighting for White Rule in Africa

‘The Point Where The “Wind of Change” Begins To Veer’¹⁸⁷

Congo’s accession to independence attracted a great deal of attention in Northern Rhodesia. The fact that Belgium, having shown little concern about decolonisation until January 1960, suddenly agreed to grant independence on 30 June of the same year (Van Bilsen 1962: 42), meant the settlers of the Federation faced the prospect of African independence in a neighbouring province that was geographically and culturally similar to the Copperbelt as well as shared many linkages with it. A writer for the Northern Rhodesian newspaper *Northern News* called attention to the fact that ‘whether or not the Congo gamble comes off no one can say now, but events there are going to affect us one way or the other much more than in the past’ (*Ibid.*). In addition, the Federation still had an important economic and political interest in Katanga in the late 1950s, as Roy Welensky noted in his memoirs:

> When it was under Belgian rule there was close and growing contact between the Congo and the Federation. We had a long common frontier, and the economy of the nearest neighbouring province, Katanga, was to be to a considerable extent complementary to our own: it too produced copper; it bought our coal and coke, and an increasing quantity of Southern Rhodesia’s consumer goods; and it used our railways for export (Welensky 1964: 209).

Despite the fact that British hegemony over the Union Minière had been significantly diminished after the First World War, Tanganyika Concessions Ltd still owned a 40 per cent share in the Union Minière. The two companies still worked in close contact, sharing reports, dividends and shares, and an abundant correspondence among other things. Moreover, British directors still sat on the Union Minière’s board¹⁸⁸ and, additionally, large British firms such as Unilever and Shell Oil had large holdings in Katanga, all of which would be threatened by a African administration run from Léopoldville (Hempstone 1962: 50; Hughes 2003: 595; James 1996: 31). On 25 July 1960, while trying to convince the British Government to give Tshombe unofficial support, Captain Charles Waterhouse, who was both the chairman of Tanganyika Conces-

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¹⁸⁷ This title is borrowed from a quote by Conor Cruise O’Brien in his Introduction to R. Ainslie (1962), The Unholy Alliance: Salazar-Verwoerd-Welensly. London: Columbia Printers, p.3. It is also quoted in Hughes (2003: 596) and this volume (135).

¹⁸⁸ At the time of the Congo crisis, British members of the Union Minière’s board of directors included Captain Charles Waterhouse (who was also chairman of Tanganyika Concessions Ltd), Sir Ulick Alexander and Lord Selborne.
sions Ltd and a director of the Union Minière, warned that British interests in Katanga amounted to £180 million.\(^{189}\) Alan James, in his *Britain and the Congo Crisis*, pointed at the fact that there was a 'Katanga lobby' within British governing circles. This group of wealthy British businessmen and politicians had been forged through the links between the TCL, the UMHK and the Federation as well as the two colonial governments and they were keen to cling on to the advantages of white rule in central Africa. It is likely that, with the future of the Federation looking increasingly uncertain, these wealthy men began to consider how they could best protect their interests in that part of the world. Secessionist Katanga, with its white-friendly tendencies, increasingly looked like the best option in terms of achieving this aim (Hughes 2003: 595; James 1996: xii-134).\(^{190}\)

The advantages of a closer association with Katanga were not lost on the settlers of the Federation either. Katanga was, after all, also inhabited by a large number of settlers and had a provincial government that openly professed 'white-friendliness'.\(^{191}\) Like their colleagues in the Federation, the Katangese settlers desired autonomy. This was largely prompted by the feeling of hostility that they harboured towards the draining of their resources by another entity, in this case Léopoldville. The British ambassador in Léopoldville noted that there was:

\[\ldots\] a strong feeling, equally current among the Belgians (of whom there are some 30,000) and Africans in the province, that Léopoldville should not be the future capital of the Congo. It suffer[s] in their minds from being the distant (over 1,400 miles) seat of an authority which has been felt in the past to be both unsympathetic and out of touch \[\ldots\]. Additional force is given to the general desire in the Katanga for strong provincial powers by the fear of both

\(^{189}\) Minute of M. Waterhouse visit to Brussels, 25 July 1960, FO 371/146640, doc. JB1015/228, para. 4 (NAUK).

\(^{190}\) The Katanga Lobby counted as members Waterhouse and the Marquess of Salisbury, one of the most influential members of the Conservative Party.

\(^{191}\) On 30 October 1958, the Confédération des Associations Tribales au Katanga (Conakat) was founded as a merger of the majority of Katangese ethnic and tribal organisations. Its original aim had been to form an alliance of 'Katangais authentiques' against what they felt to be an invasion of Baluba Kasai, who, since the 1920s, had constituted the bulk of the UMHK's African *main d'oeuvre*. The idea of decentralisation came from a perceived need for a state in charge of its own immigration affairs on the one hand, and the Conakat's short-lived alliance with the white settlers' party, the Union Katangaise, on the other. For more details about the origins of Katanga particularism, see Gérard-Libois (1963) and Yakemtchouk (1988).
Africans and Belgians of seeing their province continue to be milked for the benefit of the rest of the Congo.192

There was, therefore, almost a de facto connivance between Katangese and Rhodesian settlers. Conor Cruise O’Brien, an Irish diplomat posted by the United Nations to Katanga, wrote in 1962:

In Katanga, I came to feel that I was living at the point where the “wind of change” begins to veer: that is the point where it encounters the escarpment of a relatively old area of European settlement and rule. The 30,000 or so Europeans of Katanga felt themselves to be backed by the 300,000 or so of the Rhodesias and by more than 3,000,000 in South Africa.193

**Rumours of Association between the Federation and Katanga**

In 1958, i.e. before any mention was made of the possibility of Congolese independence, there had already been talk among white settlers in Katanga of a merger with the Federation (Hughes 2003: 598). Then, in March 1960, Welensky claimed in an interview with Rene MacColl, a reporter with the *Daily Express*, that the Katanga might well join the Federation:

‘I suppose there is going to be a hell of a row for my having told you this[…]. Suggestions have been made to me […] that the federation should “hold out the hand of friendship” to Katanga when the Congo gains its independence.’195

According to Jules Gérard-Libois, ‘le Daily Express a laissé entendre que les approches n’ont pas été opérées par des représentants des 30,000 Européens de la province, ni de la puissante Union Minière, mais par M. Moise Tshombe’ (Gérard-Libois 1963: 54). Whoever Welensky was in touch with, Welensky’s overtures towards Katanga certainly did not receive universal acclaim. They were certainly not welcomed by Britain, which was ‘popularly believed’ to be

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192 From Scott, Léopoldville to CO, current events in Katanga, 29 April 1960, FO 371/146633, doc. JB1015/82, para. 4 (NAUK).
responsible for Sir Roy Welensky\textsuperscript{196} and resented the finger-pointing that resulted from Welensky’s imprudent statements. Equally, and predictably, Belgium was not best pleased either. Indeed, its response to Welensky was summarised by the \textit{Northern News} as: ‘Hands off the Congo’\textsuperscript{197} But neither was it welcomed in Katanga itself. The \textit{Daily Express} interview drew violent protest from the local press with the \textit{Essor du Congo} noting that ‘L’invraisemblance de cette nouvelle est telle que l’on se demande comment on peut la prendre au sérieux.’\textsuperscript{198} In addition, Katanga’s ruling party, the Conakat, ridiculed the idea of Katanga joining Rhodesia and issued a statement to that effect, stressing that the racial segregation practiced by the Rhodesias and South Africa was incompatible with their dignity and mentality.\textsuperscript{199} This led the Foreign Office to conclude that ‘though important tribes straddle the Katanga/ Northern Rhodesia border,’ the only possible circumstances in which a real demand for association could be conceivable would be ‘if it were thought that the new country would be run entirely by Africans, \textit{i.e.} if U.N.I.P. ever came to power in Northern Rhodesia. Some sort of African union might then be put forward.’\textsuperscript{200} The British ambassador in Léopoldville made a similar point:

I am convinced that such a development is out of the question: the Congo Africans do not want it and have no desire to exchange one colonial regime for another; and while superficially it might seem attractive to the Belgian mining interests and settlers, the former realise that such a possible union would not work out in practice \[…\]. The Katanga will, therefore, remain in the Belgian Congo, perhaps even more closely united with the rest of the country as a result of Sir Roy Welensky’s statements, the echoes of which still reverberate.\textsuperscript{201}

Whoever was in contact with Welensky, it was obvious that the extension of white power to Katanga was not to materialise. In any case, the Federation was increasingly faced with both external and internal pressures. Following serious rioting in Nyasaland, and further disturbances in Northern Rhodesia, the British government, and in particular Ian Macleod, the Secretary of State

\textsuperscript{196} Leopoldville to Foreign Office, 5 July 1960, FO 371/146692, doc. JB1061/6 (NAUK).
\textsuperscript{199} A.G. Evans (British Consul in Elisabethville) to the British Consulate-General in Léopoldville, 5 May 1960, FO 371/146630, doc. JB1015/44 (NAUK).
\textsuperscript{200} Foreign Office to Leopoldville, 22 June 1960, FO 371/146692, doc. JB1061/3 (NAUK).
\textsuperscript{201} From Scott, Leopoldville to CO, current events in Katanga, 29 April 1960, FO 371/146633, doc. JB1015/82, para. 2 (NAUK).
for the Colonies, was pushing for independence for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. With the Federation collapsing, it no longer made sense for Welensky to clamour for an amalgamation with a secessionist state that received no international support from the sources that counted, i.e. international organisations or the major powers (Hughes 2003: 601).

The Support of the Federation for Tshombe’s Secessionist State
If secessionist Katanga was not to be Rhodesian, it could still constitute a buffer zone against the African nationalist states to the north if its pro-Western tendencies were preserved (Mulford 1967: 243). Consequently, Welensky did all that he could to support the secessionist state. From the moment Katanga seceded from the Congo in July 1960, Welensky provided continuous assistance to the flood of Belgian refugees escaping the war in Katanga (Welensky 1964: 210-211), and urged Britain to recognise Tshombe’s state or, at least, to allow the deployment of Federation troops to the area. Britain, however, decided that neither Britain, nor the Federation should give the impression that they were contributing to the disintegration of the Congo, though Macmillan did write to Welensky that if the Central Government collapsed, some kind of practical ‘recognition’ could be considered. Despite this, the Federation (and South Africa) became not only the route by which supplies and material reached and left Katanga, but also the recruiting ground for the infamous Katangese ‘gendarmerie’: a largely white mercenary force that continually thwarted the efforts of the UN forces throughout the Katangese conflict. The local press commented on the recruitment drives for the mercenaries in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Some articles read like job advertisements: ‘The man who is recruiting Rhodesians and South Africans for President Tshombe’s Katanga Army and Air Force is Mr. Stuart Finley-Bisset, a 58-year-old Scotsman who runs a labour agency in Lusaka. He wants 100 recruits – mostly technicians, etc.’ It was not long before the United Nations carried out an investigation of its own and, in December 1961, Welensky was urged to invite the United Nations to station observers

202 The National Archives of Zambia in Lusaka host ample evidence of the extent to which the Federation was involved in helping rescue Belgian refugees throughout the different exoduses witnessed in the early 1960s, and of the administrative complications that they brought about. There are two thick folders pertaining to the question of the different ‘Congo Evacuations’ that took place between 1960 and 1962. The files that they contain document the various measures taken by the government to deal with the flood of incomers throughout the years as well as the spontaneous initiatives taken locally to bring immediate relief to the refugees. See files on the Congo Evacuation, phases I & II in WP1/14/57 and WP1/14/58.


in frontier zones and airports. Addressing the UN Advisory Committee on 9 January 1962, U Thant, Hammarskjöld’s successor as UN Secretary-General, claimed that he had ‘concrete evidence’ that illicit traffic was taking place:

I wish to consult you about the replies I have received to my request […] that observers be stationed along the frontiers of Rhodesia and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic with Katanga […]. Here I might say that this approach was made because we finally had some concrete evidence of illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side, which we immediately presented to the British government and which Sir Roy Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be described as gracious.205

Welensky called the suggestion to post observers in the Federation ‘one of the most objectionable proposals’ ever made to him (Welensky 1964: 251), and negotiations on the subject subsequently fell through.206

In addition to making his disapproval of the United Nations abundantly clear, Welensky undertook a diplomatic campaign in support of Tshombe’s Katanga, protesting against what he referred to as the ‘calculated UN policy of grinding Mr. Tshombe into the ground’ (Welensky 1964: 216). Late 1961 had indeed seen a series of offensives in Katanga on the part of the UN (Gérard-Libois 1963: 238; Lefever 1965: 77; Hughes 2003: 611) and on 13 September 1961, in a climate of great latent tension, the UN special representative in Katanga, Conor Cruise O’Brien, set the green light for what would be the UN’s most controversial operation: operation Morthor. This operation, supposed to be a bloodless coup, lasted a total of eight days and resulted in the deaths of eleven UN Soldiers, about 50 gendarmes, and a handful of civilians (Lefever 1965: 89). In legal, political and military terms, operation Morthor had become a great embarrassment to Hammarskjöld, the Secretariat and the countries supporting UN action alike (Gérard-Libois 1963: 241). How, then, was this embarrassing operation justified? According to O’Brien, by allowing ‘the world to be given an official version which was so

205 U Thant’s Statement to the Avisory Committee on the Congo, New York, 9 January 1962 in Public Papers of the Secretaries-General, pp. 80-81.
206 Though he refused the posting of observers, Welensky invited U Thant to come personally to Salisbury for discussions intended to correct United Nations misunderstandings regarding both Federal policy and the position on the frontier of Northern Rhodesia and Katanga. Nothing happened in the end and this was used by Welensky in his anti-UN campaign. Northern News published a series of articles on the subject: ‘Government turns down request for UN men in Rhodesia’ (5 January 1962); ‘UN’s chief in Europe may visit Rhodesia to meet Sir Roy’ (15 January 1962); ‘UN no kind of sacred cow, sir Roy tells parliament’ (23 January 1962).
phrased as to make what had been an active intervention by the United Nations look like a defensive action’ (O’Brien 1962: 264). The relevant section of the UN report issued on 14 September (S/4940) was worded as follows:

Paragraph 15: In the early hours of September 13th [...] an alert was set since arson was discovered at the UN garage. As the UN troops were proceeding towards the garage premises, fire was opened on them from the building where a number of foreign officers are known to be staying.207

About this report, O’Brien candidly remarked: ‘If this is an accurate account of what took place in Elisabethville on the morning of September 13th, my name is Titus Oates’ (O’Brien 1962: 264), adding that:

Whatever high-level agnosticism now prevails about what we had been instructed to do and – as I found later in Léopoldville and New York, there is a veritable ‘Cloud of unknowing’ surrounding the whole subject – it is hard to see how he [Hammarskjöld] and Linner can altogether have escaped knowing the essentials […]. Morthor is a Hindi word. It does not mean ‘Sound the alarm; there is arson in the garage’ or ‘Let us now assist the provincial authorities to maintain order’. It means ‘Smash’ (Ibid.: 266).

This gave Welensky plenty of material to launch his propaganda campaign against the United Nations. On the day operation Morthor was launched, Welensky issued a solemn warning in the Federal parliament: ‘Let other countries take warning. What has happened in Elisabethville today is the law of the jungle.’208 Welensky also had UN ‘atrocities’ against civilians in Katanga described in a vitriolic pamphlet that was published at the government’s expense. This pamphlet’s conclusion read as follows: “There have been other reports of the tragic events of September and December, 1961. All refer to the lawlessness, horror, savagery and brutality of the United Nations forces and show clearly the need for a public inquiry into these matters which are of the gravest concern to the future peace of the world.”209 Welensky’s efforts did not succeed in saving Katanga however; no more than they succeeded in saving the Federation, which, just over a year after the UN finally reclaimed Katanga in January 1963, collapsed entirely. As for the fight for ‘white rule’ in Africa, by 1965 it had relocated to Southern Rhodesia.

208 A.E.P. Robinson (High Commissioner) to Harold Macmillan (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom), 13 September 1961, PREM11/3187 (NAUK).
209 Rhodesian Pamphlet on UN Atrocities in Katanga, 11 June 1962, DO 183/146, doc. 15 (NAUK).
1960 and 1961 were a difficult period for Nkumbula and the ANC. With the formation of ZANC/UNIP, Nkumbula became increasingly isolated as his former place as most visible African leader in Northern Rhodesia was rapidly being taken over by Kaunda. At the same time, Kaunda’s UNIP championed a stringent nation-building paradigm that made the party inherently exclusionary. As early as November 1959, UNIP claimed to be ‘the only party which command[ed] the respect, confidence and unanimous support of the African people in Northern Rhodesia’. In 1960, year of Congo’s independence, the general atmosphere was one of excited restlessness, especially in the UNIP’s strongholds, Luapula and Northern Provinces (‘Bemba’ country’ in other words). Following the examples of now independent countries such as Congo or Tanganyika, there was a general sentiment that active militancy, and even violence if necessary, was the way to independence. As Mulford put it: ‘Northern Rhodesia African would have to die in 1960, and everywhere they were encouraged not to be afraid’ (Mulford 1967: 137). Throughout the year, UNIP was indeed very active, organising boycotts and other similar actions, which were enthusiastically adopted by a large part of the population. By late 1960, African opposition was both effectively organised and militant under the UNIP banner who clamoured loudly its intention to break the Federation and to seize power in Northern Rhodesia (Mulford 1967: 302). The ANC, on the other hand, was crippled by severe shortages of funds and lack of ideological cohesion. As a result, it was no match for UNIP’s re-energised form of nationalism. Yet, by the end of 1962, Nkumbula, the man who was increasingly being stigmatised as ‘pleasure-loving,’ ‘internationally finished’ and an ‘alcoholic wreck’, had managed to reconstitute his party as a force to reckon with in Northern Rhodesia. As will be seen, Katanga was instrumental in dictating the terms of the showdown between Kaunda’s UNIP and Nkumbula’s ANC.

**Ideological Redefinition**

After a comparatively long period of stagnation, the ANC started showing signs of greater ideological cohesion from April 1961 when Kaunda’s party

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210 Memorandum on constitutional change submitted to His Excellency the Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, 24 November 1959, UNIPA, ANC 5/15 as quoted in Macola (2010: 76).


212 Nkumbula disappeared from the political scene between April 1961 and January 1962, during which time he was serving a prison sentence for causing death by dangerous driving. See Macola (2010: 75).
was, for the first time, denounced for its supposed animosity towards ‘the Western World’ (Macola 2010: 80). The context for this accusation was the new Constitution for Northern Rhodesia that the Colonial Office proposed to pass in 1961. This Constitution, which was originally meant to facilitate the possibility of an African majority in the legislature, was subsequently revised after much lobbying by Welensky, in favour of the Europeans (Roberts 1976: 220). This provoked UNIP to stage a ‘positive action campaign which would manifest the people’s displeasure and induce the British Government to reconsider and modify the scheme.”213 This ‘positive action campaign’ spanned four months (from 15 July to 31 October 31) and, for all Kaunda’s belief in peaceful protest, involved a fair amount of violence. The report on the disturbances stated that:

All provinces except Barotseland, were affected in varying degree; worst affected were the Northern and Luapula Provinces where gangs roaming the bush, communications were interrupted, attacks were prepared and launched against Government servants, and widespread destruction of schools, bridges, and other property by fire occurred. In these areas there was widespread violence, intimidation and violence. [...] There can be no doubt of the responsibility of officials and members of the United National Independence Party for the disorder.214

Perhaps more importantly, the same report noted:

He [Kaunda] had claimed that the party controlled the mines, the railways and the kitchens. This suggested that the essence of the plan was to be a general strike. In fact the party controlled none of these activities and have so far failed to harness to their cause the two most powerful African trade unions in the Territory – the African Mineworkers’ Trade Union and the African Railway Workers’ Union. The U.N.I.P. was therefore compelled to fall back on other methods to embarrass Government.215

In this way, the disturbances of 1961 made it apparent that not only did UNIP not receive the quasi-universal support it claimed to have, but it also made the ANC look like a ‘moderate,’ ‘responsible’ party in comparison to the impetuous UNIP. Thereafter, to sustain this new status and to dissociate itself from the UNIP-led ‘disturbances,’ the Congress’ public communications took

214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
the distinctive hallmarks of a liberalist discourse. Throughout 1962, open professions that openly followed liberal-democratic lines, as well as public ridiculing of UNIP’s supposedly ‘non-violent’ policy, became more frequent. In an important interview, Nkumbula accused UNIP of believing in a ‘totalitarian form of government’ while his party, on the contrary, was committed to ‘private enterprise’ and the ‘complete freedom of the individual.’ In the same interview, Nkumbula claimed that ‘UNIP has aligned itself with the Casablanca Group of countries, which are Communist inclined. We in the ANC to the Monrovia Group which is democratically inclined […] Kaunda is not carrying out his own policies. They are Nkrumah’s ideas.’216 These declarations had an unmistakable ‘Tshombeist’ flavour. After all, anti-communism and the continued pursuance of liberalism had been both the cause and the justification for the secession as was openly declared in the Katangese declaration of independence of 11 July 1960:

L’indépendance du Congo est un fait depuis le 30 juin 1960.
Que Constatons-nous à présent ?
[…] Un gouvernement central à majorité extrémiste s’est constitué. […]
Des troubles ont éclaté partout […].
Dans ces circonstances, et devant les menaces que ferait peser sur nous une plus longue soumission à l’arbitraire et à la volonté communisante du gouvernement central, le gouvernement katangais a décidé de proclamer l’indépendance du Katanga.
[…] Cette Indépendance est TOTALE. Cependant, conscient de la nécessité impérieuse d’une collaboration économique avec la Belgique, le gouvernement du Katanga […] demande à la Belgique de s’unir avec le Katanga en une étroite communauté économique.217

That this similarity was not deliberate seems unlikely. It was no secret that Kaunda and Tshombe had no love for each other. As early as July 1960, within days of the beginning of the Katanga secession, M. Mainza Chona, UNIP deputy president and United Kingdom representative, had made a public statement to the effect that, although the two parties had previously been very friendly towards each other, ‘His [Tshombe’s] open links with Union Minière, which have come to the surface, the fact that he appealed to the settlers of Central Africa for help, and the way he is being boosted by the

Press is proving embarrassing to most of us in the U.N.I.P.218 By January 1962, Tshombe was referred to as a ‘primitive clumsy looking man-eater’219 in a UNIP pamphlet published by the divisional headquarters in the Southern Province. He was also referred to as ‘Welensky’s stooge’ in the resolutions passed by the UNIP National Council in March 1962:

This council endorses the stand adopted by the party in the past namely that no balkanisation of the Congo, or any other part of Africa, shall ever be tolerated; that we affirm our stand that neither the West nor the East has any right to choose leaders for the Congo and that the danger of balkanisation hamply [sic] demonstrated during the recent gun-running periods when Welensky used Tshombe as a stooge. This council, therefore, appeals to all Congolese leaders to get together for the sake of national unity, and appeals to Moïse Tshombe to avoid, by breaking away from the Congo and join Rhodesia, jumping from the flying pan into the fire.220

Not to be outdone, Tshombe had let it be known that he considered Kenneth Kaunda to be ‘the Lumumba of Northern Rhodesia.’ ‘And, like Lumumba,’ he said, ‘Kaunda would never achieve real power.’221 He added, ‘wiping the anger from his face with a smile’: ‘I think the moderates, the men with the philosophy like us, men like Nkumbula and Katilungu, are the ones who will lead the Africans in Northern Rhodesia.’222 Whether this rapprochement between Katanga and the ANC, which the clear bearing of Tshombe’s ideas on the ideological re-positioning of the ANC made obvious, was ideological or practical can be debated. There was, in any case, at least one commodity that Katanga possessed in abundance and that the ANC sorely needed: cash.

Alliance with Katanga
Marginalisation, at both national and international levels, and financial crisis were certainly determining factors in strengthening Nkumbula’s resolve to seek new allies across the Katangese border. It is not certain when communication between Nkumbula and Tshombe started, but, by May 1961, Ronald John Japau, the ANC’s provincial general secretary in the North-Western

220 UNIP North Rhodesia. Resolutions of National Council of UNIP, done at UNIP freedom house, Lusaka, PO box 302, 8 March 1962 MMC/KBK, UNIP/1/1/3a, doc.06, p.3.
221 ‘Lumumbist’ Kaunda will never get power, says Tshombe,’ Northern News, 15 February 1961.
222 Ibid.
Province and Tshombe’s fellow Lunda, paid the first of a series of visits to Elisabethville where, between 1961 and 1962, he managed to secure five vehicles and an unknown sum of money for the ANC (Larmer & Macola 2007: 474-475). The precise volume of Katangese financial assistance to the ANC is difficult to gauge. Mulford found that the ANC accounts for the year up to 30 June 1961 showed a contribution of £10,000 from Katanga, most of which was used for the purchase of vehicles (Mulford 1967: 241). Thanks to the Congress’ ever more open professions of support for the secession, the Katangese financial aid continued to flow into the ANC’s pocket and may even have reached £25,000 by February 1962.223 The governor of Northern Rhodesia suggested a figure of £40,000 in August 1962.224 There is little doubt in any case, that the sums involved must have been important. By mid-1962, the (in)formal ‘alliance’ that existed between Tshombe and the ANC was not much more than an open secret. On 29 July 1962, the British Newspaper *The Observer* published an article, which, because of its direct relevance to this argument, is worth quoting in full:

The evidence is increasing that, in a last bid to save Sir Roy Welensky’s Federation, powerful interests in Katanga are intervening in the affairs of Northern Rhodesia. If Kenneth Kaunda’s United National Independence Party wins a majority in the elections next October everyone knows it will insist on following Nyasaland out of the Federation. To avert this, President Tshombe of Katanga and the moneyed interests behind him are backing, not Welensky’s United Federal Party – that would be too obvious and ineffective – but the small African Opposition Party, Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress.

For a long time there have been links between Nkumbula and Tshombe. Nkumbula has been visiting Elisabethville at least once a fortnight. Senior members of his Congress have been based there for long periods. The Congress has its party literature printed in Elisabethville. Last April Nkumbula received £24,000 from the National Bank of Katanga in Elisabethville and it is known that this was not the first subvention from those quarters […].

But this collaboration between the two goes further. Last August a Northern Rhodesian delegation went to Elisabethville to ‘thank President Tshombe for

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223 Following a new request from Nkumbula to Godefroid Munongo, the Katangese Interior Minister, an additional £20,000 were seemingly made available to the ANC in September. H.M. Nkumbula to G. Munongo, Lusaka, 7 July 1962, UNIPA, ANC 7/54 as quoted in Macola (2010: 85).

his aid to certain moderate leaders’ – according to the Bulletin des Renseignements No.261 of the Katangese security service. In the last few months this aid has taken the form of the military training of Northern Rhodesians, mainly from the Tonga and Lozi tribes, to serve as the nucleus for an “army” for Nkumbula’s A.N.C.

What is Tshombe’s motive in all this? The money he has dished out to Nkumbula was given on the understanding that the ANC was to put his case in Northern Rhodesia, but not surprisingly Congress has shown little enthusiasm for this unpopular activity. Tshombe himself has often underlined the fact that before the Europeans came, Katanga and Rhodesia formed one great territory. Some Congress leaders rather than accept rule by Kaunda’s U.N.I.P., are believed to be prepared to partition Northern Rhodesia and join parts of Katanga.225

The Observer article garnered immediate interest from the British government, which demanded clarifications from the Northern Rhodesia governor in Lusaka. The latter’s comments on the points made by the article were the following:

1 Although Nkumbula is known to have visited Elisabethville on several occasions, his visits are not at regular intervals and are far less frequent than fortnightly.
2 Congress have a well-equipped office in Elisabethville which is run by an official named Bellings LOMBE, who is known to have entrée to the Minister of the Interior and to other senior Katanga ministers. […]
3 It is known that Nkumbula has received payments of £40,000 through the Katanga National Bank during the last six months and it is thought likely that the money has come from the Katanga authorities.
4 I have no knowledge of a Northern Rhodesia Congress delegation travelling to Elisabethville in August of last year to “thank Tshombe for his aid to certain moderate leaders”.
5 No confirmation has been obtained of the allegations that Congress members are being given military training at Karavia near Elisabethville.
6 It is understood from information obtained from the Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau that the basis of the Agreement between Tshombe and Congress is that, in the event of Congress forming the future govern-

225 ‘Tshombe Intervenes in N. Rhodesia,’ The Observer, 29 July 1960, found in file sent from Elisabethville to Foreign Office on 2 August 1962, FO 371/161512, doc. JB1105/5-6 (NAUK).
ment of Northern Rhodesia, a federation between Katanga and Northern Rhodesia would be arranged.  

Kaunda himself interpreted Tshombe’s intention as including the annexation of Northern Rhodesia to Katanga and said so to the National Council: ‘Tshombe wants Angola and Northern Rhodesia to join him. This is his dream. He does not want any copper competition. Welensky is using Nkumbula to get Tshombe in order to swallow both. He wants both Northern Rhodesia and Katanga.’  

If there is little doubt that the ANC benefited from Katangese financial support, other claims sound rather fanciful. Whether and how many Northern Rhodesians trained in Katanga was never ascertained. Nor does it seem likely that Tshombe and Nkumbula could (or even would) realistically envisage the formation of a Federation between their two countries. In all likelihood, theirs was a pragmatic alliance that was to yield immediate results: cash for Nkumbula, the installation of a friendly government in neighbouring Northern Rhodesia and the easing of Katanga’s diplomatic isolation for Tshombe. But the fact that such rumours existed and the way they brought about the production of considerable correspondence reveals the fear that their alliance occasioned.

**Nkumbula’s Gamble: The 1962 Elections**

By mid-1962, therefore, thanks to Katangese cash, the ANC was no longer a party in decline. This happened just in time for the country’s first national elections, which were to be held in October and November (Mulford 1967: 229). The ANC began campaigning furiously, using their newly found ideological framework as electoral slogan: ‘multi-racialism, non-violence, economic stability.’ Yet, despite its renewed vitality, the ANC still had too little a support base to hope beating UNIP. Nkumbula then embarked in a delicate political balancing act. Knowing that Federal Prime Minister Welensky’s feared a UNIP victory, since that would undoubtedly mean the instantaneous dissolution of his precious Federation, Nkumbula entered an alliance with the settlers’ party: the United Federal Party (UFP). This was a risqué move

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226 Governor in Lusaka to First Secretary of State in London, 28 August 1962, FO 371/161512, doc. JB1105/5-21 (NAUK).
227 Minutes of the meeting of the National Council held on 10 November 1962, UNIP/1/1/2, doc.4.
228 Analysis of the Allegations that Members of the African National Congress are receiving Military training in Katanga, annexure to Savingram from Governor in Lusaka to First Secretary of State, central African Office in London, 24 August 1962, FO 371/161512, doc. JB1105/5-21 (NAUK).
but not without tactical value. For if this suggested alliance could be interpreted as a pact with the devil, Nkumbula position as Katanga’s darling could, in fact, significantly increase his electoral appeal since it would garner him the support of those who were de facto Tshombe sympathisers: the Lunda and the Europeans (Mulford 1967: 243). This is no doubt why he suggested the possibility of a future coalition government between the UFP and the ANC. By virtue of this alliance, each party was to support the other’s candidates on the national roll, which comprised both upper (white) and lower roll voters. The UFP-ANC electoral alliance succeeded and the ANC was able to add two ‘national’ seats (which would become four after the by-elections of December) to its three lower roll seats (Macola 2010: 86). As a result of Nkumbula’s coup, the ANC, now held, as Mulford pointed out, ‘the balance of power, a position of immense influence, […] radically disproportionate to the party’s actual strength in the country’ (Mulford 1967: 243).

Yet, right after these results came up, Nkumbula changed allegiances. Quite brutally so. The UFP’s votes had allowed him to open negotiations about a coalition pact with UNIP from a position of power. Now that the ANC had used its UFP alliance to the greatest possible advantage, there was no more need for it to be maintained. Despite Kaunda’s assertion that ‘Mr Nkumbula is the most worried man. If he goes with UNIP, he will be in trouble with his financial masters and if he goes with UFP, he will be finished politically,’230 Nkumbula did not seem to have too many qualms making his choice. Asked why he had suddenly changed his mind about a link with UNIP, Nkumbula immediately answered with a ready-made justification: ‘Two of the main reasons behind my decision were that Mr. Kaunda assured me his party is not committed to communism and he is more favourably inclined towards Katanga.’231 Despite having nearly twice as many parliamentarians as the ANC, UNIP eventually allocated Nkumbula’s party half of the six full ministerial posts reserved for elected representatives in the new cabinet (Macola 2010: 86). 232 As for the Legislative Council it was composed of 14 UNIP members, 16 UFP Members and seven ANC members, with a total of 37 members (Mulford 1967: 286). The 1962 elections and their aftermath also made it clear to all that the Federation was now irremediably doomed and its days numbered.

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230 Minutes of the meeting of the National Council held on 10 November 1962, UNIP/1/1/2, Doc.4.
232 UNIP and the ANC between them won over 80,000 votes – two-thirds of the total. See Roberts (1976: 221).
The Disaggregation

On 16 November 1962, three days before nomination day, Kaunda and Nkumbula issued a joint statement confirming their intention to form a coalition and calling on their respective supporters to cease hostilities. By 29 November, they were announcing their intention to co-operate in the formation of a new government and their wish for early home rule.233 Despite this optimistic statement, it grew quickly obvious that the Coalition Government was ‘ridden by political manoeuvring and rent with internal dissent’ (Mulford 1967: 338) and that the position of Nkumbula himself, despite his seemingly resounding victory, was far from secure. To start with, some ANC officials were far from happy with this alliance with their former enemies. ANC officials on the Copperbelt in particular called the pact ‘unwanted and unwarranted’ and called for Nkumbula’s resignation as party leader.234 Welensky and the UFP (which became the National Progress Party in April 1963) were – it goes without saying – similarly disgruntled. Though they had by now accepted the inevitability of the Federation’s demise, federal politicians actively sought to undermine Nkumbula by supporting the activities of a rebel faction led by national secretary Job Michello: the People’s Democratic Congress (PDC) founded in August 1963 (Macola 2010: 87; Mulford 1967: 307). But least happy with the situation were probably Nkumbula’s sponsors. When Nkumbula agreed to cooperate with UNIP, one of his chief concerns had been the maintenance of his profitable Katanga connection. Nkumbula had overtly sought Tshombe’s approval before signing his pact with UNIP in December 1962. Twice in early November Nkumbula visited Elisabethville before confronting UNIP with his Katanga demand: an assurance against hostile Katanga politics and a tripartite meeting with Tshombe before the coalition was formed. While ANC’s first demand might perhaps have been quietly fulfilled, UNIP’s pan-Africanist aspirations and Katanga policies made the second inconceivable. At the time of the joint ANC-UNIP declaration however, Nkumbula forced the issue by announcing in a Press Conference, which Kaunda was attending too, that a meeting with Tshombe had been arranged. Kaunda, however, immediately arranged his own secret meeting with Tshombe at Kitwe on 18 November (Mulford 1967: 294). This quickly leaked to the Press and soon there was speculation as to whether the two leaders were discussing ‘the possibility of a new federation of Central African countries, including a link between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga’ and the ‘tribal ties between Katang-

233 ‘ANC UNIP agree to form a coalition government’, Northern News, 29 November 1962.
gese and Northern Rhodesian Africans.\textsuperscript{235} This rumour was refuted the next day by Kaunda in a press release, in which he stated that

\begin{quote}
\text{[R]eports in the papers about Mr. Tshombe and himself discussing the possibility of a new federation of Central African countries, including a link between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga and reports of ‘a vast new confederation of states’ were all utter and malicious concoctions created by the Press which was unable to obtain access to the talks […]]. The talks […] were among other things intended to create more understandings among Africans and eventually bring Mr. Tshombe into line with the Leopoldville Government.}\textsuperscript{236}
\end{quote}

The ANC had been caught by surprise and, though Nkumbula rushed to Kitwe to meet Tshombe the following day,\textsuperscript{237} Kaunda’s coup had succeeded in undermining Nkumbula’s special relationship with Tshombe. He was no longer Tshombe’s sole interlocutor in Northern Rhodesia and, with the ending of Katangese support, the ANC was plunged back into a state of serious financial difficulty. Late in the summer of 1963, the party’s debts were already reported to be about £25,000 (Macola 2010: 87).

In addition, despite their convenient alliance, relationships between ANC and UNIP members remained tense and unfriendly. By January 1963, the coalition was unambiguously nearing its end. In the course of two days, Nkumbula and Kaunda issued public statements that were vitriolic enough to leave little doubt as to the coalition’s chance of survival. Once more, the bone of contention, at least publicly, was Katanga. On 3 January, \textit{Northern News} reported that:

\begin{quote}
Mr. Nkumbula accused Mr. Kaunda of breaking promises he made in London recently that he would end his hostile attitude to Katanga and that Congolese Premier Adoula and President Tshombe should be left to settle the crisis themselves.

Mr. Nkumbula claimed that one of the conditions of the coalition Government had been that UNIP would adopt a friendly attitude towards Katanga.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{236} Press release by Kaunda dismissing the possibility of an association with dissident Katanga, Sikota Wina, Director of Publicity Bureau, 20 November 1962, UNIP/1/1/2, doc. 21.
\textsuperscript{237} \textit{Ibid}.\footnote{237 \textit{Ibid}.}
Mr. Kaunda’s actions at the Leopoldville conference showed he had no intention of doing so.238

Thereupon, Kaunda replied with a blistering attack:

He [Kaunda] accused the ANC leader of putting Katanga’s interests before Northern Rhodesia’s and revealed they had already clashed twice on this issue. […]

Mr. Kaunda called a Press conference today to refute the charges made by Mr. Nkumbula yesterday that he had broken promises to end his hostile attitude to Katanga.

“If the African National Congress agreed to enter a coalition government in Northern Rhodesia to serve Katanga interests – which seems to be the case – then the coalition is finished,” he said. […]

“our first duty was to the Central Government in the Congo and we made that point very clear indeed.”239

On 23 January 1963, a mere five days after the secession of Katanga was finally brought to an end, so was the coalition.240 Unsurprisingly, the parties competed head-on in the general elections of January 1964. Nkumbula was, however, unable to repeat his 1962 coup d’
éclat and the ANC, with its ten seats, was soundly defeated by UNIP’s 55. On 24 October 1964, the Republic of Zambia was born. Its president was Kenneth Kaunda (Burnell 2001: 246).241

241 Many details are left out of this narrative for the sake of fluidity. Mention should be made of two other major sources of resistance that Zambian nationalism still faced on the eve of independence. First, was the Lumpa Church: an independent Christian Church that was established in 1953 by Alice Lenshina Mulenga in the village of Kasoma. The Lumpa church, which militated against earthly authority, was eventually banned in 1964 after which most of its followers took refuge at Mokambo in the Congo. Second, was the BSAC which still owned the mineral rights of the Copperbelt. After the government was able to publicly argue that that the Company had never in fact had any legal right to the royalties. On the eve of independence, the BSAC agreed to surrender its royalties. See Roberts (1976: 221-222).
5.3 The Rise of the One-Party-State

5.3.1 Disappointed Expectations of Independence

In the same way that the ‘freedom struggle’ has been portrayed as that of a nation united against a common foe, Zambia’s First Republic has generally been described as a period of relative political harmony and economic growth. The general assumption is that the Zambian post-colonial state encountered little or no challenge in the 1960s until the economic stagnation of the early 1970s created widespread popular disenchantment and threatened UNIP’s authority. However, Larmer noted how evidence from the UNIP archives suggests that the situation was not as rosy as suspected. The archives bear witness to UNIP’s inability to materialise the era of economic and political felicity that their programme promised, and this from the very beginning. The failure to address the numerous expectations of post-independence that they had dangled in the eyes of their voters in order to mobilise their support, led to significant discontent and divisions within the ruling party as well as within the country. Western Province, the Lunda heartland, was particularly vituperative, thus joining ANC’s stronghold, Southern Province, in challenging UNIP’s narrative of absolute unity (Larmer 2007: 45; Macola 2006: 44).

The Lunda Factor

Practically from the moment the first UNIP-dominated government came into power, the Lundas became one of the first and main voices expressing resistance against UNIP policies. Interestingly, that was true of both the ‘older’ Lunda stronghold, that of Mwata Yamvo, and of the ‘newer’ one, that of the Mwata Kazembe. This is no doubt related to the process of revitalisation and glamourisation of a ‘Lunda Mystique’ in provenance of Katanga that had been underway since 1959. That year, following widespread rioting in Léopoldville from 4 to 7 January, the Belgian government was shocked into announcing on 13 January 1959 that ‘La Belgique entend organiser au Congo une démocratie capable d’exercer les prérogatives de la souveraineté et de décider de son indépendance.’ In response to this declaration, the then Mwata Yamvo Ditende Yawa Nawezi III had censured the ‘unforgivable aberration’ of ‘considering the opinions which emanate from the urban centres as representing the general

242 Zambian economy upon independence, though in good health, was still characterised by a certain dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa for investments and export routes, and exclusive dependence on one commodity: copper. See Déveria (2010: 11); Roberts (1976: 224-227).
feelings of this province.\textsuperscript{244} This he did in the name of the ‘Lunda empire, one of the most important demographic groups in Katanga whose sphere of customary authority extends beyond the boundaries of the Congo [into] Angola and [Northern] Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{245} On 25 February 1960, Mwata Yamvo Ditende, striving to prove the enduring vitality of the Lunda, produced a list of ‘no fewer than thirty-two tribes and sixty major chiefs claimed as traditional subordinates of the Mwaant Yaav’. The list encompassed every group that had ever had a Lunda chief or migrated to or from any Lunda stronghold,\textsuperscript{246} including the Lunda of Kazembe (Macola 2002: 227). This boasting had a pragmatic purpose as well as an ideological one. On the eve of the secession of Katanga, the construction of an inflated representation of the pre-colonial Lunda ‘Empire’ served the purpose of rallying masses by providing a rationale for Katangese particularism and a ‘common ground’ between Tshombe’s Conakat party and the Mwata Yamvo’s royal circles. The Conakat, although 17 tribes in total were grouped under its banner (Yakemtchouk 1988: 89-90), had at its core Moïse Tshombe’s own tribe: the Lunda. Tshombe himself was a nephew and the son-in-law of the Mwata

\textsuperscript{244} Mwata Yamvo to Minister for Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, 31 January 1959, as quoted in Bustin (1975: 189).
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{246} Mwata Yamvo to Governor General, 25 February 1960, as referred to in Bustin (1975: 194).
Yamvo. In this way, the term ‘Lunda Empire’, which had not been heard of in a political context before January 1959 became a common stock phrase in militant discourses. Nor did the end of the Katangese secession call time on the process of Lunda revitalisation. On the very eve of Zambian independence, Kaunda supposedly received a message from Tshombe, who had returned to power as the prime minister of a government of national reconciliation in July 1964, indicating that “Tshombe could, if he chose, make trouble for Kaunda through his influence with the Lunda.” This did not stop Kaunda from excluding Tshombe from Zambia Independence celebrations.

For the Kanongesha Ndembi in particular, ‘Zambia’ was much less enticing a concept than that of ‘Lunda Empire’ as had been read by the Katanga secession. Since Kanongesha Ndembi was based in the District of Mwinilunga, a part of a larger Lunda area that was wedged between Congo and Angola, the promise of a revision of the borders of central Africa must have seemed particularly attractive (Bustin 1975: 190-193; Mulford 1967: 270-271; Larmer & Macola 2007: 474). Katangese dignitaries, seeking to rally support for the secession, seem to have been in contact with Ndembi from the beginning of the secession. The Mwata Yamvo himself, with whom the Kanongeshas had maintained close relationships for almost two centuries, frequently visited the North-Western Province (Larmer & Macola 2007: 474; Bustin 1975: 189). Kanongesha Ndembi was not the only resident of Mwinilunga who closely followed the evolution of the situation in Katanga however. Ronald John Japau, the local ANC’s provincial general secretary in the North-Western Province also visited Katanga a number of times, starting in May 1961 (see point 2.3 above) to promote the ANC’s cause and collect the fruit of the Tshombe-Nkumbula alliance (Larmer & Macola 2007: 474-475). Their common alliance with Tshombe encouraged supporters to the ANC in Mwinilunga to make common cause with the Lunda of Kanongesha (Ibid.: 475). Japau’s ‘New Plan for North Western Rhodesia To Join Lunda and Angola,’ which he wrote in 1964, leaves little doubt as to how ‘Lunda’ and opposition to UNIP had become synonymous in his mind:

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247 Tshombe was not the only member of the Conakat with ‘royal’ connections. In fact, the Conakat counted among its ranks members of all the old kingdoms’ aristocracies: Godefroid Munongo assured the support of the Bayeke by his position as King Msiri’s grandson; Jason Sendwe, whose origins were more modest, was nevertheless related to one of the Baluba chiefly families. See Hempstone (1962: 73); Kestergat (1986: 62); Yakemtchouk (1988: 89-90).

248 British Embassy in Leopoldville to West and Central African Department of Foreign Office, 20 October 1964, Fo 371/176685, doc. JB1062/59 (NAUK).

249 ‘ANC Man Speaks up for Tshombe,’ Times of Zambia, 15 October 1964.
To all Lunda people [...] Lunda Empire is strongly opposing to the Zambia Government [...] which is being run by a foreign Prime Minister [...] [and] is predominantly communist [...] We are to join together with the people of Angola and Katanga to form up a great force but we don’t want fighting but we want peace.  

Thus, Mwinilunga remained one of the few Northern Rhodesian localities to resist UNIP’s brand of uncompromising nationalism. In the general elections of 20 January 1964, despite the ANC’s overall defeat, Japau defeated Peter Matoka, the UNIP candidate in Mwinilunga. This caused the ANC branch of Mwinilunga to be the victim of an aggressive campaign of intimidation on the part of UNIP while Kanongesha Ndemi was threatened with deposition on several occasions for his continued support to the ANC. Consequently, in November 1965, Ndemi and a large group of his followers crossed the border into neighbouring Angola where they began to be trained by the Portuguese military as a counter-guerilla force (Larmer & Macola 2007: 476-477).

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Katanga pedicle, the Luapula Province, also started to agitate. In contrast to the Mwinilunga District, the Luapula Province had always traditionally been a centre of UNIP support, but after independence, the Luapulans had rapidly grown disaffected with UNIP. The Luapula Province had been characterised by an early and intense political mobilisation from the 1950s due to its economic importance as a source of labour and fish. As a result in this province, the feeling that independence was to bring forth immediate and tangible rewards in the form of rapid development was particularly felt. When this failed to materialise, clashes between Mwata Kazembe XVII Paul Kanyembo Lutaba and UNIP became increasingly common (Macola 2006: 44-46). Tensions came to a head in 1965, when the government announced that chiefs would soon be removed from presiding over local courts. In July of that year, Paul Kanyembo paid a long visit to the Congolese bank of the Luapula River. Kanyembo, though all the while professing his attachment to UNIP, had been a fervent supporter of the secession of Katanga (Ibid.: 53). As noted above, the Lunda of Kazembe had been included in Ditende’s list of the Mwata Yamvo’s ‘traditional subordinates,’ and though the two Mwatas did not resume any formal relationship, it is apparent that the Eastern Lunda king’s sense of Lunda ‘patriotism’ had been re-ignited by the ‘Lunda Emperial Mystique’ that the secession had contributed to revive (Macola 2002: 227). Kanyembo had reportedly declared that: ‘he [had

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been] paving way for his final action [unknown]. He [had] confirmed […] that he [had] no confidence in the Government of Zambia, except Congolese one, from where he came.\textsuperscript{251} With such anti-UNIP statements becoming increasingly common in the Luapula Province, the local regional publicity and youth secretary of UNIP reported that the ‘situation was very bad indeed. We cannot tolerate Katanga people to come and influence our people.’\textsuperscript{252} It is unlikely that Paul Kanyembo ever seriously envisaged a political union between the Luapula valley and the Congo however. His appeal to Lunda unity must be placed in the context of the Luapulans’ frustration with post-independence Zambia, and probably constituted no more than a channel in which to express grievances as well as justify them. His policy, in any case, undeniably led to an intensification of a Lunda ‘identity’ among the Luapulans (Macola 2006: 55).

Tshombe’s final fall from power in October 1965 when he was dismissed by President Joseph Kasavubu, was bad news for both Japau and Paul Kanyembo. Throughout 1966, MP Japau kept in touch with Ndembì’s successor as leader of the Lunda exiles, John Samawino, and did his best to provide him with new recruits.\textsuperscript{253} Despite Kaunda’s warning that he would dismiss any of the district’s chiefs or other troublemakers that would flaunt government authority,\textsuperscript{254} this eventually led to the only significant internal armed rebellion against the Zambian state in history, known as the ‘Mushala rebellion’ (after its leader Adamson Mushala), which took place between 1976 to 1982 in North-Western Province (See Larmer & Macola 2007). In the Luapula, though the Kazembe’s campaign was brought to an abrupt end in 1965, frustration with the government’s failure to meet ‘expectations of independence’ continued. As Macola put it:

Over the next few years calls for a more authoritarian political dispensation became more frequent and raucous both in the Luapula province and the country as a whole. When seen in the light of the long history of popular discontent which predated its inception in 1973, the one-party state was less


\textsuperscript{252} M. Lufoma to political assistants in Luapula Province, 24 September 1965, HM89/PP/2/F1 (NAZ) as quoted in Macola (2006: 54).

\textsuperscript{253} Japau was put on a very publicised trial in July-August 1967 for ‘conspiring with unknown persons to train in arms and military exercises.’ He was eventually acquitted. See ‘High treason hearing: Court told of plan to overthrow the Government,’ \textit{Times of Zambia}, 8 April 1967; Larmer & Macola (2007: 478).

a response to increased factional competition for fast-shrinking public resources (the standard explanation of political science) than the means to ensure the survival of a besieged political elite, whose erstwhile credibility had all but melted away in the heat of unfulfilled expectations (Macola 2006: 56).

It appears, therefore, that frustration with the UNIP state predated the fall of copper prices from 1970. Before bringing the argument to a close, a word should be said about the final developments that led to the inception of the one-party state and how growing opposition due to disappointed ‘expectations of Independence’ had a great part to play in it.

### 5.3.2 The Final Showdown

**The 1968 Elections**

In the summer of 1967, due to its continuing inability to raise enough money, the ANC was close to disappearing from the political map of Zambia. Thanks to the renewed enthusiasm for ANC in Mwinilunga and its unwavering support from Southern Province, however, the ANC was not only able to save itself from complete debacle, but also to become a major player in the Zambian chessboard once more, all of this within little more than a year (Macola 2010: 121-123). All the ANC’s hopes rested on the outcome of the by-elections of 1 March 1968 in Southern Province. This was very much a survive-or-die moment for the ANC as it could not have handled another defeat. The gamble was rewarded with victory: all the UNIP candidates lost in favour of their ANC colleagues (*Ibid.*: 124). Another development that eventually played in the ANC’s favour was the banning of the United Party (UP). The United Party had originally been launched at the beginning of 1966 by ANC dissidents Mumbuna and Lombe, and had been able to attract some UNIP officials from Barotseland and the North-Western Provinces. They, too, in a similar way to the Luapulans, bemoaned UNIP’s neglect of their provinces and its more general inability to meet popular expectations of independence. The UP’s attempt to gain ground in the Copperbelt in the early part of 1968 sent the industrial heartland of the country into a spiral of interparty violence thereby prompting Kaunda to bring the party’s life to a premature end. The UP ban, which Nkumbula openly condemned, enabled the Congress President to negotiate a merger between the two parties. This allowed the ANC to gar-

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255 Lozi feelings of disaffection with the central government grew out of the government’s ban on the labour recruiting activities of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association in Barotseland from the end of 1966. See Macola (2010: 125-126).

256 Kaunda managed to make it look internationally like a necessary measure for national security. See ‘Foreign Support for Kaunda’s U.P. ban,’ *Times of Zambia*, 16 August 1968.
ner comparative success in the general elections of 19 December 1968, when Nkumbula’s party succeeded in doubling its 1964 parliamentary representatives by winning eight out of the eleven Barotseland seats in addition to the ANC-friendly constituencies in the Southern and Central Provinces (Larmer & Macola 2007: 482). The results, gloated ANC’s national secretary Liso, showed that it was ‘not possible to have a one-party state in Zambia;’ at least not through electoral means.257

‘One Zambia, One Nation’

In the years that followed the election of 1968, there were increasing signs of UNIP radicalisation. Already in April 1968, Kaunda had announced to the UNIP National Council the launching of the so-called ‘Mulungushi reforms’, in virtue of which the government bought a 51 per cent (i.e. a controlling) share in 26 major companies.258 Yet, the Mulungushi reforms had merely been a harbinger of more radical economic measures to come. In August 1969, Kaunda announced the nationalisation of the copper industry.259 Even more momentous, or so it was felt, was the total ban on the ANC imposed in February 1970 in the Livingstone district, following interparty clashes in that region. This seemed to indicate that the ruling party was now moving in the direction of a one-party state (Larmer & Macola 2007: 482). This was made all the more evident by UNIP’s response to the formation of the United Progressive Party (UPP), led by Kaunda’s former ally Simon Kapwepwe. Kapwepwe’s election as UNIP and Zambia’s vice President in 1967 had sparked opposition, particularly among Easterners, who feared the ‘Bemba dominance’ of UNIP. Bemba politicians from Northern and Copperbelt Provinces, on the other hand, expected their significant contribution to the nationalist struggle to be rewarded with higher representation in the central Government. Kaunda claimed to be neutral but in reality increasingly leaned towards the Easterners. In 1969, he reduced Bemba representation in the cabinet. As a result, Simon Kapwepwe eventually resigned from government in 1970 and, in a context of growing Bemba discontent, established the UPP in 1971 (Larmer 2007: 45). The UPP was a formidable opponent for UNIP. Not only was the UPP very popular – its supporters included the Bemba of the Northern and Luapula Provinces, the workers and businessmen of the Copperbelt, and the intelligentsia of Lusaka – but Kapwepwe also made common cause with

258 ‘Govt. taking over 26 key companies’, Times of Zambia, 20 April 1968; The impact of the Mulungushi reforms is discussed Macmillan (2008).
259 This was done with the agreement of the Anglo American Company and the Roan Selection Trust, which were handsomely compensated. See Larmer (2007: 44).
Nkumbula, with whose party the UPP was sharing offices. Unsurprisingly, the prospect of an electoral alliance between Kapwepwe and Nkumbula’s organisations was a serious concern for UNIP. For the first time since independence, UNIP ran the risk to become a minority party. This was a particularly inauspicious conjuncture since the next general elections of 1973 were not so far off (Larmer & Macola 2007: 484; Macola 2010: 138). As a result, when violent clashes between UNIP and UPP supporters erupted, Kaunda took the opportunity to ban the party in February 1972, heralding the declaration of the one-party state, which, despite all its opponents’ efforts, was promulgated on 13 December 1972. The next day, *The Times of Zambia* was able to publish an article entitled ‘One Zambia One Nation One Party!’

**Conclusion**

At no point could the history of Zambian political awakening, from the first disturbances of 1935 to the establishment of the full-blown single-party state in late 1972, be really described as that of a ‘united nation’. If the anti-Federation protests of the early 1950s indeed had some of the aspects of a ‘national’ movement, it all but disintegrated as soon as its reason for existing – opposition to the Federation – disappeared. Even the strikes of 1935 and 1940, though considered the traditional starting point of Zambian political history, were meant as industrial protests rather than political ones. Though they tackled ‘race’-related issues, they did not openly question the colonial system in place. Similarly, labour unions, though traditionally regarded as the vanguard of political revolution, were primarily established to protect the interests of the Copperbelt – which usually consisted in improvements in pay or working conditions. This is not to say that the strikes and the developments that followed did not have a political effect in the long term. Firstly, they certainly played a great part in starting off the decolonisation process. Secondly, they highlighted the Bemba, whose political success on the Copperbelt can be partly explained by their experiences in Katanga, as the future leaders of political agitation. It is no coincidence that Bemba-dominated areas such as the Luapula and Northern Provinces were among those that consistently gave the Federal state the most trouble.

The secession of Katanga was the backdrop against which some of the major antagonisms of the previous decade found their resolution. From the moment Harold Macmillan announced the beginning of the ‘winds of change’

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to the fall of the UDI state of Rhodesia some twenty years later, white settlers in central Africa fought a fierce battle against Black rule. The most famous episode of this struggle is its last: the ‘Zimbabwe War of Liberation’ (also known as second Chimurenga), which eventually led to the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia in March 1980. In the early 1960s, however, this battle was very much being fought in and around the Federation’s neighbour to the north: Katanga. The settlers of the Federation started by working towards the creation of a White Federation that would embrace Katanga. When it became clear that such an association would not materialise, the settlers fought desperately for the preservation of a white-friendly regime – for want of a white-dominated one – in their vicinity. They were unsuccessful. The would-be independent Katanga state fell in 1963, and soon afterwards both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland obtained their independence. These events are not unrelated. In many ways, the Katanga affair had cost the Federation what little was left of its credibility on both national and international levels. In that sense, Katanga represented the last-ditch desperate attempt on the part of power structures that were fast becoming obsolete to assert their authority and legitimacy not only in the face of other powers abroad but also in their own territory.

If the secession sounded the death knell for white rule in that particular region of the world, it also, to a large extent, determined the nature of competing nationalism within Zambia. Tshombe’s support to the African National Congress went a long way in dictating the terms of its programme. The nearly bankrupt ANC was quick to identify Tshombe as a potential ally in its struggle against the now stronger and richer UNIP. Given the latter party’s explicit Lumumbist sympathies, anti-secessionist stance and appraisal of Tshombe and his ‘murderous ministers’ as ‘imperialist puppets’, it is hardly surprising that Katangese authorities felt more inclined to support the ANC. In turn, Kaunda became increasingly inflexible in its definition of UNIP’s ‘national’ programme as he became aware of the potentially disastrous effect that a precedent of ‘balkanisation’ in the Congo would have on his party. UNIP therefore opposed the secession wholeheartedly on both ideological and instrumental grounds since Tshombe was one of the ANC’s main sponsors. This dichotomy was commented on by the then Congo premier:

Mr. Adoula likened the relationship between the Congo and Northern Rhodesia to a double tennis game, with himself and Dr. Kaunda on one side of
the net and Mr. Nkumbula and Mr. Tshombe, ex-Katangese leader, on the other, “having picked up the racket thrown down by Welensky.”

At the same time, the constant opposition of the Katanga-supported ANC allied to the sustained Lunda militancy in Mwinilunga Districts and Luapula province threatened the credibility of the UNIP’s nationalist discourse. For all UNIP’s countrywide electoral success, the existence of a growing core of opposition in those areas ‘militated against the party’s sustained efforts to present itself as the sole legitimate embodiment of the blossoming nation and to portray the ANC as a moribund tribal organisation, limited to the Tonga-speaking areas of the Central and Southern Provinces’ (Larmer & Macola 2007: 476). Therefore, it is in the context of the nature of the challenges faced by UNIP upon independence that the inception of the Zambian one-party state should be examined. As the ANC’s very existence threatened the idea that the near-totality of Zambians subscribed to UNIP’s nationalist vision, the party leadership simply blurred the distinction between party and nation. This must also be part of the explanation for the similarities between Mobutu and Kaunda’s states: economic troubles, dwindling popularity and diminishing legitimacy, led the two neighbouring governments to resort to nationalisation and one-party-rule.

6 Conclusion
Copper, Migration and Politics

‘Long live the friendship between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of Zambia.’
- President Kaunda to Mobutu at the occasion of the anniversary of the Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), 19 May 1971

6.1 Cross-border Identities and Political Development

As set out in the introductory chapter, the aim of the present work was two-fold: to bring to the fore some of the commonalities in the history of the Copperbelt(s) and to examine how the development of these two linked regions has shaped certain political tendencies, population movements and commerce. The four chapters of this thesis have aimed to highlight the places where the history of the two regions converged, or influenced each other, and why they did so.

The first point of convergence is also the longest one. In the late nineteenth century, although the area of Katanga and Zambia that was crudely divided by the colonial border was not, strictly speaking, a tightly-knit homogeneous whole, virtually all its inhabitants shared long-standing cultural ties. Several larger ‘kingdoms’ had existed for centuries, most prominent among which were the Luba kingdom, the Lunda kingdom of Mwata Yamvo, and the kingdom of Kazembe. Though they could not be described as ‘kingdoms’ in the medieval sense of the term, their cultural aura spread far and wide. Not only were they linked together by a complex network of tributary and trading relationships, but they also sparked a series of population movements, mostly oriented southwards. As a result, many groups in Zambia’s Northern, North-Western, Copperbelt and Luapula provinces traditionally trace their ancestry to Katanga. The outline of the colonial border, entirely determined

as it was by the presence of resources, cut right through these groups and consequently significantly affected the way they interacted. Yet, two assumptions should be carefully avoided. The first is the idea that the appearance of the colonial border was the one single event that disrupted a previously undisturbed region. In fact, colonisation, of which border-drawing is the most powerful expression, was only the last phase of a long process of destabilisation. By 1900, i.e. before colonialism could be implemented in full force in any part of central Africa, all the old ‘kingdoms’ had already fallen. Throughout the nineteenth century, Katanga had come to be pressurised by a series of intruding forces. The Cokwe, the Yeke and the Arab traders – all contributed to affect previous networks of interactions and all were symptomatic of the growth of one particular phenomenon: long-distance trade. Under the influence of the latter, groupings became wider and, in the case of the Yeke, more authoritarian and conquering in nature. Thus, by the time cartographers drew an arbitrary line on the map of central Africa, the Lunda had already lost control over their southern minions and the kingdom of Kazembe had already lost control over the west side of the Luapula as well as over most of its smaller tributaries to the south. One could argue, however, that, to an extent, the appearance of the colonial border served to confirm those divisions and make them long-lasting. Yet – this is where the second mistaken assumption comes in – it would be wrong to think that all forms of relations between these groups were severed, though they were certainly transformed. Though the colonial border separated the Luba and Lunda heartland from former subsidiaries, traditional allegiances were still recognised and were still invoked at times, as happened with the Lunda in the 1960s. At the same time, in the early years of the twentieth century, local populations put the colonial border to good use. Some chiefs, eager to cut ties with their former overlord, utilised the fact that the latter now lived in a different country to become chiefs in their own right, asserting their authority by collaborating with the newly established colonial administration. The Mwata Kazembe, on the other hand, though he was never able to reclaim his western territories, was similarly able to rebuild a strong client network through collaboration with the colonial authorities. In addition, border-crossing became a common activity as a way of escaping all sorts of plights, such as an oppressive tax-system or brutal administrative practices. To sum up: the Copperbelt and its environs developed as an interconnected whole; the border was disruptive but not overpoweringly so; it was on occasions turned into ‘leverage’ by those who lived alongside it.

The second major point of convergence in the history of the two regions is probably the best-known: the parallel development of the almighty copper
industry. From the moment mining was developed in the early years of the twentieth century, it had become a joint affair. Belgium had no experience in African ventures and lacked the capital and personnel to realise the potential of the copper province. As a result, it was British interests that carried out the evaluation and initial development of copper deposits in the region, together with the development of the essential transport infrastructure. In return, the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga provided jobs and freight traffic on the British-owned railroad and offered a 40 per cent ownership of its shares to British interests. In addition, throughout the late 1910s and the early 1920s, Katanga relied almost exclusively on Northern Rhodesian labour and foodstuffs. From the outset, therefore, Katanga and Northern Rhodesia were economically interdependent in terms of capital, investment, labour, trade and expertise. Due to this interdependence, the copper industry induced new patterns of movements as labourers and traders crossed the borders in both directions to make a living. Attracted by the employment opportunities that Katanga offered, many Zambians lived and worked in Katanga for a while, sometimes a very long while, sometimes permanently. This, perhaps more than any sort of interaction that took place beforehand, contributed to bringing the two regions closer. These migrations were of a different nature than those that preceded them in that they were entirely detached from any ‘traditional’ framework. People and goods moved between villages, mining towns and countries, thus heightening cultural diversity and creating hybrid communities. Of this process, the Bemba are a case in point. The agricultural poverty of the Bemba-speaking areas of Northern Rhodesia meant that it emerged as an early labour reservoir, first to the mines of Katanga, and then to the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt. From the 1940s a new Bemba-speaking but relatively cosmopolitan urban African community began to establish itself on the Copperbelt, a process that would have many political implications. Another aspect of the mining companies of Katanga and the Copperbelt that had clear political implications was their all-pervasiveness allied to their interdependence. Given their long history of interaction and economic interdependence, events in Katanga could, from an early date, profoundly affect Northern Rhodesia and vice-versa. The omnipotence and overbearing nature of the mining industries in both countries not only inevitably linked the financial status of the Northern Rhodesian and Katangese governments with the prosperity of the copper industry, but also made sure that the effects of such an event would be magnified. This made the copper mines a monstrous presence in the territories that hosted them.

Finally, all of the above had a profound impact on the development of Zambia as a political entity. Initially, the experiences of the Zambians – the Bemba in
particular – in Katanga was instrumental in the staging of the first protests against colonial inequalities. Therefore, it can be argued that the Bemba’s connections to Katanga contributed in part to making them one of the most politically militant group in Zambia, a tendency that endured in later years. However, it was the secession of Katanga that had the most dramatic effect on Northern Rhodesia. Not only did it play a major role in the ideological positioning of the various Zambian parties in the early 1960s, but it also contributed to a great extent to determining who would win the political battle in Zambia. Secessionist Katanga was the object of a last, semi-desperate, attempt on the part of the settlers of the Federation to cling on to their prominent position. Settler hegemony did not survive long after the secession was brought to an abrupt halt. As for the role of the secession in the showdown between UNIP and the ANC, it was both rhetorical and practical. The alliance between Tshombe and Nkumbula was undoubtedly more opportunistic than ideological, but it is also arguable that this alliance would not have gained such momentum in certain areas of Northern Rhodesia had it not been for cross-border Lunda identities. The memory of a ‘glorious’ Lunda past did a great deal to provide the necessary gel between potential allies. Even after the short-lived alliance between the ANC and Tshombe was broken, the revitalisation of the Lunda ‘aura’ continued to provide a useful framework in which to express popular frustration with the post-colonial state. In both Zambia and Congo, the immediate response to such popular dissatisfaction was the nationalisation of the mining sector and the establishment of one-party states. Therefore, dangerous as it is to indulge in suppositions, it is possible that Zambia would have known a different process of political development had it not been for the influence of its neighbour to the north. Without Katangese support, the ANC might not have survived the hardships of the early 1960s. Without the strength of the Katangese ‘aura,’ the Kanongesha and the Kazembe might not have so easily joined the early chorus of protests against UNIP. Without the added support of these provinces, the ANC might not have succeeded in constituting as much as a constant and ‘general’ threat to the UNIP state. It is even possible that, without Katanga, UNIP might perhaps not have rushed the nation on the path to one-partyism at such a speed. It goes without saying that this is speculative but it is undeniable that Katanga played a role, indirect or not, in all these processes.

Thus, I have distinguished three poles of ‘interconnection’ between southern Katanga and northern Zambia: a cultural pole – identities are not limited to bounded geographic entities; an economic pole – the Copperbelt, because of its economic value, remained a nexus of ideas and people between the two countries; and a political pole – because the allied effects of the first two
poles affected the direction that Zambian history took in the 1960s. Would the history of these two countries be different had there not been any copper in their soils? That is a truism. The rise of the Luba, Lunda and Kazembe kingdoms, the outline of the colonial border, the development of the copper industry, migrant labour, industrial and political activism... copper is the thread that holds them all together. In that sense, copper was a critical factor in determining the fate of the territories beneath whose ground it lay.

6.2 The Copperbelt and ‘Nation-Statism’

The ‘nation state’ and the various ways in which its boundaries are undermined or ‘eroded’ are the broad concepts that underwrote the present narrative. It has been stated in the introduction that the ‘nation state’ is traditionally seen as an ‘old’ grounding principle, which is supposedly increasingly under threat because of the effects of such ‘modern’ phenomena as globalisation (Bislev 2004: 281). Yet, in the case of central Africa, globalisation penetrated and affected local populations long before any nation state was set up. Thanks to the long-distance trade, Katanga was fully integrated into the world economy by the nineteenth century. In fact, one could say that it is globalisation that brought about the nation state, complete with immovable borders, national institutions and export-oriented economies. It is the long-distance trade that made that region of Africa known to European observers, and this, in turn, stimulated a particularly ferocious scramble. So the idea that, as is posited by the globalisation paradigm, there is an opposition between ‘a past of territorial boundedness and a present of interconnection and fragmentation’ (Tornimbeni 2004: 107) should actually be reversed in the case of central Africa. It is because globalisation reached central Africa that is was divided into bounded entities.

The importance of the nation state, however, is not as easily disowned. In Zambia, like virtually everywhere else in Africa, ‘Nation-statism’ was adopted as a channel in which to express grievances and aspirations for independence. It was in the name of the integrity and sovereignty of the Northern Rhodesian territory that both the amalgamation with southern Rhodesia and the independence battle were fought. Given the utter artificiality of the border and the way it cut right into homogeneous entities, it is paradoxical that it should have been so. Paradoxical yet not surprising. A strong border was an essential prerequisite for any would-be independent country to be introduced into the community of recognised modern states. As a result, redrawing the map of central Africa was not an option. Before Zambia became
independent in 1964, 34 states had already achieved that status. Of all these 34 states, only in one had an actual attempt at redrawing the map occurred: the Republic of the Congo. The way in which the secession of Katanga ended after less than three years of existence sent a strong message to any other state contemplating to do the same. In only one other place was the same feat attempted – the eastern province of Biafra in Nigeria whose independence was declared in 1967, but also met a swift conclusion in 1970 (See Nixon, 1972). The example of what happened to Tshombe’s Katanga made the leader of the party under which Zambia became independent very aware of the risk of letting any particularist complaint be advertised too loudly, hence the energy put in stifling them. Therefore, if the nation state, with all its emphasis on self-governance and sovereignty, was a useful framework for the protest against colonialism, it also implied that its integrity was not to be questioned, not even by the peoples who lived within it. It is in this sense that Davidson argued that nation-statism ‘looked like a liberation, and really began as one. But it did not continue as a liberation’ (Donaldson 1992: 10).

It would be disingenuous, therefore, to argue that the nation state is non-important or that it is simply a concept with no bearings on reality. Artificial or not, colonial borders – like borders elsewhere – were real and were acted upon as such. What is criticised here is not the validity of the concept of nation-statism, but rather the fact that, though the artificiality of the African borders is a well-known fact, phenomena happening across them or overlapping memberships are often overlooked precisely because they overlie supposedly territorially separated and independent polities. In the introduction, mention was made of the concept of ‘transnationalism’, which broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states. It is argued that ‘transnationalism’ is imbued with an ‘inherently transgressive quality’ (Mitchell 1997: 101) since ‘transnational’ ties develop across borders that are considered inconvenient (Tornimbeni 2004: 110). At the same time, such interconnections change conceptions of membership as well as the institutions of each interconnected country (Bauböck 2003: 701). In many ways, the Katango-Zambian boundary is the embodiment of such processes. The movement patterns that the copper industry set into motion certainly ‘eroded’ the border even more efficiently than previous ‘protest migrations’ were able to do. If the mining companies and the colonial state worked hard to channel labour into a certain direction, they could not control every single individual. The unimpeded circulation of traders and labourers proved to be both a necessity and at times a difficulty. Migrants certainly bypassed the rules supposed to limit their movements more often than can be counted. From the inhabitants of the Mweru-Luapula areas resolutely
choosing the Katangese mines and markets because it was more convenient to them to the dismay of those who wanted to send them to the south, to the Lunda of Kanongesha Ndemi fleeing to Angola to avoid reprisal for their supporting the ANC over UNIP, border crossing in northern Zambia certainly had a transgressive quality to it. Throughout the colonial era, people crossed the border for a variety of purposes: safety, search for employment, trade, visiting relatives, (self-)imposed political exile, etc. The concept of the nation state, therefore, is very useful if one is attempting to study its particular effects on African societies and history. Unfortunately, it often obscures part of the other aspects that affected that history. The nation state is a new concept as far as Africa is concerned, introduced as it was less than 150 years ago. It is intrinsically artificial and so, therefore, are the ‘threats’ that it is supposedly facing. For all these reasons, in the case of the Copperbelt, the nation state should not be taken as de facto basis for intellectual enquiry.

6.3 Border Conflicts in the Later Twentieth Century

Before bringing this argument to a close, it should be mentioned that the northern border of the Zambian ‘nation state’ remained very much what it was in colonial years throughout the later twentieth century: a porous, contended and awkward-shaped boundary. Although negotiations continued – not to say dragged on – throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the various disputes over segments of the border, such as the Mweru-Tanganyika section, were never resolved. As soon as Zambia became independent, its first government had to deal with a number of reported problems along the boundary, which even prompted the Surveyor General and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources to suggest setting up a boundary commission in August 1966 to demarcate the disputed Mweru-Tanganyika section. However, just like during the colonial times, no commission was ever established (Davidson 2010: 189). The awkward shape of the border and its lack of demarcation continued to lead to periodic disputes, sometimes resulting in violence. A recurring problem was the Katanga pedicle through which many Zambians were compelled to travel to reach the Copperbelt (among other places). Zambians travelling through the pedicle were regularly mistreated or made to pay illegal levies by badly-paid Congolese soldiers (Musambachime 1990). In addition, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the border problem became embroiled in a series of eruption of escalating violence.
Following defeat at the hands of the United Nations in late 1961 and 1962, Tshombe’s mercenary force in Katanga, the Katangese ‘gendarmes’, gradually dissolved. Many decamped to Angola where they fought alongside the Portuguese Forces against the Angolan nationalist movements (MPLA, PNLA and UNITA). They were soon joined by the Kanongesha’s Lunda fleeing UNIP’s reprisal in November 1965. These exiled mercenaries sporadically re-emerged from Angola to create trouble in Congo and Zambia alike (Hughes 2003: 612-615). For example, those of the Lunda who had fled Mwinilunga to join the ranks of the Angolan military, re-emerged in the night between 26 and 27 November 1968, i.e. three weeks before the Zambian general elections, and razed three villages of UNIP supporters to the ground (Larmer & Macola 2007: 479). But the greatest conflict emerged in 1977 and 1978 with two failed attempts at invading Shaba (as Katanga was renamed under Mobutu’s zairinisation campaign), known as Shaba I and II, respectively. On 8 March 1977, the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FNLC), a group largely composed of former members of the Katangese gendarmerie, crossed the border into Shaba from Angola. Shaba II, in contrast to the first Shaba invasion, did not consist of an outright invasion of Zairian territory, but of an infiltration of Zaire (as Congo was known from 1971) via Zambia. In May 1978, FLNC battalions entered Shaba through a part of northern Zambia that was inhabited by the same groups (Lunda and Ndembu) as many members of the FNLC. In both cases, not only did the insurgents seem to have found little opposition from local populations along their way, but also seem to have acquired new recruits from among their Lunda kinsmen. Consequently, the two invasions were quick and efficient (in 1978, the rebels were able to capture Kolwezi) though, in the end, both were nipped in the

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264 Brief on Zaire for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Visit to Saudi Arabia and Iran, 15 May 1977, FCO 31/2117, doc. 285 (NAUK); S. Osborne (East African Department) to C. Townsend (M.P.), ‘Background notes on Shaba Invasion’, 22 April 1977, FCO 31/2115, doc. 225 (NAUK); I. Walker (African Section, Research Department) to S. Orbone (East African Department), ‘Aims, Objectives and Possible Political Affectations of the Ex-Katangese Gendarmerie’, 14 April 1977, FCO 31/2116, doc. 254 (NAUK).

265 A.G. Munro (East African Department to Private Secretary), A discussion with Ambassador Lengema, 17 May 1978, FCO 31/2288, doc. 50 (NAUK); A.G. Munro (African Department to Private Secretary), Brief for Prime Minister’s Meeting with Kaunda, 15 May 1978, FCO 31/2287, doc. 2 (NAUK).

266 E.I. Young (British Embassy) to P.E. Rosling (East African Department), ‘German Assessment of the Situation in Zaire’, 18 April 1977, FCO 31/2115, doc. 205 (NAUK); A.G. Munro (African Department to Private Secretary), Brief for Prime Minister’s Meeting with Kaunda, 15 May 1978, FCO 31/2287, doc. 2 (NAUK).
bud thanks to foreign intervention (mostly French and Belgian). During the invasion of 1978, in particular, the fact that the gendarmes entered Congo from Zambia, which Kaunda claimed to know nothing about,\textsuperscript{267} strained diplomatic relations between Zaire and Zambia. In addition, the suppression of the revolts led to minor border problems and skirmishes, caused by the great numbers of refugees who escaped through Zambia (Davidson 2010: 188).

Ultimately, it was the un-demarcated Mweru-Tanganyika section that engendered the most tensions between the two countries. In August 1980, Zambia accused Zaire of establishing a border post some 30 km within Zambian territory in the Kaputa area on the western end of the Mweru-Tanganyika section. Tensions reached a high point again in early 1982 due to a series of skirmishes that occurred along the border in the Kaputa area. Exchanges of fire also reportedly took place in February and March 1982 along the watershed section and in April 1982, tensions were further fuelled by a communiqué from Lusaka radio, which claimed that two more Zairian border posts had been established within Zambian territory in the Kaputa area. Problems along all Zaire-Zambia borderland areas continued for several years, and Zairians were often blamed for the region’s problems of crime and insecurity, including the smuggling of minerals such as emeralds and other commodities (Davidson: 188-189). Shaba still relied on Zambia for the supply of essential commodities such as sugar, mealie-meal, cooking oil and soap, but cross-border trade had been limited by the Zambian government in an attempt to protect its own domestic market. As a result, there was an increase in illegal trade and when the Zambian government took measures to stop this, it was interpreted as provocation by the Zairian authorities. Then, in July 1984, Zambia deported over 2,000 Zairians while in return Zaire expelled a similar number of Zambians from Shaba (Kongwa 1987: 104). In a context of such latent tension, many skirmishes occurred between 1980 and 1984, some of which resulted in the sending of troops but none appears to have escalated into large-scale military operations.

According to D.W. Davidson, documents from the US Department of State indicate that Zaire and Zambia had set up a joint technical committee to settle the disputed Mweru-Tanganyika section during the tensions in 1982 (Davidson 2010: 189). It was not until 19 September 1989 that an agreement on the Mweru-Tanganyika boundary section treaty was reportedly signed by

\textsuperscript{267} A.G. Munro (African Department to Private Secretary), Brief for Prime Minister’s Meeting with Kaunda, 15 May 1978, FCO 31/2287, doc. 2 (NAUK).
Presidents Mobutu and Kaunda in the Zairian town of Nsele near Kinshasa, after which President Kaunda announced:

The signing of this treaty is truly a proud moment for Africa. It shows that left to themselves, African countries are sufficiently mature to resolve even the most serious of problems in an amicable manner.\textsuperscript{268}

According to Davidson, the text of this agreement does not appear to have ever been made public so its content is unknown. Despite this, minor skirmishes and problems continued, making it doubtful whether any demarcation of the Mweru-Tanganyika section had actually taken place. In early December 1997, the Zambian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister stated in the Zambian Parliament that he blamed ‘the physical non-demarcation of Zambia’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo on the state of insecurity (along the boundary)’ and added that Zambia was willing to undertake physical demarcation but the state of insecurity along the boundary and ‘uncooperative attitude which characterised the former Zaire’ had hampered efforts (\textit{Ibid.}: 191). As a result of this continuous failure to settle on an agreement, the Mweru-Tanganyika section, remains un-demarcated and a source of diplomatic tension. On 17 May 2013, Zambian fishermen were arrested for ‘illegal fishing’ on the Congolese side of Lake Tanganyika. Subsequently, fishermen asked, in terms very similar to those used some hundred years before, for a ‘delimitation exercise’ to be instituted in order ‘to clearly mark Zambia’s borderline with its neighbour.’\textsuperscript{269} History has a way of repeating itself.


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