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**Becoming a European homegrown jihadist:
A multilevel analysis of involvement in the
Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005**

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Becoming a European homegrown jihadist: A multilevel analysis of involvement in the Dutch Hofstadgroup, 2002-2005

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