CHAPTER 2

Studying Trust

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents both a preliminary analytical framework about establishing trust and a methodology to specify this framework further. The initial framework is the starting point for the interpretation of various agricultural policies. It is based on existing concepts and studies about trust. During the process of interpreting the various agricultural policies I will modify this initial framework in response to the findings. The initial framework consists of two parts which provide answers to two sub-questions of the main research question. They are as follows:

1. How does an individual come to trust a public policy?
2. How does a group of individuals come to trust a public policy?

Both questions are straightforward. The first question aims at the development of social mechanisms of trust on the individual level; the second aims at trust mechanisms on the collective level. The framework, therefore, does not only show how individuals come to trust a policy but also how groups of individuals come to trust a policy.

Before presenting both parts of the initial framework in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I first have to deal with some important conceptual issues. Section 2.2 contains an overview of different types of studies on trust. I summarize these studies on trust, divide them into categories, and discuss why they have been useful for this study. In Section 2.3, a definition for trust is formulated. This definition is primarily based on a study of seventy previous definitions of trust. Sections 2.4 and 2.5, then, provide the two core parts of my framework. Section 2.4 presents an initial idea about how individuals come to trust. This part is based on a study and discussion of the works of the German sociologist Simmel. Section 2.5 deals with trusting on a collective level. I discuss how collective trust is possible by using the notion of collective intentionality. The work of the American philosopher Searle is mainly the source of this part of the framework. Finally the methodological issues are elaborated upon in Section 2.6.
2.2 STUDIES ABOUT TRUST

In reviewing the literature on trust, I have found several areas of interests. This review included literature from different academic disciplines such as sociology (Coleman, 1990), social psychology (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982), philosophy (Blackburn 1998), and organisational studies (McAllister 1995). From this review, I was able to distinguish five basic areas of interests. The first area of trust research is concerned with its effects; the second makes inventories about reasons for trusting; the third area seeks to define the different types of trust in relation to its targets; the fourth also defines trust, but based on its intensity rather than its target; the final area is concerned with the establishing process of trust.

First, many studies on trust are concerned with its propitious effects. Many consider trust as an important building block of social capital, also referred to as the “cement of society” (Elster, 1989). Misztal identifies three types of beneficial functions for trust. In his view, trust promotes stability, cohesion and collaboration (Misztal, 1996). Putnam’s well-known studies, for example, show that trust leads to higher levels of co-operation, organisational development, and institutional performance (1993, 2000; 2003). In these studies, the intensity of trust is expressed by the amount of societal participation in such organizations as sports-clubs and religious communities. By participating in these organisations, humans express favourable expectations towards both these organisations and its other participants. In the same spirit, Fukuyama (1995) suggests a positive relation between the level of trust and economic performance. Beck (1992) believes that risk-taking behaviour is only possibly with high enough levels of trust.

The problem with the analyses in this first area of research is that these studies assume a direct causal relationship between trust and the level of participation, co-operation and risk-taking behaviour. The amount of participation then serves as an indicator for the level of trust (cf. Seligman 1997, 80). The more people participate in a sports-club, the higher the level of trust in the institution and between its members. Participation in societal organisations, however, does not necessarily have to be an indicator for trust. Participation in joint activities can also be the result of social pressure or power play. Therefore, when co-operation or other presumed positive effects of trust are observed, this does not automatically mean that these effects are caused by trust. The argument about trust in these studies is basically tautological. This leads into the second area of trust research, which is concerned with the reasons or arguments individuals provide for trusting.

Some scholars are interested in discussing and classifying the reasons individuals provide for trusting someone or something. In large surveys citizens are asked, for example, why they trust or distrust the government. These exercises have resulted in a wealth of typologies and measurement scales for various bases and modes of trust (Möllering 2001, 413). Putnam shows, for example, that traditions and institutions are
probably the most common reasons for individuals to have trust (1993). What is familiar tends to be highly trustworthy. This is observed in sayings such as “That’s the way we do things around here”. Besides traditions and institutions, however, many more reasons have been found as to why people trust, such as intuition, qualities of character, know-how, science, group-identification, affection, legal procedures, and family-ties (cf. Sztomka 1999). Cummings and Bromiley even observe 273 reasons for trusting (1996). Apparently, individuals can put forward all kinds of reasons to trust, even reasons that others would classify as irrational, naïve, or inconsistent. Thus, Luhmann notes ‘the one who trusts is never at a loss for reasons’ (1979, 26).

These inventory studies of reasons for trusting help us to structure our moral debates about trustworthiness. They usually result in a set of inter-subjective criteria concerning trustworthy behaviour (Möllering 2001, 413). Examples of these criteria are ethical codes of behaviour for civil servant, which are usually incorporated in discussions on good governance (Braithwaite and Levi 1998). Although this second area of analysis provides insights into the many reasons people may have for trusting, it does not answer as to why people give that specific reason. A good reason for one person might be a bad reason for others. For instance, the intuition of one person to trust another could, at the same time, be a reason of a third party to completely distrust that person. Therefore, we need a better understanding about establishing trust, if we want to know why some reasons are good reason for trusting for some individuals and not for others.

The third area of trust research is mainly concerned with the delimitation of different types of trust. Scholars in this area usually label a type of trust depending on its target. Luhmann, for example, differentiates between confidence and trust where confidence refers to trust in abstract systems, such as the legal system, and trust is reserved for relations between humans (1979). Many scholars follow Luhmann and define trust as something that can only be vested in human beings, whereas trust in other targets has been labelled as confidence (cf. Coleman 1990, 91ff, 175 ff). In this narrow view, trust is then defined as ‘an expectation that other people’s future actions will produce favourable results’ (Castaldo 2002, 10). The question, however, that remains unsolved in these studies is whether the mechanism for establishing trust and confidence is different. I believe it is not. In this study I argue that the basic mechanism for trusting is the same for both persons and material objects. The argument is further developed in Section 2.3.

Scholars in the fourth area of research also attempt to define different types of trust, but their criterion is the intensity of trust, not the target. Giddens, for example, like Luhmann, differentiates between trust and confidence and claims that trust in persons is usually much weaker and people should “work at” it, whereas confidence in things is generally a more stable and lasting form of trust (1990, 121). Seligman suggests an even stronger type of trust namely an unconditional divine trust, usually
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labelled as faith (1997). Again other scholars regard suspicion, fatalism and cynicism
as types of trust with varying intensities (Robinson 2004, 301-310; Govier 1997). A
related issue refers to the differences between trust, distrust and mistrust (Sztopka
1999). Central in these studies is whether trust and distrust should be placed on a con-
tinuum or considered as two different notions altogether (dichotomy). Putnam, for
example, regards trust and distrust as two different concepts (1993). Again, in these
studies the question about how the various types of trust are established remains
largely unclear. This leads to the fifth and final area of trust research which explicitly
concerns with the establishing process of trust.

The studies that concern the process of trust, especially those in the field of or-
ganisational trust, simply suggest that trust can be established if organisations under-
take some activities that fit with the beliefs of what people find trustworthy (Kramer
and Tyler 1996). Organisations (or persons) should arouse reasons that lead people to
trust the organisation. One question, however, is usually not answered satisfactorily in
these studies: how do these reasons and activities lead to trust? These studies merely
state that activities and beliefs should fit, and do not specify in what ways this ‘fit’ is
establishable. This is a question that will be addressed explicitly in this study. Before
that, I first have to define trust.

2.3 DEFINING TRUST

In this study trust is defined as a **mental status of favourable expectations**. In the
following paragraphs I will discuss different parts of this definition. It is primarily based
on a study of Castaldo about seventy definitions of trust (Castaldo 2002). First I will
present a summary of his research. Then I will explain which elements from the defini-
tions are taken into consideration and inserted into my definition and which are not.
Finally, this section ends with an outline of the way trust, as defined here is perceived
in real life events.

In Castaldo’s study, I discern three types of definitions. First, almost 40% of the defi-
nitions in his dataset refer to trust as something that can have certain specific, favour-
able consequences. Usually, these definitions are related to risky actions. This means
that trust is about taking risks and the willingness to expose oneself to a situation of
vulnerability.

Second, about 32% of the definitions define trust as a kind of **expectation**. These
include expectations of specific, detailed activities of fellow human-beings (20%) and
more general expectations of other individuals (12%). Again, these definitions involve
a risk-taking element, but now the trustor is assumed to have reasons for his trust;
he trusts for instance that future actions will produce favourable results because of
the trustworthy personal characteristics of the other person. Third and finally, the last 28% of the definitions focus on trust as a belief, rather than an expectation about future actions of others.

Two overarching elements seem to appear in all these definitions of trust. First, they all speak of trust when risks or uncertainties are involved. Second, individuals seem to trust when they have either a favourable expectation or a belief that withstands these risks and uncertainties. I only consider these two overarching elements as important. Before further discussing these, I first defend why I dismiss some other elements in my definition.

The first element that is neglected in my definition concerns the limitation of trust for something that is practiced between humans only. As said, 20% of the definitions have this delimitation. In favour of my dismissal, Blackburn (1998) posits, for example, that the general basis of trust, which is relying, is practiced both between humans and objects as well as between two humans. According to Blackburn ‘the neutral core (...) is simply that X relies on Y to do Z (cf. Baier 1986; Holton 1994). This is all that there is to it when, for instance, I trust the rope to bear my weight. I rely on it to do so and show my trust by climbing on it’ (1998, 32). The basis for people to trust other individuals is no different. Hence, trust is not targeted solely to other individuals, but can also be directed at material objects (robes, buildings, policy plans). The second element that I dismissed from Castaldo’s analysis concerns the specification present in certain definitions about the reasons for trusting (12%). Some of the definitions explicitly say that people trust because of the character of other individuals. I take it, however, that individuals can have many more reasons for trusting other than the other’s personal characteristics. Reasons for trusting other persons or objects can be many (cf. Section 2.2).

The first general element that almost all definitions of trust seem to have is the “suspension of risk”. By this I mean that most seem to assume that humans only trust if certain risks or uncertainties are involved, which are taken for granted. When trust is well-established, people think and act, whether consciously or unconsciously, as if these risks and uncertainties are not there. Since trust is defined as either an expectation or a belief, it follows that individuals trust if they suspend risks or uncertainties and expect or believe in favourable results.

This brings us to the second general element, for it appears that almost all definitions define trust either as a favourable belief or an expectation. With respect to this issue I follow Holton (1994) who suggests that trust lacks at least some of the dispositions that would be part of really believing something is as it is. According to him, one can decide to trust, whereas one cannot decide to believe something. If one decides to

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1. The unusual term trustor, which I will be using constantly, simply indicates the person who is trusting something or someone. The more common term trustee is the person who is trusted.
trust he has reasons to do so and, consequently act as if he is certain. He knows, however, that (or could obtain access to this knowledge) that real risks and uncertainties are involved. As long as individuals do not have (or encounter) new reasons to rethink the risks and uncertainties, they will continue to trust and take things for granted.

Combining the elements from the previous paragraphs a general definition can now be formulated. In essence trust is thus an expectation. However, because trustors suspend risks and uncertainties and only expect favourable results, we should define trust as favourable expectations. Combined with the statement that trust is a mental status, which will be explained in Section 2.4, it is then defined as a mental status of favourable expectations.

Discerning trust
Before proceeding to the presentation of my analytical framework, I want first to point out how trust, as defined above is observed in real-life events. Hence, I have chosen to discuss the operationalization of the concepts close to their presentation. The way in which these concepts and indicators relate to each other will be further elaborated in the methodological Section 2.6.

The most obvious way to discern whether trust is established is simply by observing that people say that they trust. Unfortunately, most individuals do not state directly that they trust or distrust someone or something, and thus other means should be adopted. One way to do this is by analyzing statements of support. A claim of support is an easy way to communicate one’s trust. If someone states that he “supports” a policy plan, this may well be an expression of trust. Obviously, statements of support do not always indicate trust. One can also express support for opportunistic or political reasons. It is therefore essential to use a research method that uncovers these obscurities and takes account of the possible intentional positions. I will discuss in Section 2.6 that hermeneutics is suitable to do that. With the help of this method ‘one tries to put oneself in the agent’s (author’s, speaker’s) place, in order to understand the meaning of the act (the written or spoken word) more clearly’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, 54).

Another way to discern trust is through analysing the participation of individuals within organisations. If individuals join an organisation, they support such organisation with their actions possibly indicating trust. However, one should be cautious with such conclusions because, as mentioned previously, individuals can also join an organisation for many other reasons. Here again the hermeneutical method help us to disentangle these positions.
2.4 THE ESTABLISHING PROCESS OF TRUST (ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, PART A)

In this section the first part of the initial framework is presented, about how individuals arrive at a mental status of favourable expectations. It will provide a preliminary answer to the first sub-question: how does an individual come to trust a public policy? The framework is based primarily on the work of Möllering (2001). He derives his framework from having analyzed the works of Simmel and making some analytical distinctions concerning the process of trust (Simmel 1950; 1990). He distinguishes between interpretation and suspension. Furthermore, I have employed the works of Blackburn (1998) and Searle (1996) to complement my argumentation.

Interpretation

Trust is defined as a mental status of expecting something. What are mental statuses and how do we obtain them? Mental statuses are beliefs, desires, expectations, fears, joy, shame, hate, anxiety, and so on (cf. Searle 1983, 1996). Many of these refer at some specific object in the world around us. I have, for instance, the belief that some of the pieces of paper in my wallet is money. In analytical philosophy this reference is called intentionality. It is ‘the capacity of the mind to represent objects and states of affairs in the world other than itself’ (Searle 1996, 6-7).

In general terms, this means that humans conceive in their minds of objects or a state of affairs in the world other than revealed by brute physical facts. A stone, for example, could be thought of as a paper-press. We actually believe that the object on the table is a paper-press and not a stone. Twenty-two people running after a ball on a field upon which two iron structures with a net have been placed, is what we call a game of football. We claim and fully believe that “it is a game of football” and not just “twenty-two people running after a ball”. Beliefs, desires and expectations are intentional because in order to have them, we have to believe that something is such and such, desire that such and such will be the case, or expect that such and such will be the case. Expecting, believing, desiring are, thus, mental states or, to be more precise, intentional states.

How do we obtain the intentional status of expecting something? The basic idea is that we constantly interpret the behaviour of other human beings, the qualities of objects and the features of real-life situations. Hence, we are constantly developing
intentional states through our interpretations. How we interpret things, however, is answered in different ways within the social sciences.

In studies that define trust as mutual exchange relations between individuals, the reasons for arriving at favourable expectations are assumed to be based on some sort of calculation. In these studies trust is established when individuals believe that they have sufficient reasons to trust. Hence, they give their trust if it pays off to take the risk. This type of studies remains in the realm of rational-choice theories (Coleman 1990, Chapters 5 and 8; Dunn 1990; Hardin 1991). Other studies, however, posit that trust is a psychological impulse (e.g. Turner 1987; Kramer and Tyler 1996). These studies relate that trust is given because individuals have social and moral bonds, such as families (Barber, 1983). But they also say that group identification between the trustor and trustee, such as in institutional relations can be grounds for trust (Silver 1985, Wilson 1993).

Apparently the reasons for arriving at favourable expectation are many (see also Section 2.2). The various social sciences highlight different grounds for giving trust. They provide us with complementary and contradictory insights. They teach us that trust is neither based solely on rational calculations nor on emotional or moral considerations. The point with expectations is that we can always give reasons to justify them. Even if one has not formulated reasons beforehand, one can always make a rationalization afterwards. The reasons given by one person need not correspond with those of others. For someone to trust it is not necessary that others agree with the reasons he provides for his trust. It is also not necessary that his reasoning is based on rational argumentation (though it could). Initially, only the person involved believes that he has good reasons to trust (Möllering 2001). Hence, to understand why a person arrives at a mental status of favourable expectations, is to consider his sometimes complex interpretative position.

How to study a person’s interpretation?

A means to understand a person’s interpretative position is to collect information about his previous interpretations and thereby discerning a pattern of intentional states. Searle suggest that intentional states only function ‘in relation to numerous other intentional states’ (1983, 141). Thus, if we want to know which reasons are good reasons in the eyes of a trustor, we have to dig into his previous interpretations, and reconstruct some of his background intentional states. Hence, when conducting an analysis of trust, a scholar should analyse these often unconscious sets of interpretations. Such analysis is necessary to understand why some specific reasons are sufficient for persons to come to trust a policy.

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4. Note that "good" does not imply a normative theory from which individual behaviour is deducted and which can be discussed. "Good" means the trustor believes it is a sufficient reason for trusting.
I strive to discover the reasons for trust through both analysing the reasons given by policymakers as well as the reactions of the individuals whose trust is desired. These reasons given by policymakers are observed in statements and argumentations. By a statement I mean the utterance of an individual and by an argumentation the utterances between different individuals in a dialogue. Both these activities allow for the inductive derivation of reasons. Once more, the hermeneutical method can help to sort out the interpretative position of the trustor. It makes the scholar able to empathize with him and understand why he holds a particular interpretation or not.

Suspension
The second analytical feature of reaching favourable expectations is concerned with the suspension of uncertainties and risks. As mentioned earlier, trust involves situations in which persons are not entirely certain, but act as if they are certain. Based on the works of the German sociologist Simmel (1858-1918), Möllering suggests that ‘between reflexive, interpretative trust bases (‘good reasons’) and the momentarily certain expectations in enacted trust’ another element is present, which is ‘the temporary suspension of uncertainties and risks’ (Möllering 2001). ‘Suspension, then, can be defined as the mechanism that brackets out uncertainty and ignorance, thus making interpretative knowledge momentarily ‘certain’ and enabling the leap to favourable (or unfavourable) expectations’ (cf. Giddens 1991, 3, 244). In other words, suspension implies that some intentional states, such as believing in specific risks or uncertainties, are temporarily blocked out.

The risk-reducing effect of trust has been extensively described in the literature. Luhmann (1979) was one of the first to recognize the importance of trust for modern societies. His argument is that growing complexity and increasing uncertainties force modern individuals to rely more and more on other people and abstract institutions. Giddens (1991), Seligman (1997) and Sztompka (1999) take this line of reasoning further and illustrate how trust has become a characteristic feature of modernity. In contrast to many of these studies, I contend that overcoming risks and uncertainties is an part of the process of establishing trust and not a positive effect or consequence of it. In order to trust, one has to suspend risks and uncertainties. Without suspension, the potential reasons for trusting will not lead to favourable expectations. Rather, an individual will then refrain from actions or be reserved, suspicious and cynical.

Both analytical features, interpretation and suspension, are easily illustrated with an example. Suppose an individual A encounters an individual B with a dog on a leash. When they are about to pass, B pulls his dog back. Whether A decides to trust or distrust B’s dog depends on his interpretation of this “pulling back” by B. If A has been bitten before, then he is prone to interpret B’s action as a warning: “watch out, my dog likes to bite”. On the other hand, if A likes dogs, he could very well interpret this situation in a positive way and think person B just wants to temper the dog’s enthusiasm so
that it can be petted. Hence, if we want to know whether person A has good reasons to trust or distrust the dog, we have to discover A’s antecedents.

Still, even having some basic knowledge of A’s history often does not make understanding what his interpretation of the situation will be straightforward. A could very well adore dogs, but find this particular dog a frightful looking creature and approach the animal more reservedly than usual. If B then tells A that his dog ‘never bites,’ A might be easily convinced, suspend his uncertainties, and start petting the dog. Probably without knowing it, A suspends various other uncertainties as well. For instance, he relinquishes doubts about the dog’s master – he could be lying – and the dog’s mood of that day – one can never tell with animals. Suspension may have such a strong grip on A that, although B warned him against the dog, dog-loving A is so convinced of his own ‘dogs-never-bite-me’ argument that he starts petting the animal anyway.5

These two features combined, interpretation and suspension, are the building blocks employed in the following chapters to analyse how favourable expectations are established for public policies. For example, if a public official wants to gain trust, a first step is to communicate his expectations. To arrive at a favoured status he has to give reasons that support these expectations. These should be good reasons from the perspective of the persons’ whose trust he is attempting to gain. They have to fall on fertile soil, so to speak. In other words, the provided reasons should be in concordance with a favourable interpretation by the one whose trust is being sought. While presenting expectations and reasons, the policymaker should also aid the other, if necessary, to suspend the uncertainties that comes along with his interpretation. ‘One can catch glimpses of suspension empirically when people say things such as ‘everything will be fine’, ‘no need to worry’, or ‘just go ahead’ (Möllering 2001, 214).

How to discern suspension?

Before moving on to the next issue, a short overview is provided of four ways to become aware of suspension. First, utterances and statements can be signs of suspension. Consider this example: Say an inspector is involved in the fight against the foot and mouth disease. To suspend his uncertainties, he says to himself and his colleagues, after some major setbacks: ‘Nevertheless we will win this battle.’ Although this statement alone might not be a sufficient and convincing argument, it still is a pointer that he expects a good ending of the crisis. Second, suspension is observed in actions. If individuals, for example, initially say they doubt the benefits of an action but still execute it, this might indicate a suspension of some risks and uncertainties. Third, suspension is also detectable in argumentations between individuals in which risks and uncertain-

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5. Note that ‘interpretation and suspension always combine’ (Möllering 2001, 214). It involves an analytical difference not a phenomenological one. Humans do not make an interpretation and then suspend the risks that are involved. These steps go together: every interpretation is limited and incorporates some uncertainties.
ties are openly discussed, and support for a policy or an action is finally given. For example, Dutch farmers openly discussed the risks of participating in a Raiffeisen bank while many supported the plans in the end. Fourth, suspension is also perceivable through the comments and reflections of persons outside the policymaking process. Independent commentators can give an analysis of the risks and uncertainties that are involved with executing certain activities. With the introduction of the fixed-price system in agriculture, for instance, many outsiders emphasized the risk of overproduction. The then minister of agriculture Mansholt, although aware of these risks, still implemented the policy.

2.5 COLLECTIVE TRUST (ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK, PART B)

In this section, a preliminary answer will be given to the second sub-question: how does a group of individuals come to trust a policy? Humans have the capacity of intentionality and this is at the core of trust as was seen in Section 2.4. However, humans not only have the capacity for individual intentionality, but also for collective intentionality (cf. Searle 1996). Hence, we have individual intentional states of trusting, as well as collective intentional states. This section tells us how and when individuals arrive at collective intentional states. Or, to be more precise, it gives an analytical framework about how and when humans switch between the individual mode, the I-mode, and the collective mode, the we-mode, of trusting.

I start this section with an exposition on the concept of collective intentionality (2.5.1), followed by a discussion on the concept of social mechanism in general terms (2.5.2). Based on these two concepts I then present four social mechanisms that clarify how collective trust is established (2.5.3).

2.5.1 Collective intentionality

Following Searle (1996, 23), I posit that individuals have the capacity for collective intentionality. Humans not only engage in co-operative behaviour, they also share intentional states such as believing, intending, desiring and expecting. Sharing an intentional state with others means that one's own intentionality is derived from some collective intentionality. For instance, during a football game I only have an intention to pass a ball because a collective intention to build up a strategic attack exists. I am then thinking in a we-mode, which concurs with the same we-mode of other individuals in my team. This we-mode exists within the team because we all believe “we are playing football”. The individual intentions of all the players, such as passing the ball, all derive then from the collective intentionality all players share (i.e. the belief “we are playing football”). Football is, thus, both a physical and mental team sport.
In many situations one can readily observe the switch from an I- to a we-intentionality. Imagine for example a teenager who is going on a summer camp. In the car towards the meeting place he is moping about not wanting to go: "I don't feel like going". Yet, as soon as he meets up with his friends and the other kids who he has not seen the whole year, collective expectations arise. He then starts thinking in a we-mode. Everyone who has been to summer camp understands the “spirit of camping.” It is a kind of group-sensation. Once such a group is realized, most individual participants start thinking and expressing themselves in a we-mode. The expectations of what is about to come are then communicated in the first person plural: "Bye dad, we are off now!"

Much of social behaviour requires collective intentionality. The statement “preparing one-self” for some collective activity means that one is called to switch to a we-intentionality. In war, to “prepare oneself for the battle” is a statement communicated a few moments before the actual fight to force soldiers into the we-mode. Similarly, musicians in an orchestra play their part of a piece only due to the shared intention of playing a symphony. Collective intentionality, however, is not only used in joint activities. Take, for instance, the intentional state of disagreement between two individuals. They, then, could have a collective intentionality of disagreement and both think: "we disagree."

The sharing of intentional states is usually confused with a Durkheimian Conscience Collective or with a Hegelian world spirit that floods above and beyond human experiences. According to Searle this view is incorrect. Everything humans think, believe, desire, expect, or, more precisely, all of mental life takes place in everyone’s own brain. Preferences and values do not exist outside the mental lives of individuals.

Searle also dismisses the more classical position on collective intentionality in which all “we intentionality” is reduced to “I intentionality”. The idea is that if we intend to do something together, then that consists in the fact that I intend to do it in the belief that you also intend to do it and the other way round (Searle 1996, 24). The problem, however is that it does not add up to a sense of collectivity. In Searle’s view, a set of shared values actually means that individuals in a group posses, in their own minds, an intentional state that says: “we believe that such and such values are good.” Searle thus argues that it is indeed the case that all my mental life is inside my

![Figure 2.1 The traditional picture of “we intentions” (Searle 1996, 26).](image)
Academic philosophy has shown great interest in the possibility of collective intentionality. It is posited to be an important building block for collective actions and social facts. The concept of collective intentionality contributes to the question how social facts, such as organisations and institutions can exist (cf. Searle 1995; Bratman 1992; Gilbert 1989). This study, however, is not a discussion on the ontology of society and therefore I will not go into more detail about the possibility of collective intentionality. The capacity for it is assumed.

2.5.2 Social mechanisms

How and why do individuals switch between the individual mode and the collective mode of thinking? In this study I use social mechanisms to address these questions. The term “mechanism” is not frequently applied in the social sciences. Most probably, social scientists feel uneasy to employ this rather technical term. I use the adjective “social” to distinguish between the technical meaning of mechanism and the meaning proposed in this study. Social mechanisms are not law-like generalisations of associations between events. Rather, social mechanisms are ‘middle-range theories’ that are positioned between social laws and descriptions or narratives (cf. Merton 1967, 39 ff.). Thus, social mechanisms provide “a way out” of using “only” thick description while not pretending to be social laws. They do not lead to predictions about future developments. Just as Hirschman’s social mechanism “exit, voice and loyalty” (see Section 1.1), they are used as tools to understand various specific historic events. ‘Roughly speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate

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6. The infinite hierarchy of beliefs, which is assumed to be essential to explain collective intentionality in mainstream methodological individualism (I believe, that he believes, that I believe etc.), is thus solved by simply saying that individuals think: “We believe such and such”.

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Figure 2.2 We intentions as proposed by Searle (ibid.).
consequences (Elster 1999, 1). Following Vaillant, Elster provides an example of such a social mechanism:

‘Perhaps for every child, who becomes alcoholic in response to an alcoholic environment, another eschews alcohol in response to the same environment. Both reactions embody mechanisms: doing what your parents do and doing the opposite of what they do. We cannot tell ahead of time what will become of the child of an alcoholic, but if he or she turns out either a teetotaller or an alcoholic we may suspect we know why’ (Vaillant 1983, 65 in Elster 1998, 1).

In *A Plea for Mechanisms* Elster provides many more illustrations of social mechanisms, mainly at the micro level. These are specific combinations of the individual’s desires, beliefs, and action opportunities that generate specific outcomes (cf. Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 23). Elster shows how observed behaviour could consist of a whole range of social mechanisms. He also indicates that these mechanisms – atomic mechanisms as he likes to call them – could accumulate to intra and interpersonal levels. In other words, social mechanisms can be observed on many levels of both individual and group behaviour. Hence, understanding real-life situations usually requires a ‘concatenation’ of various social mechanisms (Gambetta 1998, 102).

### 2.5.3 Social mechanisms of collective trust

Which social mechanisms explicate how and why individuals switch from individual trust to collective trust? The answers to these questions deliver part B of my framework. Four mechanisms are proposed: the crisis mechanism, the diffusion mechanism, the examples mechanism, and the coupling mechanism.

The social mechanisms I propose are *belief-formation* or situational mechanisms (Hedström 1998, 313; see also Stinchcombe 1993 and Coleman 1990). They tell us how individual beliefs are formed in response to behaviour of others. Their general logic is roughly that if one sees a group of people acting in a certain way, it influences one’s beliefs, and actions. Granovetter’s work on threshold-based behaviour is a point in case (1978). It says for example that the choice of a restaurant is influenced by the amount of people that is already dining there. If the place is full, it is assumed that people believe the restaurant is good. In the same manner, the following social mechanisms tell us how and when individual trust becomes collective trust. They say under what conditions (events or behaviour of others) individuals switch from an I-mode into a we-mode of thinking.
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The crisis-mechanism
I perceived the crisis-mechanism in reaction to the many veterinarian crises in the period 1995-2001. Crises are often considered as focusing events. Through crises stakeholders may apprehend the urgency of a situation, which demands attention and shared action (Kingdon 1984, Keeler 1993). Through crises individuals could switch from an I-mode to a we-mode of thinking. Crises join hearts together. Many examples support this proverbial wisdom. External shocks such as terrorist attacks, earthquakes, the sudden death of a loved-one, and the outbreak of animal diseases affect the disposition of individuals. When many individuals are confronted with the same shock and experience, they could arrive at the same disposition, which, upon recognition, could produce a we-intentionality. They then feel they are “in it together”.

But crisis-situations can also result in fighting, anger and distrust. Instead of recognizing each other’s shared dispositions, individuals blame each other for the occurring problems (Douglas 1992; Bovens and ’t Hart 1996). The object of intentionality is then not the shared crisis-situation, but the other stakeholders. For instance, in Chapter 6 I relate how civil servants and farmers were blaming each other for spreading foot and mouth disease, rather than that they jointly cooperated in fighting the animal disease.

In this study, a crisis or an external shock is discerned through facts and figures. In agricultural policy, an external shock is a natural catastrophe, a sudden economic recession, or an outbreak of an animal disease. Indicators for collective intentionality are statements and discussions that reveal individuals expressing a we-mode. One should be cautious, however, to jump to conclusions too soon about collective intentional states. Collective actions in times of crisis may also simply be imposed by authoritative leadership (cf. Boin, ’t Hart, Stern and Sundelius 2005).

The diffusion-mechanism
I discerned the diffusion-mechanism during a preparatory institutional analysis of the farmer organisations and associations in the Netherlands. This mechanism increases understanding of why individuals switch from an I-mode to a we-mode when influenced by a social network. It is based on the work of Strang and Soule (1998). They assume that a social network facilitates the spread of new ideas, because members are inclined to imitate each other. I judge this is the case because the individuals, who form the network, already share collective beliefs. They share a concurrent intentional network and they already refer to various objects or situations in a we-mode. Thus when information about a new idea, product, or policy is diffused through the network, individuals are likely to arrive at the same disposition; this leads to a new collective

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7. These are the Classical Swine Fever, 1997 (CSF), the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, whole period (BSE), and the Foot and Mouth Disease, 2001 (FMD).
intention concerning the new idea, product, or policy. In one of the pioneering studies about diffusion, Coleman, Katz and Menzel show that whether a new drug will come in to widespread use, depends on the opinions of colleagues (1957). Apparently, the network of physicians facilitates the we-expectation concerning the new drug.

Strong homogenous diffusion networks are, however, hard to maintain. Modern pluralist societies are characterized by a plurality of values, containing citizens without dogmatic views. (Zijderveld 1991, 217 ff). Hence, in a modern society the diversity of intentional states is large, and they are easily adjusted or replaced. Consequently, diffusion networks erode or change easily. New homogenous networks are difficult to build and only ‘loose networks’ seem possible instead of ‘thick institutional’ networks (Zijderveld 2000). Accordingly, if new ideas, products or policies are diffused through networks these will not be trusted automatically. Whereas for some individuals they may evoke favourable expectations (or beliefs etc.), they could spur others to refrain from further involvement. They may even very well fracture long lasting relationships, which means that some individuals will alienate from the members of a network. In such a case, the members of the network not only lack an intentionality about the new idea, product, or policy, but they also lose (some of) the pre-existent intentional states. Consequently, collective trust in the network starts eroding.

Diffusion networks are empirically discerned through evidence of cooperation and long-lasting interaction between reasonably consistent groups of actors. Some of the most important homogenous networks in the history of the Netherlands are the religious “societal pillars” (Lijphart 1975). One of the most important networks in Dutch agriculture has been the iron triangle between the farmer-representatives, the agrarian specialists from parliament and the civil servants from the department of agriculture (De Vries 1989). These will be further discussed in Chapter 4.

The examples-mechanism
The examples-mechanism was found during an initial analysis of the history of Dutch agriculture. The basic idea is that a good example can become the basis for a shared reference.

Just as with a crisis, an example affects individual dispositions. When individuals observe the same example, they may have aligned dispositions which, upon recognition, lead to a we-intentionality. They then feel that they should follow the same example “together”. In the 1950’s the rural extension service had particularly pointed at these group-effects (Kruse 1957, 34). This organisation argued for instance, that exhibitions of modern farm buildings and machinery had inspired complete peasant communities to jointly modernize their houses, establish co-operative lease organisations and create import co-operatives (cf. Chapter 4). Furthermore, the rural sociologist Hofstee observed that the vicinity of model farms inspired other farmers to improve their farms and copy new efficient production techniques (Hofstee 1953, 24).
But examples can also disrupt collective trust. When individuals of a group observe a novelty, they may obtain different intentional states. One individual could expect favourable things from the demonstrated, new product whereas someone else does not think anything good of it. They then express themselves in an I-mode rather than a we-mode. Hofstee pointed for example at the disruptive effects for a rural community if some farmers start using modern machinery and production techniques whereas others lag behind (Hofstee 1953, 15-16).

The coupling-mechanism

The coupling-mechanism was conceptualized after a preparatory analysis of some major agricultural policies. This mechanism increases understanding of how collective intentionality transfers from one object (a policy) to another. Collective intentional states about one object may increase the likelihood that individuals will have collective intentional states about other objects. Elster observes, for example, in the works of De Tocqueville, various spill-over effects between different realms of beliefs. Consider the following example ‘Men who live in times of equality find it hard to place the intellectual authority to which they submit, beyond and outside humanity….One can anticipate that democratic peoples will not easily believe in divine missions’ (Elster 1998, 61). Here, the argument is that a lack of believe in authority, also tends to affect religious beliefs. In the same manner the collective expectations for one policy can be transferred to another. Consider the mechanisation policies, which enabled farmers to buy new machineries just after the Second World War (Chapter 4). The shared expectations over these policies resulted, in due time, also in favourable expectations over land reform policies because these created bigger plots of land which made the use of big machines more efficient. Thus collective expectations in modern machinery were transferred to land reform policies.

But, spill-over effects of collective beliefs are not social laws. Some groups of individuals may accept spill-over effect without any hesitation; they even may let it go unnoticed. Others, however, may start debating the spill-over effect and come to other conclusions. In such a case individuals could obtain various diverging individual intentional states. De Tocqueville noticed, for example, that beside the spill-over effect between political liberty and religious independence, other individuals in contrast compensate one belief with another: ‘(…) if he has no faith, he must obey, and if he is free he must believe’ (De Tocqueville 1969, 444). Consider also the collective belief of efficient farming. This conviction has evolved into plans to maintain cattle in barns year round. Whereas some farmers consent with this development because it is ef-

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8. Note that these 2 individuals, however, can still have a collective intentionality of disagreeing with each other. This collective intention however refers to their interactions and not to the product (different object of reference).
cient, others lose their full belief in efficient farming. Cattle, so they believe, ought to graze in the fields as well. Hence, the collective intention for pursuing efficiency has reached a limit and the diversity of intentional states concerning this issue is rising.

The coupling-mechanism is observed when two policy-issues relate to each other. One can find evidence of this in statements like: “Once you are doing this, then you should also do that” or “if this, then also that.” Evidence of cases with spill-over effects that are no longer supported are found in statements such as “this is a bridge too far.”

If the four social mechanisms apply, collective intentionality is observed in statements and discussions in which individuals express themselves in the we-mode: “we trust such and such.” Note, furthermore, that these four social mechanisms also apply to intentional states other than trusting (expecting), such as believing and desiring. A crisis, for example, can also result in groups of individuals who express collective beliefs, desires, and many other intentional states.

2.6 METHODOLOGY

How to find new social mechanisms of individual trust and adjust the four initially given mechanisms of collective trust? Or, in other words, what is a valid methodology for studying belief-formation mechanism? If we study the works of various sociologists and economist who formulated belief-formation social mechanisms, some observations pertaining methodology can be made. Classical scholars such as Weber and Durkheim extensively studied the links between values and social phenomena. Weber analysed the complex link (Wahlverwandshaft) between Protestant puritanical ethos and capitalism, whereas Durkheim between Catholic values and the number of suicides. Contemporary scholars label these abstracted observations as middle-range theories or as social mechanisms. (Merton 1967, 59, 68; Hedström and Swedberg 1998, 5; Swedberg 1998). The methods they used to understand the relations between values and social phenomena fall in the realm of the verstehende Soziologie (Zijderveld 1990, 35). Before I discuss the actual methodological proceedings in Section 2.6.2 I first need to make some preliminary remarks about the goals of the theories and methods of the verstehende Sociologie (2.6.1). Finally Section 2.6.3 gives an overview of the choices I made selecting my units of analysis, the texts and policy issues.

2.6.1 Verstehende Sociologie

The goal of the verstehende Sociologie is not to explain social events in a mono-causal manner but to understand the complex ‘correlative relation’ between values and social phenomena (Zijderveld 1990, 58). Weber and Durkheim constructed abstract causal patterns rather than that they empirically tested some isolated variables. The abstracted patterns they gave, deliberately highlight specific features and disregard
other observations. They do not assume a direct correspondence between theory and facts and will therefore never be universal laws as in the natural sciences.

Weber constructed *Ideal Typen*, which were meant for understanding different historic incidences. They describe social and cultural features, such as authority and bureaucracy in their pure rational shape. By analysing the deviations between these analytical constructions and historic events, one is able to better understand social and cultural behaviour (Weber 1972, 2-3). This type of analysis provides an *ideal typical* explanation rather than a mono-causal explanation (Raadschelders and Rutgers 1989). The relation (*Wahlverwandschaft*) between Protestantism and capitalism should be understood in the same manner. Weber’s aim was not to causally explain the factual relation between Protestantism and capitalism but to understand the relation between a puritanical spirit and social behaviour (capitalism). The observable fact that some Catholics were also devoted capitalists does not falsify Weber’s *ideal typical* explanation that a specific set of mental states, in casu some puritanical beliefs, results in specific behaviour, the rise of capitalism.

Contemporary sociologists and economists such as Hirschman, Merton and Coleman also found social mechanisms that have an ideal typical character. Hirschman, for example, ideal-typically explained the decay of the Nigerian railroads and the political turmoil in the German Democratic republic in 1989 with his social mechanism of ‘exit voice and loyalty’ (1970; 1993). This social mechanism provides an understanding of what happened in both cases. It is, however, not falsified if we find other mechanisms that explain these historic events better. In that case, we should conclude that these other mechanisms better ‘fit’ the explanation of the historic incidences; they make the event more understandable. Many other social mechanisms have the same character of which some are famous such as Merton’s self-fulfilling prophecy (1949), Granovetter’s bandwagon effect (1978), and Coleman’s network diffusion theory (Coleman et al. 1957). All of these theories are “tested” on their heuristic merits. This means that their ultimate test is whether or not they provide a rational understanding (*Verstehen*) of some of our social and cultural events (Zijderveld 1990, 60).

One of the most important methods in the *verstehende Sociologie* is the cultural-historic comparison (idem, 58). Weber and Durkheim based their analytical concepts and social mechanisms on the analysis of various historic incidences from different cultures and societies. They then used these abstractions to understand the various different historic incidences. The development of social mechanisms is, therefore, a continuous interaction between analytical frameworks and historic event.

Both parts of the framework which I presented in *Sections 2.4 and 2.5* are the beginnings of social mechanisms. They are tools to understand parts of social reality. They contain pieces of possible relations between trust and policymaking. They are,

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9. Weber believed that his *Ideal Typen* were rarely observed in reality.
however, not lawlike generalization but represent small indeterminate causal patterns. My aim is to critically discuss both parts of this framework (while analysing agricultural policies), readjust and if necessary reformulate them. This is done by means of the hermeneutics.

Hermeneutics

In the verstehende Sociologie the hermeneutical interpretation is often applied to understand social phenomena in their historic contexts. It is a method that goes back and forth between specific parts of social phenomena, – such as detailed historic incidences or small pieces of texts –, and a more general analytical framework – such as ideal Typen, Wahlverwandtschaften, or, in this case, social mechanisms. This procedure ‘aims for, and results in, understanding’ (Betti 1980, 56).

‘Hermeneutics has its roots in the Renaissance in two parallel and partly interacting currents of thought – the Protestant analysis of the Bible and the humanist study of ancient classics’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, 53). ‘(I)t is emphasis is on the re-enactment (Einfühlung) of the meanings that the originators of texts and acts – authors and agents – associate with these. (…) It results in the understanding of underlying meaning, not the explanation of causal connections.’ (Italics orig.) (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, 52).

The basic hermeneutical method aims to understand small pieces of texts by referring to a larger piece of text, and to understand a whole text by analysing small pieces of texts. ‘The part can only be understood from the whole, and the whole only from the parts (…); you begin, for example, in some part, try tentatively to relate it to the whole, upon which new light is shed, and from here you return to the part studied, and so on’ (ibid.).

Figure 2.3 illustrates this hermeneutic procedure.

Scholars have applied hermeneutics to many more than written texts only. Especially German scholars pushed the art of hermeneutical interpretation further. Dilthey saw all human life as “text”. In his Lebensphilosophie als Hermeneutik des Lebens he argued that we constantly interpret our words and acts in order to come to an understanding of it (cf. Schüz 2001, 58). Hermeneutics is applied to written texts, spoken

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Figure 2.3 The original hermeneutic circle

10. In order to solve the circularity, the circle is usually presented as a spiral (Radnitzky 1970, 23).
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words, interview reports, and (historical) acts in general’...The domain of hermeneutics has been successively widened to include the understanding of acts whose ultimate context is the whole of world history’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, 54).

Hermeneutics is in particular suited for this study. In Section 2.4 I discussed how individuals give trust because they find reasons that only seem good reasons to them. When and why individuals trust is thus a subjective activity. Especially in case of a delicate activity as trusting, the scholar needs a certain empathy (Einfühlung) with the trustors. An important feature of the hermeneutics is that it indeed helps to empathize with the object that is studied, in this case the trustor. Through close and careful analysis of texts and acts, one is able to internalize the situation of the person he studies; to “relive” and experience what the object has experienced before; hence, to understand the acts of the trustor (Habermas 1969, 226). This empathy is, to my mind, essential to understand how we trust. From sayings and quotes, we know that trust is experienced as something delicate and fragile. An English example says for instance, “Trust is the hardest thing to find and the easiest to lose”. Another nice example is “Trust comes by foot, but leaves on horseback”. Therefore, it seems at least wise to employ a method that takes this fragility into concern.

This characteristic of hermeneutics might also be found in other methodologies of the social sciences. Empathy may very well be possible through (participatory) observations, or by holding unstructured interviews. There is, however another characteristic which these other methods do not share: Hermeneutics can be applied to texts from different historic periods. This gives me the ability to empathize with individuals throughout history. I believe this feature increases the validity of the social mechanisms, because it implies that they are not only based on recent case-studies but also on older cases (see also Section 2.6.3).

2.6.2 Applying hermeneutics

In Reflexive Methodology, Alvesson and Sköldberg specify the hermeneutic procedure (2000, 58-67). They identify four aspects that a scholar of hermeneutics must take: (1) the pattern of interpretation, (2) the text (3) the dialogue, and (4) the subinterpretation. Alvesson and Sköldberg employ these four steps to relate the whole to the parts and vice versa. Figure 2.4 illustrates this specification of the hermeneutic circle. In the following sub-sections these four aspects of the hermeneutical circle are explained.

The Pattern of interpretation (step 1)

The pattern of interpretation consists of the initial interpretation of the texts that are studied. These early interpretations are based on the frameworks and other so-called extra-hermeneutical sources such as preconception, proposition and the presumptions of the scholar. It refers to the overarching set of interpretations of a certain
text, that is, the coherent whole of partial interpretations. The pattern of interpretation corresponds loosely to the ‘theory’ of various extra-hermeneutic discourses (ibid. 61). In line with the hermeneutics procedure, these preconceptions and concepts are constantly reflected upon, discussed and adjusted while studying and analysing the smaller parts of the text.

As described previously (Section 2.1), the framework in this study contains two parts and, consequently, two sets of concepts. The A-set of concepts refers to part A of the framework, the process of trust, and B-set to the four previously constructed social mechanisms. Both sets of concepts are a part of the initial pattern of interpretation. At start, the pattern of interpretation, should also include ‘facts’ that support these concepts. An ‘agreement’ must exist between these concepts and the particular pieces of texts (Madison 1988). These ‘facts’ should serve as indicators for the concepts. Small pieces of text or specific acts are ‘facts’ in the sense that they deliver ‘evidence’ to the plausibility of the concepts. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 have already discussed how one finds ‘evidence’ in the textual fragments actions for the various concepts of my framework.

Figures 2.5 and 2.6 summarize both parts of the pattern of interpretation. Both figures contain the initial concepts and the indicators that relate these concepts to the ‘facts’ in the texts.

Interpreting texts and actions (step 2)
The next step consists of the interpretation of the texts. This interpretation process should deliver ‘facts’ such as words, textual fragments, or actions. The interpreter reads the text first while seeking ‘facts’ for the concepts of his initial pattern of interpretation. He, however, should deliberately also look for new ‘facts’ which teach him about the concepts, and may require adjustments or the making of entirely new concepts. ‘The text can be literal, consisting of written or spoken words. It can also be figurative, in that social acts are regarded as meaningful symbols’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000, 61). ‘These particulars are endowed with a deeper and richer meaning in light of the overarching pattern of interpretation. They in turn influence the pattern of interpretation, enriching it and modifying it during the hermeneutic processes (ibid.).
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In order to extract ‘facts’ from the texts, I categorize words, acts, events and other social phenomena that might possibly contribute to the ‘discussion’ about trust establishment. This procedure for categorization takes two steps. First, the texts are studied while underlining words and textual fragments that refer to the indicators as presented in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. These words or fragments can be different sorts of things such as utterances, phrases, descriptions, actions, reports, comments etc. Second, these words are compared, and similar sets of words, events or actions are then labelled as a category.

The Dialogue (step 3)

The third step is the hermeneutical dialogue. This concerns reflection about the concepts: the ‘dialogue’ between the initial understanding, based on the concepts, and the new understanding, based on the categories. This dialogue is the hermeneutics’ method core activity. Hermeneuticians ‘use the procedure of asking questions to the text, and listening to it, in a dialogic form.’ (...) They ‘glide back and forth between the “old” aspect imposed on the text in the shape of pre-understanding, and the new understanding’ (ibid. 62). During the reading of the texts, the interpreter initially asks questions which are directly derived from his preconceptions. Concurrently, however, the interpreter should also look for new ‘facts’ that contradict with the preconceptions and push him to specify or adjust his conceptions.

### Pattern of Interpretation (part A, cf. Section 2.4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Concept</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interpretation</td>
<td>Reasons provided by statements and argumentations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Suspension of risks and uncertainties</td>
<td>Utterances and statements, actions, and argumentations by the involved actors or by non-involved commentators / historic scholars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Favourable expectations</td>
<td>Statements and action showing support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.5** The process of trust (cf. Mollering 2001).

### Pattern of Interpretation (part B, cf. Section 2.5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Concepts</th>
<th>Mechanisms</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual intentionality</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Communications in the I-mode form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coupling</td>
<td>Economic facts and figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>Statements in which two or more topics are related and spill-over effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diffusion</td>
<td>Illustrations, shows, exhibitions, and presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Societal networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collective intentionality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communications in the we-mode and collective activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.6** Four social mechanisms of collective trust

In order to extract ‘facts’ from the texts, I categorize words, acts, events and other social phenomena that might possibly contribute to the ‘discussion’ about trust establishment. This procedure for categorization takes two steps. First, the texts are studied while underlining words and textual fragments that refer to the indicators as presented in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. These words or fragments can be different sorts of things such as utterances, phrases, descriptions, actions, reports, comments etc. Second, these words are compared, and similar sets of words, events or actions are then labelled as a category.
In this study, the hermeneutical dialogue is worked out and summarized in tables. Except for Chapter 3, they are presented in Appendix A. These tables present both the categories that I found in the texts and an overview of my efforts to translate these categories into the concepts of my initial framework. The empirical Chapters 3 to 7 mainly consist of the reports of these dialogues. They attempt both to impose the concepts on Dutch agricultural policymaking and to modify these concepts when necessary. Obviously, in this study the hermeneutical dialogue begins with the question of whether or not trust has been established and, if so, how it was established and, if not, why not? Depending on the texts, the questions that followed dealt either with the process of trust (the A-set of concepts) or with the social mechanisms that facilitate the switch between the I and we-intentionality (the B-set of concepts).

For example, when interpreting the process of trust, I tried to understand what type of interpretation (first concept from set A) an individual may have had, when he wanted to establish trust. The following questions were asked: what reasons for establishing trust were provided? Why these reasons? How did he communicate these reasons? Did others also communicate these reasons? What is the background of the one who tried to establish trust? What were the reactions of the persons whose trust was desired? What were their backgrounds? Did other individuals have a similar reaction? By asking these sorts of questions, the interpreter comes to understand why specific reasons are used by the one who is seeking to establish trust, and why individuals react in a specific way to these reasons.

Per section a choice is made concerning the concepts that are discussed. Although every case-study could very well have been a vehicle to discuss all the various concepts, some of the texts are more suitable to analyse with some concepts than others. Therefore, if specific concepts are discussed, this does not imply that the other concepts could not have been analysed. The biography of a minister, for example, delivers more opportunities to study the process of trust (how he, as an individual, has been interpreting situations) than a report of a mass meeting in which different groups were formed. The latter would probably teach us more about the switch between the I and we-intentionality.

Sub-interpretations (step 4)

‘In the course of the process of interpretation we continually formulate sub-interpretations’ (ibid. 62). New interpretations are summarized at the end of every section in the empirical chapters under the heading discussion and notes. In these I draw conclusions about the establishment of trust in agricultural policies. They are a reflection on the patterns of interpretation and discuss the modifications to concepts and new interpretations. Moreover, they will contain the implications of the various sub-interpreta-

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11. I used Chapter 3 to illustrate the operational procedures in greater detail.
tions for the general patterns of interpretation. After these discussions and notes, the hermeneutic process continues with the next chapter, digging into different texts and concepts. This brings me to the selection of texts.

2.6.3 Selecting texts and policies

The texts selection

I selected a wide variety of texts because I hold that this improve the the validity of the sub interpretations (cf. Hirsch 1967, 179f). Four different aspects are taken into concern: (1) the types of sources, (2) the objects that are trusted, (3) the subjects that do the trusting (trustors), and (4) the historic periods.

First variation concerns the types of sources. I argue that a large variation in this domain improves the validity of the social mechanisms. Every literature genre has its particular view on matters and will emphasize different aspects. Hence, if I use a large variation of sources, it is likely that different parties and views on the trust establishing process will be studied. Consider, for example, that only texts from the biographies of the ministers and the representatives of the farmer-organisations were investigated. The interpreter would then have an outstanding amount of information for interpreting these individuals’ interpretations, but he would have insufficient information to answer questions about the receival of the provided reasons by the farmers. I used different kinds of sources in the various chapters. Chapter 3 and 4 are mainly based on historic writings, PhD-theses, and commentaries. In Chapter 5 I tried to discern as much information from official documents, such as regulations and policy proposals. The texts in Chapter 6 are based on interviews, but also on newspaper articles. Chapter 7 is mainly based on policy evaluation reports.

Second variation deals with the objects of trust. This study initially takes public policies as the object of trust. However, in order to understand how one comes to trust a specific policy, sometimes first studying how trust is established in individuals and organisations is inevitable. Especially Chapter 3 contains a high variety of objects of trust. It starts for example with an analysis on how trust was established among farmers for the Raiffeisen banking system. While this is not a public policy it is, however, characteristic for the development of the agricultural policy networks. Through these networks farmers, spokespersons, officials and politicians learned to share new ideas. Hence, to understand the rise of this network is to understand how collective trust was produced.

The third form of variety lies in the types of trustors. Primarily, the “unit” that does the trusting is an individual. Nothing else can do the trusting. I discuss how different individuals come to trust a policy. Not only do farmers come to trust policies, but also civil servants, politicians, and spokespersons from the farmer organisations. The differ-
ences in the way these actors come to trust policies improve my understanding of the social mechanisms.

Beside the individual, I also analyse how groups of individuals come to trust something. Because the switch between individual trust, the I-mode, and collective trust, the we-mode of thinking is an important part of the framework, variety in the units that are trusting is essential to learn more about how collective trust is established. Hence, I consider various different groups varying from two persons engaged in a social activity to all individuals in an organisation.

Fourth variation concerns the historical periods. As argued in Chapter 1, the motivation for using Dutch agricultural policy as a case study is that it shows a "rise and fall" of trust-relations. Hence, an interpretation that covers different periods of time is likely to teach us something about how trust is established and lost. Besides this main reason, the policies in the early history of modern policy-making differ from the policies in the late twentieth century. Establishing trust for fertilizers in the 1880s proceeded along different lines than trust building for agrarian nature management projects in the late 1990s. Appendix A gives an overview of selection criterion 1. Appendix C of the other three selection criteria.

The policy selection
The hermeneutic procedures are applied to a variety of different texts that concern five different policy areas; the foundation of the first agricultural institutions in the late nineteenth century (Chapter 3); the agricultural policies implemented right after the Second World War (Chapter 4); the regulation of production-surpluses in the dairy industry, such as the quota-system and the superlevy (Chapter 5); attempts to control the manure problems (Chapter 6); and non-vaccination policies (Chapter 7).

How did I select these policies? I simply choose the policy issues that were the longest on the policy agenda. I considered that if policies have been on the agenda for a long time, it is likely that the variety of texts is high. With enduring policy problems, a lot of different individuals are involved and discuss them in different settings. These policies are assumingly better documented and commented on than policy problems that only determined the political agenda for a short time. This, in turn, improves the validity of my analysis, as it is discussed in the previous sub-section.

I also looked at the contents of the policies, mainly for coherency reasons. I chose to concentrate as much as possible on arable farming and farmers with animals. Other areas in which the department of agriculture has been involved, such as fisheries, recreational policies and gardening, have not taken into consideration. I figured that more variation in the policy issues would give too much fragmentation in the study.

The most important step of my case selection has been analysing the general introduction paragraphs of all yearly budget plan presentations provided by the department of agriculture from 1945-2000. Using their content, I constructed an inven-
This resulted in a list with 120 items shown in Appendix B. Policies that were emphasized for ten years or more are presented in Table 2.1.

The most mentioned policies by far have been those concerned with research, consultation, and education, the so-called “OVO triptych”. These policy areas began in the period 1880-1900 and some parts of these will be addressed in Chapter 3. It deals with the question of how trust was established for some of the first modern agricultural institutions, such as farmer associations, dairy factories, and credit facilities. This chapter contains a bias for the activities of Catholics because they were the first and most active in establishing these institutions.

Chapter 4 continues to analyze the development of many of these “OVO institutions” as part of the so-called structural policies. Furthermore, the system of market and price policies is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 focuses mainly on the introduction of this system in The Netherlands and Chapter 5 concerns this system on the EU-level. The market and price policies run through modern Dutch agricultural history like a continuous red thread. Policies that intended to stimulate production

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### Table 2.1 Most Mentioned Policy Issues in the Budget Plans of the Department of Agriculture from 1945 to 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy issue</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Stimulating) education, consultation and research (abbr. OVO)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market and price policy NL / EC (fixed prices / guarantees / price-calculations)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency / productivity / intensification (reducing costs)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC surpluses esp. dairy-products (controlling production / superlevy)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manure / mineral surpluses</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land consolidation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature conservation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentally friendly production (clean air/soil/water)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota programs for the fishery sector (and its problems)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Stimulating) exports</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More quality less quantity (diversification of products)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative associations / organisations</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small farmers (family run) problem (improving / terminating) what you mean problem?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is not clear.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Stimulating) technological improvements</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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12. Four years were not available: 1953, 1954, 1956, and 1957.
13. OVO is short for Onderzoek (research), Voorlichting (consultation) and Onderwijs (education).
14. The Catholic farmers organisation was already established in 1896 whereas the Protestant farmers organisation only in 1916. Before 1880, however, the Netherlands already had small, rather elitist, farmer organisations which mainly included large landowners.
and efficiency are discussed in Chapter 4. The dairy surplus policies are interpreted in Chapter 5 and the manure policies in Chapter 6. Chapter 7, finally, analyzes the non-vaccination policy, which has been an issue since the outbreak of the foot and mouth disease in 2001. Although this issue is not seen in the list of Table 2.1, the problems with animal diseases are likely to become a major issue in the years to come. First, however, I start far back in history with the analysis of the first modern agricultural institution in the 1880s.