Cape Town faces north towards the Atlantic. Despite this it can be thought of as the most westerly port of the Indian ocean, or at the very least as on the line of division between the two seas. In the eyes of the strategists of the late eighteenth century the great importance of the Cape derived from its forming the master link of connection between the western and eastern world, from its being the great outwork of our Asiatic commerce and Indian Empire and above all from the conviction that, if in the hands of a powerful enemy it might enable him to shake to the foundation, perhaps overturn and destroy the whole fabrick of our oriental opulence and dominion.  

It was indeed these considerations, as well as those of supplying its fleets, which led the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to found a colony at the south-western tip of Africa in the mid-seventeenth century, and then led the British, the successors to the Dutch as the premier European imperial power in Asia, to conquer the colony in 1795 and again, after a short intermezzo when it was returned to the Netherlands, in 1806.

Even though the colony at the Cape of Good Hope was seen as an adjunct to Empire rather than as a profitable part of it, at least until the discovery of diamonds in the South African interior in 1867, from its first foundation the Dutch set about founding a self-sufficient settlement in the hinterland of Table Bay. By the early eighteenth century there had developed an economic and social structure in the colony which, despite its considerable quantitative expansion, would last until the abolition of the slave trade about a hundred years later, and indeed somewhat longer. This was based on a tripartite division between the port city of Cape Town, which provided the main market for the colony’s produce, the agricultural hinterland, within about a hundred kilometres of Cape Town, where the main crops grown were wheat and grapes, for wine, and the pastoralist interior, where sheep and cattle for meat production were run on very extensive ranches.  

The expansion of the Cape colony into the South African interior did not occur in a social vacuum. Rather the Khoisan peoples of the
western part of modern South Africa had to be conquered before this became possible. While this entailed the appropriation of their land and eventually of their labour, they were neither numerous nor tractable enough to provide the labour force required for the urban functions of the port city that grew up on the shores of Table Bay, or for the farms that were opened up on the plains and hill-slopes of the south-western Cape. As a result, almost from the beginning, the Dutch colonists and their rulers had recourse to slave labour.

They were able to do this because they could latch on to the existing network of slave trading within the Dutch maritime world in the Indian Ocean, whose node was already Batavia (Jakarta), although the position of the Cape at the western extremity of the VOC’s empire meant that there were certain peculiarities in the way it worked. It would not fit into the context of this paper to describe either the wider VOC network or the trade to the Cape colony in any great detail; it is however necessary to give a brief sketch of at least the latter if the changes which occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are to be understood.

The slave trade to Batavia and other Dutch possessions in the Indian Ocean is relatively little known, because it was not conducted by the VOC itself. As a result it has left only incidental traces in the archival record. Nevertheless it was of considerable extent. It has been reckoned that the exports from South Sulawesi, at about 3,000 per annum, were approximately equivalent in numbers to the Dutch Atlantic slave trade, which itself was around 5 per cent of the total. Although this was by far the largest single contributor to the Batavian imports, it did not in itself represent a 50 per cent share in that trade, at least if the proportions of slave origins in Batavia itself is more or less equivalent to that in the imports. This would mean that around 7,000 slaves a year would have entered the Indonesian slave trade, of whom slightly less than half ended up in Batavia itself. The slave population of Batavia was generally between twenty and thirty thousand, employed primarily in household activities. This was indeed the case with the majority of European-owned slaves in the Dutch empire, but was not universal. On Banda, there was the only major European-run plantation system in the Indian Ocean before the opening up of the Mascareignes, for the production of nutmeg. This was entirely based on slave labour.

The slaves themselves came from a wide sweep of the Indian Ocean. By the early nineteenth century, the trade was confined to the Indonesian archipelago, with Bali and the lesser Sunda islands providing the major share, after Sulawesi. In the seventeenth century, and perhaps into the early part of the eighteenth, Sri Lanka and the Indian sub-continent provided a major proportion of the slaves in Batavia (and for that matter at the Cape) but then, for unknown reasons, it dropped to almost nothing. At the Cape, though, Indian and Sri Lankan
slaves continued to constitute a small but significant proportion of the slave population.\textsuperscript{11} The Cape was able to benefit from this slave trading network. Employees of the VOC were allowed to take a small number of slaves from Batavia to the Cape for sale there.\textsuperscript{12} They could also take slaves to the Netherlands, but by so doing they implicitly manumitted them.\textsuperscript{13} Presumably there was a profit to be made in this transaction, despite the difficulties that would ensue in having money remitted from the Cape to the Netherlands and the charges that the VOC made for the transport costs. Unfortunately, though, I have no information on prices in Batavia to compare with those at the Cape.\textsuperscript{14} There are, however, suggestions that there was a price differential in favour of females in Batavia, at least in the late eighteenth century,\textsuperscript{15} but that this did not hold for the Cape.\textsuperscript{16} If this is the case, it may go some way towards explaining the massive sexual imbalance among the Cape slave population, which among adults was in the order of five men to each woman.\textsuperscript{17} This discrepancy is also explicable in terms of the work patterns in the two colonies, with Batavia requiring primarily domestics, while the Cape slave market was led by the demand for agricultural labour.

Its geographical position at the south-western point of the VOC's trading network meant that the slaves received by the Cape were not just a sub-set of those on the Batavian market. On the one hand, as was mentioned above, Indians and Sri Lankans continued to arrive at the Cape in slavery long after they had disappeared from Batavia, even if in diminished numbers. The reason for this was presumably that VOC servants who had served in those countries, and who had bought slaves in Columbo, the south Indian port cities or even Bengal continued to take a few to the Cape when they were 'repatriating', as it was known, even though the regular trade to Batavia had long since passed away. On the other hand, Cape Town could tap into the slave trade of the East African coast and Madagascar, which was of marginal importance for South and South-East Asia.\textsuperscript{18} The trade to the western shores of the Indian Ocean was of two types. Historically by far the most visible were the expeditions sent out by the VOC to acquire slaves for its own use in and around Cape Town. In total, between the foundation of the Cape Colony in 1652 and 1786, some 39 expeditions were sent, of which 33 went to Madagascar and the rest, with one exception, to the east coast of Africa, between Mozambique and Somalia.\textsuperscript{19} In total, around 4,300 slaves were purchased during these expeditions, of whom 2820 (66 per cent) came from Madagascar.\textsuperscript{20} The burghers and the VOC officials also acquired a considerable number of slaves from the western Indian Ocean. While it is possible to give at least minimal totals for the number of slaves imported privately during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,\textsuperscript{21} thereafter the
documentary record leaves historians in the dark. Also the identities of the various traders remains largely unknown. It is however clear that English slavers who put into the Cape on their way between East Africa or Madagascar and the New World took the opportunity of disposing of a number of their cargo, and there were one or two, in the seventeenth century at least, who considered it a viable proposition to shuttle between the Cape and Madagascar. This does not seem to have continued in the eighteenth century, but nevertheless the Cape was able to maintain a reasonable contact with this trade. Thus, one sample of slaves owned in the rural district of Stellenbosch in the 1760s shows that 22 per cent of the imported male slaves came from either Madagascar or Mozambique. This meant that there would have been around 300 male slaves from these regions in Stellenbosch and Drakenstein districts at the time, and if the proportions for those districts were the same as for the colony as a whole (a large and rather unwarrantable assumption), then there would have been around 750 in the whole Cape. This of course suggests that the majority of imported slaves still came from mainland or island Asia, while the women (a small minority) were already largely South African born.

From the 1770s, and above all from the 1780s, this pattern changed. In the first place, in 1767, a prohibition was enacted against the importation of Asian slaves into the Cape on Company ships. The reason for this was, in part, a wish to control the unauthorised use of shipping space on the Company’s ships. More importantly it was the result of a panic in Cape Town after Buginese and Sumatran slaves had murdered a Company official and run loose for some weeks on the slopes of Table Mountain. Ethnic stereotyping of slaves was such that the fear of the few men in this group of outlaws was extended to all slaves from Sulawesi, and indeed from the whole of Indonesia. Nevertheless, the ordinance did not have a great effect, as is shown by the fact that it had to be repeated at regular intervals till the end of Company rule.

The second main reason for this change was the great increase in the number of foreign slavers who put into Table Bay. This can be shown on the basis of the lists of ships which put into Table Bay or Simonstown, the winter harbour of the Cape. From the mid-1780s onwards, there was a considerable number of ships which sailed from one of the East African ports to the Caribbean or Brazil. Clearly a ship voyaging from Kilwa, Mozambique, Ibo, Inhambane or Quelimane to St. Domingue or Bahia can only have been transporting slaves. Between April 1783 and December 1793 at least 60 ships on such a journey entered one of the Cape harbours for a longer or shorter period, and were thus certainly able to sell slaves. The great majority of these slavers were French, destined ultimately for St. Domingue, and the peak years were 1788–9, with
11 such ships, 1790–1 also with 11, and 1791–2, with 8. In addition, a few ships sailed from the Mascareignes to St. Domingue, with, significantly by far the largest annual total in 1783–4, immediately after the War of American Independence had ended. Presumably, slaves who had been accumulated in Mauritius during the previous few years were now sent to the West Indies. How many slaves they were carrying is unknown, except for the single period between July 1790 and October 1791. The 11 ships that were destined for St. Domingue carried 3,754 slaves, and in addition one North American ship which reported its home port as Jersey carried 258. There was also one ship, on the round trip between Mauritius and the Cape, which had 50 slaves on board, presumably all for the Cape market.

In addition to these clear slavers on the route between East Africa and the New Worlds, there were a number of other ships which plied entirely within Indian Ocean waters. Between 1779 and 1793, at least 15 of the ships which put into the Cape reported that they had begun their voyage in an East African port and intended to proceed to one of the Mascareignes, usually Mauritius. Once again, it is difficult to be certain exactly what the trajectory of their voyage was, but it may very well have been the case that they were purely interested in bringing slaves to the Cape market. It is for instance significant that one of these ships’ captains, François Duminy, later entered the service of the VOC at the Cape and gained his initial promotion on the basis of his knowledge of the slave trade.29 Also, in the years immediately after the First British conquest of the Cape, a plan was hatched to acquire supplies for the beleaguered and still French islands in the Mascareignes by selling Mozambiquan slaves at the Cape in exchange for grain, which would then be shipped surreptitiously and without the knowledge of the British authorities to Mauritius. The plan was discovered by the Royal Navy and came to nothing, but it demonstrates that the possibility of such a trade was appreciated, and that it had almost certainly been previously carried out.30

All the same, slaves continued to enter the Colony in much the same way as before. In the four months for which precise lists of the import duties paid on slaves survive, March to June 1792, some 240 slaves were landed at the Cape. Of these 113 came from a single Portuguese vessel, and 12 from another, but the other 115 arrived in small numbers, often as the private cargo of Company officials. This period, the Cape autumn, was moreover a relatively slack one for Cape shipping, as the main trade fleets arrived in December or January.31 It is also difficult to gauge whether the ships journeying from the Mascareignes to Europe, or to Boston, were likely to be carrying slaves, but it is well within the bounds of possibility that they were, and that they sold their human cargoes, at least in part, at the Cape.
The result of these imports was that the total number of slaves owned by burghers within the Cape Colony grew considerably. Thus in 1782 this slave population was 11,572, but in 1795 it had risen to 16,839. This meant a growth rate of 2.9 per cent per annum, as compared with 2.4 per cent for the period from 1751 to 1782. This is admittedly a somewhat misleading average, as the detailed figures show that in 1783–4, 1786–7 and 1793–5 the population increased much more swiftly than in the other years, and thus the imports were presumably concentrated in these years. The first two years coincided with a period of prosperity at the Cape, while the growth in the last years of Dutch rule may perhaps be explained by British naval activity in the Caribbean, which would have made it less attractive to French merchants to send slaves from the East African coast to St. Domingue.

Naturally enough, the possibilities of this greatly increased trade were seen by the Cape merchants. As early as 1719 the burgher representatives had requested that the slave trade be allowed on the East African coast (where indeed they also hoped to find markets for Cape corn and wine), but this was refused, since international shipping was one of the monopolies of which the VOC was most jealous. Again, one of the demands of the Cape Patriots in 1779 was that they be allowed ‘free licence for the slave trade to Madagascar, Zanguebar etc., as otherwise foreigners take the profit’. Eventually this right was granted, in 1793. The early 1790s were not a favourable time for the beginning of commercial enterprise in the Indian Ocean by any non-British Europeans, however, and such shipping as was sent out from the Cape before the British conquest does not seem to have indulged in the slave trade. From 1793, it was claimed, no slaves were imported into the colony until the end of VOC rule two years later.

In the first years of the First British Occupation of the Cape, which was to last from 1795 to 1803, the evidence suggests that the slave trade was also at a very low level. Various proclamations issued in London made this illegal, and the Royal Navy captains of the ships on the Cape Station did their best to ensure that the law was not broken, probably because they hoped to be able to claim prize money for the capture of such slaves. It was considered that between 1795 and 1798 the price of slaves at the Cape almost doubled. The Burgher senate complained vigorously that this price rise made it impossible for the economy of the Colony to be carried on in its proper way, as the inhabitants would be forced to purchase their slaves at ruinous prices. Rather, so they believed, around 1,000 slaves a year should be imported. The result of this was that there were great profits to be made from the importation of slaves, and ‘every day’ applications for a licence to do so were made to the Governor. Nevertheless, until around 1800 these were resisted, since, despite requests to the contrary, no directions on the subject had
been received from London. Very occasionally cargoes were landed in Cape Town, when Portuguese slavers arrived in Table Bay, and their requests could not be refused, but these came no way towards meeting the demands of the Cape slave-owning class.

From about 1800 the situation changed somewhat, not as a result of new orders from London, but rather because the new Governor, Sir George Yonge, was quite prepared to ignore the limitations which had bound his predecessors. Yonge, who owed his appointment to the direct intervention of George III, was an embodiment of 'old corruption'. On the one hand, he was, it seems, quite prepared to accept a direct bribe of £5,000 from Michael Hogan, an Irish merchant resident in Cape Town, to allow the landing of some 800 slaves into the Cape. On the other hand, he usually did not need to indulge in such blatant practices. His aide-de-camp, Lt.-Col. Sir James Cockburn, described how Hogan and Yonge went about their business, in which he himself also took part. Hogan presented the enterprise of slave trading to the East African coast as 'promising very considerable advantage', which it certainly did, and stated that 'it had been always usual to offer shares in such voyages to members of the Governor's family for the time being'. Cockburn, who had to defend himself against the charge of acting improperly, commented, somewhat ingenuously, that

the procuring licences for the importation of slaves was so completely a branch of the civil department of the Government, and so entirely distinct from my line, that it was impossible I could have interfered [and moreover], as I paid my proportion of the outfit of the vessel, and was liable for a share of any loss which might have arisen, I considered the transaction merely as a favorable commercial speculation.

Hogan's methods of evading the rules prohibiting, above all, commercial dealing with Mozambique were ingenious. Initially he sent out a ship, the Collector, which was equipped with letters of marque to act as a privateer. Rather remarkably, he managed to capture two small schooners both laden with Mozambiquan slaves and to drive on to the shore a third vessel, which also contained some 250 slaves which he was able to capture (although the putative French crew seem all to have escaped). On returning to Cape Town, those slaves who had survived were admitted as prizes by the Admiralty court. In the meantime, though, 90 had apparently died of thirst. It was later discovered that, far from being prizes, the slaves had been purchased in Quelimane, along with those on another slaver, the Joaquim, which also managed to unload its slaves in Cape Town. Hogan claimed that all these procedures were the work of the ship's captain, but it seems more than likely that he was
aware of what was going on. At any rate, he managed to make a good profit out the business, and in the next few years considerably expanded his operations. In 1799, 1800 and 1801 he requested letters of marque for no less than six ships, and he also seems to have owned several others. The cession of the Cape to the Government of the Batavian republic in 1803 meant that he could no longer carry on his operations, which relied on his close relationship with the Government, and he then sold up and left the colony.

Presumably the profits that could be made in these years derived from a combination of a high demand and a plentiful supply, with the main bottleneck being in the linking of the two – an ideal situation for an unscrupulous merchant. The demand derived from the shortage of slaves over the previous years, while on the supply side the disruption of sea traffic, and indeed the slave revolution in St. Domingue, meant that earlier trading partners of the Portuguese in Mozambique no longer purchased in the numbers to which they had been accustomed.

In total, perhaps 2,000 slaves entered the colony legally during the period of the First British Occupation, while there may well have been others who were imported without licence. Under the rule of the Batavian Republic, from 1803 to 1806, there were again several hundred slaves brought to the Cape, although the spirit of Batavian rule was against the institution of slavery itself, so that, together with the difficulty of setting up a new trading network, the numbers were relatively few. Immediately after the Second British Occupation there were also about 300 slaves landed, but the abolition of the slave trade within the British Empire meant that this traffic was of short duration. Thereafter, there were a few attempts to land slaves clandestinely, but they can have had little effect on the numbers of the slave population. However, the measures to prevent this did awaken among the slaves a belief that they were unlawfully held in slavery, which contributed in part to the uprising of 1808.

The uprising also shows how the increased slave imports of the previous quarter of a century had altered the ethnic composition of the Cape slave population. Of the 71 slaves involved in the march on Cape Town whose place of birth is known, some 25 had been born in the Colony. Of the others, 26 (or 57 per cent) came from Mozambique. There is every reason to suppose that this was a fairly representative cross section of at any rate the rural slave population of the colony. This is thus a considerable change from the situation during the mid-eighteenth century, and was further strengthened by the coming of large numbers of ‘liberated Africans’ captured as prizes on Portuguese slavers from the East Coast in the half century following the abolition of the trade. What was later to be the so-called ‘Cape Coloured’ community had thus received a very substantial addition from the African mainland.
NOTES


2. C.f. the comment of the British colonial secretary, Earl Grey, in 1853 that ‘Few persons would probably dissent from the opinion that it would be far better [for Britain] if the British territory in South Africa were confined to Cape Town and Simon’s Bay [the winter harbour on the Indian ocean shore of the Cape peninsula],’ cited by J.S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British policy on the South African frontier, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963, pp.2-3.


7. For the current estimates of slave imports to Batavia, see Anthony Reid, ‘Introduction: Slavery and Bondage in South-East Asian History’, in Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency, p.19.


14. In the late seventeenth century, the taxable value of Balinese slaves imported into Batavia was no more than 15% of the real selling price of Indonesian slaves at the Cape. Diana Poot, ‘De betrekkingen tussen Batavia en Bali, 1620-1688: Een onderzoek naar een slavenhandelstraject’, M.A. thesis (Leiden, 1986), p.54; Robert C.-H. Shell, ‘Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope, 1980-1731’, Ph.D. thesis (Yale University, 1986), p.460. Clearly, these two figures are far from strictly comparable, but they do suggest that slaves in Batavia were considerably cheaper than at the Cape.


16. The problem is that the only sex-specific series for Cape slave prices yet produced ends in 1731. Shell, ‘Slavery’, p.452. At this time the differential in Batavia had not yet become prominent.


18. It was not totally insignificant. In the 1670s and 1680s, and again in 1734 slaves were sent by the VOC from Madagascar to Sumatra, for work in the gold mines there, and a century later there were African slaves working in the Calcutta docks. See James C. Armstrong, ‘Madagascar and the slave trade in the seventeenth century’,
19. The exception was a single expedition to Dahomey in 1658. To do this, the VOC had illegally to enter the charter area of the West India Company.


22. It is not impossible that this problem could be solved by demographic calculations, since we do know the absolute number of at least the burgher-owned slaves at all times in the 17th and 18th centuries. This procedure would however require a considerable number of assumptions about mortality and fertility rates at the Cape, for which there is again no hard information, and there is a danger that the errors that are unavoidable in such a procedure would be cumulative.


24. Calculated on the basis of Worden, Slavery in Dutch South Africa, Table 4.1, p.47.

25. Figures are calculated from Worden, Slavery, p.47 and Van Duin and Ross, Economy, pp.114–15. Since the inventory sample relates to the whole of Stellenbosch district, I have amalgamated the Stellenbosch and Drakenstein population figures to make my estimate of the numbers. The division made between them for the annual census was not repeated in other administrative acts.


29. For these ship lists, see Algemene Rijksarchief, s'Gravenhage, VOC 4292, 183; 4295, 123; 4298, 343; 4303, 670; 4307, 538; 4311, 324; 4315, 753; 4320, 724; 4324, 38; 4332, 850; 4333, 1101; 4350, 170; 4351, 820; 4359, 745. Unfortunately, these lists are not entirely complete. While they exist from April 1779 to August 1789 (and for that matter for earlier in the century), I have only been able to locate lists for July 1790 to April 1792 and August to December 1793 in the subsequent period. On Duminy, see J.L.M. Franken (ed.), Die Duminy Dagboeke, Cape Town, Van Riebeeck Society, 1938.


32. Van Duin and Ross, Economy, p.115.


36. Craig to Dundas, 14 Jan. 1797, RCC 2, 39.

37. This might seem to be belied by the fact that the census figures for the slave population rose from 16,839 in 1795 to 25,754 in 1798. See Van Duin and Ross, Economy, p.115; Hermann Giliomee, Die Kaap tydens die Eerste Britse Bewind, 1795–1803, Cape Town and Pretoria, 1975, p.15. However, the reason for this apparent growth should be seen in the changing universe of registration, not in any great imports. Under the VOC, the slaves owned by the officials of the Company were not included in the totals, but after the capitulation to the British this would have been the case.

38. John Osborne et al. to John H. Greene, 7 March 1800, RCC, 3, 79.

39. RCC, 2, 237.
40. Burgher Senate to Dundas, 25 Feb. 1799, RCC, 2, 373.
41. Major-General Dundas to Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas, 6 April 1799, RCC, 2, 417.
42. Craig to Dundas, 14 Jan. 1797, RCC, 2, 39; Dundas to Burgher Senate, 19 Feb. 1799, RCC, 2, 364.
43. Minute, by Hobart to Dundas, 2 May 1801, RCC, 3, 487.
44. Sir James Cockburn to Castlereagh, 1 March 1808, RCC, 6, 286–7.
45. Minute, RCC, 3, 487.
49. J.P. van der Merwe, Die Kaap onder die Bataafse Republiek, 1803–1806, Amsterdam, 1926, p.279. The Batavians in the Netherlands even issued instructions that all children born to slave mothers were henceforth to be free, but the proclamation to this effect only reached the Cape after the colony had been reconquered by the English, and so it did not take effect. Ibid., p.282.
50. Caledon to Castlereagh, 18 May 1808, RCC, 6, 328–30.
51. E.g. Caledon to Castlereagh, 18 May 1808, RCC, 6, 330–3.
52. Ross, Cape of Torments, p.98.
53. Ibid., 101; this is of course only a small proportion of the several hundred slaves who joined the march.
Notes on Contributors

Abdussamad H. Ahmad gained a Ph.D. degree in African history from the University of Illinois at Urbana – Champaign in 1986 and is a member of the Department of History of Addis Ababa University. His current research interests are in the history of the slave trade and slave conditions in Ethiopia.

Ralph A. Austen is Professor of African history at the University of Chicago. In addition to the Islamic slave trade, he has published recently on African economic history, the Duala of Cameroon, and various forms (oral and written) of African heroic and anti-heroic narrative.

Gwyn Campbell is Senior Lecturer in Economic History at the University of the Witwatersrand and a specialist in the economic history of Madagascar. He has published a number of articles on aspects of the economic history of Madagascar and East Africa and is currently working on a book on labour in nineteenth century Madagascar.

Marina Carter is a Research Associate of the CERSOI. She has written on indentured migration to Mauritius, and is currently working on a study of slavery in the Mascareignes.


James W. Cox holds graduate degrees in theology from Yale and Cambridge Universities. He now teaches in the History Department of Atkinson College, York University, in Toronto and is currently collaborating with his wife, Professor A. Jwaideh, in a study of the imperial role of Great Britain in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf during the nineteenth century.
NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

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