CHAPTER 7

The Non-Vaccination Policy

In March 2001 foot and mouth disease (FMD), a highly contagious animal disease, broke out in the Netherlands. It resulted in the death of approximately 470,000 animals. Most of these animals, however, were the victims of the Dutch government’s policy rather than direct casualties of the disease. This caused a lot of societal unrest and indignation and many, including farmers and politicians, questioned the appropriateness of the methods used.

The method employed by the Dutch government is known as the “stamping out” approach, which means that all animals within the direct vicinity of a contamination will be destroyed immediately. It usually results in the precautionary killing of many healthy animals. This method was introduced in 1992 as a necessary element of the non-vaccination policy on FMD. At that time, all members of the European Community (EC) had consented to end the FMD vaccination programs for economic reasons, and to introduce this “stamping out” method.

This chapter begins in Section 7.1 by analysing how this non-vaccination policy initially came to be trusted in 1992. Section 7.2 describes the chronological events eradicating the FMD in 2001. In Section 7.3, I continue with an investigation of the discussions about the non-vaccination policy during the outbreak of 2001. In Section 7.4, I highlight several specific problems on the fight against the FMD and Section 7.5 presents conclusions about the theory. The analyses are summarized in tables A 33 to A 37 of Appendix A.

7.1 THE NON-VACCINATION POLICY ON FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD)

7.1.1 The EC non-vaccination policy (A)

FMD is an acute, infectious, viral disease causing fever followed by the development of vesicles (blisters), chiefly in the mouth and on the feet. It affects wild and domestic animals such as, sheep, pigs, and goats. Elephants, hedgehogs and rats are also susceptible (DEFRA 2004b). Animals pick up foot and mouth disease by direct or indirect contact with an infected animal. A variety of possibilities exist for animals to be
contaminated indirectly. Under favourable weather conditions, the virus can become airborne through microparticles of feedstuff, and spread over considerable distances. Cattle trucks, lorries, market places, and loading ramps are other obvious sources of indirect contamination. Roads are also contaminateable, and the virus may be picked up and carried on the wheels of passing vehicles such as cars, delivery lorries, milk tankers, etc. Finally, any person who has come into contact with infected animals can spread the disease; dogs, cats, poultry, wild game and vermin can similarly spread it (ibid.).

Because FMD is extremely contagious and spreads easily, governments have given much care to establishing effective methods of control and eradication. Their devised strategies basically fall into two categories (Van Bekkum 1987, 720):

1. Regular preventive vaccination of susceptible animals. In practice, it amounts to the vaccination of all cattle older than four months. Should an outbreak nonetheless occur, it is brought under control through various methods: the slaughter and destruction of the animals on affected farms, the provision of extra vaccinations in the areas around affected farms, and transportation bans.

2. The so-called “stamping-out” approach. This method is applied when the animals are not annually vaccinated. In case of an outbreak the animals are slaughtered on affected farms but also on nearby farms and on so-called contact-farms. In practice, much more healthy animals will be destroyed to control the disease compared to the first method (Berentsen, Dijkhuizen, and Oskam 1990, 1).

Between 1953 and 1991, the Netherlands used the first strategy to combat FMD. This was mostly successful because, after 1953, the Netherlands only suffered several instances of the disease with the last confirmed cases in 1983 (4) and 1984 (2). Figure 7.1 presents the number of FMD cases in the Netherlands for each year between 1937 and 1984.

![Figure 7.1](image_url)
Method one was used by most European countries. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark used the second method. It helped them successfully eradicate FMD. Between 1968 and 2000, the United Kingdom, for example, had only one serious outbreak of FMD on the Isle of Wight (1981). When these three countries became members of the EC in 1973, the European Commission initiated discussions about harmonizing the FMD legislation. But ‘in spite of the extensive negotiations an immediate resolution of differing philosophies was not possible’ (SEC (89)1731 final, 6). Hence, member states were allowed to retain their favoured method of eradication.

The first serious step towards harmonization of the FMD policies was taken in 1985 when the commission promulgated a directive calling for integration of the various European FMD policies (Council Directive 85/511/EEC). It gave control measures in case of a FMD outbreak, such as rules for diagnosing the disease, monitoring the outbreak, slaughtering, and transportation. The directive, however, said nothing about a possible non-vaccination policy, hence, allowing for preventive vaccination programs.

In 1988, the Commission took a second step towards harmonization of the FMD policy. At that time, the Commission sent a report to the Council telling that a non-vaccination policy ‘is clearly safer and cheaper, and fulfills the double objective of ensuring a high health standard and the free movement of goods in the Single Market, and is therefore strongly recommended to the Member States’ (SEC (89)1731 final, 22). Clearly, the Commission had very high expectations of the non-vaccination policy. It provided two reasons, which were in its view two good reasons, for pursuing the non-vaccination option: this was safer and cheaper. Especially, the performed cost calculations were instrumental to the Commission favouring this policy.

The Commission’s cost calculations were based on primary and secondary outbreaks. Primary outbreaks are the first farms infected by some external contagious source. A sick animal imported from outside the EU is an example of such a source. Secondary outbreaks refer to the farms infected by the first infected farm. The Commission assumed that 20 other farms would be infected by one primary outbreak in their cost calculations. Furthermore, it assumed that the EC would be confronted with 13 primary outbreaks in 10 years. Hence, over a ten year period, 273 farms would be infected.¹ Since the average cost per outbreak was thought to be 158,000 ECU, the total cost after some corrective calculations, over a ten year period was estimated at 35 million ECU.

Pursuing a vaccination policy was calculated to cost 133 Million ECU per year; hence, the total cost of vaccinations, after corrective calculations, over a ten year period would be 1,080 Million ECU. The total cost for the estimated primary and secondary outbreaks that would nonetheless occur under the vaccination policy were estimated at 54 Million ECU. The number of primary outbreaks under the vaccination is

¹. 13 + (13*20).
likely to be higher (20), because the vaccin obscures the disease and therefore infected animals may be imported unnoticed. Hence, the total cost for the vaccination policy was thought to be 1,134 Million ECU per decade. Based on these calculations, the Commission considered the non-vaccination policy the more economically sound alternative.

On basis of these calculations, the Commission proposed a termination of the vaccination on FMD to the Council on 30 October, 1989.² The Commission is fully convinced that to achieve the aims of the internal market, i.e. to harmonise health standards at a high level and ensure the free movement of goods, the Community must move to a non-vaccination policy’ (SEC (89) 1731 final, 4). All other institutions involved in the EC decision making accepted its proposal with very little discussion. The European parliament only suggested a minor adjustment, while the Economic and Social Committee accepted the proposal with great enthusiasm (70 votes to nil against with two abstentions): ‘The Committee welcomes the Commission’s proposal without comments and is in full agreement with a non-vaccination and slaughter policy, vaccination only being used as an emergency measure in extreme situations’.³ The policy was considered cheaper and safer than panvaccination.⁴ Finally, the Council promulgated the non-vaccination policy: ‘Member States shall ensure that the use of foot and mouth vaccines is prohibited’ (Council Directive 90/423/EEC). The policy had to be implemented by the member states before 1 January, 1992.

7.1.2 The Dutch non-vaccination policy (A)

In 1988, various studies conducted by the Dutch department of agriculture and the agricultural university of Wageningen, concluded that a non-vaccination policy would be more cost efficient than a preventive-vaccination program for the Netherlands (Berentsen et al. 1990; Dijkhuizen 1989). While the arguments for a non-vaccination policy at the European level were mainly based on cost-efficiency calculations, arguments at the national level were also centered on trade interests. Not only would the cost for ‘stamping-out’ clearly stay below the cost of annual vaccinations, a non-vaccination policy also allowed the Netherlands to trade more animals with the United States, Japan and South-Korea. These markets were formerly closed to meat from vaccinated animals. Hence, as stated in a study from the university of Wageningen conducted in 1990, ‘ceasing vaccination (would be) the most profitable option’ (Berentsen et al. 1990, xi).

Especially pig-breeders welcomed the possibility of new markets. Despite the regulations of 1984, the number of pigs was still rising in the Netherlands (cf. Chapter 6).

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². OJ No C327, 30/12/1989, 84)
³. OJ No C113, 07/05/1990, 179)
⁴. OJ No C62, 12/03/1990, 44)
Dutch pig-breeders generally expected to expand their production due to the opening of these new markets. Hence, pig breeders considered the expansion possibilities as a very good reason to support the non-vaccination policy (Agrarisch Dagblad 12/10/1990). Other farmers were more hesitant. Dutch cattle farmers produce mainly milk for the European market and only a few produced beef, and would benefit from the opening of these new markets.

The Dutch farmer associations were generally also eager to exploit these new export possibilities. They asked the deputy minister of agriculture, Gabor to implement the non-vaccination regulation a year earlier than was deemed necessary by the EU directive. This would give Dutch farmers an economic edge over the other EC member states because they would be able to enter the new markets earlier. Such an early termination of the vaccination program, however, would jeopardize all animals. If the other EC members were still vaccinating, one would not be able to spot an infected animal from these countries. Especially the dairy industry made objections to this early implementation because they would not gain much benefits except for extra risks.

The deputy minister decided that the non-vaccination regulations would come into force on 1 March, 1991, and not on 1 January 1991 as the pig-farmers would have liked. By this time, the standard annual vaccination campaign for the year 1991 would be completed. Hence, Dutch pig farmers were still given ten months earlier access to, the Japanese, South-Korean, and American markets. Despite this advantage, the pig breeders’ association still regretted that the export to Japan was “delayed” with two months (ANP 11/10/1990).

The media paid little attention to this policy change. Only the newspaper for agriculture had a large article about this issue. (Agrarisch Dagblad 12/10/1990). Neither in this message nor in the government and academic studies, was attention paid to non-financial risks of the non-vaccination policy. Only veterinarians warned against such risks. Although they agreed that the number of outbreaks would decline with the non-vaccination policy, they feared that their magnitude would be much greater (cf. KNAW 2002, 7).

In one of the scientific contributions of an economist to the non-vaccination-discussion, attention was given to the possible reaction of public opinion to the stamping-out method: ‘Regarding strategy II b [=slaughter and destruction of animals on affected and serious contact farms GB], it must be said that the feasibility is disputable. The opposition both from the producer and public opinion in general to the slaughter of animals on apparently healthy farms would probably be considerable’ (Berentsen et al. 1990, 23-24, 72). This risk, although mentioned, never played an important role for the government in the formation of the non-vaccination policy. It was suspended by the gripping economic and financial arguments. But when FMD broke out massively

5. Beside that, also De Volkskrant (12/10/1990) and De Boerderij (16/10/1990) printed small messages.
in 2001, the stamping-out method did indeed cause major indignation among the general public.

Discussion and notes
The foregoing analysis in this section shows that financial and economic reasons were the most crucial in producing trust for the non-vaccination policy. The European Commission only convinced the European Council to implement this policy by providing cost calculations. Dutch officials produced general trust for the policy by restating the Commission’s reasons and additionally emphasizing the international trade benefits (Berentsen et al. 1990). The desire of especially the pig-breeders to speed up the law-making process, shows this situation was indeed a sizeable economic opportunity.

The dominant economic argument overshadowed all other concerns. Neither the Commission nor the Dutch government paid any attention to the potential public disgust with the stamping out method on a large scale. The Dutch scholars who did notice this potential risk still supported the non-vaccination strategy because of its financial attractiveness. ‘Even if strategy IIb is less effective (...), it remains the favourable option’ (ibid. 72). But even these scholars do not really try to assess ‘to what extent public opinion allows the implementation of such a strategy.’ Neither have I found any indication that the government struggled with this question. Only the organisation of veterinarians protested against the non-vaccination policy as they saw the public, moral dilemma the ‘stamping out’ method posed (KNAW 2002, 7). As will be shown in the following sections, the public’s reaction to this method on a massive scale was indeed extremely negative.

7.2 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN THE NETHERLANDS (B)

The first case of FMD was confirmed on 21 March 2001 in Olst, a small town in the center of the Netherlands. Exactly one month earlier on 21 February, the British government had reported its first case of FMD. In due time, experts discovered that the virus had sprung from pigs on a farm in Heddon-on-the-Wall. These had been fed with waste-food from restaurants – known as swill – and many believe that a Chinese restaurant had imported the virus. In China FMD is endemic; it is always present. If swill is not sufficiently heated, the virus can easily be transferred from animal to animal. Many suspect this is how it started.

The first case on mainland Europe was reported in Mayenne, France, on 13 March 2001. This was nearby the resting-place for long pan-European animal transports. The calves who infected the Dutch farms came from Ireland and were infected on this stop-over place by sheep coming from England. The virus, once in the Netherlands, infected 26 farms, over the whole period.
A couple of EC directives, two national laws, various regulations, and instruction manuals provided the farmers with detailed information about how to handle the outbreak of an animal disease. Hence, they were all aware that the government had to use the stamping-out method with an outbreak of FMD. As prescribed, four official agencies – the office of the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), the National Inspection Service for Livestock and Meat (RVV), the Health-Inspection for Animals (GD), and the General Inspection Service (AID) – immediately began tracing farmers that had recently bought sheep or other animals from England. Two days after the first English case, they traced several contact-herds of sheep, deer, and pigs. These herds were confirmed to have made contact with the infected animals and were destroyed within 24 hours of their discovery. Notice that the services were not allowed to await the laboratorium test to confirm whether or not these contact-herds were infected. They had to destroy them immediately.

The strict regulations and drastic actions taken by these agencies initially saw the general consent of both farmers and their representatives. Everyone put their confidence in the tough and swift approach. Public officials and farmer representatives had learned from the outbreak of CSF in 1997, that this extreme caution and strict action in the first days was essential to a successful fight (B&A groep 2002, 34-35). The chairman from the Dutch farmer association (LTO), Doornbos, for example, expressed his support for the government's policy at a press conference on the day that the first case of FMD was confirmed (LTO 21/03/2001). He even pled for a general ban on the transport of animals and milk, which would have inflicted enormous financial damage on dairy farmers.

Even without government orders the farmers were prepared to restrain their activities. On 2 March 2001, for example, LTO called on farmers, animal import companies, and slaughterhouses to stop the import and export of animals (LTO 02/03/2001). Although the minister of agriculture believed such a move was still too early, many in the industry indeed voluntarily stopped the cross-border transport of animals (B&A groep 2002, 109). Many farmers also limited the amount of visits to their farms. These voluntary and involuntary preventive actions in the first few days were generally more radical than in other European states with FMD. The general evaluation report of the department of agriculture would conclude afterwards that these quick reactions probably prevented the spread of the disease in the first days considerably (ibid. 85).

Discussion and notes

The successes of the actions in the first days of the struggle against the FMD is explained by the collective trust for the "battle plans" eradicating animal diseases. This
trust was established when the departement of agriculture and farmer representatives deliberated over such plans.

They jointly constructed such plans in response to the evaluation of the 1997 outbreak of CSF. This evaluation had stated that during the 1997 outbreak farmers and state officials were continuously fighting about the actions to take. Their main point of contention was the speed and severity with which measures needed to be carried out. Some farmer representatives, for instance, chastised for not taking sufficient and speedy actions (cf. Section 6.5.1). Hence, after the CSF had been eradicated, the department of agriculture and the farmer associations had intensive deliberations about the necessary regulations during the outbreak of animal diseases such as classical swine fever and FMD. They devised several plans about what to do in the first phase of an outbreak. For both CSF and FMD they all agreed that ‘everything should be done to prevent the spread of the virus in the first phase’ (Kamerstukken II, 1999-2000, 26800XIV, nr. 83, 4). To achieve this, they formulated a rather tough and swift program of action.

The effect of jointly formulating these plans was that the department, the farmer representatives, and all others involved, had formulated a widely supported action program for the outbreak of animal diseases. When the sector was confronted with a new outbreak (FMD), it immediately led to a collective intentionality to overcome the crisis. That is, the rules were clear at the time the crisis occurred, and all abode by them.

To sum up, collective trust for tough and swift programs of actions was established in advance, which made many apply the stern rules when an actual crisis was upon them (cf. B&A groep 2002, 84-85, 257). In other words, it pays off to establish collective trust for battle plans in “peace-time”.

7.3 THE NON-VACCINATION POLICY DISPUTE (A)

The government’s actions to eradicate FMD were initially supported by farmers, sector representatives, and state officials. But as the animal death toll rose, farmers and citizens became more critical. Most of them were especially critical on the stamping-out method, because it resulted in the death of many healthy animals.

After the virus broke out, the general public suddenly learned that not only cattle could be infected, but also pet animals such as lamas, camels and goats. This meant that healthy pets such as childrens’ goats, rare animals some types of cows (e.g. Lakenvelders and scottish highlanders), and price-winning cows, also had to be slaughtered. The media broadcasted such dramas as children loosing their pets and the destruction of deers. Zoos and national parks were closed for fear of infection. Hence, the variety of susceptible animals and the need to slaughter them made this crisis different than the 1997 CSF outbreak. Although the number of animals killed during the CSF outbreak
The scope of animals affected by FMD as well as the indirect impact on many societal activities eventually made many farmers, politicians, and citizens very cynical about the non-vaccination policy. The underlying justification for the policy – its cost-efficiency and its facilitation of exports – became detested by organizations, farmers, concerned citizens, politicians, and others (cf. Section 7.1). Several organizations, such as the animal protection agency and wakker dier, started demonstrating in March 2003, against the preventive destruction of healthy animals. They advertised in various newspapers (15/03/2001) and demonstrated in front of the department of agriculture. A few hundred citizens protested against the non-vaccination policy in Amsterdam, while farmers placed protest-signs in their fields; all called for vaccination. Veterinarians, who had objected against the non-vaccination policy in the first place, expressed their discontent in a public letter to the parliament and government. They especially abhorred the idea that economic interests were placed above the lives of healthy animals (Schaftenaar 21/03/2001).

The political parties as well as the department of agriculture agreed that non-vaccination should be abandoned. The then minister of agriculture, Brinkhorst, began discussing the European non-vaccination policy on 19 March 2001 with his fellow European ministers of agriculture. This only had limited success, however. Only Germany was a modest supporter of the Netherlands’ plea to end non-vaccination. On 20 March, LTO, sent a letter to the prime-minister urging him to discuss this issue at a forthcoming European summit of European heads of state. According to the minister of agriculture, farmer representatives, and civil servants, destroying healthy animals for economic reasons could no longer be justified to the public. The policy had simply become indefensible. Or, in terms of this research, the reasons for this policy – its cost efficiency and its facilitation of exports – became detested by organizations, farmers, concerned citizens, politicians, and others. The European Commission agreed to make an exception for cows. These 54,000 animals did not have to be slaughtered. The Commission summoned however that they had to stay within the closed area for at least one year and that the export of milk and meat was allowed only after special treatment. For economic reasons, the Dutch farmer organisation LTO advised to destroy these cows nonetheless.
efficiency and its facilitation of exports – were no longer good reasons to sustain public confidence (Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26800XIV, nr. 83; B&A groep 2002, 307). It did no longer fit with the dominant set of background intentional states.

In a newspaper interview, the former minister of agriculture Braks (1980-1990), explained that society had changed considerably since his incumbency. ‘The consumer is different: richer, more demanding. Everything has to be right: price, quality, environment, nature, and animal welfare’ (NRC 23/02/2001). During the FMD outbreak, consumers were confronted with an unacceptable welfare policy and wanted to see it changed. According to Braks, instead of only reasoning in economic terms, consumers now also desired that the government and farmers acted in line with other values, such as animal welfare.

All public officials, however, realized this desire was futile at the EU level. Most other members did not support the idea. Furthermore, a national vaccination-program of Dutch animals would result in large EU fines as well as an elimination of many Dutch farms and food processing companies because they would not be allowed to export vaccinated animals.

The general dissatisfaction with this situation among many participants in the policy arena, resulted in a collective action against the non-vaccination policy. With a large advertisement on 12 April 2001, various actors, such as environmental issue groups, farmer organisations, veterinarians and employee organisations, pled for a change in policy as well as a new future for the cattle breeding industry. They repeated this plea in September 2001. ‘The FMD crisis resulted in an unprecedented unity between many societal organisations, agricultural organisations, environmental groups, nature conservation organisations and animal protection organisations’ (B&A groep 2002, 315-316).

Discussion and notes
This section shows, as seen before, that a crisis can be seized as an opportunity to change an existing policy. Just as during the CSF crisis when the manure policy came under dispute, the FMD crisis resulted in a dispute over the non-vaccination policy. During the joint struggle against the FMD, nearly all parties changed their views about the non-vaccination policy. The economic reasons upon which this policy had been based no longer justified the death of seemingly healthy animals. Many different organisations, for different reasons, pled for a reintroduction of general vaccination-programs. Hence, the crisis resulted in ‘an unanimity between different organisations which had never been seen before’ (B&A 2000, 315).

This change of minds about the non-vaccination policy, however, was not able to materialize politically. Even though Dutch policy makers no longer supported the non-vaccination policy, they were unable to change it because other EU member states were unwilling to do so. Furthermore, a unilateral vaccination of all cattle would have
been disastrous because 70% of all Dutch dairy products are exported. A unilateral vaccination policy would have destroyed this industry. Consequently, all actors involved aimed their protest against the EU not the Dutch government.

To conclude, politicians, state-officials, and farmer associations had lost confidence in the non-vaccination policy, but they were unable to change the policy. They were locked-in, as it were, in the existing institution of the European non-vaccination policy. I propose to rename this policy lock-in effect as a confidence lock-in. Initially, in the 1980s, farmers and state officials wholeheartedly trusted the non-vaccination policy. But in 2001 they were unable to withdraw their support because of their dependence on EU institutions. The only thing that the Dutch were able to do was to gain trust for a reintroduction of a pan-European vaccination program by communicating their new set of intentional states on animal welfare to other EU member states.

7.4 DISTRUST OF THE CLEARING POLICY (A/B)

The government, although it agreed that the non-vaccination policy should be changed, was still forced to implement the existing stern policy regulations. While most farmers agreed with these tough rules (cf. Section 7.2), some small groups of farmers did not and distrusted all activities of both state officials and the farmer associations. Especially the farmers from Kootwijkerbroek distrusted these public officers and the laboratory tests they ran.

Kootwijkerbroek

The first report filed on 24 March, about a possible case of FMD in Kootwijkerbroek raised alarming. It was a town outside the direct area of most infected farms and officials were unable to reconstruct how the disease would have spread to it. Kootwijkerbroek did not even fall into the larger North-Veluwe area. Nevertheless, as a precautionary measure the agricultural inspection agency cleared the possible infected farm on 27 March. On 29 March the case was confirmed. The farmers from Kootwijkerbroek, however, did not believe the public agencies. They could not accept that the virus had actually affected their village. A rumor spread that no actual confirmation existed.

The farmers from Kootwijkerbroek distrusted the state-agencies and started emphasizing the many uncertainties and inconsistencies concerning the tests and clearings. First, they saw the long period between the first report and the definitive confirmation as a sign that something had gone wrong. Indeed, the laboratory had difficulty in determining whether the case was positive or negative. It needed three different tests to confirm it, of which the first two only provided a “weak indication”. Furthermore, the third test, which made the final confirmation, was not officially approved by the International Office for Animal Desease (OIE). Second, the virus was only con-
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firmed for just one calf of the total life-stock of the infected farm. Moreover the type of virus behaved differently compared to other cases. Third, no explanation was provided about how the virus had arrived in the village. Today, this is still not clear and it probably never will be. Fourth, the farmer that had reported the case possessed a second farm with animals having the same symptoms. The laboratory, however, concluded that no animals on this other farm were infected with FMD. Fifth, rumors circulated about this farmer, who already had a difficult position in this small-town community, that he had committed fraud in order to receive a large financial compensation. Sixth, the department of agriculture did not allow room for a second opinion about the matter. All these resulted in a lot of distrust among the farmers of Kootwijkerbroek.

On the night of 28 March, when the suppressive vaccination started of nearly all farms in the village, the rumors about the possible absence of FMD resulted in a hostage situation. Three employees of the National Inspection for Livestock and Meat (RVV) were captured and held hostage by angry farmers. The police ended the situation on the morning of the 29th. Suppressive vaccination proceeded on 31 March, but the farmers continued their resistance and protest.

Their anger increased because of the way the clearings were organised. Since 3 April, the EU had allowed for suppressive vaccination, which implied that the animals would first be vaccinated on the farm and then brought to a destruction site. Officially, however, the farms in Kootwijkerbroek just fell under the previous destruction regime, which meant that the animals had to be killed at the farm. One can image that the latter is emotionally much more distressing for farmers. Therefore, before the clearings the mayor and the involved agencies decided to organise an information meeting to appease the rumors and unrest. Or, in terms of this research, they tried to establish trust for the evidence that the virus was present. This meeting, however, had exactly the opposite effect.

During the meeting on 7 April, the RVV representatives answered all kinds of questions. In their answers, the officials mainly dwelled about the various actions they had to take during a clearing, but did not really give a convincing explanation of why the animals had to be destroyed. The farmers became increasingly angry about this during the meeting. At the end of the evening, one of the RVV representatives tried to establish some collective intentionality by stating that ‘the priority at this moment is to fight the FMD-virus, and we are going to win this battle’ (B&A groep 2002, 218). This statement, although well meant, produced severe turmoil within the audience. The representative had tried to draw upon a we-intentionality which was not there; none of the farmers actually believed the FMD battle was one they were in. Hence, the farmers interpreted the statement as that the RVV was also going to fight against them. The next day the largest public disturbance in the affair broke out.

After Kootwijkerbroek was declared free from FMD, ‘various law suits were still running against the department of agriculture, some civil servants were still having psy-
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The farm which was initially infected moved to the north of the Netherlands, and the community of Kootwijkerbroek remained internally divided’ (B&A groep 2002, 291).

More distrust

At the time that farmers from Kootwijkerbroek were arguing with local clearing agencies, distrust also rose between other farmers and the national farmer organisation LTO. On 3 April, the government decided to vaccinate the North-Veluwe area. The EU gave it a choice of either destroying the vaccinated animals, according to standard procedure, or exempting the cattle from destruction. This latter option would leave the cattle unharmed, but required that the 54,000 cows had to stay inside the closed area for at least one year and that their milk and meat products were to undergo special treatment before processing. This option also posed the risk that the disease would not be eradicated in a year, and that vaccination would have to be repeated for many more years. The minister of agriculture asked the LTO what they wanted to do. On 10 April, when local spokesmen were still discussing this issue with the involved farmers, the chairman of the LTO said on television that the organisation strongly urged the minister to clear the area completely, including the cattle. The farmers were astonished and felt betrayed. ‘Trust in the LTO disappeared in a split-second’ (Siemes 2001, 50). In terms of this research, the local LTO spokesmen were trying to establish trust for a specific policy decision. The national chair, however, overruled this process by imposing a decision without providing good reasons in the eyes of the farmers.

Discussion and notes

The sub-section about Kootwijkerbroek shows that distrust is produced when uncertainty is spread. In this case, the farmers of this village had an increasing list of reasons to be uncertain about the existence of FMD in their town, making them suspicious and distrustful of the involved government agencies.

Furthermore, this case illustrates two decisive moments in which collective trust was lost. The first was when the local RVV chairmen were still deliberating with the farmers and were overruled by their national spokesmen. The second was when the RVV representatives were referring to a non-existent we-intentionality with Kootwijkerbroek’s farmers. The first moment shows that when a process to build trust is initiated and overruled by others, distrust is the result. This is understandable because indi-

8. Since the whole FMD crisis, 35 legal appeals have been made to the speld court for businesses conflicts and 108 regular law suits have been filed (ibid. 207 and 305)
vuals will not feel they are taken seriously in such a case. Interrupting such a trust building process is probably more damaging to trust for a policy than simply introducing a decision without any deliberation.

The second moment shows that invoking a non-existent collective intentionality can have disastrous consequences. First, the invoker will be embarrassed and scolded. Second, if the invoker has a formal position with influence, the mishap may lead to large scale protests and indignation against him and his organization. It may even lead to violence. This is what was seen in Kootwijkerbroek.

7.5 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

7.5.1 The process of trust
What does this chapter teach us about the process of trust? Clearly, knowing whose trust is being sought is crucial. Although the professional actors involved in the FMD crisis such as the farmers, veterinarians, and public officials were, originally, in concurrence about the harsh actions to be taken, the virus did also affect non-professionals. But many others were also involved such as pet owners, and the people working in zoos or recreational areas. Hence, trust was not only required of professionals, but also among the general public. Since this trust was lacking, a large amount of societal indignation resulted.

Clearly, this trust is not necessary for all animal diseases. With CSF, only specific groups of professionals are affected while the public is generally not. Trust to prevent societal indignation is then not such a large issue. Hence, one should know which groups are involved and whose trust is to be gained to make policies successful. This differs for each animal disease. (cf. B&A groep 2002, 259).

This case further illustrates that trust on one governmental level, does not imply trust on another level. The opposition against the non-vaccination policy was generally supported on the national level. But the Dutch government was unable to change the situation because of the lack of support at the European level. Such a “confidence lock-in effect” is also observable at other levels. For instance, plans that are formulated and supported by individual farmers, and local communities or municipalities, can be overruled by higher levels of government. Hence, to maintain the general legitimacy of public government, local authorities are forced to adopt this position despite their personal convictions.

Finally, this chapter reveals that the way events are interpreted can change overtime having grave consequences for the level of trust. While the non-vaccination policy – combined with the stamping-out method – was initially trusted due to trade-interests and its cost-effectiveness, it was later detested for its negative effects on animal welfare. Intentional states that are dominant at one time might be corrected
or changed, and new ones may appear and become dominant in the realm of policies and politics. When policy-makers are not aware that different sets of intentional states are involved in a policy alternative then confidence lock-in effects are likely to follow. They first will consent with a policy based on a particular value and get the policy institutionalized, but when other beliefs (or any other relevant intentional state) become politically more accepted due which this policy will be questioned, they will find it difficult to change.

7.5.2 The social mechanisms
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the crisis social mechanism can either bring individuals together to overcome an emergency situation or it can result in broken relationships. The FMD crisis shows that, if the actors involved have come to an agreement in "peace-time" about the necessary course of action, the crisis is likely to result in a strong, collective intentionality. The actors generally put their faith in the peace time agreement. Hence, actors should invest time to discuss and inform each other about possible crises beforehand. Fortunately, the farmer representatives and the deputy minister had done this with regards to animal diseases in 2000 making them more prepared for the FMD crisis. Nonetheless, to make them do so required a previous crisis.

The outbreak of the FMD, however also confirms the proposition that crisis can lead to distrust. Although the fight against FMD ran generally smoothly, there were hiccups and resulted in distrust between farmers and state-officials. This was illustrated in the case of Kootwijkerbroek.