The handle [http://hdl.handle.net/1887/46672](http://hdl.handle.net/1887/46672) holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation

**Author:** Nakamura, Mari  
**Title:** Emancipation in postmodernity: political thought in Japanese science fiction animation  
**Issue Date:** 2017-03-14
2. THE POLITICS OF EMANCIPATION: INTELLECTUALS, EVERYDAYNESS AND PHILOSOPHY IN GRAMSCI AND TOSAKA

2.1. Introduction

This chapter makes a theoretical case that popular culture including anime offers a respectable and useful site of inquiry into philosophy and the politics of emancipation. I review the role of intellectuals, the concept of everydayness, and the nexus between theory and practice discussed by the critical theorists Antonio Gramsci and Tosaka Jun (1900-1945). Although both Gramsci and Tosaka are identified as Marxist philosophers like some of other theorists I reviewed in the previous chapter, their views on popular culture are more radical than other philosophers. They considered popular culture as philosophical practices, rather than totally ignoring it or rejecting it as a “mass deception” of modern capitalism. Since popular culture mediates thought and worldviews, cultural practices are the object of philosophy. Moreover, the experts involved in the production and distribution of popular culture are intellectuals too. I further argue that anime is social, political and philosophical insofar as it is part of the fabric of people’s everyday lives, and that anime directors, animators and scriptwriters and other experts working in the anime industry are also intellectuals.

Facing modernity, thinkers in Europe and Japan reflected critically on their everyday experiences as industrial capitalism developed. Recent studies on intellectual history in the interwar years in Europe and Japan show how thinkers in both places developed their thoughts through their contemporary experiences of modernity, conceptualizing the everyday as a social, political and philosophical category. European critical intellectuals such as Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, and Frankfurt School philosophers Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch, took everyday experience and the concreteness of material objects – from fashion to architecture, from opera to film – seriously as a source of philosophy in their works. Their approaches represented an alternative method to that of philosophy. For example, Buck-Morss (1989, 3–4) suggests that Benjamin tried to “bridge the gap between everyday experience and traditional academic concerns” in Das Passagen-Werk (the Arcades project) through his highly original approach to philosophy, and he aimed to “take materialism so seriously that the historical phenomena themselves were brought to speech.”
Examining the works of prominent intellectuals in the interwar period in Japan such as Tosaka Jun, Miki Kiyoshi, Watsuji Tetsurō, and Yanagida Kunio, along with the works of their European contemporaries such as Heidegger and Benjamin, Harry Harootunian (2000a; 2000b; 2008) suggests that the concept of the everyday became a “minimal unity of temporal experience” for those intellectuals reflecting on and understanding the process of modernity as experienced throughout the world, particularly in Europe and Japan in the interwar years.

Among these critical intellectuals, Gramsci and Tosaka shared a similar vision for the new type of knowledge inspired by Marx’s thought and oriented to human emancipation. Both thinkers understood intellectuals as playing a significant social and political role. For Gramsci (1971, 12), intellectuals are “functionalities” as they are “mediated’ by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures.” In other words, they are “pivotal to the working of modern society” (Said 1994, 10). Gramsci’s own career – as a philologist, an organizer of the Italian working-class movement, and a journalist – can be seen as a good example of the Gramscian intellectual “whose purpose was to build not just a social movement but an entire cultural formation associated with the movement” (Said 1994, 3–4). In a similar way to Gramsci, Tosaka’s own career – as a philosopher, a founder of a research group and a journal on materialism for the anti-fascist movement, and a cultural critic – also exemplifies his normative vision as an intellectual who sought to link current social problems with philosophy. Gramsci and Tosaka rethought existing modes of knowledge production and the role of intellectuals in society, relating themselves to political struggles against the social hegemony of capitalist ideology and fascism. As Harootunian (2000b) points out, there is an intellectual affinity between Tosaka and Gramsci concerning the nexus between theory and practice in everyday life and their contribution to political thought in the Marxian tradition. Harootunian notes that

Tosaka worked formally within the framework of a philosophical discourse devoted to the study of materialism, much like his great Italian contemporary Antonio Gramsci, who coded Marxism as a philosophy of praxis. It was the logic of this discourse that opened the way to thinking about how everyday practices might be disrupted, not the appeal to an explicit theory of revolution constituting a nodal event in the progression of a fictive narrative. (ibid., 150)

For both thinkers, everyday life is dynamic in nature and has a key role in both conservative and transformative projects in society. Everyday life mediates people’s worldviews, and at the same time opens the possibility for criticism and disruption of existing worldviews. Critical analysis of everyday life and its materiality is an alternative way of doing philosophy, different from both orthodox economic determinism and idealist philosophy. Gramsci and Tosaka’s thoughts on
intellectuals and everydayness remind us of the importance of everyday cultural practices as a site of inquiry in political thought, and they also enable us to see animation – a significant everyday socio-cultural practice in contemporary society – as a respectable and useful space for exploring the pressing political issue of emancipation.

In the following sections, I first look at Gramsci and Tosaka’s thought on intellectuals, and their ideas of everydayness as a historical, political and philosophical category, before discussing their theoretical contributions to the field of political thought in the Marxian tradition. I then argue that Gramsci and Tosaka’s works could serve as a theoretical and methodological basis for analyzing anime – a practice of cultural analysis – as a site of political thought.

2.2. Everyone is Potentially an Intellectual

Interestingly, for both Gramsci and Tosaka, everyone is potentially an intellectual, a philosopher, or a journalist in their everyday life. Every human activity links to an intellectual activity of thinking and doing; everyone participates in maintaining a particular kind of worldview and morality in society, or challenging existing orientations and promoting new ways of seeing the world and morality. As Gramsci (1971, 9) noted

All men [sic] are intellectuals, one could there say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals … There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens. Each man, finally, outside his professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is he is a “philosopher,” an artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.

In a similar manner, Tosaka suggested that every human being is a journalist. Extending the idea that human beings are social animals, Tosaka argued that a human being with language capacity had a journalistic existence too. “Basically every human being, in its capability as a human, is necessary a journalist. In this sense, the fact that human beings are social animals, they are a journalistic being
Both Gramsci and Tosaka see an intellect and the capacity for language as basic characteristics of all human beings.

Moreover, they also regard critical thinking about everyday practices as the most important thing in philosophy and journalism. In other words, both philosophy and journalism are forms of critical analysis of everyday practices. In the case of Gramsci (1971, 324), he acknowledges that “we are all conformists of some conformism or other” because our conception of the world always belongs to a particular social group in a particular historical moment. Nevertheless, Gramsci thought that the critique of one’s own worldview would link to a more advanced level of philosophy. The important thing for philosophy is critical analysis of existing philosophy, which, in his view, is the result of contingent historical and cultural processes. Thus, to criticize one’s own conception of the world means therefore to make it a coherent unity and to raise it to the level reached by the most advanced thought in the world. It therefore also means criticism of all previous philosophy. “The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory” (Gramsci 1971, 324).

In another passage, Gramsci noted that critical analysis of common sense is central to his vision of philosophy because common sense always remains in existing philosophy, which is the result of historical and cultural processes. “Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: this is the document of its historical effectiveness” (ibid., 326n5). Gramsci also calle common sense the folklore of philosophy, which is developed as “the result of historical processes of cultural sedimentation, the residue of a multitude of deposits, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of very different kind of social visions and political projects” (Rupert 2009, 183).

Indeed, common sense is a worldview, which looks static, conventional or traditional at a glance; for Gramsci however, it is dynamic and changing nature. “Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life” (Gramsci 1971, 326n5). Accordingly, Gramsci considers that social change must be generated from criticism of existing common sense in society and made a clear distinction between common sense and good sense. “Philosophy is

---

19 Schäfer (2012, 105) translates jānisuto-teki sonzai as a journalistic existence, while I translate as a journalistic being.

20 Gramsci attempted to break down the widespread prejudice about philosophy as “systematic philosophy,” which is a specifically intellectual activity only for specialists (2000, 300). He extended the notion of philosophy greatly by including language, common sense and popular religion or the system of belief under the name of “folklore” or “spontaneous philosophy” (1971, 323).
criticism and the superseding of religion and ‘common sense.’ In this sense it coincides with ‘good’ as opposed to ‘common’ sense” (Gramsci 1971, 326).

For Gramsci, common sense is shaped and shared commonly by people in society and people support and/or maintain their common sense, just like their religious beliefs. Popular common sense is a form of social hegemony, and this hegemony is so widely penetrated and naturalized in society by people’s consent, as they internalize it as their beliefs. At the same time though, social change would be possible through criticism of existing popular common sense because common sense is also fluid and constantly changing. He therefore contends that good sense – another kind of common sense - is only generated from criticism of existing common sense, yet it has the potential for reshaping society.

To some extent, Tosaka would have shared Gramsci’s conception of philosophy as criticism of common sense and its indispensable function in society. As Harootunian (2000a, 133–134) suggests, Tosaka examined the status of common sense and its relationship to philosophy on many occasions and called for “philosophy to return to its roots in common sense,” and its criticism. Moreover, the temporality of the present offers Tosaka “an urgent reason to reconsider the role of common sense and how it relates to philosophy” (ibid., 133). In his discussion on a method of philosophy, Tosaka emphasised the significance of common sense as well as current matters – what’s going on now – and criticism as a site of philosophical inquiry.

This speciality [philosophy] must be returned to the world of common sense again. Moreover, it is necessary to dissolve it philosophically and honestly into the commonsense world. That is the problem of philosophy. The problem of philosophy, in a certain meaning, is the problem of contemporary eventfulness, the problem of criticism. A philosophy that does not understand the ‘problem of actuality’ is not philosophy (Tosaka [1935] 1966i, 173; Harootunian 2000a, 136).

It therefore makes sense for Tosaka to link philosophy with journalism, as both had a common vocation in criticism of everyday life and common sense.

In the essay “The Relationship between Journalism and Philosophy” ([1934] 1966g), Tosaka pointed out an affinity between journalism and philosophy, and proposes that criticism is the essence of both. Based on the common ground of their critical function, Tosaka discussed the philosophical meaning of journalism, and the journalistic necessity of philosophy (i.e. philosophy must engage with everyday practice in the present). Tosaka considered philosophy to be the

---

21 Schäfer (2012, 108) suggests that both Tosaka and early Frankfurt School saw the most fundamental meaning of philosophy and journalism in critique of everyday life.
“science of thought” (shisō no kagaku), and its appropriate method as the critical examination of thoughts (Tosaka [1934] 1966g, 147–148). In Tosaka’s view, thoughts are a summary of culture, which shape various forms (i.e. literature, custom, common sense and so on) – and thus criticism of thought is equivalent to criticism of culture ([1934] 1966g, 148). In other words, the critical analysis of ordinary cultural practices – criticism of literature, custom, common sense etc. – is an alternative way of doing philosophy. As Hashikawa Bunsō (1966) suggests, “Above all, Tosaka’s literary criticism illustrates his practice as a philosopher most vividly…at the same time, his criticisms of customs and morality are also his philosophical necessity” (471, my translation).

Tosaka ([1935] 1966c; [1935] 1977) made a distinction similar to Gramsci’s distinction between common sense and good sense. Describing popular common sense as tsūnen – something conventional and stereotypical – he envisaged a contrast with a new kind of common sense that contests commonly accepted beliefs or dominant ideologies.22 He also argued that literature’s role is to break down conventions and to create new common sense and new morals.

Moral common sense, as accepted beliefs and morality, is conventional and stereotypical. What kind of norm would literature have, if literature breaks down moral common sense? …In other words, if literature cannot create new common sense, what moral inquiry and what literature is it for? ([1935] 1966c, 123, my translation)

For Tosaka, the task of literature is that of philosophy. Moreover, new common sense does not come from out of the blue. It is only generated from the negation of existing common sense. In fact, in his view, it is impossible to only negate the existing common sense, because there has always been new common sense or, at least, new morals out there (Tosaka [1935] 1966c, 124). Since everyday life is constantly changing, common sense must be changing and generating something new too.

How did Tosaka understand this new common sense or true common sense? Just as his concept of everydayness is based on the concrete rather than the abstract, common sense has to be grounded in people’s everyday life and its materiality. For him, true common sense is everyday

---

22 Schäfer points out an affinity between Gramsci and Tosaka with regards to their ideas of alternative common sense. He notes that “Gramsci and Tosaka (1977 [1935/36]: 91) would have agreed that another common sense – one of ‘everyday knowledge’ – exists besides a normative philosophical or political common sense. This ‘philosophy of non-philosophers’ (how Gramsci termed it) was a ‘concept of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man [sic] is developed’ and, thus was ‘not a single unique conception, identical in time and space’ (Gramsci 1988:343)” (Schäfer 2012, 26–27n12).
sense (*nichijō-kankaku*), which means not only a sense common among ordinary people, but also an attitude toward knowledge that is based on everydayness, or what he calls a “journalistic attitude (*jānarizumu-teki taido*)” (Tosaka [1932] 1966d, 128, my translation).

Indeed, for Tosaka, true common sense means a journalistic attitude with a critical perspective. Tosaka considered criticism of common sense based on everyday practices as a form of philosophy and he exemplified this throughout his career. His philosophical reflection centered on critical analyses of custom, morality, current social matters and literature, and his critical spirit has been highly regarded by many critics. Tsurumi Shunsuke, for example, observes that “the most noteworthy thing in Tosaka’s work is his consistent principle of criticism” (Tsurumi 1966, 439, my translation).

In summary, Gramsci and Tosaka had very original and unconventional ideas about the intellectual, and about philosophy and journalism. For them, human individuals are all potentially intellectuals, philosophers or journalists. They proposed that using their capacity for language involves human beings in a kind of intellectual activity. The critique of common sense and everyday life is, for them, the essence of philosophy and journalism. Both of them argued that the creation of new common sense (good sense) is required for the social transformational project and that new common sense can only be generated from criticism of existing common sense. Thus, strictly speaking, the intellectual activity of criticism – philosophy and journalism – is not exclusive to academic philosophers or professional journalists, but open to anyone. Yet as Gramsci noted, not everyone functions as a professional intellectual, philosopher, or journalist in society. Nor can everyone play a leading role in society, either stabilising social hegemony or challenging it. The concept of the intellectual, as they understand it, can denote anyone whose social function is primarily to organize, educate or lead others. It is very important, Gramsci and Tosaka suggested, to redefine the notion of the intellectual, and to analyze different types of intellectuals in modern capitalist society more closely, to understand the mechanisms of social hegemony and ideology. Gramsci and Tosaka considered the issue of the social and moral function of intellectuals further by categorizing different types of intellectuals in modern capitalist society. They also addressed the problem of existing forms of knowledge production by academic philosophers being separated from the criticism of current social issues.

### 2.3. Intellectuals and Society

The previous section elaborated on Gramsci’s and Tosaka’s understanding of intellectuals. This section looks at the ways in which intellectuals are associated with social change and social progress. Both Gramsci and Tosaka criticized traditional intellectual elites who merely deal with
abstract philosophical inquiries, detaching themselves from everyday practices rather than engaging with current social issues. They thought that those who create new knowledge could be crucial actors in generating social and political change. Gramsci and Tosaka distinguished between two types of intellectuals in modern societies: traditional intellectuals and organic intellectuals for Gramsci, and academic philosophers and journalists for Tosaka. Criticizing existing concepts of the intellectual, they developed more comprehensive notions that are not limited by conventional understandings of intellectuals in history.

Gramsci (1971, 9) described the “traditional or vulgarized type of the intellectual” as “the man [sic] of letters, philosopher or artist.” In his view, this type of intellectual is often rooted in traditional elites and deals with abstract philosophical or religious inquiries, but fails to deal with actual social problems. Gramsci was very critical of traditional intellectuals or “crystallized” intellectuals because they are “conservative and reactionary” or a “fossilised left-over of the social group which has been historically superseded” (Gramsci 1971, 453). They often contribute to maintaining the existing social order or social reality, rather than criticizing it. Gramsci called them “the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ supporting its social hegemony and political government, which, according to Gramsci, comprised of: (1) “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group;” and (2) the apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively” (ibid., 12). Traditional intellectuals become a crystallized social group, which “sees itself as continuing uninterruptedly through history and thus independent of the struggle of groups rather than as the expression of a dialectical process through which every dominant social group elaborates its own category of intellectuals” (ibid., 452).

Renate Holub (1992, 165–166) suggests that the distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals in Gramsci’s thought is a complex one rather than a simple function or a relation, and that Gramsci carefully criticizes the problem of traditional intellectuals who think of themselves as politically autonomous and independent of the dominant social group. For example, traditional Italian intellectuals have organically emerged in a particular historical moment – e.g. the priest became an intellectual under feudalism. In other words, traditional intellectuals are also organic intellectuals. Yet, in Gramsci’s view, the traditional Italian intellectuals (i.e. the philosopher, the artist, the poet) attend “more closely to the world of Aristotle and Plato than to the political world of their own time” (Holub 1992, 165–166). “They have traditionally lived outside the parameters of political organicity, following a logic of their own that celebrated autonomy, self-determination and independence. This presumed autonomy of traditional Italian intellectual … is nothing but social utopia” (Holub 1992, 166). For Gramsci, intellectuals and their work always interacted with their social context to some extent, and thus the autonomy of intellectuals is simply a myth.
Tosaka likewise criticized philosophers in academic institutions, calling them “snobs” (*zokubutsu*). He lamented the way they produce knowledge in the academy, often separating themselves from materiality or the *actuality* of everyday and merely dealing with abstract concepts in a disinterested or autonomous manner.23 Tosaka ([1934] 1966b) considered this separation and dismissal of everydayness to be a major problem of the academy because, as a result, philosophers fail to link their knowledge with the worldviews and thoughts shaping society, and this means that they have given up their own vocation as philosopher. For Tosaka ([1934] 1966b, 148; 2013b, 41), thought is equivalent to “the content of a relatively unified worldview,” which is always political and philosophical. As Tosaka noted,

> The academy has no connection with the everyday current problems of general society and deals with manners more fundamental and eternal…for the academy, problems are not current matters but *traditional* problems…as a consequence of this, irrespective of how political and intellectual [*shisôteki*] the science it utilizes may be, the academy pulls it away from an immediate relationship with thought itself. The sciences are not treated intellectually but rather in *technical* terms… They [scholars] no longer feel the need to link their technical specializations with a wider worldview; even academic philosophy has come to give up the latter along with its own philosophical pretensions. ([1934] 1966b, 149; 2013b, 42–43, emphasis in the original)

Tosaka believed that it is important for academic intellectuals to engage with current social problems as a site of philosophical and intellectual as well as political inquiry. For Tosaka, academic intellectuals, with their abstract and timeless mode of questioning, fail to do philosophy and science appropriately because their approach is merely technical or instrumental, lacking any intellectual or political engagement with the thoughts and worldviews of the present. In other words, existing academic intellectuals have abandoned their vocation as intellectuals to seek solutions to actual problems in society.

In summary, both Gramsci and Tosaka criticized traditional intellectuals, academic philosophers and their mode of knowledge production. This type of intellectual only studies philosophical texts in an abstract manner, as if current social and political issues have nothing to do with philosophy. For these intellectuals, the philosophical canon and associated texts are the only valid material for study, and they enjoy political and intellectual autonomy in devoting themselves into these texts. For Gramsci and Tosaka, this kind of approach to philosophy is wrong because

23 Schäfer (2012, 95–98) juxtaposes Tosaka with Adorno and Horkheimer and their visions of true intellectuals and knowledge.
these intellectuals fail to recognize the fact that people’s thought and worldviews have been shaped and reshaped through concrete everyday social and cultural practices. People’s everyday practices and common sense are the proper subject of and valid sources for philosophy. If intellectuals’ vocation is to lead other members of society toward emancipation by creating a new culture, new worldview, and new philosophy, philosophers must critically study social and cultural practices, rather than distancing themselves from those issues. In other words, both thinkers called for intellectuals to be political rather than apathetic. At the same time, they also sought a new type of intellectual who would more closely connect to emerging social groups and be more involved in political struggles.

Gramsci and Tosaka therefore radically redefined the intellectual in modern capitalist societies and examined the possibility of the emergence of a new type of intellectual. Gramsci (1971, 13) noted that “in the modern world the category of intellectuals, understood in this [broader] sense, has undergone an unprecedented expansion.” Along with this expansion of intellectuals, the notion of knowledge is also broadened.

According to Gramsci (1971, 9), “in the modern world, technical education, closely bound to industrial labour even at the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new type of intellectual.” Gramsci thought that the new intellectuals, the organic intellectuals, would be specialists in political economy: “entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, business lawyers, economists, engineers and industrial technicians” who had organically emerged through the development of modern capitalist society (Jones 2006, 84).

Gramsci’s idea of the intellectual not only links to economic relations, but also to social and political relations, as each social group creates its own intellectuals. Gramsci (1971, 5) noted that “every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.” For instance, the capitalist entrepreneur is a specialist in political economy as well as an organizer of a new culture, or a new legal system (ibid.).

Gramsci’s idea of the organic intellectual is a person who fulfills a particular set of functions in society. In Said’s (1994, 8–9) interpretation, everyone who works in any field of so-called knowledge industries – i.e. broadcasters, academic professionals, computer analysts, sports and media lawyers, management consultants, policy experts, government advisers, authors of specialized market reports, and indeed the whole field of modern mass journalism itself – can be categorized as an intellectual. They all connect their work either with the production or distribution of knowledge. Said’s account of an organic intellectual in modern society is also applicable to the anime industry. Everyone who works in anime industry, whether they are animators, directors, technical directors, art directors, special effects artists, character designers, motion graphic
designers, producers, voice actors and actresses, sound specialists, editors, or scriptwriters, can be categorized as an intellectual. This notion of an organic intellectual also applies to the creators of original stories including manga artists, novelists, and game developers, legal and marketing specialists, and the whole field of media industry linked to anime production and distribution.

Nevertheless, as Said (1994) rightly reminds us, organic intellectuals are not just faceless professionals, who are simply competent in doing their business. Rather, they must be “endowed with a faculty for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public” (Said 1994, 11). Moreover, they raise embarrassing questions publicly, “to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them), to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d'être is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug” (Said 1994, 11). In this sense, Gramsci characterized intellectuals as a collective rather than as individuals, and his concern was to create “the mass of intellectuals” that leads the revolutionary practice of the proletariat and is able to build an “alliance between the proletariat and the peasant masses” (Gramsci 1994, 336). In his vision of emancipatory politics, new intellectuals have to be willing to participate in political struggles for social hegemony with their expertise and also to take up cultural and moral leadership among different social groups by shaping a “new common sense and with it a new culture and a new philosophy” (Gramsci 1971, 424). Gramsci’s purpose is to build an entire cultural formation associated with the revolution in which the mass of intellectuals was involved. In Said’s (1994, 4) words

Today’s advertising or public relations expert, who devises techniques for winning a detergent or airline company a larger share of the market, would be considered an organic intellectual according to Gramsci, someone who in a democratic society tries to gain the consent of potential customers, win approval, marshal consumer or voter opinion. Gramsci believed that organic intellectuals are actively involved in society, that is, they constantly struggle to change minds and expand markets; unlike teachers and priests, who seem more or less to remain in place, doing the same kind of work year in year out, organic intellectuals are always on the move, on the make.

24 Interestingly, Holub (1992) suggests that by the early to mid-1920s, Gramsci’s way of writing as an intellectual changes along with his notion of the intellectuals. “Gramsci’s new intellectual is now called upon not to reduce his/her field of influence by rhetorically restrictive methods but to expand the sphere of cultural literacy. This includes the identification of already existing cultural, moral, philosophical and artistic potentials of the proletariat, the mobilization of the latent intellectual power of the people” (ibid., 155).
Extending Said’s account, we could say that experts in the anime industry can be considered organic intellectuals who try to gain the consent of potential viewers and consumers, and to lead them into new forms of aesthetics, cultural production and consumption. For example, tracing the cultural history of the first animated TV series *Astroboy* to the transformations of media culture in post-war Japan, Steinberg (2012a) suggests that anime is not only a style of Japanese animation per se but has been playing a pivotal role in the development of media convergence or *media mix* in Japan. Considering the intimate relationship between anime and media mix, Steinberg argues that the immobility or stillness of the anime-image (e.g. iconic image of Astroboy) – a particular kind of aesthetics in limited animation especially anime – is a key to further merchandising of the anime image and the expansion and commodification of its franchise across media. Thus, the creators of the anime *Astroboy*, the original manga artist and anime director Tezuka Osamu and his collaborators in Mushi Productions, are organic intellectuals who have actively involved in society in multiple ways through their product and media franchise. *Astroboy*, with its iconic character image and its immobility provides a new aesthetic for the moving image, which is very different from that of the cinematic movement. Moreover, this visual style opens a way to new communication, consumption and production of the anime-image across visual media. Creators of anime are also on the move, on the make.

Tosaka’s vision of new intellectuals and new knowledge – journalists and journalism – is similar to Gramsci’s conception of organic intellectuals. It is also based on everyday life and its social reality, and defined in contrast to the university system where philosophers often merely deal with abstract ideas detached from the social reality. Although Tosaka acknowledged that both the academy and journalism are ideological phenomena generated from the material foundations in society (Tosaka [1934] 1966b, 147; Tosaka 2013b, 39), and that he is taking a critical approach to mass media in relation to his theorization of ideology, Tosaka had more confidence in journalism than in academic philosophy. For Tosaka, journalism captures everyday experiences and its materiality in a concrete manner, while academic philosophy “disregards everyday life and the concrete as serious categories for a conception of abstract ‘reality’ or false concreteness” (Harootunian 2000b, 125).  

Tosaka ([1934] 1966b; 2013b) observed a new wave of journalism called *theoretical journalism* (*riron-tekijānarizumu*) or *journalistic theory* (*jānarizumutekiron*) which is led by

---

25 According to Harootunian (2000b, 125–126), the confidence in journalism, newspapers, and magazines in which Tosaka and his contemporary Marxian critic Hirabayashi Hatsunosuke shared set them apart from German contemporaries such as Benjamin and Heidegger, but not Kracauer. Schäfer (2012, 111–112) suggests that Tosaka and many of the critical intellectuals of the Frankfurt School such as Benjamin, Kracauer and Bloch shared journalism’s possibility of social criticism.
former professors who become journalists and critics in the 1920s after leaving or being dismissed from universities. Theoretical journalism is “not just another form of academic theorizing but rather by deploying theory in a journalistic manner, it stands in opposition to academia in a qualitative sense” (Tosaka [1934] 1966b, 146; Tosaka 2013b, 38–39). He believes that this new type of journalism becomes an alternative approach for creating new knowledge and a force for challenging traditional academic theory (akademī-teki riron). Tosaka finds some potential for the philosophical method in journalism set outside of an academic discipline of philosophy. In other words, Tosaka sees journalism as another way of doing philosophy.

Tosaka ([1934] 1966b, 147–148; 2013b, 40–41) notes that because journalism is always about something ordinary, social, and trivial, journalism closely connects to an everyday knowledge or common sense. Journalism is also about current matters, or about what is going on in society, and not about something timeless and detached from society. For Tosaka, current issues are trivial matters judged by common sense; in other words, these issues are the things people care about and are at the same time popular. Moreover, current affairs are always political as well as philosophical since social practices, politics, and thoughts are closely interrelated. According to Tosaka ([1934] 1966b, 148; 2013b, 41), social practice is the most significant form of politics; politics is reflected by consciousness or thought; and thought is always philosophical. “The contents of journalism must be one kind of direct expression of this [world] view as held by the members of society. In this way, the current condition of society [sesō] is vividly portrayed” ([1934] 1966b, 148; 2013b, 42). In other words, journalism must be an immediate way to engage with people’s everyday knowledge – their views, common sense, and thought – and this is an alternative way of producing knowledge.

In summary, Gramsci and Tosaka saw intellectuals as a sociological as well as a moral category. They argued that intellectuals function in both maintaining and challenging social hegemony. They also envisaged that new types of intellectuals in a rising social group – organic intellectuals in Gramsci’s case and journalists in Tosaka’s – would potentially play an important social role in challenging social hegemony through their everyday social and cultural practices: criticizing existing knowledge, creating new common sense, and organizing moral and cultural leadership in the politics of emancipation. Importantly, new types of intellectuals are actively involved in society and link to not only economic relations but social and cultural relations. In Said’s interpretation of an organic intellectual in modern society, everyone who engages in the production or distribution of knowledge (i.e. mass media journalism itself) can be categorized as an intellectual. Borrowing Said’s account, I argued that everyone who works in the anime industry can be categorized as an organic intellectual. Experts who work in anime production and distribution are actively involved in society: they attempt to gain the consent of potential viewers and consumers through their product, maintain and expand their market, and participate in new cultural production,
distribution and consumption. Just as media experts are organic intellectuals in modern societies, experts in the anime industry are also intellectuals.

2.4. Everydayness and Philosophy

The previous section discussed an affinity between Gramsci and Tosaka in their ideas about intellectuals and their own intellectual orientations toward the nexus between theory and practice in everyday life. This section further elaborates their notion of everydayness and its relation to philosophy.

Everyday life is an important site for politics in Gramsci and Tosaka’s intellectual projects. As mentioned at the inception of this chapter, both thinkers developed their political and philosophical insights not only through their formal academic writings, but also in a large number of notes and essays about philosophy, politics, science, technology, journalism, literature, culture, and many other fields, in relation to current social issues in their time. In other words, their writing is itself the embodiment of their philosophy of praxis in Gramsci’s term. Gramsci and Tosaka both witnessed the emergence of social movements in the 1920s and later the rise of fascism in the late 1920s and 1930s in both Japan and Italy. They were attracted by Marx’s thought and his vision of human emancipation, and critically studied Marx’s as well as other philosophers’ works while reflecting on their own socio-historical context. They later developed their own particular theories of ideology and hegemony. Their ideas and method of philosophy – Marxism for Gramsci and materialism for Tosaka – are crucial to their studies of contemporary everyday life: for Gramsci, it was criticism of common sense, while for Tosaka it was journalism and critical analysis of everyday life. Their intellectual orientations were intimately related to their concerns with the problem of ideology, hegemony and political strategy, and their intellectual trajectories can be seen as a series of political and intellectual struggles against social hegemony in their historical context.

As we have seen in Chapter 1, Gramsci defined hegemony as moral and intellectual leadership operating in civil society through various social processes in people’s everyday lives. Importantly, Gramsci considered that the social hegemony of the ruling class in Western Europe is maintained not only through economic relations but also through complex social relations including the operation of popular common sense – received beliefs about the world shared among subaltern people – which lead to naturalization of the status quo. Thus for Gramsci, a new hegemony requires an intellectual and moral reformation to change people’s way of thinking in everyday life and to create a new world-view. As Mouffe (1979, 191) notes, intellectual and moral reform plays a central role in Gramsci’s conception of hegemony because for Gramsci, hegemony consists in the creation of a “collective will” based on “a common world-view which will serve as a unifying
principle” to fuse different social groups. As Gramsci (1971, 183) notes, “The establishment of a class of leaders (that is, of a state) is equivalent to the creation of a weltanschauungen [world-view].” The creation of a new political and civil society requires the creation of a new worldview, or in other words, “emancipation in practice must be preceded by ideational emancipation” (Robinson 2006, 78). However importantly, Gramsci did not envisage “the creation of a new world-view” in an abstract sense, but rather in a concrete sense on the basis of his observations and reflections of people’s everyday life. As we have seen in this chapter so far, Gramsci wrote extensive criticism of received philosophy and popular common sense; as well as on the role of the intellectuals in modern capitalist society in relation to social hegemony of his time.

In Tosaka’s case, his intellectual development was also closely linked to his political vision. The social and political incidents that moved Japan towards war and fascism after its invasion of Manchuria in 1931 shadowed Tosaka’s intellectual reorientation toward materialism (Yoshida 2001, 295; Harootunian 2008, 100). Tosaka co-founded the research group Studies in Materialism (Yuibutsuron kenkyūkai or Yuiken) in 1932. He was also an active editor of and a frequent contributor to its journal on materialism (Yuibutsuron kenkyū), which was published from 1932 to 1938 until the association was forced to disband by the police (Kawashima, Schäfer, and Stolz 2013, xii).

Significantly, Yuiken is both an intellectual and cultural movement: it was the first association on materialism established in Japan; and the anti-fascist movement in the cultural sphere (Kozai in Yoshida 2001, 295–296). Moreover, materialism and critical analysis of everyday life became the intellectual and political strategy for Tosaka in the fight against the social hegemony of fascism, Japanism, liberalism and its capitalist cultural ideology, which was increasingly penetrating people’s everyday life in the 1930s. In Harootunian’s (2008, 100) words, Tosaka “opened up a critical front against fascism as it had permeated everyday life in the 1930s through the publication of works like Shisō to fūzoku ([1936] 1966j) and Sekai no ikkan to shite no Nihon ([1937] 1967) that sought to clarify the conditions of contemporary Japan.”

Tosaka’s work resonates with Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, in that he considered the urgent task of intellectuals and philosophers to link philosophy with the actual problems of people’s

---

26 Tosaka ([1935] 1977) noted that there are three aspects of liberalism – economic, political and cultural – and attacked cultural liberalism in particular and its complicity with fascism and Japanism in interwar Japan. I will return to Tosaka’s criticism of cultural liberalism later in this chapter. Tosaka considered that each aspect of liberalism had developed within a specific historical context, hence it is a historical product. He, however, also argued that leading liberal intellectuals, such as contemporary philosopher Nishida Kitarō and his followers, nevertheless treated things in an abstract and eternal manner (Tosaka [1935] 1977). Tosaka ([1935] 1977) warned about the danger of such a philosophical method as it gives theoretical grounds for Japanism – the construction of essentialized Japanese nation and culture.
everyday life. Tosaka adopted a materialist approach for this project, which involved the criticism of contemporary social and cultural practices. His critical engagement with everyday life, its materiality and the actuality of the present was driven by both his intellectual and political concerns. Tosaka’s project was a strong intellectual critique of contemporary idealist philosophy and metaphysics which merely dealt with abstract ideas in contrast to the concrete materiality embedded in everyday life, and lapsed into “the virtual dematerialization of experience and the detemporalization of the everyday” (Harootunian 2008, 98). Against this, Tosaka sought to rematerialize everyday experiences and called for attention to the centrality of everyday life as a philosophical category against the elimination of the concreteness of the everyday by contemporary philosophers including Heidegger, Watsuji, Nishida, and their followers.27 Tosaka’s materialism is political in the sense that he refuted the dominant discourse of fascism, its cultural ideology and the contemporary philosophers who conspired to provide a theoretical ground for it in interwar Japan. As Goto-Jones (2005a, 115) suggests, Tosaka was a rare intellectual who seemed to “resist the pull of everyday politics,” and did so by “emphasizing how ineffective (and bourgeois) Nishida’s idealism was in the everyday world of material reality” in the atmosphere of the late 1930s and the 1940s. By then, his fellow philosophers of the Kyoto School such as Miki Kiyoshi, Nishitani Keiji, and Tanabe Hajime had already been pulling Nishida’s philosophical concepts in very dangerous fascist directions (ibid.).

Tosaka earlier developed his theory on everydayness in the present in “The Principle of Everydayness and Historical Time” ([1930/1934] 1966a; 2013c), together with his theory of space in “On Space” ([1931/1936] 1966k; 2013a). Tosaka formed his theoretical idea of the everyday as a central historical, philosophical and political category in these articles, and it formed the basis for his cultural critiques in the 1930s. Unlike other contemporary idealist philosophers who discussed consciousness and existence while abstractly removing the materiality of everyday life from their philosophical reflection, Tosaka saw the concreteness of everydayness as “the basic unifying element of the present” (Harootunian 2000b, 141). Tosaka centered the materiality and actuality of everydayness in history, or in what he called the *structure of history* or the *historical time* of the

---

27 Harootunian (2000a, 146–147) suggests that Tosaka clearly targeted Heidegger’s dismissal of the everydayness of the present in his theorization of space as everyday space and recall for the centrality of the materiality of the existence and the historical moment in philosophical reflection. Goto-Jones (2006) offers an insightful discussion on the philosophies of Tosaka Jun and Miki Kiyoshi in the multiple-directional context of political Left in interwar Japan. According to Goto-Jones, Miki’s philosophy was “at the cutting edge of interwar political philosophy” inspired by eminent contemporaries like Nishida, Watsuji and Heidegger as well as Marx (ibid., 10) but “anti-materialistic from the start” (ibid., 9). Tosaka rejected Miki’s new approach to Marxism. For Tosaka, Miki’s Marxism was wrong because this kind of “philological and hermeneutic method” to history “opening the door to liberalism” as well as Japanism (ibid., 12-15).
present. He rejected the received category of history in historicism which depended on “metaphysical categories and narrative development under the sign of hermeneutics” (Harootunian 2000a, 136).

For Tosaka, “the problem for idealism has always been its misrecognized identification between the metaphysical meaning of practice and practice itself. Tosaka wanted to liberate ‘practice’ from its constrained idealistic identification” (Harootunian 2000a, 136). Thus, Tosaka ([1935] 1977; [1934] 1966f) also carefully distinguished between two realities that he called reality (genjitsu) and actuality (jissaisei): the former refers to an abstract reality used in idealism and metaphysics, while the latter designates a concrete reality used in materialism. He preferred to use the word actuality, as it signifies embeddedness in the concrete materiality of everyday life. Moreover, he underscored the importance of actuality and practice in the present, contrasting this with the principle of possibility and a utopian imagination set in the future. Tosaka observed that

The principle of everydayness is the principle of presentness. It is the principle of reality, the principle of factuality [jijitsusei]. Accordingly, it is the principle of practice [jissensei]. To sum up, the principle of everydayness is the principle of reality and factual truth [practice]. In other words, it is not the principle of possibility; this we must not forget. ([1930/1934] 1966a, 102; 2013c, 13)

It is also worth noting that Tosaka made a clear distinction between actuality (of the present) and possibility (of the future). For Tosaka, the actuality of now, today or the present – in other words, the various embodiments of the principle of everydayness – is far more important than any abstract possibility that might be realized tomorrow or sometime in the future. He believed that looking at the future instead of the present is merely to confuse actuality and possibility ([1930/1934] 1966a, 102–103; 2013c, 14). In his words, “[in] the end, aligning the reality given by the present with the possibility of the future (ideality, imagination, expectation, fear, anxiety, and so on) – in a non-everyday, formalistic manner – is necessarily a fiction that renders any of our practical action impossible. This fiction is called utopia” ([1930/1934] 1966a, 103; 2013c, 15, emphasis in the original).

It seems here that there is little space for anything between actuality and possibility or between the present and the future. In this passage, we can see Tosaka’s idea of everydayness is precisely embedded within the actuality of the present, and not in a possibility grounded somewhere in the future or somewhere between the present and the future. In other words, Tosaka strongly rejected utopian thinking, because for him it merely belongs to the realm of possibility, not actuality. Although I do sympathize Tosaka’s firm commitment to the everydayness and materialism during the struggles against fascism and Japanism in his time, I do not agree with the anti-utopianism he
based on the clear distinction between actuality and possibility. As I discuss further in Chapter 3, imagination does matter to real politics; utopian narratives can become a concrete political practice in the present. The future depicted in utopian and science fiction narratives are not the future as such; rather, the depicted future functions as a metaphor of the present in which the authors and the readers live. Such temporal reorientation is a literary device of cognitive estrangement that allows us to see our present more clearly. Thus at this point, the significance of Tosaka’s work is his conception of everydayness as a philosophical practice rather than his anti-utopianism. Harootunian (2000a, 137) suggests that Tosaka envisaged a new purpose and task for historical materialism by theorizing everydayness as a historical, philosophical and political category, and would have shared this ambition with his contemporaries Walter Benjamin and Gramsci, who also tried to “imagine a conception of history that would open the way for practice in history that historicism, in all of its forms, had simply foreclosed.” In this vein, Tosaka established his basic materialist theory of everydayness, before launching his critiques of the social hegemony of Japanism (fascism in Japan) and its cultural ideology, as well as of contemporary philosophy’s complicity with dominant ideologies.

Asking the pressing question of how liberalism turned into fascism in modern capitalist society in Japan, Tosaka attacked Japanism, fascism and liberalism, and their common theoretical mechanisms from the standpoint of materialism in Japanese Ideology ([1935] 1977). As Kozai notes, “Tosaka gradually built his materialist method from the late 1920s to the early 1930s, while it was after the break of the war in 1931 that Tosaka used this theoretical weapon to fight against fascism and the ideological glorification of war. Japanese Ideology was a culmination of his fight against fascism” (Kozai 1977, 423, my translation).

In this collected volume, Tosaka ([1935] 1977, 21–22) disclosed the common philosophical mechanism of interpretative philosophy (kaishaku tetsugaku) behind these ideologies: the philological and hermeneutic method in philosophy, which “only explains the corresponding order of meanings instead of clarifying the order of real matters/objects.” According to Tosaka ([1935] 1977), this mechanism produces the literary (bungaku-shugi) and philological (bunkengaku-shugi) logic which has deeply penetrated Japanese intellectual life (ibid., 22–23). In support of this, he cited as examples contemporary liberal philosophers Watsuji and Nishida as well as Japanist philosopher Takahashi Satomi, and their followers (ibid., 28-29). In Tosaka’s account,

_bungaku-shugi_ is a hermeneutic method using literary categories based on the literary image instead of using philosophical categories based on reality, while _bunkengaku-shugi_ is a method solely based on etymology and philology instead of real matters/objects… _bungaku-shugi_ makes a representation into an (abstract) idea, while _bunkengaku-shugi_ makes a language into an idea. (ibid., 24-25, my translation)
Tosaka regarded this method as a reactionary force that has emerged as a necessary consequence of modern capitalism (fukko-shugi) (ibid., 26). He also argued that this method becomes a perfect instrument for Japanism when it is applied to national history, for this is when various ideologies such as Japanese spiritualism, Japanese agrarianism, Japanese Pan-Asianism (nihon-seishin-shugi, nihon-nōhon-shugi, nihon-ajia-shugi) turn into a proper Japanism with their appeals to a particularized and essentialized Japanese culture (ibid., 26-27). Tosaka also argued that these interpretative philosophers “consciously and unconsciously conspire to support fascist ideology or end up supporting it” by creating a fantasy appealing to an abstract idea of the Japanese nation and the Japanese spirit in an eternal, ontological sense (ibid., 235).

Tosaka wrote numerous cultural critiques of custom, literature, journalism and morality from a materialist point of view when fascism and its essentialist cultural ideologies came to increasingly occupy people’s everyday lives. “What drove Tosaka … in this project to reunite philosophy and everyday life was the desire to juxtapose an alternative everydayness and the production of modern custom to the fictive abstractions of national culture circulating in the 1930s” (Harootunian 2000b, 141). Importantly, in a move similar to Gramsci’s conception of common sense, Tosaka not only situated custom within a social and historical context and “at the heart of any social order,” but also recognized that custom is “susceptible to change” (Harootunian 2000a, 120). For Tosaka, everyday life, especially that of ordinary people, is not something merely routine or mundane, but rather lively, dynamic, and constantly changing in nature. From this perspective, everyday life is a repetition (hanpuku) but it is only manageable by breaking down conventions and creating new ones. According to Tosaka

It was not possible to carry out everyday life by merely following things as they are, historical necessity and received contention…everyday life survived only by destroying received conventions and constructing new necessities. (Tosaka [1934] 1966f, 136–137; Harootunian 2000a, 128)

Because of this changing nature of everyday life, Tosaka’s criticism of custom in everyday life is an important point of intervention to challenge dominant discourses of Japanism and their appeal to the idealised eternal ideas of national culture. As Harootunian points out, “Tosaka was encouraged to propose the everyday as philosophy’s true vocation and recommended a return to its materiality as a necessary countermove to offset the baneful efforts of metaphysics and its appeal to the transcendent and eternal” (Harootunian 2008, 106).

In summary, both Gramsci and Tosaka argued for the political and philosophical significance of everyday life. For Gramsci, civil society – everyday social and cultural practices – is a locus of political struggles for social hegemony, while Tosaka theorized everydayness as a proper
philosophical category, fighting against the dominant Japanese fascism and its cultural ideology with his materialism based on the concrete materiality of everydayness. Tosaka criticized received customs in people’s everyday life, which are increasingly occupied by an abstract idealised idea of national culture, while envisaging new conventions and new morals emerging within the criticism of everyday life in the present. Importantly, both Gramsci and Tosaka believed that everyday life is constantly changing, rather than static and conventional, and the possibility for social change therefore always remains open.

2.5. Conclusion: Critical Analysis of Everyday Life as a Political and Philosophical Intervention

Gramsci’s and Tosaka’s work on the role of the intellectuals and everydayness provides a useful point of departure for dealing with similar problems in our time, and when considering how knowledge is produced and what methods and approaches are appropriate in studying political theory. They both criticized existing modes of knowledge production and redefined the identity and vocation of intellectuals in modern capitalist society. They extended the scope of the intellectual in modern capitalist society and saw them as important actors organizing and leading a moral and intellectual reformation in society. For Gramsci, the intellectual has a dual social function, both maintaining social hegemony and challenging it in transformative social projects. Both Gramsci and Tosaka envisaged a new purpose and task for intellectuals: to engage with the creation of new world-views, new common sense, and new morals in the politics of emancipation. Thus, the philosophers’ vocation is to link philosophy and everyday practices, while philosophy in practice is the criticism of received common sense, current affairs, and social and cultural practices, together with the creation of new common sense and new morals.

By closely examining the everyday experience of their time, both thinkers linked philosophy with everyday experience by conceptualizing everydayness as a historical, philosophical and political category. They argued for immediate attention to everyday experience as the object of philosophy. For them, everyday life is not something merely pedestrian, traditional, or conventional, and therefore a matter of peripheral interest, but rather a rich source for philosophical inquiry, and philosophers should accordingly not only look at classic philosophical texts but also extend their scope of study to everyday practices. Moreover, everyday life has a political significance in the present, opening the possibility for criticism and social change. Everyday life is a sphere of social, political, and cultural struggles for hegemony, ideology, and resistance. In this vein, Gramsci’s and Tosaka’s respective theories offer a perspective from which history, culture, society and politics can be viewed as being irreducible parts of everyday life.
Thus, their new conception of intellectuals and the everyday has a significant political and philosophical connotation: it is political because it serves as a means for intellectuals to lead other members of society to reflect and criticize received worldviews and common sense, opening the way for political interventions through everyday practices. It is philosophical because theorizing intellectuals and everydayness becomes an alternative way of doing philosophy – Marxism for Gramsci and materialism for Tosaka respectively.

Accordingly, the importance of Gramsci and Tosaka’s theory for the study of anime (or any of other cultural products) should seem clear now. In contrast to orthodox Marxists, Gramsci and Tosaka regard class essentialism and economism as unsatisfactory simplifications that cannot explain everything. Orthodox Marxism, saturated in economic analysis, is problematically fatalistic or even anti-political in determining in advance that everyday life and cultural practice are inconsequential. In offering an alternative to this economic determinism, Gramsci’s and Tosaka’s theories of intellectuals and everydayness have been strongly influential within cultural studies. Paul Bowman (2007) therefore calls for relating post-Marxist theory to cultural studies. He says that

Both post-Marxist theory and cultural studies as institutions initially and constitutively orientated themselves as interventional efforts, as wanting to challenge, dislodge, or at least develop, existing and often broadly Marxist models of political causality, of intervention, and of what determines the character of conjunctures, identities and objects. Both cultural studies and post-Marxism, that is, sought to establish precisely what effective and responsible, intellectually justifiable and rigorous ethico-political intervention could be. In other words, both sought to intervene. (Bowman 2007, xii)

To end this chapter, I’d like to pose the question of whether anime can be understood as a serious intellectual source of political thought that explores pressing political ideas. My short answer is yes, and Gramsci’s and Tosaka’s thoughts on a role of intellectuals and everydayness provide us with a helpful account of this issue.

Gramsci’s and Tosaka’s work suggests that everyday cultural practices are an important site of philosophical inquiry. Anime – a major cultural force in Japan and beyond – is an important intellectual source in the field of political thought. Moreover, with a broader definition of the intellectual, participants in the anime industry such as animation directors, animators, scriptwriters, anime critics can all be understood as intellectuals who engage in intellectual activities. For example, the work of leading animation directors and animators Tezuka Osamu, Miyazaki Hayao, Anno Hideaki, Oshii Mamoru, among many others, can become an additional intellectual source for political thought alongside classical political philosophical texts. Political theorists should not dismiss anime as having nothing to do with their political philosophical inquiries, and should
instead critically reflect on it as a site of inquiry. Anime’s relevance as a site of inquiry seems to be valid now, but some may wonder why I focus on science fiction anime, and not on anime that depict more mundane, everyday situation. As we follow Tosaka’s materialist standpoint, utopian imagination seems to be relatively useless or even harmful. The next chapter explains why imagination, in particular utopian and science fiction imagination matters to political thinking and political thought.