EUROPEANISATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES

A comparative study about the impact of EU security governance on the domestic security policies of small member states.

Caroline J. A. M. Kok

Abstract

This study aims to describe and analyse the Europeanisation of defence policy in smaller member states. By using comparative analysis it will assess the impact of their EU membership on the national policies and institutions of three countries: the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden.

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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>Air-to-Air Refuelling</td>
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<td>ABNL</td>
<td>the Headquarters of the Admiralty Benelux</td>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DDD</td>
<td>Dutch Defence Doctrine</td>
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<td>EB</td>
<td>Eurobarometer</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Social Survey</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUOHQ</td>
<td>European Union Operational Headquarters</td>
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<td>EVS</td>
<td>European Values Study</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security and Assistance Force</td>
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<td>MSU</td>
<td>Multinational specialized Unit</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation Europe</td>
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<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability</td>
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<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>SDIO</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Initiative Organization</td>
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<td>SAF</td>
<td>Swedish Armed Forces</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UK/NL AF</td>
<td>Kingdom / Netherlands Amphibious Force</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Introduction

On behalf of the European Commission (EC), Frans Timmermans, the first Vice-President of the EC, presented on 28 April 2015 a new ‘European agenda on Security for the period of 2015-2020’ in order to improve the cooperation between member states in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cybercrime.1 During his speech, Timmermans emphasized that a joint policy benefits the security of the European member states: ‘Because in this area no single European country is able to effectively tackle the challenges on its own.’2 The agenda outlines a renewed Internal Security Strategy which sets out the necessary actions towards a more secure Europe.3 Its success depends on the commitment of all involved actors to do more and to cooperate. This emphasizes the need for intense cooperation between the European Union’s (EU) member states.

In the course of the foreign affairs council of 18 May 2015 in Brussels, several conclusions were made concerning European internal and external security. For instance, the global as well as the European security environment has transformed drastically in recent years. Conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Ukraine threaten the stability in the European Union’s immediate and wider neighbourhood and causes serious impact on European security. In addition, new and emerging hybrid forms of warfare, such as cyberwarfare and the use of unmanned aircraft systems, demand the cooperation between member states. According to the European Council, just as Timmermans stated, this calls for a united Europe, with a stronger and more effective Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).4

The CSDP is the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and was renamed in 2009 when the treaty of Lisbon came into force. The CSDP is a tool of EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to manage the internal and external security threats and allows the EU countries to combine forces and organize joint military and civilian operations on behalf of European and international security.

What currently is decided on EU level penetrates more and more areas of domestic policy-making. The term Europeanisation must be seen as a process where the EU becomes increasingly

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2 Press release, Opening remarks in the European Parliament by First Vice-President Timmermans on the adoption of the European Agenda on Security (Strasbourg, 28 April 2015).


important on the national governance level of the member state. International objectives are nowadays frequently designed on European level, instead of ‘brought to Brussels’ by member states. However, in certain policy sectors member states are reluctant to give up their central position. The governance of domestic defence is one of these policy sectors. Resistance to transferring a part of national sovereignty to a supranational institution is one of the reasons why security governance remains to a large degree domestic policy. But other factors, such as opening the market of private weapon industry, also play important roles.\(^5\)

Although the European Council has welcomed the increasing participation in CSDP missions and operations, it still strongly underlines the need to further strengthen the European alliance.\(^6\) It urges the EU to fight as a united front against terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, border management, energy security and cyber security.\(^7\) In addition, the Council expressed their wish to see an EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform by mid-2016.\(^8\) You could conclude that the European council desires to move towards a deeply integrated defence policy. But does this affect the national defence policy of the member state? Would EU’s policy have priority over national defence policy? And what about the smaller member states? One could argue that smaller member states with little military capabilities would be greater affected by military decisions on European level than the so called ‘Big Three’. This paper will therefore explore to what extent the CSDP and similar European policies have led to the Europeanisation of defence policies of the (small) member states.


\(^6\) European Council, Council conclusions on CSDP (18 May 2015) 7.

\(^7\) European Council, Council conclusions on CSDP (18 May 2015) 8.

\(^8\) Ibidem, 7.
Defining the theoretical framework

Europeanisation of national security: what does it mean?

To measure the effect of the CSDP on national defence policies, first the term Europeanisation must be defined in order to draw a theoretical framework. Europeanisation is a relatively new but increasingly researched subject. In the beginning of the ’90s there were less than ten scientific articles published per year on Europeanisation. Between 2000 and 2001 this number increased to 24 and 22 publications. Until recent years, the largest part of the studies in international relations focused on the domestic implementation in sectors of the Community’s competence, such as the internal market policy. Other studies related to Europeanisation discussed areas such as environmental policy, social policy and employment policy. Lately, however, the focus on the definition and impact of Europeanisation shifted to other sectors of international relations, including security and defence policy. One of the first studies on the Europeanisation of security and defence policies was conducted by Jolyon Howort and Anand Menon in their book ‘The European Union and national defence policy’. They concluded that the EU had little or no impact on national defence policy. But their study was published before the development of the ESDP. In 1999, the ESDP was inaugurated at the Cologne European Council in order to develop autonomous defence capabilities. The creation of the ESDP gave scholars a great impetus to study the impact of a common European security policy on the national policy of member states or even domestic sub-policies such as institutional adaptation, arms export policy and security identity. For example, Margriet Drent, research fellow at the Dutch institute for international relations Clingendael, studied how the formation and change of the European security identity influenced the security identities of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany between 1998 and 2008. She concluded that there was in fact a distinct European way of conducting security and defence policy and a steady trend on

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10 Sitterman, Birgit. „Europeanisation – A step forward in Understanding Europe?” 1-23.
domestic level towards the organization of security in European fora.\textsuperscript{14} But what do we exactly mean with Europeanisation of the national security policy? Oliver Treib, a political scientist at the University of Münster, describes Europeanisation as “the effects of European integration in the member states”\textsuperscript{15}. This is a very broad meaning as it covers more areas than solely national security governance. A more specified definition is given by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse. Their study on domestic change caused by EU level decision-making, identifies three dimensions within the concept of Europeanisation: policies, politics and polity.\textsuperscript{16} Europeanisation in their definition begins in the policy-making area. The implementation of policies on the EU level can change policies on the domestic level of the member states. This could mean the transformation of the general approach, use of other policy instruments or the differentiation of policy standards. Policy changes on domestic level induce “legal and administrative structures, patterns of interest intermediation, and policy narratives and discourses”\textsuperscript{17}. Here is where politics come in: if policies are more often made at the European level, it is likely to lead to domestic (political) actors pursuing their interests into the European policy-making.\textsuperscript{18} Studies on Europeanisation can also focus on the dimension of ‘polity’ studies and describe specific policies and changes in the political, legal, and administrative structures that carry out policies. The definition of Europeanisation by Börzel and Risse includes the changes in “legal and administrative structures, patterns of interest intermediation, and policy narratives and discourses” due to the common security policy of the EU.

Patrick Müller and Nicole Alecu de Flers present a different approach to Europeanisation within the security framework.\textsuperscript{19} In their working paper named ‘Applying the Concept of Europeanisation to the study of Foreign Policy’, they review the literature on the concept of Europeanisation in national foreign and security policy. Unlike Börzel and Risse, they present two dimensions of Europeanisation: the uploading of national policy preferences to the EU level (also known as bottom-up Europeanisation) and the downloading of policy models and ideas from the EU to the national level (top-down

\textsuperscript{15} Treib, „Implementing and complying with EU governance outputs.” 4.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem, 3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem, 4.
\textsuperscript{19} Müller, Patrick and Flers, Nicole Alecu de. Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the study of Foreign Policy. Working Paper Series, Austria: Institute for European Integration Research, 2009.
Europeanisation).\textsuperscript{20} Europeanisation of foreign policy is in their opinion best understood as “an interactive process of change linking the national and EU level”\textsuperscript{21}. Moravcsik argues something similar in a very early study (1997) about Europeanisation. He describes two perspectives: that of the constructivists and that of the rationalists. According to the constructivist approach, Europeanisation is the creation of a collective identity based on shared normative ideals and elite socialization, while viewed from a rationalistic approach Europeanisation is based on the maximization of influence within EU structures in order to achieve national policy goals.\textsuperscript{22} Although the early works on Europeanisation were mostly interested in the bottom-up dimension of Europeanisation, the latest studies on the effects of Europeanisation examine the top-down impact of EU policies.

One of the most relevant books written on Europeanisation within national security policies is the study of Eva Gross. In ‘The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management’,\textsuperscript{23} she explores to what extent member states’ positions have been Europeanised and describes Europeanisation as the effect of the EU institutions on domestic policies, both as a way to export policy preferences as well as to import common European guidelines. To analyse the degree Europeanisation, she uses three dimensions: Europeanisation, alliance politics, and governmental politics. This shows that domestic, trans-Atlantic or European institutional policies and agreements are always intertwined with each other. Furthermore, she uses case study analysis to find out to what extent foreign policy is decided by the EU member states on national and supranational level. Britain, France and Germany are the focus of these case studies because these were the crucial member states both in terms of their size and their contributions to the missions under the European Security and Defence Policy.\textsuperscript{24}

Although relatively more research has been done on the impact of Europeanisation on national security policies since the inauguration of the ESDP than before, there still remains a literature gap. For instance, little is written about the Europeanisation of small member states’ defence policies. One of the few examples is the study about the limited Europeanisation of Portugal by Steve Robinson. His article argues that the security dimensions of contemporary Portuguese foreign policy show that

\textsuperscript{20} Müller, Applying the Concept of Europeanization to the study of Foreign Policy, 4.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{22} Michalski, A. „Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark’s and Sweden’s Relations with China.” Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013: 884-900.


\textsuperscript{24} Gross, E. The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management.
“Europeanisation can be found in Portuguese security policy, but that the Atlantic remains central to the country’s strategic priorities” 25.

It shows that the concept of Europeanisation has no overall definition. According to Peter Mair, the concept of Europeanisation should be “unpacked”, meaning that one should first carefully do research in depth to conceive of something that is wholly separate from, national politics and national political systems. 26 However, the definition of Europeanisation is crucial in order to outline the theoretical framework of this paper. Therefore, I will combine several given definitions in order to formulate one which will be used in this study. This definition consists of the definition by Börzel and Risse, combined with the bottom-up structure of Müller and Flers and the import of EU policies described by Gross. While I am aware of the bottom-up structure and ‘uploading’ dimension of Europeanisation, this paper will restrict itself to the “top-down” perspective. In other words, in this paper, Europeanisation of national security policies will be defined as followed: Europeanisation of national defence policies is a process in which national defence policies, institutions and ideas are influenced by new practices, norms, rules and procedures designed at the supranational level of the EU.

**Methods:**

This paper will first provide a historical background of the formation of the CSDP. Then an analysis is given on the defence policies of the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden in order to assess the amount of Europeanisation in their national defence governance. An important challenge for this study’s methodology is the problem of ‘equifinality’ – which is the difference between domestic changes due to Europeanisation and changes caused by other phenomena in (inter)national spheres of EU member states. 27 In other words, common obligations of EU membership can still result in different impacts on various countries. 28 This is because the EU is not the only external actor that affect national policies. The CSDP is entangled with the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the Euro-Atlantic security cooperation. Therefore the NATO has a strong causal influence on European and domestic policies as well. To distinguish Europeanisation from “NATO-anization”, I will use methods such as literature analysis, process tracing and case studies of three smaller member states.

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27 Müller, P.
28 Michalski, A. „Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark’s and Sweden’s Relations with China.” 884-900.
The existing literature on the Europeanisation of domestic security policies is rarely focused on small member states. But what exactly entails a small state? One would automatically think of a country with a small population, small territory, little military power and limited resources. Nevertheless, a clear-cut definition of a small state is hard to describe. This study will not contribute to the definition of a small state. It rather categorizes the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden as small in contrast to the large member states as France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). The Netherlands has a long history of foreign policy based on the trans-Atlantic relationship. In other words, the cornerstone of its foreign policy is NATO. Belgium is, just as the Netherlands, a NATO member and one of the six ‘founding fathers’ of the European Economic Community (EEC). However, having Europe’s “capital” located in their own territory, could mean that it is more Brussels-oriented than other NATO-countries. Therefore, it is likely that Belgium is more ‘Europeanised’ by the CSDP than the Netherlands. Sweden has a long history as a neutral state and was forced to adopt European legislation and institutions when it joined the EU. The intensity of the impact of EU membership on national policies can depend, or at least vary, on the point in time the country has joined the Union. Sweden’s case study analysis forms a good comparison with Europe’s ‘founding fathers’ to distinguish national policy of EU adopted policy. Because of the fact that NATO is a military alliance, Sweden did not join the organisation. However, it did join the CSDP. By comparing non- NATO member Sweden with NATO members Belgium and the Netherlands, the NATO as a contributing factor to changes in national defence policy can partly be isolated.

The Europeanisation of defence policies depends on the development of a common European strategic culture among the Member States. This should be based on similar norms, ideas and practices regarding security and defence policies and the legitimization of the use of hard force. To analyse if there is a common strategic culture among the European Member States, we not only have to analyse if there is a shared identifiable set of norms, beliefs and habits but also whether these norms are derived from a shared European identity or from NATO. To define relevant actors, one can look at emerging strategic culture in discourse. For instance, the emphasis in Europe is most often on the civilian as well as the military part of defence and promotes a multilateral comprehensive approach. This shows that Europe’s discourse maintain key aspects of the trans-Atlantic relationship, while building up Europe’s

civil dimensions. To identify the strategic culture in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, one can look at the discourse among the general public, the national leaders, or the military itself. You can also explore if the norms and values in the specific country are derived from the EU or rather from NATO. To find similarities, every case will be analysed in five categories: doctrine, budget, military capabilities, cooperation and support of the general public. Then, we identify common norms and values and potentially explain these as an outcome of Europeanisation.

To measure to what extent the selected case studies are Europeanised, I used the ‘three degrees’ of Börzel and Risse in ‘Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe’. They describe three degrees of domestic policy due to Europeanisation: absorption, accommodation and transformation.\(^{31}\) Absorption means the incorporation of European policies and ideas in their domestic policies and structures without “substantially modifying existing processes, policies, and institutions”\(^ {32}\). This degree of domestic change is low. Accommodation entails greater “European” pressure: member states adapt existing processes, policies and institutions but without changing their fundamental character and its collective understanding.\(^ {33}\) An example is “patching up” existing policies with new adjustments. The degree of domestic change when a country accommodates is modest. The last, and largest amount of domestic change occurs in a ‘transformation’. When a country ‘transforms’, member states replace their existing policies and institutions by new, substantially different ones, or they change existing policies to such extent that the underlying understanding is fundamentally changed.\(^ {34}\)

These changes can appear in the form of governmental adaption, political adaption and strategic adaption.\(^ {35}\) Governmental adaption focuses on the response of the central governments organizational adjustments and changes in institutions and doctrine to meet the new challenges.\(^ {36}\) It is the extent to which new institutions have been introduced and the mechanisms that have been set up to coordinate these factors. Each country will therefore be studied in what has been done at the domestic level to change the way of governance in order to accommodate to EU membership’s conditions. Political adaption focuses on the response on the political level and concentrates on the member’s willingness to change in order to meet the new demands. It is the countries commitment to either facilitate or hinder

\(^{31}\) Börzel, T and Risse, T. „Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe.“ 2009.

\(^{32}\) Ibidem.

\(^{33}\) Ibidem.

\(^{34}\) Ibidem.

\(^{35}\) Hanf, Kenneth and Soetendorp, Ben. „Small states and the Europeanization of public policy.“ 8.

\(^{36}\) Ibidem.
European integration. Strategic adaption concentrates on the national policymakers’ response to the need to develop a strategy in order to achieve national objectives in an international context. For example, are there formal and informal patterns of coalition in place? And has the focus of the strategy shifted from an Atlanticist to an Europeanist approach or vice versa?

The study of CSDP-policies is mostly based on secondary literature. Examples of secondary literature are all conclusions of meetings, notes and other public documents of the European Council and European Commission concerning the CSDP and European security policies. In order to compare European defence policies with the defence policies of member states, I analyse the domestic policies as well. To measure the existing commitment in the selected countries, I use data of population surveys from three institutions: Eurobarometer (EB), the European Values Study (EVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS). The advantage of the EB surveys is that data for all EU member states are available. However, the questions asked in the surveys sometimes appear biased and more positive about Brussels policy, especially when you consider that most part of the reports are commissioned by the European Commission. In the EB, European sentiments seem more favourable than in other studies. In order to base my arguments not only on a potentially biased EB, I additionally use the data of EVS and ESS. Unfortunately, the data of these institutions are often older than the data collected by EB.

The analytical timeframe focuses for most part on the period from 1989 until 2015. It commences with the end of the Cold War and ends in 2015, six months before the announced publication of the new European global strategy. This study contributes to the academic debate on Europeanisation in national defence policy by filling the literature gap on Europeanisation of small member states’ national defence policy. It provides more clarity on which factors of national defence policies are decided on a European level, and what impact future global strategies could have on small EU member states in general.

37 Hanf, Kenneth and Soetendorp, Ben., 1-13.
38 Ibidem.
EU’s road towards a common security
From post-World War II until the 80’s: an Atlanticist approach
The aim of this chapter is to describe the historical process from the Western European Union (WEU) towards the CSDP. In the post-World War II period, two contrasting approaches in the field of security were revealed: the Europeanist approach and the Atlanticist approach, also known as the internalized and externalized approach. The internalized approach concentrates on cooperation within the Union, while the externalized approach concentrates on cooperation outside the Union, in this case on the trans-Atlantic relationship. During the Cold War period, the Atlanticist approach functioned as the cornerstone of European security policy. Before 1954 however, several attempts had been made to create internalized Europeanist institutions.

In November 1944, Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle met in Paris. During this meeting, de Gaulle proposed a Franco-British security partnership in order to rebuild Europe and to gain influence in the new world order dominated by two superpowers. Despite de Gaulle’s efforts, Churchill declined his proposal, reminding France that Great Britain always had an Atlantic option from which they benefitted. Nevertheless, near the end of the war, several countries, such as Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Britain, were developing blueprints for a West-European security bloc. These drafts were mainly concerned with economic and political integration.

But three years later, in Dunkirk, the Franco-British Treaty was signed which became the first bilateral security agreement between European states after World War II. At that time, the European security situation was transformed. The German threat was replaced by a Soviet threat and the American Marshall plan led to an externalist influence on Europe’s security. The Treaty of Brussels in 1948 marked the first step towards multilateral European integration on an economic, social, cultural and security level. It also contained an externalized approach: the United States of America (USA) came into an alliance with Western-Europe in the NATO. In 1950 the ‘Pleven Plan’ emerged, which also suggested the creation of a pan-European military named the European Defence Community (EDC) by

40 Howorth, Jolyon, 5.
41 Ibidem.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibidem.
1954. In 1952, the Treaty of the EDC was signed. This Treaty proposed the creation of a European army under a European authority. The Treaty was accepted by most Western countries, but the proposal for an EDC was rejected and not ratified in 1954 by the French national Assembly. France proved unwilling to give up a part of their sovereignty under a purely supranational European institution. The member states established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which became the first European institution of the future EU. The aim of the ECSC was to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” and focused on economic market integration instead of military integration. With the defeat of the EDC by the ECSC, the promise of European institutions on security faded to the background and integration through common economic markets gained priority. Until the mid-1980s, no substantial attempts were made to integrate security policies of Western-European states outside of NATO.

From the 1960s it became clear that ECSC member states did have a desire for military cooperation and concerted action. The dependency on the US was for some European states undesirable. France, known for its reluctance towards the trans-Atlantic relationship, even withdrew from NATO. Nevertheless, the ‘Soviet threat’ was of greater concern than ‘American dependence’. At the Hague Summit of 1969, the foreign ministers of the Community were requested to increase cooperation between the member states in foreign policy. This led to the creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The EPC was based on intergovernmental cooperation and consensus, and its decisions were not binding and excluded from military aspects. Although the EPC came into force in 1970, it was not recognized in the Treaties until the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986.

The 1980’s: a new desire for autonomy

In the 1980’s, the small desire to become an autonomous global power grew bigger. First, because European dependence on the USA raised some tension. During the ongoing arms race between the SU and the US, Ronald Reagan decided to launch the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, also known as ‘Star Wars’) in 1983 without consulting Europe. This instigated the debate in Europe to revive the WEU. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) was a research and technology development program

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46 Schuman, Robert. Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950).

created by the United States. The aim of the SDI was to protect the American population and its allies against Soviet ballistic missiles by placing a "missile shield" in space. As a response, a meeting of the WEU was held in Rome in 1984. The WEU decided to revive the organisation as a forum for discussions on European security. They boldly stated that they “were convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence”. At The Hague in 1987 a ‘Platform on European Security Interests’ was adopted with the aim of developing a more cohesive European defence identity. In addition, the SEA of 1986 explicitly stated that member states would formulate and implement a common foreign policy on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation. It also gave a great impetus to European integration by creating a base for advancement in foreign and security policy cooperation, albeit in an intergovernmental nature. Finally, change also appeared in the form of Gorbachev, who seemed to direct in a new era of détente.

The end of the Cold War allowed several states into Europe and eliminated the Soviet threat. It also decreased the geopolitical importance of Europe to the USA, which created an opening for a more autonomous security and defence policy. The Maastricht Treaty of February 1992, also known as the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), provided for the CFSP to integrate in EU’s second pillar. The key elements of the pillar were: the general objectives of the CFSP that member states were expected to achieve; intergovernmental decision-making based on unanimity; the eventual creation of a common defence policy; and the WEU as part of the development of the Union. In June 1992, the EU member states convened in Petersberg to define this new security role, which later became known as the Petersberg tasks. These tasks entailed crisis management, including combat-force tasks; peace-keeping; and humanitarian and rescue missions. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 strengthened the Maastricht Treaty in a number of ways. It adopted the Petersberg tasks and marked the beginning of more internalized and autonomous policy. It established a High Representative for the CFSP to make the

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48 Ibidem.
49 Ibidem.
50 Howorth, Jolyon, 6.
53 Howorth, 7.
54 Freire, 6.
55 Nugent, Neil. The government and policies of the European Union.
56 These tasks were incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam.
57 Freire.
policy more coherent. Also, to overcome the inefficient consensus-based decision-making, the Treaty allowed member states to abstain from a common operation.58 This way, other member states could still engage whilst the joint operation did not get blocked. Additionally, the Treaty included ‘Common Strategies’, which enabled the EU to set objectives in key domains -such as EU-Russia relations- and design common policies to achieve them.59 It renamed the EPC into the CFSP and new policy instruments expanded the Unions foreign policy toolbox. Qualified majority voting (QMV) became a decision-making tool for some policy implementations, although this was never used. It seemed that the willingness for military cooperation among EU nation states resurrected, but common positions among member states about international security were not yet reached.

Nevertheless, the structural and procedural developments were not backed up by the EU when it intervened in the Balkans. The Union failed to stop the bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia and fell short in several security-related areas.60 The defence strategy was based on traditional territorial defence but proved inadequate for the civil ‘intrastate’ wars.61 The lack of European coordination in the Balkans, the Kosovo crisis in particular, let the Americans once again take the lead in a ‘European’ crisis.62 In addition, the Union had no deployable, professional armed forces, and lacked a common strategic culture. The Balkans showed the EU that it could not back up its promises with the necessary actions because it lacked the capabilities to achieve their goals. In the following years, the pressure of the USA to share the burden, combined with the desire of member states to be less dependent, led to the narrowing of the capabilities gap.63

The 1990’s: on the road to self-dependency
Washington supported the strengthening of the CFSP as its formation was confined by the framework of NATO. NATO gave access to its capabilities when the EU would carry out military operations without them involved. However, the real breakthrough in the search to autonomy was the Franco-British summit in St. Malo in 1998. Great Britain’s perspective had shifted its strategic orientation since it opposed the WEU, fearing that it would undermine NATO.64 Conflicts in the EU, the smaller importance of Europe as a geopolitical territory and the wish to become a global security actor, paved the way for a

58 Freire, 9-25.
59 Freire, 11.
60 Ibidem.
61 Ibidem.
63 Freire, 11.
64 Ibidem, 12
more Europeanist-minded UK. France and the UK declared their support for the development of an autonomous European defence capacity on the condition that it would not jeopardize the relationship with NATO. 65 A week after the St. Malo summit, the other EU member states supported the proposal as well: the ESDP was created. This did not mean that the Americans also supported the outcome of St. Malo, on the contrary, the ESDP was seen as a calculated move away from the transatlantic partnership. The then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, saw the ESDP as a ‘Gaullist’ attempt of the EU to challenge American supremacy in the western alliance. She agreed to the ESDP under three conditions – later to be known as her famous ‘3D’s’. These provisions ensured that the EU would not ‘Duplicate’ NATO assets, ‘Discriminate’ against non-EU NATO members, nor try to ‘Decouple’ the EU from NATO. 66 At NATO’s Washington summit in April 1999, members declared that they were “ready to define and adopt the necessary agreement for ready access by the European Union to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance” 67. These agreements became to be known as the ‘Berlin-plus agreement’. 68

Despite America’s assumptions, member states did not want the ESDP to compete with national security policies nor with the NATO. 69 That is why the EU agreed to the provision that specifies that the ESDP “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states and shall respect the obligations of certain member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” 70. Article 43 of TFEU specifies the certain missions that the EU conducts under the ESDP framework. 71 These missions include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention” 72 and also the combat against terrorism. 73 Several new institutions were created under the European Council and the EU received guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities and assets for EU-led crisis management operations under the ‘Berlin Plus agreement’.  

65 Ibidem.
68 The propositions which was upon agreed, were proposed in 1996 in Berlin. Hence they were called the Berlin-plus agreements.
70 Art.42 (2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TFEU).
71 Art. 43 of the Treaty of the European Union, post Maastricht (1992)
72 Art. 43 of the Treaty of the European Union, post Maastricht (1992)
73 Keukeleire, S., The Foreign Policy of the European Union.
At the June 1999 Cologne summit, the declaration ‘on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’ was published.\textsuperscript{74} It stated that the Council should have the ability to take decisions using every tool in its crisis management tasks as defined in the Petersberg Tasks.\textsuperscript{75} These provisions were confirmed at the Helsinki summit in December. A ‘Headline Goal’ was set under which, by 2003, a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) had to be created, consisting of 60,000 persons and deployable within 60 days for at least one year.\textsuperscript{76} In order to meet this headline, the EU also created EU Battlegroups. These are not standing forces but can be called up to carry out military operations. The battlegroups have not been deployed since its creation.\textsuperscript{77} At the June 2000 Feira summit, member states committed themselves to provide up to 5000 civilian police officers within 30 days in crisis situations. The Brussels summit in 2003 adopted the European Security Strategy, named ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’.\textsuperscript{78} The strategy focused on effective multilateralism through the United Nations (UN), cooperation with NATO and autonomy for the EU in some operations. In 2008 a summit was held in Paris, where the then High Representative of the CFSP Javier Solana, emphasized the need to resolve the capabilities gap and improve civilian and military capacities. This summit also reaffirmed Helsinki’s Headline Goal. The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, introduced a mutual defence clause, meaning that if a member state is attacked on its own territory, other member states are obliged to provide assistance. The Lisbon Treaty gave security and defence its own section in the TEU and relabelled the ESDP to the CSDP.\textsuperscript{79} It created the European External Action Service under the authority of the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Commission, then Catherine Ashton. The new post gave the HR the possibility to assemble all the EU security assets when necessary and to apply an overall approach in EU crisis management.\textsuperscript{80} Finally, the Lisbon Treaty expanded the interpretation of the Petersberg Tasks, which now included: “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by

\textsuperscript{75} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibidem, 382.
\textsuperscript{77} Moment of writing: 7 June 2016.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{79} Ibidm.
\textsuperscript{80} The European Agenda on Security, p.2.
supporting third countries in combatting terrorism in their territories.\(^{81}\)

A lot of changes has been made in the European policy since the summit at Cologne. The treaty of Lisbon already increased the cooperation between authorities of different member states. The Internal Security Fund has been created to address the targets up to 2020. Member states coordinate common priorities and actions through the EU Policy Cycle to response efficiently in crisis situations, avoiding an overlap in efforts by the member states.\(^{82}\) Furthermore, the Council invited the High Representative and the Commission to develop, in consultation with the member states, an EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform by mid-2016.\(^{83}\) However, despite the expansion in the CSDP and the increase of the EU as a security actor, the success of the CSDP is limited to the Petersberg Tasks. This means that the ‘traditional’ defence is still left to NATO (or in certain circumstances, to national defence itself). The CSDP can only act autonomously when NATO chooses not to act. Decision-making in the CSDP remained intergovernmental. Also, the CSDP is open to non-EU NATO Members and European state applicants. These core features show that the CSDP is an intergovernmental alliance, still committed to the Atlantic partnership and with limited autonomy in practice when it comes to military operations.

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81 Article 43 (1) TEU.
82 European Commission, The European Agenda on Security, Strasbourg, 28.4.2015, p.5.
The Netherlands

1989-1999

The Dutch economy mostly evolves around international trade. This means that a stable and safe neighbourhood is crucial for the Netherlands. Therefore, the Dutch Armed Forces not only protect Dutch and allies’ territory, but also contribute to missions that support and sustain international peace in third countries. As stated in Article 97 of the Dutch Constitution: "to defend and protect the interests of the Kingdom, as well as for the maintenance and promotion of the international rule of law, there is a force". In order to maintain global stability, the Netherlands cooperates with NATO, the EU, the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Of these organisations, NATO is seen as ‘the cornerstone’ of Dutch military security.

In 1989, the Netherlands invested 2.2 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in defence. This amount decreased to 2.11 percent in 1991, 1.92 percent in 1993 and eventually to 1.34 percent in 1998. A decreasing budget can often lead to a decrease in resources and diminishing capabilities. A way to tackle such a capability gap is by bundling resources with other member states. The Netherlands has taken a lot of initiatives in international cooperation and the ‘pooling and sharing’ of resources in the field of security. Since 1972 the Dutch and British marines form together an amphibious force. This force is called the United Kingdom / Netherlands Amphibious Force (UK/NL AF). It contributes to the European Multinational Maritime Force (EMMF), which is a European fleet. The Dutch contribution consists of circa 1000 men. Another example of early pooling and sharing with fellow EU members is the cooperation between the Dutch and Belgian navy called ‘the Headquarters of the Admiralty Benelux’ (ABNL). The Headquarters was established in 1995 and located in Den Helder. It is under the command of the Dutch Commander of the Royal Dutch Navy and has the commander of the Belgian Navy component as his deputy. Dutch policy-makers have generally been strong supporters of European security integration. The signing of the Single European Act in 1989 and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 was

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84 het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. „de Nederlandse Grondwet.” Artikel 97. sd.
86 Centraal Plan Bureau. Lange tijdsreeksen overheidsfinanciën. 21 September 2015.
87 Centraal Plan Bureau. Lange tijdsreeksen overheidsfinanciën. 21 September 2015.
agreed upon after a referendum. Most of the Dutch political parties supported a federal structure and the supranational institutions of the Community.  

1999-2007

The Netherlands played a substantial part in the development of the ESDP between 1999 and 2005. Following the example of the British, the Dutch concentrated on military capacity building and started the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) in 2001. In 2003 the Dutch ministry of defence wrote the ‘Dutch Defence Doctrine’ (DDD) after the EU published its European Security Strategy. This doctrine mostly focused its policy on promoting human rights progress, good governance and economic development. The country implemented in their crisis-management the three D’s (not to be confused with Madeleine Albright’s 3D’s): Defence, Diplomacy and Development. During its EU presidency in the second half of 2004, the Netherlands made much progress in the implementation of the 2010 Helsinki Headline Goal, the Battlegroups, the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the preparation of the EU operation in Bosnia. However, this Dutch progress in the ESDP changed with the arrival of the Constitutional Treaty of 2005. The political leaders in the ministries were reluctant to maintain this active role in promoting the ESDP and shifted its focus on the trans-Atlantic relationship with NATO instead.

The coalition agreement of the Balkenende II administration (2003), stipulated that "in the Dutch foreign and security issues, there should be an integrated structure of decision-making where various relevant policies are coordinated." But what exactly entails this integrated approach? With the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, states ensured consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action. Such consistency was to be provided by the HR. A form of comprehensive approach was used when the Dutch forces intervened in Afghanistan. During this mission, the ‘outdated’ concept of the three D’s was renewed by the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) as ‘security, governance

90 Drent, Margriet. „Security and Defence at EU Level: The Hague’s Blind Spot?”, 147.
92 Ibidem.
93 Ibidem.
and development’. The reason for the change in its name was that the Dutch three D’s did not cover judiciary, police and economic cooperation. The term integrated is often used in Dutch strategy papers and the Dutch government supports the integrative approach in several press releases.

Between 1999 and 2007, the Dutch military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP grew even smaller than before. It diminished from 1.41 percent to 1.09 percent of the GDP. The integrative approach gave the Dutch forces the possibility to use other policy tools, which narrowed the capabilities gap. For example, as the headlines of the London Times in 2007 outrageously screamed: Dutch were inviting the Taliban for tea. The Dutch military used diplomacy instead of hard force as a tool in order to achieve peace with local tribes.

In the period between 1999 and 2007, Dutch cooperation with other member states in the field of security intensified. In 2002, Germany and the Netherlands started working together in NATO’s High Readiness Forces Headquarters. Germany and the Netherlands also lead the Army Corps of Münster together. The staff consists of more than 400 military and civilian personnel. Most part of the functions are divided equally between Germany and the Netherlands, although seventy functions are reserved for other EU and NATO member states. The Headquarters’ commander, a lieutenant-general, is alternately from Germany or the Netherlands and switches every two or three years. Additionally, Dutch military personnel take part in the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF, also known as EUROGENDFOR). This force was created in 2006 by an agreement between five EU member states: France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Its structure is based on the design of the French Gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia Civil, the Italian Carabinieri and the Multinational specialized Unit

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98 Osch, Ton van. The Netherlands and the CSDP (accessed May 16, 2016).
102 de Koninklijke Landmacht. 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps. n.d. (accessed May 20, 2016).
The main objective of the EGF was to create a European intervention force with militarized police functions specialized in crisis situations. For example, since 2009 the EGF contributes to the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the War in Afghanistan.

During 1997 until 2007, the support amongst the Dutch citizens for EU decision-making in the area of defence policies is relatively big. According to the data of ESS collected in 2002 (see Figure 2.1), 41.5 percent of the Dutch population wants to see decision-making in defence on a European level. 23.5 Percent wants decisions in defence policies made on a national level, compared to 34.1 percent who wants defence policy decided on an international level, for example by NATO, just not on an explicit European level. Although governmental leaders appear to be in favour of more cooperation between European member states, the ‘Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ (Scientific Board for Governmental Policy) noted in the 2010 report ‘Europe in the Netherlands’, that the country has been lacking a political debate on the current and future significance of Europe for the Netherlands and the specific Dutch ambitions in European policy. One could argue that although there is much cooperation, decisions are still made in a NATO environment. The analysed Dutch defence strategy confirms this view because its fundament is built on NATO’s cornerstone.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred decision level of defence policies</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European level</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional or local level</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2.1 Preferred decision levels of defence policies in the Netherlands (ESS; 2001)*

**2007-2015**

After 2007, the collective defence depended mostly on the transatlantic relationship. NATO was still the key factor in the cooperation between Dutch and allies’ armed forces. In 2008, Minister of Foreign

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103 European Social Survey data of 2001; filtered with ‘the Netherlands’ and ‘preferred decision level of defence policies’.
Affairs Maxime Verhagen announced a needed change in Dutch policy. He argued that the focus of the Dutch foreign policy should shift to Europe: “a necessary condition for the Netherlands to be able to promote its interests in the world.” Verhagen emphasized the importance of investing in the ESDP since Europe would have to be able to take autonomous military action without the help of NATO. This need for autonomy was further underlined in 2009, when the Expert Group headed by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted in its recommendations: “NATO is a regional, not a global organization” and adds: “Compared to its first decades, NATO between 2010 and 2020 is likely to appear less on the central stage of global affairs.” In 2010 former ministers Verhagen and Van Middelkoop (ministry of defence) together wrote a letter saying that “the Netherlands have an interest in a more effective and efficient CSDP. This will benefit our national security”. In 2011, the Netherlands proposed to consolidate the CSDP agenda, which would implement several initiatives made in the past. A number of important provisions on the CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty are still to be implemented. For example, the articles on a Mutual Assistance Clause and Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of defence are not realized. However, Dutch cabinet members still strongly focused on the trans-Atlantic relationship and the role of the Americans in Europe.

Since then, the global security situation has transformed dramatically and led to the publication of a new DDD in 2013. This Doctrine describes how the Dutch defence strategy has led to more joint operations and military integration with other countries. A good example is the huge increase of pooling and sharing of forces and capabilities with other European member states. The doctrine was created by example of the NATO doctrine and formulates that NATO’s opinion is leading in the Dutch decision to deploy and use the military instruments. The DDD has three starting points. The first premise is that NATO doctrine is applied, unless the national policy deviates for own reasons.

105 Ibidem.
109 Drent, 143-161.
the so-called ‘green pages’ of the NATO doctrines these exceptions are written down per country. The second principle is that the doctrine follows national policy. Nevertheless, the DDD describes mainly cooperation with NATO and seems little influenced by the CSDP or the CFSP as both are not mentioned. The third principle is the use of the comprehensive approach which is essential in their defence doctrine.

In December 2013 the High Representative published ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises.’ This document describes the guiding principles by which the EU wants to focus on conflict prevention and crisis management in a more detailed manner than the 2007 guideline. The term comprehensiveness does not only mean the combined use of EU instruments and resources, but also “the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and member States.” It has been translated into Dutch policy as well: “For an effective approach, it is important that the Netherlands from case to case find the optimal mix of diplomatic, military and development instruments.” The actual implementation of the comprehensive approach requires the willingness among member states to inform each other, work together and share influence. Therefore, it is often a challenge to translate the comprehensive approach to operations in practice. However, since then the Netherlands became more aware of the US shifting their focus from Europe to Asia. Recent statements of American president Obama indicating that Europe will increasingly have to protect its own interests, made it clear to the EU that it has to take on a larger part of their burden. NATO is still the cornerstone for Dutch security, but the importance of EU’s CSDP seems more recognized by the Dutch government than before.

But does Dutch defence budget in fact meet the requirements described in the DDD? Policy-makers emphasize the need for international cooperation in security policy and that there is no national prosperity without international security. This led to the majority’s belief that the investment in international stability is a major cost on the national budget. In a time of economic crisis, the public was more concerned with economic self-interest. As a result, the budgets for diplomacy, development

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115 Matthijssen.
117 Osch, Ton van. The Netherlands and the CSDP. (accessed May 16, 2016).
118 Ibidem.
119 Osch, Ton van. The Netherlands and the CSDP.
cooperation and defence decreased over the past years. In the period after the Lisbon Treaty, Dutch military expenditure shrank from 1.07 percent of the GDP in 2008 to 1.0 percent in 2015.\textsuperscript{120} Although the budget in 2016 has increased, it is still a small number in comparison with the previous periods. In March 2016, NATO published a report of the contribution of NATO states. It was agreed among NATO member states to spend 2 percent of their GDP on the armed forces. This became the NATO guideline for members’ defence expenditure. The Netherlands currently pays 1.14 percent on defence.\textsuperscript{121} The average of the EU member states is 1.43 percent.\textsuperscript{122} It is no surprise that the Dutch government has received a lot of criticism from NATO concerning the low investment in defence expenditure. NATO also worries about future expenses: “the Netherlands’ defence expenditures expressed as a percentage of GDP will continue to decrease and are predicted to fall to 1.08 percent, in 2020, which is much below the NATO guideline of 2 percent”\textsuperscript{123}. Moreover, the Dutch defence policy is unrealistic and not feasible according to the Rekenkamers report published by the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) ‘validation policy in the interest of the Netherlands’. Although the Netherlands is pooling and sharing to compensate for this difference, it seems that the Dutch government is not able to contribute its fair share to international security. This also means that it does not contribute enough to the CSDP, as the CSDP is within NATO’s framework. If the Netherlands can not reach the requirements of NATO, it certainly does not have the capability to act autonomously outside NATO. However, the Netherlands does have several increases planned in their national defence budget. For example, the Netherlands’ defence budget will receive extra funding of 220 million euros in 2016 leading to a total defence budget of 7.5 billion euros.\textsuperscript{124}

According to NATO’s report, Dutch budget cuts have resulted in decreasing quality and quantity. Statistics of the Dutch Ministry of Defence confirms this. In 2008, 46.547 military personnel was employed.\textsuperscript{125} In 2015, this number decreased to 41.873 military personnel.\textsuperscript{126} The NATO report

\textsuperscript{120} Centraal Plan Bureau. \textit{Lange tijdsreksen overheidsfinanciën}. 21 September 2015.


\textsuperscript{123} Ibidem.


concluded that the Netherlands “can expect the Alliance to ask for more of its armed forces, (...)a much higher readiness (...) and that those forces are capable of conducting and sustaining themselves in high-intensity operations.”\textsuperscript{127} However, Dutch military capabilities have eroded due to the successive cuts in the last decades, especially when Prime Minister Rutte’s first administration cut a billion in the defence budget.\textsuperscript{128} Although these cuts were later reduced, in May 2016 minister Hennis still had to admit that the armed forces did not “fully comply” with the most basic employability goals.\textsuperscript{129}

In the period after the Lisbon Treaty, more cooperation initiatives were made. The Netherlands became a member of the international C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) created in 2008. This international partnership is created to meet the need for strategic airlift within NATO and EU and make it more efficient through international cooperation. The transport aircraft are flown by crews from twelve nations: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and the United States. The Netherlands also partakes in the European Air Transport Command (EATC)(2010). This is a global command centre that performs the operational control of the military air transport for Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. The centre is located at Air Base Eindhoven and consists of more than 200 people from all participating countries. Additionally, the 11th Dutch Airmobile Brigade is a rapidly deployable unit within the Dutch and German armed forces and can be anywhere in the world in five to twenty days. Troops are deployed as part of the NATO or the United Nations. Since 2014 the 11th Dutch Airmobile Brigade is part of the German Special Operations Division and under German division command.

Finally, the Netherlands is currently leading a European Air-to-Air Refuelling project. Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) is considered as an area where Europe lacks capabilities. The missions in Mali, Libya, and Kosovo, where European forces were dependant on resources of the United States were a perfect example of this shortcoming.\textsuperscript{130} To make Europe more self-reliant, the European Defence Agency (EDA) designed short, medium, and long term solutions.\textsuperscript{131} One of these solutions is the AAR project, which is an initiative of the Netherlands, but a common project of Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Hungary,

\textsuperscript{127} NATO. “NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/16.”
\textsuperscript{128} Percentage measured in march 2016. Source: Outeren, Emily van. „Dalende uitgaven aan defensie volgens NAVO ‘verontrustend’.” NRC, 24 March 2016.
\textsuperscript{131} European Defence Agency. Air-to-Air Refuelling. 11 November 2014.
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Norway.\footnote{Ibidem.}

The data of EVS surveys in 2008 (figure 1.1 and 1.2) show that the trust of Dutch citizens in the EU is relatively low compared to the trust in NATO, implying that NATO is still preferred as the decision-maker on defence policies over the EU and its CSDP. However, trust is not solely based on decision-making in defence policies, but is influenced by economic, social and cultural variables. Therefore, one must see the “trust-numbers” in the context of fears for economic crisis and the consequences of an EU enlargement. For instance, according to the EVS data of 2008, 62 percent of the population was afraid to contribute more taxes to the EU when the EU would grow even bigger.\footnote{http://www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu/new/europa.php?ids=259&year=2008}

<table>
<thead>
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<th>how much confidence in: NATO (Q63K)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a great deal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quite a lot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not very much</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none at all</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dk</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1.1 Confidence in NATO in the Netherlands (EVS; 2008) (na= not answered, dk= don’t know)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>how much confidence in: european union (Q63J)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a great deal</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quite a lot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not very much</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none at all</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dk</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1.2 Confidence in the EU in the Netherlands (2008)*

However, the EB data of February-March in 2015 confirms the huge support of the Dutch population for an EU common defence policy (see figure 1.3). Therefore we can conclude that although the general
trust of Dutch citizens may be relatively lower in the EU than in NATO, they do support a common defence policy and decision-making on European level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU PROPOSALS: COMMON DEFENCE POLICY</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>For</td>
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<td>19,537</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,957</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,461</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>26,955</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1.3: Dutch citizens for/against common European defence policy (EB; feb/march 2015)*

The intense cooperation with several EU Members in the recent years, can contribute to several new patterns in Dutch coalitions and decision-making. National strategic cultures can change through transnational links and interactions among national militaries.\(^{134}\) However, although the Netherlands have many transnational links when you look at the large amount of defence partnerships, the strategic adaption seems not to have changed substantially. The Netherlands had to use the EU as a channel to promote national interests. If it would act autonomously instead of through the Union, it would be more difficult to make any difference on global level. Whether it comes to energy and climate security, financial stability or food security – the way to achieve national interests is through the EU.

**Conclusion**

To what extent has Dutch defence policy been Europeanised? Has it absorbed, accommodated or even transformed its policy to fulfil the obligations of EU membership? When it comes to governmental adaption, the Dutch governmental leaders have been proponents of a common EU defence policy. However, the trans-Atlantic relationship with NATO has been prioritized. In the recent years, the Dutch government seemed more aware of the need to develop a stronger focus on EU integrated security. However, this view is still hard to find translated in Dutch defence strategy papers. In fact, the latest Dutch strategy is based on the NATO doctrine and still emphasizes NATO’s lead role in international security. This emphasis on NATO as the cornerstone of Dutch security policy is to a certain extent outdated: the Dutch share more similarities in military strategic goals and culture with fellow EU

member states than with the USA.\textsuperscript{135}

In the field of political adaption, several arguments can be made: for the Dutch governmental leaders it is clear that US’ interest in Europe as well as the willingness to do “Europe’s dirty work” has decreased, which means NATO’s most dominant player wants to have a smaller share in Europe’s burden. This makes CSDP a more important instrument and essential for the EU to retain its influence in the world. Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, the current Dutch minister of Defence, wrote in 2013: “(...) a robust and responsive military is in our interest. (...) The global developments suggest that military missions in the future will not be less demanding or diverse. Therefore, a powerful and international cooperating force remains necessary.\textsuperscript{136} Governmental leaders declare their commitment towards a more unified Europe and the need to empower European defence since the US shifted its focus towards Asia. However, despite some well-written documents, the Netherlands does not have its own proactive agenda on defence and security in the EU.\textsuperscript{137} The general public in the Netherlands belief that decision-making should be made on an international level. In the area of defence this even means a European level. Still, EU-level decision-making does not have the overall support of Dutch citizens. It even appears that the overall support for the EU declined over the past few years.

Dutch defence forces work much together with other EU member states. Strategically, this can lead to a more common defence culture among the cooperating EU member states. In the overall period of 1989 until 2015, Dutch defence has made increasingly use of pooling and sharing. The capabilities gap, due to successive cuts in the Dutch defence budget, seems the primary reason for the pooling and sharing with other countries. Dutch defence can not meet its requirements for NATO, let alone for the ambitions to become part of an independent European military power.

The degree to what extent Dutch policy has been Europeanised is absorption. Although governmental leaders promote a EU-orientated policy, this view only slightly appears in strategy papers and only in the form of cooperation projects like the AAR project led by the Dutch forces. Defence white papers lack an explicit strategy for a common Dutch-EU defence. Dutch citizens do seem in favour for a European common defence. However, the DDD still views NATO as the cornerstone of their defence policy. Above all, successive budget cuts do not allow Dutch defence to shift away from the US as a trans-Atlantic partner. Considering all of these factors, Dutch defence policy has not been Europeanised that

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{137} Drent, Margriet. „Security and Defence at EU Level: The Hague’s Blind Spot?“ 148.
\end{footnotesize}
much. Many policies were already in place because of Dutch membership to NATO. Therefore, it has only absorbed new European policy in the existing defence policy.
Belgium

1989-1999

The fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, and of the Communist bloc, in 1991, ended the Cold War and the bipolar world order. The new European defence architecture was discussed in all NATO countries. For Belgium, the new world order meant returning to the original European defence structure. Belgium was one of the first countries that had an Europeanist focus in its foreign and security policy. Aware of the limitations of individual European countries, Belgium became one of the strongest proponents of the development of military cooperation among EU member states. Also, while promoting collective security, Belgium engaged in multinational operations under UN, NATO and EU-command since the early 1990s. The country had a post-colonial tradition in their military operations and repeatedly sent troops to Africa. After the first Gulf War (1990-1991), discussions about out of area operations arose. The priority of the Belgian army changed from territorial defence into supporting peace. After the Rwanda genocide (1994) Belgium became very careful with foreign operations. The operations in the Balkan however, led the Belgians to shift their strategy from peacekeeping to peace enforcing.

Its long tradition of promoting military cooperation among EU member states has confronted the country with a number of unresolved dilemmas, one of which is the sharp decline of its military expenditure. Belgium’s military budget was 3.3 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980.138 This decreased to 2.9 percent in 1986,139 and to a 1.38 percent in 1999.140 With the extreme budget cuts, the capabilities of the Belgian army grew smaller. In addition, Belgium was one of the first EU countries to end conscription, in 1993, and has continued to downsize its volunteer forces.141 The country recognized that, since the small scale of its armed forces, common pooling capabilities with other EU member states was the best way of maintaining its militarily capabilities. This led to a network of bilateral cooperation with other EU member states. Examples of these partnerships are the Admiral Benelux, the integration of the Belgian and Dutch navies and the Eurocorps.

139 United Nations University. The US military economy. n.d.
1999-2007

In 1999, NATO wrote a new strategic concept. After the publication, the EU reacted with the ESS in 2003. The conflicts in the Balkans and Iraq were not like previous conflicts and demanded a renewed approach. In this new policy, the civil dimension of conflict became an important factor. Belgium itself had its own reaction on the new NATO strategy and published the 'Vision 2015'. This vision named “the strategic plan for the modernization of the Belgian army for the period 2000-2015” included the basic factors of Belgian defence policy.142 In 2001, Belgium sets its international position in a primarily European perspective. In the Laeken Declaration of December 2001, it said, "The EU is a success .. the unification of Europe is near .. (...) Must not Europe, now it is one at last, play a leading role in a new world order (...), resolutely battle all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, and not shut the eyes to the glaring injustice in the world".143 Throughout the years, the Belgian government has strongly supported all projects that could revive the CSDP. One of these projects picked up by Belgium made it possible to form coalitions of willing member states to conduct military tasks under an EU flag. Another project was the new European Security Strategy (ESS), which set out EU's future security and defense objectives and priorities. Additionally, the EU Maritime Security Strategy was set out by Belgian officials.

This Belgian quest to revive the CSDP has its limits. Belgian defence cuts has made its military weak and its contributions to a European common defense small.144 The defence budget decreased from 1.37 percent of the GDP in 2000,145 to 1.09 percent of the GDP in 2007.146 Because of the large cuts in military expenditure, the Belgian army ended the 20th century with a capabilities gap and became more difficult to deploy. Furthermore, the constant promotion of military cooperation among EU member states by Belgian officials, while continuously cutting in the defence budget, caused friction with other member states. Belgium lacked credibility by pleading for common military operations whilst letting other member states alone to pick up the bill.

The Belgian government started several projects shared with other member states. For example, in April 2003 the ‘Chocolate summit’ was held in Tervuren. At the time, the EU was divided due to the American military intervention in Iraq. Belgium brought France, Germany and Luxembourg together for a

143 Rosiers, J. „Belgisch defensiebeleid: een missie voor de wereld?” 268.
meeting on the future of the CSDP. The ideas of this summit eventually influenced the CSDP a great deal. It planted the seeds for several projects, such as the EDA, the European Security and Defence College, the EU Battlegroups, the European Air Transport Command and the EU Operations Centre.\footnote{Fiott, Daniel. „The CSDP: national perspectives.” \textit{Egmont Paper 79}, 2015: 5-125.} Between 2003 and 2007, Belgium participated in all four EU military operations. Since their share of the operations did not much differ from their contributions to NATO missions, Belgium used the existing structures for the UN and NATO to plan and carry out the EU missions.\footnote{Van Hoonacker, Sophie and Jacobs, D. „ESDP and Institutional Change: The Case of Belgium.” \textit{Security Dialogue}, 2010: 568.}

However, despite the similarities between EU and NATO missions, the CSDP military operations also raised new challenges. New institutions and structures were created: the Belgian ministry of defence expanded its Directorate General ACOS Strat with an CSDP unit, alongside those who were already dealing with NATO, the OSCE, the UN and bilateral affairs.\footnote{Van Hoonacker, Sophie and Jacobs, D. „ESDP and Institutional Change: The Case of Belgium.” \textit{Security Dialogue}, 2010: 569.} Also, in the ministry of foreign affairs, three new officials were assigned to deal with military ESDP operations.\footnote{Ibidem.} A direct link between both ministries and the Belgian Permanent Representation (PermRep) had to be established in order to communicate between the EU and Belgian government. The PermRep, the Belgian members of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) channel European requests to the national level and report back on possible offers from the Belgian government. The Belgian representatives in the PSC are diplomats seconded by the ministry of foreign affairs, which means that there was already a link to the ministry of foreign affairs. In contrast, the link of the Permrep and the ministry of defence was new to establish. The Belgian member in the EU Military Committee (EUMC) became the ministry’s primary contact in the PermRep.\footnote{Ibidem.} The necessary administrative changes were mainly introduced prior to the launching of the CSDP.\footnote{Ibidem.} The 2003 Concordia operation proved that the country could largely rely on the existing structures. This, however, did not mean that the shift of focus towards the EU had no challenges at all. Those challenges were just of a more political nature than of an administrative nature. During the period of 1999–2007, the minister of defence was André Flahaut, a member of the Socialist Party. Although he did not oppose Belgian participation in European crisis management, it was neither a priority for him. The Socialist Party supported European integration in general, but in their traditional view opposed external military crisis management. Their position was in
huge contrast with the view of Prime Minister Verhofstadt and the liberals, who wanted to be a key player in the CSDP. These differences between the two parties led to tensions. For example, the political-military coordination, also known as the POLMIL coordination was a mechanism which gave advice to the council in order to effectively deal with new crisis management tasks. It coordinated political judgements together with military planning and operations in short time-scales. POLMIL coordination areas included “development of recommendations for Alliance policy on peacekeeping” and improving structures and procedures.\(^{153}\) It also gave advice about the political-military aspects of Alliance operation planning, including command and control arrangements in order to achieve effective cooperation between the EU, UN, OSCE or NATO.\(^{154}\) However, minister Flahaut limited the ability of civil servants to participate in POLMIL. Only members of his ministerial cabinet were allowed to contribute.\(^{155}\) In this way, he could control the decision-making process.

2007-2015

From 2007 until 2015, Belgium kept pushing towards a structural common defence within the EU. During its EU Presidency in the second half of 2010, Belgium tried to promote a permanent structure of cooperation and wanted to use the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) clause of the EU Treaty.\(^{156}\) This clause gave certain EU member states the possibility to strengthen their cooperation in military matters by creating a permanent structured cooperation.\(^{157}\) If this clause had been activated, it likely would have strengthened the CSDP. However, instead of PESCO, “Pooling and Sharing” became the new strategy to combat EU’s capabilities gap and the ‘Ghent Initiative for Pooling & Sharing of capabilities’ was launched.\(^{158}\) This concept entailed more pooling and sharing among EU members in order to gain more military capabilities.\(^{159}\)

On a the national governance level, Belgium was much more “Brussels-oriented”. For instance, the Di Rupo Coalition Agreement of 2011 stated that “the Belgian government will actively cooperate in the creation and reinforcement of European defence, a cornerstone for a credible European foreign

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\(^{155}\) Van Hoonacker, 578.

\(^{156}\) Art. 44 of TEU

\(^{157}\) Art. 42 (6) and 46 of TEU.

\(^{158}\) Biscop, S., J. Coelmont, en M. and Zandee, D. Drent., 2.

The subsequent Coalition Agreement in 2014, stated that “the Belgian government will actively cooperate in the creation and reinforcement of European defence, an essential basis for a credible European foreign policy”. The coalition agreement of the government Michel in October 2014 aimed at a well-functioning multilateral (legal) order, with particular attention to the role of NATO and the EU. The main task of the army is described as “the participation in foreign missions with the aim of promoting peace and security in the world”. As in the Netherlands, also in Belgium an integrated approach of defence, development and diplomacy, also known as the 3D concept, is used. This doctrinal similarity makes joint operations between the two countries easier. Additionally, in the latest strategy paper of Belgium’s defence department of 2016, the Europeanist focus is clearly outlined: “The regional European framework is already the most important dimension for the Belgian security policy”. The strategy also acknowledges the shifted focus of the US and emphasizes the need for a stronger security role for the EU: “The United States is the main global security partner of Europe. They ask the European countries a greater contribution to the stabilization of the own European periphery. Europe will need to incorporate the role of security provider more explicitly, rather than the role of the consumer of security.”

The Belgian defence budget decreased again: from 1.37 percent of the GDP in 2000, to an 0.98 percent in 2014. The downside of this course of decline is that the room for investments in equipment, infrastructure, training and operational deployment is shrinking as well. In the case of Belgium, it is estimated that the investments will decline in the coming years to less than 4 percent of the defense budget. In an opinion piece of the newspaper ‘De standaard’, US ambassador Denise Bauer urges Belgium to invest more in defense: “We can not afford to save on our collective defense”, “Given the current uncertain security environment, it is more important than ever to demonstrate a shared commitment to our future common defense”.

161 Federaal Regeerakkoord, Brussels, 9 October 2014.
164 Defensie. De strategische visie voor Defensie.
167 Rood, J. and Homan, K. „Heeft de defensiesamenwerking met Nederland toekomst?”.
168 Bauer, D. „VS-ambassadrice vraagt meer geld voor defensie.” De Standaard, 1 October 2015.
defence, its actual defence policy is questionable. If the promises in the described agreements would be followed up by concrete proposals for initiatives that would increase Europe’s capabilities, Belgium’s position would gain in legitimacy. However, in view of the difficult budgetary context, Belgium’s ambition has been to create in every component, army, navy and air, a cooperation with other member states. The Belgian government has also acknowledged that the use of common resources with other member states is the only way of maintaining military relevant capabilities.\(^{169}\)

The Belgian army has been reorganised into just two brigades in 2011. It continued downsizing its forces to an amount of 30,000 military and civilian personnel.\(^{170}\) Also, as a result of an uneven divide in age numbers, this amount is set to drop in future years. It is estimated that by 2025, more than half of the current personnel will have retired.\(^ {171}\) In the same timeframe, several of the major platforms currently in use – most notably the F-16 fighter fleet – will face the end of their service lives.\(^ {172}\) In February 2015, the Dutch Chief of Defence Middendorp expressed his concern at a meeting of the Defence Committee of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, about the Dutch-Belgian partnership, saying: “If only one party is better and the other gets the bill, then the willingness to cooperate is a lot less.”\(^ {173}\) He also stated that “the main consequence is the loss of credibility as a reliable partner”\(^ {174}\) and that “a fair win-win situation with respect to our partner countries can not be maintained.”\(^ {175}\)

The country did start several military projects with other member states. The Ghent initiative, mentioned previously, was launched together with Germany in November 2010. In October 2013 the Belgian and Dutch air force commanders signed an agreement on an exchange program called the ‘Combined Joint Helicopter Command’ (CJHC) for pilots and the establishment of a Belgian-Netherlands Coordination Cell (BENECC). That same year, the Ministers of Defence of Belgium and the Netherlands signed a letter of intent on the drafting of an agreement on the integration of airspace surveillance. In 2013 the combined Benelux Arms Control Agency (BACA) was launched. In this agency, Belgian, Luxembourg and Dutch units are grouped together under a single joint command. The three

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169 Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas. 2013, Loc. cit, p. 37
170 Sven, Biscop. 2011.
173 Rood, J. and Homan, K. „Heeft de defensiesamenwerking met Nederland toekomst?”
174 Ibidem.
175 Ibidem.

36
countries have also started with the preparations of the EU Battle Group 2018 (EUBG 2018), led by the Benelux. The first Force Commander of the EUBG 2018 will be provided by the Netherlands.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU PROPOSALS: COMMON DEFENCE POLICY</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Against</td>
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<td>131</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>992</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1: Percentage voted For/against a common defence policy in Belgium (Eurobarometer, 2015)

As you can see in figure 2.1, 82.8 percent of the Belgian general public supports a common defence policy by the EU (2015). However, the trust in the EU is almost as high as the percentage of people who do not trust the EU (figure 2.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: EUROPEAN UNION</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tend to trust</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tend not to trust</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>992</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.2 Belgian trust in the Union (Eurobarometer, 2015)

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176 Ibidem.
In Belgium, the population’s trust in the EU has decreased between 2008 and 2015 (figure 2.2). Nevertheless, trust in NATO is lower (figure 2.4).

This data indicates that, although trust in the EU has declined, it still is the favorable decision-making level compared to other international institutions like NATO.

**Conclusion**

To what extent has Belgian defence policy been Europeanised? When it comes to governmental adaption, the governmental leaders of Belgium have been strong proponents of a common EU defence policy. Not NATO, but the CSDP is seen as the cornerstone of the Belgian defence policy. The country has created several institutes to achieve their European military objectives. The van Ghent initiative for instance, was explicitly created to improve the use of common military resources among EU member

**figure 2.3 Belgian trust in the EU (EVS, 2008)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>how much confidence in: european union (Q63J)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>117</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quite a lot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>781</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>52.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>not very much</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none at all</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dk</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

**figure 2.4 Belgium confidence in NATO (EVS, 2008)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>how much confidence in: NATO (Q63K)</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>% of all</th>
<th>% of valid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not very much</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dk</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>
When it comes to political adaption, Belgian governance leaders have been promoting a common European defence during the entire period of 1997 until 2015. Belgium is one of the CSDP member states—in particularly France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Spain—that want to develop CSDP as an alternative to NATO. In other words, these states do not see the Berlin Plus agreements as the cornerstone of their security policy, but want full CSDP autonomy. The CSDP is seen as the most essential tool for the EU to maintain its military capability, especially since the US has shifted its focus to Asia. The Belgian public including the Belgian policy makers are known for their desire to create a common defence. Although the trust in the EU has decreased since 2008, it is still the favourable level of decision-making compared to other institutions like NATO.

When it comes to strategic adaption, the country has installed new links in order to communicate more efficiently between the national government and leaders on the EU level. For instance, a direct link between ministries and the PermRep was established. The country also started several projects and initiatives in order to start missions and partnerships exclusively with EU member states. The strong plea for European defence sometimes results in tensions with more NATO-oriented EU member states. Although the Belgian governance is very committed, their budget does not back up their commitment. Its ambition can therefore be seen as questionable. However, following criticism from Belgium’s allies, the Belgian Defence Minister Steven Vandeput declared in summer 2015 that he was willing to triple the kingdom’s defence budget over a fifteen-year period. After twenty years of budget reductions for the Belgian military forces, the 2016 budget is up from EUR 2.26 billion to EUR 2.498 billion.

So has Belgium’s defence been Europeanised? Their defence policy prioritizes Europe. Governmental leaders and the general public both are in favour of a European common defence and prefer the EU over NATO. In a strategical point of view, the country has set up many partnerships and institutions to improve cooperation and communication among EU member states. In this context, Belgian defence policy has accommodated its policy to fulfil EU memberships obligations.

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Sweden
1987-1997

In the course of the Cold War, the primary tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces were defined around the concept of territorial defence and traditional peace operations. Sweden had two chains of command in place: a military chain of command and a civilian one. The civilian chain operated independently and expanded foreign policy with new tools such as diplomacy and aid. This concept seems similar to the comprehensive approach used by the Netherlands and Belgium. In fact, the Swedish argue that they were the first to come up with the concept: “We cultivated a comprehensive approach through our concept of total defence, well before it became fashionable.”

In 1995 Sweden joined the EU and was highly sceptical of a common EU defence policy. At first, the Swedish government wanted to stop the progress towards an EU security and defence policy. They argued that military crisis management should be clearly separated from a common defence which would include territorial defence and mutual defence guarantees. The Swedish blocked the progress towards a collective defence because it wanted to exclude these factors. This exclusion must be seen in a certain context: Sweden was only for a few years member of the EU and maintained a traditional non-alignment strategy.

Eventually, the ‘Petersberg tasks’ were transferred to the EU which was seen as a form of enlarging the civilian element of EU’s CSDP. The increased recognition of building up a European military capacity contributed to further reforms of Swedish defence policy. On 1 July 1997, the Swedish International Command (SWEDINT) was created. This institution “organizes, trains and supports [...] peace-promoting operations” and included the creation of an independent battalion. Furthermore, several changes followed after the Defence Commission’s report on security and defence policy. This report emphasized the need to enlarge the crisis management’s capabilities and marked the beginning of

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183 Ibidem.
185 Ibidem.
186 Ibidem.
188 Rieker, Pernille. Europeanization of national security identity, 79.
Sweden’s transformation in its security identity. 189

With the end of the Cold War, the Swedish military underwent dramatic budget cuts, as was the case in the Netherlands and Belgium. In 1988 the military expenditure as a percentage of Swedish GDP was 2.4 percent. This decreased to 1.97 percent in 1997. 190 However, the military capabilities and contributions of Sweden were higher than in Belgium and the Netherlands. The Swedish Armed Forces consisted of 800,000 deployable men and women. 191 Historically speaking, Sweden was one of the UN’s most generous contributors both financially and in terms of personnel. Since the beginning of the peacekeeping era, Sweden has supplied 12 percent of the 530,000 soldiers who participated in UN missions until 1997. 192 Sweden joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, just before it became an official member state of the EU. Because of Sweden’s traditional strategy of non-alignment, membership to NATO was out of question, but “special significance is attached nonetheless to close cooperation and long-term integration into the structures of NATO” 193.

1997-2007

The Cologne summit of 1999 marked the birth of the ESDP, but also explicitly included only “those functions of the WEU which [would] be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks” 194, which meant that a ‘clear dividing line between crisis management and territorial defence’ 195 was drawn. After the Cologne summit, Sweden distanced itself from other member states by stating that the CSDP policy mainly focused on “minesweeping, police training and the interpretation of satellite images” 196. The Swedish government argued that the policy lacked civilian instruments. To counter the military dimension, they emphasized on non-military aspects. 197 In their opinion, if the EU wanted to become a key player in international security, it would have to include civilian instruments. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, Sweden promoted the civilian dimension of the CSDP, including the creation of a committee for civilian crisis management. 198 At the end of the

189 Rieker, 79.
190 Ruffa, 343-359.
191 Ibidem, 353.
192 Ibidem.
193 Ibidem, 349.
194 WEU Secretariat General - Secrétariat Général UEO. „The meeting of the Council of Ministers of Western European Union (WEU), held on 22 and 23 November.” CVCE. 3 March 2010.
195 Quote of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh after the June summit on the ESDP (1999).
196 Lee-Ohlsson, Fredrick, 124.
197 Ibidem, 128.
198 Lee-Ohlsson, Fredrick. 129.
summit, the ‘non-military crisis management’ aspects were recognized. Furthermore, the committee for civilian crisis management was established in May 2000. 199

The government created in 2002 a civilian military cooperation centre named the ‘Folke Bernadotte Academy’, which was, as the ministry of Foreign Affairs stated “a Swedish response to the EU decision to improve its capacity for crisis management” 200. The ‘CIMIC handbook’ that was published in 2002, focused on effective cooperation in multilateral civil-military operations. After the publication, the Swedish government institutionalized the weekly meeting between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice. Operation Concordia, the first CSDP military mission, confirmed this Europeanist shift in perspective. 201

With the change in military doctrine, a huge change came in the military expenditure of Sweden. The military expenditure decreased further from 1.92 percent in 1998 to 1.32 percent of the country’s GDP in 2007. 202 Nevertheless, Sweden maintained a large amount of long-term deployable personnel. At the beginning of 2006, 9,500 officers and soldiers were deployable for up to 360 days. 203 Once reluctant to engage in military operations, in 2000 Sweden contributed 1.900 troops to EU operations. 204 If Concordia reduced fear of CSDP’s military dimension, Operation Artemis in Congo would eliminate it. The Operation differed on several levels: for the first time the EU deployed troops out-of-area, and based an ESDP mandate on a UN Chapter VII resolution without optional NATO assets. 205 In other words, it was the UN asking for the help of the EU, it was an autonomous mission and it was in Africa. France was willing to launch the whole operation on its own, but Sweden was committed to participate, especially concerning the fact that the operation was a Swedish initiative. Sweden and France were eventually the only two member states contributing combat troops to Artemis. Sweden also took part in the EU Battlegroups (EUBG) in 2004 and even led one Battlegroup. In addition, it contributed the largest part of the Nordic Battle Group (NBG). In December 2007, the Swedish government declared that a force of around 200 staff would be made available to Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA. Sweden became an active player within the CSDP.

199 Ibidem, 129.
200 Rieker, 85.
201 Lee-Ohlsson, 130.
202 Ruffa, 353.
203 Ibidem.
204 Rieker, 80.
205 Ibidem.
Nowadays, Sweden is one of the strongest supporters of the CSDP. The Swedish government has contributed to all CSDP missions, including the military operations. The CSDP led Sweden to join not only the EU Battlegroup, but also to the formation of a Nordic Battlegroup. One of the reasons to become a keyplayer in EU security, was to become a key decision-maker that could control the future of a common defence policy. Therefore, the CSDP inspired Sweden to new coalitions, but also to a strategy that achieved domestic objectives on European level: the 2009 defence resolution adopted by the Swedish Parliament, states that territorial defence is no longer the point of departure, but national interest is. Although peace operations still have priority, the shift to the defence of interest may cause Swedish armed forces to be deployed in more combat operations.\textsuperscript{206} In July 2008, the government extended the Swedish mission in Chad until late September 2008, even though the operation itself would last until March 2009.\textsuperscript{207} The reason for extending the operation for a shorter period seems to have been mostly financial, as Sweden was involved in the NATO-led Afghanistan peace-keeping force and in EU’s Nordic Battlegroup.\textsuperscript{208} The large amount of responsibilities combined with the lower amount of financial resources resulted in less available military capabilities. The military expenditure slightly decreased from 1.17 percent of the GDP in 2008 to 1.09 percent in 2015.\textsuperscript{209} Therefore, the Swedish government appointed a commission that is currently examining whether it is feasible to introduce conscription back in 2019 (conscription during a period of peace was abolished in 2010). This commission wants to

\textsuperscript{206} Ruffa, 351.
\textsuperscript{208} Sipilä, Tommi Koivula and Joonas. “Missing in action? EU crisis management and the link to the domestic political debate.”, 522.
combine professional soldiers and conscripts together, in order to increase the amount of deployable men and women in the country.\textsuperscript{210}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
EU PROPOSALS: COMMON DEFENCE POLICY & Code & Frequency & % of all & % of valid \\
\hline
For & 1 & 19,701 & 73.2 & 73.2 \\
Against & 2 & 4,796 & 17.8 & 17.8 \\
DK & 3 & 2,429 & 9.0 & 9.0 \\
Total & & 26,926 & 100.0 & 100.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textit{figure 3. 1} \textit{EB February 2015; Swedish public on common EU defence}

The general public of Sweden supports a common EU defence (figure 3.1). This shows that, even though Swedish military culture is characterized by non-alignment, nowadays this perspective has shifted towards an understanding of EU solidarity.

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS: EUROPEAN UNION & Code & Frequency & % of all & % of valid \\
\hline
Tend to trust & 1 & 11,035 & 41.0 & 41.0 \\
Tend not to trust & 2 & 12,287 & 45.6 & 45.6 \\
DK & 3 & 3,604 & 13.4 & 13.4 \\
Total & & 26,926 & 100.0 & 100.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textit{figure 3. 2} \textit{EB February 2015; Trust of Swedish citizens in the EU}

Although Sweden is more EU oriented in its policy documents, most of the general public of Sweden tends not to trust the EU as an institution (figure 3.2). This does not necessary mean that Sweden prefers NATO more than the EU, it rather shows that Sweden still prefer their identity of non-alignment. Compared to the EVS of 2008 (figure 3.3) trust in the EU has slightly decreased (from 40.5 percent to 38.1 percent), however, distrust in the EU has decreased as well from 59.5 percent to 56.4 percent (figure 3.4).

In 2008, the general public tended to trust the EU more than NATO. This confirms the Europeanist perspective in Swedish policy papers. Nevertheless, it is not as high as one would expect when you read the Government Bill of 2008/2009, where a strong commitment to collective security was made: “Sweden will not take a passive stance if another EU Member State or other Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. (...) The objective of military defence is to defend Sweden and promote our security, individually and together with others, within and outside the country.”

Most confidence is given to the UN, which still lies more in the course of their non-alignment tradition.

Conclusion
Has Sweden, as a non-original member of the EU, absorbed, accommodated or transformed its defence policy in order to fulfill EU’s membership obligations? Sweden slightly changed its doctrine in 1992 in order to obtain EU membership. In spite of these adjustments, it remained difficult to match EU’s security identity as Sweden was a traditionally neutral state. The CSDP challenged Sweden to adopt a...
new view on its security policy, and Sweden challenged the EU to do the same. Sweden made the CSDP compatible with its non-alignment tradition: the Petersberg tasks were incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty and Sweden promoted the civilian dimension of CSDP as a key instrument for a comprehensive approach. Between 1995 and 2015, the Swedish role in a shared EU security identity transformed from a reluctant member to a key player.

The Swedish political discourse on security strategy has changed as well. Sweden changed its coalition strategy in a relatively short period of time, making its neutral position questionable regarding their involvement in CSDP’s operations. From the policy documents and its most recent choices, Sweden clearly prefers the EU over NATO.\(^\text{214}\) As a troop contributor, it gained insight into NATO-led operations as a non-NATO country.\(^\text{215}\) One could argue, since Sweden is also a NATO-pfp country, its strategy change could be influenced by NATO as well. However, official statements refer to EU related changes in their doctrine, mostly motivated by global solidarity, EU solidarity and Nordic solidarity instead of NATO solidarity.\(^\text{216}\)\(^\text{217}\) The governmental leaders and the general public seem mostly positive and supportive about a European common defence.\(^\text{218}\) However, it did not completely reform, since Sweden still is an active promoter for the civilian dimension in the CSDP and the general public still sees itself as a neutral state. Strategically speaking, new methods have been institutionalized in light of meeting EU’s obligations. The Swedish government institutionalizes the weekly meeting between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice. Considering the governmental, political and strategic adjustments with regard to Swedish defence policy, Sweden has accommodated its defence policy. Therefore, the degree of Europeanisation is accommodation.

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\(^{214}\) Ruffa, 350.  
\(^{216}\) Ruffa, 352.  
\(^{217}\) Rieker, 87.  
\(^{218}\) Sipilä, 522.
Similarities and differences between the case studies

Do shared ideas about the identities, strategies and visions of both the general public and governments between the three member states concerning their defence policies exist, pointing out the presence of a potential shared strategic culture?

Doctrine

When it comes to the defence doctrine, several comparisons can be made. Although the Netherlands cooperates with NATO, the EU, the UN and the OSCE, NATO is seen as ‘the cornerstone’ of Dutch military security. The country played a substantial part in the development of the ESDP, but Dutch political leaders were reluctant to maintain this active role in promoting the ESDP and shifted their focus back to the trans-Atlantic relationship. In the current Dutch strategy papers, the CSDP is not even mentioned. Nevertheless, the Dutch share more similar goals with fellow Europeans than with the leaders across the Atlantic.

In contrast with the Netherlands, Belgium sets its international position in a primarily European perspective. It even tried to promote a permanent structure of cooperation and wanted to use the PESCO clause of the EU Treaty. In the latest strategy paper of Belgium’s defence department of 2016, the Europeanist focus is clearly outlined. In contrast, the Swedish government was primarily highly sceptical of a common EU defence policy. Its doctrine was defined around the concept of territorial defence and traditional peace operations. Even so, the country was one of the first states who maintained a comprehensive approach by using military and civilian powertools in their foreign policy. Nowadays, Sweden is one of the strongest supporters of the CSDP and has led multiple operations. The use of an integrated- or comprehensive approach is one parallel in the diverse policy papers of the case studies. This doctrinal similarity underlines the importance of the civilian aspect in their defence policies. It also indicates that there is a European strategic culture which emphasizes the comprehensive approach and civilian tools in foreign policy. Nevertheless, Dutch doctrine is focused on NATO, Belgian focus is on the CSDP and Swedish doctrine has shifted its focus to the EU only recently. To speak of a shared European strategic culture is therefore still premature.

\[219\text{Ibidem.}\]
\[220\text{Art. 44 of TEU}\]
Budget and capabilities

One resemblance between the case studies clearly states out: military expenditure is below the NATO guideline in all three member states. The Netherlands and Belgium successively cut their defence budgets and Sweden has decreased its military expenditure with almost 1.0 percent since 1989. The method used to narrow this capability gap is shared by all three countries. Pooling and sharing seems to be most mentioned in policy papers of Belgium and the Netherlands. This is to no surprise, considering that their military expenditure is lowest, and they already started several bilateral military partnerships decades ago. Sweden was one of UN’s most generous contributors both financially and in terms of personnel. Nevertheless, Sweden maintained a large amount of long-term deployable personnel. The large amount of responsibilities combined with the lower amount of financial resources eventually resulted in less available military capabilities. Netherlands and Belgium endure also diminishing military capabilities. Dutch armed forces do not comply with the most basic employability goals, and the use of common resources with other member states is the only way for Belgium to stay military relevant. Cooperation and use of other tools, such as diplomacy by “drinking tea with the Taliban”, are methods of filling this capability gap.

Cooperation

The reaction of the three small member states to the decreasing military capabilities were almost the same: intensifying cooperation with other member states in order to narrow the capability gap by bundling resources. For the Netherlands, this meant the creation of bilateral partnerships with mostly the UK, Belgium and Germany. These bilateral relations were designed in a NATO and EU structure. Belgium also intensified cooperation, but created partnerships within the EU, mainly between the BENELUX countries. Sweden became a key player in European military cooperation, by leading several missions under the CSDP. Their main partner in these missions was France. The described partnerships lead to more integration between the member states, and contribute to a common military culture. All three countries did intensify cooperation since 1989, but Belgium and Sweden found their partners foremost in the EU, whilst the Netherlands still searched an ally within the trans-Atlantic relationship.

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222 Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas. 2013, Loc. cit, p. 37
Decision-making

The Dutch general public supports the idea of European security integration and a common defence policy. It also supports decision-making on a European level more than an international level like NATO. However, Dutch governmental leaders still make decisions in a NATO environment. This can be explained with the higher trust in NATO than in the EU, although this is also influenced by economic, social and cultural factors. In Belgium, new institutions and structures were created in order to adapt to the new CSDP structures. Of the Belgian general public, most citizens support a common defence policy by the EU. Although the population’s trust in the EU has decreased, their trust in NATO is lower. The EU-level is the most favorable level of decision-making. In Sweden, the general public supports a common EU defence policy. The public still prefers their identity of non-alignment, which differs a lot of the identity in Netherlands and Belgium. The general public trusts the EU more than NATO, but sees the UN as the most favorable platform of decision-making, which underlines their non-alignment identity. All three countries prefer an international level of decision-making rather than a national level, when it comes to defence policy. The preferred international level differs from each other. Even though Dutch citizens would want EU-level decision-making concerning their defence policy, governmental leaders decide in a NATO environment. Swedish governmental leaders decide in a EU environment, but the public still supports a non-alignment identity and prefers the UN as their ideal platform for decision-making. Belgium is the only country where the general public and governmental leaders seem to coincide with each other when it comes to the preferable level of decision-making.

Conclusion

Do the case studies share a common military strategic culture? Yes, a specific strategic culture has evolved in the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, with the focus laid on the comprehensive approach. It is not about becoming a military hard power, but maintaining a safe European neighborhood by using mostly civilian tools. It expresses itself throughout speeches and policy documents that promotes more European cooperation within the CSDP and promises to become a more military self-reliant Europe. The culture is characterized by successive budget cuts in defence over a period of more than twenty years. This indicates that the countries, despite their promises, do not prioritize defence over economic self-interest. These successive cuts result in a capability gap, especially in the Netherlands and Belgium. The government’s attempt to narrow this gap by pooling and sharing is only sufficient for a small part. Although the general public of the three states do not share a military identity, they do support a common EU defence policy. Although the Dutch governmental leaders see NATO as their cornerstone on
national defence, the Belgian governmental leaders argue that the CSDP is the best foundation for a defence policy and the Swedish public still sees its country as a non-military country, they do share a lot of similarities. This is why you can definitely speak of a shared strategic culture, with overlapping features and nationalistic exceptions.
Conclusion
When Timmermans pleaded for more cooperation between EU member states, he was echoing what his predecessors had been saying for years: Europe needs to focus more on increasing its military capabilities and cooperation, especially now that the US takes a step away from European territorial defence. With pooling and sharing and the latest military partnerships among EU member states, defence policies are already influenced by a European perspective. A shared strategic culture can be identified amongst these small member states. But is this shared culture in defence policy a consequence of Europeanisation?

A shared strategic culture among small EU member states does not necessarily prove a form of Europeanisation. It can have other explanations as well. Belgium and the Netherlands, both “founding fathers” of western Europe, share (military) history. History is one huge factor in the identity of a country, and it is likely that in this context, the countries have a similar identity. They are also both member of NATO for decades, which means that the shared strategic culture could also be a form of “NATO-isation”. Dutch governmental leaders still see NATO as a cornerstone of their security. Their fundamental understanding of domestic defence has not dramatically changed. In addition, Sweden had a short period to adjust to EU’s membership obligations, which made the changes in discourse, strategy and objectives seem more drastic.

Still, when you analyse the case studies, you can speak of Europeanisation. The change in ideas, values, promises and structures, can mostly be linked to EU membership obligations. The need for more cooperation is a reaction of the EU to the reluctance of the US to pick up Europe’s defence bill. The relatively fast change in Swedish discourse in domestic defence policy is foremost linked to the CSDP. And the shared values, where civilian power tools are equal to and just as necessary as hard power tools, is in line with the European strategy of a comprehensive approach. Therefore, the level of Europeanisation in domestic defence policies of small EU member states is ‘absorption’.

Further analysis of more small EU countries is necessary in order to give a general predicament for the future of defence of small EU candidates. Furthermore, the available data is often provided by EU institutions, and can therefore be biased. By conducting surveys and collecting data that is not published by EU-led institutions, the use of biased results can be avoided and a more reliable conclusion can be formulated.
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