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DE GRIJS AND THE SINO–DUTCH TREATY OF TIENTSIN
(1863)

The need of a treaty with China

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Dutch East India Company had sent four embassies to China to try to establish commercial relations. These embassies obtained valuable information about China, and the travelogues written by them remained an important source on China for a long time. But the Chinese regarded these commercial envoys as barbarians bringing tribute to the Chinese Emperor and did not treat them on an equal basis. As a result, they did not achieve their purpose of opening up trade with China. Only Canton (and of course Macao) was to a limited extent open to foreign trade, for the Dutch East India Company from 1728 onwards.

In the nineteenth century, the British took the initiative to establish further commercial relations with China, and after the Opium War of 1839–42, which has been called “the most unreasonable war waged for the most unreasonable purpose,” China was forced to open five “treaty ports,” including Canton, Amoy, and Shanghai, and to cede Hong Kong to Britain forever. From 1856 to 1858, a second war was waged by the British, now allied with the French, resulting in 1858 in the Treaties of Tientsin with further concessions by the Chinese. These treaties were concluded with Britain, France, the United States, and Russia. When China did not act in full accordance with the treaty provisions, a second expeditionary force was sent to Northern China, which landed in Tientsin and even occupied Peking. In retaliation for the murder of British envoys by the Chinese, British, and French troops heavily damaged the Emperor’s Summer Palace in Peking. This second Opium War ended with the Convention of Peking of 1860. Now more treaty ports were opened, foreign ambassadors were to be accepted and allowed to reside in Peking where they would not have to perform the ketou (kowtow) in front of the Emperor, and it was forbidden for the Chinese to designate the foreigners as barbarians (Yi 夷). There were also advantages for the Christian mission, which was also allowed into the interior of China.

The Dutch took a neutral position during these wars; this was for several reasons. By this time the Dutch were no longer the great sea power of two centuries before. Throughout the nineteenth century (until 1940),
the Netherlands in general took a neutral position in conflicts between the great powers. Moreover, the Governor-General of the Indies and the Minister of Colonies, and not the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were responsible for diplomatic and consular relations with China and Japan, and they did not wish to harm the special, age-old relationship with Japan by an aggressive policy towards China.\(^4\) The Netherlands Indies government also had its hands full managing affairs in the Indies, where several colonial wars were waged.\(^5\) Despite its neutral position, the Netherlands would still profit from the advantages achieved by others.\(^6\)

In 1861, a year after the Convention of Peking, at the initiative of Prince Gong, a half brother of the Emperor, the Chinese established a ministry of foreign affairs, the *Zongli Yamen* 總理衙門, “Office for the general administration (of the affairs of all countries),” which was headed by Prince Gong.\(^7\) This institution would play an important role not only in diplomacy but also in the modernisation of China for the next forty years. It also included a school for interpreters called the Tongwenguan 同文館. Under Prince Gong there were two “Vice-Ministers,” called Commissioners (or Superintendants) of Trade, one of the Northern Harbours, stationed in Tientsin, and one of the Southern Harbours stationed in Shanghai, who both played an active role in contacts with the Western powers.

Before the transfer of responsibility for Chinese and Japanese affairs to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1862,\(^8\) J. des Amorie van der Hoeven, the Dutch ‘Consul in Canton,’ who was actually living in Macao, wrote several letters to Governor-General Sloet on the need and methods for concluding a treaty. On 28 November 1861, he reported that Xue Huan 薛煥,\(^9\) the Commissioner of the Southern Harbours of China, had prohibited issuing passports for sailing on Chinese rivers to ships of nations without a treaty with China, and that there was no hope that this situation would change in the near future.

Two months later, on 20 January 1862, he wrote that an effort to conclude a treaty, supported by some show of the flag to inspire respect, would now have a chance of success. He added that for negotiations with the Chinese government the assistance of C.F.M. de Grijs would be of great value; he was acting Vice-Consul in Amoy and destined to serve as Chinese interpreter in the Indies. On 23 February 1862, Governor-General Sloet decided in the first place that De Grijs should for the time being remain acting Vice-Consul in Amoy in order to be used as interpreter for negotiations, and in the second place that Van der Hoeven should draft such a treaty.\(^10\)

Soon after the transfer of Chinese and Japanese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 25 September 1862, Van der Hoeven sent a letter to Xue Huan asking him to beseech (*kěn* 懇) the Emperor for permission to conclude a treaty with the Netherlands. In this letter, in which his Chinese
name was translated as Fang 方, he referred to the age-old commercial relations between the two countries and the urgent need to regularise trade.

Xue Huan sent a memorial to the Emperor advising to give approval for a treaty, adding that it should be a copy of the Belgian treaty that had just been signed in Shanghai. In order to spare costs and time, the Dutch were not to send a special envoy. But in his memorial he also remarked that “in the request the Dutch called their ruler the Great Emperor (Da Huang-di 大皇帝); in the future a way should be found to make them change this.” The Emperor gave his approval, but actually it was his mother, the Empress Dowager Cixi, who made the decision. At that time the Tongzhi Emperor (1857–75) was only seven years old. His reign period was 1861–75, but his Imperial seal was kept by his mother Cixi. The power of the Emperor was therefore in her hands, and she would rule China from 1861 to 1908.

The letter to which Xue Huan referred must have been translated by Schaalje, who was then studying in Canton. At the time, the Chinese words for Emperor and King were often confused, as Lobscheid explained in his dictionary. At the entry “King” he added a footnote: “皇 [huang] means emperor and 王 [wang] king, a distinction, which has not always been observed when making treaties with the Chinese.”

When he received the Emperor’s approval, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Jhr. Mr. P.Th. van der Maesen de Sombreff answered that he still wished to send an envoy and to conclude a full treaty, not a copy of the Belgian one. He considered the manner which the Chinese suggested both as contempt for the treaty and an insult to Dutch dignity.

Thereupon Van der Maesen assigned Van der Hoeven as plenipotentiary. A Royal Authorisation (volmagt) was issued on 11 December 1862, and on 23 December Van der Maesen sent instructions to Van der Hoeven. These were that the treaty should in the first place guarantee the fulfilment of the most-favoured nation principle, both in the field of political advantages and—in particular—in commerce and shipping. According to this principle, which was generally employed in European treaties at the time, the Dutch would be given all advantages that had been afforded to other nations. In other matters, Van der Hoeven was allowed, if necessary, to give in to Chinese demands. This treaty of friendship and commerce should establish consular and diplomatic relations, in the same way as other nations had done. Van der Hoeven was to proceed to China on a Dutch warship, the steamer Vice-Admiral Koopman—necessary for displaying the flag—and then to conclude the treaty.

From De Grijs’ letters, diary, and a draft article, many details are known about the history of this mission, particularly his own role, his observations, opinions, and feelings. These are supported and further illustrated by Chinese sources. In the following account, the emphasis is on clarifi-
cation of what this mission meant for the interpreter De Grijs and what he meant to this mission.

Preparing for the embassy

In May 1863, Van der Hoeven and De Grijs awaited the Vice-Admiraal Koopman, which was returning from a mission in Japan. De Grijs had already decided to take along his teacher Ang, whose salary would be about three times as much as the normal teacher’s salary of $10 to $15 per month. He wrote to Francken from Amoy:

In the past I told you about Peking, but do you know that Ang will go there with me? He will get $35 per month from me as long as the expedition lasts, and he deserves it, because I trust him as much as a Chinese can be trusted.21

At the same time, De Grijs had misgivings about the mission: knowing China well, he did not approve of the aims and methods of the Dutch government. He was angry because the embassy was led by the merchant Van der Hoeven. De Grijs’ anger was not unfounded; later the Chinese would also be indignant that the Dutch sent a merchant as plenipotentiary.22 Moreover, he was eager to leave China and go to Java, and his function in the delegation was not clear. He was under great stress, and he may also have had doubts about his ability to interpret in Mandarin on this important occasion; according to Schlegel in 1872, De Grijs only spoke a little Mandarin.23 In another private letter to Francken, he vented his emotions:

As to the treaty business, there is nothing I can say. In the past, I imagined some decent person from Holland or Java would be sent, and therefore I stayed in China, against my interests. Now it is Van der Hoeven, and I noticed that he has depended on me for a long time. If I back out now, the stupid morons as well as the sensible lot will think—at the instigation of an ultra-conservative merchant in ginger, spices, edible oil, etc.—that I am backing out because I am afraid to make a treaty under the eyes of such a proficient China-expert as the ambassador in question. Even if the gods and goddesses were to lend me their speaking trumpets to curse with, that would not be enough to express my anger, but unfortunately, as Thomas Carlisle has said, it is a difficult operation to drive anything into a wooden head. The infatuation of the government goes so far that, of all ships in the world, they have chosen one named V.A. Koopman [Dutch for “merchant”], with a koopman [merchant] as ambassador—without a secretary, without an interpreter, without anything, because I only seem to be an adjunct for the purpose of buying Gù-bah [牛肉, “beef”]24 for them. The worst is that I cannot do anything about it! Before the treaty is settled I’ll have a talk with Van der Hoeven, and I promise you that I will keep it as decent as possible.25

A few weeks later De Grijs went to Hong Kong, where he arrived on 1 June. On that day, he wrote to the students in Amoy that he was “rath-
er sure he would try to withdraw from the embassy." Ten days later he changed his mind after Van der Hoeven offered him a possible trip to the Netherlands, a very attractive reward after eight years in the Far East. He wrote to Francken:

I wished to go to Java now, but Van der Hoeven stopped me, saying that I will go North with him next week, and I will probably take the treaty home [to Holland] soon.

The *Vice-Admiraal Koopman* under Captain J.E. Buys arrived in Hong Kong on 15 June, but went into dock at Whampoa, where it was to be newly coppered (*nieuwkoperen*). Again, De Grijs experienced a grudge against his fellow countrymen, which he expressed in a letter to Schaalje:

So the *Vice-Admiraal Koopman* arrived here and has 15 officers and 175 men on board. The commander is an ultra-conservative Hollander whose heart and bosom throbs at the word ‘Holland’ and who reproached me after I had seen him for half an hour, that I was ashamed of Holland and was no Hollander. The officers are all true Dutch lads (jolly good fellows), and the food on board is ultra-conservative. Van der Hoeven will feel completely at home, but I, a bastard, feel out of place here.

About this time, De Grijs was finally appointed by Van der Hoeven as ‘Chinese Secretary and interpreter.’ This was probably effective from 1 July, when Johnston was made acting Vice-Consul in Amoy. De Grijs remained insecure about the future:

I do not know what will become of me when we are finished in the North. I think I’ll go to Java, or perhaps to Holland.

In the meantime, apart from investigating opportunities for the three students in Amoy to study Hakka in Hong Kong, De Grijs was probably already busy making a translation of the draft treaty and preparing the official correspondence with the Chinese government. He urged Schaalje to send his teacher Ang, “the cross-eyed one” (*de scheele*), as quickly as possible, as he had a lot of writing to do. Ang’s full name was probably Ang In Liong. He also asked Schaalje to send books and other things that he needed on the mission: Kangxi’s and Morrison’s dictionaries (he had probably already taken along the much smaller dictionary by Medhurst), Biot’s geographic dictionary of China (borrowing Schaalje’s or Groeneweldt’s copy), “the mirror’s flowers” (perhaps the novel *Jinghuayuan* 鏡花緣), and all books that could be stored in a book chest. Besides these, he needed his Dutch Bible and English hymnal, a French–Dutch dictionary, Brill’s Dutch grammar, and writing utensils such as a box of red pencils [for correction], and a Chinese inkstone and writing brushes. Other things he needed were his cases of tobacco and cigars, his new black woolen coat (*lakenschen jas*), his overcoat and his sabre. On 28 June, Ang and De Grijs’
servant Tsì-laî arrived in Hong Kong. At that time, they expected the negotiations would take four to five months, and that they would spend the winter in the North since, as De Grijs wrote to Francken after arriving in Tientsin, “it always takes a few months before Chinese negotiators are appointed, while I fear that the concluding and signing of the treaty will be postponed ad calendas Graecas.”

The new coppering of the Vice-Admiraal Koopman could not be finished in time, so Van der Hoeven decided to take another warship, the steamer Citadel van Antwerpen, which happened to arrive on 10 July, returning from a mission in Siam. The ship had a technical problem with its engine, but it could be repaired soon. On 29 July, the delegation boarded ship and the Citadel van Antwerpen left Hong Kong. Later, De Grijs wrote to an English-speaking friend, showing his own feelings and the atmosphere on board:

After a great deal of waiting I managed to be put at last on board of the Citadel of Antwerp & in the hallowed expectation of spending four to five months of my earthly career in the Ultima Thule of Asia alias called the glorious city of Tientsin; really it sounds well in the ears of a Dutchman to hear Godverdomme here & dito there & everywhere. If I had all the shillings for profane swearing during my trip north, I would be better off than Jardine.

First they went to Shanghai, where the delegation stayed from 4 to 12 August and visited the Dutch Vice-Consul, Th. Kroes. The Chinese Commissioner Xue Huan had written in 1862 that the treaty should be signed in Shanghai instead of Tientsin, which would save money and time, saying that the Dutch could just as well copy the (very short) Belgian treaty of 8 August 1862. This had already been considered unacceptable, and Van der Hoeven decided to leave Shanghai and go northwards to prevent undue delay. He left a letter explaining this to the new Commissioner Li Hongzhang, and proceeded to the North the next day without waiting for an answer. They arrived at Dagu (Taku) off Tientsin on 19 August.

De Grijs wrote to Francken:

Later, when we were already in Tientsin, we received a letter from the Commissioner [Li Hongzhang], in which he said that we should do it in Shanghai, that we had come to beseech [肯] for a treaty, and therefore should copy the Belgian treaty, etc. etc. He ended with a most polite phrase asking us to give instructions in reply [示覆], which is the usual term in letters from an inferior to a superior. I find the style rude and impolite and it is very well possible that the Commissioner did not read the letter [himself]. Anyhow, no reply was sent.

The rudeness possibly referred to the word “to beseech,” which had been used in a slightly different context in Van der Hoeven’s first letter translated by Schaalje in 1862. De Grijs wished eagerly that the Dutch be treated
with respect, and was worried about subtle ways in which the Chinese implied superiority. Certainly the last of the following sentences of Li Hongzhang’s letter was authoritarian:

Now if Your Honourable Country concludes a treaty in accordance with the Belgian regulations, this must of course still be handled in Shanghai. There is no need to proceed to the capital. If you venture to go there, there will be no one to receive you to handle the matter. Your Honourable Minister should therefore still return to Shanghai, only then can you have a meeting with this Vice-Minister to conclude the treaty.45

De Grijs’ supposition that Li Hongzhang might not have read the letter from the Dutch was clearly wrong, since Li quoted both Van der Hoeven’s and his own letter in full in his memorial to the Emperor of 13 August.46 In any case, Van der Hoeven decided to ignore Li Hongzhang’s letter and to negotiate with the Commissioner of the Northern Harbours.

In this memorial Li Hongzhang showed wariness of possible additional requests by the Dutch, and was particularly worried that they would proceed to Peking; moreover, the stationing of a Dutch envoy in Peking should at all costs be avoided. Li also conceded the true purpose of his letter to Van der Hoeven was to keep him from going to the capital. Li noticed that the wording of Van der Hoeven’s letter was different from the letter of the previous year. The earlier letter had probably been translated by Schaalje, who was then studying in Canton,47 while this letter was translated by De Grijs. ‘The Netherlands’ was now translated as Da Heguo 大和國 instead of Da Helan guo 大荷蘭國. At the same time, ‘King’ was now translated with the neutral term junzhu 君主 ‘sovereign,’ just as the British had done in their treaties with China in 1842–60. The ‘King of the Netherlands’ was now translated as Da Heguo Da Junzhu 大和國大君主.

Li commented on the wording as follows:

The character 荷 (Hé, “lotus”) in the name of their country had been changed into the character 和 (Hé, “harmony”), apparently because it has the same sound. In their request of last year they called their ruler Emperor (皇帝 Huangdi) but in this letter they call him sovereign (君主 junzhu). Therefore this item has already been changed without the trouble of a forceful debate. When concluding the treaty we should of course take this text of the envoy as final.48

Li Hongzhang did not mention that 和 was an abbreviation of the archaic name 和蘭 from the Ming dynasty (1368–1644),49 and he seems to have accepted this change in combination with the change from “Emperor” to “sovereign.”

Van der Hoeven’s name had also been changed from Fang 方 to Fan 粛, but Li had no comments on this change. He must have assumed that these were two different persons, because they had different functions: Fang was Consul and Fan was plenipotentiary.50 To their chagrin, the Chinese found
out in Tientsin that the envoy Fan was the same as the mercantile consul Fang from Canton.

Two years earlier, De Grijs probably had already used the name *Da Heguo* 大和國, when he designated himself as 大和國領事官 (Consul of the Netherlands). *Da Heguo* 大和國 was no doubt coined after the examples of *Da Qingguo* 大清國 (China), *Da Yingguo* 大英國 (Britain) and *Da Faguo* 大法國 (France) that were used in treaties in 1842 and later; the latter two were abbreviations of the common names at that time: *Yingjili* 英吉利 and *Falanxi* 法蘭西. 51 De Grijs probably chose the Ming-dynasty name *Helan* 和蘭 as the basis for this new name, because it was generally used on Java. As acting Vice-Consul, he often came into contact with Chinese from the Indies, who would use this name. He may also have been influenced by his teacher Hoffmann, with whom he regularly corresponded, since the Ming name was also used in Japan. Another, stylistic reason for this choice may have been that *Da Heguo* 大和國, “Great Harmonious Country” seemed a more elegant name than *Da Heguo* 大荷國, “Great Lotus Country.” As a consequence, these names were used in the Treaty of 1863, and so the archaic *Helan* 和蘭 and *Da Heguo* 大和國 became the official Chinese names used in diplomacy for the Netherlands. But they were hardly used elsewhere, and the common name *Helan* 荷蘭 remained in general use in all other Chinese publications. The use of these archaic names in diplomacy continued for eighty years and was finally abolished in 1944.52

In Tientsin

After arrival off Taku (19 August), De Grijs went to Tientsin first to make preparations, accompanied by the naval cadet J.M. van der Wijck, his clerk Ang and Tsai Lai (and probably his boy). On 7 September 1863, he wrote to Francken:

Having left Shanghai on 12 August, we arrived off Taku on 19 August, and the next morning I went to the coast at Taku to go overland to Tientsin. After landing I went to the French commander of the fortress [le Vicomte de la Tour du Pin], who received me most politely and arranged a beautiful hired boat for me on which I left that night at nine. I arrived the next night at half past one in Tientsin. So I sat on board that boat for more than 24 hours and had plenty of opportunity to see the river, and I can assure you it is really worthwhile. The river has so many surprising bends that the journey is lengthened excessively, while the straight distance to Tientsin [50 km] is almost half the distance on the river. Now, I could have gone by cart and horse, but because of the frequent rains, the roads were so bad that I did not take a post-chaise with two mules. In the morning I left the boat and went to look for Fred Pedder.53
Pedder was an old friend of De Grijs from Amoy, who was now British Consul in Tientsin. In four days’ time De Grijs hired a house and purchased furniture, then he left Ang as caretaker and returned to Taku.

The next day [Friday 28 August], I left with Van der Hoeven, Colonel Mossel [Commander], and Van der Wijck, attaché, to Tientsin where we arrived in the evening on Saturday 29 August, to the great pleasure of the gentlemen, who could not stop praising the beauty of the house and the furniture, and how well it was all arranged. I told a Cantonese cook that dinner should be ready by seven o’clock and had left the squint-eyed one [Ang] at home to see to it that my orders were executed. The food was sumptuous and remained so, and since I am the director of the house and cashier, and Tsâi Lâi assists me, all is perfectly according to my wishes.

Also, ceremony was not neglected. “The Dutch flag was raised, a guard was stationed at the door and Chonghou was notified of our arrival.”

On his first visit to Tientsin De Grijs had delivered a letter to Chonghou, the Commissioner of the Northern Harbours, who would lead the Chinese delegation as he had during negotiations with other countries. In this letter De Grijs mentioned that the Dutch plenipotentiary arrived on a warship (da huolun shichuan 大火輪師船), and he added a sensitive detail about their destination, which he explained as follows:

In the translation Tientsin is indicated as if this was on the King’s orders and there could be no question of staying in Shanghai.

When the delegation arrived in Tientsin on 29 August, Chonghou had already sent an answer, saying that he wished to do anything to speed up the negotiations, and therefore wished to see Van der Hoeven’s authorisation (volmagt) first in an official place (gongsuo 公所). Van der Hoeven refused, as Chonghou in his position was not entitled to this. Thereupon De Grijs went to him, saying that he could see the authorisation as a friend, but not in a neutral place; Chonghou should come to Van der Hoeven’s place to see it. Chonghou stuck to his position, and so did De Grijs. Finally the Commissioner gave in, and they decided together that Van der Hoeven and Chonghou would first meet in a public building, the Danghang 嘉行. This place was chosen as a neutral place, in order that neither of the parties could boast of having received the other party first. They would greet each other on 2 September, and afterwards Chonghou would visit Van der Hoeven, and vice versa.

Therefore we came together in a beautiful building, myself as interpreter, and although I thought that I would not be able to bring out one word in Mandarin, it went better than I thought.

That afternoon, Chonghou came to Van der Hoeven’s place, saw the authorisation, and received De Grijs’ translation of it. The following day Van der
Hoeven paid him a return visit. Subsequently they had to wait for a letter from the Emperor that Chonghou was appointed as plenipotentiary.

Almost thirty years later, De Grijs disclosed that the Chinese were indignant that Van der Hoeven was made plenipotentiary, because he was a merchant in Macao. A few days after their arrival, Chonghou told De Grijs: “Yes, I know that you are a learned man and not a merchant, while Mr. Van der Hoeven is carrying on trade.” De Grijs added that he was always treated with distinction, while Van der Hoeven was not as much respected as Colonel Mossel of the Navy. According to the ancient Chinese ranking of social classes—scholars, farmers, artisans, and merchants—the merchant class was the lowest. Besides, civil authorities were considered higher than the military. Another reason for their anger was probably that they felt deceived because ‘plenipotentiary Fan’ was the same person as ‘Consul Fang’ in the earlier correspondence.

On his life in Tientsin, while waiting for Chonghou’s answer, De Grijs wrote jokingly to N.G. Peter in Macao:

Our life goes on like that of the diligent farmer, that is, we let God’s water flow over God’s fields, since it is indisputable that all is sure to be right except Lapidoth’s legs, therefore we also hope that the treaty will be settled. We live in the lap of luxury—and although the female personnel leave nothing to be desired, there being no ladies—it is most probable that you would feel comfortable here. The food is so abundant that we have coolies to keep off the roast turkeys that just walk into our mouths. Van der Hoeven is rather satisfied, I believe, and in fact as good as could be expected under the circumstances. The great fleet commander is dispassionately liberal, eats a lot, sleeps a lot, and does not get too bored.

De Grijs paid visits to foreign consuls and wrote in a private letter to Francken about Tientsin:

Tientsin is a prosperous town, developing exceptionally fast as demonstrated by the number of Chinese shops selling European goods. There is a street named High Street, perhaps a mile long, which is full of shops with all kinds of precious wares, silks, furs, porcelain, jade-stones, picture shops, eating-places, etc., etc. I have seen Canton, but that cannot compare with this street. And keep in mind that almost the whole street burned down one and a half years ago, so all shops are new. Some shops sell clay puppets that are so beautiful that they should be placed on brackets—they only cost one dollar a dozen. Microscopic articles, thousands of photographs, mostly naked girls. Then there are a few temples where young neophytes—I mean catamites—can be obtained, and although it is general practice here to go to the girls, almost every Chinese has his boy: in all kinds of public gambling and theatre houses, there are separate dens where the boys will lead you, and if one way doesn’t work the other way will: they don’t even object to Hâm (Kâm) your thing. Now this is a dirty story, but it’s true. The houses of the foreigners are Chinese houses, and by the river, in the settlement, they are building now, so in two or three years, there will be a lot of European houses.
In his draft article, he gave his opinion on the photographs:

Among the European objects one finds whole stacks of photographs that give a very unfortunate idea of European morals and taste, one would wish that they at least did not try to civilise the Chinese with such pictures.72

In his diary, he wrote on 13 September:

In order to dispel the monotony of Van der Hoeven’s daily life, we invited Chinese acrobats to our house. I had many objections, but that was to no avail. The gymnastic routines of a nine-year old child were certainly nice, but the rest was unpleasant.73

It is not clear what he did not like about the acrobats—perhaps he found the extreme bending of bodies disturbing, or the fact that poor people were obliged to make a living in this way.74

The negotiations

Chonghou’s authorisation arrived on 8 September. He asked Van der Hoeven to choose a day to inspect the authorisations in the usual manner. De Grijs wrote in his draft article:

This took place on the tenth of September with all pomp and formality that one could wish on the basis of equality: the authorisation of the Emperor was written on yellow paper in a yellow box wrapped in yellow silk; when both authorisations had been found in order, Chonghou introduced two commissioners to negotiate the various articles, whereupon Van der Hoeven appointed the present author as the Dutch commissioner. The Dutch plenipotentiary immediately presented a Chinese translation of the draft treaty, in order to fulfill the Chinese wish aimed at a speedy handling of the matter.75

De Grijs wrote later in his diary that this draft text contained 19 articles.76

He introduced the Chinese diplomats in his diary as follows:

Chonghou, the appointed plenipotentiary, is a Manchu who has functioned as such at several treaties. He is well disposed towards the Europeans and one of the most civilised and well-mannered persons in the world. He is an excellent example of a naturally civilised man, and while he is not always very talkative, this is perhaps rather because of a sort of natural shyness than because of a lack of conversation. Although he is very shrewd, he blushes easily when he is found out driving at something that is not straight. Chonghou notified all foreign consuls of his appointment. He is assisted by two Chinese who match him very well. A little fellow with the rank of daotai, who is very brazen-faced, very clever, and who has a very sharp tongue; and a big good-natured chap, who actually has more sense than the little one but who acts as an intermediary when the little one goes somewhat too far. These two persons are charged with the negotiations for the Chinese side, while I am appointed to work with them for the Dutch side. The three of us will discuss the treaty article by article, and when that is finished, ask the plenipotentiaries for their approval.77
In his draft article, De Grijs gave some more details:

Because he [Chonghou] always strives to keep good relations with the foreigners, he leaves the negotiations about less pleasant subjects to two persons who all the time assist him and act as his agents: the youngest Zhou Jiaxun [周家勲], who has the rank of *daotai* (Resident or Director), is very shrewd, very talkative, very impertinent, but he will shrink back from someone who dares to oppose him; he always began the attack when they were in a position that was difficult to defend; when he was repulsed, the second person Gao Congwang [高從望] came to his aid. This gentleman, governor of Tientsin Prefecture and surroundings, has a lot of experience with Europeans; he is more careful than his colleague and tries to mitigate somewhat the effect of the too sharp tongue of the former. I mean here the character of these gentlemen in official intercourse: as soon as the work is finished, they are charming, generous, and even kind-hearted and sincere.78

After the treaty was concluded, Chonghou sent a memorial to the Emperor giving an account of the negotiations. In this memorial he related that when De Grijs introduced the purpose of the Dutch, the Chinese immediately protested against a long treaty with many articles. Chonghou was surprised to see how well-prepared De Grijs was and how he took the initiative.

I commissioned Prefect Fei Xuezeng 費學曾 and Prefect Appointee Zhou Jiaxun 周家勲 of Tianjin Prefecture to negotiate with the interpreter De Grijs (Kaishi 凱士), who had come together with the envoy and who was conversant with the Chinese written and spoken language. At that time De Grijs declared in person that this time the envoy had come specially to Tianjin to discuss the drawing up of a treaty. He planned to arrange it after the example of the treaties with Britain and France, in order to express the most-favoured-nation principle. To this we answered that all advantages and privileges between the two countries in the regulations for trade could be considered and approved, but it should not be divided into dozens of articles like Britain and France had done80 [1858], it should only have the general meaning, all-inclusive, in a few articles and then it could be finished. To our surprise, that interpreter fixed a date for a preliminary meeting with the commissioners and he also said that he would now present a draft text of the treaty.81

De Grijs negotiated with them from 14 to 30 September, using five drafts of the treaty. Four drafts are kept in the Leiden University Library, two of which must have been copied by De Grijs’ teacher Ang. These drafts show many corrections and changes, written in De Grijs’ clumsy hand with a black or red pencil, or by his teacher Ang with a writing brush. Ang was perhaps also present at the negotiations and made these corrections on the spot.82

De Grijs wrote in his draft article:

On 14 September the first meeting of the newly appointed commissioners took place, and a series of skirmishes started that were sometimes extremely unpleasant. The above-mentioned two Chinese officials, Zhou Jiaxun
and Gao Congwang, acquitted themselves bravely of their tasks and tried all the time through various detours to stray away from the matter in question, to subjects that were completely outside the topic. It was a constant effort to keep them to the point. Since the meetings were without strict ceremonial, it was rather easy to let those gentlemen know the opinion of the Dutch plenipotentiary, without having to resort to all kinds of elegant phrases. The meetings usually started about half past nine and ended at one o’clock, and were mostly concluded with a collation where the three commissioners forgot their animosity with champagne and Chinese pastry, and had ample opportunity to exchange all kinds of questions about Europe and China.\footnote{De Grijs gave more details about what he actually did in his diary:}

De Grijs felt great respect for his Chinese counterparts:

Truly, I believe there is not much reason to criticise Chinese diplomacy. They are clever, and extremely clever: for instance, when I noted that a treaty should contain extensive directives on the duties of ships and captains, they asked whether all ships that arrive and leave are always found out or not, and how they will get to know those laws that exist as long as there is no treaty with China.\footnote{De Grijs felt great respect for his Chinese counterparts:}

In his memorial to the Emperor, Chonghou did not give any dates except 10 September, the first meeting, when there were no negotiations in De
Grijs’ account. Chonghou did not clearly distinguish this meeting from the actual negotiations by the commissioners on 14-17 September. Although he did not mention his own draft of 10 articles or De Grijs’ second draft of 16 articles, most of the contents of his memorial tally with De Grijs’ diary and article. He probably kept to the 19 articles version to show that the Dutch had made a concession.

Chonghou often referred to the number of articles, which seems to have been an important issue for the Chinese. He elaborately reported on the debates about the length of the treaty, showing how the Chinese felt about the Dutch wish for a full treaty, and implicitly how they finally accepted De Grijs’ argument for a succinct text.

According to [De Grijs’] reports, the draft text offered now was based on the treaties with Britain and France, taking into account the successively concluded regulations in the treaties with Prussia [1861], Spain and Denmark [1863]. We were requested to organise a meeting for deliberating each article separately. The [Chinese] Commissioners held on to their earlier opinion and again answered that since there were already fixed rules for trade in all harbours, it was not necessary to draw up more articles. It was only necessary to clarify the general meaning. If more articles were drawn up, it would be difficult to obtain approval. After repeatedly enjoining him, that interpreter agreed to present them in a simplified form. Thereupon De Grijs came forward and presented his draft treaty in 16 articles. And he said: “In the articles drawn up this time, already two-thirds has been cancelled in comparison to other countries; they are extremely simple, and cannot be simplified any further.” At that time we told him that although the drawn-up articles were fewer than those of other countries, the general meaning was not at all different. Since the Netherlands had already decided upon 16 articles, our side still needed to deliberate and reunite [the two versions]. It was only necessary to be simple and clear, and then all would be settled. The number of articles was of no importance. And the critical points in the articles drawn up by that country were each directly disputed and rebuked. Subjects such as going to the capital, trading in Nanjing, missions in the interior, tariff reduction, taking the Dutch text as the basis and exchanging the treaty in the capital, should all first be dropped and altered. Both sides held on to their opinions and debated for some time. Subsequently the drawn-up articles were copied and sent to the Minister Prince [Gong] of the Zongli Yamen to take notice.

After Chonghou received a new draft in 16 articles from Prince Gong, a meeting was held between Chonghou and Van der Hoeven on 22 September (see illustration 12). Both De Grijs and Chonghou gave accounts of the difficulties of the negotiations, and each reported that the other party made concessions, but only De Grijs also mentioned the concessions on his own side. This is understandable when one realises the dangers for Chinese officials who negotiated with foreigners. One of Chonghou’s predecessors, Qiying 耆英, who had negotiated with the British from the 1840s, had been degraded and finally sentenced to death in 1858, and
12. First pages of Prince Gong's draft of the Sino-Dutch treaty of Tientsin with corrections, 22 September 1863 (BPL 1782: 24B).
the same would later happen to Chonghou, although that verdict would not be not executed.

De Grijs wrote in his draft article:

Two questions remained undecided, namely the appointment of unsalaried consuls and the residence of a Dutch plenipotentiary in Peking: the two plenipotentiaries came together to discuss this matter, and although that meeting was not all couleur de rose, Chonghou finally gave in.94

De Grijs wrote in his diary about this meeting, which was exasperating for him:

22 September. We had a meeting with Chonghou. He also had a draft of 16 articles and tried to catch us in every possible way. The discussion took five hours and I really needed my head to pay attention.95

Chonghou gave a vivid description of this meeting with Van der Hoeven and De Grijs:

Thereupon we received a written answer from the Zongli Yamen, which pointed out all important subjects. These were also compared and discussed respectively in 16 articles. I immediately ordered the Commissioners to hand them over for inspection. Thereupon the envoy fixed a date, on which he came accompanied by De Grijs to engage in direct negotiations. When there were points that they would not agree with, they refused obstinately. After repeated direct negotiations about each article, either by our guiding them with kind words or by straightforward rebuking, several times corrections were made. The envoy Van der Hoeven (Fan) does not understand Chinese, but I noticed the discontented tone of his words, while De Grijs was extremely crafty, and each time he argued forcefully, bringing forward the treaties with Prussia and Spain, querulously annoying us without interruption. My humble opinion is that in contacts with foreign states, one always has to exhaust all possible arguments. Foreigners are by nature treacherous. If you refuse them too bluntly, the matter will be spoiled, but if you give in too lightly, they may foster extravagant expectations. This is why I had ordered the commissioners to work from the side on De Grijs, making known our standpoint again and again, to try to make him change his mind, in order to make him assimilate to our sphere of influence.96

From other sources, other details about the negotiations are known. As to going to Peking, the Chinese requested that Van der Hoeven apply for a passport issued by another Western country that already had diplomatic relations with China. Since this would again be beyond the dignity of the Dutch plenipotentiary, Van der Hoeven decided not to go to Peking.97 Thus the Dutch gave in regarding the need to go to Peking in order to sign the treaty.

As to the question of the Dutch camlets from Leiden, the Dutch wished to have the same import tariff as for the English camlets. The Dutch woolen cloth had been imported from Holland since the beginning of the century
and was very popular in China; it was used to make men’s jackets. However, it was of a higher quality and also higher price than the English camlets. On this minor point, the Dutch would also give in.98

One of the main questions was that of the Dutch consuls. The Dutch wished the Chinese to recognise their mercantile consuls and a diplomatic representative in Peking. Although De Grijs personally sympathised with the Chinese standpoint that the consuls should not be merchants, and that there was no need for a Dutch representative in Peking,99 he did what he was expected to do and obtained sufficient results in the negotiations: article 1 of the treaty allowed the Dutch to have mercantile consuls.100 However, representation in Peking was not mentioned in the treaty, but based on the most-favoured nation clause (article 15), it was allowed after all.101

After this meeting, De Grijs, who had now had his nerves amply grated on, continued his negotiations with the Chinese commissioners about the camlets. On the following days he wrote in his diary:

23 September, we checked the draft treaty, didn’t approve a few things, and wrote about the Dutch camlets.102 I think this question is not fair and I believe it should have been left out. Didn’t sleep, ill.
24 September, continued to work on the treaty; no answer from Chonghou. Ill, nervous, fever.
25 September, no answer from Chonghou, ill and sad. Twelve hours of meeting with Zhou and Gao. I returned in good spirits, amused myself perfectly well. Question of the Dutch camlets: they were right.103

On 27 September, he translated the treaty into Dutch, copied it, and after final negotiations with Zhou and Gao on Monday 28 September, there was a conclusive meeting between Chonghou and Van der Hoeven on Tuesday 29 September. Chonghou reported the successful end of the negotiations in his memorial as follows:

After several new draft texts, finally all important subjects were dropped or changed without any trace. In general there was no aberration.104

The final treaty had 16 articles, but probably since the number was a sensitive matter for the Chinese, on 30 September it was decided to drop it in the title.105

When the negotiations were finished, Chonghou announced that Chinese soothsayers had chosen a propitious day for the signing of the treaty, which was the 24th day of the 8th month (Tuesday 6 October). The ceremony would take place in the building where they had met for the first conference.106 On this day, De Grijs wrote in his diary (with an addition from his draft article):

Dreamt that I came home and was asked what I wanted [to eat]. I said: peas with beef, and later hake and sauerkraut. Finally the day arrived on which
the treaty would be signed, and of course, I got up very early. I had finally achieved my result and wished nothing more than to get out. At half past nine in the morning, the soldiers were inspected, twelve men, a corporal, and a sergeant. Thereupon, I gave directions about how the soldiers should walk, and at exactly half past 12 the column started to march: in front came Mr. De Grijs in a sedan chair, behind him a corporal with my case and the seals, followed by four soldiers, then Van der Hoeven’s chair, carried by four men, with four soldiers at the sides, and after him another four soldiers. Then the Colonel and three officers, all in sedan chairs. After entering, the soldiers lined up and presented arms. The Chinese were nicely dressed, and we sat down in the hall. Van der Hoeven and Chonghou at a table; Gao, Zhou, an officer, and myself at a table; the Colonel and two officers and the sergeant at a table; then a bunch of lower mandarins to the right and left. Now the treaties, seals, cases, etc., were produced and all was signed, while I filled in the Chinese dates. Then the soldiers were treated to food and drink in another hall. We were also served a large dinner, which was paid proper honours, and while on normal visits we drank champagne, we now got sherry-cordial in beer glasses. But reading out the menu would be exacting too much from our readers, we only note that bird’s nests, shark’s fins, etc. were not lacking. Van der Hoeven gave a toast to the Emperor, and Chonghou to the King, and we parted the best of friends. The party now marched off, and at three o’clock, all was ended, and I began to make preparations for my journey to Peking.

De Grijs’ visit to Peking

Two months before, on 8 August 1863, Van der Hoeven had asked permission from Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Maesen to charge De Grijs with personally bringing the signed treaty to the Netherlands for ratification, similarly to what other countries had done. Since he could not receive an answer in time, he took the decision on himself, and charged De Grijs to travel by way of Peking and Siberia. While in Tientsin, they heard that travelling through Siberia could be very fast, probably by making use of Russian post horses. The Russian Consul in Tientsin, Eugène Butzov, had done it twice and said that it would take about forty days. Although Van der Hoeven had refrained from going to Peking himself, it must have given him some satisfaction that he could now send De Grijs instead.

However, on 2 October, De Grijs also could not get a passport for Peking because the treaty had not yet taken effect. Since it was no problem for him to make use of another nation’s passport, on 5 October he obtained a consular passport from the American acting Consul Pomeroy, allowing him to proceed to the capital and other places. For his protection on his journey from Peking to Siberia, De Grijs also borrowed a pistol from the warship.
On 7 October at 3:30 A.M., De Grijs left Tientsin in a wagon.

I passed the river, the marble bridge, and Senggerinqin’s wall. The rolling of the wagon was horrible, and I would not be surprised if there were people who walked back after an hour’s worth of rolling.

In his draft article he wrote:

the suffering in that wagon: at first I thought I could sleep, which had not happened during the last two nights, but the bumping of head and arms was so extreme that one could not even think of sleeping in a sitting position. Finally, my patience was exhausted, but the donkey driver awakened from his slumbering and advised me to sit on the carriage pole. Truly, the man was right, although my knees were right up against the mule, the jostling was much less.

He arrived at a hostel at 5 P.M., where they could pass the night. “The food that the Chinese Vatel served was rather tasty, and it strengthened my conviction that Chinese are good cooks by nature.” During the night, an incident happened, to which De Grijs reacted in a typical scholarly fashion.

Rather tired, I fell asleep soon after dinner, but at about ten o’clock, I was awakened because of voices in my room. Thinking they were thieves I grabbed the chest with silver that stood next to me, and discovered it had not been touched. Now I listened to the conversation of the intruding gentlemen and understood nothing of it. On my question what they wished, I received an answer in Chinese, that they had come to look at me, because they had never seen a European in their country (Mongolia). The conversation with the Mongolian guests became more and more lively, in particular when I asked them to translate some Chinese expressions into Mongolian, which I noted down. Soon I made a rather sufficient collection of words and expressions, which could be of use on my travel through Mongolia.

The next day, De Grijs left again at 4 A.M., and he arrived in Peking at 2 P.M. He first paid a visit to the American minister (gezant) Anson Burlingame, who invited him cordially to stay with him, and then went to the Russian chargé d’affaires to apply for a passport for Russia. Formally, this could only be given on presentation of a Dutch passport, but since De Grijs did not possess such document, his verbal explanation of the purpose of this journey was considered sufficient and he was provided with a passport. The Russian chargé d’affaires also told De Grijs that the journey from Peking to The Hague would take about three months; only Russian officials could make use of the horses of the postal service, and changing horses would take much time for anyone not speaking Russian.

In the following days, De Grijs visited and inspected several sights in Peking: the Temple of Heaven, the Summer Palace, the Temple of the Bell, and the astronomic observatory. Perhaps he was instructed to inspect the damage inflicted upon these by the foreigners. In his draft article, De Grijs mentioned his personal feelings about the Temple of Heaven.
This building was until now closed for anyone except the Emperor and his suite. Therefore it is not strange that a European who has had long intercourse with the Chinese and Chinese books enters with some respect the place where the Emperor once a year prostrates himself as high priest.121

In a letter to Van der Hoeven he gave the following description:

Friday morning [9 October], I visited the Temple of Heaven and found all buildings and forests kept in good order. But some foreign visitors take the liberty of breaking holes in the doors, carved with foliage, on the excuse that otherwise they cannot enter into the temple. If one realises that the Temple of Heaven is the place where the Emperor as Pontifex Maximus [High Priest] sacrifices once a year for the whole nation, then it’s surprising that the Chinese government still allows foreigners in such places. The curtains used in the temple are made of blue glass tubes held together with strings in the same way as bamboo curtains. There are foreigners here who break off those glass tubes and take them away to make penholders of them!!122

In his draft article De Grijs commented on another case of looting:

When the spoils robbed from the Summer Palace were publicly sold, the prices of many objects were often double their original value: everybody in the Chinese harbours proudly shows some little pot or pan he got possession of, forgetting these are all stolen goods.123

The next day he went on a Tartar horse with a Tartar saddle to the Summer Palace and noticed that it was not completely destroyed,124 but there was heavy damage:

Saturday [10 October] I visited the Summer Palace of the Emperor, Yuanming Yuan 'Round bright gardens.' This beautiful summer abode had been systematically destroyed by the British and French soldiers. Magnificent avenues of cedar and pine trees were mutilated here and there by the burning of a few trees. Stone lions were mutilated by the loss of a tail, an ear, or a leg; marble sundials were thrown over or broken; beautiful stone stairs are mutilated because here and there an angle or a piece has been knocked off. A temple with an enormous copper Buddha and 16 large Arhats was totally burnt, the large Buddha had fallen over, some Arhats were without head, arm, or leg and the colour of the copper, iron-red, was spread among the marble, the beautiful limestone, and many glazed roof-tiles. But this image of destruction reaches its climax when one casts a look at the gigantic building standing right behind the destroyed temple. The building is very high and has at both sides stairs and galleries of green and yellow glazed earthenware. Ascending the stairs, which is not easy because one has to find one’s way through all the debris covering the stairs, one gets to a large storey with closed iron doors. The walls here are covered with tiles one foot square and glazed with yellow. Each of these tiles is a Buddha statue in a brick frame. Going higher up, the storeys become lower and the tiles smaller, and when one reaches the top, one can see on one side a lake with an artificial island, and on the other side, innumerable villages. On both sides of this main building, there are two lama pagodas and down, a little further, at the foot, there is a copper house. Everything in that little house is made of copper: the floor, the beams, the doors. It’s a true jewel of patience and neatness.125
De Grijs planned to leave on Monday 12 October, together with the engineer Pompei, but on Sunday evening, Pompei was suddenly appointed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Zongli Yamen) as inspector for the coal mines. Now De Grijs had two objections to the journey: in the first place the long duration (three months), and in the second place, the dangers of travelling alone. Moreover, all legations had strongly advised him against travelling in November: it would be better to wait until May. Therefore he decided to deviate from Van der Hoeven’s instructions and to return immediately to Tientsin in order to travel by sea. He departed together with the British missionary Edkines, who was also well known as a sinologist. He joined Van der Hoeven in Chefoo (Zhifu, near Yantai, Shandong), where the Citadel van Antwerpen was loading coal. They left on 21 October and arrived in Hong Kong on 30 October, where he visited Consul Kup and others, and he finally left China on Sunday 1 November, in a way which showed how much he was appreciated by others.

Sunday morning, the Captain brought me on board a gig with twelve Dutch sailors, an honourable departure for which I had never dared to hope. He first travelled to Singapore, where he took the Caledonian, and the ‘overland mail’ via Suez, to the Netherlands.

On several occasions, Van der Hoeven reported on the indispensable role played by De Grijs during the negotiations. In the nineteenth century, interpreters in China were at the same time advisors of the Western envoys, and often later had a diplomatic career themselves. On the day the treaty was signed, Van der Hoeven wrote a letter to the Minister, to be taken along by De Grijs, which ended as follows:

Finally I feel compelled to declare to Your Excellency that a large part of the success of my negotiations is due to the knowledge and tact of Mr. C.F.M. de Grijs, whose—for the Chinese—charming and persuasive interpretation of my arguments, and general familiarity with the modes of thinking and forms of courtesy, afforded me a highly necessary support.

The negotiations in Tientsin took little more than a month, much shorter than the four or five months that they had expected, and this may in part be due to De Grijs.

Two months after he left Tientsin, on 14 December 1863, De Grijs arrived in The Hague and immediately went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where on the following day he was received by Minister Van der Maesen de Sombreff. After congratulating De Grijs on the treaty (although he had not yet checked it), the Minister complained about the high expenditure of bringing the treaty in person. De Grijs replied that without explicit directives, Van der Hoeven had had to act in the spirit
of his instructions, and because the emphasis was on obtaining uniform advantages with those of other countries, the treaty itself should be taken by special envoy, just as other countries had done. The Minister seemed not to be convinced, but he let it be. He asked what De Grijs’ plans were, and when he heard that De Grijs was to go to his family in Leiden, he decided that he should wait there for further instructions.\textsuperscript{131}

On 15 January 1864, Minister of Colonies Fransen van de Putte wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Van der Maesen that he objected paying any of De Grijs expenses unless incurred under orders by his ministry,\textsuperscript{132}—that is, he would not pay for De Grijs’ travel expenses. A month later, on 18 February, the treaty was ratified by Royal Decree,\textsuperscript{133} and on 20 February 1864, Minister of the Navy W.J.C. Kattendijke charged De Grijs to take the letter of ratification back to China.\textsuperscript{134} On 12 March, De Grijs received the documents concerned and a general letter of introduction in French, signed by A. Uijttenhooven, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{135} At the same time, Uijttenhooven told him that he did not need to stay in China to act as Chinese secretary and interpreter for the correspondence and exchange of the letters of ratification.\textsuperscript{136}

Thereupon De Grijs left the Netherlands and arrived in Macao six weeks later, bringing along the letter of ratification and 200 copies of the printed treaty, probably the bilingual Dutch and English version.\textsuperscript{137} He wished to go on to the Indies right away, but when Van der Hoeven was informed about the oral directive to De Grijs, he wrote to Governor-General Sloet that there was no good reason not to charge De Grijs with this temporary function, because he was now just as indispensable as in the past. Van der Hoeven requested Sloet to do his best to obtain approval to charge De Grijs again temporarily with the function of Chinese secretary and interpreter, which he fulfilled during the negotiations in Tientsin with particular skill and knowledge of the subject. Without his services I would be dependent upon the readiness of the English or French authorities in Canton to lend me the help of one of their interpreters for this indispensable service. I would not be happy to see Dutch interests dependent upon this, in particular because these foreigners cannot have an accurate understanding of our special relationship with the Chinese government and, besides, their proficiency in Chinese leaves much to be desired.\textsuperscript{138}

Governor-General Sloet then asked the advice of the Council of the Indies, which considered this request well founded in all respects, on condition that there was not yet a fixed term for De Grijs return to the Indies. No approval from the Minister was necessary for a destination deviating only from an oral directive by the Secretary General. The Governor-General then decided, on 17 July 1864, that there was no objection against designating De Grijs for that purpose. When finished,
De Grijs should be sent to Java to complete his assignment. At the same time, Sloet asked De Grijs about the salary he should receive.\textsuperscript{139} But when Minister of Colonies Fransen van de Putte was informed about this decision, he was not at all amused, and notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{140} He also expressed this in his letter to the Governor-General on 19 October, with the argument that De Grijs would be again withdrawn from service in the Indies: he hoped that the abnormal assignment of De Grijs would finally come to an end.\textsuperscript{141}

\textit{The exchange of ratifications}

On 21 May, Van der Hoeven sent a letter in Chinese translated by De Grijs to Chonghou, informing him that the letter of ratification had arrived, and asking him for a date for the exchange of the letters of ratification, but in October there was still no answer.\textsuperscript{142} Exactly one year after the signing of the treaty, on 6 October 1864, Van der Hoeven wrote to the Governor of Guangdong, Guo Songtao,\textsuperscript{143} repeating the question. A week later, on 12 October, Van der Hoeven notified the new Minister of Foreign Affairs E.J.J.B. Cremers\textsuperscript{144} that the term of one year stipulated in Article 16 of the treaty for exchange of the letters of ratification had expired, although he assumed that the Chinese would not attach great importance to this. On 16 October, after hearing from the French Consul that the documents had arrived, he wrote again to Guo Songtao asking for a time of exchange, and announcing that he would send his Chinese secretary [De Grijs] to compare the documents. The reason for the latter was not mentioned; it must have been because the Dutch letter of ratification was only accompanied by a Dutch copy of the treaty, and not by a Chinese text. Since it would be impossible for the Chinese to identify the text, De Grijs had the Chinese text copied,\textsuperscript{145} together with a translation of the text of the letter of ratification, and these had to be compared with the texts brought by the Chinese. In Guo’s answer of the same day, he informed Van der Hoeven of the date and place for the exchange, which would transpire on 20 October at 10 o’clock in the Buddhist temple Wha Lam Sze (Hualinsi 华林寺).\textsuperscript{146} But Guo also stated it would not be necessary to compare the documents. In an extra letter, he suggested that De Grijs could come an hour earlier, at 9 o’clock, to compare the texts.

When on that day, 20 October 1864, De Grijs and Guo Songtao’s secretary Lioe Tsioe Hou came to the temple and compared the texts, it turned out that the Dutch had brought the letter of ratification with a \textit{copy} of the treaty, not the original, while the Chinese had brought the original document signed in Tientsin, to which the Imperial seal of ratification had been affixed. Guo was very surprised to see that it was a new document, since he expected that the original treaties from Tientsin
would be exchanged, as was customary in China. Judging from the literal text of the treaty and the correspondence, this misunderstanding was not unfounded. The formulation in both the Dutch and Chinese texts and in the Chinese correspondence indicated an exchange of the treaty itself; the Dutch version was “to exchange the ratified treaties,” while the Chinese version was “to deliver mutually” (互相交付) [documents] after “ratification” (御筆硃批), and in the correspondence it was simply called “to exchange the treaty” (換約). In case the Dutch copy would be exchanged for the Chinese original containing the Emperor’s seal, both original treaties would end up in Dutch hands. Guo now requested to receive the original document, which was still in the Netherlands. Van der Hoeven told him that the Chinese government was mistaken, and suggested to have the Emperor sign a separate letter of ratification, which could then be exchanged for the Dutch letter. On a later visit to Van der Hoeven, Guo admitted that the Western fashion of exchange was more practical, but he would have to ask Chonghou in Tientsin for instructions. Since it would probably still take a few months before there would be an answer, Van der Hoeven decided on 22 October that De Grijs could now leave China, and notified Minister Cremers. From then on, translations and interpretations would be made by the student-interpreter De Breuk, who had arrived a few months earlier.

On 11 December, Van der Hoeven received an answer from Guo Songtao, who had been notified by Chonghou that the original treaties should be exchanged. Three days later, Van der Hoeven informed Minister Cremers, saying that he had promised Chonghou that he would do his best to obtain the original treaty—which in his opinion actually was an irrelevant question. But he also wrote:

While in the Netherlands, Mr. C.F.M. de Grijs had, as he assured me, more than once pointed out that the Chinese designated the original document for exchange, but His Excellency the [previous] Minister was of the opinion that the usual form of [Western] diplomacy should be followed. This can be very well accomplished, without offending Chinese customs, namely by attaching the letter of ratification to the original text.

He added that the Danish were confronted with the same problem in Shanghai, but this could be easily solved, since by way of precaution they had brought along the original treaty. On 31 January 1865, Minister Cremers sent the original treaty by mail ship to Hong Kong, and he simultaneously sent a letter to Van der Hoeven in Macao with a receipt (reçu) for collecting the treaty. This time it almost went awry again, as would become clear half a year later. On 18 July 1865, Van der Hoeven wrote to the Minister that he had not received the letter announcing the shipment, which was probably lost, but that the
parcel with the documents had arrived long since. The parcel had been kept at the office of P&O Steam Navigation Company in Hong Kong since 24 March—for almost four months! After waiting for some time, the steamship company sent a circular with a list of uncollected goods that was noticed by Kup. Subsequently, Van der Hoeven went to Hong Kong to collect the parcel personally. It contained the letter of 31 January, the original treaty, and permission to attach this to the letter of ratification. He immediately informed the Chinese that the Netherlands had given permission, and asked Guo for a time and place for the exchange.\textsuperscript{150}

Ten days later, on 26 July 1865, the exchange took place in the Wha Lam Sze. Van der Hoeven wrote to the Minister on the same day, noticing that the Chinese evidently saw no need to make a record (proces-verbaal). This time, De Breuk acted as interpreter—he was, of course, not as proficient as De Grijs. Van der Hoeven concluded his letter:

\begin{quote}
Mr. Johannes de Breuk, aspirant-interpreter employed by the Netherlands Indies government, assisted me on this occasion as Chinese secretary and interpreter and acquitted himself of his task in a satisfactory manner. As a matter of fact, there were no problems. During the preliminary friendly visit, Governor Guo asked for an explanation for the long lapse since our last meeting. Answering him, I only made it known that—not counting the delay caused by the great distance, of course—more time was necessary for me to induce the Dutch government into compliance than for him to obtain an affirmation from Tientsin of what he thought he should require according to Chinese custom.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

This was also meant to stress that there was nothing wrong with the documents offered for exchange by the Dutch. Now finally the treaty had come into effect, and copies were sent to the vice-consulates.

The exchanged treaty was taken to the Netherlands personally by George J. Helland, former Danish Consul in Hong Kong and commercial partner of Kup. It arrived in the Netherlands on 20 September, and the Dutch treaty text was published in \textit{Staatsblad (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees)} 1865, no. 119 on 5 October.\textsuperscript{152}

\textit{Later developments for De Grijs}

A few months after De Grijs was appointed in Semarang, on 13 April 1865, he finished an account of the negotiations and his impressions of Shanghai, Tientsin, and Peking, entitled “Het tractaat van Tiëntsin” (The treaty of Tientsin). Soon afterwards, H.D. Levysohn Norman of Batavia,\textsuperscript{153} member of the KITLV, sent the manuscript on his behalf to the board of the Royal Institute for the Linguistics, Geography and Ethnology of the Netherlands Indies (KITLV) in The Hague. He offered it for publication in the \textit{Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië},
preferably without any addition or change. At the same time, he asked for fifty off-prints. At the meeting of the board of the KITLV on 21 October 1865, this request was made known, but the decision was postponed until a later date.

One and a half years later, on 8 June 1867, “Hoffmann—whose authority to judge on this question could not be denied by anyone—advised against inserting it in the journal, because publication without any change in form would not be in the interests of the author.” Although in this article De Grijs was much more dispassionate than in his private letters or diary, perhaps he was still considered too outspoken, in particular in his sympathy with the Chinese opinion on the consuls and camlets. Another unnamed “man of scholarship and good taste” agreed with Hoffmann’s advice and wrote to De Grijs as a friend. In the end, the manuscript was not published and was sent back to De Grijs. It is now kept in the Leiden University Library.

As a result of the Treaty of Tientsin, in 1872 J.H. Ferguson was to be appointed as Consul General and Minister Resident of the Netherlands in China. But the establishment of a Consulate General in China stood or fell with the possibility of assigning one of the Chinese interpreters in the Indies as secretary and interpreter. Although they could hardly be dispensed with in the Indies—two interpreters had recently passed away and one would go on leave—a Consulate General would also be in the interest of the Indies government, and a stay in China would be useful for the interpreter. When all interpreters were asked by telegram if they were interested, four of them replied by telegram that they were willing: Albrecht, De Grijs, Groeneveldt, and Schaalje. Schlegel was not eligible since he was going on sick leave to the Netherlands. Schlegel first advised to assign either De Grijs, who had diplomatic experience and spoke some Mandarin, or Groeneveldt, although he was to take over Schlegel’s task of teaching the student Roelofs. They both had the necessary tact to carry on diplomatic negotiations, but if this was not a condition, Schaalje would be the best candidate. The secretary-interpreter would be appointed for one year and receive an allowance of f5,000, on top of his normal salary in the Indies and a passage fee. De Grijs, now married and with three children, was willing, but he had three financial conditions: free passage for his family, f1,000 extra if stationed in (expensive) Shanghai, and continuation of his f100 allowance from the Orphans Chamber. Groeneveldt, a bachelor and then stationed in Padang in the Outer Possessions, had no conditions. Therefore he was appointed, and this appointment was later extended by another year, so he worked in China from 1872 to 1874, at first residing in Shanghai, but later also in Peking. The Consul General himself was first stationed in Shanghai, later moved to Chefoo, and only after 1880 did he permanently reside in Peking.