ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the nature, longevity and intensity of Anglophobia in Dutch public debate, between 1756 and 1784. Although the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War triggered the Patriot Era, this subject has not seen any study. At most, Anglophobia has been represented as marginal to the domestic critique on the Stadholder William V and the oligarchic regents, a consequence of the focus in the historiography on domestic political developments, most notably, the republican Patriot ideology. This thesis aims to show that Anglophobia was a dominant undercurrent in the Dutch Republic, also within that republican Patriotic discourse that has up till now been considered Francophobic.

Anglophobia was contingent on contextual events as well as deeper laying developments. The Seven Year War brought about a conflict between Britain and the Dutch Republic over maritime treaties after the Dutch decided to stay neutral. The declining Dutch economy made trade with Britain’s enemies during war a very profitable prospect. Therefore, Britain captured Dutch ships. The resulting conflict was sharpened by the dynastic links of the House of Orange with Britain. This context is crucial to understand the outrage against Britain in this period.

During the Seven Year War, Anglophobic imagery was used in debates surrounding piracy, neutrality and dynasty. National particularistic stereotyping was used to depict the English negatively, further shaped by a historical consciousness of the seventeenth century, when the roles were reversed and the Dutch Republic was deemed more powerful. Sources point to Britain as playing a part in both the deeper lying sense of cultural insecurity in Dutch society, and the ‘moral corruption’ narrative that was a product of it.

But during the 1770s, influenced in part by the American Revolutionary War, Anglophobia was used to reflect positively upon the situation, identity and history of the Dutch. Indeed, the same problems occurred with English privateers like in the Seven Year War. But the Anglophobia around this time received more intellectual argumentation. Britain was increasingly depicted as ‘despotic’, antithetical to republican ‘freedom-loving’ values. This narrative was strengthened by international Anglophobia, and more specifically, by English patriots themselves. However, Dutch writers misunderstood the signs of British power as they predicted its imminent downfall. Even when war broke out that optimism lingered. The cumulative Anglophobic frustration exploded in a feast of songs, poems and celebrations. Ultimately, when the humiliation of the war was irrefutable, Anglophobic turned against domestic ‘traitors’.
Anglophobia in the Dutch Republic, 1756-1784

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24 June 2016
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Introduction

Although the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784) triggered the Patriot Era (1780-1787), the role of Britain and the English within Dutch public discourse has been neglected and deemed insignificant among other, seemingly more arresting political developments. The following exploration of Anglophobia, suggests that this is unjustified. Anglophobia was at the heart of Dutch reflections on identity, history, domestic politics and international prestige for at least thirty years.

Historians refer to the importance of Anglophobia, but barely provide clarification as to what it constituted. This because of their focus on Dutch domestic conditions and the political ideology of the Patriots, which leads to confusing and incompatible interpretations. First, Anglophobia has been treated as integral part of Dutch nationalism. Bartstra mentions a growing anti-English nationalistic psychosis among Holland’s merchant communities in the decade before the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Nationalism, at minimum, implies a broadly carried sentiment directed at a foreign ‘nation’ across the population of the Dutch Republic. Particularly Van Sas repeatedly argues that we can truly speak of Dutch Patriotic nationalism directed against the English, during the 1780s. But what Anglophobia exactly comprised within their discourse that venerated ‘love of the fatherland’ lingers in vagueness. The focus is on the use of nationalist discourse of the Patriots on the domestic enemy, whom they called the Engelsgezinden (Anglophiles).

Secondly, the Anglophiles is used by historians to distinguish the retinue around the 18th century stadholders, the Orangists (Prinsgezinden), who favored a strong alliance with Britain. This faction was traditionally opposed by the Statists (Loevensteiner) faction since the early 17th century. Thus, to be Anglophile was to favor a strong alliance with Britain. To be Anglophobic was not a label used primarily to distinguish negative feelings towards Britain or the English nation. It surfaces as a marginal, secondary, merely rhetorical appendage of the anti-Orangism of the conventional opposition to the Orangists.

3 For example, Alice Carter, The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years War (London, 1971), pp. 25-26.
Thirdly, Anglophobia is figured as being integral to Patriot rhetoric, but not ideology. Patriots of the 1780s crucially went beyond the Statist ideological tradition, constituting a broad and diverse coalition of men who shaped and thought of politics in sharply new ways. While the ideological basis of Patriotism was firmly rooted in the Statist tradition,\(^4\) Patriots of the 1780s, who comprised a broad and diverse coalition, though of politics in new ways.\(^5\) The Patriots labeled their enemies the ‘Aristocrats’, comprising both the oligarchy of regents and the Stadholder. Historians favor the broad label of republicanism to denote the identity, ideology and culture of the Patriots.\(^6\) In general, political republicanism concerns the relation between the people - the governed - and politics. Influenced by Roman classical texts reflecting on the virtue of their lost Republic, it captures a vision of society where virtuous citizens participate actively in political society.\(^7\) Republicanism also had a broader meaning, defining itself in opposition of the ‘moral corruption’ of society. The ever-growing print media of the period was obsessed with reflections on this subject, sharpened by copiousness of the national economic decline of the Dutch Republic.\(^8\)

Historians emphasize how republican identity was contrasted with everything considered French.\(^9\) Adoption of French clothing, mannerisms and language was deemed responsible for the lethargy and immoral behavior of the Dutch nation, and in particular of its ‘periwig’ regents.\(^10\) Many Dutch, in reaction, gradually started venerating characteristics considered distinctly Dutch.\(^11\) By contrast with Francophobia, Anglophobia barely features in historical writing on the Dutch republican tradition. Similarly, Anglophobia has been quickly passed over by historical works that emphasize the sympathy of the Dutch towards the American Revolution.\(^12\) The focus on the Francophobic undercurrent of Dutch republicanism confuses understanding of Anglophobia among the Patriots. If Patriots are deemed

\(^7\)Klein, *Republikanisme*, p. 4, 51.
\(^11\)Van Sas, ‘De vaderlandse imperatief’, pp. 69-86. This has been symbolized manifold by historians by using the example of publisher Justus van Effen, who switched from publishing his Hollandsche Spectator (1731-1735) in French to the Dutch language, in order to celebrate the values and qualities of the latter. For example, Mijnhardt, ‘The Dutch Enlightenment’, p. 207; J.J. Kloek, ‘Vaderland en letterkunde, 1750-1800’, in N.C.F van Sas ed., *Vaderland. Een geschiedenis vanaf de vijftiende eeuw tot 1940* (Amsterdam, 1999), pp. 237-275.
\(^12\)Schulte-Nordholt’s often cited work still provides a thorough account of the developments between 1778 and 1782. J.W. Schulte-Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic and American Independence* (Chapel Hill, 1982).
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replicants, must we then understand Anglophobia as being essentially separate from their republican discourses? How does that equate with the use of the Patriot label of the Anglophiles, which is a broader label than the Anglophiles as a denotation of diplomatic and dynastical preference used by historians?

These ambiguities surrounding the meaning and significance of Anglophobia will be clarified by asking the following: what was the longevity, intensity and nature of Anglophobia within Dutch public discourse between 1756 and 1784? In answering these questions, this thesis will demonstrate that Anglophobia was a continuous and dominant part of how the Dutch constructed narratives that described themselves and their world. It was not communicated, however, in a single, coherent language. Distinctly republican and national particularistic reasoning was used as a basis for Anglophobia, interwoven with arguments on maritime law and historical determinism. These were expressed by different groups of people, to vent grievances that were to a large degree contingent on a particular contexts.

Anglophobia offers new perspectives from which to know how the Dutch reflected on the remarkable last stages of their Republic, specifically within the Dutch republican Patriot tradition. Additionally, this study is a critical side note to the substantial writing that celebrates the ‘special’ Anglo-Dutch relationship. While new light is shed on how to understand the depth of Anglophobic sentiments in the period, the main focus is on how Anglophobia featured in debate. Likewise, it is not the intention to make the case here for using the concept of nationalism, but this study does provide additional material that can enrich our assessments of its usefulness.

A period of almost 30 years offers a wealth of potentially relevant material, of which

only a small percentage could be used here. Two types of sources are examined. First, there are sources historians of the republican Patriot tradition have identified as highly influential: the pamphlets surrounding the ‘Wittenoorlog’ (Chapter 1), the books of Engelberts (Chapter 1) and Stijl (Chapter 2), the work of Van de Capellen (Chapter 2) and Nassau la Lecq (Chapter 2), and the periodical Post van den Neder-Rhy (Chapter 3). Especially the Post is deemed symbolic of Patriot ideology by historians. Secondly, this thesis interrogates less well-known sources, most notably pamphlets from the Knuttel collection. These are useful for they highlight the similarities in discourse and narrative with the above-mentioned canonical works. Moreover, visual evidence is used as key evidence to support various claims, as they exhibit a variety of Anglophobic imagery.

In order properly to reveal the different strands of Anglophobia, the thesis follows a broadly chronological structure. This reflects at least two key assumptions. First, Anglophobia must be understood in terms of or in relation to specific contextual events. Secondly, Anglophobic discourse was shaped by a gradual accelerating politicization of society between 1750 and 1780. The three chapters are constructed around this chronology.

By commencing the story during the Seven Year War (1756-1763), the deep roots of Anglophobia are emphasized. The war had a significant impact on public debate, signaling how the Dutch came to grips with new geopolitical conditions by comparing themselves with the English. The second chapter runs from 1774 to 1780, a period which saw the fruition of a new, intellectual strand of Anglophobia. That discourse created a specific image of Britain that provided a hopeful and positive contrast for the Dutch. The third chapter makes headway into the Patriot Era up to 1784. It is solely concerned with how Anglophobia turned from being a critique of a foreign enemy being one focused on a domestic threat.

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15 Van Sas, ‘De vaderlandse imperatief’, p. 283. This development, on which this thesis can only scantily elucidate, is also the core argument of Klein’s Patriots Republikanisme, explained on p. 22.
Chapter 1. Anglophobia from 1756 to 1763

In 1763, Matthias Engelbertus Engelberts’ (1734-1807) Verdediging van de eer der Hollandsche natie (In Defence of the Honor of the Dutch Nation) was published.¹ His was a reaction to an English historical work published in 1759, which dedicated a full volume to the ‘United-Provinces’. He was particularly struck by the tone of this volume, which commenced as follows:

As to the manners of the people, like those of every other nation, they are influenced by the climate and the nature of the government. Cold, phlegmatic, uninventive, and brutal, they prosecute every measure with indefatigable perseverance, and accomplish the most arduous attempts, without a spark of genius, of liberality, or the true spirit of enterprise; by the single virtue of patience they have become proficient in science and the arts. […] The dullness and insensibility of the Batavians became proverbial among the ancients; their descendants are no less distinguished by the moderns for their want of feeling, of refinement, and of passion.²

Despite Engelberts’ reacting to a work of an English author, his Anglophobia remains curiously neglected in the substantial historiography that uses his work.³ This is because Engelberts is framed within the larger forces of the Francophobic Dutch Enlightenment. A recent example is the comprehensive 1800, Blueprints for a National Community, by linguist J.J. Kloek and cultural historian W.W. Mijnhardt.⁴ This work reproduces important assumptions brought forward by Mijnhardt in other work.⁵ The authors argue that Engelberts’ work is symptomatic of new developments: the Dutch became increasingly conscious of their loss of prestige in international affairs, together with the condescending views of other nations on Dutch culture and traditions that accompanied this decline.⁶ By placing Engelberts within this larger narrative, they curiously marginalize Engelberts’s Anglophobia. Before engaging with his Anglophobic commentary however, it is crucial to analyze their second omission: namely, the Anglophobic context for Engelberts’ treatise.

¹ Matthias Engelbertus Engelberts, Verdediging van de eer der Hollandsche natie (Amsterdam, 1763).
² A Universal History of the Modern World, Volume XXXI, 1759.
³ Van Sas briefly goes in depth on Engelberts, and does mention the context of the Seven Year War. However, he makes only scant mention of Anglophobia, and rather focusses on the concept of ‘fatherland’. Metamorfose, pp.101-103. Klein also immediately connects Engelberts with Frenchification and Justus van Effen, effectively negating his Anglophobia, Republikanisme, pp. 38-39.
⁵ For example editor of The Dutch Republic in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1992).
⁶ Mijnhardt, 1800, p. 204; p. 144.
Dynasty and Neutrality

This context was shaped by two major events: the ending of the ‘Second Stadholderless Era’ (1702-1747) and the reign of Anna of Hanover (1751-1759); and the Seven Year War. Two related, but separate Anglophobic narratives arose that would influence Engelberts’ writing: the political- dynastical, and the commercial- national particularistic. Both were interwoven with reflections on shared Anglo-Dutch history.

At the end of the ill-fated War of the Austrian Succession, William IV was thrust into a powerful, hereditary position as Stadholder of Holland (in 1747), as well as gaining significant privileges in electing officeholders. If that was not already a major blow to the regents’ prestige, William IV sided with the ‘Doelisten’, who had violently revolted against tax-collectors in Amsterdam. After William IV died in 1751, his power passed in the hands of his wife, Anna of Hannover. Less than five years later, the Seven Year War broke out, completely reversing the old European alliance system. With France and Austria now standing against Prussia and Britain, the Dutch Republic had to rethink their position in Europe. Specifically, the Republic had to re-evaluate its relationship with Britain. This reinvigorated the traditional factional divide between the House of Orange, the orthodox Reformed Church and the nobility in the landward provinces on the one hand and the merchant regents of Holland on the other.

Although overwhelmingly the Dutch wished to remain neutral, disagreements erupted on how that would affect relations with Britain. The treaty of 1678 (reinforced in 1716) had ‘declared that a perpetual friendship existed between Britain and the Dutch Republic’. Further, it stipulated that should Britain be attacked, the Republic should send 6,000 troops, as was done during the Jacobite Rising in 1745-6. In 1756, George II again requested the troops. The inner circle of the Dutch government that believed in maintaining the alliance did not want to affront Britain. But the province of Holland resisted vehemently; the fear of French and Austrian invasion from the south was too great: hence, it was decided to stay neutral. Nevertheless, as the 6,000 troops remained in the Republic, the scope to interpret another treaty between the two powers more freely was lost. This 1674 treaty stipulated the

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9 Schama, Patriots, p. 46.
11 Carter, Seven Year War, p. 18.
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‘free goods, free trade’ principle, meaning that Dutch ships, if neutral, could carry goods to belligerents of England. Dutch merchants during the war supplied various goods such as gunpowder, Baltic wood and grain, and Caribbean sugar to France. As English maritime pre-eminence grew, especially from 1758, this was an open wound to Britain’s attempt to blockade France. An ensuing crisis between Britain and the Dutch Republic was barely averted after a major diplomatic confrontation in 1759.13

Between 1756 and 1759, English privateers captured dozens of Dutch ships. Merchants’ protests swelled, blaming Anna of Hanover – daughter of George II - and the Orangists in the Hague. Anna had already thoroughly alienated the Holland regents by her brusque and clumsy use of patronage in the years leading up to 1756. Therefore, she ‘placed a wonderful propaganda weapon in the hands of the anti-Orangists, [who] may have exaggerated the effects of the privateering activities of the English, but this did not affect the impact of their anti-English and by association anti-Stadholderian clarion calls’.14 But the grievances against Anna and the Orangists were voiced in a controlled way, despite what fury may lay underneath it (as seen in Figure 1). The critique that did find its way into public discourse, if at all, was disguised within historiographical debates.

The Legacy of De Witt

In 1757 a pamphlet war erupted over the legacy of Johan de Witt (1625-1672), after he was depicted in positive light in Jan Wagenaar’s seminal historical work of Dutch history, which appeared in twenty chronological parts between 1747 and 1759.15 De Witt was the Grand Pensionary of Holland who presided over the first ‘Stadholderless Era’, an advocate for republican ‘true freedom’ as well as neutrality. In 1672, he and his brother were lynched by an Orangist mob. Thus, in light of the recent political upheaval, Johan de Witt ‘served merely as a convenient peg on which to hang political opinions about the foreign and domestic policies of the Republic’.16

Naturally, it was against the backdrop of Anna’s English birth and the alliance with Britain that de Witt’s policies towards Britain were scrutinized. Between 1652 to 1672 he presided over the three Anglo-Dutch wars. More importantly, he presided over the secret ‘Act of Seclusion’ of 1654 with the government of Cromwell. This treaty stipulated that the young

13 Carter, Seven Year War, pp. 121-129.
14 Ibid., p. 154, 159.
15 Vaderlandsche Historie vervattende de geschiedenissen der nu Vereenigde Nederlanden
William III could never acquire the right to Stadholdership. That quite the reverse happened was not forgotten by the pamphleteers: after becoming Stadholder of Holland in 1672, William would be crowned joint monarch of England, Ireland and Scotland in 1689.

Imagery of English is nevertheless scarce in the highly historiographical and intellectual ‘Wittenoorlog’ controversy. That de Witt or William III sold out to the interests of other countries was tarnishing enough for pamphleteers such as Jan Wagenaar and Elie Luzac. Yet, Anglophobia lurks in the texts. Recurrent remarks on English betrayal and traitorous behavior can be observed. One pamphlet mentions the ‘foul and treacherous court of Great-Britain’. This quite possibly alludes to the dynastic connection of Anna, but even then it is a rare reference. Anglophobia surfaced more often in pamphlets which directly tackled the alliance with Britain and the question of neutrality. In order to distinguish those elements however, it is necessary to start with a brief exploration of the imagery of the English over a longer period.

**National Particularism**

The way that English people were portrayed by Dutch writers was common in pre-modern Europe. There was a long tradition of distinguishing societies and their members according to their perceived national character. These character traits were viewed as being shaped by several factors, especially climate. This is what Leerssen calls ‘national particularism’, a label which encapsulates how Europeans defined their ethnographic nation within a broader matrix of nations, each with their own specific traits.

The views of the English as represented by the Dutch in the early modern period have been best documented for the three Anglo-Dutch Wars of the mid-17th century. As religion played a larger role in international conflict of the 17th century, the Dutch branded the Britain (with their catholic monarch Charles II) as a land of fallen angels - a play on the Dutch word for angel: Engel. Further, they were depicted as devilish peoples: bulldogs, bloodhounds, werewolves, and, especially, people with tails. The English also had a southern temper, unlike the stable, pious and prudent Dutch, born in a cooler climate. The volatile English was a common stereotype in the Dutch Republic, influenced by the violent English civil wars and

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the period of Cromwellian rule. By the 18th century, the notion that the English were characterized by peculiar political and religious instability was widespread in Europe. English supposed arrogance can be aligned with the imagery of John Bull, who represented the Englishman who was ‘strongly characterized by Protestant moral values such as the right to speak one’s mind, and one’s duty to speak the truth’. 

**Jealousy and Piracy**

During the ‘Wittenoorlog’, Wagenaar had grudgingly committed himself in the debate about neutrality, arguing for strict adherence to it. His pamphlet title began with ‘The behavior of the English’, and concerns the legality of English actions: ‘They hinder, they curdle free sailing and trade, by visiting, taking in a multitude of Holland’s ships, squarely in conflict with the Tractates: and it is this crying injustice, that I commit myself to put in clear daylight’. Wagenaar confides how even George II held little power over the English ‘hijackers’ (kaapers), who would try to capture Dutch ships even without royal edicts. It is an interesting distinction, which relates to the title of the pamphlet, differentiating clearly between royal authority and the English sailors, whom he calls a ‘a race of pirates’. Wagenaar invokes the long history of mercantile competition between the two countries by underscoring 'the jealousy, that they [the English], for over two centuries, have for the Dutch shipping'.

Another pamphlet was more direct in its Anglophobia. In this anonymous work the ‘true nature of Great-Britain’ is discussed. The author argues that the true nature of the English Nation is their commitment to ‘injustice’, and the ‘the extermination of the Dutch merchant trade and seafaring’. The nature of the Englishman leads to their ‘robbing our free

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30 ‘Hunne Onrechtvaardigheid, die wy dagelyks ondervinden, baard deeze Vrees, en hunne onvriendelyke bedryyen meer dan na Barbaarsche Regelen afgemeeten, overtuijen ons volkomen, dat hun doelwit is, zig
merchant trade, based on the rights of the people and the pledge of tractates’. In sum, not
only are the English immoral for their neglect of treaties, their ‘true nature’, which shows
itself in an inclination to piracy, and jealousy, makes them a natural adversary.

This rising unease about growing English maritime domination and activities
corresponds with what others have observed in the field of overseas commerce and finances.
Boxer has noted increasing negativity against the English in the second half of the 18th
century, ‘when the official correspondence of the VOC is full of lamentations about the
superiority of the English and the threat they posed to the Dutch, even in Indonesia’. This
Anglophobic undercurrent was also apparent in the Dutch banking sector, where ‘The Dutch
credit giving had a pure economical character, as the bankers trusted English solidity. There
seems little sympathy; as competitors they hated the English. The merchant letters are full of
sharp remarks on the English’.

Rude as an Englishman
Having discussed some the relevant contexts from Engelberts’ book, it is now possible to
analyze it from the perspective of the impact of the Seven Year War. Having studied in
Leiden to become a Calvinist pastor, being an avid landscape painter and later becoming a
member of the Holland Economic Society in Haarlem, Engelberts possessed all the elements
of the typical Enlightened man. Not only is he representative of the symbol of the growing
intellectual and politically articulate Dutch society. He lived in the seaside city of Hoorn, one
of the chief administrative centers for seafaring and trading (one of five Admiralities). As a
pastor in such an important port, it can safely be assumed that he was intimately familiar with
the stories of the sailors and the merchants.

Indeed, early on in the book Engelberts mentions misdeeds of English on the seas at
the same time as referring to their condescending views of Dutch arts and sciences. After

volstrekt meester van de Zee te maken, […] en was ’t mogelyk onze Scheepvaart, zonder herstel te vernielen’. Het waare oogmerk van Groot-Britannien, 1758, Knutel [18695], p. 4.
31 ‘Het eigentlyke Oogmerk van de Engelschen hebben in het beroven, mishandelen, nemen en confisqueeren onzer Schepen zonder onderscheid, in weveril van de Allerheiligste Verbonden welke wy met hen gesloooten hebben’. Het waare oogmerk, p.1
lamenting the slavish pursuit of foreign culture, he fires his first broadside. Engelberts confides that although the French can be likewise condescending,

I would like to just mention the English now. If there is a nation, who in a blinding trust of own values and ability, goes too far in their degrading scorn of strangers, they are it without denial; where not only the French, with their total difference in religion and political understandings, but also we must experience the examination more than other peoples; even though we are bound together by nature, religion, political interest, and manifold treaties. While they regard no-one with more honors, than a born Brit, it is hard to grasp, why they subject such peoples, who are closest to them, by land and water equal, who contributed without charge, to their fame in the arts and sciences, to the consequences of their own conceit, and envy. That same anger, in that mean Englishman, is strongest in those cases, when the Netherlands finds it not reasonable to contribute to the enlargement of their power to the disadvantage of their own; for we rather reap the benefits of a wholesome peace, than the imagined benefits of a senseless and destructive war. It is no wonder, that our ships could not use the free seas, without being subject to an old resentment, to plunderous violence, and that the mean, in different cases, had to cool their reckless anger and malice, with swearwords and assaults.35

Here, Engelberts combines the arrogant nature of the English, as well as their jealousy of Dutch trade (‘an old resentment’), to explain their behavior in the Seven Year War. Throughout, Engelberts returns to this Anglophobic hymn. The arrogant dispositions are natural to an Englishman, for ‘brutality and rudeness […] are the prevalent characteristics, in which the English excel above all peoples […] If someone is so rude as an Englishman, he makes himself known and hated, for it is in conflict with the soft and accommodating nature

35 ‘Van de Engelschen lust het my nu alleen te reppen. Is ‘er toch eene natie, die zig in een blind vertrouwen op eige waardye en vermogen; in eene laatdunkende veragting van alle vreemdelingen te buiten gaat, zy zyn het buiten allen tegenspraak; waar van niet alleen de Franschen, met hun geheel verschillende in godsdienst en staatkundige inzichten, maar ook wy de geduurige blyken meer dan andere volmeren ondervinden moeten; hoewel wy door de natuur, den godsdienst, staatkundige belangen, en menigvuldige verdragen ten nauwsten aan elkander verbonden zyn. Dewyl zy niemand eenigen roem of voordeel waardig agten, dan eenen gebooren Brit, is het ligtyelyk nategaan, waarom zy zulke volkeren, die hun digtst by liggen, te land of te water naast in vermogen opwegen; en die hunnen koophandel en handwerken eenigszins, hoewel schuldeloos, in den weg, of hunnen roem in kunsten en weetenschappen in het licht staan; waarom zy, zegge ik, den zulken de gevoelgste uitwerksels van hunne verwaandheid, en afgunst doen ondervinden. Dezelve woeden, by den gemeenen Engelschman, wel sterkst in zulke gevallen, wanneer Nederland het niet raadzaam vindt hunne overzecbes bondgenooten in het vergrooten hunner magt ten nadeele van andere de hand te leenen; daar wy veel liever de zekere vrugten eener heilzaame vrede, dan de ingebeelde voordeelen van een noodeloozen en verwoestenden oorlog genieten willen. Geen wonder dan, dat onze schepen de vrye zee onlangs niet hebben kunnen gebruiken, zonder aan de uitwerkselen eener oude wrok, en aan een plunderziek geweld bloot gesteld te zyn, en dat het onbeschote gemeen, in allerlye gevallen, hunne onbesuiside drift en kwaadaartigheid, met scheldwoorden en mischandelingen, heeft zoeken te koelen’. Engelberts, Verdediging, pp. 8-10.
of the Hollander.’

He embraces the negative stereotype of the boring, patient Dutchman, contrasting it with ‘England, where patience is at odds with the hot-tempered nature of its people, is therefore a weakness, of which a born Brit must be ashamed of’. His allegations directly echo the tone of merchants’ anti-English hostility between 1756 and 1759. Clearly, the long established national particularistic imagery is being revived and redeployed.

**Historical Awareness**

Like the pamphleteers in the ‘Wittenoorlog’, Engelberts offered his own reading of Anglo-Dutch history in a manner distinctive of the second half of the Dutch 18th century. Historians note the increase of historical consciousness among the Dutch. They replaced the Batavian Myth that was popular in the 17th century with that of their own ‘Golden Age’.

Engelberts frequently returns to the previous century, wherein Dutch and English fates had been intertwined. Did Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Leicester not help the Dutch during the days of the Dutch Revolt? And did not the Dutch repay their dues? Surely, Engelberts argues, ‘our commonwealth has never retreated, never left its Ally, only attacked them after an unavoidable urgency’. He continues by referring to Charles II, who was harbored in the Dutch Republic during the tenure of Cromwell, and how William III ‘cleansed Britain of all oppressors: his Freedom and Religion was put on safer ground, then ever before’. But Britain did not return the favor. Instead, he sarcastically observes, the English generosity for Dutch support is still found ‘in our Companies, and special Merchants, in all circumstances’.

Similarly, Engelberts repeats that the English have been ungrateful about the Dutch contributions to English arts and sciences.

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36 ‘Het verwondere niemand, dat onze Engelschman, die dagelyks de verschrikkelyke uitwerkingen van een oploopende drift, en toomelooze woede gewoon is te zien in een land, daar men zyne hartstochten den ruimen teugel viert, en in geen ding de maat houdt; dat hy, onze Natie voor koel en hartstochteloos aanziet: de deftigheid, en bezadigdheid, is in Engeland by geenen anderen naam of denkbeeld, onder het gemeen, bekend. Vreemder moet het een iegelyk voorkomen, dat hy van brutaliteit of onbeschoftheid durft gewagen, daar deeze toch een heerschende eigenschap is, waarin de ENgelschen, verre boven alle volkeren, uitmunten; […] Is iemand onder ons zoo onbeschoft als een Engelschman, hy maakt zich ras by een ieder kennelyk en haatelyk, dewyl zulks met den zagten en inschikkelyken aart der Hollanderen strydig is’. Ibid., p. 19.

37 ‘In Engeland voorzeker, waar zulk een geduld met den doldriftigen aart des volks volstrekt strydig is, en daarom eene zwakheid, waar over zich een gebooren Brit zoude moeten schaamen’. Ibid., p. 22


39 Robert Dudley, the earl of Leicester, was invited by the states of Holland to act as governor-general in the fight against the Spanish between 1585 and 1585, but made himself very unpopular.

40 ‘Ons Gemeenbest heeft zich nooit ontrokken, nimmer zynen Bondgenoot verlaaten, veel min vyandelyk aangevallen, dan na een onvermydelyken nooddwang’. Engelberts, Verdediging, p. 68.

41 ‘De Britsche edelmoeidigheid of dankbaarheid geene gelukkiger uitwerkselen voor ons heeft voortgebracht, ondervonden, en onervinden nog onze Maatschappen, en byzondere Kooplieden’, Ibid., p. 70.

42 Ibid., p.70-78.
Nevertheless, the Batavian myth remains crucial in Engelberts’ narrative. The Batavians showed the Dutch’ inclination towards freedom. Moreover, the ancient predecessors of the English, the Britons, did not possess this to the same extent. The Batavians were brave enough to withstand the powers of Rome, Engelberts argues, and so could be ‘designated as allies of the Roman Empire: of all taxes and expenses dismissed, they supported alone the legions with manpower and weaponry in the subjugation of other peoples, which also include the Britons’. Freedom is a recurrent theme in Engelberts’ work, underscoring his allegiance to the classical republican ideals of his time. The way he uses ‘freedom’ to contrast the Dutch and the English, however, returns us to the historians Kloek and Mijnhardt.

**Republican Anglophobia, Anglophobic Republicanism**

A primary component of (Dutch) republican discourse was the quest for moral revival. Moral degeneration of the 18th century was mainly considered to have been driven by the corruption of wealth and luxury. The consequence of the omnipresence of French culture in Europe, was that a pillar of this moral depravity narrative is the critique on ‘Frenchified’ manners that contaminated the republican spirit. Hence, Kloek and Mijnhardt directly associate Engelberts with the ‘fight against Frenchification’. They remark that ‘to Engelberts it was a foregone conclusion that Frenchification and a lack of patriotism had corrupted those ancient Batavian practices’. Further, they note that this fight against ‘Frenchification’ lost its ferociousness at the end of the century: ‘After 1780, when France metamorphosed from traditional antagonist to natural ally, Britain became the archenemy’.

This might imply that the Engelberts’s Anglophobia is marginal, merely echoing an earlier ‘national particularism’. But how Kloek and Mijnhardt’s premise of Engelberts’s ‘fight against Frenchification’ is one-sided, can be observed in Engelberts’s following observation, where France shares the burden of possessing loathsome characteristics with England: ‘The haughtiness [hoogmoed] is both a defining characteristic of the French and of the English, only with this distinction, that this shows in the first more in posture and clothing, and the

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45 Mijnhardt, 1800, p. 237.
46 Ibid., p. 205.
last with their scornful deeds’. For even when Engelberts writes such quintessential republican phrases, it is not just French culture that is corrupting the Dutch republican spirit – it is English culture as well. The Dutch defame the clothing of their fore-fathers – and with it, their honour: ‘everything which is invented or produced by a Hollander, does not qualify: it must be designed and created in Paris or London, or at least look like the English or French way’. That both nations’ cultures have a corrupting effect is abundantly clear: ‘But to turn around the use of foreign habits and customs, never let it be sufficient to say to yourselves and others: that is how they dress in Paris, that is how they live in London. Must we live and dress like them because of that? With what consequences? Such lowness for freeborn republicans!’

In sum, Engelberts is a revealing case-study for understanding Anglophobia, because he connects together elements often held apart by historians. The text clearly builds on the anger that was present within the merchant community. In his imagery, he uses established national particularistic characterizations of the English, but connects them to these contemporary themes. And, as in the ‘Wittenoorlog’, he uses a particular reading of Anglo-Dutch history to seek evidence of English treachery. Unlike in the ‘Wittenoorlog’, however, Engelberts does not connect Anglophobia with criticism of the house of Orange. This means that national particularistic Anglophobia did not always overlap with the political-dynastical Anglophobia. Moreover, with respect to the larger developments that converge in what is called the Dutch Enlightenment, it is remarkable that he brands English cultural influence as being as dangerous as French. He contrasts the vices of an Englishman with the virtues of a Dutch ‘freeborn republican’.

How Anglophobia fits into the historiographically established contours of republicanism is further explored in the next chapter. When the American Revolutionary War broke out, the Anglophobic narrative was broadened and deepened. It is therefore no coincidence that Engelberts’s successful book received its first reprint in 1776.

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47 ‘De hoogmoed is zoo wel een onderscheidend kenmerk der Franschen als der Engelschen; egter met dit onderscheid, dat ze by de eersten meer in houding en kleederen, by de laatsten meer in hoonende daaden, zich laat zien’. Engelberts, Verdediging, p. 42.
48 ‘Alles wat van eenen Hollander uitgevonden of vervaardigd is, komt byna niet in aanmerking: het moet te Parys of Londen uitgedagt en opgemaakt, of ten minsten op een Engelschen of Franschen leest hier te lande geschoeid zyn’. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Chapter 2. Anglophobia from 1774 to 1780

When Britain declared war on the Dutch Republic in December 1780 the Dutch were thunderstruck. ‘Bewilderment gripped’ the Holland merchant class, as they ‘hugged close in their utter lack of realism’.¹ William V and his retinue were equally shocked.² Both the States- and Orangist faction ‘flattered themselves with idle hope’ that Britain would not attack, conveying their ‘overestimation of the importance of the Dutch Republic’.³ A ‘catastrophe’ was needed radically to change that perception.⁴ What could have caused this general, quixotic loss of judgment? More intriguing is how this relates to the historiography of the Dutch Enlightenment. Time and again it is emphasized that the Dutch were painfully aware of their own decline already by the 1770s, using literature like Engelberts’s.⁵ Why then did the Dutch still think of themselves as a major force in international politics?

This chapter argues that focusing on Anglophobia begins to provide some answers to these questions. New methods of reading history created a fatalistic narrative: the historical arc of justice would inevitably and ultimately bend in favour again of the Dutch Republic - for Britain showed all the symptoms of ruin. This new, ‘reasoned’ layer of Anglophobia was strengthened by the American Revolution and by English Patriots and writers who forcefully argued the same. Moreover, as Britain was framed as despotic and decadent, it provided a negative contrast to supposed Dutch virtue and freedom.

Flourishing Nederland, Doomed Britain

In 1774, Simon Stijl published his Opkomst en Bloei van de Nederlandse Republiek (‘The rise and flourishing of the Dutch Republic’).⁶ His work has been studied comprehensively, especially by Leonard Leeb.⁷ Stijl is viewed as the first Dutch ‘Enlightened historian’, because of his emphasis on analytical, rather than chronological history.⁸ In keeping with this analytical perspective, he argued that history repeats itself, governed by uniform laws or principles.

¹ Schulte-Nordholt, American Independence, p. 156.
² Edwin van Meerkerk, Willem V en Wilhelmina van Pruisen. De laatste stadhouders, (Amsterdam, 2009), p. 84. He had frequently said that he did not want the Dutch Republic to stand idly by if the downfall of England would commence. Bartstra, Vlootherstel, p. 258.
⁴ Bartstra, Vlootherstel, p. 258.
⁵ For example, Velema, Republicans, p. 121.
⁶ Simon Stijl, Opkomst en Bloei van de Nederlandse Republiek (Amsterdam, 1774).
On first glance, Stijl’s Anglophobia is not obvious. With respect to English cultural intrusion, Stijl remarks that: ‘they say that there are even Hollanders who break a tooth or two, in order to become complete masters of English pronunciation’. The Dutch, he argued, should be more proud of the culture that was given to them by their fore-fathers, even though these qualities may be the *burgerlijke* honesty and industriousness. Stijl provided a reading of Anglo-Dutch history that mirrored his predecessors. Leicester and Elizabeth were the Machiavellian oppressors whose actions served to arouse Dutch citizenry values. Cromwell’s jealousy of Dutch trading forced him to revive ‘old conflicts […] to capture the dreamed mastery of the seas’. Unlike Engelberts, Stijl was remarkably positive about the ‘flourishing’ Dutch state. The foundations were strong. Especially the type of government ensured that the Batavian freedom was alive in the Republic. His optimistic viewpoint leaves Leeb aghast. It is worthy quoting him extensively on this:

What could be the political lessons one might glean from Stijl’s *Rise and Flourishing* of the United Netherlands? The fact that it was widely read and ran through several editions, points the way. Here was the popular version of the synthesis that most Dutchmen believed had been achieved by the 1770’s. Moderation, virtue, morality are the keynotes. It is the perfect smug justification of the political, economic and social dreamworld most of his contemporaries thought themselves in. He has picked those elements in the past of the Netherlanders which seemed most important to their successes in the world and made them into cardinal virtues. He is barely aware of the true situation of the Republic and he tries always to steer the middle course between the interests, factions and parties which made up the political life of the state.

It could be inferred from Leeb’s criticism that Stijl’s reading of Anglo-Dutch history and the scattered Anglophobic comments are ‘middle-of-the-road’ as well. But he overlooks the importance of Britain to Stijl. It is arguable that Stijl was this positive of the Dutch Republic, precisely because of an implicit contrast with the condition of Britain. This is not shown in


11 Ibid., p. 571.

12 ‘Daarom beproefde hy allerleie middelen, om de beide Natien van elkanderen te vervreemden, door het ophaalen van oude geschillen; door het maaken van bepaalingen op den Hollandschen handel in Engeland, waaruit nieuwe moesten ontstaan; en door het voorwenden van eene gedroomde Heerschappy ter zee, die wonder wel in den smaak van zyne onderdaanen viel’. Ibid., p. 669.

13 Ibid., p. 666, 681.

Stijl’s own writing, but in the translation of a book he used as an introduction, a (375 page) book by Frenchman F.H. Turpin. In fact, this was not a French book at all. Rather, Turpin’s book is a translated version of Edward Wortley Montagu’s, *Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republicks* (1759). Like many of his fellow English patriots, Montagu’s text was concerned solely with the arguments that pointed to moral corruption and the imminent collapse of Britain.

Taking into account this 375-page prediction of Britain’s downfall, it is less peculiar that within Stijl’s history of the Dutch Republic, Anglophobia features relatively little – the contrast discloses enough. Montagu’s central premise is that the ‘rise and fall of ancient republics’ offer lessons to the present corrupted state of Britain. Athens demonstrates the dangers of democracy and subsequent despotism, Carthage the vices of mercenaries and Rome the corrupting influences of luxury. Montagu’s republicanism is conspicuous: ‘the great increase of our trading since the peace of Utrecht has rooted in our island the gold and affluence. In becoming richer, we have become ingenious in the pursuit of excess’. Thus, he concludes: ‘If we compare, without partisanship, the current state of England with that of Rome and of Carthage when they were declining, we will find a shocking likeness with these declining Republics’.

The use of Montagu (through Turpin) by Stijl indicates a new intellectual layer of Anglophobia, already present in 1774. This is significant, for the tensions between Britain and the North American colonies had not yet reached the point of open conflict. This new strand of Anglophobia is separate but complementary to the Anglophobia that is observed in the Seven Year War. It is by no means solely a product of the Dutch themselves. Like Stijl’s use of Turpin – who used Montagu – indicates, this reading of Britain’s situation was commonplace in both France and Britain at this time.

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15 Stijl, *Opkomst*, p. iii.
18 Klein, *Patriots Republikanisme*, p. 54.
19 As remarked also by Klein, *Republikanisme*, p. 29. He asks if this is a form of confidence or irony, but leaves that particular question unanswered.
20 Montagu, introduction, xiii, Stijl, (Turpin), p. 203: ‘Great-Britain is the second Carthage, it has the same seeds of awakeness and decline’.
International Anglophobia

After the Seven Year War, Britain’s global power and pretensions where creating growing alienation internationally. In Prussia there was deep resentment after Britain had concluded an early peace during the Seven Year War in 1761, leaving Frederick personally dismayed. He built a steady stream anti-English political propaganda in which: ‘he taught his successors that it was the practice of these ‘haughty’ and ‘arrogant’ English to sacrifice their allies the first moment they no longer needed them’. The American colonists, frustrated by the higher taxes that the parliament stipulated after 1763, began to vent their grievances.

The principal agitator against everything English were the French, who had lost the most in the Seven Year War. Already during this war, the anti-English sentiment disseminated in government-backed propaganda reached levels never before experienced. Before wars had been presented as mainly dynastical or religious in character, now as a battle between nations. The French depicted the English as ‘arrogant’ and ‘haughty’. Further, the French ‘consistently compared them to the grasping, mercantile Carthaginians, and suggested that England would soon, quite deservedly, share Carthage’s hideous fate’.

But gloomy voices within Britain itself proved most important to Dutch Anglophobia. As Turpin confesses in his introduction, he was inspired by an ‘English writer’, who ‘seems to have no other goal, than to create an altar, of which Pitt is the demigod’. William Pitt was an important patriotic statesman who was viewed as a hero of the politics of national revival. This ‘national revival’ narrative expressed itself even more forcefully on the accession of George III, and was then later taken up by writers such as John Wilkes, but also Richard Price and Joseph Priestley. Like Montagu, their polemic was marked by a streak of profoundly, almost paranoid pessimism. They had international appeal for their style and ideals.

That Stijl was acutely aware of this tradition is seen in his references to Wilkes, the

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22 H.M. Scott, *British Foreign Policy in the Age of the American Revolution* (Oxford, 1990), pp. 192-207; ‘a strong body of feeling in Europe looked on England with aversion as the modern Carthage, the ruthless monopolist of the sea, the perfidious Albion that made continental allies only to exploit them’. R.R. Palmer, p. 248.


25 Bell, *inventing nationalism*, p. 80; ‘Not since the Wars of Religion had French printing presses churned out such quantities of xenophobic polemic’. Bell, *Inventing nationalism*, p. 83; Acomb states ‘In this case the villain in the piece was not just the king, or the ministry, or the court party, but the entire English nation’, in *Anglophobia in France, 1763-1789* (Durkham, 1950), p. 71.


27 Bell, *inventing nationalism*, p. 84.


symbol of the English patriot cause in the 1760s and early 1770s. He does so in a side-note, as he discusses early Anglo-Dutch history. Coincidentally, one of Leicester’s henchman who tried to break up the privileges of the Dutch provincial bodies in the later 16th century was named Wilkes. For Stijl, this ‘Wilkes, an English counselor […] and maybe not unlike the widely known Wilkes of our time, [argued] that the Sovereignty of the Commonwealth was not attributed to them, but to the People’. Although Wilkes may have agreed with Stijl on the corruption of the English, Stijl found a way to diminish him for being too radical and obnoxious. Indeed, by 1774, John Wilkes had become a notorious figure in English politics. His use of the printed media, and other methods of finding his audience however, was to be an inspiration for another Dutchman. He was a the Dutch Patriot Joan Derk van de Capellen tot den Pol, lovingly called ‘Notre Wilkes’ by the Holland regents.

Monarchy on the Seas

The debate surrounding the Anglo-Dutch treaties resurfaced in 1775. As the American revolt gained strength, George III made a request to the Dutch States-General for the supply of the 6,000 troops. Ultimately, the Duke of Brunswick, de facto ruler of the Dutch Republic with Stadholder William V, would decide not to send the troops. But this was only after an intense public debate had sprung up: the different provincial states had to gather to vote on this matter. When the States of Overijssel discussed Britain’s request, Van de Capellen made a controversial adress. The published version was in great demand around the country. He argued that were the Dutch Republic to send these troops, they would effectively choosing to take sides. As the country is one of trade and agriculture, they must instead opt for strict neutrality. He did not make an attempt to make the decision dependent on a strict interpretation of the 1678 treaty. Rather, he placed the choice confronting the country within the larger framework of Anglo-Dutch history. He reminded his audience of the

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30 ‘Leicester stookte de tweedragt uit Engeland door brieven; en zyne Medestanders lieten hier geene middelen onbeproefd. Wilkes, een Engelsch Raadsheer, in den Raad van Staate zitting hebbende, en misschien niet ongelyk aan den alombekende Wilkes van onzen tyd, beweerde openlyk dat de Staaten geen recht hadden tot zulke veranderingen als zy invoerden; dewyl, volgens zyne stelling, de Oppermagt van het Gemeenebest niet tot hen, maar tot het Volk, behoorde’. Stijl, Opkomst, p. 565. See also Leeb, Ideological Origins, p. 132.
31 Klein, Republikanisme, p. 76.
33 Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, Advis, door jonkheer Johan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, over het verzoek van [...] den koning van Groot Brittannie, raakende het leenen der Shotsche[!] brigade, S.l.s.n., 1775 [Knuttel 19069], p. 2
greatness of England, for whom we spilt, without any national advantage, without any reciprocity, our prosperity, and where for the so-called Balance of Europe, that had cost streams of blood, has been broken, so that hence, one sees this empire practice a monarchy on the seas, that is more tenacious than ever there has been one; that greatness is seen by the HOUSE OF BOURBON, and all of whom who wish for the freedom of Europe and the TRADE, shall wait and see, to strike more effectively.34

With respect to the treaties, the English negate the principle of ‘free ship, free goods’, and they ‘confiscate’ our ships at pleasure […] and they treat us, as if we are not a free people [Volk].35 Thus, similarly to Stijl’s translation of Montagu, Van de Capellen employs a distinct republican narrative to paint a contrast between the Dutch and the English, between freedom and monarchy. Even more than Stijl, he was not only sympathetic to, but ideologically dependent on English patriotic republicanism.36 Fully mastering the English language, he translated works of English patriots like Richard Price, and American patriots such as John Adams’ Massachusetts Constitution (1778), with whom he would have contact when Adams resided in the Dutch Republic.37

Importantly, Van de Capellen was a nobleman living in a landward province. Thus, unlike the merchant communities in Holland, his economic frame did not hinge on maritime trade. Moreover, although the Stadholder’s influence was more tangible in these areas, there was less of a traditional hatred against his office. He also had his own personal history with the oligarchic regent classes in the province of Gelderland. Therefore, he cannot be positioned in the traditional Orangist-Statist divide.38 He is exemplary of the many disenfranchised, political outsiders who came to support the Patriots in the 1780s.

This points attention to his Anglophobia in two ways that are not mutually exclusive. For Van de Capellen Anglophobia was a means of appealing to a countrywide audience, especially in the extensive tradition of Anglophobia in seaside Holland. This is also confided in passing by Schulte-Nordholt, who remarks that the success of his speech proved ‘that there

34 ‘De grootheid van England, tot welkers opbouw wy zonder eenig Nationaal voordeel, zonder eenige wederverdeling, onze welvaart zo onverantwoordelyk verspild hebben, en waar door de zogenaamde Balans van Europa, die stroomen bloeds heeft gekost, zo geheel is verbrooken, dat men dit Ryk thans eene Monarchie ter Zee ziet oeflenen, die gedugter is dan ‘er ooit eene was; die grootheid, ziet het HUIS VAN BOURBON, en alle die de vryheid van Europa en van den KOOPHANDEL wenschen, met geene onverschilligheid aan; het zal meer dan waarschynlyk zyzen Slag ter bewkaamer tyd waarnemen, om des te gewisser te treffen’. Van de Capellen, Advis, p. 3.
35 ‘Ment confiskeert naar welgevallen onze Scheepen […] alsof Wy geen vry Volk waren’. Ibid., p.5.
36 Klein, Republikanisme, p. 78.
38 Schama, Patriots, p. 76.
was a great hunger for news, and perhaps also a latent anti-English feeling. Secondly, Van de Capellen was sympathetic to English republican writing and was distanced from the traditional Statist narrative against the Stadholder. Therefore, we can assume that his Anglophobia did not stem from a personal hatred against the English people. His critique was not about personal, legal or strategic issues, but a moral critique on the conduct of the English.

**Nassau La Lecq**

The view that Britain was a corrupted state on the verge of decline became stronger during the 1770s. Lodewijk Theodorus van Nassau la Lecq wrote a series of pamphlets on the developments in America between 1777-1780. Historians consider his work relatively neutral, especially towards the American rebels. He elaborates on the various factors that influence the war, from the abilities of Britain’s fleets, America’s economic strength, the potential influence of Spain and Portugal’s entering the conflict, to the capacities of France. The core argument of his letters is that Britain will lose the war, because of its perilous condition.

Despite his ‘factual’ elaborations, his arguments reveal a pervasive adherence to the republican discourse of corruption. Exemplary is his insistence on the weak financial state of Britain, completely misunderstanding the nature underlying resilience of the English national debt. This obsession with the impending financial ruin of Britain was rife among the English patriots as well. This argument is connected to the republican disdain of mercenaries, which La Lecq alludes to when he argues that the constitution of England strengthens the court party, which in turn is bent on costly, mercenary warfare.

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40 Lodewijk Theodorus van Nassau la Leck, *Brieven over de Noord-Amerikaansche Onlusten, den waarschijnlijken uitslag dier oorlog, en den invloed die deeze gebeurtenisse zoude kunnen hebben, zo op de belangens van Europa in ’t algemeen, als van deezen staat in ’t bijzonder* (Utrecht, 1777-1780).
41 F.W. Van Wijk considers him a ‘fully informed’ and ‘sober’ pamphleteer, in *De Republiek en Amerika, 1776 tot 1782*, Dissertation Leiden University, Leiden, Brill, 1921, p. 16. Klein states that he was skeptical about the American experiment, *Republikanisme*, p. 34
42 ‘Ik beschouw de teegenswoordige toestand van Engeland, als een der hachlijkste, waar in dat Rijk mooglijk ooit geweest is, ja als zodanig, dat den uitslag der teegenswoordige Amerikaansche onlusten, of den steedsdurende bloei of den merklijken ondergang van ’t zelve zal beslissen’. La Lecq, *Brieven*, p. 10.
43 ‘In 1777 we have a well-known Dutch estimate, the most extreme claim ever made about the extent of Dutch holdings in the English debt. In that year the Count Van Nassau La Leck, anti-Orangist, anti-British, propagandist and dilettante, published his *Brieven over de Noord-Amerikaansche Onlusten*. He urged his readers to get rid of their British investments, otherwise they would suffer heavily in the coming capital depreciation’. Carter, *Dutch foreign investment*, p. 335. La Lecq had so much authority, that his misinterpretations of English debt were visible in historical writing until very recently, see: Ibid., ‘The Dutch and the English Public Debt in 1777’, *Economica*, 20/78(1953), pp. 159-161.
44 La Lecq, *Brieven*, p. 120. The disdain of mercenaries, and the veneration of the armed citizen, is one of the core principles of Patriotic republicanism.
But sometimes he even goes beyond, reading of history in a way that is reminiscent of Stijl. When he does so, he displays a quite staggering confidence in imminent English downfall. Whereas other authors point to the ‘immorality’ of Britain’s maritime monopoly, La Lecq bases his view on the natural course of the world. ‘Nature is administered by an invisible hand’\(^{45}\), he commences, as seen in nature, in animals, in humans, and in peoples and nations. Thus, ‘One power stood firm for a shorter period, the for others longer periods, but that all lasted a certain amount of time’.\(^{46}\) He continues with examples of the Persians, Assyrians, of Greece, Charlemagne and Charles V of Spain, and concludes: ‘From these and countless other example becomes abundantly clear, that the Nations, like heavenly bodies, equally have their Apogeum and Perigeum’. These terms point to the extremes of the trajectories of a planetary orbit. Thus, he continues: ‘From this perspective, the descent of England shall not be different than the normal course of Nature, and deprive us from all our surprise’\(^{47}\).

**De Staatsman**

At the same time, Nassau la Lecq was editor of the *De Staatsman of onpartijdige redeneringen* (‘The Statesman or objective reasoning’, 1778-1780).\(^{48}\) This spectatorial magazine was quite new in its focus on commentary about international relations.\(^{49}\) Unlike La Lecq’s *Brieven*, the content is much more overtly polemical.\(^{50}\) New arguments to support the notion of Britain’s imminent downfall are brought forward. Although their parliament may be a noteworthy political body ‘it is the place were truth is the scarcest. Every party has the right to scream’, and to frame policies in their own interests, so that ‘London is covered in a fog. Like the sun, the truth is clouded […]. That which they call Freedom, is as detrimental as slavery’.\(^{51}\)

Britain is repeatedly compared to France. Where France is like a deep-rooted tree

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50 ‘Us deze en ontelbare andere voorbeelden wordt men ten duidelijkste gewaar, dat de Natien even gelijk de Dwaalsterren hun Apogeum en Perigeum hebben. De daeling van Engeland dus onder dit oopgunt beschouwd, zoude niet anders zijn dan de gewonen loop der Natuur, en ons alle stoffe van verwondering benemen’, La Lecq, *Brieven*, p. 103
50 The Anglophobic elements are most clearly observed in La Lecq, *Brieven*, pp. 176-190.
51 ‘Ieder party het voorrecht hebbende om te schreeuwen, elk zyn gevoelen daar voorstanders vindende, en zy die het beste onderdeelz ynh mooglyk het meeste belang er by hebbende, da teen ander het niet zy, is London thans als met een nevel bedeckt. De waarheid wordt er even als de Zon met gedurige wolfen beneveld. De beklaaglyke waarheid! Het geen men Vryheid noemt, is u dan zo schaaldlyk als de slaverny’. *De Staatsman*, p. 176.
whose branches have been broken by recent storms, ‘England is a great Colossus, with his feet on fragile fundamenten, whose imminent collapse becomes more dangerous’. Somewhat later, it is declared that ‘It seems that we must observe England as a hydropsic body, standing on two legs, of which one has already rotten, while the other is eaten by cancer’. And like Carthage, when a country builds its power upon a fleet, the downfall is imminent (naturally, The Dutch Republic is an exception to this rule). They had conquered the whole world, and then should have ‘had to say basta, and in the midst of their splendor, in the midst of their power, to become an example of moderation. […] But the Philosopher and the Statesman remained silent, or were too blinded by the luster’. His republican view of international affairs is irrefutable when reading the following excerpt: ‘If Europe would open its eyes, when so many insulted nations, so many insulted flags would unite […] and when some of these powers would collectively say, “Let us break the scepter of that Rome of the seas”, what could it do?\textsuperscript{56}

\textbf{Escalation}

Not only did this positive Dutch outlook on English downfall have its roots in republicanism. La Lecq’s \textit{Brieven} and \textit{De Staatsman} must be understood as products of the rapidly escalating geopolitical situation in 1778-‘79. The growing outrage over English privateering had started some five years earlier. By 1774, the contraband trade between the Dutch Caribbean island of St. Eustatius and the American rebels was considered by Britain’s diplomats to be of an enormous degree.\textsuperscript{57} The ‘free ships, free goods’ principle complicated the relationship between the two countries, exactly mirroring the problems of the Seven Years War. The enormous trade with the American revolutionaries created a series of confrontations which increased the tension between Britain and the Dutch Republic, eventually resulting in war.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{52} ‘Engeland in tegendeel was een groote Colossus, met zyne voeten op ondermynde en wankelbare fundamenten rustende, wiens dreigende val te gevaarlyker wierd’. Ibid., p. 101.
\textsuperscript{53} Hydropsy is an abnormal accumulation of fluids beneath the skin, causing swollen legs. ‘Het schynt dat men Engeland moet beschouwen als een waterzuchtig lichaam, staande op twee beenen, waarvan het een reeds afgerot is, terwijl het andere door een begijn van kanker opgevreten wordt’. \textit{De Staatsman}, p. 178.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 186-188.
\textsuperscript{55} ‘Engeland had toen basta moeten zeggen, en midden in den voorspoed, midden in zyne overwegende macht, een voorbeeld van matigheid dienen te geven. […] Maar de Philozoof en de Staatsman zwegen stil, of waren te zeer verblind door den voorspoed’. Ibid., p. 178.
\textsuperscript{56} ‘Wat zal Engeland dan worden, beroofd van de twee bronnen, die nog tot heden voedsel gave aan deszelfs rykdom en trotscheid? En indien Europa zyn oogen eens opened; indien zo veele beledigde Natien, zo veele vernederde Vlaggen zich eens vereenigden’. Ibid., p. 184.
\textsuperscript{58} Miller, \textit{Sir Joseph Yorke}, p. 30.
The trade with the Americans was well established when an American ship flying the rebel flag received an official salute by the Dutch in St. Eustatius. Britain demanded that the governor of St. Eustatius should step down, creating a considerable diplomatic conflict. More public outrage started over Dutch compliance with the demands of the English flared up in 1777, when a contingent of Hessian mercenaries was sent through territory of the Dutch Republic. As they entered Rotterdam to embark the ships to America, mutiny broke out. Dutch troops helped to repress it. Shortly after, the Battle of Saratoga saw the first decisive victory for the Americans against the English. It was the push the French administration needed to convince them to establish defensive relations with the Americans. As French demand soared, further opportunities opened up for Dutch merchants. Britain enforced its blockade more strongly, capturing 42 ships in the month of July 1778 alone.

By then, widespread outrage over English privateers had prompted Catherine the Great of Russia seek to establish a League of Armed Neutrality, which eventually was created in the spring of 1780. In June 1779, France and Spain had declared war and were fully coordinating their actions against Britain. Acomb writes how in France this created ‘a sort of joyous spontaneity: finally England is going to have her defeat’. The prospect of The League of the Armed Neutrality presented an enormous opportunity for the Dutch merchant classes, whose ships still sailed without proper protection. For a decade, the Dutch States-General was hopelessly divided among the seaward and landward provinces over funding of either an army or a navy, and ended up having neither. The joyous spontaneity is visible in the political cartoons as well, particularly those of 1780. Figures 3, 4 and 5 depict various Europeans, with Catherine the Great easily recognizable. The titles are revealing: the British leopard or the English dog receive deserved punishment, or are brought to reason.

**John Paul Jones Affair**

It is during 1778 that Anglophobia became energetic and widespread. The merchant cities in Holland now fell in line with every critique Amsterdam sent to the Hague. Bartstra noted a growing anti-English ‘psychosis’. As he bases his conclusions on correspondence and unpublished documents, it is worth quoting him at length on this. He states that this growing

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60 Van Wijk, *Republiek*, p. 32.
61 It would ally Russia, Sweden, Denmark to combine their forces on the seas, deterring English privateers.
64 This is the central subject of Bartstra’s *Vlootherstel en legeraugmentatie*.
65 Miller, *Sir Joseph Yorke*, p. 36. Based on old-fashioned interpretations of Patriots and Republicanism though.
“anti-English” protest must be seen as going “beyond” the usual merchant objections against the government, and becoming a “growing nationalism”. He quotes a French envoy “who wrote on November 17th, that the hate against England was becoming so big in Amsterdam, that already various English were thrown into the water and that the sailors of English ships did not want to leave their ships anymore”.66

The John Paul Jones affair of October 1779, however, provided a sharp escalation. After a nearly disastrous clash with British ships, an American privateer showed up in front of the Dutch coast, carrying wounded and British prisoners, in search of a neutral port. It created an enormous diplomatic embarrassment for the Dutch, as Jones wanted to sail under French colors, immediately causing suspicion among the British.67 In the meantime, Jones largely had taken matter into his own hands. He visited Amsterdam, where he was received like a homecoming hero. When his ships lay before the port of Den Helder, swathes of Dutch visited to peek a glance at his ships.

Like Van de Capellen’s pamphlet above, this incident is mostly studied from the perspective of Dutch-American relations. Historian interprets these affairs as demonstrating sympathy for the American revolution.68 Only on an aside do Schulte-Nordholt and Van Wijk allude that perhaps sympathy for Jones stemmed from a shared hatred of Britain. For example, Schulte-Nordholt writes that “Jones willingly believed, that the Dutch people were sympathetic to the American cause. Resentment against England also played a part, he understood”. In general, he argues that the American revolution had ‘substantial’ impact on the Dutch Republic.69 That analysis is understandable when we consider that his main source material is from men like John Adams, who received prominent Dutch intellectual sympathizers. In his extensive overview of printed source material, Van Wijk is far more hesitant, arguing that the public debate focused on Britain towards the end of the 1770s.70 Indeed, the enthusiasm of the Dutch for Jones should be understood as an Anglophobic sentiment. He had not only fought the English on the seas, but had taken English ships and sailors. While dozens of defenseless Dutch ships waited in the ports in fear of English privateers, Paul Jones had broken out with a vengeance.71

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66 Bartstra, Vlootherstel, pp. 219-220.
67 Ultimately, the French allowed him to draw the French flag, after which he escaped to the Atlantic.
68 Schama, Patriots, p. 60-62; Scott, British Foreign Policy, p. 223.
69 Schulte-Nordholt, American Independence, p. 128.
70 Van Wijk, Republiek, p. 37.
71 Acomb suggests the same: ‘many of the partisans of America at Paris were not so much friends of American liberty as they were enemies of Great Britain’. Anglophobia, p. 72.
Popular Anglophobia

In the meantime, a burgeoning market for Anglophobic printed material appealed to the larger part of Dutch society. John Adams wrote just before the war broke out how ‘many new songs appear among the populace […] particularly adapted for the amusement of the sailors, and calculated to inspire them with proper sentiments of resentment toward the English. A woman who sung it in the streets the day before yesterday sold six-hundred of them in an hour and in one spot’. In these pamphlets, the rhetoric invokes the same Anglophobic imagery seen during the Seven Year war, but was decisively more intense and varied.

This is also shown in the cartoons of this period. A clear example of this Anglophobia is Figure 2. A merchant ship is hunted onto land by a firing British privateer. On the beach an angry Dutch mob represents the popular resentment towards the English. In figure 2 to 6 the Dutchman is depicted as a simple farmer wearing plain clothes and a small hat. If the English are not depicted as animals, they are seen with elaborate clothing, wearing their wigs: the English ‘Lords’. This was a reminder of English ‘arrogance’ contrasted with Dutch ‘simple bravery’ to be an opposition found throughout the written pamphlets. For example, one pamphlet called The British mischievous pride, proved and curbed seeks to find proof of English ‘haughtiness’ and ‘pride’ in the history books, explaining the difference between British ‘bravado’ and Dutch ‘courage’.

Even old religious imagery from the 17th century is reused. Britain is described as the ‘SINFUL, ROTTEN, DEVILSLAND’, for example. Anglophobia is communicated in uncomplicated and humorous ways. In The British tyranny, in a talk between father and son, a father relates the now commonplace reading of Anglo-Dutch history to his son in simple language. Another pamphlet presented a thoroughly sarcastic interpretation of a Catholic English children’s book, published in 1781. It lists several children’s prayers, songs and chants, celebrating the treacherous, plunderous, alcoholic traditions of the English nation. As they continuously celebrate the old heroes of the Anglo-Dutch wars, they are evidence of a historically literate audience. The repeated idolization of Admiral de Ruyter and his daring

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73 See Figure 6.
74 De Britsche baldadige trotshheid, beweezen en beteugeld. S.l.s.n., 1778 [Knuttel 19198].
75 See footnote 12 on H. Helmers.
76 Zedig antwoord aan schryver van het zinryke vaars getitult Engeland, naar ’t leven geschetst enz., [S.I]. [S.n]. 1780 [Knuttel 01435].
77 Nieuwe spiegel der jeugd, of Britsche tyranny, voorgesteld in een samenspraak tusschen vader en zoon, Harlingen, 1779 [Knuttel 19303].
78 Nieuw Engelsch catholyk A, B, C-boek, voor de Britsche jonge jeugd, als oude baldadige Britten, onredeleyk, vol bedrog, begeert punch, op dat gy daar moet opwassen met alle schelmeren., S.l.s.n., 1781 [Knuttel 19719]
raid into Chatham (in 1667) is a definitive shift to a war-mongering rhetoric among the Dutch population. But Anglophobia in this period offers a true coming together of a wide range of Anglophobic imagery. In a booklet full of Anglophobic songs, one song solely hammers away at the Dutch shops who sell only English clothing and beer. This loathing of the Dutch use of foreign cloth, already mentioned by Engelberts, is depicted on Figure 10, where a Dutch man is undressed by English and French shopkeepers. The following poem offers old religious connotations, national particularistic characteristics of English temper, interpretations of shared history, as well as using Enlightened ‘reason and natural rights’:

Hypocrite and arrogant Ally!
Who shame- and faithlessly, proud and cunning,
Dares to trample the rights of Nations;
That reward perverse loyalty;
Our land’s wise fathers harmed and offended;
What unbridled passion carried you from the trail of reason?
What hellish spirit drove your savagery, To betray true friends?

A more ‘conscious’ blending of the various strands of Anglophobia is to be found in a pamphlet entitled Research into the conduct of the British. It was a reprint of a 1757 pamphlet, which showcases how similar, and yet different, the situation of the Seven Year War had been. In the 1778 foreword, the author briefly recalls the wrongdoings of the English inflicted on Dutch shipping, after which he turns to the hypocrisy and bad faith of the English people, invoking the inherent passionate character of the English. He mentions that he is not alone in these opinions: he refers to Engelberts’s ‘excellent’ work on In Defence of the honor of the Dutch Nation. Furthermore, he uses the republican discourse in assessing the conduct of the British. First he refers to Richard Price, and paraphrases his views of the English: ‘Are

80 ‘Op het draagen van de Engelsche Modens’ in Opwekkende matroozen-liederen ter aanmoediging van ’s lands zeemagt (1781). [http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/_opw002opwe01_01/]
81 ‘Geveindse en trotsche Bondgenoot!/Die schaamt- en trouwloos, fier en snood,/Het recht der Volkren durft vertreeden;/Die avrechts braave trouw beloond;’s Lands wyze Vadren schend en hoond;/Wat toomeloose drift voerde u van ’t spoor der reden?/Wat helgeest dreef uw woestheid aan/OM waare Vrienden te veraân?’ Engeland’s vloek en Nederlands zegen, Amsterdam, Jan Louis van Laar Mahuet Amsterdam, 1780 [Knuttel 1944], p. 5.
82 Louis Joseph Plumard de Dangeul, Onderzoek van Groot-Brittanjes gedrag, ten opzichte van Holland […]. Dienende tot opmaken van het nationale karakter der Engelschen, in haar gedrag met de Americaanen., Amsterdam, Jacobus de Zierikzee Kanter, 1778 [Knuttel 19188]
we not cursed upon on both ends of the globe? Additionaly, he refers to Turpin’s remarks in Stijl’s book about Britain as the new Carthage. The work itself, which carefully lays out why the Dutch Republic’s alliance with Britain is a farce, going back to the shared Anglo-Dutch history: ‘the source of this all is a born hatred, and a jealousy of our trade and shipping, that has spirited them since two centuries, and that shall never end, as long as England is England, and Holland is Holland.’

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84 Ibid., p. 5.
85 Ibid., p. 7.
86 ‘De grond van dit alles is een aangeboren haat, en jalousie op onzen handel, en Zeevaart die hun sint twee eeuwen bezielt heeft, en niet eindigen zal, zo lang Engeland Engeland, en Holland Holland is’. Ibid. p. 140.
Chapter 3. Anglophobia from 1781 to 1784

Historians frequently note how Anglophobia was turned on domestic enemies - most notably the Stadholder - when the war with the English turned sour. Analyzing the most important periodical magazine of this period, however, demonstrates that this domestic critique was largely marginal to Anglophobia during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Indeed, Anglophobia can be observed as something altogether separate from domestic critiques. However, when the conspiracy around the label of the *Anglophile* took off, however, the similarities in discourse were profound, stemming from their mutual republican basis.

*The Post van den Neder-Rhyn*

By the summer of 1780, war was imminent. The Dutch Republic was aiming for membership in the Armed League of Neutrality, something Britain had no intention of allowing to happen. All it needed was a smoking gun.¹ This was provided for when an English privateer captured a Dutch ship sailing from North America. Documents were found that proved that Amsterdam was developing an alliance with American revolutionaries. On 20 December 1780, Britain declared war against the Dutch Republic. Immediately, the war proved completely disastrous for the Dutch.² Britain mounted simultaneous offensives, capturing numerous colonial garrisons, and hundreds of unprotected, richly-laden colonial ships. The losses for the Dutch ran in the tens of millions, especially in the East-Indies.

As is shown in Figure 6, where the British flag is dragged over the streets by an excited mob, the outbreak of the war immediately intensified Anglophobia. The already high demand for printed Anglophobic material soared. The most famous periodical of the 1780s was founded only days after the war started, in January 1781. The Utrecht based *Post van den Neder-Rhyn* became the ‘mouthpiece’ of the Patriot revolution, that would erupt a few years later.³ Not only its content is deemed typically Patriotic. It found a substantial audience throughout the Dutch Republic, with an edition size of between 2400 to 3000.⁴ The first volumes marked definitive similarities with *de Staatsman*: mainly the progress of the war is discussed, mixed with correspondence of people around the country. The similarity points to

¹ Van Wijk, *De Republiek*, p. 104.
the rising demand for a certain kind of news. It is no coincidence that before Nassau La Lecq started printing the Staatsman in Amsterdam, he had negotiated a deal with the firm Van Paddenburg in Utrecht. When the printing firm Van Paddenburg could not sign La Lecq, it sought another opening in the burgeoning print market. It contracted Pieter ‘t Hoen who would be the editor of the Post.\(^5\)

Unlike the Staatsman, the Post is crammed with Anglophobia, almost every edition contains lengthy Anglophobic poems and songs. The primacy of Anglophobia as a core tenet of the Post is clearly symbolized on the front page, where a depiction of Dutch Freedom holds down an English leopard (Figure 8). Importantly, the Anglophobia is separate of any domestic political critique that the Post vented – at least in the early years. However obvious the connection between Anglophobia and anti-Orangism may seem with respect to what happened later, it is non-existent in the first volumes of the Post. Exemplary is that the Post proudly announces at the start of the war how the States-General is unified in their resolve.\(^6\) Despite the staggering setbacks for the Dutch in the war, the Post remains remarkably optimistic throughout 1781. There is a sense that finally the English are going to confront their defeat.\(^7\) Again, it was based on selective reading of British doomsayers who in particular misunderstood the impact of the enormous English national debt.\(^8\) This euphoria peaked in August 1781 after the Battle of Doggersbank, when a Dutch convoy was intercepted by the British in the North Sea. The battle ended in a stalemate, but the Dutch immediately clung to it as a historic victory.\(^9\) It was celebrated in various ways, becoming an annual event for the Patriots.\(^10\) It was viewed as an extension of the victories over the English in the previous century.

Slowly, however, an uneasy feeling becomes palpable in the Post about the complete inability of the Dutch to mount a robust defense.\(^11\) As more and more ships and fortresses are captured, and millions of guilders are lost, the Post started to allocate blame. At first, Amsterdam received much of this blame.\(^12\) Eventually this criticism, some of it paid for by the Hague, backfired. The defiance of Amsterdam against Britain was seen as evidence of their

\(^5\) Theeuwen, Pieter ‘t Hoen, p. 590-591.
\(^6\) De Post Vol. 1, No. 13, p. 102; No. 17, p. 141.
\(^8\) Theeuwen, Pieter ‘t Hoen, p. 141.
\(^9\) An booklet containing numerous songs is A la Zoutmans victorie, bevogten door de Hollanders op de Engelsche. Voorgevallen op de Doggersbank, in de Noordzee, den 5. Augustus 1781 (Amsterdam, 1782).
\(^11\) Theeuwen, Pieter ‘t Hoen, p. 151; De Post Vol. I, No. 11, p. 86
\(^12\) De Post Vol. I, No. 18, p. 143.
‘Fatherland-loving’ spirit. The first media casualty of the sprouting political press was the ‘foreign’ Duke of Brunswick.\(^{13}\) Still, the Stadholder himself was by no means a major target, despite the spread of the famous pamphlet *To the People of the Netherlands* distributed in September 1781, written anonymously by Van de Capellen. This pamphlet directly attacked the Stadholder for his treachery – but was deemed too radical at first by the *Post*.\(^ {14}\)

### The Anglophiles

Bit by bit, the idea that domestic traitors roam the Dutch Republic seeps into the discourse of the *Post*.\(^ {15}\) This was a phased process, driven by the accumulating misfortunes of the war.\(^ {16}\) The first mention of the *Anglophiles* appears in the *Post* in the summer of 1782.\(^ {17}\) The *Post* states that they have been kind in their judgments of the leadership of the government, but it looks increasingly that there are traitors wandering in their midst.\(^ {18}\) Where before there was a diffuse entity of several individuals who had been wrong, slowly, the *Anglophiles* are stipulated as being a coherent faction.\(^ {19}\) In October 1782, the *Post* observed a clear ‘rupture’ between ‘lovers of the fatherland’, and the so-called ‘power-hungry Anglophiles’\(^ {20}\).

Increasingly, the *Post* radicalized in tone. It set out to bring ‘truth’ to the public, ‘Investigates the Cancer/ Up to the Bones of our Nation’.\(^ {21}\) The *Post* laments the absence of Dutch courage that had been present in the 17\(^{th}\) century, and points to the *Anglophiles* for explanations:

\[
\text{I see the rotting traitors of this country,} \\
\text{Catching their last breaths} \\
\text{I see fathers, with valiant spirit,} \\
\text{Smash the hardened head of the leopard,} \\
\text{I see that murderous and plunderous beast} \\
\text{Wired in his own nets,} \\
\text{British slaves, who are still in hiding,} \\
\text{In these free spirited lands,} \\
\text{Hear, yes, hear, how the monster is crying}
\]

\(^{13}\) *De Post Vol. I*, No. 10, pp. 79-82.  
\(^{14}\) Theeuwen, *Pieter 't Hoen*, p. 114.  
\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 172.  
\(^{16}\) Klein, *Republikanisme*, p. 136.  
\(^{17}\) *De Post Vol. I*, No. 40, pp. 331-339.  
\(^{19}\) Theeuwen, *Pieter 't Hoen*, p. 189.  
\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 201.  
Creep away, dodge your disgrace!\textsuperscript{22}

Only by the summer of 1783, the Anglophiles had become a commonplace label employed in the \textit{Post}. One reader wrote that he did not believe that such a thing existed. The response was a thundering plea by the \textit{Post} editors, who exclaimed that they were not just chasing a ghost. They produced a detailed account of how the government had actively deceived the people in favor of English support.\textsuperscript{23} After this demonstration was placed a poem entitled \textit{To the friends of England}. The characteristics of the Anglophiles that are stipulated in this poem bear resemblance to the standard Anglophobic imagery. They are portrayed as passionate and tempered, who fall for their own egoism and the promise of English gold.\textsuperscript{24}

The dominant claim is that the Anglophiles, like the English, have the goal to ‘destroy our dear Freedom’.\textsuperscript{25} It is declared that ‘the goal of England and their Dutch followers is to destroy Dutch Freedom, replace it with tyranny, and wreck its prosperity and demolish the sources of its wealth’.\textsuperscript{26} Although Theeuwen does not note this, the influence of peace negotiations in 1783 seemed to have a large influence on the fanatical anti-Anglophile craze. The \textit{Post} wanted a victory before a peace was settled, for negotiating with Britain was an example of weakness and corruption:

shall they make peace, which drags the country to irreparable ruin; which loads our humiliated country with even bigger disgrace? Then we show that we are disowned by our forefathers, unworthy of their name and memory; then we must console ourselves, with the dishonorable brand named the SLAVES OF EUROPE.\textsuperscript{27}

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\textsuperscript{22} ‘k zie het landverradend rot/ Ras den laatsten doodsnik geven./ ‘k Zie de Vadren, kloek van geest,/ S’ Luipaards harden kop verpletten/ ‘k Zie dat moord en roofziek beest/ Vastbenard in eigen netten/ Britsche slaaven, die nog schuilt/ In dees vrijgevochten Landen,/ Hoort, ei, hoort, hoe ’t monster huilt,/ Kruipt ook weg, ontduipt uw schanden!’ \textit{De Post Vol II}, No. 75, p. 648.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{De Post Vol II}, No. 85, pp. 731-736.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{De Post Vol II}, No. 85, pp. 736-737.

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{De Post Vol II}, No. 89, p. 765. ‘vernieting onzer dierbare Vrijheid’.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{De Post Vol III}, No. 106, p. 929. ‘Het doelwit van Engeland en zijnen Nederlandschen aanhang is Neerlands Vrijheid te vernielen; dwinglandij in haare plaats op den throno te heffen, en zijn voorspoed, door het vernielen van de bronnen zijner welvaart te vergrijsjen’.

\textsuperscript{27} ‘Zal men een vreede sluiten, die ‘sLands onherstelbaare ruine naar zich sleept; die onze vernederde Republiek met nog grootere schande overlaat? Dan toonen wij, van onze dappere voorouders ten eenemaal ontaard, hunnen naam en gedagtenis geheel onwaardig te zijn; dan moeten wij ons getroosten, met den schandnaam DE SLAAVEN VAN EUROPA, gebrandmerkt te worden’. \textit{De Post Vol IV}, No. 164, p. 66.
Anglophobia and the Stadholder

This anti-Anglophile rhetoric turned explicitly on the Stadholder in the summer of 1783.\textsuperscript{28} The event that triggered this was the ‘St. Nicolaas celebrations’ of 5 December, 1782.\textsuperscript{29} A few hundred Orange clad protesters took to the streets, drunk from the liquor paid by some Orangist regents. The riot was framed as a ‘celebration’ by the Patriots.\textsuperscript{30} And celebrating in the midst of this wartime catastrophe was deemed the ultimate example of Orangist treachery, strengthened the already present conspiracy theories. The riot also reinvigorated the memory of the lynching of the De Witt brothers in 1672.\textsuperscript{31} William V had become an integral part of the Anglophile faction in the eyes of the Post.

Now the die was cast, William V became the center of various critiques. His conspicuously luxurious lifestyle was receiving more criticism, framed as the symbol of the moral corruption and military ineptitude of the Republic.\textsuperscript{32} His court was connected with ‘egoism’, ‘monarchy’, ‘slavery’, which was diametrically opposed to ‘patriotism’, ‘virtue’, and ‘freedom’.\textsuperscript{33} Indeed, in No. 140 and No. 155 of the Post the Anglophile faction is brought in direct relation with the Stadholder. The Stadholder, like the Anglophiles were seen as keen on removing Dutch freedom.\textsuperscript{34} Naturally, the history of English dynastical influence in the Dutch Republic is not ignored. Long after the Peace of Paris of 1783, the Stadholders are put up as henchmen of the ‘English kings’.\textsuperscript{35} This is seen in figure 9 also, where William V is portrayed as sitting on an English barrel, drinking its wine.

Klein states that the Patriot pamphleteers were so successful in spreading their message because they managed to frame the debate as one between good and evil.\textsuperscript{36} What could be more evil than the English, who were branded as ‘hellish’, depicted as ‘devil hounds’ and characterized as corrupted, slaveholding tyrants, eternally jealous of Dutch glory? For thirty years, the Dutch had been educated in making connections between Britain and various negative concepts, emotions and beliefs. By 1784, Anglophobia had such potency that simply labelling someone as Anglophile had become an extraordinary rhetorical weapon.

\textsuperscript{28} Theeuwen sees implicit remarks against the stadholder very early already (see p. 152). Looking at the source material itself however, this is very hard to prove. Indeed, this particular source rather refers to Van Brunswijk. On p. 156 he writes that the mistrust against the Orange family in the first fifteen months of the Post is only visible in ‘retrospective (historical) sense’ at maximum.
\textsuperscript{29} Klein, Republikanisme, p. 120. De Wit, Revolutie, p. 32-37.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 121.
\textsuperscript{31} De Wit, Revolutie, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{32} Klein, Republikanisme, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 149.
\textsuperscript{34} De Post Vol III, No. 140, pp. 1235-1242 and No. 155, p. 1379.
\textsuperscript{35} De Post Vol IV, No. 216, p. 538.
\textsuperscript{36} Klein, Republikanisme, p. 123.
Conclusion

This thesis has explored the longevity, variety and intensity with which Anglophobia was manifest in the public debates of the Dutch Republic between 1756 and 1784. Stopping the analysis at 1784, just when the Patriot Era turned into a ‘revolution’, might seem to be a missed opportunity.\(^{37}\) Certainly, the Patriot Era was yet to erupt, and the domestic political debate became louder and grittier. But the focus of this thesis is not concerned with the domestic political element. Anglophobia did not develop much in content after those opening barrages on the Anglophiles during 1782-'83.

The cumulative growth of Anglophobia over a period of at least thirty years had created a richly layered assortment of negative imagery. At the basis, there were the deeply rooted national particularistic and religious labels. These were enhanced by notions of legality and justice within maritime law, and more intensely, a historical consciousness that depicted Britain as a ‘jealous’ nation that was bent on destroying Dutch welfare. Furthermore, republican discourse influenced the way people perceived Britain. It not only featured as a form of cultural and economic intrusion, like French culture. Anglophobia turned on negating British ‘despotism’, ‘decadence’ and portraying Britain as a ‘Roman empire’ of the seas. Anglophobia was highly contingent on the conflicts surrounding the many merchant ships that were captured by English privateers. As a consequence, Anglophobia flared up during wartime, when the distressed merchants of the Dutch Republic sought to increase profits by trading with France and the American revolutionaries. By the early 1780s, that public was receptive of and articulate in expressing Anglophobia that included various interrelated themes and narratives, only one of which was explicitly political.

These findings negate the historiographically established premise that Patriot Anglophobia was merely contingent on the Fourth-Anglo Dutch War, in an otherwise ‘special relationship’. Anglophobia was not a phenomenon that shallow surface waters of Dutch society. Unlike what the substantial historiography focusing on the republican Patriot ideology has portrayed, Anglophobia was part of a deep undercurrent of society. Although some historians allude to the international consciousness of the Dutch in this period, the study of republican ideology, generally focusses on ‘domestic’ political views. This focus has distorted our understanding of a widespread sentiment that lived in Dutch society.

\(^{37}\) By 1786, the city of Utrecht had openly disavowed Stadholderian rule, experimenting with new political constitutions and citizen militias. This spread throughout the Republic in 1787, after which it was be crushed by Prussian troops. Thousands of Patriots fled to France, but returned seven years later during the French Revolution.
In showcasing the intensity, variety and longevity of Anglophobia, this thesis hopes not only to deep the existing knowledge of the Patriot Era. It was a historian with the stature of Kossmann who was able to confide, in an aside, that the relative calm and local nature of the Patriot ‘revolution’, so easily overturned by the Prussians, coupled with its blandness compared with the enormity of the French revolution, is challenging for historians, who would want to write an immersive historical work of this period. The ironic tone that Kossmann has employed to depict the Patriots been thoroughly negated, but his use of it is, in a way, understandable. Indeed, when observing the lack of judgment on the part of many Dutch, as they stumbled into the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, seems almost ludicrous in retrospect. Here, the influence of Anglophobia could provide a welcome addition. Whatever the justified fascination by historians for the political developments in this era, the extraordinarily fierce Anglophobia that the Dutch public unleashed in the printed media could emphasize the importance of using the label of nationalism to distinguish the mentalities of the Dutch in this period. That leads us to perceive this period in a different in a more arresting manner, for the concept of nationalism has unquestionably more sobering connotations.

But this hypothesis could only be more comprehensively explored if more research is pursued in source material that was not part this research. How Anglophobia shaped agency should be most tangible in Amsterdam, where some residents made the fateful choice of conducting independent diplomacy with the Americans and the French that would lead to the catastrophic Fourth Anglo-Dutch War. Since it has been established that similar Anglophobic discourse existed throughout Europe, there is also scope to explore how these discourses compare. Similarly, the period of analysis should be expanded to the Batavian and French Era (1795-1813). Hypothetically, analysis of Anglophobia adds explanatory power as to why many Dutchmen chose to welcome a French invasion. And what did Anglophobia constitute during the Orangist restauration of 1787-1795? To what extent was William V willing to embrace the label of Anglophile? It is still uncertain to what extent the small clique around William V merit this label. Diaries, correspondence and minutes could demonstrate how Anglophobia shaped the lives those in the Dutch Republic whose fates had been deeply intertwined with that of Britain and its people, whether in trade, finance, or in the republic of letters.

39 As observed by Van Sas, De Metamorfose, p. 20.
Illustrations

Figure 1 Hollandse kooplieden overhandigen prinses Anna een klaagschrift over de Engelse aanvallen (Holland merchants deliver a formal complaint on the English attacks to Anna), 1758
Anglophobia in the Dutch Republic, 1756-1784

Figure 2 Vlaardinger hoeker door de Engelsen op het strand gejaagd (A ship from Vlaardingen chased by the English to the beach), 1781.

Figure 3 Bestraffing van de Engelse dog. Loon na Werk, (Getting what he deserves, punishing the English dog), 1780.
Figure 4 Den Britsen Leopard tot Reden gebracht (The British)

Figure 5 Bestraffing van de Engelse hoogmoed, (The punishment of English haughtiness), 1780.
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**Figure 6** "Spotprent op de wankele Britse economische positie" (Cartoon on the shaky position of the British economy), 1780.

**Figure 7** (Excerpt of) "Anti Engelse demonstratie te Rotterdam" (Anti-English demonstration in Rotterdam), 1781.
Figure 8 Title Page of *Post van den Neder-Rhijn*, volume 4, 1784.

Figure 9 *Spotprent op prins Willem V als brakende Bacchus*. (Cartoon of William V as a drunken Bacchus), 1782.

Figure 10: Excerpt of *Spotprent op Engelsgezindheid* (Cartoon of the Anglophiles), 1780.
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