Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam mobilization online

Comparing the networks of- and frames on British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages

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Abstract
The use of social media technology has profoundly shaped contemporary social movements, changing the way contentious politics is organized, mobilized, and framed (Castells, 2013). The Internet offers new possibilities for mobilizing people, especially for actors that spread hate speech. This study (i) analyses the network of British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors, and (ii) the collective action frame used by these actors to frame the issues of immigration and Islam. The results show that (i) the British network is a rather cohesive field of non-institutionalized actors, whereas the German network is a more scattered field of different non-institutionalized and institutionalized actors. Moreover, (ii) Islam and immigration are framed as a form of threat for safety and culture on the British page, whereas on the German page these issues are more used to indirectly blame politicians. Specific trends and events seem to influence the posts and the framing of the posts on the pages in some extent. These findings fit the theoretical expectation that the offline context is reflected in the organizational networks of- and the framing by British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors online.

Keywords: online mobilization, xenophobic, counter-jihad, network analyses, frame analyses
Introduction
Over the past decades, immigration and Islam have become highly politicized issues (Koopmans et al., 2005: 205). The anti-immigrant and anti-Islam protest rallies in Germany, as well as several other European countries, are a visible expression of growing hostility towards the influx of migrants. The mobilization for these protests are more and more taking place online (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). The Internet has changed activism in several ways. The web offers a fast and easy way to transfer ideas and ideological frames of the organization to users (Van Stekelenburg & Boekkooi, 2013). Especially for extremist groups, the Internet has offered opportunities to reach express hatred and fear, reach out to followers, and contact other extremist groups (Zhou et al., 2005).

The links which organizations have with other organizations, and the collective action frames used by organizations to attract the attention of users are forms of mobilization. Networks of links between online actors provide an insight in the potential mobilization structure of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups (Caiani & Parenti, 2013:66). Mobilization depends on a complex interaction among online actors, and on the intersubjective construction of frames of meaning (Keck & Sikkink, 1999: 90). Framing is used by organizations to attract the attention of users, create a shared ideology between users and to mobilize users (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996: 1651). The theoretical apparatus in this thesis draws on the mobilization literature. Mobilization is investigated in terms of organizational structure and framing. By extracting data from the social media network Facebook and by using network analyses and content analyses this paper aims to get a better insight in the online mobilization process of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors.

Earlier social movement research has shown that the type of actors and their framing depends on the political and cultural contextual factors in which these groups are embedded. When it comes to online mobilization, Caiani and Wagemann (2009) argue that the structure of links between right wing organizations reflects their offline structure. And also the framing used by right wing groups is dependent on the context. Organizations adapt their frames in a way that it fits the political-cultural context of a country (Koopmans et al., 2005). When organizations do not adapt these frames, the chances that they will be successful will be very small (Rydgren, 2005).

Attention to context promotes systematic knowledge, argue Tilly and Goodin (2006:6): “context and contextual effects lend themselves to systematic description and explanation, hence their proper understanding facilitates discovery of true regularities in political processes”. To find out how anti-immigrant and anti-Islam mobilization differs in different contexts, in this
research, the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam mobilization on British and German social media are compared. The following question is posed: How does the mobilization by British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages differ; and is there a relation between these differences in the framing and networks of the British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors on Facebook and the opportunities offered by the context of these countries?

Britain and Germany have a similar political structure. Both countries have a political context that offers little opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups to enter the political sphere. However, the German case differs from the British case in that anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups have more opportunities on the local level. Britain and Germany, furthermore, differ strongly on the socio-cultural context. Where Germany experienced a Nazi-fascist regime, Britain did not. This makes that there is a “different degree of societal consensus and political elites sensitivity against extreme right organizations and movements” in these countries (Caiani et al., 2012: 105). Furthermore, these countries strongly differ in citizenship traditions and granting rights to citizens. These differences are expected to influence the organizational networks of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages and framing on these Facebook pages. The thesis analyses three kinds of contextual effects. These include the understanding of structural effects such as the political opportunity structure on the actors in and the structure of the network; the impact of historical and cultural factors on the framing of online Facebook posts, and also on the influence of general trends and events on the framing of these posts.

The online sphere has been proven a useful tool for researchers to observe extremist groups (Zhou et al., 2005; Caiani et al., 2012; Caiani & Parenti, 2013). Still research that is specifically focused on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam mobilization is rare. Research has also been mainly focused on left-wing organizations, on the US extreme right (Zhou et al., 2005), and has focused on links between webpages but not between Facebook pages (Caiani et al., 2012; Caiani & Parenti, 2009). The framing on issues of Islam and immigration has also been done in the past, but this research has mainly been on descriptive analyses of traditional forms of media, such as newspapers. Comparative research in this field is also rare. This research tries to fill these gaps.

The Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism fears that forms of violence against immigrants – especially Muslim immigrants - will increase in the near future (NCTV, 2015). How people are mobilized online through forms of hate speech is therefore especially important nowadays. Monitoring extremist groups online is considered especially important by watchdog organizations, as the Internet is used for mobilization by these groups.
(Zhou et al., 2005; Caiani et al., 2012: 55). The Internet should also not be overlooked in terms of right wing violence, as the Internet is used for the spread of hate speech. Also, significant acts of right wing violence, such as the Oklahoma bomber and the attack on Utoya in Norway, have been carried out by lone wolves with often very loose affiliations to formal organizations, but many contacts online (Caiani et al., 2012: 55; Berntzen & Sandberg, 2015).
Theoretical framework
The use of social media technology has shaped contemporary social movements, changing the way contentious politics is organized, mobilized, and framed (Castells 2013). Especially for extremist groups or groups spreading hate speech, who lack resources and offline opportunities, the Internet has made collective mobilization easier by reducing the costs of communication with users (Caiani & Parenti, 2013). It has also created new opportunities for these groups to recruit new members, spread their ideology and maintain contact with other (inter)national extremist groups, forming potential networks of mobilization (Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 108). The organizational network of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages and the framing used by these actors to bring over a message to Facebook users are the aspects of mobilization that are central in this research.

Organizational networks of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam mobilization-actors
The organizational network of links between right wing groups online has proven to be an important factor in explaining the mobilization potential of groups, since communication between organizations is crucial in the process of mobilization (Diani, 2013). Where strong organizations lack, the Internet plays an essential role in the coordination between different organizations or actors (Zhou et al., 2005). The online network of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors consist of a variety of actors; from political parties, and political action groups to communities of like-minded people. Networks of mobilization can be characterized by the type of actors which make up the network, the position of these actors in the network as well as the structure of the network (Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 51).

The actors and structure of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam networks
Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam networks can consist of diverse type of actors, ranging from political parties or political organizations that express anti-immigrant and anti-Islam views; as well as communities of like-mined people. These various actors link together and form organizational network of like-minded others. Actors that receive a lot of lot of links from other actors are considered prominent and influential (Diani, 2013: 307).

The structure of the network refers to way in which these various actors are related, or have a link with each other and form the network. In a dense network, where actors are closely related to each other, and thus have many links between each other, collective action will be easier, since the close ties between actors make “the exchange of resources and the construction of a common identity” much easier than in networks in which actors are related to each other through “weak ties” (Cinalli & Füglister, 2008, as cited by Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 55).
Actors are more likely to link to other actors that are more similar to them (McPherson et al., 2001). Actors that are clustered together are likely to have similar characteristics. In networks that are strongly fragmented, identifying different clusters of actors can provide an insight in how these clusters differ ideologically (Caiani & Parenti, 2013). Zhou et al. (2005) for example showed that the network of American extreme right wing consisted of several distinguishable groups of actors – also named clusters – such as neo-Nazi groups, white supremacy organizations, Christian identity groups and neo-confederate groups. Similarly, Caiani and Parenti (2013) and Caiani et al. (2012) found that the right wing sphere in European countries consist of actors ranging from political organizations, youth groups, neo-Nazi and neo-fascist groups to nationalist organizations.

At the same time, actors can become more similar to other actors with whom they have a connection. Hadden (2015: 64) has shown that actors are more likely to choose controversial forms of protest if they had more ties with groups who previously used such controversial forms of action.

Caiani et al. (2012: 75) show that cross-country specificities related to the characteristics of the offline extreme right milieu are visible in the structure of the online networks. The authors showed that the strong divisions which existed between right-wing political elites in Italy offline were also visible in the structure of the online network. This network was rather scattered, diversified and difficult to co-ordinate. At the same time, they showed that the German online network was more centralized around one political party (the NPD), that was very prominent in the offline sphere. How contextual factors affect the actors that make up the online organizational network and the structure of this network is presented here.

The effects of the context on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam networks
Social movement scholars have explained the type of actors that mobilize around a certain issue, as well the relation between these actors, by looking at the openness of the political context (Kriesi, 1995; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Caiani et al., 2013). The opportunities offered by the political system refer to the way in which votes can be transferred into seats and power (Kriesi, 2004). "Actors perceive their opportunities and adapt their decisions and forms of action depending on the structure, which they perceive" (Hadden, 2015: 68). When offline political opportunities are limited, actors are more likely to adapt their strategies. In cases of limited opportunities for right wing actors to enter the formal political sphere, there will be more non-institutionalized, and possibly radicalized mobilization. An open political sphere,
with many opportunities, has a moderating effect on the action repertoire of organizations (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). This theory of political opportunities has also been used by explaining forms of mobilization online (Caiani et al., 2012; Caiani & Parenti, 2013). Based on this theory, it can be expected that:

H1a: if there are open political opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors offline, the online network will mainly consist of institutional actors;

H1b: if there are closed political opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors offline, the online network will mainly consist of non-institutional actors.

A combination of a strong movement and a strong party in one context is not likely (Hutter, 2014; Caiani et al, 2012: 57). When there is a closed political sphere for extreme right actors, there are no clear “institutional actors - that is, an extreme right political party - around which the whole sector could organize and consolidate” (Caiani et al., 2012: 74). Less possibilities will therefore lead to more segmented networks, in which there is a less clear centralized structure. In these closed systems, online actors are more likely to be structured around several prominent non-institutionalized actors. This leads to the following expectations:

H2a: if there are open political opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors offline, the online network is more likely to be structured around one institutionalized actor;

H2b: if there are closed political opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors offline, the online network is more likely to be structured around several non-institutionalized actors.

Finally, the structure or shape of a network has been related to the context in which actors operate. As the previous expectations show, more open possibilities will lead to a clear institutionalized actor around which the network is structured. Caiani et al., (2012) argued that more open possibilities for the extreme right to access the political system leads to a denser and more concentrated network, since there is one clear actor around which the network can be structured. More closed systems, at the other hand, will lead to a more scattered distribution of power, which results in a less dense network. Hadden (2008, as cited by Caiani et al., 2012: 56), similarly found that that more segmented networks lead to more radical action, while moderate action flows from densely connected networks. This leads to the following expectations with respect to the structure of the network:

H3a: if there are open political opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors offline, a denser and more concentrated online network is more likely;
H3b: if there are closed political opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors offline, a more segmented online network is more likely.

**Collective action framing**

Online groups can form “networks of organizations that can potentially sustain mobilizations and facilitate the construction of a collective identity” (Burris et al., 2000, p. 216). This makes that different groups come up with a more coherent vision, and form a more clear collective action frame (Burris et al., 2000; Tateo, 2005). In this way, the organizational network of links between right wing groups form an important factor in explaining the mobilization potential of groups (Diani, 2013).

Frames are “cognitive instruments that allow making sense of the external reality” (Snow & Benford, 1998, as cited by Akkerman, 2011: 6). Frames can influence how people perceive a certain situation or problem. Collective action framing refers to the rhetoric of social movements. Collective action frames are used to express angers, and create a collective identity among those who identify with the organization. How people interpreted their grievances influences their decision to take part in a movement or not (Akkerman, 2011:6). In this way, frames are used by organizations to persuade people to take part in action (Akkerman, 2011:6).

This makes framing an important aspect of mobilization, and makes frame alignment – linking individual interests, values, and beliefs to those of the movement – an important tasks for movements (Snow & Benford, 2000; Akkerman, 2011:6). For framing to be successful, it needs to fit the experiences, values and belief systems of people (Gamson, 1988). Framing can be used to address the problems which movements address as well as defining a remedy for this problem and motivating people to take part in the actions (Snow & Benford, 2000). Polletta and Ho (2006) argue that good mobilization frames combine these aspects in a coherent fashion.

**Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam framing**

Muslims and immigrants can be framed in a positive manner, for example as an advantage to the multicultural society or as a form of cheap labor (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007; Helbling, 2014). Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors are more likely to frame immigration and Islam in a negative way (Helbling, 2014). Research on racist and counter-jihad framing has identified several ways of portraying immigrants and Muslims negatively.

Frames can be used to portray the culture and habits of immigrants and Muslims as backwards or by victimizing the way the “religious culture forces women to be obedient and cover themselves” (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007:301). Some cultural frames portray
Muslims and immigrants as groups that form a threat to the national culture by changing traditions or making claims for rights, such as halal slaughter (Ekman, 2015). These cultural frames are used to emphasize the “preservation of national boundaries and a culturally homogeneous society” (Helbling, 2014:24). Besides a threat for the national culture, immigrants and Muslims can also be framed as a threat to national security (Helbling, 2015:26). These frames tend to emphasize the violent nature of migrants and Muslims, by framing them as rapers, pedophiles, drug dealers (Ekman, 2015:1995), or by portraying them as terrorists (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007: 302).

Another way in which the threat that, mainly immigrants, form is expressed through the enormous numbers in which they immigrate. The restriction frame poses the entrance of new immigrants as a problem (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007:301). Immigrants are often framed in combination with metaphors such as ‘floods’ (Orrù, 2015: 128). Similarly, a demographic frame emphasizes the threat that the higher birth rate of immigrants and Muslims in comparison to us form (Ekman, 2015: 1992). Another manner of framing the influx of migrants is by emphasizing its consequences for the competition of scarce goods. This ‘labor and social security frame’ links immigration with unemployment, the erosion of the welfare state and lack of housing (Helbling, 2015: 26).

Finally, framing can also be used not to blame Muslims and immigrants, but rather to blame the political elite. The problems caused by immigrants and Muslims can also be used to blame the incompetency of (leftist) politicians. This political correctness frame “accuses media and politicians of lying and concealing the facts” (Eckman, 2015: 1995). Furthermore, immigration can also be framed as a denial of racism frame (Orrù, 2015: 128).

These issue specific frames can be divided into broader collective action frames. Some frames, such as the cultural frames and threat frames, can be categorized as ‘diagnostic’ frames. Diagnostic frames are used to identify the problem (Snow & Benford, 2000). Cultural frames and threat frames are used to show that immigrants and Muslims form for the national culture and safety. Besides addressing a problem, some frames are focused on identifying a remedy for the problem (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014: 760-61). Snow and Benford (2000) named these frames prognostic frames. Diagnostic and prognostic frames are often used in combination, or overlap with motivational frames (Berntzen & Sandberg, 2014: 760-61). These frames “produce the motivations and the incentives for action” (Caiani & Parenti, 2011: 182).
The influence of context on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam framing

How Muslims and immigrants are framed is dependent on the context in which the framing takes place. An organization is formed in its decisions to frame a certain issues by factors outside of the organization (Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009; Meyer & Staggenborg 1996). These factors can be contextual factors, such as the history of a country, the political culture and the rules and regulation, as well as trends, such as immigration, economic recession, unemployment and inflation; and events, such as terrorist attacks.

Caiani and Della Porta (2011: 185) have shown that the historical political culture in Germany and Italy are very present in the way in which right wing parties frame current issues. The framing of these parties reflects ‘internally deep rooted traditions’ of the countries. Similarly, Lähesmäki (2015) has shown that historical traditions are very important for framing by right wing parties in Finland. That frames need to fit the historical culture of a country is consisted with the idea that for framing to be successful, it needs to fit the experiences, values and belief systems of people (Gamson, 1988). Adapting frames to make them fit with the values and belief systems in a certain context has proven to be important in order for right wing parties to survive a certain context (Rydgren, 2005). Koopmans et al., (2005:19) have argued that claims should resonate with the opportunities offered by the context in order to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse. Framing immigration and Islam in terms of culture and race is, for example, more accepted in Britain, where race is a salient issue than for example in France (Koopmans et al., 2005). Based on this research, the expectation is that anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors perceive the opportunity that offered by the historically determined socio-cultural opportunities and adapt their framing accordingly (Hadden, 2015: 68). This leads to the following general hypotheses, which will be specified later on:

H4: the collective action frame of the online actors is influenced by social-cultural context in which the actor operates.

Besides the socio-cultural opportunities, certain trends or events can also influence how often an issue is discussed and in what terms this issue is discussed. Trends, such as immigration, can make that people are more worried about their jobs and social security. This can result in that their tolerance to migrants or ‘others’ decreases (Van der Burg, Fennema & Tillie, 2005). The expectation is therefore that fears about migration are expressed more often if there is a high influx of migrants, and that framing will often focus on the number of immigrants or the negative effects of immigration for the socio-economic situation. Based on this, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H5a: After a large influx of migrants, more posts focus on immigration;
H5b: After a large influx of migrants, the restriction frame and socio-economic frame are more common in posts

Moreover, specific ‘events’, such as terrorist attacks, can influence how often immigration and Islam are discussed and how these are framed. The expectation is that, after a terrorist attack, carried out by radical Islamic ideologists, more posts will focus on the Islam. In line with findings of Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt (2007), the expectation is that the framing of these posts will more often use a security frame. Therefore, it is expected that:

H6a: After a terrorist attack, more posts focus on the Islam;
H6b: After a terrorist attack, the security frame is more common in posts.

Conceptual model

Figure 1 visually summarizes the expectations. In general, it is expected that the organizational networks of Facebook pages and the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam framing by these pages are influenced by the context. For the organizational networks, the expectation is that the opportunities offered by the political structure influence the type of actors in the network, their position in the network, and the way they are related to each other and form a structure.

The expectation is that the framing is influenced by the social-cultural opportunities that are offered by the context. These can be various, such as the history of the country; and the role of migration and religion. Finally, trends, such as migration, and events, such as conflicts or terrorism are expected to influence the topics which are discussed on the pages, and the framing of these topics. The next chapter offers an overview of these structures, trends and events in Britain and Germany in order to understand the organizational networks of Facebook pages and the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam framing in these contexts.
Figure 1: Conceptual model
Contextual factors

Structures: Political and socio-cultural opportunities

Political opportunities in Britain and Germany
The German and British context offer rather little opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups to enter the political sphere. Britain is characterized by a closed political opportunity structure for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups. The First Past The Post electoral system offers little possibilities for right wing parties to enter parliament. Furthermore, racist and xenophobic parties, such as the British National Party have had little success in the past (Pero & Solomos, 2013). In Germany, a threshold of 5 percent has hampered right wing parties in gaining success. Also, there is a lack of willingness from other parties to form a coalition with right wing parties (Heinen et al., 2015, p. 5). Germany differs from Britain, in that the political structure offers more opportunities on the local level. On the local level, mainly in Eastern Germany, these right wing parties have obtained some successes (Erk et al., 2013, p. 132). The right wing sphere in Germany consists of a variety of political parties that address issues of migration and Islam, such as the National Demokratische Partei (NPD), PRO NRW the Republikaner and, more recently, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Arzheimer, 2015). Furthermore, there are various Neo-Nazi groups and political action groups. Recently, anti-Islam movement PEGIDA gained attention with the large-scale organized movements in the German city of Dresden. Other cities, and even in other countries, PEGIDA has led to similar movements.

Socio-cultural opportunities
Socio-cultural opportunities can be various, referring to the history of the country, the role of migration and religion, the discursive opportunities on the issues of immigration and Islam. Both Britain and Germany have a history of migration. Britain knows a history of immigrants from former colonies and the commonwealth (Poynting & Mason, 2007). In Germany, migrants have been mainly working migrants, who came to the country during the 1960s and 70s.

In Germany, the foreign born population as of January 2014 was 12.2 percent of the population – 98180 – most of whom came from a non-EU member states. Similarly 12.5 percent – 80356 – of the population in the UK was foreign born at the time¹. In the 2011 Census, Muslims were the second largest religious group in Britain. 4.8 percent (2.7 million people) of

¹ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/nl
the population was Muslim (ONS, 2012). In Germany, Muslims form 2.6 percent of the population (FOWID, 2014).

Britain and Germany differ in the citizenship regime as well as in accommodating rights to minorities. Germany has for a long time applied a very rigid ethnic citizenship regime (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010: 777). Only in 2000, changes in the citizenship law in 2000 has simplified and shortened the procedure of becoming a German citizen (Koopmans et al. 2005). In comparison, the British naturalization regime is much less strict (Koopmans et al., 2005: 36).

Similarly, when it comes to accommodating rights of citizens, Britain has been much more willing to accommodate the religious needs of its Muslim citizens than Germany. In Britain, Islamic schools receive government aid, just as Christian schools. Girls are allowed to wear headscarf’s to school, and classes cover not only Christianity but also other religions, such as Judaism and Islam (Soper et al., 2007: 935). In Germany, counties differ in allowing teaching about the Islam and provide school aid to Islamic schools (Dolezal et al., 2010; Soper et al., 2007). Public funding for religiously-based social services and other activities is limited (Soper et al., 2007: 935). Furthermore, Muslims in Britain are granted more rights to practice their ritual customs. Ritual slaughter is for example allowed in Britain, but not in Germany (Dolezal et al., 2010; Soper et al., 2007).

Differences in cultural background makes that the debate on Muslims and immigrants differs between Germany and Britain. Germany experienced a Nazi-fascist regime, whereas Britain has not. This influences the sensitivity against extreme right organizations and movements (Caiani et al., 2012: 55). Multiculturalism and immigration have for a long time been ‘denied’ in Germany (Joppke, 1996: 467). “There is a very broad ‘societal consensus’ in Germany against the Nazi past and a high level of public sensitivity towards issues of immigration and religion” (Caiani et al., 2012: 55). Right wing extremism is broadly stigmatized as unaccepted in Germany (Caiani et al., 2012: 55). Caiani and Della Porta (2009) have shown that right wing groups use this historical restriction by blaming politicians in framing issues in a politically correct way. The German context is also characterized by strict off- and online regulation against extremist groups and the spreading of hateful messages against certain groups or religions applies (Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 34).

The situation is differently in Britain, where discussing immigration in terms of race is considered more accepted (Poynting & Mason, 2007; Koopmans et al., 2005). This ‘openness’ of discussion could be related to the British history of immigration (Poynting & Mason, 2007). The British immigration debate has in the past been characterized by racial distinctions. Joppke (1996: 478) argues that “Britain preferred white immigrants”. Furthermore, Britain has hardly
any restrictions with respect to racist and hate speech. Legal constraints are lacking, both offline and online (Caiani & Parenti, 2013, p. 43). This is also visible in the very negative framing of immigrants and Muslims in the British media (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Moore, Mason & Lewis, 2008).

The expectation is that, due to the burden which history poses on the immigration and Islam debate in Germany, the framing of these issues will be more focused on blaming politicians for talking politically correct on this topic. Furthermore, since Germany is less willing to accommodate Muslims similar rights as Christians, the focus on the Islam as a threat for the national culture is less present. In Britain, the absence of a fascist past in combination with a larger willingness to accommodate Muslims rights makes it more likely to frame immigrants and the Islam as a threat to the British culture. The general hypotheses “the collective action frame of the online actors is influenced by social-cultural context in which the actor operates” is therefore specified for British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam pages as follows:

\[ H4a: \text{immigrants and Muslims are mainly framed as a cultural threat on the British page;} \]
\[ H4b: \text{the political correctness frame is most often used when in posts about immigration and Islam on the German page.} \]

**Trends and events**

Trends, such as migration, and events, such as conflicts or terrorism are expected to influence the topics which are discussed on the pages. The year 2015 has known a strong trend of migration to European countries. Most migrants came from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Albania (Eurostat, 2015a; 2015b). Table 1 provides an overview of the number of migrants to Britain and Germany in the first three quarters of 2015.

**Table 1: overview of the number of migrants to the Britain and Germany during the first three quarters of 2015 (January – September). Data retrieved from Eurostat (2015a, 2015b)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Q1 (January – March)</th>
<th>Q2 (April – June)</th>
<th>Q3 (July – September)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>7 330</td>
<td>7 470</td>
<td>11 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>73 120</td>
<td>80 935</td>
<td>108 305</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Germany has a far higher absolute number of migrants. As Figure 2 shows, the relative number of migrants between January and October 2015 is also much higher in Germany than in Britain. Especially during the third quarter, Germany took in many migrants. Of the 413 800 first time
asylum seekers who applied for international protection in the Member States of the European Union (EU), Germany took in 108,305 migrants (Eurostat, 2015b). In comparison, Britain has been very hesitant with offering asylum for migrants, taken in relatively little migrants (see figure 2).

Besides the trend of migration, 2015 has known several ‘events’ in the form of terrorist attacks, carried out by radical Islamic ideologists. In January, several cartoonists and writers of the satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo were killed in Paris. Two days later, on the 9th of January, several people were taken hostage, four of whom were killed, in a Kosher Supermarket in Paris. In February, a gunmen killed two people and injured five others when he opened fire during a freedom of speech meeting and later at a Synagogue in Copenhagen. In August, an attack on board of a Thalys train took place during which four people were injured. This attack was intercepted. On Friday the 13th of November, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks occurred in Paris, leaving 130 people death. Several days later, a man injured a police officer in Berlin. Attacks outside of Europe also affected European citizens. Several British tourists were killed during a terrorist attack outside of Europe, when on June 26th over 28 people were killed in a resort close to the city of Sousse in Tunisia. On the 20th of November, a terrorist attack in a hotel in Mali took place in which several people were taken hostage and killed.
Summary

On the basis of the overview of the contexts, the hypotheses could be specified for the British and German context. Table 2 provides an overview of the expectations for the networks of- and framing on British and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages.

Table 2: overview of the specific expectations for Germany and Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 1: network analysis</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network structure (H1ab)</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors in the network (H2ab)</td>
<td>Non-institutionalized actors</td>
<td>Non-institutionalized actors, some institutionalized (local) actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most prominent actor(s) (H3ab)</td>
<td>Several non-institutionalized actors</td>
<td>Several non-institutionalized actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part 2: framing analysis</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framing on the historical discourse (H4ab)</td>
<td>Cultural frame prominent</td>
<td>Political correctness frame prominent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of events (H5ab)</td>
<td>- more posts about Islam after events</td>
<td>- more posts about Islam after events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of trends (H6ab)</td>
<td>- framing more on safety</td>
<td>- framing more on safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects of trends (H6ab)</td>
<td>- more posts about immigration after influx</td>
<td>- more posts about immigration after influx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Issues are framed more on the basis of restriction and socio-economic consequences</td>
<td>- Issues are framed more on the basis of restriction and socio-economic consequences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part 1: Data and methods of the network analysis
In the first part of the research, the network of links between Facebook pages is mapped to gain an insight in the organizational network of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors. The links between Facebook pages form a proxy for the network of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors. Earlier research has looked into how webpages of extremist right wing organizations linked to each other, in order to learn more about the organizational structure of these organizations (Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 51; Zhou et al., 2005). The organizational structure refers to “the visibility of certain actors, configurations of power, as well as alliances and potential conflicts between these groups” (Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 51). Even though the analysis of online links between these actors does reflect real relations, links between actors online represent a kind of ‘friendship’ relation which can be considered a proxy for ideological affinity, common objectives, or shared interests between the groups. Furthermore, these links can be considered means of coordination (Burris et al., 2000: 215, as cited by Caiani & Parenti, 2013: 51).

Data on the links between Facebook pages was retrieved through a method of webcrawling. Using webcrawling, a link of a page was inserted in the Facebook application Netvizz (Rieder, 2013). This application then retrieved all the links, which this page had with other Facebook pages. Links in this case refer to the pages which are liked by a certain page. It also retrieved information about each page, such as the number of users who liked the page; and the category of the page. Only pages that were characterized as anti-immigrant and anti-Islam were inserted in Netvizz, and only the direct network of the inserted pages was retrieved. This initial sample of pages was chosen on the basis of earlier research on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups in these four countries (e.g. Caiani & Parenti, 2013; Caiani et al., 2012; Arzheimer, 2015). For the British case the pages of Britain First, UKIP, British National Party and English Defence League were selected. The pages of the Alternative für Deutschland, PEGIDA, Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, Pro NRW, NPD, Die Republikaner, Die Freiheit, Die Rechte- were selected for the German case.

The links which were discovered by ‘crawling’ this initial sample were used to generate an even bigger network. This was done by crawling the direct network of new pages that were discovered by this first round of “crawling”. The pages which resulted from the first round of crawling also included pages that were not anti-immigrant and anti-Islam or could not be considered British or French. The decision was made to only crawl a page if it could be categorized as anti-Islam and/or anti-immigrant and German or British. In most instances, the name of the page already showed whether the page fell into these categories (e.g. pages of local sections of political parties and action groups). When it was unclear whether the page was
suitable or not, a more qualitative analysis of the information section of the page and some of the posts on the page was done.

In total, the direct network of 177 German anti-Islam and anti-immigrant pages was crawled. This resulted in a network of 1864 pages with 15254 links between these pages. For the British network 96 anti-Islam and anti-immigrant pages were crawled. This resulted in a network of 851 pages with 8075 links between these pages. In network terminology, the pages in the network are referred to as nodes, the links between these pages are referred to as edges.

After the collection of the data, the irrelevant pages were removed from the networks. The decision was made to not check all pages, since only the ‘popular’ pages disrupt the results. Popular pages that could be considered irrelevant, such as pages of brands and artists were removed from the network. Most pages that could not be categorized as anti-Islam or anti-immigrant pages, such as pages of the British army, were not removed from the network, since they did not influence the structure strongly and they provided an insight in the ideological relation of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages.

**Methods and Analyses**
To conduct the network analyses the tool Gephi was used. Gephi is a free network visualization tool, developed by researchers at SciencesPo (Bastian et al., 2009). In Gephi, the data was visualized and analyzed by calculating network measures.

To test hypotheses H1a and H1b on the type of actors that make up the network, the additional information about the category of the page was used. In order to create a Facebook page, moderators need to assign their page a category. These categories are pre-determined by Facebook and vary from categories such as ‘artists’ and ‘books’ to ‘political parties’, ‘communities’ and ‘politicians’. The data which was retrieved from Facebook through Netvizz contains the details for this category for each page. The categories ‘political party’, ‘politician’ refer to more institutionalized actors, whereas the categories ‘political organization’, ‘NGO, or ‘community’ are referring to pages of non-institutionalized groups. By providing a descriptive overview of the categories of pages that are most common in the British and German network, an overview of whether the network is institutionalized or non-institutionalized could be gained.

The downside of this method is that these categories are decided upon by the moderators of these pages. The categorization might be understood differently by different moderators, which could mean that similar pages receive different categorizations. Therefore, a description of the categories of pages might not provide an accurate overview of the type of pages that
make up the network. In order to solve this problem, a more qualitative analysis of the clusters in the network is added.

Clusters are groups of pages that have many links in between them. Clusters could detect similar types of pages, which use similar types of actions (Hadden, 2015). By clustering the network, pages that have many mutual links are pushed together and are randomly assigned a color. For each cluster, a description of the pages is provided. This analysis consisted of looking at the name of the page to see what type of page it was. In most cases, this was sufficient to know that the page was related to a specific party or action group – for example the page PEGIDA Bodensee shows that this is a page related to the action group PEGIDA. When the title of the page did not make it clear what kind of page it was, a more qualitative analysis of the content of the page was done, by looking at the information section and posts on the pages. This qualitative analysis of clusters shows whether a cluster consists of institutionalized and non-institutionalized actors.

To test hypotheses H2a and H2b on the position of actors in the networks, the indegree of all Facebook pages in the network was calculated. The indegree refers to the number of likes which a Facebook page receives from other pages in the network. When a page has a high indegree, it can be considered a ‘prestigious’ actor in the network (Caiani & Parenti, 2013:59). Moreover, in the visualizations of the network, the nodes as well as their labels were increased on the basis of their indegree. Bigger nodes receive more ‘likes’ from other Facebook pages in the network and occupy therefore a more important position in the network.

To test hypotheses H3a and H3b on the overall structure of the density, average distance, and average degree of the British and German networks were calculated. The density of the network is a value which varies between 0 and 1, in which 0 represents a network without any links between the Facebook pages; and 1 represents a network where all the Facebook pages in the network are linked to each other (Caiani & Parenti, 2013:57). The average distance refers to the distance, on average, of the shortest way to connect any two Facebook pages in the network. The smaller the average distance between pages, the more cohesive the network. The average degree presents the average number of contacts that the Facebook pages have. These three measures characterize how the Facebook pages in the network are related to each other and form a reflection of the overall structure of the network.
Part 1: Findings of the network analysis

First a description of the clusters of pages in the British and German networks is provided, as well as an overview of the categorization of these pages and the position of pages. This is done to see which actors make up the British and German networks of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages, as well as the position of the actors in the network. In order to compare the structure of the network and relate this back to the context, the network measures of the British and German network are compared. In the conclusion, the findings are discussed in light of the expectations.

The British anti-immigrant and anti-Islam network

The British network consists of 851 Facebook pages and 8075 links between the pages. Figure 3 shows the network of pages that are related to British anti-Islam and anti-immigrant Facebook pages. The British network consists of roughly six clusters. The largest cluster in the network is the dark blue cluster. This cluster consists of pages that are related to the English Defence League, such as local EDL groups. The most prominent page in this network is that of the English Defence League. Besides official organizations, there are also many pages in their name specific express anger over the Islam. In particular, the boycott of halal and banning the burka in this cluster prominent, such as the pages Boycott Halal, Ban halal and kosher slaughter in the UK and Ban the burka in Britain.

The network of British anti-Islam pages is also related to pages that cannot be categorized as anti-Islam or anti-immigration, such as pages that honor the British Army and British soldiers, nationalist pages and pages that refer to the First World War. These pages form the green cluster in the network. This cluster also includes the pages of the British National Party and Britain First.

The yellow cluster is composed of a diverse group of anti-Islam community pages and organizations. The cluster contains a lot of non-British pages, such as a Geert Wilders support group and American anti-Islam pages. The pages in this cluster are not so much linked to a political party or organization - except the EDL pages - but can be seen more as community pages that oppose Islam or against Islam habits. Examples of these are pages that are specifically targeted to promote bacon.

The red cluster is further removed from the network and is more institutionalized than the other clusters and consists mostly of pages of politicians or parties. This cluster contains the page of the political party UKIP as well as pages that are linked to UKIP, such as pages of local UKIP organizations, youth organization of UKIP, and the page of Nigel Farage.
Less prominent clusters in the network are the purple, pink and orange clusters. These clusters consist of very few pages. These are mainly foreign pages which are liked by the British anti-Islam pages. Examples are pages of the German Defense League of the Dutch Defense League. These clusters have a less central position in the network, because they receive less likes from British anti-immigrant and anti-Islam pages in the network.

These findings show that the clusters in the British network overlap strongly. Most clusters consist of action groups. Only the small red, rather marginalized, cluster, consists of institutionalized pages related to the political party UKIP are institutionalized actors.
Figure 3: The network of pages that are related to British anti-Islam and anti-immigrant Facebook pages (actors are Facebook pages, relations = likes, directed). The size of the nodes and the labels is increased on the basis of their indegree. The labels of pages that receive very little attention of users (less than 10,000 likes) are not shown in the network.
This overrepresentation of non-institutionalized actors in the British network is also visible when looking at the categorization of pages. Figure 4 shows that most pages in the British network are categorized as community and non-profit organization. Only a small amount of pages is characterized as a political party or politician. These findings fit the expectation that less offline opportunities lead to an online network that consist of mainly non-institutionalized actors (H1b).

![Figure 4: overview of the classification of Facebook pages in the network of pages that are related to British anti-Islam and anti-immigrant pages (categories that occur less than five times in the network are left out of the graph)](image)

Even though the findings fit with the expectation that more non-institutional actors would be present in a closed political context, the results do completely not fit second expectation about the position of actors in the network. The expectation was that less opportunities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors to access the political system would be reflected in a network that is structured around several non-institutionalized actors (H2b). In spite of the closed context, the British network is strongly centralized around the page of the English Defence League (indegree = 145). This does not correspond with the expectation.

The German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam network
The German network is much bigger than the British network, consisting of 1864 pages and 15254 links between these pages. Figure 5 shows the network of pages that are related to German anti-Islam and anti-immigrant Facebook pages. The network consists of roughly six clusters. The purple cluster is constituted of pages related to the German far-right National Democratic Party (NPD), such as pages of local NPD groups and politicians, as well as pages of the youth organization of the NPD: the young national democrats (JN). This cluster also
contains a number of community pages that are created out of citizen initiatives against immigration, the arrival of asylum seekers or the settlement of mosques. Examples of such pages are *Kein Asylantenheim in Wertingen* and *Vöhringen braucht KEINE mosque*.

The most prominent actor in the pink cluster is the page of the *Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland*. A large number of pages in this cluster are local sections of this Identitäre Bewegung, as well as pages belonging to the French, Italian and Austrian counterparts of the Identitarian movement. In this cluster, there are also pages that focus specifically on an issue, such as the page *Nein zum Syrien-Krieg* and the page *Nein zur EU*.

The yellow cluster consists almost exclusively of pages of local departments, politicians of the German political party Alternative für Deutschland. The light green cluster at the top of the network contains pages of the extreme right party Die Republikaner, politicians of this party and its youth movement the REP Jugend. This cluster consists furthermore of pages that are devoted to various topics, such as anti-left and anti-Europe pages.

Furthermore, the network consists of some small clusters. There are a number of pages, which belong to the anti-Islamization movement PEGIDA, such as LEGIDA and BRAGIDA. These PEGIDA-related pages form the blue cluster. A large portion of the pages in this cluster are non-German PEGIDA pages from other countries such as Austria, Australia, Switzerland and Norway. This cluster takes in a very central position in the network. This means that many other pages in the network like the page of PEGIDA. The small green cluster at the bottom of the network consists of pages that are related to the German right wing party DIE RECHTE.
Figure 5: The network of pages that are related to German anti-Islam and anti-immigrant Facebook pages (actors are Facebook pages, relations = likes, directed). The size of the nodes and the labels is increased on the basis of their indegree. The labels of pages that receive very little attention of users (less than 10,000 likes) are not shown in the network.
The description of the clusters shows that the German consists of clearly defined clusters, which all represent a specific party or group. There is hardly any communication or links with other clusters. Parties in the German network mainly link to pages that are related to their own party, because they perceive each other as competition (Arzheimer, 2015: 8). They are, however, willing to link to pages of political action groups, such as PEGIDA. PEGIDA, therefore, attracts likes from a much broader range of pages. This explains why PEGIDA is much more centrally located in the network. The purple, yellow and both green clusters consists mainly of pages of political parties, whereas the pink and blue cluster consist of pages that are more non-institutionalized.

Figure 6 stresses this diversity of actors in the German network. The majority of pages are categorized as political party, community, political organization and politician. This large presence of political parties in the closed German system does not fit the expectation that a closed contexts consist mainly of non-institutionalized actors (H1b).

![Figure 6: overview of the classification of Facebook pages in the network of pages that are related to German anti-Islam and anti-immigrant pages (categories that occur less than five times in the network are left out of the graph)](image)

This scattering of the German network in different clusters is also visible in that there is not one clear prominent actor, that receives a lot of attention from other pages. The page of the Alternative für Deutschland has the highest indegree (indegree =192), but the page of the NPD (indegree =163) as well as PEGIDA (indegree =122) also receive a lot of attention of other pages in the network. This distribution of power around several actors in the network fits the expectation that if there are less open possibilities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors to
access the political system then the online network is more likely to be structured around several non-institutionalized actors (H2b).

The structure of the British and German networks
As the description of the clusters in the networks already showed, the British network is rather clustered and consist of fairly similar actors. These actors are rather centralized around the page of the English Defence League, which takes in the most prominent position in the network. The German network, at the other hand, is more scattered and consists of several prominent actors. The network measures in Table 3 underline these findings. The network of British pages is denser than the network of German pages - respectively 0.011 and 0.004. Similarly, the mean number of connections that each page in the network has is higher in the British than in the German network - respectively 9.5 connections in the British and 8.1 connections in the German network. The distance, on average, of the shortest way to connect any two Facebook pages in the network is also lower in the British network (about 3.9 actors removed from each other), than in the German network (5.1).

Table 3. Overview of the measures of the networks of Facebook pages which are linked to the British and German anti-Islam and anti-immigrant Facebook pages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of the Network</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>German</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nodes (number of pages)</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>1864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edges (number of relations between the pages)</td>
<td>8075</td>
<td>15254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density (number of existing links/number of possible links)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average degree (average number of contacts of each page)</td>
<td>9.489</td>
<td>8.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average path length (distance, on average, of the shortest way to connect any two Facebook pages in the network)</td>
<td>3.942</td>
<td>5.132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These findings imply that the network of British anti-immigrant and anti-Islam pages is better connected than the German network. Information can be spread more easily through this network. It is more likely that the pages in the network are more similar in how they frame issues and which forms of action they use. At the other hand, it is more likely that the pages in the German network differ in the forms of action which they use, and the framing which they apply. The expectation that less possibilities for anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors to access the political system lead to a more segmented online network (H3b) is only reflected in the German online network. The British network is actually rather dense and cohesive.
Network analysis: Conclusion

*Can the findings on the online network be related back to the context?* By describing the networks of pages that are related to British- and German anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages a comparison can be made between the outcomes of these networks in terms of the actors that make up the network, the most prominent actor(s) in the network and the relation between the actors in the network. Table 4 provides a summary of these findings.

Table 4: Summary of the results of the network analyzes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of actors</td>
<td>Non-institutionalized</td>
<td>Non-institutionalized and institutionalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prominent actor(s)</td>
<td>English Defence League</td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland, PEGIDA, NPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network structure</td>
<td>Dense</td>
<td>Scattered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of the British network are partially in accordance with the expectations. Even though the British network consisted mainly of non-institutionalized actors, the network was still rather dense and structured around the EDL page. This does not fit the expectation that the network would be scattered, and power would be dispersed. An explanation for these differing findings could be that the English Defence League mainly operates through social media and has a very prominent social media strategy (Allen, 2011). The EDL has many local divisions, which all have a Facebook page. Many of these local pages link to the EDL page, which can explain its very high indegree.

The findings of the German network are partially in accordance with the expectations. The expectation that the network would be scattered and the power would be dispersed around different actors is in accordance with the findings. The idea that these powerful actors would be non-institutionalized does not become visible from these findings. Even though PEGIDA is a non-institutionalized actor, the pages of the political parties Alternative für Deutschland and NPD are also very prominent. Similarly, the expectation that the network would mainly consist out of non-institutionalized actors has not become clear from the findings.

Two explanations could be provided for this differing finding. First the German political system is rare in that it offers more opportunities for right wing parties at the local level than at the national level. This could explain why there are still many institutionalized actors present in the network, since they still have chances to have an electoral success at the local level. Furthermore, the selection of the initial sample included many pages of German right wing
extremist parties. When other pages would have been selected, the findings might have been very different.
**Part 2: Data and methods of the framing analysis**

Collective action frames are used to express angers, and create a collective identity among those who identify with the organization. In the second part of the study, how collective action framing on immigration and Islam are taking place is researched by comparing the framing on a British and German Facebook page.

The pages of which the posts were analyzed were selected on the basis of the popularity of the page in terms of likes and activity on the page, as well as on the basis of the position of the page in the network on the basis of the in-degree. The way in which groups mobilize their users and frame their issues depends on the type of organization (Caiani & Parenti, 2013; Hadden, 2015). Therefore, to make the analysis comparable, a page of a political action group was chosen for both contexts.

The page of the English Defence League (EDL) was chosen for the British case and the page of PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes - in English the *Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident*) for the German case. The EDL started out as a street movement in the British town of Luton in 2009 (Allen, 2011). PEGIDA is a German anti-Islam street-movement formed in October 2014 in the city of Dresden, Germany. Both the EDL and PEGIDA are considered very prominent islamophobic street movements, that extensively use social media and the web to organize their offline protests. Both movements are very prominent and have been adapted by counter-Islam movements worldwide. As of 18th of November, the Facebook page of the EDL has 249,291 likes of Facebook users, the page of PEGIDA had 181,582 likes of users.

The pages cannot be considered representative of the whole network of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam organizations. As has been shown in the results section of the network analyses, the German network consists of actors which are far-removed, which can mean that the pages differ strongly in the issues which they discuss, and how they discuss these issues. The British page might offer a rather good representation, since the British network is rather dense and consists of many local EDL pages.

For the content analysis, data was gathered over four week-long periods in 2015. The decision was made to spread the collection of data over four separate weeks in the year instead of four consecutive weeks of 2015 in order to make sure that the data was not specifically influenced by a certain period. On all posts that were posted by the EDL and PEGIDA from the 14th up to 21th in the months February, May, August and November data was gathered. Several events took place during or before these four weeks. The data in February covers the attacks in
Copenhagen. The data in August covers the attack in the Thalys train. The week of November portrays the aftermath of the Paris attacks.

The data was gathered by scraping information from Facebook using the Facebook application Netvizz (Rieder, 2013). The data which was retrieved was already formatted in a data file, containing information on the date of the post, the type of post – whether it was a link, photos, events and videos – the number of likes, the number of comments and the URL of the post. During this time period 474 post were gathered from the British page and 176 from the German page. Because of this large difference in number of posts on the British and German page, a sample of 237 posts of the British page which was analyzed. This sample was selected through a systematic random sample. From all posts that were gathered, every second post was included in the sample.

Methods

Posts on Facebook pages can be categorized as events, links, photos, status and videos. Most of the time, events, links, photos, and videos are accompanied by a small text written by the moderators of the pages. Only the part that was actually visible in the post on the page was coded. For example, when an article was included in the post, only the part of the article that was visible without clicking on it – often the image, title and first sentence – was coded.

First the manifest content of posts was coded. Manifest coding refers to who or what is portrayed in the post. All posts were coded to see whether they were about immigration or the Islam or not. Posts about the Islam were coded as 1. A post was about the Islam if it mentioned or portrayed the religion, Muslims, ISIS or individuals that are ‘perceived to be Muslims’ (Ekman, 2015: 1995). Posts about immigration were coded as 2. A post was about immigration if it mentioned or portrayed immigrants. Posts which mentioned both the Islam as well as immigrants were coded as 3. Irrelevant posts that dealt with different topics than the Islam or immigration were coded as 0. Examples of such irrelevant posts are shown in figure 7. Posts that paid a tribute to the Paris aftermath which did not refer to immigrants, Muslims or the Islam were also coded as non-topical. Non-topical posts were excluded in the latent coding of the posts. In the latent coding of the posts, the frames that were used to portray the issues of immigration and Islam were coded.
Figure 7: Non-topical posts

Issue specific frames on Islam and immigration as predetermined by Ekman (2015), Orrù (2015), and Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007) were the starting point for coding the posts. These frames were supplemented through a process of open coding. Open coding refers to identifying, naming, categorizing and describing phenomena found in the posts on the British and German page. After open coding different codes were related to each other through a process of axial coding. Through axial coding relationships among the open codes were identified in order to understand connections and identify patterns between the different frames used in the posts. Through this process of axial coding eight categories of frames were identified.

The security frame applied to posts that portrayed migrants and Muslims by emphasizing their violent nature, as well as the threat which they formed for the national security. These were posts that brought immigrants and Muslims in relation with the increased threat of a terrorist attack applied as well with crime news on rape, sexual abuse, pedophilia, violence.

The cultural frame portrays Muslims and immigrants as a threat to western civilization and values such as church-state relations, freedom of expression, gender equality and tolerance towards homosexuality (Vliegenthart & Roggeband, 2007: 302). Posts with this frame highlight own traditions, emphasize the superiority of the own culture to the culture of Muslims or immigrants. This cultural difference is highlighted by stressing that the habits and culture of immigrants and Muslims are ‘backwards’. Similarly, this frame contains posts that highlight that Muslims and immigrants should not have ‘special rights’. These posts also express the fear that the Islam is taking over the country.
Posts that portrayed the entrance of immigrants or Muslims as a problem were coded as a restriction frame. Posts that portrayed immigrants as a problem for increased competition for housing, jobs or other scarce goods contained a socioeconomic frame.

These four frames focus specifically on the problem which the Islam and immigrants pose for society. Posts on immigration and Islam could also be used to criticize not immigrants and Muslims, but rather the political elite or the media. Posts with a political correctness frame argue that “mainstream politicians and the news media are particularly targeted and accused of concealing the facts and thereby upholding a societal climate of political correctness” (Ekman, 2015: 1995). Besides criticizing the Muslims, immigrants and the political elite, posts on immigration and Islam can also be used to bring down accusations of racism (Orrù, 2015: 128). Posts that explicitly deny that critique on Muslims and immigrants is racist contain a denial of racism frame.

Some posts did not focus on the ‘problem’, but rather offered a solution. These solutions differed from closing borders and sending migrants back to submitting the death penalty to kill Muslims. Posts that offered a solution were not very often occurring, therefore these different types of solutions were coded as containing a solution frame. Posts that did not contain any of the above frames, but merely informed users were coded as having an informative frame. These were for example posts that mentioned that an attack was carried out by the Russians against ISIS. Posts of which a frame could not be detected were coded as unclear.

Posts could contain more than one frame. Therefore, for each post, all frames were coded as present (=1) or not present (=0). The full codebook is listed in Appendix A.

Part 2: Findings of the framing analysis

In this part of the paper the findings on the content analysis of a British and German anti-Islam and anti-immigrant page are presented. These findings focus on how structural factors, trends and events are reflected in the topics and frames on the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam pages EDL and PEGIDA. For each page, how the expectations are reflected in the results is discussed separately. In the end, a comparison between the framing on the German and British pages is made to conclude whether the framing on these pages can be related back to their context.

Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam framing by the English Defence League

From the four weeks of data which was retrieved from the page of the English Defence League, 237 posts that were included in the sample (Table 5). From this sample about 30 percent of the
posts did not focus on immigration or the Islam. In total the frames used in 165 posts were coded. Most of these posts (60 percent) focused on the Islam. Immigration was only present in 10 percent of the posts.

Table 5: Number of posts retrieved (N) and subject of posts in proportions on the page of the English Defence League

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retrieved posts (N)</th>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th>Week 2</th>
<th>Week 3</th>
<th>Week 4</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-topical</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topical (coded):</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam and immigration</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expectation was that the posts on immigration and Islam on the page of the English Defence League would be mainly framed in terms of threat which these immigrants and Muslims form for the British culture and traditions (H4a). Table 6 provides an overview of the proportion of posts that contained a certain frame in each week, as well as the overall number of posts that contained this frame in absolute and relative numbers.

Table 6: The frames used in posts per week on the page of the English Defence League (proportions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>week 1</th>
<th>week 2</th>
<th>week 3</th>
<th>week 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solution frame</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety frame</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political correctness frame</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction frame</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic frame</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural frame</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative frame</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denial of racism frame</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of coded posts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cultural frame is present in 18 percent of the posts on the page. In the third week, most of the posts (41 percent) contained a cultural frame. Posts containing this frame emphasize the differences in traditions, customs and habits of the British and Muslims. Figure 8 shows an
example of a post in which it is argued that Muslims should adapt to the British culture by not wearing Burkas. This desire for Muslims to adapt is also visible in posts on the page that argue that halal food should not be sold, and schools should not provide halal lunches. This wish of cultural adaptation fits the fear that the Muslim culture is taking over Britain (see figure 9).

Figure 8: Post containing a cultural frame
Even though the cultural frame is very common in the posts on the page of the EDL, the expectation that the posts on immigration and Islam on the page of the English Defence League would be mainly framed in terms of threat which these immigrants and Muslims form for the British culture. By far the majority of posts contains a safety frame (57 percent of the posts). This safety frame addresses the threat which the Islam poses for the security of the British society, as well as the danger the Islam poses in terms of violence, pedophilia and crime (figure 10). The most posts on the British page contain a cultural and/or safety frame. Other frames are not very often used in posts on this page.
Besides the cultural historical tradition of the country, the expectation was that trends and events would influence the frames that were used on the pages. Table 5 does not show a change over time in posts on immigration and the Islam. Similarly, Table 6 does not show a clear change in frames of the posts on the page. Even though the most common frame during the fourth week is the security frame, this frame was also the most common in the first and second week. The effects of trends and events are therefore difficult to divert from the subject of posts and their frames on the page of the EDL. These findings do not fit the expectations formulated in hypotheses H5a, H5b, H6a and H6b.

In general, the posts on the British page focused mainly on the Islam. The subject of the posts and the framing of these subjects is rather consistent over time. The framing was mainly aimed at addressing the danger that the Islam poses both for the safety of the British society, as well as for the British traditions and culture. In this way, the framing are mainly aimed at diagnosing the problem of the Islam. A small amount of posts suggest a solution to the problem of the Islam, such as one post in which a death sentence for Muslims was suggested. Most of the posts on the British page were very brief and did not contain a lot of text. This makes that the situation was often very simplified. For example, no distinction is made between moderate and radical Muslims. The Islam is in itself seen as an evil, mind controlling cult (figure 11).

![Simplified post on the EDL page](image)

*Figure 11: simplified post on the EDL page*
Anti-immigrant and anti-Islam framing by PEGIDA

In total, 175 posts were retrieved which were posted on the page of PEGIDA during the four week-long periods (Table 7). Somewhat more than half of these posts were non-topical and were aimed at promoting the success of PEGIDA. Only 81 posts (46 percent of all posts) were coded on the frames which they contained. There were slightly more posts that focused on immigration (21 percent) than on the Islam (18 percent).

Table 7: Number of posts retrieved (N) and subject of posts in proportions on the page of PEGIDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retrieved posts (N)</th>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th>Week 2</th>
<th>Week 3</th>
<th>Week 4</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Proportion of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-topical</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topical (coded):</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam and immigration</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The expectation was that posts on immigration and Islam on the page of PEGIDA would be mainly framed in terms of a political correctness frame (H4b). Table 8 provides an overview of the frames that are used in the posts on immigration and Islam on the page of PEGIDA in each of the four weeks.

Table 8: The frames used in posts per week on the page of PEGIDA (proportions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution frame</th>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th>Week 2</th>
<th>Week 3</th>
<th>Week 4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security frame</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political correctness frame</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction frame</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic frame</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural frame</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informative frame</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denail of racism frame</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear frame</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of coded posts</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings in table x are in accordance with the expectation formulated in hypothesis h4a. About half of the posts contained the political correctness frame. These posts argue that
politicians and the media hide the truth. The word *lugenpresse* is often occurring in posts to emphasize this lying character of the press. The framing of Islam and immigrants is therefore indirect an attack on the news media and politicians (see figure 12). Many of the posts on the page also express the lack of trust in politicians due to this lying and withholding of facts (figure 13). By portraying the media and politicians as untrustworthy and liars, PEGIDA portrays itself as the protector of the people. It tries to alarm people that there is a threat, which the politicians and the media try to hide.

![Figure 12: post with political correctness frame](image)
Besides the political correctness frame, the security frame is present in 37 percent of the posts. There is, however, a shift in the focus of this security. In week 3, most of the posts using a security frame focus on an incident that happened in an immigrant hostel in the city of Suhl, Germany. This incident is very often mentioned in the posts in order to address the violent nature of migrants. One of the posts argues that immigrants bring the situation for which they fled with them to Germany (Translated from: “Sie bringen die Zustände, vor den sie angeblich geflohen sind in unser Land!”2). In week 4, the focus of security shifted more to the fear of new terrorist attacks after the Paris attacks.

Furthermore, posts on cultural frames are rather common. These cultural frames are, however, much less explicit than the posts on the British page that used this frame. These posts refer mostly to other European countries that have taken measures to restrict rights of Muslims and immigrants. Posts that perceive immigrants and Muslims as a threat for the German culture are not present.

The expectation that trends such as immigration affect how often frames are used is also visible on the German page. In the data covering the first two weeks, immigration is hardly

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mentioned. In the third week about 51 percent of the posts is on immigration. As data from Eurostat showed, during this time, the number of immigrants increased significantly in Germany. In the fourth week, just after the Paris attacks, the proportion of posts that focus specifically on immigration is suddenly much lower (0.11). In this week, most posts focus on the Islam (0.32) or combine immigration and the Islam (0.19). The subject that is central in the posts seem to reflect the trends and events during that time. These findings are in line with the expectations formulated in hypotheses H5a and H6a.

This effect of contexts are not clearly visible in the frames used on the page. Since there were not a lot of posts during the first and second week, it is difficult to detect a shift in frames. In all weeks, the political correctness frame and the security frames seem to dominate the posts on immigration and Islam. Posts portraying a restriction frame, such as in figure 14, are not much more common in the third week. There is, however, a small increase in the posts that use a socio-economic frame. These findings are in line with the expectation formulated in hypotheses H5b. Still, with these small number of posts, it is very difficult to make solid conclusions. Similarly for week 4, after the Paris attacks, there is an increase in the number of posts that use a security frame. Still, posts that use a political correctness frame are in this week most common. Therefore, this finding is not in line with the expectation formulated in hypotheses H6b.

PEGIDA via The Epoch Times
Deutschland
17 november

(...)Bayern erwartet mehr als 2 Millionen Asylbewerber(...)

Wir werden von WAAAAHNSINNIGEN regiert!!!

(...)"Wenn der Andrang weiter so hoch bleibt, kommen bis zum Ende des Jahres nicht 1,5 Millionen, sondern weit über zwei Millionen Flüchtlinge nach Deutschland", meldete das bayerische Innenministerium. (...)

Figure 14: post using a restriction frame

In short, most posts on the page of PEGIDA did indeed use a political correctness frame in posts on immigration and the Islam. Just as on the British page, most posts seem to focus on addressing the problem. Even though the German page also uses the cultural frame and safety
frame to address the problem of immigration and Islam, in comparison with the post on the British page, the politicians are much more often the attacked rather than the Islam or immigrants. The posts on the page are also much more nuanced and contain longer texts. Where the posts on the British page did not differ between extremists and moderate Muslims, the posts on the page of PEGIDA do differ between immigrants who need help and immigrants who abuse the situation (see figure 15).

#AsylbetrügerRaus #PlatzSchaffenFürEchteKriegsflüchtlinge
#GlücksritterZurückverschiffen #SchengenAussetzen #GrenzenDicht
#ZollstaDD

Figure 15: part of a post that differentiates between ‘frauds’ and war-refugees

Conclusions of the framing analysis

How is the framing of immigrants and Muslims related to, or a reflection of, the context in which this framing takes place? This question was answered by comparing the framing of immigration and Islam on a British and German anti-immigrant page. The British page of the EDL was much more active in posting than the German page PEGIDA. The content of the posts on the page of PEGIDA was quite differently from the ones on the EDL page. The posts on the German pages were often fairly long, and contained more informative information and were more nuanced than the posts on the British page which were often very short, simplified and seemed to contain conspiracy theories.

By analyzing the framing in posts on a prominent British and German Facebook page, it can be concluded that the way the Islam and immigration is portrayed can to some extend be related to structural factors, trends or events. This was especially visible on the German page. The framing of most of the posts on the German page is as expected. The fascist history of Germany, in combination with a lack of discussion on immigration and Islam in the public sphere and a strict regulation against racist remarks makes that the majority of posts frame the Islam and immigration in light of this taboo. Politicians and media are attacked for their political correctness. For the British case, the conclusion is somewhat different. Even though some posts on the British page contained, as expected, a cultural frame, most of the posts used a safety frame to portray immigrants and Muslims. This is not as what would be expected from the British societal culture. An explanation for this differing result could be that the lack of regulation on racist speech in Britain makes that the online debate is very harsh and negative.
Another reason could be the influence of the mainstream newspapers and media. Immigrants and Muslims are portrayed very negative in British media (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Moore, Mason & Lewis, 2008). Many of the posts on the page of the EDL share links of news media, this might explain the rather negative and extreme way of portraying Muslims.

Besides the historical cultural context, trends and events also were expected to influence the topics and framing of these topics on the pages. The increase in immigration seemed to be reflected in the number of posts, and in lesser way also in the framing of posts on the German page. Similarly, the Paris attacks lead to more posts about the Islam on the German page. Changes in frames were not as clear. On the British page of the EDL, the effects of these events was not as visible in the number of posts on the Islam and immigration. An explanation could be that immigration is not as prominent an issue in Britain as in Germany, since the absolute and relative number of immigrants in 2015 are much lower in Britain than in Germany. Similarly changes after the Paris attacks were not as present either, since most of the posts before the attacks were already on the Islam and used a safety frame.

Besides the attacks in Paris, other attacks did not seem to be as clearly reflected in the posts on the pages. The attacks in Copenhagen were not mentioned, whereas the attack in the Thalys train was mentioned only once on the page of the EDL. It could be that these events made a less big impact and received less coverage in the news. The attacks in Copenhagen had specific targets, namely a freedom of speech meeting and a synagogue, the attacks in the Thalys train were intercepted. The Paris attacks were however more large scale, and attacked at many citizens.
Conclusion and discussion
In this paper the effect of context on online mobilization by anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups in Germany and Britain has been explained. The focus has been specifically on which actors make up the mobilization network, how these actors are linked as well as the way these actors frame the issues of immigration and Islam.

The German and British online networks showed some reflections of the offline context. The expectations that a closed offline political context would be reflected in more non-institutionalized actors was visible in the British network, but not in the German network. The expectation that a more offline political context would be reflected in a network in which power was scattered around several actors was visible in the German network. The closed political British context seems to be voiced in a solid, cohesive network of non-institutionalized actors, whereas the openness of the German system at the local level seems to be reflected in a very scattered network of institutionalized actors.

Similarly, structural factors, such as the societal culture were reflected in the framing on the German page. The painful history is reflected in the focus on blaming media and politics for being political correct. This fits earlier research on framing by extreme right wing groups in Germany (Caiani & Della Porta, 2011). Even though the Islam was often framed as a threat to the national cultural, it was not the most commonly used frame. The focus was mainly on the threat posed by the Islam to the national safety. This is in line with the negative framing nature of immigrants and the Islam in the British media and politics (Huysmans & Buonfino, 2008; Moore, Mason & Lewis, 2008). On the German page, the number of posts and the framing of posts seemed to, partially, reflect trends of immigration and events. However, these findings reflect only a very small amount of posts, and were also not visible on the British page.

Even though the results do show that there is, in a way, a reflection of the context on the networks of- and framing on anti-immigrant and anti-Islam Facebook pages, overall the contextual impact on both networks and framing is limited or modest. For each of the formulated expectations, the outcomes were only reflected in either the British or the German context. These differences in expectations and findings could have theoretical or methodological grounds.

Theoretically, the political opportunities might not form a sufficient explanation for explaining variation in mobilization online. Theoretically, the effects of political opportunities might not form a sufficient explanation for explaining the actors that make up a certain network and the structure of a network. Other contextual factors, such as legal regulation against right
wing groups might explain why some groups are more present in a context than others. For the framing, the historically determined societal culture seemed to be reflected in posts on the German, and to a lesser extent, British page. Societal culture might therefore form a good explanation for differences in frames.

Methodologically, the case selection might not have offered enough variation in political context to explain for variation in the organizational networks. For the network analyses, the initial sample of pages might have influenced the actors that formed the network, as well as the structure of the network. For the German case, many local extreme right wing parties were chosen for the begin sample. Different networks might have been generated when selecting other pages for the sample. For the content analysis, the selection of pages might have influenced the results. First of all, both PEGIDA and the English Defence League are primarily anti-Islam movements. Pages that focus stronger on immigration might contain very different frames. Furthermore, the EDL has in the past distanced itself from racist actors, such as the British National Party. This might explain why the framing was not as strongly focused on cultural differences. Finally, the decision to gather data over four weeks spread around the year might not be the best way to detect changes in frames due to trends or events.

In this research, the mobilization of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam actors has only been researched in two countries. There are some limits to this research, as well as some ways in which this research can be improved. A downside of comparing the German and British anti-immigrant and anti-Islam networks is that they have a similar closed political system. This makes it difficult to relate differences or similarities in the networks to the context. For future research, it is advisable to include countries with very different contexts, such as the France or The Netherlands.

Another limitation of this research is that only two pages have been compared in the content analysis. The two pages which have been selected might not be representative of other British or German Facebook groups. The two pages represent action groups, which are not representative of the framing used by pages of political parties or other pages. Parties might reach their users already through more traditional forms of media, and might therefore discuss different topics, and frame issues differently. Even though the EDL is very prominent in Britain, but it remains the question whether it is representative for other pages. Similarly, the German network proved to be very scattered. This might mean that pages in the network differ strongly in their framing of issues. Including more diverse groups for the content analysis, might provide a better insight in the framing in different contexts.
Another limitation of this research is that the data on the posts on the page was rather limited. The four weeks of data that were used for the content analysis was spread around a year. Posts on the German page seemed to partially reflect trends and events over time. However, it is difficult to make such a conclusion on only small amount of data. Further research could include more content retrieved over a longer time period in order to test whether these trends and events are indeed reflected in the posts on the pages. Furthermore, in future research posts could be coded by more than one person to ensure intercoder reliability.

In spite of these limitations, this research has provided some insight in how the contextual factors in which anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups operate influence the types of frames which they use to frame immigration and Islam. Furthermore, this research has provided insight in what kind of anti-immigrant and anti-Islam groups make up the British and German organizational networks. These findings are especially important during a time when more violence against immigrants is used. The fear that feelings of xenophobia will increase after the current influx of immigrants and terrorist attacks out of Islamic motives have taken place, and which has known an enormous influx from (non-Western) immigrants, these issues are more present than ever. The fear exists that right wing groups will become more powerful in the coming years. Since right wing groups have successfully used social media to present hate speech and mobilize users (Zhou et al., 2005), a better insight in what type of groups exist, how they are linked with each other, and how they attract the attention of the users is important.
References


FOWID (2014). Religionszugehörigkeit Bevölkerung Deutschland. Retrieved from


Poynting, S., & Mason, V. (2007). The resistible rise of Islamophobia Anti-Muslim racism in


## Appendix A

For each of the posts the following frames were coded on whether they were present (=1) or not present (=0) in the posts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>From source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive frame</strong></td>
<td>Migrants and Muslims are portrayed positively. For example, as an advantage to the multicultural society or as cheap labor.</td>
<td>(Vliegenthart &amp; Roggeband, 2007; Helbling, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security frame</strong></td>
<td>Migrants and Muslims are portrayed as a threat to the safety and national security. Relating them to terrorism and violent acts, such as rape, violence, sexual abuse, grooming and pedophilia.</td>
<td>(Helbling, 2015: 26; Vliegenthart &amp; Roggeband, 2007: 302; Ekman, 2015: 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Restriction frame</strong></td>
<td>Posts that frame the entrance of new immigrants – and/or Muslims - as a problem contain a restriction frame.</td>
<td>(Vliegenthart &amp; Roggeband, 2007: 301; Ekman, 2015: 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic frame</strong></td>
<td>Immigrants– and/or Muslims – are portrayed as the cause for unemployment, the erosion of the welfare state and other forms of competition between scarce resources.</td>
<td>(Helbling, 2015: 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural frame</strong></td>
<td>Muslims and immigrants are portrayed as a threat to western civilization and values such as church-state relations, freedom of expression, gender equality and tolerance towards homosexuality (Vliegenthart &amp; Roggeband, 2007: 302). Posts with this frame highlight own traditions, emphasize the superiority of the own culture to the culture of Muslims or immigrants. This cultural difference is highlighted by stressing that the habits and culture of immigrants and Muslims are ‘backwards’. Similarly, this frame contains posts that highlight that Muslims and immigrants should not have ‘special rights’.</td>
<td>(Helbling, 2014:24; Ekman, 2015; Vliegenthart &amp; Roggeband, 2007: 301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political correctness frame</strong></td>
<td>This frame blames politicians and the news media for concealing the facts about immigrants and Muslims in order to uphold a societal climate of political correctness.</td>
<td>(Ekman, 2015: 1995).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denial of racism frame</strong></td>
<td>These frames are used to avoid public blame of racism.</td>
<td>(Orrù, 2015: 128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prognostic frame</strong></td>
<td>These posts mention solutions to solve problems of immigration or Muslims. Examples of these are posts that suggest the closing of borders.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informative frame</strong></td>
<td>Posts that did not contain any of the above frames, but merely informed users were coded as having an informative frame. These were for example posts that mentioned that an attack was carried out by the Russians against ISIS.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unclear frame</strong></td>
<td>The framing of immigration and Islam does not become clear from the posts.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

<table>
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