In this chapter an attempt is made to analyse the way in which the Griqua contrived to establish their hegemony over the African peoples of the eastern Transkei in the decade between their arrival there in 1863 and the British take-over in 1874. Situations of alien domination are common enough in Africa, and are well nigh universal in cases of colonial rule, but any understanding of the dynamics of political life in such circumstances depends on isolating the important variables on both sides of the line, among the dominators as well as among the dominated. This paper does not attempt to build any kind of model of the possible interrelationships, for this is beyond its scope, but rather to present a detailed account of a particular instance of this process, and so to point to fruitful comparisons that may illumine not only Griqua-African relations, but equally the problems that faced both whites and Africans in establishing their domination in southern Africa, and, specifically, in the Transkei.

The arrival of the Griqua in Nomansland
The Griqua people had emerged during the eighteenth century in the Cape Colony. They were drawn from the marginal “Bastaards” who could not find acceptance in the increasingly racially
stratified, white-dominated society, but yet felt themselves to be of that society as independent farmers and stock keepers, rather than as labourers. They had set themselves up along the Orange River, where their political organisation developed a considerable sophistication. They saw themselves as superior to the Sotho-Tswana with whom they came into contact, and in the years around 1840 they made a concerted effort to assert their hegemony over much of Transorangia, attempting to gain control particularly over the Thlaping, by using as intermediaries and collaborators those of the Tswana who had come under mission influence. This attempt failed, and the Griqua in Transorangia became steadily less powerful, in competition with the Boer population that was moving north.

By the late 1850s the Griqua of Philippolis were in an intolerable position. Although sheep farming had raised a substantial number of them to a position of considerable wealth, the political pressures to which they were subjected by the Orange Free State, in whose territory they lived and with whose burghers they were interspersed, grew to such an extent that they considered that the only way in which to survive as an entity, and thus preserve any semblance of their wealth, was to trek. They could do this because they knew the land in Nomansland, across the Drakensberg, to be empty, and they visited it in 1859 and were well satisfied. The immediate spur for their decision to move was the failure of Sir George Grey's confederation scheme, which would have brought the Griqua into the Cape's orbit as British subjects, and the consequent election of Marthinus Wessel Pretorius as President of the Orange Free State. They left Philippolis from the end of 1861 onwards, spent the winter of 1862 disastrously in the Witteberg, losing many of their cattle and sheep to the combined efforts of drought and Sotho raiders, and debouched into Nomansland during the summer of 1862–3, after an epic crossing which entailed building a wagon road over the High Drakensberg at Ongeluks Nek.

The legal status both of the area into which they moved,
Charles Brownlee, African administrator and the Cape’s first Secretary for Native Affairs (1872-8).
roughly the modern districts of Matatiele, Mount Currie and Umzimkulu, and of the Griqua themselves, during and after the trek, is highly complicated. Although it may be possible to sort out the various conceptions that the actors held of the situation, from a historical point of view its ambiguity is most important. Essentially the area had been claimed by Faku of the Mpondo in his treaty with the British of 1844, but as a pre-emptive measure, for he could not establish effective control over the Bhaca, the Mpondumise and the Xesibe, who lived north of the Mpondo settlements. In 1850, in consequence of his inability to cope with cattle raids into Natal, conducted primarily by San, in alliance with the Bhaca under Ncaphayi, he ceded the area to Natal on the condition of its effective occupation. This was never forthcoming, primarily because the schemes of Theophilus Shepstone to remove large numbers of Natal’s Africans into the area were quashed by Sir George Grey. Grey it was who consented to the Griqua being allowed to move into Nomansland, despite protests from the government of Natal, but they were to move as British subjects and a British Resident was to be placed among them. As it was, no such resident was appointed, and so the Griqua enjoyed the prestige of the British connection without the constraints of supervision.

The area into which they moved was in large measure thinly populated. Although it would appear to have been the region from which many of the Cape Nguni had dispersed, the highland sourveld along the southern slopes of the Drakensberg can never have been thickly inhabited with Africans, primarily because it only provided grazing for half the year. Rather it remained, in conjunction with the Highlands of Lesotho, the haunt of San hunter-gatherers until the mid-nineteenth century, only being evacuated by them in the decade and a half before the Griqua trek. This does not, however, mean that the Griqua entered a political vacuum. On the contrary, they came into contact with numerous African peoples, over whom they attempted to establish hegemony. It is this ultimately unsuccessful process that the discus-
sion that follows attempts to describe.

**Rivalries in the eastern Transkei**

The various groups of Nguni-speakers in the eastern Transkei had, effectively, a short history, for events before the Mfecane no longer affected the political relations extant in the early 1860s. Nevertheless, in the intervening forty years much had happened to determine the reactions of individuals to the Griqua trek. The Mfecane had seen the establishment of two major powers in the area, each with their own designs and enemies, namely the Mpondo and the Bhaca. Initially moderately amicable, they fell out as the threat from the “Fetcani hordes”, notably the Qwabe, diminished, and the regent of the Bhaca, their notable leader Ncaphayi, was killed by the Mpondo. This led to the splitting of the Bhaca into two sections, one under Ncaphayi’s son, Makaula, which remained in Mount Frere, and the other under Mdutyana, which congregated on the right bank of the Mzimkulu River. This struggle formed part of an attempt by Faku to gain paramountcy over the whole of the eastern Transkei, which was helped by the treaty with the colonial government in 1844, but which ultimately failed. In pursuance of this policy, Faku came into conflict with a variety of African groups, but as they were all primarily concerned to maintain their own independence, they did not ally with the Griqua to obtain safety from the Mpondo, for Adam Kok was generally, and correctly, seen as a greater threat than Faku. Moreover, the internal fission that divided the Mpondomise and Bhaca into sections created cross-cutting enmities of great complexity.

One major rivalry, however, did persist from the Mfecane until the Le Fleur revolt of 1896, namely that between the Bhaca and the Hlangweni. Originating in the aftermath of Shaka’s devastation in southern Natal, it was maintained despite the fission of both groups, for the Hlangweni adhering to both Fodo and Sidoi appear to have retained memories of scores to be settled, as did all Bhaca. It was, moreover, exacerbated by the depositions of Fodo and
Sidoi by the British Government in Natal, on the earlier occasion in consequence of attacks made on Bhaca who were moving into the province. Fodo, who had played a considerable and important role as henchman of the Voor-trekkers during their raid on Ncaphayi, was removed in 1846, and then migrated to Nomansland, where many of his followers gathered around him. Sidoi’s did likewise after he fled from the colonial forces in 1857. Across the Mzimkulu, the two groups continued a bickering warfare of raid and counter-raid, into which the Griqua were drawn for two main reasons. First, a group of “Hottentots”, who had been rebels on the Kat River and who were led by Smith Pommer, fell foul of the Bhaca under Mdutyana because of their random cattle raiding from their base near Mount Currie. These men naturally assimilated to the Griqua on their arrival, for Pommer had been in contact with Kok before the trek. As Pommer gained a position of eminence within Griqua society, in consequence of his following and force of personality, the Griqua naturally became party to his quarrels. Furthermore, a party of Griqua, who appear to have been on a hunting trip over the Berg in advance of the main trek, were massacred by Bhaca who stormed a laager that included Griqua as well as the Hlangweni who had been raiding Bhaca cattle.

Rival Claimants to Nomansland
The Griqua were by no means the only people who coveted and moved into Nomansland around 1860. As one of the few areas of empty country in South Africa, it was widely desired at a time when the increase of population made land much scarcer than heretofore. The various “coloureds” either in Pommer’s following or among the more peaceable inhabitants of Pearcetown, on the Ibesi River, or in the Gatberg were not, however, the greatest threat to Griqua hegemony, for this came from Nehemiah Moshweshwe, who from 1859 onwards had been attempting to set up a principality around Matatiele. He had moved down from Lesotho in part in an attempt to forestall the establishment of a rival Sotho state under Letele, the senior Kwena chief, and Lehana, successor to
Sekonyella as head of the Tlokwa. The frustrations of being a highly able junior son, who had no chance of power within the Sotho state, must also have weighed with him. Nehemiah could not by himself command much force — according to Sir Walter Currie, he had but 50 fighting men with him in 1861 — but he could call on the numbers and experience of Lesotho, and above all of the mountain bandits of the south, notably Poshuli, whose power had already been exercised over the Drakensberg against the Mpondomise. Moreover he was attempting to fill the same niche as the Griqua themselves, as educated overlord of the Bantu-speaking tribes, and was, so it was rumoured, in cahoots with the Mpondo to drive out the Griqua, for the better division of Nomansland. It is thus not surprising that a “regular system of stealing developed between Nehemiah’s followers and those of Adam Kok”. With the outbreak of the war between the Sotho and the Orange Free State at the beginning of 1865, Nehemiah’s position became untenable, for it had always rested on the power across the mountains that was now fully engaged, and the smallest show of Griqua force, not even directly aimed at him, was sufficient to drive him away. Thus the Griqua position was secured, and further enhanced at Sotho expense when a highly successful raid was launched on the Sotho flocks and herds that had been moved to the highlands, away from the Free State armies. The economic resurgence of the Griqua, such as it was, dates from this raid.

With the threat of competition from Nehemiah removed, and their own level of subsistence, which had been very greatly reduced by the rigours of the trek and the difficulties of accustoming themselves and their stock to the new environment, increasing, the Griqua were able to cope effectively with those amongst whom they lived. They could not, evidently, treat all their neighbours in like fashion. Although they had managed to baulk Natal’s efforts to gain control over Nomansland and had thus incurred a long-lasting enmity, the Griqua had to maintain a façade of politeness towards the Natal government, and to refrain from
open conflict. Their own position depended in part on the prestige that they gained from the British connection, for in an ill-defined and informal way the British were, even before annexation, the arbiters of inter-tribal rivalries throughout the Transkei. The intense dislike the Griqua felt for Natal was well known by the Cape Government and in London, and so, aided by the possibility of playing Cape Town off against Pietermaritzburg, Adam Kok was able to keep the Natalians out of his territory. On one occasion he even sought to increase the extent that was recognised as his by granting some, which was refused as too paltry, to Natal.\textsuperscript{21} Border incidents were not infrequent, especially after Natal annexed Alfred county in 1866, for this area formed the route by which Griqua raided Mpondo and were raided by them.\textsuperscript{22} The fulminations of successive governors of Natal against the iniquities of Griqua rule in Nomansland perhaps increased the odium in which the community was held, and so lessened their chances of continued independence.

A similar relationship of hostile neutrality existed between the Griqua and the Mpondo. Both of these powers, as also Natal, had as their ultimate aim suzerainty over the eastern Transkei, and Faku had protested as vigorously and as unavailingly as Shepstone or Scott against the Griqua trek.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, although the Griqua did not scruple to aid Jojo of the Xesibe or the Nci in their attempts to gain their independence from Faku – because of the cattle forthcoming from the various raids, if for no other reason – neither Adam Kok and his councillors, nor Faku, Mqikela, his successor, and theirs, dared commit significant resources to a challenge of the other party. In part this arose from a mutual acknowledgement of military parity. The Griqua were always conscious of their own lack of numbers, and had not succeeded in building a large enough following among the subject African populations to cope with the strength of the Mpondo who, in their turn, realised that the cannon and mounted riflemen of the Griqua constituted the single most effective force in the Transkei.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, of course, the eyes of the British, both in the
Cape and in Natal, were on the relationship, and would not permit an open struggle for paramountcy between them, for the British had settled the border lines between the two powers and, in the interests both of prestige and border security, wished these to be maintained. The Natal government was thus instrumental in settling one particular bout of cattle raiding through the Ingeli mountains. It can thus be seen that both Griqua and Mpondo leaders realised that they did not operate in a political vacuum, and could not afford to base their calculations on such an assumption. Forces external to the pure problems of diplomatic mechanics were too great to be disregarded, if any desired solution was to be achieved. North of the Ingeli mountains, such constraints operated much more loosely. It was over the modern districts of Umzimkulu, Mount Currie, Mount Frere, Matatiele, Mount Fletcher and perhaps Mount Ayliff, that the Griqua attempted to establish their hegemony, while trying to build up a following among the “coloureds”, many of them of Griqua origin, in the Gatberg, modern Maclear. Rather over 2 000 Griqua were thus to be an aristocracy over more than 40 000 Africans. The task of control was immense, although the fact that many of the African tribes only arrived in the area after the Griqua themselves eased the problem somewhat. Only Umzimkulu and Mount Frere were at all thickly populated in 1860, for Mount Fletcher was settled in 1869 as a deliberate move on the part of the British Government to reduce the pressure on land in the Witteberg reserve while Matatiele, which contained a few Sotho at the time of the Griqua trek, received many more as the 1860s progressed, particularly in the aftermath of the Orange Free State-Sotho war.

The Nature of Griqua rule
It is important to note that Griqualand remained, even as late as the 1870s, an open society, in that it received individuals of whatever background. It is thus rather difficult to write of the “Griqua”, as distinct from the “Bantu” or the “Africans”, for there were many people whom it would be difficult to assign to any category. Jan July, for
instance, was born a Sotho, and may well have died one, for he was prominent in the Basotho rebellion of 1880, unlike almost all other Griqua, but, having gained the confidence of Adam Kok, he was a leading figure in the Griqua government from the trek to annexation, and became a *Veld Kornet.*\(^\text{27}\) It would appear that his case was not unique, but rather that a steady trickle of persons of Sotho or Nguni origin, who had for some reason or other become detached from their original society, was accepted into the Griqua community. Although there was a clear distinction made between those who lived a “tribal” life and were thus liable for hut-tax, and those who were “Griqua” and eligible for a “plaas”, the line could be crossed by individuals in both directions.

Donald Strachan was an example of this ambiguity. Ethnically he was undoubtedly white, being a first generation immigrant from Europe, and he was always accepted as such by the white community of Natal and the Cape, for he served for a time as magistrate under the Cape Government, was a member of a major parliamentary commission and was for one session M.L.A. for East Griqualand. As against this, he was a Griqua burgher throughout the 1860s and 1870s, having preceded the Griqua into Nomansland, setting up a successful trading business for himself and his brother Thomas. He was so far accepted that they made him both *Veld Kornet* and Magistrate over Umzimkulu, where he lived.\(^\text{28}\) Moreover, he was highly fluent in all the Bantu dialects with which he came into contact, and was trusted enough to be able to build up a regiment of Africans under his personal command.\(^\text{29}\) The precise composition of this body is unfortunately unknown, but no doubt many of its members were men without affiliation or power in the tribal system, who looked to Strachan and through him to the Griqua captaincy for status and for law.

This was one of the ways in which the African population of Umzimkulu was brought under the Griqua system of control. Some members of small kraals accepted the control of whoever was able to impose it. The great pro-
portion of the inhabitants of Umzimkulu were, however, either Bhaca or Hlangweni. Sidoi, as we have seen, was always a firm ally of the Griqua, especially as the fortunes of Smith Pommer, his closest acquaintance and partner, waxed within the captaincy. For all that Sidoi had married a daughter of the Bhaca chief Ncaphayi, the Hlangweni alliance between him and Fodo appears to have held, and Fodo maintained a close relationship to the Griqua, perhaps in part because they gave him support against his brother Nondabula. In this case, however, it is difficult to see who was using whom, for Fodo and his son, Nkisiwana, were able to exploit the divisions between Pommer and Donald Strachan, so that they gave Pommer the chance to move into Strachan’s ward and “eat up” Nondabula. Strachan, in fact, appears to have been able to prevent the relevant Griqua government commission coming to a decision, for, in the relationship of power then current at Mount Currie, any definite outcome would have gone against him.

The Bhaca of Umzimkulu present an even more complicated picture. Essentially, the Griqua attempted to divide and rule, but although their divisive techniques were highly successful, this did not increase their ability to rule, as both the occasions on which they attempted to impose their authority led merely to the emigration of the chief whom they were disciplining, along with his followers. On the first occasion, on the death of Mdutyana, the Bhaca under him showed all the classic symptoms of impending fission. The chief of the great house, Cijisiwe, was a minor, as was the chief of the right hand house, Nomtsheketshe, who had been favoured by his father. Thiba, the uncle and regent, was thus in a strong position, until Nomtsheketshe came of age, when he returned from living with another section of the Bhaca people and demanded an inheritance to which he was not strictly entitled. After a certain amount of fighting between the two factions, the Griqua imposed a solution, dividing the Bhaca people between Nomtsheketshe and Thiba, while the two protagonists were fined one and four hundred cattle respectively. The Griqua govern-
ment were no doubt highly gratified at establishing a puppet, for Thiba had previously displayed reluctance in the vital matter of paying taxes.\(^{33}\) This rebounded against them, however, for in the next year, an attempt to collect a small fine from Thiba was prosecuted with considerable vigour, Thiba himself showed signs of resistance, and on the appearance of a large Griqua force he fled across the river into Natal, with most of his followers and stock.\(^{34}\) Although a fair number of these Bhaca later returned to their old lands, where, chiefless, they were more easily governable, many others, including Thiba and Cjiswe, remained in Natal, or began engaging in such activities as transport riding, which later enabled them to buy up Griqua farms.\(^{35}\) Nomsheketse, in his turn, fell foul of the Griqua authorities some two years later, apparently for condoning the smelling out of witches, which resulted in the burning of two. He was forced to move to Pondoland, although, again, the evidence suggests that many of his followers remained in Umzimkulu.\(^{36}\)

West of the main Griqua settlements, the Sotho who filled the country did so on the understanding that they came under Griqua authority, even though they later claimed that such authority was bestowed by the British government. As has been noted, the greatest influx came during and after the Free State War, as was the case with the most important of these, Magwai, whose “mountain fortress” was stormed in December 1867,\(^{37}\) while other headmen, such as Mosi Lipheana and Letuka Morosi, had been in the area since the expulsion of Nehemiah.\(^{38}\) By 1875, Matatiele district contained, according to the census, 5,728 Sotho and 2,529 Mfengu, who had drifted up from the west, seeking land, or, in at least one notable case, refuge.\(^{39}\)

These groups were all small, unlike the three units that migrated from Herschel district into Mount Fletcher at the instance of Sir Philip Wodehouse in 1868. There they remained and the Griqua never seem to have made any attempt to impose their control over any of them, although the squabbles between Lehana, the Tlokwa chief, and the
Mpondomise, and between him, Lebenya, a Sotho leader, and Zibi, the Hlubi chief, may well have been sufficient to allow effective intervention, had the area remained independent much longer. In that case events may well have taken the course exemplified by Griqua dealings with Makaula, the Bhaca chief who lived in Mount Frere. Although initially he and the Griqua had been moderately amicable, as the Griqua became more securely settled in Nomansland relations deteriorated, and, almost inevitably, a series of cattle raids and counter-raids developed. On the Griqua side, these were conducted primarily, so it would seem, by Mfengu and Sotho from Matatiele, rather than by Griqua themselves. A certain Ncukana, a Hlubi, was the most prominent of these raiders. This does not mean, however, that the Griqua did not realise what was going on, or were not responsible for the border warfare, for, as occurred when similar expeditions went into Pondoland, it was possible for the Griqua to restrain their subjects if necessary. No doubt Makaula could have imposed similar restrictions on his border kraals should he so have desired. Both sides believed that they were right, and were able to convince their missionaries that they were. Thus William Dower at Mount Currie wrote:

A Kaffir tribe lying on our northern border has been making frequent raids into Griqua territory, killing, burning and stealing and, as it turns out now, all with a view to provoke hostilities. Capt. Kok sent once and again a deputation or commission of peace, but without effect. I had hoped that an outbreak might be prevented but all efforts in that direction failed. Capt. Kok did not call out his commando before several of his subjects had been killed and several huts burnt down and a quantity of stock stolen, chiefly belonging to the Basuto residing under Adam Kok’s rule. In contrast Charles White, the Wesleyan missionary with Makaula, related that “Makaula says it is because he stopped the stealing of cattle from Natal and sent them back that Adam Kok has sent his army laying his country waste.” At all events, the Griqua commando, which, as
it only comprised burghers of two *Veld Kornetcies* and the Africans from across the Mzimvubu, was far from the largest force the Griqua could field, rampaged through Makaula’s country, burnt a large number of huts and captured in all 1,400 cattle, 500 horses and 1,700 sheep, with the consequence that Makaula soon sued for peace, as he and his followers had been driven over the Tina River into Mpondonise country.

The war with the Bhaca was the last time that the Griqua had to assert their authority. In general, in fact, they were able to rule Nomansland with remarkably little difficulty. This was for four main reasons. In the first place, they were obviously more formidable than any African tribe on its own, and the Transkei was sufficiently split between various factions and sub-tribes to make large scale alliance against the Griqua impossible. Secondly, the Griqua were moderately astute in their handling of these factional differences, so that some, at least, of the African tribes held to the Griqua in order to use them against other Africans. Thirdly, the Griqua controlled what was by the 1860s the only land in the area that was still unoccupied, and thus had a valuable asset with which the loyalties of landless men could be secured. Fourthly, the duties that the Griqua imposed on those who came under their rule were far from heavy, although they were vital to the survival of the Griqua in Nomansland. The military service was scarcely onerous, especially as it was frequently directed against those who were the old or recent enemies of the militia itself. It was perhaps a greater strain on the loyalties of the Africans when they were forbidden to indulge in what were potentially highly lucrative cattle raids. Thus the Griqua had little difficulty in compensating for their own lack of numbers, for all that African troops do not ever seem to have been as effective in the field as the Griqua themselves.

The Griqua also felt a duty to impose a code of laws more in accord with the ways of the Cape Colony – of Christian civilisation as they saw it – than with the traditional systems of the peoples they ruled. In part this was to avoid the taunt...
of savagery that was being hurled at them by Natalians who coveted their farms, but the Griqua had a long history of imitating white ways of government. Adam Kok did, however, realise that the imposition of new laws might strain the legal competence of his state beyond the limit, and thus initially virtually all the judicial functions remained with the chiefs, and were only gradually transferred to the courts run by the Griqua at the centre of the captaincy. Thus it was announced that murder would be made a capital offence well in advance of the actual implementation of the promulgation, while the major crime that the Griqua were concerned to stamp out was the practice of “smelling out” for witchcraft, which, as it had been an integral part of the system of social control, was of considerable moment. Although, increasingly, large-scale theft was brought under the jurisdiction of the Griqua, who had, of course, always been prepared to bring chiefs to their own justice when they considered it expedient, the routine running of affairs in the locations remained in the hands of Africans. Thus local customs as to marriage, land tenure and so forth (of which the Griqua were ignorant) might be maintained, while the expensive use of interpreters, who were necessary in the Griqua courts, was obviated. Disputes between Griqua and African were, however, always dealt with by the Griqua judiciary. Despite this they by no means invariably resulted in the verdict going to the Griqua party, as even the most prominent officials on government business might be arraigned for misuse of their powers. There was even an African chief, Mosi Lipheana, who was dignified by the title of Veld Kornet, primarily because he had among his entourage an Irishman by the name of Paddy O’Reilly, who could conduct the business of that office, but in general the local officials were Griqua who attempted to use their prestige to maintain order in difficult border areas, for they were normally of high rank.

Lastly and most importantly, the Africans under Griqua rule were required to pay a hut-tax, variously reported as 5/- or 7/6 per hut. By 1874, approximately 43% of Griqua government income came from this source. Indeed, the
escape of the Griqua from debt, which had been nearly accomplished by the time of the British take-over, was largely a consequence of the hut-tax, which might be paid in kind if no cash was available. For non-payment individuals might be driven out, but, in fact, the amount of resistance to the Griqua authorities was remarkably small. Only Thiba ever raised major objections and even they were not so much against the principle of paying taxes as against the government he was paying. Probably the fact that most of the Africans in Nomansland were immigrants is important. Many must have paid such taxes before, whether in the Cape Colony or in Natal, and so become accustomed to such practices.

The settlements upon which these taxes were levied were almost invariably designated locations, upon which there was a certain amount of pressure from land-hungry Griqua, who may well have hoped to raise income from rents to the same Africans. More than anyone it was the Kaptyn himself who contained this pressure, probably because he was more aware of the need for the Griqua nation to placate those among whom they lived than were many of his subjects. Africans who lived on Griqua farms might be expelled by the owner, but interlopers into locations other than their own suffered similarly. The pattern of aristocratic rule was thus complete, even if the Griqua were far too poor ever to be aristocrats, and took much less care about restricting the movements of those under their rule than those across the border in Natal, for the Griqua government only issued passes to those who required such documents for travel in Natal or the Cape Colony.

Obviously, in the short time that they had at their disposal — barely ten years — the Griqua were unable to develop unquestioning acceptance of their rule among their subjects. Their rule was still very definitely backed by the threat and the need for force. In this of course, they were no different from the British who succeeded them. The Griqua were poorer than the British, they did not have the might of the British empire behind them, and they could not use mis-
sionaries or traders to establish their power. But they had less to distract them, for their responsibilities were far narrower, they had more officials in the area, officials, moreover, who had a tighter grasp of the African reality than many colonial dignitaries, and they were not be-devilled to the same extent by inconvenient racial attitudes. But, as intruding powers, aided by the rifle and the chancery, in their attempts to establish dominance the Griqua and the British had much in common. The possible permutations of colonial rule were not that large, for the population that was being ruled remained unchanged, except through the passage of time, and the ruling groups emanated from the same cultural, if not political, tradition.

FOOTNOTES

2. For elaboration of this theme see M. C. Legassick, *The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries* (Ph.D. UCLA 1969) chs. VII, VIII.
9. He was also known as Silonyana. As he was a minor, his half-brother Diko ruled initially. See W. D. Hammond-Tooke, *The Tribes of Mount Frere District* (Pretoria 1955) pp. 42–3.
11. This section may perhaps go some way towards answering the questions about the involvement of the two groups in the revolt of 1896 raised by C. van Onselen in his article *Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa* in *J.A.H.* XIII (3) 1972, p. 479.
14. Hulley Papers (Killie Campbell Library, Durban), sec. 3.
16. Currie to Grey, 29 June 1861, encl. in Grey to Newcastle, 12 July 1861, G.H. 28/76 (Cape Archives).
20. Thomas Jenkins, the Wesleyan Missionary with the Mpondo, heard that the Griqua took 1 700 cattle, 1 300 sheep and 300 horses (Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society Archives, S.A. Box XX: Jenkins to Secs. 27 Dec. 1865); Donald Strachan, who knew the Griqua better, gives the same figures, except that he claims they took 6 000 sheep (*Cape Parl. Papers*, G 58, 1879, p. 51).
22. See, e.g., Shepstone to Harding, 18 Jan. 1871, encl. in Keate to Barkly, 10 August 1871, G.H. 9/9 (Cape Archives).
25. On this see the voluminous correspondence in the Natal Archives (S.N.A. files 1/1/24, 1/1/25).
26. Figures from census returns after annexation and are highly approximate (see *Cape Parl. Papers*, G 27, 1874, p. 55; G 17, 1878, pp. 72–3).
28. Perhaps Adam Kok was influenced in this by the fact that this particular area contained many white settlers and Africans and few Griqua.
30. Hammond-Tooke, *Tribes of Mount Frere*, p. 44.
31. E. Stafford to Henrique Shepstone (magistrate of Alfred County), n.d. (7 March 1871) and H. Shepstone to S.N.A. Natal, 9 March 1871, encl. in Keate to Barkly, 10 August 1871, G.H. 9/9 (Cape Archives).
33. He “did not feel like paying Hottentots” (statement of Duta and Mehlwana, 14 March 1865, encl. in Maclean to Wodehouse, 28 March 1865, G.H. 9/6 (Cape Archives)).
34. There is a voluminous correspondence on this episode in G.H. 9/8 (Cape Archives).
36. Hulley Papers.
38. G.O.1, 30 Jan. 1866 (Cape Archives).
40. The Griqua in fact declared the injuries done to Ncukana the chief cause of the war (Gedye to Shepstone, 23 Sept. 1871, encl. in Keate to Barkly, 7 Oct. 1871, G.H. 9/9 (Cape Archives)).
41. Dower to Mullen, 12 Oct. 1871, S.A. Box 35/5/B (L.M.S. Archives).
42. White to Shepstone, 29 Sept. 1871, in Keate to Barkly, 7 Oct. 1871, G.H. 9/9 (Cape Archives).
43. G.O.1, 5 Sept. 1871 (Cape Archives).
44. G.O.9 (Cape Archives).
45. Kok to Letuka Morosi, Stephanus Lepheane, Lebu Lepheane and Mosi Lepheane, 30 Jan. 1867, G.O.1 (Cape Archives).
46. This section follows the evidence of G. C. Brisley to the Commission on Native Laws and Customs (Cape Parl. Papers, G 4, 1883, pp. 510–2); it is confirmed by the records of the case of Monjonjo’s murder (G.O.4, 15 July 1871 (Cape Archives)).
47. G.O.1, 8 Sept. 1866, Dío vs “Rooi” Jan Pienaar (Cape Archives).
48. G.O.9, but tax record for 1867 (Cape Archives). O’Reilly’s “real” name was Murphy (see Kokstad Advertiser, 19 Dec. 1902).
49. Cape Parl. Papers, G 58, 1879, p. 50.
52. G.O.3, 5 Sept. 1872: complaints of J. de Vreis and Sakopula (Cape Archives).