“Names as weapons”: The Russian government framing of the Second Chechen War and its influence on domestic audience.

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Abstract

The main topic of this study is how the framing of liberation struggles as terrorism affects public opinion for military action. The goal of this thesis is to investigate how the “counter-terrorist” discourse of the Russian President Vladimir Putin after the focusing event of 9/11 affected the Russian public opinion towards the Second Chechen War. Furthermore, I argue that the 9/11 attacks facilitated the (re)framing of the conflict from an internal issue of separatism to an external issue of global terrorism and a greater public support for the war. The theoretical framework utilized is the framing theory and the mechanism-based approach of Alimi et al. (2015) in order to examine how counter-terrorist discourse created polarization and affected the public opinion. Ten most salient quotes of presidential speeches for each period of pre 9/11 and after 9/11 attacks of the timeframe from September 1999 until December 2003 were selected based on the relevance and the focus of transcripts and were analyzed through Van Dijk’s (2004) framework. These two frames were compared with the public opinion polls from the Levada Center. The results revealed that the framing of the conflict was predominantly “counter-terrorist” the whole examined timeframe and even before the 9/11 attacks whereas, interestingly, there were instances when Putin recognized the interconnection between separatism and terrorism after 9/11. However, the results did not support the expectations for greater public support towards war in the period after 9/11 and that the event of 9/11 facilitated the acceptance of the framing in the domestic arena.
1. Introduction

The “war on terror” is one of the most important conflicts since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Few hours after September 11, 2001 attacks, President Bush declared that US was launching a “global war against terrorism” and this “new” threat required a new response by pronouncing prior deterrence and containment methods insufficient. Thus, preemption strategies followed and international military coalitions and campaigns under the vague banner of the “war on terror” launched wars such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. This counter-terrorist campaign of such a large-scale political and military project required a significant degree of social consensus which is not possible without the deployment of a specific and dominant discourse in order to justify and normalize a “global war” (Jackson, 2005). Many scholars examined how this controversial concept of the term “terrorism” was since used by the Bush administration and the mass media discourse in order to justify and mobilize the global military, political, legal and conceptual struggle against countries associated with Islamic terrorism organizations. Specifically, a lot of research examined how the “war on terror” has impacted the fight against terrorism and how the discursive framing of the wars took place in order to be accepted by their domestic audiences, abusing civil rights and liberties (Jackson, 2005).

However, the “war on terror” discourse affected not only the fight against terrorism but separatist movements have been affected as well.

The term “terrorism” has been frequently changing its meaning throughout history. According to Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism is where politics and violence intersect in the hope of delivering power. All terrorism involves the quest for power: power to dominate and coerce, to intimidate and control, and ultimately to effect fundamental political change” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 174). In other words, terrorism refers to the use or the threat of violence for sociopolitical ends as a
means of asymmetric warfare against a large number of noncombatants. Ethno-nationalist separatist movements refer to liberation and self-determination struggles and such movements aim to gain territorial independence, autonomy and can sometimes involve violence and resort to terrorist acts in pursuit of separatists goals. The level of violence used by these groups is “to determine an effective level of violence that is at once “tolerable” for the local populace, tacitly acceptable to international opinion, and sufficiently modulated not to provoke massive governmental crackdown and reaction” (Hoffman, 2006, p.233). According to many scholars, even when the means are easily definable as “terrorist” it is tricky to talk of a “terrorist organization” (Donatella della Porta, 2013, p.28).

This vague distinction between the two concepts is evident in contemporary world of “war on terror”. For example, the Uyghur ethnonationalist separatist movement in China was associated with Al-Qaeda cooperatives. In Turkey, Kurdish separatists are referred to as terrorist groups by the Turkish government and it rejects any negotiation with them. In Russia, the Second Chechen War started as an “operation to restore constitutional order” and resulted after 9/11 as a “counter-terrorist operation” (Pokalova, 2011). Specifically, after 9/11, Putin’s administration opportunistically played up the connections of Chechen rebels with Al-Qaeda jihadists and we have a rapprochement of Russia-US and a cooperation with Bush administration on “war on terror”. The radicalization of Chechen rebels started in the meantime of the two wars (Hughes, 2013) but, according to many scholars, there is no concrete evidence that Chechen rebels were “jihadists”, “Al-Qaeda Shock Brigades”, “Mujahedeen” as they were “classified” by Russian elites and media editorials (Bhatia, 2005, Williams, 2004, Russell, 2002, Souleimanov, 2015).

Such trends, I argue, indicate that governments exploit this interconnection between separatism and terrorism and opportunistically play up the latter one to strategically frame their policies
The reason of this discursive framing is because governments attempt to resist the accommodation of ethno-nationalist separatist grievances or change the territorial status quo. Framing an entire separatist movement as a terrorist threat avoids any negotiation with the separatists and facilitates a distinction between “us” and “them”. This thesis explores the use of framing by governments in order to disguise their true challenges to gain more widespread support for military force. I use September 11 as a focusing event that allowed governments to shift their framing of ethno-nationalist separatist conflicts. Thus, I compared the pre-9/11 framing of ethno-nationalist separatist conflict with the framing that emerged following the 9/11 attacks (Polakova, 2011).

While a lot of research has focused on both separatism and terrorism, not much scholarship studied the crossover between the two and examined the effects of the “war on terror” discourse on ethno-national separatist conflicts and how this shift affected the domestic public opinion. This thesis intends to amend this situation and uncover the effects of framing discourse on the evolutionary course of a conflict characterized in forms of “terrorism”, while “terrorism” was a result of the war and not its cause.

This project is a qualitative study based on the single case study of the Second Chechen War for the timeframe of September 1999 until December 2003. The research question is formulated as follows: “How the framing in terms of “war on terror” of the Second Chechen war by the Russian government affected the Russian public opinion?” Firstly, light is shed on the existing literature and on its relevance for this study. Second, the theoretical framework is discussed and the case selection. Third, the methodology and the analytical framework is laid out. Fourth, the data analysis and the conclusions are discussed.
2. Literature Review

War is undoubtedly a social practice that begs the question “why?” Indeed as a deadly activity endangering human lives, in order to mobilize masses and generate support, war must be assigned a certain degree of legitimacy before it is undertaken. And this legitimation of violence takes serious rhetorical effort that is most often undertaken by the political leadership. One key to success for political leaders is their “soft power”, argued by Nye (2004), to persuade others without using force to do things they otherwise would not do.

The conception of identity discourses in war is aimed to be instrumental and the discourse formation, in discourse theory, is seen as a social process. Subsequently, for various reasons, powerful actors may attempt to “convince their audiences that a certain incompatibility of goals is threatening them, and try to turn this into a dominant discourse”. In essence, according to Jarvis, these representations do not merely describe or “mirror” objects, but they position and “actively construct” objects in relation to the “self” (and demonizing the “other”, the “enemy”) and by that means, perceiving certain categorizations as real, they act upon them. “Discourse is action” and this is the power of it (Demmers, 2012, p.125). Specifically, scholar studies show that dominant classifications such as “terrorist” are selectively employed by powerful actors, through “politics of naming” in order to justify violent actions and gain public support (Bhatia, 2005, Suthaharan Nadarajah & Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, 2005, Donatella della Porta, 2013).

The crucial role of discourse as the instrument of politics has been recognized by cognitive linguists (Lakoff, 1999, 2004) and discourse analysis experts (Fairclough, 1989, Wodak, 2001, 2002). Many scholars studied the role of political discourse in the creation of social reality and how it affects the public opinion. Discourse explains and justifies social activity, and involves providing
‘good reasons, grounds, or acceptable motivations for past or present action’ (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 255).

According to Ball (1988) and the social construction theory, political actors play a key role in the social construction of reality. Zaller (1992) argues that political elites frame and control the way events are presented. Goffman (1974, 1983) refers to a process of “fabrication” and Schneider and Ingram (1997) refer to “framing dynamics”, which is the ability of the political elites to frame issues and it can be used as a tool to affect the process of social construction of the reality (Pokalova, 2011).

Studies of political communication such as that of Miskimmon, O’Loughlin & Roselle (2014) stressed out the notion of “strategic narratives” and the “framing” in political discourse in shaping international affairs and public opinion.

Drawing from theories of social movements, according to Donatella della Porta (2013), “frame analysis focuses on the attribution of the meaning that lies behind the evolution of social movements by looking at the recognition of certain facts as social problems, of the strategies to address them, and of the motivations for action” (p. 37).

Finally, it is not hard to see how political rhetoric “frames” the social construction of the reality by giving certain “meanings” to political issues or events. Thus, discourse framing and public opinion is interconnected. This thesis is based on the argument that reality is socially constructed and as a result, our perceptions can be changed in terms of how the information is presented to us. Consequently, framing theory constitutes the theoretical framework for this project focusing on the question how the framing of the Second Chechen war by the Russian government, in terms of “war on terror” and not “separatism”, affected the Russian public opinion.

In this project I treat the 9/11 attacks as a focusing event that facilitated the shift in Russian government’s framing. Specifically, I argue that the 9/11 attacks were crucial for Russia’s framing
challenges and by portraying the conflict in terms of “war on terror” gained domestic acceptance. Thus, the focusing event served not only to frame the issue of “terrorism” itself but allowed the “terrorist” framing to be involved in other phenomena such as ethno-national separatism. While a lot of research investigated how focusing events created new frames (Jackson, 2005) little research has been done on how focusing events such as the 9/11 attacks not only created new frames and applied the new frames into policies but also, allowed political elites to re-frame the existing issues (such as separatism) in their better interests (Polakova, 2011). This thesis fills this knowledge gap.

3. Theoretical Framework

In this study, I apply the theory of framing in order to answer the research question “How the framing in terms of “war on terror” of the Second Chechen war by the Russian government affected the Russian public opinion?”. I argue that the theory of framing is suitable in order to examine the relationship between the political discourse and its discursive construction of social reality and the response of public opinion. Opinion polls are both an indicator of approval of government policies as well as a target that politicians try to influence by employing certain discourses. Furthermore, except from the classic theory of framing, I use the notion of upwards political opportunity spirals in order to explain how the “terrorist” framing was facilitated by the 9/11 attacks in the Chechen case and how both mechanisms played a role in the categorization “Us/Them” (Alimi et al., 2015). Particularly, I examine how this Us / Them distinction in terms of the “terrorist” (re)framing affected the Russian public opinion. The “counter-terrorist” discourse, as many scholars argue, is based on this distinction (Jackson, 2005, Van Dijk, 2006).

Utilizing the framing theory I hypothesize that:
• The more “counter-terrorist” was the political discourse regarding to the Second Chechen War after 9/11 attacks, the greater was the Russian public acceptance of the war.

I examined how the Second Chechen war was framed by the Russian political discourse, using the focusing event of the 9/11 attacks, prior to 9/11 attacks and after the attacks and which was the public opinion response before and after the attacks and then, I compared the different frames for the same issue and the public opinion responses.

Framing is one of the primary tools that political elites use in order to influence public opinion (Druckman and Nelson 2003). According to political communication scholars and political scientists there are two ways of using the term “frame” (Druckman, 2001c; Scheufele, 1999). Firstly, a “frame in communication” refers to the words, images and the style of presentation that a speaker such as a politician or a journalist uses when delivering information about an issue or an event to an audience (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989). Secondly, a “frame in thought” or an “individual frame” is the cognitive understanding of a certain issue by an individual (D. Chong & J. N. Druckman, 2007). In this project I will investigate “frames in communication” from the President of Russia.

Political elites use frames in order to promote a desired level of policy support from its audience (Gamson & Modigandi, 1987, Callaghan & Schnell, 2005) and by emphasizing certain elements of their policies while omitting others, elites use framing to “manipulate popular preferences to serve their own interests” (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.120). According to Edelman (1993, p. 231), political elites “win public support for [their] actions only by creating and spreading beliefs about those who are deserving and those who are threats” (Pokalova, 2011).
According to Chong and Druckman (2007) the framing theory refers to that a particular issue can be viewed from multiple perspectives and framing is a process “by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.104). Framing is a mechanism that serves for the social construction of the reality and is a tool for generating particular conceptualizations (Pokalova, 2011). Thus, frames are patterns of interpretation that allow individuals “to locate, perceive, identify and label” what happens in the world (Snow et al. ,1986, p.464).

There are two perspectives of defining frames. The sociological perspective views framing as a process that generates the construction of social reality and the frame is referred as “schemata of interpretation” allowing individuals to process the relayed information (Gooffman, 1974). Frames act as plots that construct together pieces of information to introduce a coherent narrative (Entman, 1993). Furthermore, according to Entman (1993), frames highlight some aspects of reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, providing a problem definition, diagnosing causes, making moral evaluation and oftentimes solution recommendations while omitting other features which might lead audiences to have different responses. Jackson (2005) argues, for instance, that the “war on terror” illustrates an example of a not objective representation of reality and a discursive construction which affected our understanding of terrorism and influenced our policy preferences for counter-terrorism strategies (Polakova, 2011). The psychological approach argues that political elites use framing not only to present issues from a particular perspective but also to foster certain public responses (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Different presentations of the same issue provoke different responses from the audience and can lead to a shift in public opinion, known as “framing effect” (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In this project I adopt both approaches of defining frames (Pokalova, 2011).
In this project I utilize the theoretical framework of Alimi et al. (2015) in order to explain the relationship between the state (the Russian government) and the social movement (Chechen separatists) and how the “terrorist” framing was facilitated by the 9/11 attacks domestically. Contrary to McAdam et al. (2001), they introduce an open-ended, actor-based relational approach of a mechanism-based social context which they term as “arenas of interaction”. They use mechanisms (and sub-mechanisms) as key tools and useful units of comparison to explain processes of radicalization. In other words, how a non-violent movement at some point becomes violent. According to Tilly (2003), mechanisms are “similar events that produce essentially the same immediate effects across a wide range of circumstances” (Tilly, 2003, p.20).

Also, they emphasize the “portability” of mechanisms from one context to another (Falleti & Lynch, 2009), that they are not fixed dimensions of variance and can correspond to different ways of operationalization. They identify only mechanisms (and their interactions) that play a central role in “contentious episodes “ and they do not exhaust all forces at play. Their approach is different from the case comparison and covariance approaches because in order to unfold the process they try, firstly, to explain the process (“how” and “when” processes of radicalization take place). Especially, they argue that “processes of radicalization involve relational, cognitive and environmental mechanisms, and that relational mechanisms mediate the salience of the other two types of mechanisms in variable ways” (Alimi et al., p.38).

However, in this project my main focus is not on how the Chechen movement was led to stepped-up radicalization but, how the “framing” in terms of “terrorism” was facilitated by 9/11 attacks and how, through various processes, the binary ‘Us/Them’ became more salient. I use this theoretical model in order to unfold the process of Russian state’s framing of the Second Chechen conflict.
Specifically, I utilize the notion of “upward spirals of political opportunities” relational mechanism which is defined as “newly developing political constraints or threats on the movement’s space of action or ability to promote its goals” (Alimi et al., 2015, p.39) and “changes in the movement’s political environment that alter the constraints, possibilities, and threats the movement faces, thereby enabling or inhibiting its collective action and/or goal attainment” (p.42). This actor-specific mechanism explains the relations in the arena between the social movement and the political environment. I argue that the 9/11 attacks constituted an “upwardly” constellation of changes and weakened the strategic positioning of the ethnonationalist separatist Chechen movement vis-a-vis the Russian state. The sub-mechanism “framing” defined as “adopting and broadcasting a shared definition of an issue or performance” (Alimi et al., 2015, p.28) took place with the 9/11 attacks. After the 9/11, the “war on terror” cooperation increased the salience of the cognitive sub-mechanism “threat attribution” defined as “the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely negative consequences of possible actions... undertaken by a political actor” (McAdam et al., 2001 p.95). Thus, the 9/11 facilitated the “framing” of the Chechen conflict in terms of “new” terrorism. The new position and the counter-terrorist policies undertaken by the Russian state weakened the political leverage of the separatist Chechen movement. This mechanism “triggered” and worked closely with the cognitive sub-mechanism of “attribution of opportunity” defined as “the construction of a shared definition concerning the likely positive consequences of possible actions by a political actor” (McAdam et al., 2001, p.95). Subsequently, these two sub-mechanisms increased the salience of “boundary activation”. This cognitive sub-mechanism defined as “increase in the salience of the ‘us-them’ distinction separating two political actors” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007, p.215) undermined more the separatist’s movement goals and the “war on terror” discourse divided socially the Russian state and the Chechen movement (Alimi et al., 2015).
I argue that these mechanisms were at play on September 9/11 and the “war on terror” facilitated the “framing” of the Chechen conflict as “counter-terrorist operation” which resulted in “boundary activation” and the distinction between Us/Them, where “them” they referred to “terrorists” Chechens and not “separatists”. In this project, utilizing the framing theory and the theoretical framework of Alimi et al. (2015) I investigate how this “counter-terrorist” framing of the conflict affected the Russian public opinion and hypothesize that the more “counter-terrorist” (which allows a great distinction between Us/Them and “demonizing” the enemy) was the political discourse regarding to the Second Chechen War after 9/11 attacks, the greater was the Russian public acceptance of the war.

What the framing theory explains, as I elaborated above, is the relation between the political discourse and the public response. What the theory predicts is a “framing effect”. According to Druckman (2001), a framing effect is “said to occur when, in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (p. 1042). In order for a framing effect to occur, a given conceptualization (e.g. a political speech) needs to be stored in the individual’s memory, be available and accessible. Accessibility increases through regular exposure to a communication frame (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Finally, Nelson et al. (1998) argue that the framing effect works through a “psychological process” in which individuals are conscious and not passive and they deliberately think about the “relative importance of different considerations suggested by a frame” and the frames work “by altering belief importance” (Druckman, 2001).

4. Case study: Chechnya

According to I. Khrestin and J. Elliott (2007), nothing shapes Russia’s foreign policy decision making about Middle East and terrorism than the region of Chechnya. While US security is
threatened by the Islamist terrorism, the Chechen conflict threatens both Russian national security and territorial integrity. Under Yeltsin’s presidency, the presence of Russian military in North Caucasus in 1994 claimed about one hundred thousand lives. The first Chechen War was tough for the Russians and resulted in a widespread demoralization of federal forces and the almost unanimous opposition of the Russian public opinion to the conflict pressured Boris Yeltsin’s government to declare a ceasefire with the Chechen Republic in 1996 and sign a peace treaty a year later. According to the casualties figure for Russian military deaths, the number is even estimated as high as 14,000. The defeat for Russians was a military humiliation.

The radicalization of Chechen rebels started in the meantime of the two wars (Hughes, 2013). After 1996 cease-fire, Chechnya was referred as “Somalia of the Caucasus” and anarchy dominated in the region (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007). In the fall of 1999, Vladimir Putin became Russia’s new prime minister and ordered the Russian military to reassert order in Chechnya (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007, Freedman, 2010). His brutal second Chechen war in 1999 (Dannreuther, 2012) helped him to thwart the near anarchy situation in Russia from Yeltsin era, consolidate his power and eventually, become president (Khrestin & Elliott, 2007, Freedman, 2010).

After the terrorist attacks in the US on 9/11, Putin was the first foreign leader who called G. Bush (Khrestin & Elliot, 2007). The 9/11 attacks led to a complete change of U.S. policy, putting less pressure towards the Russian war against Chechnya (Hughes, 2013). Following 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the global “war on terror” against the transnational Islamist terrorism by the Bush administration, Putin skillfully seized the opportunity to cooperate with the West against the transnational terrorism as well as the eradication of Taliban in Afghanistan (Trenin, 2013) and stop the negative international criticism about the rough Russian stance in Chechnya and human rights violations (Allison, 2013; Dannreuther, 2012) by overemphasizing the transnational terrorist dimension of the Chechnya war (Notte, 2016 & Trenin, 2013). The terrorist threat emanating from
Chechnya was described in Russian discourse as global in nature and links with Al-Qaeda were opportunistically stressed out by the Russian leadership (Notte, 2016).

Current research on Chechnya has produced many contradictory narratives of the conflict by the Russian government, western governments, Chechen separatists, journalists and scholars as well. In Russia, the Second Chechen War started as an “operation to restore constitutional order” and resulted after 9/11 as a “counter-terrorist operation”. Particularly, in the Second Chechen War and the Putin’s era, we have a shift of Russian narrative from “bandits”, “mafia” and “madmen” Chechens in Yeltsin’s era to “terrorists”.

I selected this case study as illustrative of the crossover between terrorism and ethno-national separatism where the Russian government, especially after 9/11 attacks, attempted to “frame” the conflict as mainly in terms of “international terrorism”.

Therefore, it is really interesting to examine the way discourses affect the transformation of liberation struggles to terrorism, how that categorization of “terrorists” may be not real (but opportunistically played up or constructed by powerful actors) and consequently, whether this characterization of the conflict as a form of terrorism affected the opinion of the Russian citizens. The material reasons why Russia conducted the war against the Chechen Republic and cooperated with the Bush administration is beyond of the scope of the study.

Furthermore, most of the research in framing and the “war on terror” is focused on western governments. However, this counter-terrorist discourse strategy is not dominant only in the western world but it is rather universal and discourses are only one of the forms of communication in which it is expressed (Renwick, 2007 & Cohen, 2016) and that is a reason why I selected this case study. Thus, this study provides an empirical contribution to the academic world as long as there is multiple studies regarding to the western world and only few studies regard to the other half of the world whereas the phenomenon is rather global.
5. Methodology and Data

In this project I examine the political discourse regarding to the Second Chechen War employed by Putin administration in the timeframe starting from September 1999 and the Moscow apartment bombings until 2003 when three Chechen groups were included as terrorist organizations in the U.S. and UN terrorist lists. The Moscow apartment bombings, which was a series of apartment explosions that hit the Russian cities of of Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September 1999 killing thousand of people, spread a wave of fear across the country. I selected the start of this study timeframe because the bombings, which characterized as a “terrorist” attack by the Russian government whereas the issue is disputed and controversial by many scholars, together with the Dagestan War, led the Russian government into the Second Chechen War. In 2003, the enlistment of three Chechen groups as terrorists by the US Department and the United Nations indicates in some way the acceptance of the Russian narrative by the West. In 2003, Russia started to distance itself from the “war on terror” cooperation due to the American war against Iraq.

In order to analyze the framing of the Russian government in terms of “war on terror” I utilize a Critical Discourse Analysis approach as a method and particularly that of Van Dijk’s (2006).

Van Dijk (1998, 2001) advocated the notion of “manipulation” triangulating a social, cognitive and discursive approach. The development of an Us/Them binary that involves the semantic macro strategy of the self positive representation versus the other negative representation and is at the best interest of manipulator against the best interest of dominated groups. This notion, I argue, is related to the “boundary activation” I elaborated on the theoretical framework. Thus, Van Dijk’s method is suitable in order to investigate how this binary ‘Us/Them’ (triggered with ‘boundary activation’) in Russian political discourse in terms of ‘war on terror’ affected the Russian public opinion.
Manipulation is a social phenomenon - because it involves social interaction and abuse of power between actors and groups, a cognitive phenomenon - because it occurs through the manipulation of the minds of human groups, and a discursive-semiotic phenomenon - because manipulation is exercised through text, talk and visual images. Manipulation examines the formation or the change of socially shared representations such as attitudes and ideologies about important social issues and events (Van Dijk, 2006).

Analytical Framework:

Van Dijk (2004) sees the political discourse as a social process and advocates the notion of “manipulation” triangulating a social, cognitive and discursive approach. According to Van Dijk (2004) there are two main strategies in the form of an “ideological square”: emphasize our good things, emphasize their bad things, de-emphasize our bad things, de-emphasize their bad things (p. 734). Apart from the two general strategies of representation, van Dijk (2004) introduces 25 other ideological strategies. The selected key terms of the framework are defined in the Appendix (p.22).

All these discursive features/ strategies of manipulation were examined in closer detail to see how they function in text and talk and examine how they achieve their contextual effects. All of the data are textual. I firstly critically analyzed the texts by employing the Van Dijk’s framework and identifying the features/ strategies of discursive manipulation. The semantic and rhetorical figures identified in the speaker’s text are presented in boldface and interpreted using the definitions of strategies from the Van Dijk’s study (2006). I compared the texts prior to 9/11 and the period after the attacks, on the basis of the number of the occurrence of identified strategies in the texts.

Van Dijk’s theoretical approach to manipulation strategies, unlike other frameworks in the field of CDA, is a comprehensive one. His design is a combination of argumentation, political
strategies, rhetorical tools and semantic strategies in order to uncover the distortion of realities in the process of discourse projection. In addition, Van Dijk (2006) takes into consideration politics, sociology, history and context and proposes a thorough, all-purpose framework (Rashidi & Souzandeifar, 2010). Considering all these above advantages of the theoretical framework, this study utilize van Dijk’s framework in order to analyze our materials. However, there are some limitations of this methodology that have to be stressed out. Morgan (2010) argues that the array of options available through the multiple traditions can render issues of methodology problematic, as each tradition has its own epistemological position, concepts, procedures, analytical frameworks in particular understanding of CDA and the meaning can never be fixed (Mogashoa, 2014).

Data:

The selected 4 transcripts from presidential interviews and 4 statements from press conferences regarding to the Chechen conflict for each period from September 1999 until December 2003 (10 transcripts for the period before 9/11 and 10 transcripts for the period after 9/11), based on the relevance and the focus of transcripts and the relevant year. I used the materials from the Official Kremlin presidential website http://kremlin.ru/. In order to find the texts regarding to the Chechen conflict I used the keywords “Chechnya”, “Chechen”, “North Caucasus” for the search and arranged the dates for the specific timeframe.

For the acceptance attitudes of the Russian public opinion regarding to the Chechen conflict I utilized public opinion polls from professional polling services in Russia, the Levada Center. The Levada Center is a Russian and independent, non-governmental polling and sociological research organization. It was rated by experts as very reliable and one of the largest Russian research companies and regularly conduct its own and commissioned polling research.
In order to examine how the political discourse affected the public opinion towards the conflict I compared the results of the most salient quotes I identified in the analyzed transcripts between the two periods with the data from public opinion polls.

Using polling data has the accompanying limitations such as distribution and the question format.

6. Data Analysis

a. Discourse Analysis

**Period before 9/11**

| 1. Transcript of Interview with the ORT TV Channel on February 7th, 2000 | … the people who took control of Chechen territory are not content with the independence of Chechnya and have gone further. … If these extremist forces manage to gain a foothold in the Caucasus, and not only gain a foothold in Chechnya but several other territories, then this “contagion” could move up the Volga River and spill into other republics. And then we will either face the “balkanization” of Russia… | The President presupposes that the goal of the Chechen militants is not independence. Then, he utilizes lexicalization expressing terrorism in Chechnya as “contagion” and that it will result in “balkanization” of Russia to illustrate the importance of the problem. |
| 2. Transcript of Interview to “BBC Breakfast with Frost” on March 5th, 2000 | …the Chechen people have fallen victim to international extremism… So what we got was like a mini-Afghanistan… And from that moment on it became crystal clear to us that unless we deliver a blow at the very lair of terrorism, at the bases situated in the Chechen Republic, we would never be able to rid ourselves of this scourge, this gangrene… | President Putin by presenting Chechen people as “victims” of international extremism make use of the victimization strategy. He illustrates the Chechen conflict as the example of Afghanistan utilizing the lexicalization and the metaphor “mini-Afghanistan”. Furthermore, he attempts to create a consensus in order to fight against terrorists and utilizes lexicalizations and metaphors such as “scourge” and “gangrene”.

| 3. Transcript of a Joint News Conference of President Vladimir Putin and British Prime Minister Tony Blair on March 11th, 2000 | …What is going on in the Caucasus is not only, and not so much, a Chechen problem… Terrorist forces promptly filled the vacuum that Russia tolerated in Chechnya. They do not limit themselves to one republic but are out to cross the Chechen borders and attack Russia along all its borders. Russia cannot afford to tolerate this dangerous situation… | The President internationalize the Chechen conflict utilizing generalization. Then, he presents Russia positively and terrorists negatively, creating polarization when he says “Russia cannot afford to tolerate this dangerous situation”.

| 4. Statement Concerning Violation of Human Rights in the Course of the Counterterrorist Operation in the North Caucasus on April 13th, 2000 | … The militants desecrated basic principles of Islam under the cover of Sharia to wage war on the entire population of Chechnya… | President Putin presents the Chechen militants negatively.

| 5. News Conference Following Russian-British Talks on April 17th, 2000 | … Our aim is to free Chechnya from international terrorists and extremists, who are threatening Russia and other European countries in an equal measure… In this case Russia is fighting against this global evil singlehanded, and this is not right, because extremism is a common enemy of the civilized world… | Vladimir Putin employs positive self-representation to advocate that Russia alone is fighting against terrorism and for the terrorists negative other-representation using the topos “global evil”. Furthermore, the topos “civilized world” is utilized in order to emphasize the distinction between Us/Them.

| 6. Statement for the Press and Answer to a Question on the Results of the Russia-EU Summit on May 29th, 2000 | …We call on all of you to pool your efforts in the fight against international terrorism… | In this quote the President Putin attempts to create a consensus in order to fight against terrorism. |
| 7. Interview with German TV Channels ARD and ZDF on June 9th, 2000 | “We are not fighting against the Chechen people there. It has never been our aim to suppress or enslave Chechnya...When the bandits came to these villages – by the way, it is also a Muslim republic – they murdered people, destroyed houses, stole property, they took things out of homes by the truckload...” | The President describes the Chechen militants who are referred as “bandits” and utilizes the strategy of other negative representation in order to show the binary Us/Them. Moreover, he provides examples/illustrations so as to make more vivid their actions. |
| 8. Statement for the Press and News Conference on the Results of the Russian-Spanish Negotiations on June 14th, 2000 | “we believe that we are confronting not just separatists and nationalists, we are confronting terrorists, because nationalists and separatists do not come to a neighboring republic, as happened with Dagestan, under the slogan of Chechen independence. They came and attacked Dagestan under a different slogan...” | In this quote President Putin presupposes that Chechen separatists are mainly terrorists and their aim is not Chechen independence. |
| 9. Interview With the Italian Newspaper “Corriere della Sera” on July 16th, 2001 | “But the Chechen people themselves fell victim to Muslim fundamentalism. That is why what we are doing in Chechnya enjoys fairly broad support in Russian society because, confronted with the aggression of Islamic fundamentalism from the territory of Chechnya, we had to protect our territorial integrity...” | Putin employs in this quote the strategy of victimization: Chechens are presented as victims of Muslim fundamentalism, whereas Russia is positively presented fighting against fundamentalists. |
| 10. Excerpts from the Transcript of a Press Conference for Russian and Foreign Journalists on July 18th, 2001 | “Was it prompted by the need to fight for the independence of Chechnya? We all understand that this is delirious rubbish, it has nothing in common with the interests of the Chechen people...They are trying to supplant the interests of the Chechen people with their own fundamentalist aspirations and goals. And when we fight against them, they claim that we are fighting against Chechnya and its population, and some people take it up consciously or because they don’t understand the essence of the events...” | The President claims that Chechen militants do not fight for independence but are terrorists. He employs lexicalization “delirious rubbish” to give emphasis on that and utilize the strategy of victimization to counter the terrorist’s narrative of aggressive Russia. |

In the period before the 9/11 attacks, President Putin utilized -as is illustrated in the table above- a family of metaphors such as “contagion”, “scourge”, “gangrene” in order to describe the Chechen militants and the more common representation “bandits” as his predecessor President
Yeltsin. The Russian President illustrated the Chechen conflict characterizing it as “mini-Afghanistan” and referred to the threat of “balkanization” of Russia. According to J. Headley (2005), Russia was deeply concerned with the “arc of instability” which included three geographical areas: Central Asia, the Balkans and the North Caucasus. Thus, the President attempted to illustrate the ideological links between Chechnya and other extremist regions. This metaphorical language about Chechen “terrorists” facilitated the framing of the Chechen conflict in the period before the 9/11 attacks in terms of “terrorism international”. Thus, drawing from the political discourse, Vladimir Putin used a phraseology and lexical mechanisms in order to present the situation in Chechnya as not an internal issue of ethnonational separatism but of global jihad.

In parallel, the rhetorical mechanisms indicate that President Putin utilized one of the oldest in history and powerful “topos” such as the civilized/barbarian division. The speeches of President Putin were full of phraseology such as “the global evil”, “enemy of the civilized world” and “bandits”. These epithets and categorizations in the Russian political discourse aimed to dehumanize their opponents. This moralistic language by the Russian government illustrated the Chechen rebels as uncivilized people and Chechnya as a territory where lawlessness and disorder were dominant. Therefore, this other negative representation and the “barbarian” rhetoric facilitated the de-legitimation of their opponents. On the contrary, Russia was discursively represented positively as a country fighting against fundamentalism and a legitimate force struggling to maintain law and order in the region. The identified victimization mechanism indicates that the Chechen conflict is framed and justified in counter-terrorist and self-defense terms where the victims are the Chechen people who fell victims of international terrorists abroad and have links with the Chechen movement’s perpetrators and the Russian people who are under this threat. As a result, the Russian President denied the legitimacy of their internal “uncivilized” opponents and argued for defensive action creating a consensus in order to justify the military intervention against
Chechnya to “eliminate” the “terrorist” movement which was covered under the slogan of separatism.

To sum up, the main frame in political communication of this period is the “internationalization” of the Chechen conflict and the framing of the Chechen rebels in terms of “international terrorists” rather than “separatists”. The independence of Chechnya, according to the Russian President, was merely “delirious rubbish” and a slogan used by Chechen terrorists who were affiliates with terrorists abroad and specifically in Central Asia and the Balkans.

### Period after 9/11-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Interview with the German Magazine Focus on September 19th, 2001</th>
<th>… Eventually it created the grave situation we have been trying to bring under control in Chechnya for a year and a half now...Today they speak unofficially, but openly to all intents and purposes, about recruiting volunteers to be sent to Afghanistan. This is well known, the mass media have reported it. And there are many such centers in Western Europe. But we should not allow this situation. You know, when an ostrich is in danger, it buries its head in the sand believing that the rest of its body is invisible too. But that is not so...First, because fundamentalists, under the cover of the fight for the independence of Chechnya, started implementing their plans that had nothing to do with the independence of Chechnya: they launched an attack on the neighboring Republic of Dagestan...</th>
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<tr>
<td>2. Russian President’s Statement on September 24th, 2001</td>
<td>… Now that the civilized world has defined its position on fighting terror, everyone should define his or her position as well. This chance should also be offered to those who have not yet laid down arms in Chechnya...</td>
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<td>3. Statement and Answers to Questions Following the Russia-EU Summit on October 3rd, 2001</td>
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<td>… First, it is evident to us that there is a link between those who are trying to further their ends in the North Caucasus and especially in Chechnya by force of arms and international terrorists. The explosions of residential houses, markets and other places where people congregate, and explosions in New York and Washington are indisputable proof of the link. They reveal the same hand. We have proof that the substance used for these terrorist attacks has been produced.</td>
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<td>This whole quote links Chechen militants with international terrorists and using <strong>evidentiality</strong> with phrases such as “indisputable proof”, “it has proven by the investigation”, <strong>vagueness</strong> and the <strong>metaphor</strong> “same hand” <strong>implies and presupposes</strong> the interconnection of Chechens with terrorism and rejects any connection with the independence narrative.</td>
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<th>4. Answers to Questions at a Joint Press Conference with the CIS Heads of State on November 30th, 2001</th>
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<td>… And of course that enclave has relay towers which the militants in Chechnya use to communicate with their sponsors in the Gulf countries and in Afghanistan. All this is a very real, and not an imagined problem for us…</td>
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<td>The President <strong>implies and presupposes</strong> the links of Chechen militants with international terrorists.</td>
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<th>5. Joint Press Conference with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair on December 21st, 2001</th>
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<td>… the situation is not all that simple and we are not going to pretend that we are dealing only with manifestations of terrorism in Chechnya, although many of the problems there are created by international terrorists…But some of the people who have not laid down their arms can hardly be referred to as terrorists because they are driven above all by the ideas of separatism…everybody knows that it is a problem that confronts not only Russia, but many other parts of the world, including Europe…</td>
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<tr>
<td>In this quote no strategy of Van Dijk’s framework was identified. There is a shift on President’s discourse: Chechens militants are not categorized as terrorists such as in quote 2 but separatists. Here there is no rejection of the Chechen conflict in terms of independence and separatism.</td>
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<td>6. Interview with the Polish Newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and the Polish TVP Channel on January 15th, 2002</td>
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<td>7. Interview with the Chinese News Agency Xinhua and Chinese Central Television (CCTV) on November 27th, 2002</td>
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<td>8. Interview to France-3 Television on February 9th, 2003</td>
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<td>9. Transcript of a Meeting with the French Regional Press and TV Channels on February 12th, 2003</td>
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In the period after 9/11, President Putin utilized plenty of metaphors in order to describe the situation in Chechnya. Specifically, he characterized it as a “grave situation” which took the region “back into the Middle Ages” and where fundamentalism is not much different from “the communist revolution” or the “Nazi” ideology and terrorists as “ostriches”. These powerful metaphors indicate the magnitude of the existential threat the President attempted to convey to the public in order to frame the Chechen conflict. Furthermore, Putin used the example of Yugoslavia in order to strengthen his securitization argument that Chechen terrorists can cause the collapse of the Russian state.

Similarly to the period before the 9/11 attacks, the presidential speeches referred again to the Us/Them division. The President created a polarization utilizing the topos of the “civilized world” dividing “us” as “civilized” Russian people and “Them” as terrorists which resembles to common political counter-terrorist speeches of other leaders (Jackson, 2005). This division was aimed to present the Russian state positively and Chechen rebels as perpetrators who had connections with international terrorists.

The main frame in political communication of this period -same as in the period before the 9/11 attacks- is the “internationalization” of the Chechen conflict and the framing of the Chechen rebels in terms of “international terrorists” rather than “separatists”. Particularly, most of the quotes

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<th>10. Excerpts from the President’s Live Television and Radio Dialogue with the Nation on December 18th, 2003</th>
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<td>…Their aim is not independence for Chechnya, but for all the areas where there are a lot of Muslims. We, of course, must fight this if we don’t want to see the collapse of our country. If this were to happen, it would be worse than Yugoslavia. It would mean a Yugoslav scenario for Russia in its worst form and with far more victims. Armed with this knowledge we have to fight this problem, fight together with the whole international community, because the threat does not come from within, it comes from beyond our borders…</td>
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<td>Putin here rejects any connection with the independence of Chechnya. Especially, he uses the example of Yugoslavia to make more persuasive his illustration of Chechnya and attempts to create a consensus among the international community to fight against terrorism.</td>
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</table>
clearly reject any interconnection of the Chechen conflict with separatism and highlight the global threat of terrorism.

However, there is a contradiction in the framing of the Chechen War in quotes 5, 6 and 8. From the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin attempted to discursively “internationalize” the conflict in terms of a counter-terrorist campaign. These three quotes indicate a different narrative which constitute a paradox. While the rhetorical representation of the conflict was framed predominantly as an external affair - Chechnya as one of the battlefields of international terrorism and the global jihad and the Chechen rebels as not members of the ethnonationalist separatist movement but members of the international terrorist movement and the manifestation of the global evil- in these quotes the issue was presented as an internal one as well, where Russia is fighting to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Thus, the President here clearly admitted that there is an interconnection between separatism and terrorism. Interestingly, the President acknowledges this interconnection soon after the 9/11 attacks in the Joint Press Conference with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair on December 21st, 2001 and a year after to Polish journalists and on February 9th, 2003 to French television.

On balance, the central narrative is the same as in the period before the 9/11 attacks: President Putin rejected the connection of the conflict with the independence of Chechnya and declared that the international terrorist movement, which had links with the Chechen movement, was threatening the stability, integrity and security of the Russian state and thus, he attempted to create a consensus to combat this “international issue” and justify the Chechen war. Nevertheless, there were instances where the framing of the Chechen conflict was discursively paradoxical. Even though the presidential discourse was predominantly “counter- terrorist”, which created a great Us/Them binary as in the previous period, Putin in some instances acknowledged that the two issues of separatism and terrorism are intertwined.
"What do you think, should Russia continue military actions against Chechnya or start peaceful negotiations?

In December 1999, the 72% of Russians considered that it is better to continue the war against Chechnya, whereas 20% believed that negotiations should start. In both December 2000 and 2001, the figures decreased to 45% of Russians who deemed that the war should continue whereas, the sentiment in favor of negotiations in 2000 and 2001 increased up to nearly 42% from 20% in last year. Overall, the sentiment in December 1999 was in favor of the war and in December of 2000 and 2001 the half of the Russian public opinion was in favor of peaceful negotiations.
“What do you think, should Russia continue military actions against Chechnya - or start peaceful negotiations?”

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<tr>
<td><strong>Continue the military action</strong></td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Start peaceful negotiations</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Difficult to answer</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>18</td>
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Obviously, in February and April 2000 the Russian public sentiment was in favor of the continuation of the Second Chechen War. However, in October 2000 a shift in public opinion occurred and the public was divided between the continuation of military actions and the need for peaceful negotiations with the Chechen Republic. After the 9/11 attacks, in October 2001, the half of Russian population believed that their government has to start peaceful negotiations with Chechnya. In October 2002, the Russian public opinion was equally divided between the continuation of the military operation against Chechnya (46%) and the need for peaceful negotiations (45%). However, in 2003 the figures towards negotiations reached the peak of 68% in November 2003.
Conclusion

A close examination of the transcripts through the van Dijk’s (2004) framework reveals that the Russian government framed the Chechen conflict in terms of “counter-terrorism” - and not “separatism”- throughout the whole examined timeframe. Specifically, in the period before 9/11 the number of the occurrence of the identified strategies is 27 and for the period after 9/11 is 25 which indicates that the “counter-terrorist” framing was dominant in both periods. However, drawing from the transcripts 5, 6 and 8 after the 9/11 there is an obvious shift in presidential discourse and framing of the conflict: the interconnection of terrorism and separatism was recognized. Thus, before 9/11 the framing was predominantly “counter-terrorist” and after 9/11 it continued to be, however, there were some instances when Vladimir Putin recognized that terrorism and separatism are interconnected.

The analysis of the opinion polls showed that the public opinion between 1999 and 2000 was in favor of the war against Chechnya (up to 70%) whereas, the figures indicate that from October 2000 the general trend started to favor peaceful negotiations. In 2001 the opinion was divided and after the 9/11 attacks until 2003 the Russian public opinion showed a great support towards peaceful negotiations. The data indicate that the “counter-terrorist” framing before 9/11 affected the public opinion which favored military actions, however, the “counter-terrorist” framing of the conflict after 9/11 attacks was not persuasive to the public which gradually favored rather peaceful negotiations and reached the peak of 68% (November 2003).

Therefore, the hypothesis of this study was not justified. The expected outcome of the study would be that after 9/11 the public opinion would be affected by the counterterrorist framing and favor the military continuation. On the contrary, the results showed that in 2001 the opinion was
rather divided and gradually favored negotiations. Furthermore, an unexpected result was that there were instances when the political discourse after 9/11 acknowledged the interconnection of terrorism and separatism. Drawing back to the theory of framing, the empirical data prove the “framing effect” which the theory predicts in the period before 9/11 due to high public support towards military actions. However, the Russian public did not favor the war after the 9/11 attacks as the framing theory would predict.

I suggest that this theory is highly interpretive and is concerned with interpreting the meanings actors assign to communication and assumes that there are multiple meanings than one singular objective truth. Also, it is difficult empirically to achieve accurate predictions while the large body of data is qualitative. Therefore, this high subjectivity of discursive interpretation indicates the general predictive ability of the theory to be low.

The theoretical framework of Alimi et al. (2015) clearly explains how the “counter-terrorist” framing of the conflict was created. However, the empirical data showed that the “counter-terrorist” -and not the “separatist” framing- discourse was salient before 9/11. Specifically, although the first examined period precedes the 9/11 attacks, the Russian government framed the Chechen conflict in terms of a “counter-terrorist operation” and attributed the threat of international terrorism to the Chechen rebels and the Chechen separatist movement by providing a new shared definition of them in terms of “international terrorists”. At the same time, President Putin constructed a positive representation of Russia and attempted to create a consensus in order to fight against global terrorism. Thus, this rhetorical polarization created a strong binary of Us/ Them and the mechanism of boundary activation occurred even before the focusing event of the 9/11 attacks. Thus, no (re)framing from “ethnonational separatism” to “counterterrorism” occurred domestically and was facilitated by the 9/11 attacks: the “counter-terrorist” discourse was already salient before the attacks.
The same mechanisms were at play after the 9/11 attacks due to the continuation of the “counter-terrorist” discourse and facilitated the “counter-terrorist” framing for the Russian government whereas the “framing effect” did not occur as the Russian public rather favored peaceful negotiations. Consequently, it was not the focusing event of the 9/11 attacks that facilitated the acceptance of the “counter-terrorist” framing in the domestic arena as I argued.

This theoretical framework of relational mechanisms has high explanatory and predictive value and would be useful in further research in order to explain the creation and the trajectory of the political framing and its impact on social movements and stepped-up radicalization. However, taking into consideration that in three transcripts after 9/11 (a Joint press conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair and interviews with the Polish and French media) President Putin shifted the dominant framing, these framing theories omit to address why and how shifts in discourse occur when actors face different audiences or the actors change in international arena.

The limitations of my research are that due to limited time conducting the research and the limited amount of words, I had to select the most salient quotes from each transcript which might entail the risk of not presenting other aspects of the framing. Another limitation of my research design is that I based my research only on the analytical model of Van Dijk (2006) and Levada opinion polls which have their accompanied limitations discussed in the methodology section and on presidential discourse which might be more diplomatic in international affairs and not other political elites’ discourse such as that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of Defense. Finally, I suggest further and more comprehensive empirical research by examining the framing of the conflict by all actors involved (the Russian state, the international community and the Chechen movement) and which one was the most salient to influence the domestic public opinion.
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**APPENDIX  The definitions of the 22 selected ideological strategies (Van Dijk, 2004)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Actor description:</strong></th>
<th>The way actors or groups are described either in positive or negative way.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authority:</strong></td>
<td>Mentioning authorities in order to advocate one’s claims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Categorization:</strong></td>
<td>Assigning people to different groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparison:</strong></td>
<td>Different from rhetorical similes, comparisons as intended here typically occur in talk, namely when speakers compare in-groups and out-groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consensus:</strong></td>
<td>Creating agreement and solidarity in situations where the country is threatened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterfactuals:</strong></td>
<td>“What would happen, if…” the typical expression of a counterfactual. An persuasive argumentative move that is also related to the move of asking for empathy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disclaimers:</strong></td>
<td>Presenting briefly Our positive characteristics but then focus rather exclusively on Their negative attributes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidentiality:</strong></td>
<td>Presenting some hard facts, evidence or proof for one’s ideas. This may happen by references to authority figures or institutions (see Authority above).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example/Illustration:</strong></td>
<td>A powerful move in argumentation is to give concrete examples in the form of short stories, illustrating or making more plausible the speaker’s argument. Short stories are better memorized, have more emotional impact and are more persuasive than arguments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generalization:</strong></td>
<td>Generalizations and the formulation of prejudices about generalized negative characteristics of the Other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hyperbole:</strong></td>
<td>A semantic rhetorical device for the enhancement and exaggeration of the meaning.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Implication:</strong></td>
<td>Deducting or referring to implicit information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irony:</strong></td>
<td>Accusations in forms of lighter irony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lexicalization:</strong></td>
<td>An overall ideological strategy denoting Others through the semantic features of the words.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metaphor:</strong></td>
<td>A powerful semantic-rhetorical persuasive figure. Abstract, complex, unfamiliar, new or emotional meanings may be made more familiar and more concrete.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Self Glorification:</strong></td>
<td>A nationalistic rhetoric. A device creating positive self representation by glorifying one’s country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number Game:</strong></td>
<td>Using numbers and statistics in order to persuasively display objectivity and appear credible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polarization (Us-Them categorization):</strong></td>
<td>Categorical division of people in in-group (Us) with good attributes and out-group (Them) with bad attributes.</td>
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<td><strong>Presupposition:</strong></td>
<td>The general sociocultural knowledge or ideas taken for granted strategically in a proposition when such truth is not established at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topos:</strong></td>
<td>Argumentation often based on various standards arguments, or topoi, which represent premises that are taken for granted, as self-evident and as sufficient reasons to accept the conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vagueness:</strong></td>
<td>Vague expressions, expressions that do not have well-defined referents or which refer to fuzzy sets (e.g. ‘few’, ‘very’, ‘high’, ‘low’) and create uncertainty and ambiguity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victimization:</strong></td>
<td>Emphasizing the “bad” nature of Others and telling bad stories about Them who do not belong to Us.</td>
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