SOUTH KOREA’S MULTICULTURALISM
The State, Migration and Contested Ethno-Nationalism

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Abstract

In the past twenty-five years, the number of immigrants in South Korean society has increased dramatically. As a result, the South Korean state has transitioned from defining South Korea as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation-state towards defining South Korea as a ‘multicultural society’. This raises the question what ‘multiculturalism’ means in the South Korean context and whether and how the South Korean government redefines South Korea’s prevailing notion of ethnic national identity in order to allow for migrants’ full and equal citizenship. In order to answer these questions, this thesis analyzes South Korea’s laws and policies on immigration, integration and multicultural education.
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Recent studies by scholars such as Han (2008: 16-22) and Kim (2011: 1-23) have pointed out that throughout history a large variety of ethnic groups have inhabited the Korean peninsula. Despite this fact, the South Korean state has until recently disseminated a nationalism predicated on the notion of Korean ethnic homogeneity. According to Shin (1999: 5-9), Korean anti-colonial nationalists developed this ethnically homogeneous self-understanding during the Japanese Colonial Period (1910-1945) in opposition to Japanese suppression and policies of cultural assimilation. Following the Korean War (1950-1953), the South Korean government reinforced these ethno-nationalist ideas with a volatile anti-Communism in order to mobilize the South Korean nation under its banner and against the North Korean state. These ethno-nationalist ideas are still prevalent in Korea today. This makes it challenging that the South Korean state has recently started facilitating the immigration of large numbers of immigrants into Korea. According to Nora Kim (2012), this increase in the number of immigrants has led South Korea's government, its academia and its media to conceive of South Korea as a multicultural society. This raises a number of questions, most importantly how to define what it means to be ‘South Korean’ today.

Existing scholarship on the incorporation of immigrants into South Korean society largely focuses on South Korea's two largest groups of immigrants, migrant workers and migrant brides. This body of scholarship identifies the failure of the South Korean government to extend equal legal rights of citizenship to these two groups with ‘ethnic nationalism’ and identifies the extension of equal legal rights to citizenship with ‘multiculturalism’ (Lim, 2003; Lee and Park, 2005; Kim, 2007; Chung and Kim, 2012; Kim and Kwon, 2012). This body of scholarship effectively applies the concepts of ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism in order to suggest continuity in the South Korean state’s ethnically homogeneous understanding of the Korean nation. However, this body of scholarship reveals
shortcomings in wielding a narrow legal focus and in failing to define both the terms ‘ethnic nationalism’ and ‘multiculturalism’. As such, these concepts have limited value in explaining why and how South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ immigration laws and policies (fail to) constitute immigrants as members of the South Korean nation. Conversely, recent scholarship has made preliminary attempts at developing a more fruitful approach to the study of the incorporation of immigrants into South Korean society by investigating why the South Korean state shapes its immigration policies in selective terms (Lim, 2010) and by investigating how the South Korean state’s integration policies frame immigrants in South Korea’s national imaginary as perpetual ‘others’ (Kim, 2010; Nora Kim, 2012). This thesis situates itself in the latter body of scholarship by investigating whether and how South Korea’s multicultural immigration and integration policies effect a transformation in South Korea’s ethnic national identity in order to allow for the incorporation of migrants as South Korean citizens. In answering this question, this thesis pays particular attention to the manner in which South Korea’s multicultural education, one of the state’s central instruments of nation-building, (fails to) shape the formation of a shared national identity. While this thesis acknowledges that South Korea’s multicultural society contains a large variety of minority ethnic and cultural groups, this thesis focuses on the state’s laws and policies on migrant workers and migrant brides.

This thesis starts with a literature review which explicates the dominant theories on nationalism and minority integration. Subsequently, this thesis describes the development of the central features of South Korea’s exclusive ethno-cultural national identity and its historic effects on the South Korean state’s immigration policies. Next, this thesis elucidates how South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ policies on immigration and integration grant migrants differential access to citizenship and affect their incorporation into South Korean society. Finally, this thesis delineates the way in which South Korea’s education system (fails to) frame migrants as part of South Korea’s national community.
This literature review explores the relation between immigration and integration laws and policies and national identity formation. First, literature on nationalism delineates the processes of national identity formation and underscores nation-states’ tendencies to assimilate immigrants into the indigenous population. Secondly, literature on multiculturalism critiques nationalist views on immigration and emphasizes the importance of the recognition of the social group identities of minorities. Thirdly, literature on interculturalism explores the boundaries of multicultural politics and presents alternative views on the construction of a shared national identity. Finally, this review poses a specific research question concerning the topic discussed in this paper.

Nationalism

From a ‘primordialist’ perspective, ethnic groups are at the basis of modern nations. For example, Weber (2010: 21) defines an ethnic group in terms of its subjective belief in common descent based on shared physical appearance, language and culture. Similarly, Smith (2010: 27) defines ethnic groups in terms of shared ancestry myths, history and culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. Both authors define nationalism as the process in which an ethnic group engages in political action in order to attain an autonomous state, defined as the set of autonomous political institutions concerned with the maintenance of order.

Conversely, ‘modernist’ perspectives emphasize the modern, constructed nature of the nation. For example, Gellner (1983: 8-38) highlights the fact that the modern state’s institution of a centralized, hierarchical education system creates a community’s shared ‘high culture’ and enables industrial production. This ‘high culture’ defines the national community. Gellner (1983: 1) underlines the
relationship between the state and the nation by defining nationalism as a “political principle, which holds that the nation and the state must be congruent”. Similarly, Anderson (2006) underscores the fact that the inhabitants of a state-administered territory obtain a self-awareness as members of the same national community through the spread of ‘print-capitalism’. According to Anderson (ibid: 6-7), ‘networks’ rising out of the modern state and the spread of print-capitalism facilitate the imagining of the nation as a limited, sovereign ‘imagined community’. In negotiating the poles of this debate between primordialism and modernism, Brown (2005: 33) argues that national identities contain both ethno-cultural elements, or symbols of common ethnic ancestry, and civic elements, or a shared commitment to institutions of state and civil society. This raises the question of in negotiating the poles of this debate between primordialism and modernism, Brown (2005: 33) argues that most national identities contain both ethno-cultural elements, or symbols of common ethnic ancestry, and civic elements, or a shared commitment to institutions of state and civil society. However, membership of a national community does not solely depend on the possession of these ethnic and civic characteristics.

Namely, argues Eriksen (2010: 50), as identities are socially constructed the possession of a national identity is contingent on an individual’s self-identification with a nation and on the validation of that identification by co-nationals. Because of their socially constructed nature, argues Brubaker (1999: 298), the boundaries of national identities are fluid. For, as the content of national networks of interaction change, so do national identities. However, the fact that national identities are socially constructed also indicates that political actors may further influence these national identities’ boundaries through the way in which they frame the national community in the public sphere.

One example of such actors are state-élites. According to Smith (2010: 30), state-élites legitimize their power by presenting themselves as sharing in the histories, culture and myths of the nation-state’s dominant ethnic group. Consequently, notes Anderson (2006: 86), these state-élites promote the creation of a shared linguistic and cultural community in order to prevent the rise of alternative
nationalisms and to ensure that they retain their power in the future. In other words, nation-states possess the tendency to assimilate their population into a shared national community at the cost of the exclusion of competing political identities. One of the tools which the state adopts in order to do so is the national school system.

This school system, according to Anderson (2006: 121-122) provides a “self-contained universe of experience” which provides students through their common experience in the classroom with a “territorially specific imagined reality (which is) every day confirmed by the accents and physiognomies of their classmates”. In other words, the national school system provides its students, through their experiences with fellow students, with an image of the ethnic and cultural traits of their ‘average’ countrymen. To this, Philo Washburn (cited in Hart, 1999: 73), adds that the national curriculum further increases students’ identification with the members of a particular national group by juxtaposing this group to ‘Other’ national groups, teaches students to identify with the nation-state’s dominant political institutions and teaches students to identify with models of exemplary citizenship. In identifying the nation by virtue of ‘who-we-are-not’, argues Said (2003: 6), the nation-state elevates the self to a privileged position by producing a denigrating image of ‘Other’ nation-states. Through this discourse, the state extends power over its citizens and over the ‘Other’.

However, this tendency of defining the nation by virtue of who-it-is-not has broader implications when coupled to the appeal for ethnic or civic unity inherent in nationalism. Namely, argues Miller (1995: 126-130), if state-élites regard a shared national identity as essential to political stability, they regard an influx of non-nationals as destabilizing. Consequently, states are not only faced with the task of assimilating its domestic population into a shared national community but also with the question of how to cope with the impact of immigration on its national identity. In answering this question, Nora Kim (2008: 579) notes that the state “transforms subjective (nationalist) beliefs into objective, measurable
characteristics” through its immigration policies. In other words, the state carries out a regulatory function in defining the criteria of national belonging through its immigration and integration policies.

In doing so, note Castles and Miller (2009: 247-248), nation-states typically implement differential exclusion or assimilation models in order to limit the rights of migrants to citizenship, here defined in Rosaldo’s (1994: 410) terms as the legal duties, rights and inclusion in terms of “dignity, thriving and well-being”. For example, the differential exclusion model grants short-term migrants the right to participate in the labor market and to contribute to the national economy but denies them access to citizenship. Conversely, the assimilation model grants long-term migrants access to citizenship, but makes this citizenship contingent on migrants shedding their native linguistic, cultural and social characteristics and becoming indistinguishable from the majority population. However, the reality of labor migration makes this assimilatory approach unrealistic as it fails to recognize nation-states’ structural need for labor migration and the long-term settlement of labor migrants. Namely, these migrants typically engage in socio-economically disadvantaged occupations and reside in specific neighborhoods. There, they form enduring links between ethnic background and social class while maintaining their minority cultures and languages. This has led scholars to engage in the search for new ‘multicultural’ models of social integration which recognize the long-term persistence of group difference.

Multiculturalism

‘Multiculturalist’ perspectives advocate that liberal democratic nation-states grant collective rights to minorities in order to ensure the survival of these minorities’ cultures, religions or languages. For example, Kymlicka (1995: 108-115) bases this suggestion on the observation that in order for national minorities or immigrants to be autonomous these need a secure sense of identity as members of a
‘societal culture’ which provides its members with “meaningful choices among the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both private and public spheres”. Consequently, when the state forces minorities to assimilate into the majority culture it deprives them of their secure context of choice and harms their interests. As such, if self-government rights for national minorities or ethnic group rights for immigrants help minorities access a societal culture they can contribute to individual freedom.

Whereas Kymlicka’s argument focuses solely on national and ethnic differences, Taylor (1994: 25-74) suggests that states extend collective rights to all social groups marginalized on the basis of their gender, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. Taylor bases this assertion on the observation of a conflict between the values of dignity and authenticity. Namely, the value of dignity, the basis of the liberal democratic state, generates a ‘politics of universalism’ which demands the extension of equal rights to every individual. Conversely, the value of authenticity generates a ‘politics of difference’ which demands the recognition of the unique identity of every individual. However, the ‘politics of universalism’ conflicts with the ‘politics of difference’ because the former reflects the hegemonic liberal value of autonomy. Consequently, argues Taylor (ibid: 25), as individuals obtain recognition of their self-understanding in dialogue with society, minority groups which value remaining true to the culture of their ancestors at the expense of individual autonomy risk failing to gain this recognition which leads to “real damage... if society mirrors back to them a... confining image of themselves”. Therefore, Taylor (ibid: 61) suggests a revised form of liberalism which guarantees fundamental rights for every individual, but weighs the importance of uniform treatment against the importance of cultural survival and opts sometimes in favor of the latter.
Interculturalism

As seen above, both the literature on nationalism and on multiculturalism distinguish between distinct, homogeneous majority and minority ‘cultures’. However, Parekh (2010: 238-242) criticizes this understanding of culture and argues that cultures contain a plurality of elements, permeate each other and reconstitute themselves through mutual contact. Consequently, multiculturalism’s political division of society between different social groups leads to the dual problems of representation and reconciliation. Regarding the former, Appiah (1994: 154-162) argues that when the state divides society politically among social groups such as ethnic groups, within these groups a majority will again claim to be representative of the entirety of the group while imposing its values upon the minority. Regarding the latter, Radtke (2010: 291-298) argues that when the state organizes socio-economic conflicts along the fault lines of social groups such as ethnic groups, the state fails to provide these ethnic groups with a common sense of unity and thus makes these conflicts irreconcilable. Consequently, Appiah (1994: 158) argues that in order to achieve social justice for all minorities and bind society together liberal politics need to appeal to values more substantive than a respect for liberal procedures. The question is what such a society should look like in Korea.

In answer to this question, literature on ‘interculturalism’ argues that Korea’s multicultural society does not need to transcend the liberal democratic state. For instance, Kim (2008b) and Shim (2012) argue that the Korean state should cultivate what Jürgen Habermas (1994) calls ‘liberal constitutional patriotism’. In this society, the outcomes of the political decision making process reflect the needs of the majority group and are thus not ethically neutral. However, provided that immigrants assent to the principles of the constitution and the political culture of the host country, and provided that the state grants these immigrants unrestricted access to the public sphere, these immigrants will find themselves co-authors of that national conception of the good life that they are subject to.
However, argues Miller (1995: 138-142), in order give immigrants access to full and equal citizenship the state cannot simply provide immigrants with the legal rights and duties of ordinary citizens but must also grant them full and equal participation in public institutions such as the education system and military service. In the case of the former Park (2011) and Park and Hong (2012) echo Rosaldo in arguing that the government will need to revise the national curriculum so that it does not focus solely on the assimilation of immigrants into the majority culture, but so that it will teach all students to recognize how different ethnicities, sub-cultures and viewpoints on the ends of life are all constitutive of the same inclusive community. According to Miller (1995: 138), in reconstituting a national identity in this way a society strips its collective self-understanding of those ethnic elements that compete with the ethnic self-understanding of minority groups, so that the “national identity can be embraced as an addition to, rather than as a replacement for ethnic consciousness.”

In short, an ‘interculturalist’ approach illuminates the relationship between national identity formation and immigration and integration laws and policies by analyzing the discursive position of immigrants within these policies and their outcomes. Furthermore, this approach concurs with multiculturalism’s assertion that migrants deserve the right to autonomous cultural expression, but is critical of the way the state constitutes migrants’ identities through law and policy. With the aim of further research, this paper therefore examines whether and how South Korea’s multicultural immigration and integration policies effect a transformation in South Korea’s ethnic national identity in order to allow for the incorporation of migrants as South Korean citizens. This paper does this by focusing on two different targets of South Korea’s immigration and integration policies, namely labor migrants and marriage migrants. In doing so, this paper contributes to the study of the social integration of immigrants in supposedly ethno-culturally homogeneous countries.
This chapter first investigates the construction of Korea’s ethnic nationalism and asks how this nationalism historically affected the inclusion or exclusion of non-ethnic Koreans as South Korean citizens. In answering this question, this chapter argues that the South Korean state’s dissemination of ethnic nationalism, societal processes of social and culture convergence and the paucity of non-ethnic Korean nationals strengthened South Koreans’ belief in a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural Korean nation. Simultaneously, this belief in a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural Korean nation led South Koreans to exclude both non-ethnic and ethnic Korean nationals who failed to pass the norms of ‘Koreanness’. In making this argument, this chapter provides context before the next chapter investigates South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ immigration and integration laws and policies.

Although the origins of Korea’s ethnic nationalism are the subject of debate, this chapter suggests that the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) influenced the formation of some of its characteristics. During the Japanese colonial period Korean nationalists developed ethnic conceptions of the Korean nation in response to Japan’s material subjugation of the Korean peninsula and its policies of cultural assimilation. For example, according to Shin (2006, 1-74) the influential historian and journalist Shin Ch’aeho (1880-1936) explicitly narrated Korean history in terms of the history of the ethnically homogeneous Korean nation (Korean: tan’il minjok). In this history, Shin Ch’aeho transformed the myth of Tan’gun, the legendary first king of Korea into a symbol of the common patrilineal descent of the Korean nation. Furthermore, Shin Ch’aeho emphasized the notion that this ethnically homogeneous family was united by a common language, territory, history and culture. At this time, conceptions of the ethnic unity of the Korean nation such as these proved appealing to the Korean nationalist movement because they allowed Korean nationalists to assert that as long as the Korean nation preserved its ethnic
identity, it could in time reassert political control over the Korean peninsula and found an independent state.

Needless to say, Korean intellectuals also developed alternative ‘imagined communities’. For example, Lie (2014: 6-7) points out that certain Korean intellectuals subscribed to the Japanese colonial ideology of unity between the Japanese and Korean nations, whereas Robinson (1988) notes that other intellectuals emphasized their identification with social class over nation. Having said that, Lie (2014: 6-7) does suggest that the aforementioned identification with conceptions of the ethnic Korean nation, combined with increased inter-Korean interaction through educational networks, peninsula-wide transportation and communication networks and urbanization laid the foundation for the later widespread identification with notions of the mono-ethnic, mono-cultural Korean nation.

Following Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics occupied the Korean peninsula. Subsequently, notes Buzo (2007: 35-65) these occupying forces respectively enabled the establishment of the capitalist Republic of Korea (hereafter: South Korea) in the South and the socialist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter: North Korea) in the North. According to Shin (2006: 157-162), the establishment of separate states set up two antagonistic political systems for the Korean War (1950-1953), ready to purge their ideological ‘Other’ and to assert their right to the exclusive political representation of the ethnic Korean nation. In these efforts, as is typical for post-colonial nation-states (Poole, 1999: 31), both South Korea and North Korea endeavored to assert existing ethno-cultural identities and to replace the reactionary nationalism against the colonial oppressor with a new national identity which identified with the state.

**The State and Ethnic Nationalism**

In post-war South Korea, a general state of economic destitution urged the subsequent governments of Syngman Rhee (1948-1960), Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-Hwan (1980-1988) to facilitate
economic recovery by educating an industrial labor force and developing South Korea’s nascent industrial base. Simultaneously, domestic political turmoil and the enduring conflict with North Korea urged these governments to disseminate ethno-nationalist ideologies which mobilized the population under its banner and against the North Korean state. The medium through which these governments, to speak in Gellner’s (1983: 1) terms, both enabled industrial production and ensured the congruence between the nation and the state, was the national education system. For example, Park Chung-Hee’s developmental state used an ethno-nationalist ideology known as ‘Modernization of the Fatherland’ (Korean: choguk kŭndaehwa) in order to frame its state-led economic development as a sacred national project. As part of this project, note Grinker (1998: 139, 156) and Hart (1999: 85), the national education system asserted that the state would protect its citizens against Communism, promised that it would ‘recover’ ethnic homogeneity by overthrowing its Northern political ‘Other’ and emphasized the role of the state in guaranteeing the economic prosperity of its citizens. Simultaneously, the state prohibited political dissent for the sake of national unity and political stability.

In addition to disseminating assertive rhetoric on the Korean nation’s ethnic homogeneity, these administrations translated existing ethnic Korean social customs into law and policy. One example of such initiatives is the fact that, according to Lee (2014: 4-8) the Syngman Rhee administration codified the principle of patrilineal jus sanguinis into its 1948 Nationality Act. According to this act, the foreign wife of a Korean husband automatically obtained the Korean nationality upon marriage. The Rhee administration followed the same principle when it implemented the Korean Civil Act in 1960 (ibid: 8-12). According to this act, only the male head of a Korean household was legible to register his offspring on the family register (Korean: hoju-kwŏn) and to provide his offspring with a source of legal identification and de facto citizenship. By implementing these laws, the Rhee administration ensured the full legal, economic and social citizenship of ethnic Koreans in South Korea at the expense of the citizenship of non-ethnic Koreans. This latter group consisted, notes Gage (2014: 246-276) of the mixed-blood (Korean:
honhyŏl) children of American soldiers and Korean women and, notes Nam (2013: 169-175) of ethnic Chinese traders (Korean: hwagyo). In fact, the Rhee and Park administrations implemented multiple policies to excise these non-ethnic Korean nationals from South Korea. For example, Doolan (2013: 42) notes that the Rhee administration selectively facilitated the foreign adoption of mixed-blood children but prohibited the adoption of ethnic Korean children. Furthermore, notes Nam (2013: 169-175), the Park administration implemented policies which prohibited foreigners from exchanging money or owning large pieces of land. As a result of these discriminatory policies, South Korean women gave up their mixed-blood children for adoption and ethnic Chinese migrated to third countries in the hope of finding better lives for themselves and their children.

Mono-Ethnic, Mono-Cultural Korea

As seen above, the Rhee, Park and Chun governments disseminated officially sanctioned views of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. However, to speak in Anderson’s (2006: 6-7) terms, what really facilitated the imagining of the nation as an ethnically and culturally homogeneous community were state-wide ‘networks’ which ensured further social and cultural convergence. For example, Hart (2002: 41-42) notes that after Park Chung-Hee instituted a policy of export-led industrialization South Korean people moved to urban areas en masse in order to take up occupation as part of South Korea’s industrial labor force. As a result, the percentage of the South Korean population living in cities rose from 28.3% in 1960, to 54.9% in 1979 and to 78.3% in 2000. Furthermore, adds Hart (2002: 81), the performance of wage labor provided working-class South Koreans with new social mobility as they depended on their achievements in Korea’s market society to achieve middle-class status. According to Cho (2002: 12-14), these working-class South Koreans ‘performed’ their new middle-class status by consuming products associated with the middle-class as advertised by the media. As a result, during the 1970s and the 1980s South Korean people increasingly divided themselves into ready categories of social differentiation.
However, argues Lie (2014: 10-14) this spatial and cultural convergence, in combination with the ideological stress on ethnic homogeneity, also made societal success contingent on the performance of normative ‘Koreaness’. Consequently, these developments guaranteed the systematic social exclusion of mixed-blood children and ethnic Chinese, as well as ethnic Koreans which failed to pass the norms of ‘Korean’ behavior such as those hailing from disadvantaged regions, the disabled, and those who spent a long time abroad. By the end of the 1980s, the dissemination of ethno-nationalist ideologies, processes of social and cultural convergence and the paucity of non-ethnic Korean nationals thus made South Koreans’ belief in a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural Korea hegemonic.

**Conclusion**

The subsequent governments of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-Hee and Chun Doo-Hwan successfully disseminated ethno-nationalist, anti-Communist and developmentalist notions of the Korean nation in order to bolster their legitimacy. However, by making their legitimacy contingent on the economic prosperity of the Korean nation and on the ‘recovery’ of Korean homogeneity, these administrations made themselves vulnerable to criticism from those parts of the notion that did not feel represented. These rose up in the 1980s as part of the people’s (Korean: *minjung*) movement which, according to Koo (1993: 144) advocated the restructuring of the Korean economy, rejected the governments’ anti-communist ideology in favor of national unification and promoted a contrasting version of ethnic nationalism which mobilized the interests of the ethnic Korean nation against the state. However, argues Lie (2014: 16-18), as both the South Korean state and its political opposition imagined the Korean nation in essentialist terms, ethnic nationalism remained a crucial source of pride and inspiration for South Koreans during their difficult transition to democracy. Because of this, and because of the scarcity of immigration into South Korea, neither the South Korean state nor its political opposition questioned
Korea’s uneasy relationship with ethnic and non-ethnic Koreans who failed to pass the ethnic norms of ‘Koreanness’.
From 1988 onwards, subsequent South Korean governments revised Korea’s immigration laws and policies in order to allow for the influx of migrants. Firstly, the Kim Young-Sam administration (1993-1998) started allowing the temporary immigration of labor migrants. Secondly, the Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) administration started facilitating the permanent immigration of marriage migrants. As a result of these changes, notes the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (2015, 1), the number of migrants in Korea rapidly increased up to 1,741,919 in 2015. This number comprises 3.4% of the total population of 51,327,916 people. These immigrants consist among other groups of migrant workers (34.9%), overseas Koreans (16.4%), marriage migrants (13.7%) and North Korean refugees (1.5%). This rapid increase in inbound migration flows has created structural pressure for the redefinition of Korea’s mono-ethnic, mono-cultural national identity. In order to accommodate these pressures, from 2006 onwards the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2008) therefore started implementing ‘multiculturalism’ as a state policy. This raises the question how South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ immigration and integration laws and policies regulate South Korea’s criteria of national belonging and how these laws and policies affect the inclusion of immigrants as South Korean citizens. In order to answer these questions, this chapter examines the immigration and integration laws and policies concerning labor migrants, the largest group of short-term migrants, and marriage migrants, the largest group of long-term migrants. This chapter argues that South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ immigration and integration laws and policies continue to operate according to ethnocentric norms, including the patrilineal logic of descent. As such, these laws and policies prohibit the permanent immigration of male non-ethnic Korean labor migrants. Conversely, these laws and policies selectively facilitate the

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1 Hereafter, ‘Korea’ refers to ‘South Korea’ unless explicitly mentioned otherwise.
permanent immigration of *female* marriage migrants into South Korean society on condition of their complete cultural assimilation. In doing so, these laws and policies fail to renegotiate South Korea’s mono-ethnic, mono-cultural identity with South Korea’s society at large, which relegates those migrant brides and mixed-ethnic children that fail to meet the ethnic and cultural norms of ‘Koreanness’ to positions of second-class citizens.

**Immigration Laws and Policies: Labor Migrants**

From 1962 until 1988, Korea’s developmental state repressed workers’ labor rights in order to maintain high export-based economic growth. However, notes Kim (2004: 319-321), when Korean workers started asserting their labor rights in the 1980s, their living standards rose and they became increasingly reluctant to carry out labor-intensive work in the manufacturing sector. As a result, notes Gray (2007: 300), by 1987 the Small and Medium Enterprises sector faced a labor shortage of 200,000 unskilled and low-skilled workers. In order to solve these labor shortages, the Kim Young-Sam administration started implementing laws and policies to facilitate the temporary migration of low-skilled, male migrant workers into Korea.\(^2\) Subsequently, this chapter argues, South Korea’s labor migration laws and policies provided ethnic Korean migrant workers with preferential rights to labor and settlement and prohibited non-ethnic Korean migrant workers from permanently settling in Korea. In doing so, these laws and policies maximize the economic benefits of labor migration for the South Korean population while maintaining South Korea’s supposed ethnic homogeneity.

In 1994 the Kim Young-Sam administration introduced the Industrial Trainee System (hereafter: ITS) which facilitated the temporary migration of low-skilled migrant workers. Under this system, the

\(^2\) According to the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (2015, 1), between 1987 and 2015 the number of migrant workers increased from 6,409 to 608,116. Of these migrants, 91.2% is low-skilled and 8.8% is high-skilled. The five largest groups of migrant workers consisted of: ethnic Korean-Chinese (268,558 or 44.1%), Vietnamese (55,092 or 9%), Indonesian (36,249 or 5.9%), Cambodian (30,680 or 5%) and Filipino (27,627 or 4.5%). The male to female ratios of these groups amount to 56.3% (ethnic Korean-Chinese), 90.6% (Vietnamese), 95.3% (Indonesian), 81.7% (Cambodian) and 75.8% (Filipino).
government assigned the Korean Federation for Small Businesses (hereafter: KFSB) with the task to recruit migrant workers in the guise of ‘trainees’. Although officially designated ‘trainee’, Korean companies did not provide these migrant workers with training. Instead, these companies expected migrant workers to fulfil two years of heavy manual labor before returning to their countries of origin. As a result of this policy, notes Lim (2006: 244), by 1997 245,399 migrant workers of (ethnic-Korean) Chinese and South-East Asian origin had come to Korea in order to chase the ‘Korean dream’.

Despite migrant workers’ expectations, their relationship with Korean society quickly soured as the ITS facilitated the extreme economic exploitation of both non-ethnic and ethnic Korean migrant workers. Namely, notes Gray (2007: 301), the ITS defined both groups of migrant workers as ‘trainees’ and therefore excluded them from the coverage under Korea’s Labor Standards Law 3 granted to full-time workers. As such, ‘trainees’ lacked basic labor rights. Simultaneously, the ITS prohibited ‘trainees’ from moving workplaces. Taken together, migrant workers’ financial dependence on their jobs, their inability to switch jobs and their exclusion from Korean labor laws resulted in the dependence of ‘trainees’ upon their employers. As a result, notes Lim (2006: 246), until the ITS’ termination in 2007 Korean employers systematically subjected ‘trainees’ to economic exploitation – including substandard pay, nonpayment of wages, lack of overtime pay, excessive work hours, unsafe working conditions and nonexistent compensation for industrial accidents – as well as verbal, physical and sexual assault.

Unsurprisingly, the exploitative circumstances of the ITS system generated significant backlash under migrant workers. For example, Gray (2007: 316) notes that from 1994 to 1998 up to 80% of all migrant workers fled their designated places of work in order to enjoy more competitive wages in the free labor market. However unintended, these measures further enhanced their exploitation by the Korean government and companies. Namely, notes Kim (2004: 316), as migrant workers intended to

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3 The Labor Standards Law guarantees the right to unemployment insurance, accident insurance, national pension and medical insurance. Furthermore, the Law guarantees the right to unionize, the right of collective bargaining and the right to collective action.
make good on their erstwhile ‘Korean Dream’, they settled in so-called ‘Kosian’ (Korean-Asian) towns at the edge of large cities. According to Lim (2006: 243), the Kim Young-Sam administration tacitly allowed the existence of these undocumented workers so that these could contribute to Korea’s economy as a ‘flexible labor force’, which the government could repatriate on the report of their employers. This effectively condemned illegal migrant workers to live their lives in Korea as second-rate citizens, because they faced continuous abuse and the constant threat of deportation.

For Korea’s burgeoning civil society movement (Korean: simin undong), the continuous violations of the human rights of migrant workers gave cause to engage in vigorous campaigns to improve the rights of migrant workers. Typically, non-governmental organizations (hereafter NGOs) engaged in migrant activism consisted of religious organizations, migrant worker advocacy groups, human rights groups and labor unions. Together, their high-profile protests and large-scale petition campaigns led the Kim Young-Sam administration to extend small but notable increases in migrant workers’ rights. For example, in 1993 the government granted ‘trainees’ the right of compensation to industrial injury, in 1997 the government modified the ITS and allowed ‘trainees’ a three year visa for two years of ‘traineeship’ and one year of ‘work’ and in 1998 the government granted both legal and illegal migrant workers protection under the Labor Standards Law. However, argues Gray (2007: 303), in practice these small-scale improvements did not benefit illegal migrant workers, as these did not exercise their rights and report violations of the law out of the well-founded fear of being deported.

Given the enduring inability of the Kim Young-Sam administration to solve the systemic problems of the ITS, the migrant advocacy movement endeavored to find more systemic solutions to migrant workers’ problems. For example, in 1995 migrant support NGOs decided to form the Joint Committee for Migrants in Korea (hereafter: JCMK), an umbrella organization for migrant activism. The JCMK committed itself to the introduction of a new legal framework, the Work Permit System (hereafter: WPS). This system sought to abolish the ITS, extend the full range of domestic labor rights to all migrant
workers and grant illegal migrant workers in Korea a full amnesty. Initially, the government of Kim Dae-Jung, one of the foremost proponents of South Korea’s democratization movement, sought to implement the WPS in 2000. However, according to Gray (2007: 307), mounting pressure of the KFSB forced the administration to shelve its plans. As such, the efforts of the JCMK failed to garner concrete effects until the government of Roh Moo-Hyun, a former human rights lawyer.

In 2004, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration implemented the ‘Employment Permit System’ (hereafter: EPS). This system, a variation on the WPS, provided legal migrant workers with full coverage under the Labor Standards Act. Furthermore, as the Roh administration offered illegal migrant workers a limited-time amnesty and the chance to register as worker under the EPS the number of illegal migrants drastically decreased. However, this system also differentiated between non-ethnic Korean and ethnic Korean low-skilled migrant workers by providing the former with preferential rights to labor and settlement and prohibiting the latter from permanently settling in Korea. The EPS did so by maintaining the maximum labor term of three years and a prohibition on changing workplaces. According to Lim (2010: 61), the Ministry of Labor stated that it expressly designed the three year time limit to “prevent permanent settlement of foreign workers in Korea” because immigrants can apply for permanent residence after staying in Korea for five years. Although the EPS eventually allowed qualified workers to extend their stay up to a maximum of five years, these workers were obliged to return to their home countries when these five years had passed and were only legible to re-apply for the EPS after a waiting period of six months. Subsequent South Korean governments thus explicitly designed their labor migration laws and policies to prohibit the permanent settlement of male, non-ethnic Korean migrant workers in Korea.

In contrast, these same administrations provided ethnic Korean migrants with far-reaching rights to labor and settlement so that these could contribute to South Korea’s economy without upsetting its ethnic homogeneity. Namely, following the 1997 Asian financial crisis the Kim Dae-Jung
administration used Koreans’ supposed ethnic kinship to the economic advantage of South Korea’s recovering economy by extending the labor and settlement rights of high-skilled, ethnic Koreans. One way in which the Kim Dae-Jung administration did so, argues Nora Kim (2008: 579-592), is by implementing the Overseas Korean Act in 1998. This act provided those ethnic Koreans “who had once been (South) Korean citizens and their descendants” with the same rights to labor and settlement as native South Koreans. Notably however, the Overseas Korean Act initially only benefited high-skilled ethnic Koreans from ‘advanced’ countries such as the USA. Simultaneously, this measure excluded low-skilled Koreans from ‘underdeveloped’ countries such as China and the USSR, because these had left the Korean peninsula during the Japanese colonial period and had thus never been citizens of the ROK.

In protest to this discriminating treatment Korean migrant NGOs embarked on a vigorous campaign which demanded the equal treatment of low- and high-skilled ethnic Korean workers based on their shared ethnicity. In response, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration modified the EPS in 2004 in order to include Special Work Permits for low-skilled ethnic Koreans. These permits provided low-skilled ethnic Koreans with the right to preferential allocation for jobs in the construction and service sectors as well as the right to change workplaces. Furthermore, in 2010 the Lee Myung-Bak administration (2008-2013) modified the Overseas Korean Act so that it would apply to all overseas ethnic Koreans, regardless of skill level or wealth. Thus, in contrast to the prohibition on the settlement of low-skilled, non-ethnic Korean migrant workers subsequent South Korean governments expressly facilitated the permanent immigration of ethnic Korean migrant workers on the basis of their supposed ethnic kinship.

In conclusion, South Korea’s immigration laws for migrant workers adopt an ethnocentric, developmentalist form of different exclusion based on (the absence of) shared ethnicity and the expected economic benefits of labor migration to the South Korean nation-state. This can be seen from the fact that subsequent South Korean governments have categorized labor migrants’ right to labor and settlement along the patrilineal fault line of ethnicity (between male ethnic Korean migrant workers and
male non-ethnic Korean migrant workers). These governments, by facilitating the temporary migration of labor migrants, use non-ethnic and ethnic Korean migrant workers as a flexible labor force which contributes to the economy of the Korean nation-state. Simultaneously, the South Korean government, by prohibiting the permanent settlement of low-skilled, non-ethnic Korean migrants, officially maintains Korea’s supposed ethnic homogeneity. Interestingly however, as the next chapter illustrates, South Korea’s ethnic principle of patrilineal descent also facilitates immigration as subsequent South Korean governments actively stimulated ethnic Korean men to marry foreign, non-ethnic Korean women under the presumption that these would assimilate into ethnically and culturally ‘Korean’ households.

Immigration Laws and Policies: Marriage Migrants

From 1988 onwards, rising costs of living, child-raising and education in urban areas caused urban families to limit their reproductive behavior. As a result, note Chung and Kim (2012: 196) the Korean fertility rate plummeted from 2.1 children per family in 1984 to 1.08 children in 2005. This declining birth rate gives rise to an aging society (Korean: koryŏnghwasaehoe) and resultant increasing social costs for an increasingly small part of the population. The fact that young Korean women migrate to cities en masse in the hope of finding better educational, occupational and marital opportunities exacerbates this trend in rural areas. This has resulted in a rural ‘crisis’ because farmers are unable to find a wife in order to take care of their elderly parents and extend their patrilineal family line. In order to solve these demographic problems, subsequent South Korean governments implemented laws and policies to facilitate the permanent migration of ethnic Korean and Southeast-Asian migrant brides into Korea.4

Subsequently, this sub-chapter argues that South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ immigration and integration

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4 According to the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (2015, 1), between 1987 and 2015 the number of marriage migrants increased from 5000 in 1990 to 239,698 in 2015. Of these marriage migrants, 212,826 or 89% are female. The five largest groups of marriage migrants consisted of: Vietnamese (66,330 or 27.6%), Chinese (61,046 or 25.5%), ethnic Korean-Chinese (58,717 or 24.5%), Filipinos (16,664 or 6.9%) and Japanese (12,809 or 5.3%). The female to male ratios of these groups amount to: 90% (Chinese), 84% (ethnic Korean-Chinese), 86% (Vietnamese), 90% (Japanese) and 97% (Filipinos).
laws and policies facilitated the immigration of migrant brides into Korea based on the ethnocentric expectation of their socio-cultural assimilability into the Korean family as ‘Korean’ wives, daughters-in-law and mothers. As a consequence, Korean society relegates migrant brides that fail to meet the ethnocultural norms of Korean behavior to positions of second-class citizens.

From the early 1990’s onwards, Korean municipal governments started organizing so-called ‘marriage tours’ in order to facilitate marriages between Korean farmers and ethnic Korean-Chinese women. At the time, notes Freeman (2005: 84, 86) South Korean society expected that these women’s ethnic Korean heritage allowed them to integrate into Korea’s rural society as dutiful, ‘Korean’ wives and form an ideal solution to South Korea’s demographic problems. However, these expectations failed to take account of the desires of migrant brides themselves. Namely, according to Freeman (2005: 97), these women married Korean men “out of a sense of independence, adventure, entrepreneurship, and a longing to lead a ‘modern’ life in a ‘developed country’”. In reality however, these women ended up marrying poor, uneducated husbands living in isolated rural villages and were unable to realize their objective of upward marital mobility. As a result, these ethnic Korean migrant brides quickly grew disillusioned with their new lives in Korea. To make matters worse, migrant brides’ families in law expected these women to be grateful for the ‘opportunity’ to live in a developed country, expected these women to adopt patriarchal gender roles as care-givers and stay-at-home mothers and criticized these women for failing to meet ‘Korean’ norms of dress, speech and behavior. As their families in law were unable to renegotiate their expectations of migrant brides’ socio-cultural assimilation, these ethnic Korean migrant brides ran away to escape the harsh circumstances they found themselves in. Consequently, the Kim Young-Sam administration took measures to limit further ‘fake marriages’ by these ethnic Korean brides.6

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5 In fact, the 1948 Nationality Law facilitated the automatic naturalization of these women as Korean citizens precisely based upon the patrilineal expectation of a bride’s assimilability into her Korean husband’s family.

6 For example, Hyekyung Lee (2008 112) notes in 1996 the Kim Young-Sam government signed a memorandum with China which turned international marriages between Koreans and Chinese into a more complicated process.
However, because Korea’s demographic problems persisted subsequent administrations implemented new legislation which facilitated the immigration of South-East Asian migrant brides. For example, in 1999 the Kim Dae-Jung administration legalized the private marriage broker business which from then on facilitated the immigration of migrant brides on a commercial basis. Furthermore, notes Shim (2012: 202) in 1997 the Kim Young-Sam administration modified the Nationality Law so that both male and female spouses of Korean nationals would be able to obtain the Korean nationality, but only following a two year waiting period. As a result, migrant brides who divorced their Korean husbands before their naturalization had to leave South Korea. However, notes Hyekyung Lee (2008: 115) from 2004 onwards the Roh administration allowed non-naturalized migrant brides who divorce their Korean spouses to stay in Korea on condition that these brides take care of their parents-in-law or raise Korean children. As such, South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ immigration and integration laws constituted migrant brides’ legal rights and duties as citizens in terms of their role as ‘Korean’ mothers.

Interestingly, despite the fact that these marriage brokers married ethnic Korean men to foreign, non-ethnic Korean women, Korea’s rural communities retained their expectations regarding these women’s socio-cultural roles as ‘Korean’ wives, daughters-in-law and mothers. According to Abelmann and Kim (2005: 108), these rural communities based these expectations on the patrilineal assumption that “non-Korean women were assimilable into South Korean families”. In fact, note Abelmann and Kim (ibid: 109-111), private marriage brokers explicitly catered to these expectations by advertising women from Vietnam and the Philippines as ‘pure’ and ‘traditional’ women. According to these advertisements, these migrant brides’ shared physiological features and ‘underdeveloped’ countries of descent facilitated their easy integration into Korea’s rural communities. However, with these expectations Korea’s rural communities again failed to take account of the desires of migrant brides themselves. Namely, Kim (2007: 110-115) notes that these migrant brides, inspired by images of Korea’s material development, came to Korea in the expectation that they would live their lives in affluence, engage in a
romantic relationship with a Korean man, establish a ‘modern’ nuclear family and combine motherhood with the freedom to work. Thus, neither Korean families in law, with their ethnocentric expectations of sociocultural assimilation, nor South-East Asian migrant brides themselves, with their fantasies of affluence and romance, were sufficiently prepared for the realities of international marriage.

As would turn out, the expectations of South-East Asian migrant brides clashed with the realities of their new abode. As with ethnic Korean migrant brides before them, South-East Asian migrant brides married poor, lowly educated husbands, were expected to assist with hard physical labor on the farm and faced the imperative to take care of their aging parents in law and raise their children. Furthermore, Korean families in law typically adopted a heavy-handed attitude in molding these migrant brides into ideal ‘Korean’ wives. For example, Kim (2007: 110) notes that migrant brides’ mothers in law controlled everything from a migrant bride’s eating habits or style of work down to her sexual behavior. Furthermore, note Han and Kim (2011: 45), these mothers in law prohibited migrant brides from speaking their native language or cooking foreign food. South Korea’s rural communities thus made acceptance of migrant brides as full members of the family contingent on their conformity to ‘Korean’ norms of social and cultural behavior.

Significantly, migrant brides themselves criticized rural communities’ lopsided expectations of their servitude and cultural assimilation. For example, May Cordova, member of the Korea Filipino Wives’ Association, expressed that “most Koreans force us to follow their culture. We do, but they also want us to forget our own culture. That’s the cause of problems of married migrant couples” (ISIS International, 2008: 1). In practice however, migrant brides’ effort to assert their discomfort with their unfortunate circumstances garnered little effect. According to Kim (2007: 118), migrant brides’ efforts to assert their own volition typically amounted to sleeping in different rooms from their husband’s or threatening with
In doing so, these migrant brides tried to renegotiate their roles in the household. However, notes Ku (ibid: 70), when South-East Asian migrant brides run away or divorce their husbands, municipal governments and conservative sections of the Korean media protest vehemently and frame those women that fail to perform their duties to the family as selfish, irresponsible ‘runaway brides’ who ‘desert their families’ and ‘fool their men’. South Korea’s municipal governments, rural communities and conservative media thus seem to have little empathy for the difficulty of migrant brides in adapting to the normative ideals of ‘Korean’ behavior.

The above responses of Korean society to international marriage migration seem to suggest that Korean society continues to uphold normative conceptions of the Korean nation as both mono-ethnic and mono-cultural. This suggestion is bolstered by Kang (2010: 13), who points out that Koreans continue to attribute as much value to civic factors as “possessing the South Korean nationality” (89.4%) or “following South Korea’s political system and laws” (86.3%) as to ethnic factors as “possessing Korean blood” (84%) or “following South Koreans traditions” (85.9%) as important criteria for the possession of South Korean nationhood. In fact, recent research suggests that Koreans are unable or unwilling to cope with difference from the Korean norm in general. For example, the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (Korea Herald, 2012: 1) notes that Koreans believe that conflicts arise out of difference in language (57.8%), differences in religion (50.8%) and even out of differences in skin color (47.5%). As such, despite rapid increases of immigration into the South Korean peninsula South Koreans continue to uphold their self-identification with a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural nation.

In the final equation, the South Korean government facilitates the immigration of migrant brides on the expectation of their demographic contributions to the reproduction of the Korean nation. Conversely, South Korean society makes the recognition of migrant brides’ full citizenship, defined in Rosaldo’s (1994: 410) terms as equal inclusion in terms of legal rights, duties and “dignity, thriving and

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7 In fact, Ku (2012: 50), notes that the divorce rate in marriages between ethnic Korean men and migrant brides rose from 1,567 divorces and 25,105 marriages in 2004 to 8,349 divorces and 22,265 marriages in 2011.
well-being”, contingent on migrant brides complete adaptation to socio-cultural norms of ‘Koreanness’. As these expectations clash with those of migrant brides’ themselves, migrant brides are effectively relegated to a position as second-rate citizens and thus increasingly divorce their husbands and return to their home country. That said, in recent years, the South Korean government has acknowledged the challenge that migrant brides immigration forms to Korea’s supposedly mono-ethnic, mono-cultural society by instituting ‘multicultural’ integration laws and policies.

Integration Laws and Policies: South Korea’s ‘Multiculturalism’

The enduring inability of the Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung administrations to solve migrant brides’ problems of economic destitution and ethno-cultural discrimination, the 2005 ‘racial riots’ in France and the rapid increase of immigrants in South Korea led South Korea’s media to engage in discussions on the desirability of ‘multiculturalism’. Specifically, notes Nora Kim (2014: 64-66), Korea’s conservative media questioned whether migrant brides, and in particular their mixed-ethnic children, solved Korea’s demographic problems or formed a potential source of social unrest and violence. In response, notes Kim (2007: 108), the Roh Moo-Hyun administration asked the Presidential Committee on Aging Society and Population Policy to draw up plans for the creation of a ‘multicultural society’. Subsequently, the Roh administration implemented ‘multicultural’ integration laws and policies in the form of the 2007 ‘Basic Law on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea’, its 2007 ‘Multicultural Education’ and its 2008 ‘Multicultural Family Support Law’.

However, since the introduction of these laws and policies, Korean scholars have significantly criticized the government’s understanding of ‘multiculturalism’. For example, Kim (2007: 103-104) notes that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration first started using the word ‘multicultural’ as a politically correct replacement for the term ‘mixed-blood’. As a result, notes Lee (2015: 7), subsequent Korean governments have used the term ‘multicultural family’ to refer to families consisting of a Korean spouse
and a spouse with “ethnic or cultural backgrounds different from us” (native Koreans). Furthermore, these governments used the term ‘multicultural children’ to refer to the children of Korean men and migrant brides, or of foreign men and Korean women. In other words, subsequent Korean governments have used the term ‘multiculturalism’ as a way to refer to policies on non-ethnic Korean citizens, rather than as a way of recognizing difference. This raises the question of how these integration laws and policies affect the inclusion of immigrants as South Korean citizens. In answering this question, this chapter argues that rather than recognizing difference, these policies aim to increase migrant brides’ demographic contribution to the reproduction of the South Korean nation by reconstructing migrant brides’ identities into those of the ideal, governmentally sanctioned ‘Korean’ mother. In doing so, these immigration laws and policies do not renegotiate South Korea’s exclusive mono-ethnic, mono-cultural national identity with Korean society at large, which continues to relegate those migrant brides and mixed-ethnic children that fail to meet the ethnic and cultural norms of ‘Koreanness’ to positions of second-class citizens.

As stated above, Korea’s National Assembly implemented the ‘Basic Law on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea’ (hereafter: Basic Law) in 2007. According to Younghee Shim (2010: 213-213), the Basic Law aims to “help foreigners in Korea adapt to Korean society and to use their individual abilities fully and to contribute to the development and social integration of Korea”. However, this act itself does not contain information on specific policies and as such does not go beyond a declaration of intent. Nevertheless, it is significant in so far that it requires the Korean government to formulate a ‘Basic Plan for Immigration Policy’ every five years which formulates the specific intent of South Korea’s integration programs.

In 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak administration implemented the ‘First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy’ (hereafter: Basic Plan). Ostensibly, the Basic Plan endeavors to solve migrant brides’ socio-economic problems and problems of ethno-cultural discrimination. However, the Basic Plan locates the
source of these problems in the failure of migrant brides to adapt to Korean society. For example, the Basic Plan (Ministry of Justice, 2008: 46) notes that “the failure of immigrants through marriage to adapt to Korean society undermines the foundation of families and incurs major social costs... Despite their having lived in Korea for a long time, most immigrants through marriage lack sufficient knowledge of the Korean language and culture to live conveniently in Korea... Insufficient understanding of Korean society exposes migrants through marriage to discrimination and human rights abuses”. The Basic Plan thus implies that migrant brides’ lack of knowledge of the ‘Korean culture’ is the source of their problems, rather than that the dire economic circumstances of Korea’s rural areas, or the inability of Korean citizens to negotiate with cultural differences.

As the Basic Plan formulates the content of specific integration programs, the South Korean government’s understanding of ‘multiculturalism’ as policies on non-ethnic Korean migrants is further reflected in the ‘Multicultural Family Support Law’ (hereafter: MFSL). The MFSL is the first and only law which carries out the policies detailed in the Basic Plan. According to Kim (2011: 1591), the MFSL aims to “foster a stable family life for members of multicultural families and to encourage their social integration”. The MFSL does so by providing existing migrant support NGOs with project-based funding to function as Multicultural Family Support Centers (hereafter: MFSCs), which provide government-sanctioned services to ‘multicultural families’. However, notes Nora Kim (2014: 70), although MFSCs ostensibly target ‘multicultural families’ in the broad sense, in reality they only provide services to the primary targets of South Korea’s immigration policies: migrant brides and their children.

Significantly, MFSCs’ support programs shape migrant brides into ideal ‘Korean’ mothers who are tasked to reproduce the ‘Korean’ nation. They do so by assisting non-ethnic Korean migrant brides with their task of motherhood and by facilitating the assimilation of these migrant brides into Korean society culture so that these can raise their children as ‘Korean’ children. According to Younghee Shim (2010: 213-214), MFSCs do this by offering their support services based on preconceived notions of
Korean women’s life-cycles. These pass from ‘preparation for marriage’, to ‘pregnancy and child-birth’, to ‘child-rearing’ and ‘entering the labor market. As such, MFSCs prioritize migrant brides’ role as mothers regardless of these brides’ educational background, work experience or career goals and expect them to go through the same cycles as the ideal ‘Korean woman’.

The content of MFSCs’ specific support measures further evidence the aim of the South Korean government to use migrant brides to reproduce the Korean nation. For example, Kim (2011: 1593-1595) notes that MFSCs provide Korean language and culture classes to migrant brides through the Korean Immigration and Integration Program; provide marriage education to Korean spouses; provide support for victims of domestic violence; provide pre- and post-natal care in the form of home-visits by child-rearing specialists before birth and nurse-support specialists after birth, provide education on ‘good parenthood’ and provide education which teaches parents to assist their children with reading, writing and homework; prevent discrimination against members of multicultural families and offer extracurricular Korean language and culture classes to Korean children. Thus, MFSCs emphasize migrant brides’ reproductive function and multicultural families’ assimilation into Korean society. However, through these policies the MFSL and MFSCs further institutionalize South Koreans’ normative demand of migrant brides’ socio-cultural assimilation into Korean society as ‘Korean’ wives, daughters-in-law and mothers as criterion of their citizenship.

Another example of recent legal changes is the fact that the Ministry of Health and Welfare (2011: 265) recently declared that it will provide all ‘multicultural families’ with subsidies on childcare and education for children between 0 and 5 years old, regardless of their income. By providing migrant brides with benefits through MFSC support measures and special subsidies, the Korean government expects to relieve migrant brides’ socio-economic problems and thus continue to use these brides as a tool to solve South Korea’s economic problems. Simultaneously however, these special support measures have a significant downside for migrant brides’ social integration. Namely, as the government
provides support programs through the MFSL and not through the regular welfare system, these support measures are only available to migrant brides and not to native Koreans with similar socio-economic problems. As a result, to speak in Radtke’s terms (2010: 291-298) the governments’ ‘multicultural’ support policies create ‘the migrant bride’ as a separate, minority social group and thus makes it differences irreconcilable with the majority population. Namely, the Hankyoreh (2012: 1) notes that special support measures for migrant brides constitute these brides as a social group which is a beneficiary of the Korean government and as such, either an object of pity – for requiring Korean help – or an object of scorn – for taking away ‘Korean’ resources from (ethnic) Korean families. As such, the government’s ‘multicultural’ integration laws and policies for ‘multicultural families’ function as a double-edged sword that can actually hinder their integration into South Korean society.

In conclusion, South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ laws and support measures intend to resolve migrant brides' most stringent problems of economic destitution and ethno-cultural discrimination. However, these support measures are predicated on migrant brides’ function in reproducing the Korean nation and on their assimilation into Korean society. In fact, rather than instituting a multiculturalism predicated on the notion of recognizing difference, the South Korean government attributes migrant brides’ economic problems and problems of socio-cultural discrimination to their lack of understanding ‘Korean culture’. In doing so, the South Korean government fails to renegotiate Korea’s mono-ethnic, mono-cultural national identity with South Korea’s society at large, which relegates those migrant brides and mixed-ethnic children that fail to meet the ethnic and cultural norms of ‘Koreaness’ to positions of second-class citizenship. What further exacerbates this problem is the fact that support measures aimed at multicultural families constitute ‘the migrant bride’ and her ‘multicultural family’ as dependent social groups and thus perpetuate their differences from South Korea’s ‘indigenous’ population. This speaks of the need for the South Korean government to engage Korean society as a whole to negotiate its self-identification with a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural national identity in order to facilitate the easier
integration of immigrations as South Korean citizens. In order to see whether and how the South Korean government aims to do so, the next chapter investigates how the contents of South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’ re-negotiate what it means to ‘Korean’ in Korea’s multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society.
As the previous chapter elucidated, subsequent South Korean governments promoted the marriage migration of migrant brides order to solve the demographic problem of a low national birthrate and low rates of marriage in the countryside. Consequently, the number of children born out of ‘multicultural families’ increased rapidly, from 44,258 children in 2007 to 183,732 in 2015. Given the fact that the majority of these children has been born in the past five years, 67,806 of these children are currently of school-going age out of which 47,297 children (71.2%) attend elementary school. Although this number seems small, the amount of ‘multicultural students’ as a percentage of the total number of South Korean students has increased rapidly, from 0.44% in 2010 to 1.07% in 2014 (Ministry of Education, 2015: 1). However, these ‘multicultural students’ encounter a variety of interrelated problems at school which prevent them from attaining equal participation in the South Korean education system. Most importantly, note Kim et al (2009: 169-173), these students suffer from underdeveloped Korean language abilities, a poorly developed scholastic attitude and problems of social exclusion by their peers.

In response, notes Lee (2015: 6-8) the Roh Moo-Hyun administration announced in 2006 that the South Korean government would implement ‘multicultural education’ in Korean schools “as a solution to underachievement in schooling and minority disintegration”. The Lee Myung-Bak administration subsequently implemented ‘multicultural education’ in 2009 as part of the seventh curriculum. This development is important because the national school system, as one of the state’s primary tools for nation-building, has the potential to bridge the difference between South Korea’s multi-ethnic, multi-

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8 Reflecting the ethnic and national origins of their parents, 57,856 children (31.4%) have a Vietnamese background, 42,791 children (23.2%) have a Chinese background; 30,039 children (16.3%) have an ethnic-Korean Chinese background, 20,584 children (11.1%) have a Filipino background and 17,195 (9.3%) have a Japanese background (Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs, 2015: 1).
cultural reality and the vision of a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural national community which is still dominant under South Korea’s population at large. This raises several questions, such as why ethnic Korean children exclude their ‘multicultural’ peers, how the Lee Myung-Bak administration implemented ‘multicultural education’ into its elementary school textbooks and how this influences the existing dynamics of contact between ethnic Korean students and ‘multicultural students.

‘Multicultural Children’ and the Politics of Belonging

In explaining the causes which lead ethnic Korean children to exclude their ‘multicultural’ peers, this sub-chapter argues that Korean parents and the mass media inculcate into ethnic Korean children ethnocentric viewpoints even before these encounter ‘multicultural’ students at elementary school. For example, ethnic Korean parents believe in the oneness of the Korean culture, ethnic group and nation and have no experience in living together with people with a different ethnicity. As such, argue Ji and Kim (2010: 81-105), these parents share no affection for immigrants as members of the same national community and inculcate into their children emotional distance from their ‘multicultural’ peers and a reluctance to accept people with a different ethnicity as a member of the Korean nation. Subsequently, the media exacerbate this emotional distance because they inculcate stereotypes regarding ‘multicultural families’ in the minds of ethnic Korean children. For example, the media distinguish in their appraisal of different groups of migrants depending on their origin. For example, Song (2013: 59-62) notes that whereas the Korean media portray migrant brides from the United States and Europe as independent women who are able to critique Korean society freely, they migrant brides from South-East Asia as incompetent mothers who need to adapt to Korean society as quickly as possible. The result of

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9 This study limits itself to elementary school social science (Korean: sahoehak), language (Korean: kuko) and ethics (Korean: dodŏk) textbooks, because the government is the sole provider of these textbooks. Consequently, every student has access to the same classroom materials across Korea. The analysis of these textbooks will therefore most accurately display the type of citizen the South Korean government wants to form through its ‘multicultural education’.
these stereotypes is that ethnic Korean students from a young age onwards develop a strong sense of ethnocentrism and a hierarchical preference for specific nations.

Further exacerbating the social distance between ethnic Korean students and ‘multicultural’ students is the fact that the underdeveloped Korean language abilities and scholastic aptitude of ‘multicultural students’ prohibits these from integrating into the classroom. Namely, Han and Kim (2011: 39-45) note that migrant brides, who are responsible for raising their children, impart in their children a handicap in the development of their Korean language abilities. As a result, ‘multicultural’ students fail to understand the contents of their schoolwork and have difficulty in getting along with their classmates. Furthermore, because these students have little contact with their ethnic Korean peers, they feel little sense of scholastic competition, neglect their studies and obtain poor grades. This combination of underdeveloped language abilities and poor scholastic attitude exacerbates the social distance that ethnic Korean students feel toward ‘multicultural students’ in class. The direct result of this social distance, according to a survey held by Uyŏp Shim (2010: 55) under 718 ethnic Korean elementary school children in Seoul and Kangwondo, is that a mere 24.5% believed that ‘multicultural students’ belong to the Korean national community, whereas 27.6% regarded them as foreigner-cum-Korean, 17.9% regarded them as foreigners and 24.7% did not know which category they belong to.

As such, ethnic Korean students develop from a young age onwards a strong ethnocentric preference based on the belief in the oneness of the Korean culture, ethnicity and nation. This ethnocentric preference is combined with a complicated mixture of discriminatory views based on the Other’s country of origin, skin color and cultural and language differences. This social distance leads ethnic Korean students to exclude ‘multicultural students’ from their national community and as fellow classmates. The question is how South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’ tackles these problems in order to attain its self-set goal of ‘minority integration’.
Multicultural Education and the Meaning of ‘Culture’

When the Roh Moo-Hyun administration proposed implementing ‘multicultural education’ in Korea’s national curriculum it understood the need to address the ethnocentric preferences of South Korea’s student population as a whole. Consequently, the Roh administration tasked Seoul National University’s Multicultural Education Center with developing a ‘multicultural curriculum’. However, a recent evaluation of the implementation of the seventh ‘multicultural curriculum’ carried out by the Multicultural Education Center (Cho, 2010a: 7-10) notes that at that time policymakers were divided on multicultural education’s goals, target groups and contents because the administration had only recently introduced multiculturalism as new, guiding policy for Korean society. The Roh administration did define several goals for Korea’s multicultural education, including ‘reducing the emphasis on mono-ethnicity’, ‘inducing respect for different cultures’, ‘lessening prejudices’ and ‘providing global citizenship education’. However, it failed to define how this multicultural education was to achieve these goals. As such, rather than identifying a coherent vision on multicultural education and revising the national curriculum as a whole, the Roh administration’s ‘multicultural education’ reflected the definition of the ‘multicultural’ as ‘not ethnic Korean’. As such, multicultural education consists of education for ‘the multicultural’ – or the provision of Korean language and cultural education for the ‘multicultural student’, or education on ‘the multicultural’ – or the provision of information to ethnic Korean students on culturally and ethnically ‘non-Korean’ nations. It is to the latter type of ‘multicultural education’ that this paper turns. The question is how Korea’s ‘multicultural’ curriculum has identified Korea’s national community vis-à-vis other cultural, ethnic and national ‘Others’? And how does this affect ethnic Korean students’ relation with their ‘multicultural’ peers? In order to answer these questions, this chapter first analyzes how the multicultural curriculum defines the South Korean nation. Secondly, this chapter analyzes how the curriculum positions the South Korean nation relative to ‘other’ nations. Thirdly, this chapter analyzes the way in which the curriculum describes the position of migrant
minority groups within the South Korean nation-state. Finally, this chapter suggests how South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’ affects the relationship between ethnic Korean students and ‘multicultural students’.

On Ethnic Nationalism

Following South Korea’s democratization, the South Korean state obtained a broad societal base of legitimacy. As such, the state transitioned from defining itself as the antonym of its socialist, political ‘Other’ in the North towards defining itself as a ‘democratic’, ‘modern’ and ‘advanced’ nation-state in a global hierarchy of ‘Other’ nation-states. However, despite the fact that the Korean state started defining itself vis-à-vis ‘Other’ nation-states the state continued to define the Korean nation, as depicted in Korea’s national curriculum, in ethnic terms. For example, Moon (2013: 428) notes that the Kim Young-Sam administration kept using the national curriculum to emphasize the ethnic and cultural homogeneous identity of Koreans. Simultaneously, the Kim administration replaced part of the curriculum’s anti-communist political content with ‘modern’ topics such as changing gender roles in Korean society, environmental durability, human rights and Korea’s international image. In doing so, the curriculum endeavored to create versatile, ‘modern’ Koreans who could compete on the global labor market. Subsequently, note So et al (2012: 800), the national curriculum under Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun continued to reflect this combination of ethnic nationalism and ‘modern’ values.

Significantly, the ‘multicultural’ seventh curriculum continues to define the Korean nation in ethnically and culturally homogeneous terms. The fifty-two social science, language and ethics textbooks released as part of the seventh curriculum do this by substituting the traditions of the Koeran ethnic group with the traditions of the Korean nation. For example, according to Cho and Park (2014: 10), these textbooks depict ‘Korean nationals’ without exception as characters with an ‘ethnic Korean appearance’ with black hair, black eyes and yellow skin. Furthermore, these characters engage in
cultural practices association with the Korean ethnic group and wear ‘traditional’ Korean clothes, craft ‘traditional’ Korean pottery and live in ‘traditional’ Korean houses. Social studies, ethics and language textbooks thus provide little to no content on ethnic or cultural minority groups within the South Korean state.

At the same time, these textbooks portray Koreans’ ethnic homogeneity as an important characteristic of the South Korean national community. For example, according to Moon (2013: 433) ethics textbooks emphasize the ethnically and culturally homogeneous character of the South Korean nation in sections such as “love for the Korean nation as the driving force behind the development of the Korean national community” and “Love for the Korean nation as the driving force of reunification” (with the DPRK). Specifically, in regard to the latter in particular, textbooks portray “ethnic heterogenization due to prolonged division as something that must be avoided in all costs”. As such, these textbooks leave little space for the incorporation of ethnic or cultural minority groups that differ from the Korean norm.

Interestingly, Moon (ibid: 433) notes that some textbooks do appeal to ethnic Korean students to tolerate cultural differences, respect citizens of ‘multicultural’ backgrounds and to think of ways to incorporate North Korean refugees, naturalized citizens and other immigrants into one Korean community. Thus, even as these ‘multicultural’ textbooks emphasize the ethnically and culturally homogeneous character of the South Korean nation, they create a tension, if not direct contradiction to this image by appealing to ethnic Korean students to think of the possibilities to integrate culturally and ethnically ‘Other’ groups within South Korea’s national community. Moreover, the fact that South Korea’s ‘multicultural curriculum’ emphasizes the ethnically and culturally homogeneous character of the Korean nation implies that ‘multicultural students’ are at best tolerated as members of the Korean nation, but never in possession of all ethnic and cultural qualifications and therefore never equal.
The fact that only a minority of 24.5% of ethnic Korean elementary school students conceives of ‘multicultural students’ as co-nationals to begin with raises the question how the national curriculum describes the countries of origin of South Korea’s ‘foreign’ multicultural families and whether and how these descriptions contribute to the multicultural curriculum’s goal of ‘inducing respect for different cultures’ and ‘lessening prejudices’. In order to answer this question, the next sub-chapter of this paper investigates the ‘multicultural contents’ regarding culturally and ethnically ‘non-Korean’ groups outside of the Korean nation-state, before returning to the depiction of immigrants within South Korea.

On ‘Other’ Nations

When describing other nations, South Korea’s elementary school textbooks juxtapose the aforementioned ethnically and culturally homogeneous descriptions of the Korean nation-state with essential depictions of ‘Other’ nation-states. For example, Cho and Park (2014: 13) note that these textbooks juxtapose South Korea to other ‘developed’ countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan. In doing so, these textbooks utilize one-dimensional, culturally and ethnically homogeneous conceptions of the nation-state in order to describe the ‘essence’ of these countries. These textbooks thus describe the inhabitants of Germany as white people with blonde hair and blue eyes who believe in Christianity. Similarly, the inhabitants of Japan are yellow people who wear kimonos and believe in Shinto.

However, these textbooks reveal a qualitative difference in their descriptions of ‘underdeveloped’ nation-states in Asia and Africa. Significantly, these ‘underdeveloped’ countries include the countries of origin of migrant workers and migrant brides in Korea such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Cambodia. Specifically, note Cho and Park (2014: 13), when describing these nation-state’s textbooks fail to distinguish between individual countries but rather classify them into “large ethnic or racial categories”. Furthermore, these textbooks distinguish the inhabitants of these territories...
from Koreans by portraying them with a dark skin color. As such, South Korea’s elementary school textbooks contrast ‘developed’ individual nation-states with ‘underdeveloped’ regions, and connect these contrasts between levels of ‘development’ with differences in skin color.

Furthermore, these one-dimensional descriptions of combine with subjective narratives on the history and development of ‘developed’ countries and contrast these with ‘underdeveloped’ regions. For example, Cho and Park (2014: 12) argue that social science textbooks describe ‘developed’ countries such as the United States, Germany, South Korea and Japan as responsible for “resolving global problems, the unification of international society and maintaining world peace”. Conversely, these textbooks portray ‘underdeveloped’ Asian and African nation-states as the origin of “social injustice, poverty, regional conflict, environmental issues and terrorism”. As such, it is the responsibility of ‘developed’ nation-states such as South Korea to help these ‘underdeveloped’ regions reach ‘modern’, ‘advanced’ levels of development. For example, Lee (2013: 64-84) notes that these textbooks emphasize South Korea’s position of relative superiority towards ‘other’ nation-states in sections of global citizenship by focusing on South Korea’s responsibility to help the dark-skinned inhabitants of poor, exploited and sick ‘Third World countries’. As such, these textbooks are indicative of South Korea’s new self-identification as a ‘developed’ nation-state among other ‘modern’ nation-states. However, in order to teach its students to identify with this particular image of Korea’s national community the national curriculum, to speak in Said’s (2003: 6) terms, elevates the self to a privileged position by producing a denigrating image of ‘Other’ nation-states.

Finally, this dynamic of defining the nation by virtue of who-it-is-not provides particularly colored representations of those countries South Korea historically has a troubled relationship with. For example, Brown (2015: 55) notes that when these textbooks depict countries such as Japan, they focus on problem areas such as the ownership of Dokdo Island or the legacy of Japan’s colonization of Korea.
As a result, these textbooks inculcate into Korean elementary school children a particular type of indignant nationalism aimed at nation-states South Korea historically has a troubled relationship with.

As seen above, South Korea’s elementary school textbooks provide one-dimensional descriptions of nation-states in which they do not distinguish between ethnic and cultural variety within the nation-states in question. As such, South Korea’s elementary school textbooks do not recognize, to speak in Parekh’s (2010: 238-242) terms that ‘cultures’ contain a plurality of elements. Rather, by conflating culture, ethnicity and nation into one essential, homogeneous image these textbooks teach students that cultures, ethnic groups and nations are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, as these textbooks combine essential descriptions of ‘Other’ nations with subjective narratives on the relative development or ‘historical character’ of these nations, textbooks do not ‘reduce prejudice’ but rather perpetrate the existing ‘hierarchy of nations’ in elementary students’ national imaginary’ national imaginary. In doing so, these textbooks abet the perpetuation of negative stereotypes toward ‘multicultural families’ nation-states of origin, such as ‘underdeveloped’ Vietnam or ‘hostile’ Japan. However, this raises the question of how the seventh curriculum describes the identity of migrants once they have become citizens of the South Korean nation-state. Are ‘non-Korean’ migrants to be seen and treated differently than their co-nationals after arriving in Korea?

On Migrants in Korea

As part of the seventh curriculum’s ‘multicultural contents’, South Korea’s elementary school textbooks include sections on immigrant groups inside the Korean nation-state. However, these sections only refer to those immigrant groups designated as a South Korean government priority in the context of South Korea’s ‘multicultural society’, namely migrant workers and migrant brides. Interestingly, when these textbooks refer to these immigrant groups, they provide little more information than the socio-economic motivations behind their migration to Korea. Few sections however, include information of
the constitutive role of migrants in the social and cultural development of Korean society. For example, Lee (2015: 47) notes that out of all fourth grade textbooks only one textbook included an article on the positive contribution of resident migrant workers to Korean society. This consisted of a description of the “Eulim (Harmony) patrol guard team” which consists of Korean citizens, police officers and migrant workers from Indonesia, Vietnam and Pakistan who serve a local community where more than 4,000 migrant workers live. As such, these textbooks generally constitute migrants as homogeneous social groups which are different from domestic South Koreans and migrate to Korea to further their own self-interest. However, as these textbooks fail to describe these groups’ diverse daily lives and relationships with their fellow ethnic Korean citizens, these textbooks thus prepare ethnic Korean students to form and perpetuate stereotypes regarding immigrants in Korean society, especially in areas with few immigrants present.

In fact, rather than proffering images of migrants which are just as part of South Korea’s national community as other ethnic groups and sub-cultures in South Korean society, these textbooks constitute migrants in Korea as dependent problem groups. For example, Lee (2013: 75-76) notes that textbooks refer to non-ethnic Korean migrants as victims of ethnocentric discrimination and as dependent on the financial assistance of the Korean state and community. However, when describing these situations textbooks do not specify the specific circumstances which cause ethnic Koreans to discriminate against migrant workers, or the socio-economic problems which cause migrant brides to depend on assistance from the state. As such, these textbooks inculcate into South Korean students images of migrants as perpetually different problem groups which are dependent on South Korean society for help.

Interestingly, these textbooks indirectly suggest that the lack of understanding of ‘Korean culture’ is the cause of migrant workers and migrant brides’ social and economic misfortunes. For example, when textbooks ask students to find solutions for migrant workers economic problems, tehse
depict pictures of Korean language and culture classes as possible solutions. These textbooks thus reflect the ethnocentric bias displayed in the 2008 ‘First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy’, which implied that lack of knowledge on Korean language and ‘culture’ is the source of migrants’ social problems and human rights abuses, rather than the socio-economic conditions of Korean society or the inability of Korean citizens to engage with cultural differences.

This ethnic bias is further reflected in textbooks’ multicultural contents which specifically detail migrant brides and multicultural children. This is further reflected in textbooks’ ‘multicultural contents’ which detail migrant brides and ‘multicultural children’. For example, according to Kikyu Lee (2012: 166), third year ethics textbooks include chapters which ask students to think about the commonalities between families consisting of ‘grandparents and children’; ‘elderly parents and children’; ‘one-parent families’ and ‘multi-cultural families’. While these textbooks ostensibly try to appeal to Korean students to include immigrants as fellow members of Korean society, these textbooks distinguish between ‘normal’ Korean families and between families with a handicap and position families with a different ethnicity or culture in the latter group. In doing so, these textbooks continue to juxtapose an essential notion of the ‘Korean’ cultural and ethnic group vis-à-vis ‘Other’, ‘non-Korean’ (sub-)cultures and ethnic groups. In doing so, these textbooks imply that possessing a different culture or ethnicity in Korean society means that an individual is fundamentally different from the norm, or lacking.

This sense of lack is further expounded on in sections detailing the largest groups of permanent migrants in Korean society, namely migrant brides and ‘multicultural families’. For example, Lee (2013: 66-68) notes that the sixth grade reading textbook presents a story called ‘the fragrance that blew across the sea’. This story details the uneasy relationship between the ethnic Korean girl Han-Byŏl and her Vietnamese stepmother Huong. In this story, the textbook depicts Hong as possessing dark-brown skin and as unable to speak Korean at all. Furthermore, the textbook depicts how Han Byŏl dislikes Huong, but fails to name the reasons for her dislike. In this textbook’s homework, notes Lee (2013: 122-124),
students are asked to reflect on why Han-Byŏl dislikes Huong and how both Han-Byŏl and Huong feel in this new situation. Here, the fact that Korea’s ‘multicultural curriculum’ fails to establish a coherent vision on recognizing difference and rather includes information on the typical characteristics of non-ethnic Korean nationals shows its limits. Namely, notes Lee, without any guidelines on recognizing difference, both teachers and students answer that they too would feel uneasy with a foreigner in their family. These exercises thus fail to stimulate critical thinking on the fluidity of social categories such as ethnicity and culture, but rather reflect the hegemonic understanding of difference in skin-color or ‘culture’ as a problem. In doing so, these textbooks furthermore fail to explicate non-ethnic values that individuals can subscribe to in order to become recognized as full and equal citizens of Korean society. These textbooks thus implicitly reconfirm the hegemonic notion of the immutable ethnically and culturally homogeneous nation which may tolerate immigrants into Korean society, but only on condition of their socio-cultural assimilation.

Finally, it is important to note that the seventh, ‘multicultural’ curriculum further problematizes the lack implicit in the mixed ethnicity of multicultural children. In their depiction of ‘multicultural children’, South Korean elementary school textbooks only include the children from migrant brides. These textbooks do not include children from migrant workers or children of whom neither of the parents possess Korean blood. As such, these textbooks are reflective of the fact that migrant brides constitute the largest group of long-term migrants in Korea and the fact that under Korea’s patrilineal logic only the children of Korean men are considered ‘Korean’. However, despite this patrilineal logic, these textbooks problematize these children’s status as Koreans. For example, Kikyu Lee (2012: 168 notes that fourth year social science textbooks presents a story called ‘the quandary of Kyŏngsu’. This story presents a situation in which ethnic Korean school children bully the ‘multicultural’ and dark-skinned Jinhŭi for ostensibly ‘not being Korean’. In this situation, the ethnic Korean boy Jiwon ends up in conflict with his classmates as Jiwon asserts that his classmates are wrong for bullying Jinhŭi this way.
When these bullies become tired of fighting with Jiwon they ask Kyŏngsu to mediate and tell them how he thinks about this situation. Upon being asked this question, Kyŏngsu looks carefully at Jinhŭi’s face and goes into deep thought, thinking of whether Jinhŭi is Korean or not. However, as with the story ‘the fragrance that blew across the sea’ mentioned earlier, ‘the quandary of Kyŏngsu’ fails to answer the question whether whether Jinhŭi is Korean or not. It fails to answer this question because it does not recognize ‘multiculturalism’ as a way to recognize difference and thus does not provide Korean students guidance on possible overarching values that might serve to reconstitute their conception of the Korean nation. Rather, this story simply depicts Jinhŭi as being bullied because he is ostensibly ‘not Korean’. It does not put present Korean children’s bullying of Jinhŭi as part of the wide and pervasive social problem of bullying in South Korea. Rather, it reduces the cause of Jinhŭi’s problems to the Jinhŭi’s (lack of) ‘Koreanness’ and as such reiterates the ethno-centric assumption that the nationality of someone whose origins are not ‘pure’ ethnic Korean are suspect. Finally, by – again – leaving it up to ethnic Korean children such as Kyŏngsu to act as the final judge of Jinhŭi’s status as a ‘Korean’ national, this story makes the inclusion of immigrants into Korean society entirely contingent on the tolerance of ethnic Koreans. However, in doing so it fails to renegotiate the exclusive, immutable ethnically and culturally homogeneous national identity that renders immigrants the objects of exclusion in the first place.

As seen above, Korea’s elementary school textbooks continue to reflect the Korean state’s definition of ‘culture’ as a static, unchanging and essential conflation of ‘culture, ethnicity and nation’. Based on this understanding, Korea’s elementary school textbooks create a binary between culturally, ethnically and nationally homogeneous ‘Koreans’ and those who are not. In doing so, these textbooks strengthen the culturally and ethnically homogeneous identity of existing members of the Korean nation by emphasizing the deficiency of members who do not share these ethnic or cultural traits. By implementing ‘multicultural contents’ on the basis of this definition of culture, these textbooks reiterate
Korea’s normative cultural and ethnic homogeneity. This perpetuates the exclusion of immigrants and ethnic Korean members of South Korean society that fail to conform to Korea's normative standards of ‘Koreanness’. Furthermore, these textbooks perpetuate the objectification of non-ethnic Korean immigrants and their children by projecting the ‘lack’ of these immigrants’ ethnic and cultural origins and by failing to present an adequate image of these immigrants’ contributions to Korea’s social, cultural and economic life. Despite its good intentions, the seventh curriculum’s ‘multicultural contents’ allow and even encourage ethnic South Korean children to regard cultural and ethnic minorities as part of a fundamentally ‘non-Korean’ out-group. The question is whether and how these highly exclusionary dynamics affect the inclusion or exclusion of ‘multicultural students’ in elementary school classrooms.

Multicultural Classrooms: the Exclusion of the ‘Other’

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, ‘multicultural students’ are often the victim of bullying in elementary school classrooms. For example, Brown (2015: 46) notes a 2012 nationwide survey on ‘multicultural families’ conducted by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family affairs concluded that 8.5% of all ‘multicultural children’ suffered from various forms of violence at school. According to this report, 66.5% of these students reported being threatened or insulted with abusive language, 34.7% reported that they experienced group ostracization, 16.3% reported that they were hit or locked in a confined area and 15.3% reported that their classmates stole their belongings. However, given ethnic Korean children’s ethnocentric bias and the pervasive nature of bullying as a social problem in South Korean classrooms, these numbers seem surprisingly low. Significantly, notes the Chosun Ilbo (2012: 1), a 2011 survey by Korea’s National Human Rights Commission presented completely different numbers and concluded that up to 37% of all ‘multicultural children’ gets bullied.

Although it is difficult to verify the exact percentage of ‘multicultural students’ that gets bullied, it is certain that bullying puts significant pressure on those multicultural students that suffer from it.
Namely, the Hankyoreh (2012: 1) notes that because of the combination of language problems, poor academic performance and bullying, 36% of all ‘multicultural students’ drop out of school by the time they are in elementary school, 51% by middle school and 69% by high-school. This creates significant socio-cultural problems for South Korean society. Namely, because ‘multicultural students’ drop out of school at such early ages they become confined to the lowest rungs of the Korean labor market and thus constitutes this group as a special category of second-class citizens. Furthermore, as non-ethnic Korean children disappear out of view from ethnic Korean children from a young age onwards, the school system is unable to inculcate into these children a common national feeling of belonging.

In fact, South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’, in its current form, arguably serves to exacerbate these problems by juxtaposing ethnic Koreans’ supposed ethnically and culturally homogeneous national identity against those of ‘Other’ sub-cultures, ethnic groups and nations. For example, Han and Kim (2011: 41-42) note that ethnic Korean children actually bully ‘multicultural children’ more after reviewing the ‘multicultural contents’ in textbooks. This is because multicultural education in its current form emphasizes the differences of ‘multicultural students’ based on their parents’ nation-state of origin, in disregard of the student’s country of birth. As such, ‘multicultural education’ turns the ‘multicultural student’ into a representative of the nation of origin of its parents, and ties the identity of the student to the level of development and historic legacy of this nation-state. This is corroborated by Brown (2015: 54), who notes that following elementary school textbooks’ description of South-East Asian migrant brides as ‘mail order brides’, ethnic Korean students started teasing ‘multicultural students’ whose parents hailed from the Philippines. Significantly, ethnic Korean students discriminate against their ‘multicultural’ peers even more following lessons regarding countries with a historically difficult relation with the Korean peninsula. For example, Han (2011: 42) and Brown (2015: 55) both note that following history lessons which portray countries such as Japan, China and Mongolia as perpetrators of acts of aggression against Korea, Korean children take revenge on
‘multicultural children’. These ethnic Korean children beat ‘multicultural children’ up, hide their belongings or ostracize them from them in class.

Interestingly, ‘multicultural students’ deal with this exclusion differently based on the narrative that they are assigned through the contents of South Korea’s ‘multicultural curriculum’ and the dynamics in class. For example, Brown (2015: 55) notes that ethnic Korean students initially bully Japanese-Korean students out of anger over the Japan’s historical transgressions towards Korea. However, because Japanese-Korean students share the same physiological characteristics as ethnic Korean students, because their Japanese parent hails from a ‘developed’ country and because these students generally speak Korean well they start receiving more positive responses on their Japanese heritage as time goes by. This indicates that these students have the liberty to define themselves as ‘non-Korean’ ‘multicultural students’ and embrace this identity as an asset. In contrast, ethnic Korean students ostracize South-East Asian students comparatively much, and in particular those students with a different skin color, for being ‘poor’ and ‘inferior’.

This creates a particular dynamic in which non ethnic-Korean children that do not hail from ‘advanced’ nation-states do not possess the liberty to define themselves as a non-Korean, as a ‘multicultural’ student. Rather, most ‘multicultural students’ hide their ethnic origins. They do so, according to the Chosun Ilbo (2012: 1) by hiding the fact that one of their parents ranges from a country other than Korea, or, so notes Brown (2015: 55) by talking badly about countries such as Vietnam or the Philippines. Generally speaking, these students thus try to ‘pass’ as an ethnic South Korean student. For dark-skinned South-Asian-Korean students specifically, ‘passing’ is thus not a matter of choice but a matter of necessity if they wish to escape social ostracizement. These results are mimicked in the 2012 National Survey on Multicultural Families (cited in Brown, 2015: 60). Significantly, whereas 47.7% of Japanese-Korean children report having pride in their ‘multicultural’ origins, only 22.8% of Vietnamese-Korean children and 8.7% of Cambodian children professed having pride in their ‘multicultural origins’.
Thus, ethnic South Korean students develop from a young age onwards a strong ethnocentric preference based on a complicated mixture of discriminatory views based on the ‘Other’ country of origin, skin color, ‘mixed blood’, cultural and language differences. The fact that multicultural education in its current form fails to identify a comprehensive vision for the recognition of ethnic and cultural difference in Korean society, but rather includes ‘multicultural contents’ on ‘non-Korean’ ‘Others’ this social distance between ethnic Korean and non-ethnic Korean students. It does so by teaching ethnic Korean students to conflate culture, ethnicity in nation in one essential notion of Korean national identity which contrasts sharply with the image presented of ‘multicultural’ parents and families. Significantly, whereas ethnic Korean students ostracize Japanese students for Japan’s volatile historic relations with Korea, the relative economic development of Japan allows these ‘multicultural students’ to eventually assert their ‘multicultural’ identity as an asset. Conversely, the fact that the ‘multicultural’ curriculum reinforces prejudice towards ‘underdeveloped’ regions and nation exacerbates ethnic Korean students’ discriminatory attitudes concerning multicultural students whose parents hail from these regions. This increases the pressure for Southeast and South-Asian students to racially ‘pass’ as Korean or to drop out of school. South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’ thus fails to attain its self-set goals of ‘reducing the emphasis on mono-ethnicity’, ‘inducing respect for different cultures’, ‘lessening prejudices’ and ‘providing global citizenship education’. In order to remedy this situation, notes Seoul Nation University’s Central Multicultural Education Center (Cho, 2010: 180), it is thus vital for South Korea’s ‘multicultural curriculum’ to reduce the emphasis on ethnic consciousness, craft comprehensive guidelines for multicultural education, systematically implement more ethnically and (sub-)culturally varied content throughout schoolbooks.
This thesis established that until the late 1980’s, South Korea’s developmental state conceptualized the South Korean nation in exclusive, ethnic terms. Simultaneously, processes of spatial, social and cultural convergence, in combination with highly exclusionary immigration policies compounded this sense of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. This has left an enduring legacy in the South Korean national imaginary, which is defined as a combination of ethnic and civic terms up until this day. Simultaneously, from the late 1980s subsequent South Korean governments have redefined South Korea’s national identity in terms of Korea’s new-found status as ‘advanced’ nation-state in a globalizing world. As part of this redefinition, the Korean state facilitated the immigration of migrant workers and migrant brides into South Korea so that these could provide economic and demographic benefits to the Korean nation.

However, in doing so the Korean government continued to define South Korea’s governmentally-sanctioned national identity in ethnic terms. This shows among other things from the fact that subsequent South Korean governments have introduced a differential exclusion model which, to speak in the words of Nora Kim (2008: 579), regulate the criteria to Korean nationhood in ethnic terms. For example, the South Korean state selectively facilitates the immigration of migrant brides as new South Korean citizens, while prohibiting non-ethnic Korean migrant workers from permanently settling in Korea.

Significantly however, migrant brides’ rights to citizenship come at the obligation of demographic reproduction according to a ‘Korean’ model. This shows among other things from South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ policies which provide migrant brides with services that emphasize their reproductive function and encourage them to raise as many Korean children as possible. Significantly,
while these policies provide migrant brides with vast economic benefits to fulfil these obligations, these policies are less effective in contributing towards their integration into Korean society.

Namely, South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ policies do little to speak to South Korea’s population as a whole to redefine what it means to be Korean in a ‘multicultural’ society. In fact, these policies put heavy emphasis on the responsibility of migrant brides and their children to completely assimilate into Korean culture. At the heart of this lies the Korean government’s understanding of ‘culture’ as a homogeneous and essential conflation notion of culture, ethnicity and nation. This understanding of culture is also reflected in South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’. Rather than, to speak in Miller’s terms (1995: 138) stripping Korea’s national identity of those ethnic elements that compete with the self-understanding of minority groups, South Korea’s ‘multicultural education’ reinforces the exclusive nature of Korea’s national identity. This has significant consequences for migrant brides and especially their ‘multicultural children’. Namely, South Korea’s ‘multicultural’ integration policies institutionalize Korean society’s ethnic understanding of Korean national identity and its lopsided expectations of socio-cultural integration, which therefore continues to relegate those migrant brides and multicultural children that fail to conform to second-class citizens.

In the final analysis, the South Korean government has shown impressive effort in improving the legal rights to citizenship of both migrant workers and migrant brides. However, the government seems reluctant to redefine existing notions of Korean national identity and expects the full assimilation of migrants into Korean society. These policies therefore institutionalize Korea’s norms of ethnic and cultural ‘Koreanness’, which leads Korean society to relegate migrants that do not conform to these norms to positions as second-class citizens. That said, the Korean government continues to task policymakers and scholars to study the nature of multiculturalism and redefine its ‘multicultural’ programs. If it continues to devote attention towards enhancing its multicultural policies, it should not find it more difficult to create a multicultural society than any other nation-state.


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