EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY-FORMATION PROCESS

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This dissertation is submitted for the degree:
Master of Arts in International Relations

JUNE 2015
DECLARATION

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing, which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. It has not been previously submitted, in part or whole, to any university of institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification.

In accordance with the Faculty of Humanities guidelines, this thesis is does not exceed 20,000 words, and it contains less than 150 figures.

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Annsophie Schmitt
SUMMARY / ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY-FORMATION PROCESS

The European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in the year 2004 and aimed at promoting prosperity, stability and security in the neighbouring countries. The Thesis tests the explanatory power of European Integration theories in explaining the formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy on the European level. Elements of the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the theory of intensive transgovernmentalism and historical institutionalism are used. The Thesis aims to answer the question why the European Neighbourhood Policy appeared on the ENP, which factors influenced its shape and who were the relevant actors. The ENP is an interesting policy to research for different reasons. The countries participating in the ENP differ in their political and economic development. Furthermore, after the Enlargement round in 2004 it was one of the first foreign policies in which the European Commission had a significant role. The Thesis aims to analyse the interplay between the European Institutions which led to the current policy and the policy emphasis on security and stability. The relevant documents of the European Commission, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council and the Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council were analysed. The Enlargement of the EU in 2004 triggered the initiation of the ENP as it led to a new neighbourhood of the EU, this can be explained by the mechanism of Path-dependency. The preferences of the Member States of the EU, the decision to conduct in common the relations with the new States of the EU, the decision to conduct in common the relations with the new neighbourhood on a European level and the economic cooperation with the new neighbouring states can be explained with the Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The intensive transgovernmentalism explains the distinguished role of few Member States in initiating the ENP, for example as Poland. It is assumed that the European Council and the General Affairs and External Relations Council set the objectives as prosperity, stability and security on the basis of the Member States preferences. The Commission used similar tools as in the policy of Enlargement, for example conditionality, and expanded its influence in the policy of foreign affairs. Its influence on the objectives was limited.
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<tr>
<td><strong>ENP</strong></td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PCA</strong></td>
<td>Partnership Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td><strong>EMP</strong></td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td><strong>ESS</strong></td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td><strong>LI</strong></td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<td><strong>CFSP</strong></td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td><strong>DG</strong></td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td><strong>COREPER</strong></td>
<td>Committee of Permanent Representatives</td>
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<td><strong>EMP</strong></td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td><strong>EMAA</strong></td>
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ENP-MAP
1 INTRODUCTION

The European Neighbourhood Policy (hereafter ENP) was launched in the year 2004. Its aim is “....to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union.” (European Commission, 2003, p. 4). The policy provides an alternative to the membership to the EU and creates a framework to maintain relations with the neighbouring states of the EU (European Commission, 2003, p. 5). The ENP combines elements of different policies, for example, economic policies and elements of the Common Foreign Security Policy (hereafter CFSP). Altogether, the relations between the EU and its eastern and southern neighbour countries are organised under its framework. The dissertation examines the formation process of the policy and aims at identifying the actors and factors which shaped the ENP in its current form. The central questions of the thesis are as follows:

WHY WAS THE ENP ON THE AGENDA?
WHAT SHAPED THE ENP IN ITS CURRENT FORM?
WHO WERE THE CENTRAL ACTORS OF THE ENP?

The ENP is interesting to research in different regards. It provides an alternative to the membership of the EU and consists of a broad scope of objectives. Furthermore, the participating countries differ in their economic and political development. The enlargement of the European Union was a significant event in the evolution of the ENP. It led to a new neighbourhood surrounding Europe; one intention behind the ENP could have been preventing neighbouring countries from isolation. Furthermore, the prevention of negative spill-over’s into the Union from possible emerging political
instability (W. Wallace & Europe, 2003, p. 4). Further reason was a certain fatigue regarding future prospects of enlargement rounds and the necessity of an alternative to enlargement. The Commission coordinated the enlargement round in 2004 and it is likely that striving for more power in the external relations of the European Union and towards a consistent European foreign policy was one of the motivations of the Commission to influence the ENP on the European level. Furthermore, the EU sought for a consistent approach for the relations with the neighbouring countries.

In the literature, the ENP is controversially discussed. While some authors argue that the incentives of the policy are too weak to initiate reforms, other authors argue that the contradictory goals of the policy cause its weak success. Furthermore, a controversial discussion exists about the policy formation process. Some authors attribute a strong influence to the Commission, which results from learning and adaptation from the Enlargement policy (Kelley, 2006, p. 58). Others conclude that the initial proposal of the Commission was diminished by the European Council (hereafter EUCO) and resulted in weak incentives (Balfour & Rotta, 2005, p. 8).

The research on the origins of the policy design is sparse (Tulmets, 2007b, p. 1), although the similarities between the tools of Enlargement used in 2004 and the ENP are illustrated now in the existing literature. Disaccord exists in the literature about the central actor during the formation process. The European Commission (hereafter Commission), is assumed to be responsible for the adaption of the tools of Enlargement (Kelley, 2006; Robert, 2001). The EUCO is seen as relevant actor because of the interest of the European member states in security implications and owing to geographic proximity to the neighbouring states. It is argued that the EUCO and the Council of the European Union (hereafter Council) played a significant role in the design of the incentives and the prioritisation of security and stability (Balfour & Rotta, 2005). Indeed, due to the broad scope of elements and the participation of supranational institutions and intergovernmental actors, it is difficult to explain the integration process with a traditional European integration theory. This contribution analyses the policy formation process and aims at exploring the explanatory power of intensive transgovernmentalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism (hereafter LI). Intensive transgovernmentalism describes the in-depth cooperation of European member states governments which engage in extensive cooperation but not under the full EU institutional framework (W. Wallace & Europe, 2003, p. 101). The central actors of the LI are national states which take rational decisions and cooperate either by reason of
economic benefits or if the economic cooperation produces positive geopolitical externalities (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 27).

On the basis of the theories it is assumed that the European member states had an interest to pursue political stability and security through economic cooperation with the neighbouring states. This preference can be explained by LI. The cooperation with the neighbouring states without a membership perspective and the strong role of the EUCO in defining the shape and the objectives of the policy, is a form of intensive transgovernmentalism. The role of the Commission is a bit more complex. The Commission may adapted the policy tools from Enlargement as suggested by Kelley (Kelley, 2006). However, the formation process was more convoluted as suggested by Kelley and as Delcour already pointed out (Delcour, 2007, p. 122). The ENP is an example of close cooperation between EUCO and the Commission as observed in other policies by Jan Werts (Werts, 2008, p. 53). The close cooperation between the EUCO and the Commission explains the contradiction that the initial proposal of the Commission was subject to many changes regarding its proposed incentives (Balfour & Rotta, 2005) and the argument that the Commission shaped central elements of the ENP (Balfour & Rotta, 2005). It is in line with the observation made by Howorth that the Commission carries out the work of the CFSP while the Council of the European Union and the EUCO make the decisions (Howorth, 2000, p. 37). In addition, the strong influence of the member states explains the prioritisation of security and stabilisation over democracy and human rights, which is observed by Börzel. The aim of this research is to analyse the institutional interplay which led to the policy in its current shape and the prioritisation of stabilisation over democratisation. As result it is expected that the Commission had a significant influence on the structure of the policy through the adaptation of tools originated in the policy of Enlargement. However, the interest of the EUCO and the Council of the European Union is relevant regarding the formation of the incentives and objectives of the policy. The second chapter offers an overview over the ENP. In the third chapter are the roles and function of the Commission, the EUCO and the Council of the European Union described. The fourth chapter consists of the literature discussion. The gap which is to be filled by the thesis is described in further detail. The fifth chapter describes the LI and the intensive transgovernmentalism. The underlying assumption and main arguments are defined. The sixth chapter outlines the chosen method and describes the results of the analysis. It follows in the seventh chapter
Chapter 1: Introduction

the analysis of the preferences of the different actors. The findings and the analysis are discussed in the eighth chapter. The last chapter concludes.
2 EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

The development of the ENP as well as its current form is outlined in the subsequent chapter. The relations with neighbouring countries in the past as well as existing partnerships with the neighbouring countries of the European Union are explained in further detail. It starts with the relations towards the Mediterranean countries and is followed by the present relations towards eastern neighbours.

The EU maintained relations with the euro-Mediterranean countries through the common commercial policy, it shaped the relations with the EU and the Mediterranean countries. The relations were complemented and influenced by the policy of development in 1970th and the foreign and security policy in the 1990th (Licari, 1998, p. 2). During the 1990th, it was the first time that agreements were established which encompassed different aspects of the relations. The EU established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) for the countries on the southern border of the EU and was launched in November 1995 (The Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). The Barcelona declaration of the year 1995 lies down the framework for the Euro Mediterranean Partnership and is the ancestor of the ENP. Euro-Mediterranean Partnership consists of Free Trade Agreements between the participating countries, the EU and among themselves (Licari, 1998, p. 7). The plan for the agreements to be closed with the individual countries, the Europe-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAAs) (Schumacher, 2004, p. 1), was set out in the Barcelona Declaration in the year 1995. In this declaration, it is stated that peace, security and stability of the
Chapter 2: European Neighbourhood Policy

Mediterranean region is a common asset and that the countries will pursue “objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (The Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995, p. 2). The establishment of the Free Trade area was targeted at 2010. The measures to achieve this goal, as for example tariff removal, were lied down in the Barcelona Declaration (The Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995, p. 4). The overall goal was defined as follows: “...strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty...” (The Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995, p. 2). Furthermore, the EU committed itself to liberal values and aimed at the creation of peace, stability and prosperity (Kahraman, 2005, p. 10). The developments between the period of 1995-2004, as for example the Iraq war and the event of ‘9/11’ as well as the enlargement of the EU, led to the reform of the EMP and the relations with the EUS neighbours (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p. 18). In addition, the Barcelona Process was of limited success in promoting socio-economic development (Schumacher, 2004, p. 1).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU established a policy framework towards the countries of the former Soviet Union, which aimed at economic liberalisation and legal approximation with the law of the then European Communities (Delcour, 2007, p. 128). The relations were organised on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with each individual country (Hillion & Mayhew, 2009, p. 6). The PCA did not lead to the influence over regional developments the EU wished to gain, which could be seen in the stagnation of political and economic reforms in Ukraine (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 180). The EMAA and the PCA were the legal basis for the relation of the EU with its neighbouring countries. The policy is based on bilateral action plans in which the neighbouring countries obligate themselves to contribute and reform in order to achieve these goals. The countries and the EU are responsible for the shaping and implementing the policy; the principle for implementation is called: joint ownership principle. (Van Elsuwege, Peter, 2011, p. 65)The European Union demonstrated is transformative power in the Enlargement process in 2004, but was not able to replicate the success so far (Kelley, 2006, p. 42).

In the year 2003 the initiative on the wider European Union was published, aiming to create an alternative to the Enlargement Policy and to establish a framework to cooperate with the new neighbourhood of the European Union after the Enlargement in 2004. The initiative consisted of bilateral agreements and aimed at creating prosperity and stability in the neighbouring countries of the EU. The instruments used for the
implementation of the policy were adopted from the Enlargement policy as for example the mechanism of positive conditionality, which is defined and explained in the fourth chapter.

The crucial element of the ENP is differentiation (Soimu, Trofimov, & Urquijo, 2012, p. 135). The policy is based on the bilateral agreements as the PCA and the EMAA. The relations are organized through the provided guidance by the EUCO in its Conclusions of the summits and the jointly agreed action plans, established between the individual neighbouring country and the EU. In the Action Plans the policy priorities are defined.

The policy encompasses the relations with the eastern countries and the southern countries of the EU and includes economical aspects as well as security aspects. Sometimes it is referred to as an umbrella policy (Aliboni, 2005, p. 8). An excerpt of the policy framework is provided below:

**Article 3 Policy framework**

1. The partnership and cooperation agreements, the association agreements and other existing or future agreements which establish a relationship with partner countries, and the relevant Commission communications and Council conclusions laying down guidelines for European Union policy towards these countries, shall provide an overall policy framework for the programming of Community assistance under this Regulation. Jointly agreed action plans or other equivalent documents shall provide a key point of reference for setting Community assistance priorities.

2. Where no agreements, as mentioned in paragraph 1, between the European Union and partner countries exist, Community assistance may be provided when it proves useful to pursue European Union policy objectives, and shall be programmed on the basis of such objectives. (REGULATION (EC) No 1638/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2006 Art. 3)

The countries to which the ENP is proposed are the following: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, the non-EU countries in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, that is Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, and the countries of the Southern Caucasus, that is Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia (Balfour & Rotta, 2005, p. 9).

The Thesis considers different institutions of the EU in order to identify the actor, which shaped the ENP in its current form. The ENP is a policy tool which organises external relations of the EU. Foreign relations of the EU are conducted under the CFSP (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art. 24.1 (former Art 11.1)). The CFSP is traditionally intergovernmental organised (Øhrgaard, 2004, p. 26). The main focus of the Thesis is on the European Institutions in which representatives and officials of the Member States of the EU meet and make decisions. The Commission is taken into consideration because it has the right to initiate law and it is assumed that it influenced the formation of the ENP, in close cooperation with the intergovernmental institutions. The Court of Justice and European Parliament are not considered, because the exchange with the EUCO is rather weak (Werts, 2008, pp. 54–59).
3.1 European Commission

The Commission is the institution with the right to initiate law, but besides this responsibility, it fulfils a wide range of tasks and roles within the system of the EU which are shortly outlined below. The Commission consists of the College of Commissioners, the Directorate Generals and the cabinets (Chalmers, Davies, & Monti, 2014, p. 54). The College of Commissioners consists of 28 members, one from each member state of the EU, including its President and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art. 8). Each Commissioner is responsible for a portfolio and the members shall be independent during their mandate at the Commission (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 54). The EUCO nominates the President of the Commission by qualified majority voting and the candidate is elected by the European Parliament (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art. 17.7). At the beginning of a new term, a term consists of 5 years, the president of the Commission takes part in the appointment of the Commissioners, together with the Head of states and governments and the European Parliament and distributes the Portfolios for the new term (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 54). The political task of the president is to provide guidelines to the Commission and to set priorities for the Commission during his term (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 54). He is responsible for the internal organization of the Commission and the Commissioners are responsible to him (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 54). In addition, the Commissioners are supported by cabinets, which can be described as a personal team of advisers (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 60). The task of the cabinet is to assist the Commissioner in its policy field and coordination with the Services and Member States (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 63). Furthermore, the cabinet is the link between the Commissioner and the Directorate General (hereafter DG), it monitors the work of officials and passes opinions between the Services and the Commissioner (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 63). The system of Directorate Generals is comparable to ministries at national level by reason that these are responsible for a policy area. The DGs serve the Commissioner and its cabinet (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 129). The term Commission is used in this Thesis as defined by David Spence and Geoffrey Edwards: “...'European Commission’ may refer to the College of Commissioners or more broadly to the whole organisation comprising the College and the administrative organisation that support its work.” (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 128).
The Commission has an “initiative role” (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 7); it has the right and responsibility to initiate law. In addition, it has an “administrative and management role” (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 7), in areas in which the EU has exclusive competences (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 8). Other roles include mediation between member states, representation of the EU in third countries and a normative role in supervising the compliance with the Treaties (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 8). The Commission as a place in which new ideas can evolve and interests are cumulated. As a consequence it has certain Agenda Setting powers (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 61). In addition it can publish soft law, which is not legally binding but can have practical effects and result in hard law as defined in Art. 288. TFEU (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 101).

3.2 The Council of the European Union
The Council of the European Union often, referred to as the Council of Ministers is the institution in which national governments discuss their interest (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 67). In policy areas which the Member States have the competences, the coordination happens in the Council of Ministers. An example is the coordination of the general economic policy (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 art. [5]). In the event that institutions breach with EU law, the Council of Ministers can make a claim to the European Court of Justice. The Council of Ministers has the power to adopt legislation and can request from the Commission to initiate legislative proposals (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 68). The definition of the CFSP takes place in line with the guidelines given by the EUCO (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 68). Since 2002, the former General Affairs and External Relations Council met variantly as General Affairs Council and External Relations Council. The General affairs Council ensures consistency among the Council formations and prepares the summits of the EUCO as well as post-processing after the meeting has been held (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 68).

The Presidency of the Council of ministers rotates and is shared between three member states for 18 months, organising the meetings and setting outs the general framework (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 74). The weekly meetings of the Council are prepared by COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Representatives assists the Council in fulfilling its tasks by setting the agenda and prepare its conclusions (Chalmers et al., 2014, p. 74).
3.3 The European Council

In the year 1957 the Heads of governments of countries taking part in the treaties of Rome met for the first time as EUCO (Werts, 2008, p. 22). The EUCO expanded its powers over the years and became more institutionalized (Alexandrova, Carammia, & Timmermans, 2013, p. 59). The European Council belongs officially to the institutions of the European Union since the Treaty of Lisbon (Rittelmeyer, 2013, p. 27). The tasks of the EUCO are defined in the TEU as “defining general political directions and priorities...” (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art. 15.1). The EUCO is composed of the Heads of States or Government of the States, its President, the President of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art 15.2). The President of the EUCO is elected by a qualified majority voting of its members (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art. 15.5). In terms of his work the EUCO meets every six month at a two day summit (Consolidated Version (2012) of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 Art. 15.3). The EUCO is not equipped with legislative functions but as described above, it provides guidelines for the decision making. Decisions in the EUCO are taken by consensus and are from political relevance.

This chapter provided an overview of the relevant institutions involved in the process of initiating the ENP on the European level. The institution of the European Parliament is not considered in this Thesis. One reason is that the Thesis aims to explore the explanatory power of the LI and the intensive transgovernmentalism, in which supranational organisations play a subordinated role. Secondly, the EUCO is the institution that represents the member countries of the European Union. As described in the next chapter, the LI considers the national governments as relevant actors. In the intensive transgovernmentalism the national states engage in a more intense cooperation rather than other International Organisations. The relations between the EUCO and the European Parliament is rather week (Werts, 2008, p. 54).

Annsophie Schmitt - June 2015
4 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter the research project and its subject are described in further detail, thereafter the existent literature on this topic is specified and discussed regarding its strengths and weaknesses. The first part covers existing literature on the origin and the design of the ENP. Moreover, concepts relevant to the analysis are defined. The second part examines the existing literature, explains which gap this dissertation aims to close and how it complements existing research.

The existing research concludes that the weak incentives, offered to neighbouring countries, are one of the main reasons for its limited success. Others conclude that the EU pursues conflictive goals in the ENP; hence the ENP is of limited success. In order to analyse the weakness of the existing policy it is important to understand its development. Why did the ENP appear on the European Agenda in the year? Who shaped the policy in its current form and which actors had impact on the policy? This dissertation aims at answering these questions and analyses which actor formed the ENP in its current form. It will analyse the existing documents from the early stage of the policy and the formation process of the incentives included in this policy.
4.1 Definition and Explanation of important concepts

Enlargement, incentives, security and democratisation are relevant concepts in the research on the ENP and will be defined and explained in the next sections.

4.1.1 Enlargement

The term enlargement refers to countries, previously outside of the EU, obtaining the membership of the EU and thus become a member of the EU. In general, the term Enlargement refers, from a sociological perspective, to “...the expansion of international community.” (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 47). In more detail it is described as a “gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). The development in which the activities of social actors are normatively shaped is called Institutionalization (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). Horizontal Institutionalization is the opposite of vertical Institutionalization; the latter refers to deeper integration in a policy field of the EU and the former to the adaption of new policy fields or, as in the case of Enlargement, new Member States entering the EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). The institutionalization is formally due to its agreements between the EU member states and the new countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). The process is gradual; thereby it is not completed after the admission of new members (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). The definition is used because it specifies the enlargement as a process of widening the EU and describes the process of enlargement (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002, p. 503). In the history of the EU different rounds of Enlargement took place in which new countries became member of the EU. However, in the following text the term Enlargement refers to the access of ten new states in the EU in the year 2004. The event of Enlargement in 2004 is seen as an important influencing factor on the ENP. In addition to the new Member states more candidates were in the process of accession at this time (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 186). Given these points, the EU started searching for alternatives to the Enlargement policy.

4.1.2 Conditionality and Incentives

Conditionality and incentives are tools used in the process of Enlargement in 2004 and adapted in the policy of the ENP. Therefore, a short definition is provided to the terms of conditionality and incentives.
Conditionality is a tool aimed at changing the behaviour of an actor or to encourage him to comply with formulated conditions. Incentives are an important factor in using the tool of conditionality. The reward for behaviour depends on the fulfilment or compliance with the conditions. As an illustration, foreign actors expect a sovereign state to apply with certain condition and give prospect to a possible reward (Stepan 1986 as cited in Ethier, 2003, p. 100). Nonconformity with the required conditions leads to withholding of the foreseen gains (Stepan 1986 as cited in Ethier, 2003, p. 100) In the literature no common definition on incentives exists (Ethier, 2003, p. 100). As stated in Collins English Dictionary, the word itself has the meaning of: (1.a) a motivation for a certain action (2.a) a promised benefit for an action (3.) a contribution to encourage a certain action. (“incentive,” 2015).

Political conditionality is used by the EU towards states aiming at EU membership or preferential relations (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 190). The set of requirements includes, for example, democratic rules and compliance with the conditions are rewarded with financial benefits or shared institutions (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 191). The conditionality applied by the EU is mainly positive and results of non-compliance are retention of benefits rather than sanctions (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 191).

Incentives need to be high and conditionality needs to be credible to be effective. The adaptation of “liberal political norms” (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 190) increases the cost for authoritarian regimes, hence the incentives for the country need to be sufficient for the loss of domestic power (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 191). The EU membership is assessed as high incentive because the increased costs are covered by the membership of an international organisation. However, this incentive only applied to the Enlargement in 2004, the current incentives of the ENP policy for the neighbouring countries consist of financial aid and institutional assistance. (Costa, 2007, p. 9; Magen, 2006, p. 386).

The reward will be received after compliance with the condition. The EU needs to be credible in its intention to pay the reward after fulfilment of a certain action and to hold back the reward in the case of default (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 191). As a consequence of the interdependent relations between the EU and its neighbours, unequal because the neighbour states are more dependent on the EU’s internal market, the EU has been credible in its threat to withhold rewards (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 191). On the contrary, the promised profit distribution needs to be credible, while this
was usually the case for financial assistance, the EU is more ambivalent on a membership perspective (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 144; Lefebvre, Maxime, 2004, p. 17). The mechanism of conditionality and incentives is used in Enlargement and is part of the ENP as further explained in the next chapter.

4.1.3 Security, democracy and stability in the EU context
It is assumed that geopolitical interests as well as considerations on security and political stability played a role in the formation of the ENP. The concept of security is used in different contexts, therefore the relevance and definition of this term in the EU is shortly outlined. The Oxford English Dictionary defines security as “I. The state or condition of being or feeling secure II. Freedom from danger or threat. a. The state or condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; safety.” (“security,” 2015). The security policy strives to protect a certain aim (Biscop, 2004, p. 4). In the setting of the EU, a closer look is taken at the European Security Strategy. The security policy of Europe aims to defend the security of Europe and to promote its values (Solana, Javier, 2003, p. 6). The term security refers to the protection of Europe and its values.

Democratisation of third countries and stability can be relevant for the security of Europe as its is explained in the following document:

The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states (Solana, Javier, 2003, p. 10). Security is a precondition of development (Solana, Javier, 2003, p. 2).

“Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond.” (Solana, Javier, 2003, p. 10).

The European Security Strategy defines security, stability and democracy as important goals of the EU and in its foreign relations.

4.2 The role of these concepts in the existing literature
The concepts, assumed to be relevant for the formation of the ENP are outlined in the previous chapter. The use of these concepts in the existing literature is outlined in this chapter. The ENP aims to create prosperity and stability in its neighbouring states. In the literature different explanations exists for the appearance of the ENP on the European Agenda. In addition, the literature suggests different factors with a possible influence on the ENP.
4.2.1 Relevance
The research on the origin of the ENP policy design is rather limited (Tulmets, 2007a, p. 29). The role of the Commission is analysed, because it is suggested that it designed its tools (Kelley, 2006; Robert, 2001; Tulmets, 2007b). However, it also exists research on the incentives and the objectives of the ENP (Balfour & Rotta, 2005; Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014; Cadier, 2013). The latter includes research, that assumes the influence of the intergovernmental institutions and national states were larger than suggested by the researchers on the role of the Commission. Conducting external relations is a sensitive policy in national states, it often takes priority over other policies (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5). Therefore, in the EU it was traditionally intergovernmental organised, as states are reluctant to give up the possibility to act unilateral in the policy of security and defence (Wagner, 2003, p. 578). The event of Enlargement played a central role in the formation process of the ENP.

4.2.2 The influence of international foreign policy events
The event of Enlargement triggered the initiation of the ENP and influenced its structure. The ENP is modelled after Enlargement as it is concluded by different authors (Dannreuther, 2006; Kelley, 2006; Magen, 2006). The event of the Enlargement of the EU in the year 2004 had a crucial impact on the ENP in different manners. It led to a new geopolitical situation. After the entry of 10 new member states the EU was surrounded by a new neighbourhood of different countries. As a consequence, the EU aimed for a strategy to avoid instability. The ENP aims at avoiding new dividing lines and creating a well governed ring of friends (Romano Prodi, 2002, p. 3). In order to avoid to import instability from the neighbouring countries, the EU needed to export stability (W. Wallace & Europe, 2003, p. 4).

In addition, the policy of Enlargement is seen as one of the most successful foreign policies of the EU due to its transformational effect in the new member state countries (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008, p. 188). In the literature the link between the Enlargement and the ENP is analysed. The ENP is seen as the result of organizational adaptation of the Enlargement process through the Commission (Magen, 2006, p. 426).

Likewise, the European Enlargement influenced the structure of the ENP. The Enlargement is described as the “...most successful external relations’ tool of the European Union (EU).” (European Commission, 2003, p. 5; Phinnemore, 2006, p. 7). Thereupon, instruments, as for example conditionality, were adapted from the process
Chapter 4: Literature Review

of Enlargement into the new policy of the ENP. It is argued that a learning and adaptation process by the Commission during the process of Enlargement led to the adaptation of conditionality and socialisation in the ENP (Kelley, 2006, p. 30). Furthermore, the adaptation of conditionality in the ENP is explained by path-dependency and organisational management theory. Path-dependency is a mechanism to explain behaviour of actors, decisions which are taken in the past as well as present decisions limit future options of the actor (P. Pierson, 1996). Kelley argues that the ENP is a consequence of the Enlargement because of the risk of instability in the new neighbours, as for example Moldova or Ukraine (Kelley, 2006, p. 31). An example for adoption are the use of similar targets in the ENP as the Copenhagen proximity criteria in the Enlargement (Tulmets, 2007a, p. 32). In addition, the administrative body of the Commission had an influence on the shape of the ENP. Former employees of the directorate general Enlargement were involved in the initial phase of the development of the ENP. Roberts argues similar to Kelley, that the ENP is a consequence of the Enlargement and was designed after this (Robert, 2001, p. 1). It is argued that the Commission and its officials had a clear impact on the ENP. As a consequence, it is concluded that the ENP is designed on the experiences with the enlargement policy (Cadier, 2013, p. 55; Kelley, 2006; Robert, 2001; Tulmets, 2007a, p. 30).

In the literature the lack of membership perspective and weak incentives are identified as reason for the lack of democratisation and progress in reforms in the neighbouring states (Lavenex, Sandra, 2008, p. 938). It is argued that conditionality functions the best with a credible membership perspective, which is not given in the ENP (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 146). The transformative effect did not occur in the ENP to the same extent as it was seen in the policy of Enlargement (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 677). Furthermore, the ENP countries face more transition difficulties than the countries which entered the EU in 2004, and the suitability of the Enlargement tools in the ENP are questioned (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2007, p. 146). The offered explanations and analysis uncover the link between Enlargement and the ENP. The limited success is explained by the necessity of stronger political reforms in neighbouring countries compared to the countries of the Enlargement round in 2004. Other authors agree with the transfer of tools of the Enlargement to the ENP but assume that the process was more complex than the mechanisms suggested by Kelley (Delcour, 2007, p. 122). Therefore, the literature on the development of ENP incentives and objectives is included.
Another external factor was the Iraq war, a common and cohesive strategy of the EU was absent for this external situation. The lack of strategy led to pursuing a coordinated strategy on a European level and resulted in the European Security Strategy (ESS) (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 186). Furthermore, it led to certain Enlargement weariness (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 186).

4.2.3 The objectives of the ENP
The focus on the objectives of the ENP instead of the lack of incentives offers further insights on the development of the policy. The EU prioritized security, stability and economic growth over democracy (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2011, p. 13). As reasons for this prioritisation, possible negative externalities as unrestrained migration and fragility of energy security can be mentioned (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2011, p. 13). The problematic of contradictory goals is confirmed by other researchers. The EU depends on its ability to include the promotion of democracy and economic reform in its security dominated approach (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 201). Democratic and economic reform are essential to decrease instability, this assumption is embedded in the ENP policy (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 201). The existing provisions on democracy are loose and not binding though, the stabilisation of the country is seen of greater value for the EU (Bosse & others, 2007, p. 57). The research of Börzel provides a detailed analysis of the objectives of the ENP, but is not focused on its development.

Börzel showed that the conflicting goals of the ENP, stabilisation and democratisation, result in a slow process of democratisation and economic reforms. The thesis assumes that this prioritisation of stability and security, as described in her research, could be a result of the intergovernmental influence on the development of the policy. The ruled out membership perspective could have been consequence of the preferences of the national states.

4.2.4 The design of the incentives
The construction and design of the incentives are analysed and seen as an important factor for the current results of the ENP (Kelley, 2006, p. 31). Research on the formation of the incentives came to the conclusion that the weak incentives were caused by the Council of the European Union following a guideline of the EUCO, who changed the incentives of the original proposal of the Commission towards a security and stability emphasis (Balfour & Rotta, 2005, p. 8). An example of the original proposal is
the inclusion of visa and migration policy. In addition, it reflects geopolitical interests (Cadier, 2013, p. 57). Regarding further incentives, it is argued that none of the ENP countries, except Israel, are competitive enough to participate in the internal market (Balfour & Rotta, 2005, p. 14). Furthermore, approximation in legislation is expensive for countries which suffer from poverty (Balfour & Rotta, 2005, p. 14). For the Mediterranean Partners the trade liberalisation of services is of special importance, fifty percentage of the GDP is from service sector (Muller-Jentsch, 2003, p. 20), despite the fact, so far, only 3.5% of the trade in services within the EU consists of trade with the Mediterranean countries (Lannon & Gestöhl, 2011, p. 90). The incentives offered by the EU in the ENP are not attractive for the neighbouring countries of the EU; therefore the success of the policy in achieving its objectives is limited. Rather than the adaptation of Enlargement tools, the influence of the EUCO and its emphasis on security and stability is seen as eminent for the shape of the ENP. The expectations of neighbouring countries to cooperate in prevalent security issues (Lavenex, 2006, p. 344).

4.2.5 The role of the Commission
It is argued that the Commission embedded the tools of the Enlargement procedure into the new policy (Kelley, 2006). In addition, the acquired expertise during the process was applied in the development of the new policy (Robert, 2001). Moreover, the Commission aimed to gain further influence in the foreign affairs policy by designing the tools of the ENP (Kelley, 2006). The ENP is a consequence of the new geographical situation after the enlargement and its structure was influenced by the successful policy of Enlargement.

4.2.6 The role of intergovernmental institutions
Other scholars share the view on the importance of the Enlargement process on the ENP, but emphasize the role of the General Affairs and External Relations Council and show that the incentives of the first Communication of the Commission were larger than the incentives of the current policy (Balfour & Rotta, 2005). The influence which the EUCO and the General Affairs and External Relations Council had on the design of the incentives is analysed in the research of Balfour and Rotta. However, the development of the policy and role of the Commission is not part of it. The analysis of the interests and the power of the Member States, the EUCO and the Council of the European Union were limited to the formation of incentives and not part of a theoretical analysis of the policy formation process yet.
4.2.7 Influences of the European Institutions

A comparison of the proposal made by the Commission and the document adapted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council showed that the original proposal of the Commission included higher incentives as e.g. access to the internal market and visa policies (Balfour & Rotta, 2005). The priorities in the launched policy were changed by the Council of Ministers towards a focus on stability and security (Balfour & Rotta, 2005). On the basis of this research, it is assumed that the influence of the Commission was limited to its structure. Kelley has been criticised for her argument that the Commission has adapted the tools of Enlargement through mechanical borrowing (Dannreuther, 2006, p. 122).

Moreover, the focus on stability and security prevails in the ENP (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014; Cadier, 2013; Cremona & Meloni, 2007, p. 16). The research shows that the priorities of the ENP are security and stability, rather than integration into the common market, democratisation or human rights. Although a good analysis regarding the objectives and effectiveness of the ENP is provided, a research analysing the influence of national countries as well as supranational actors does not exist.

4.2.8 Aims and objectives

The existing literature focuses either on the role of the Commission and the similarities of the ENP to the Enlargement Policy or its objectives as stability and security. The Thesis suggests that the development process of the policy was intertwined between the intergovernmental organisations and the Commission as a supranational institution. The development of the ENP evolved after the Treaty of Amsterdam which only partly addressed the existing rivalry between the Commission and the Council of the European Union “...for the ultimate control of European foreign policy” (Peterson & Sjursen, 2005, p. 59). In addition the Commission developed the aspiration to become a central actor in conducting the foreign policy of the EU (Peterson & Sjursen, 2005, p. 57). The ambition to gain more influence in the foreign affairs field would explain the active role of the Commission in the ENP. The dissertation aims to complement the research on the role of the Commission and identify the factors which shaped the ENP in its current form. The reason for the conflicting goals of the policy will be analysed. First, the interest of the different actors will be analysed. Secondly, the explanatory power of the integration theories will be analysed.
5 THEORY

In this chapter the theory of LI and intensive transgovernmentalism is explained. The theory will be analysed regarding its explanatory power for the formation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The chapter starts with the LI; afterwards the theory of intensive transgovernmentalism is explained. The aim is to test the adequacy of the theories to explain the formation and shape of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

5.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The author Andrew Moravcsik published in the book “The Choice of Europe” his explanation of European Integration on the basis of decisions taken due to the preferences of national states. The Theory claims that European Integration is a consequence of “rational decisions made by national actors” (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18). The decisions of the actors are influenced by domestic economic interests and international organisations have the function to ensure and strengthen credible commitments between the states (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18). It will be analysed if the LI offers an adequate explanation for the formation of the ENP.

The author describes European Integration as follows:

“In a world in which governments are, broadly speaking, rational and instrumental, integration can be seen as a process in which they define a series of underlying objectives or preferences, bargain to substantive agreements concerning cooperation, and finally select appropriate international institutions in which to embed them.” (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 5)

The decisions of governments are based on economic interests as well as their “relative power” (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18). Furthermore, domestic groups with influence in the
domestic policy are of noteworthiness, because these can influence the national preference formation as described below. (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24)

He defines the cooperation among the member states, former European Community and since 2009 European Union, as follows: “...the EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination.” (Andrew Moravcsik, 1993, p. 474)

One important assumption is the rationality of the actors, as described in the definition of European Integration. As a consequence of this division, the process of integration is by the author separated in a three stage process. The formation of national preferences is the first step, as a second step the interstate bargaining follows and the third step is the creation of European institutions (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 18).

The first stage of European integration is the preference formation, the motivations and interests which shape the preference of a state will described in this subsection.

The term preference is in the dictionary defined as “1 preference (for somebody/something) a greater interest in or desire for somebody/something than somebody/something else.” (oxforddictionaries, 2015).

This definition is used, because it defines the term “preference” as something exogenous, which is not influenced by the international political situation, as it is intended by the author of the theory (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24). This is emphasized, because the theory implies that these preferences are stable inside every country on every matter and in every negotiation. However, it is assumed that the stability of preferences is only given inside every negotiation, every state and each topic (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24).

5.1.1.1 The influence of geopolitical interest on the preference formation

Moravcsik presents four different arguments for the explanation of the relations between economic cooperation, geopolitical interest and European integration. Economic integration happens because of its indirect consequences of economic integration (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 35). These geopolitical interests influence the preference formation in different ways. At first the relation between economic integration and geopolitical interest need to be outlined. The idea is, that economic integration serves a higher purpose as for example defence from a threat to political sovereignty (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 27). If economic integration is perceived as likely to affect the geopolitical interest in a positive way, countries are more likely to approve
economic integration. On the contrary, economic integration is less likely to happen if the expected outcome has a negative impact on their geostrategic interest (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 29).

The first explanation of economic cooperation is cooperation against a threatening state or Union, as for example the Soviet Union (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 29). In the case of a difficulty or danger, the economic allies would also provide military assistance and unilateral solutions with the opponent would be ruled out (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 29).

Secondly, the European Integration could aim at power and autonomy to countervail other powerful states. The objective of integration would be a common foreign policy as well as cooperation in defence (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 30).

An institutional view on preference formation through geopolitical interest is the third explanation. The EU seeks to engage threatening states into cooperation rather than exclude these (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 31). It follows the assumption that integration leads to an alignment of economic interest and ideological norms (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 31).

The last explanation of European integration is derived from the “liberal constructivist theory. The geopolitical interest is formed by the strong influence of elites and populations and their ideologies, which leads to cooperation (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 31).

5.1.1.2 Economic interest and preference formation

The LI argues that the economic interest has a direct effect on economic integration (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 35). An incentive for countries in order to align their economic policies can be given if unintended negative consequences can be reduced or even created (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 35).

“cooperation is a means to restructure the pattern of economic policy externalities ...to their mutual benefit” (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 35)

Different Hypothesis are derived from political economy and contain different predictions on the factor of economic interest and its influence on European Integration.

Dependent on the possible economic advantage the preference of countries differ among different topics and also between the countries (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 49). The more interdependent countries become, as for example through EU policies, the perspective
of possible new markets and trade possibilities will increase the interest in trade liberalisation (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 49).

In addition it is to expect that the EU will adjust its regional policies in line with its economic interest, rather than the geopolitical interest. Geopolitical concession can be used to achieve an economic goal (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 50). Moreover, domestic interest groups and officials can have a significant influence through the formulation of policies (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 50).

In the process of negotiation the asymmetrical interdependence is from importance. The term Asymmetrical Interdependence is defined as a relative value that a state puts on an agreement, which influences the extent of concessions it is willing to make (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 60). “…sources of power among actors” (R.O. Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 18). The bargaining power of each state depends on the strength of the preference (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 60). As a consequence, members with a strong preference will make larger concessions to achieve an agreement as countries with weaker preference on a certain issue (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 60). The central assumption is that voting happens within a “noncoercive”, unanimous voting system with small transaction costs (A. Moravcsik, 1998, p. 63).

5.2 Intensive transgovernmentalism
This thesis uses also the theory of intensive Transgovernmentalism. The preferences cannot be explained by this theory. The theory aims at explaining cooperation which goes beyond traditional international cooperation other international organisations, but is still strongly influenced by national countries.

The term transgovernmentalism is introduced by Keohane and Nye, the authors used the term “Transgovernmental” to describe relations between “sub-units of governments”, the underlying assumption is that states not always act as an unit (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1974, p. 41). Transgovernmental relations are described as “…sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments.” (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1974, p. 43).

The term is used as defined by the authors Wallace and Wallace. It describes transgovernmental relations not part of the EU framework or structures (H. Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 352). On the other hand, these relations “…develop a momentum, an intensity of interactions, and a sensitivity of structured and productive collaboration.” (H.
Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 352). EU member states decided “...cumulatively to commit themselves to rather extensive engagements...but have judged the full EU institutional framework or the full EU membership to be inappropriate or unacceptable, or not ripe for adoption.”(H. Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 352).

The following characteristics describe intensive transgovernmentalism:

“policy entrepreneurship from some national capitals and the active involvement of the European Council in setting the overall direction of policy;

» the predominance of the Council of Ministers (or an equivalent forum of national ministers) in consolidating cooperation;

» the limited or marginal role of the Commission;

» the exclusion of the EP and the ECJ from the circle of involvement;

» the involvement of a distinct circle of key national policy-makers;

» the adoption of special arrangements for managing cooperation, in particular the Council Secretariat [cf. also Beach 2008];

» the opaqueness of the process, to national parliaments and citizens;

but

» the capacity on occasion to deliver substantial joint policy”

(H. Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 352)

Another author argues that the cooperation happens in the COREPER and in the Council Secretariat. He describes it as a process off Brussels-based Intergovernmentalism (Howorth, 2000, p. 35). The differentiation between national leaders and officials, which includes the underlying assumption that a state does not act unified, is derived from the earlier work of Keohane and Nye (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1974, p. 41). As mentioned above, these authors used the term “transgovernmental” to describe “sub-units of governments” in the case that they act independently from higher international politics. (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1974, p. 41)
On the role of the role of supranational organisation during the process of European Integration, the assumption of Jan Werts is used. “...Commission carrying out its initiating role not by means of its formal rights, but via the back door of the European Council” (Werts, 2008, p. 53).

The Theory is used here, because it explains the cooperation of national governments on EU level better than the classical LI (H. Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 351). While the Intergovernmentalism offers explanation for the formation of preference building, it can better explain cooperation in international organization, in which the cooperation, commitments and discipline is more limited than in the EU (H. Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 251). Furthermore, intensive transgovernmentalism explains intensive cooperation at the EU level in which the Councils preserved their core role (Allerkamp, 2010, p. 13).

5.3 Historical Institutionalism and Path-dependency

The historical institutionalism itself is an approach to analyse the effect of institutions on behaviour and outcomes (Steinmo, 2008, p. 118).

The necessary conditions for current outcomes occurred in the past. The crucial object of study becomes the critical juncture or trigger-ing events, which set development along a particular path, and the mechanisms of reproduction of the current path—which at first glance might seem com-monplace or at least analytically uninteresting. (Paul Pierson, 2000, p. 263). The mechanism of Path dependency can be described as “...self-reinforc-ing or positive feedback processes”(Paul Pierson, 2000, p. 251). The path dependency includes two elements. First, over time the costs to switch to an alternative increases, which makes it more likely to stick on the chosen path (Paul Pierson, 2000, p. 251). Secondly, moments or events can reinforce a path or lead to a new path; past historical events are relevant for present decisions. (Paul Pierson, 2000, p. 252)

It is assumed, that policy actors have a short time horizon and cannot foresee all consequences of a choice. On the other hand, a reverse of a policy decision will become more costly over time (Paul Pierson, 2000, p. 257).

The path dependency is a possible explanation for the appearance of the ENP on the supranational level, namely as a consequence of the Enlargement, the previous event which triggered the ENP.
5.4 Relations between the Commission and the EUCO

Jan Werts argues that the EUCO upgraded the political position of the Commission. The Commission was able to set its priorities (Werts, 2008, p. 52). For example, the Commission asks the European Council to ask in their conclusions for a proposal by the Commission, in order to get their work confirmed by the Head of States (Werts, 2008, p. 53). Commission got a stronger influence through enlargement, because the number of members increased (Werts, 2008, p. 53). He argues that the EUCO reinforced the role of the Commission (Werts, 2008, p. 53).
6 METHODOLOGY

An overview over the used methodology in this dissertation is given in the subsequent chapter. With the aim to achieve a thorough analysis of the policy formation process, which aims at identifying actors and objectives, the analysis is on the basis of a mixed-methods approach. The documents published by the institutions of the European Union and related to the ENP are used to analyze the creation of the policy on the supranational level. In addition, few unstructured interviews were conducted under the Chatham House Rule in order to gain further clarity and to support the findings of the analysis.

The Conclusions of the Presidency of the EUCO from the year 2002-2004 are used as data source to analyse the policy formation process. The data are retrieved from the service Eurlex provided by the EU, which grants free access to legal texts of the European Union. The documents of the Commission relevant to the establishing of the ENP were analysed as well as speeches given by Commissioners and the President of the Commission. The documents for the analysis of the documents of the Commission were retrieved from the service EUR-Lex. All documents of the Commission from the period of the year 2003 – 2006 were retrieved and underwent a key word search. Afterwards, a key word search on the term “European Neighbourhood policy” identified the relevant documents. The documents containing this term were considered for further analysis. For further analysis of the content the same key word catalogue as for the other institutions was used.

The analysis of the documents of the Council of Ministers was restricted on the Conclusions of the Council for General Affairs and External Relations between 2002
and 2004. The conclusions of the Council for General Affairs and External Relations were conducted. The documents were captured from the documents register of the Council of the European Union. The documents relevant to the formation process of the ENP were considered. The issues regarding the foreign relations of the European Union handled in the EU CO, at this point by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (Werts, 2008, p. 64). As mentioned before, after 2002, the General Affairs and External Relations Council met alternately as General Affairs Council and External Relations Council.

In order to gain insights into the preferences of the EU member states and the countries which entered the EU in 2004, speeches, lectures and letters were analyzed.
7 Analysis

This chapter describes the process of establishing the ENP at the supranational level and takes an in depth look at the roles the different institutions had during the policy formation. The first approach was influenced by the experience of the Northern dimension as for example assistance in development and transnational cooperation (Browning & Joenniemi, 2003, p. 470).

7.1 Commission

The role of the Commission in establishing the ENP is analysed in this section. The Commission had a central role in the process of Enlargement in 2004. The Commission prepared and implemented the Enlargement Policy (Lass-Lennecke & Werner, 2009, p. 271). The tools and mechanisms of the ENP, for example, the set targets and the mechanism of conditionality are similar to the tools used during the Enlargement (Tulmets, 2007a, p. 29). Additionally, the Task force for the new policy was first part of the DG Enlargement. It is assumed that the Commission influenced the adaptation of the tools of the ENP.

The most known initiative of the Commission is its Communication on wider Europe. Nevertheless, the initiation of developing a new framework for the neighbouring countries in the Commission began earlier. A letter of the Commissioner Chris Patten and Javier Solana to the EU Presidency elaborates about a policy towards the new neighbouring states. The letter suggests the scope of the policy, the Mediterranean, the Western Balkans, Russia and the eastern neighbours (Patten, Christopher & Solana, Javier, 2002, p. 1).
The letter emphasizes on differentiation, a shared set of political and economic values and regional stability and co-operation. In addition, it includes the approximation of legislation and increased trade (Patten, Christopher & Solana, Javier, 2002, p. 1). The letter refers to the eastern Enlargement and emphasizes on the importance of a new policy. It is remarkable that the letter includes EU membership perspective towards the eastern neighbours (Patten, Christopher & Solana, Javier, 2002, p. 1). The General Affairs and External Relations Council invited the Commission to start preparing possibilities for the relations with the new neighbours.

In the year 2003, the Commission published a Communication which was called “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A new Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. The accession of member states is mentioned as reason to intensify the relations with the neighbours of the EU (European Commission, 2003, p. 3). The Communication included incentives as a stake in the internal market and integration and liberalisation towards the four freedoms (persons, goods, services and capital) (European Commission, 2003, p. 10). The offered incentives included increased cooperation in lawful migration and greater promotion of human rights (European Commission, 2003, p. 4+5). Additionally, full integration into the transport, energy and telecommunications network is offered.(European Commission, 2003, p. 13) It is here mentioned because these sectors are large in the economies of the neighbouring countries.

In July 2003, a further Communication of the Commission suggested to combine the different financial instruments for the relations with the neighbouring countries into a new Instrument (Commission, 2003, p. 1). The Communication stressed the importance to combat organised crime and to ensure secure borders (Commission, 2003, p. 5), while democracy and human rights were not mentioned. Afterwards the Task force “Wider Europe” was initiated, the officials working in this Task force came from the DG Enlargement and the DG RELEX (Tulmets, 2007b, p. 5). Task forces are project teams which can evolve in a DG, however sometimes the task force ends after its mandate (David & Geoffrey, 2006, p. 140). The Task Force was responsible for working on a political concept of the ENP and to develop action plans. The Task force was led by Verheugen, the former Commissioner for Enlargement (Van Vooren, 2011, p. 192). The experience of the officials working in the policy of Enlargement and later in the ENP are likely to be responsible for the adaptation of the Enlargement tools (Robert, 2001, p. 1).
It is highly likely that the Enlargement influenced the work of the Commission in preparing proposals for the ENP. The different concepts were adapted by the experience of the policy of Enlargement (Tulmets, 2007b, p. 5). In the beginning, the Commission did not exclude future membership perspective, as it is shown in the letter of Chris Patten and the communication in which the ENP shall aim only at the countries which are currently without membership perspective (European Commission, 2003, p. 4). Moreover, the Task force was led by the former Commissioner of Enlargement, Verheugen (Kratochvil, 2006, p. 17). Another example is a speech of Danuta Hübner, she is former Commissioner of Trade and Regional Policy, declared in a speech 2006 that the EU should remain open towards possible new member states. She refers not only to the effect of past Enlargements on the EU but mentions also possible future enlargements (Hübner, Danuta, 2006, p. 3+4). Contrary, Romano Prodi, president of the Commission at this time, excluded in his speech the possibility of future memberships with his statement: "sharing everything with the Union but institutions" (Romano Prodi, 2002, p. 4). In the communication it is stated that countries, which wish to join should have the prospective of membership, however not in the framework of the ENP (European Commission, 2003, p. 5). It seems as few policy decision makers and officials, especially in the beginning, supported the idea to provide future membership perspectives. However, the tone changed towards a security approach and exclusion of the membership documents after the first Communication on wider Europe.

7.2 EUCO and the Council of the European Union
The General Affairs and External Relations under the Presidency of Spain mentioned in the conclusions the importance of the relations with the eastern neighbours of the future enlarged EU in the year 2002 the first time (General Affairs Council, 2002). It was after Jack Straw sent an open letter regarding a policy towards the new neighbourhood, that the relations towards the east were mentioned and the Commission as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security were invited to prepare proposals for relations with the future neighbours. In December 2002, at the EUCO took the relations towards the neighbour into closer consideration. The promotion of stability and prosperity as well as the avoidance of new dividing lines was mentioned. In the conclusions the Commission was invited to prepare further steps of this policy (European Council, 2002, p. 8). In May 2003 the Commission published the Communication in the wider European Union; the Communication includes objectives of a possible new policy towards neighbouring countries as well as possible incentive if
the cooperation is successful in achieving its targets. The External Relations Council met in June 2003 and published in its conclusion a framework to conduct relation with the neighbouring countries. The “wider Europe-New Neighbourhood-Council Conclusions” were developed on the basis of the Communication provided by the Commission. The conclusions excluded the possibility of a membership in the EU as a consequence of taking part in the ENP. The overall aim was to increase prosperity and to reduce poverty. The incentives emphasized on cooperation in security matters, as security threats, conflict prevention (General Affairs Council, 2003, p. VI). Nonetheless, the perspective of enhancing the economic cooperation in the service sector as transport as well as the prospective of partly integration into the internal market is given. Moreover, it emphasised the importance of shared values as democracy and human rights. The “wider Europe-New Neighbourhood-Council Conclusions” were confirmed at the EUCO meeting in Thessaloniki and encourages future cooperation between the European Commission and the Council of ministers (“PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS.THESSALONIKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL..,” 2003, p. 14). In October 2003, the EUCO points out that he appreciates the proposal on the financial instruments and emphasizes the importance of the existing relations between the EU and the new neighbouring states. In this proposal, it becomes clear that the EU aims towards a consistent framework including the already existing forms of cooperation (European Council, 2003, p. 14). Moreover, the progress of the Commission was mentioned and appreciated (European Council, 2003, p. 14).

7.3 National States
The following section gives an overview of the interest of the national states in the ENP. The aim is to show which countries demonstrated a strong interest in the ENP. Poland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and Finland will be analysed.

The Northern Dimension was one of the first initiatives towards the neighbouring countries and initiated by Finland and Sweden. Its aim was to improve the relations with its neighbours, due to proximity Finland had a special interest and expected to benefit from the resources of Russia and to gain advantage by the development of the infrastructure. Few countries which were part of the Northern Dimension became later member states of the EU (Catellani, 2000, p. 22). For the Baltic states and Poland it was a great way of intensifying the relations with the EU (Catellani, 2000, p. 15).
The United-Kingdom was one of the first countries discussing the need for an approach towards the neighbouring countries. Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary at this time, send a letter to the Spanish presidency of the Council of the European Union. In a speech delivered in Germany, he clarifies his motives. He refers to the risk of creating new diving lines as a consequence of the Enlargement in 2004 (Straw, Jack, 2002, p. 6).

In his view enlargement can help to promote political stability (Straw, Jack, 2002, p. 5). Contrary, he emphasizes on security aspects, as combating organised crime, terrorism and illegal migration (Straw, Jack, 2002, p. 5). On the one hand, further enlargement is seen as a potential to increase European security (Straw, Jack, 2002, p. 6), on the other hand it imposes challenges on the EU (Straw, Jack, 200AD, p. 2). In general, the speeches of Jack Straw let assume that the United Kingdom expected new challenges caused by the new neighbourhood and he aimed at European security and political stability.

Germany had a strong interest in the new policy, due to geographical proximity and past experiences. After the Second World War, Germany sought to maintain good relations with its neighbours (Kempe, Iris, n.d., p. 26). Furthermore, it was also a driving force behind the eastern enlargement. The enlargement led to new markets and it was in its interest to ensure political stability through the integration of the eastern neighbours into the EU (Freudenstein, 1998, p. 26). It acted as a sort of advocate for the Eastern countries during the process of Enlargement (Krotz & Schild, 2013, p. 151). The interest of Germany in the eastern neighbours of the EU continued after the enlargement. The chancellors of Germany as Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder maintained close relations with Russia (Kempe, Iris, n.d., p. 28). Germany had an interest to avoid political instability as it happened at this point in Ukraine (Schäuble, Wolfgang, 2005). All in all it can be said that Germany had a tradition in maintaining relations with the eastern neighbours and in the ENP it aimed at avoiding new political instability.

France appreciated the new initiative for conducting relations with the neighbouring countries, as it traditionally had a special interest in conducting relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries. It was in its interest to counterbalance the change of interest towards the eastern countries after the Enlargement. In addition, it was not in favour of a membership perspective for the new neighbouring countries (Lefebvre, Maxime, 2004, p. 4). In the interview conducted with a policy decision maker of the new member states, he pointed out the Southern European Countries were afraid of
losing resources at the new eastern neighbours. In addition, these countries were against a possible membership perspective.

Poland was one of the countries that joined the EU in the year 2004. Poland was one of the most proactive countries towards a new neighbourhood Policy among the member states that entered the EU in 2004. In the interview with a policy decision maker involved into the development of the ENP, it was explained that Poland aimed to extend the possibility of membership to its eastern neighbours, as for example Ukraine. This information is supported by a document published by the polish ministry of foreign affairs in the year 2003, emphasizing on the relations with the new neighbouring country (Stefan Batory Foundation, 2003). The speeches given by the Minister of foreign affairs of Poland in 2002 brought further attention towards the new policy, although his main focus lied on the relations with Ukraine and Moldova (Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 2003a, p. 3). In a lecture he emphasized on the importance of strengthening the relations towards the European neighbours (Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 2003b, p. 2). The launched policy was in the view of Poland too broad, because the framework would also include the Southern neighbouring states (Copsey & Pomorska, 2014, p. 424). The preference for Poland was it to maintain the possibility to access the EU, to offer a tailored policy towards the neighbours rather than a common framework for all neighbours of the EU (Overhaus, Marco, 2006, p. 5). The interviewed person recapped that Poland was not satisfied with the form of the ENP, as it did not provide a membership perspective or a special approach for the eastern neighbours of Poland. This was added later on in the year 2009 with the Eastern Dimension (“Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague,” 2009). An interview conducted with a former politician of a Baltic state confirmed that the new EU member state countries had a strong interest in the formation of a policy towards their new neighbours. It was stated, that security concerns due to the neighbour country Russia played a relevant role for their interest in the ENP.

The analysed interviews led assume that the similarities of the ENP with the Enlargement result from the influence of the Commission, while the strong interest in security and political stability and the exclusion of a Membership perspective results from the preferences of the member states.
In this chapter, the theories are applied on the policy which is to analyze. In the chapter of analysis the adequacy of the theories to explain the formation and shape of the ENP is reviewed.

Following the LI, the central actors in establishing the ENP were the governments of the member states of the EU. The first stage of European Integration in the LI explains the preference formation of national states. Preference formation, according to the LI is either based on economic preferences or geopolitical interest. European Integration is to expect if either it has direct beneficial economical consequences or it creates positive effects on the security situation of a country. Independent of the preference, the cooperation is expected to be economically. The third explanation of geopolitical preferences and economic cooperation offered by Moravcsik, through which the EU seeks to integrate threatening states rather than to exclude them, follows the assumption that economic cooperation leads to an alignment of economic interest and ideological norms. The preferences of the member states of the EU towards an ENP can be explained by the LI. As shown in the previous chapter, Poland and Germany had a strong interest in a political stable neighbourhood and the United Kingdom as well as
the Baltic states had security concerns after the Enlargement. On the basis of the security interest the countries were in favour to commonly conduct foreign relations with the neighbouring states on the EU level. The possibility for economic cooperation can be find in the documents of the General Affairs and External Relations Council as well as in the documents of the Commission. The economic cooperation with the new neighbouring states is partly because of the positive effect on political stability as it is assumed in the LI. In addition, it also explains the interplay between the Member States. Poland was willing to give up the membership perspective for the new neighbouring states, because primarily it had a strong interest in the creation of a policy towards the eastern neighbours. On other hand, France and the Southern European countries had not a strong interest for a new policy, as the Barcelona declaration, including the Southern Mediterranean States, existed already. It was in a better bargaining position and would only agree to the new policy if the membership perspective towards the eastern countries excluded and if the Southern Mediterranean neighbouring countries would be included in the new policy too. The member states of the EU had a strong geopolitical interest as avoiding political instability and strengthen security after the Enlargement. It is for this reason that the member states decided to conduct relations with the neighbouring states on the supranational level and initiated economic cooperation with these states. The economic cooperation with the neighbouring states and the EU was seen as a possibility to reduce the likability of instable political situations on the borders of Europe. Nonetheless, the explanatory power of the LI is limited as the role of the Commission in the formation process of the ENP cannot be explained by LI.

Although, the LI offers good explanations for preference formation, the process of interstate bargaining of the LI reflects rather the procedures in international organizations, but it does not do justice to the complexity of procedures in the European Union. Therefore, the intensive transgovernmentalism is used to explain the interaction and underlying mechanisms between the relevant actors. The intergovernmental institutions, as the Council of the European Union and the EUCO are central in the integration process and the shape of the policy.

Different characteristics let assume that intensive transgovernmentalism took place during the policy formation process. The General Affairs and External Relations Council and the EUCO were important in defining prosperity, stability and security as objectives of the policy. In addition, the Council of Ministers invited the Commission to prepare a proposal on a possible framework to conduct relation with the neighbors in
the year 2002. The EUCO and the General Affairs and External Relations Council set the direction of the policy, therefore it can be concluded that there was a predominance of the Council of Ministers and the EUCO. In addition, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice were not involved in the process of establishing the ENP. Another relevant requirement is the “the involvement of a distinct circle of key national policy-makers” (H. Wallace & Wallace, 2007, p. 352). Here actors of different nationalities can be names, which had mostly the position of the minister of foreign affairs as for example Jack straw in the United Kingdom and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz for Poland. The intensive transgovernmentalism explains the cooperation among the EU member states in conducting relations with its neighbours, because the cooperation is more intense as in other International Organisations.

The intensive transgovernmentalism differs from the LI in its assumption that states act as a unified actor. The officials of a government being involved in the integration process, not necessarily act in line with their leaders. This can lead to a dynamic in which officials can form a policy in a significant way, although their actions may not be in line with the guidance provided by their leaders. For the policy of the ENP, that means that the officials working in the COREPER or for the Commission could have had an influence in the creation of the tools of the ENP. Rather than the officials of the COREPER, it is likely that the officials of the Commission adapted an approach similar as in the Enlargement policy, which was not perfectly suitable as the biggest incentive, the membership perspective, was not in line with the objectives of the neighbouring states. The intensive transgovernmentalism is less limited about its assumption on the actors as the Li and has a stronger explanatory power in explaining European Integration which is still led by national states.

However, the Thesis suggests that the influence of the Commission can be even better explained by taking a closer look at the relation between the Commission and the EUCO. It is assumed that the first preference of the Commission, it was to gain further influence in the policy of foreign affairs (Peterson & Sjursen, 2005, p. 57) instead of realizing its policy preferences at the first place. Additionally, the Treaty of Amsterdam (effective since 1999), created the position of the high representative for EU foreign Policy. The Commission extended its power in the foreign affairs policy through preparing and designing the policy after the objectives with the EUCO and the Council of Ministers applying the expertise gained during Enlargement. The close cooperation between the EUCO and the Commission is observed in the literature before, as the

The role of the event of Enlargement can be best explained with the theory of historical institutionalism. Past events influence the current situation and the decisions of policy makers; moreover the reversion of a decision becomes more costly over time. The Enlargement in 2004 was the largest in EU history, this event made further decisions necessary as finding a possibility to avoid instability spill-over effects from the neighbouring countries. The appearance of the ENP on the European Agenda was very likely a consequence of path dependency on the Enlargement round in 2004, which led to a new neighbourhood surrounding Europe. The existing literature links the ENP to the event of the Enlargement. "The path dependency of the ENP is strong. Its raison d'être is enlargement" (Kelley, 2006, p. 31). Although, it is in the existing literature not clear which actor initiated the ENP, it is argued that the ENP was a consequence of the Enlargement policy. The enlargement in 2004 affected the initiation of the ENP (Tilmets, 2007b, p. 16). Other geopolitical relevant events were the Iraq war, in which the EU did not have a consistent position.

The ENP was initiated as a consequence of path-dependency from the event of the Enlargement. The preference formation of the EU member states can be best explained by the LI as geopolitical interest and economic cooperation were predominant. The intensive transgovernmentalism explains the dominant role of the intergovernmental institutions in defining incentives and objectives. In addition, it offers an explanation why the EU member states cooperate closer as it is common in International Organisations. The role of the Commission in applying tools of the Enlargement can be best explained by its striving for more power in the field of foreign affairs and the institutional changing situation between the EUCO and the Commission.
Chapter 8: Theoretical explanations to the formation process of the ENP

The analysis explains the origin of the observations made by Börzel. As the EU is reluctant in applying negative conditionality on aid in terms of democracy and in consequence only little progress is made (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1045). The external effectiveness is undermined by the security interest, as energy, migration and trade (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1044). The main argument is that the objectives of the policy undermine each other, the objective of democratisation and security. “‘Greater differentiation’ and ‘stricter conditionality’ appear hardly adequate to overcome the EU's dilemma.” (as cited in Natasha Butler, Commission spokeswoman, quoted in Söderbaum (2004) Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1044). The analysis suggests that the close cooperation between the institutions led to a policy in which the tools are not perfectly suitable to the objectives, as the tools of Enlargement are applied to objectives which exclude membership and focus on security and stability. Furthermore, the aim was it to complement the research on the role of the Commission. The Commission had a significant influence in designing the mechanisms and tools. However, the preferences of the Member States were very diverse as well and it is suggested that the broad policy is a result of the diverse interests of the member states.
Chapter 9: Conclusions

9 CONCLUSIONS

In the year 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched and aimed at avoiding the building of new dividing lines and creating prosperity and stability in the countries surrounding Europe. The policy provided an alternative to the membership perspective and under its framework are different forms of agreements with the neighbouring states subordinated. The policy combines elements of different policies as it includes elements of economic and foreign affairs policy. The policy has been criticised for offering only weak incentives and the limited success in repeating the transformative success in the countries of the Enlargement in 2004. The dissertation explained the European Neighbourhood policy and its tools. Furthermore, it gave an overview over relevant concepts and the existing literature. The Thesis aims to complement the research on the role of the Commission in the formation process in the ENP, to identify the relevant actors and the reason for the emphasis on security and stability. The speeches of Commissioners and the Communication on the Wider European Union keep the option on a possible membership perspective open and offer larger incentives, similar to the policy of Enlargement. However, the policy developed into a policy focusing on stability, security excluding a membership perspective. It is suggested, that this process cannot be only explained by the influence of the Commission. The Thesis comes to the conclusion that the policy formation was more intertwined. The theories of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, intensive transgovernmentalism and path-dependency were explained. Afterwards, it followed an overview over the preferences of the member states. The final analysis aimed at
exploring the explanatory power of the theories. Different elements of the theories were applied in order to uncover the process of the ENP policy formation.

The Commission sought at extending its influence in a foreign policy and it formed the policy on the experience gained at the policy of Enlargement. The objectives of the policy are a result of the preferences of the member states of the EU. In core the preferences were similar as the aim was to avoid political stability and ensure security on the border of the EU. Nonetheless, there were differences in the preferences among the member states. The new member states as Poland and Lithuania aimed for a specialized approach towards the eastern countries including a membership perspective. France and the countries on the Southern Europe were against a membership perspective and did not want to reduce the support towards the Southern Mediterranean Countries. The United Kingdom aimed for border security and political stability. The information on the preferences results from an interview with a policy decision maker involved in the ENP. The preferences can be explained by the LI, as outlined in the previous chapter. These were relevant in defining the security and stability focus of the ENP. The influence and cooperation between the policy decision-makers can be explained by intensive transgovernmentalism. It explains the bargaining and negotiation process among the member states better than the LI. The complex procedures in the EU are taken into account in this theory. The role of the Commission is explained through the increased cooperation between the EUCO and the Commission since the Treaty of Amsterdam. Although the Commission did have a limited impact on the objectives of the ENP, due to its close cooperation with the General Affairs and External Relation Council and the Council of Europe it was able to shape the tools of the ENP and to increase its influence in the foreign policy.

The Enlargement of the EU in 2004 led to a new neighborhood surrounding the EU, this event triggered the initiation of the ENP. The ambition for consistency in EU foreign affairs appeared after the Iraq war and consistency in conducting foreign relations with neighbours. Furthermore the existing forms of cooperation with the neighbouring countries were in need of form as for example the Barcelona process for the Southern Mediterranean countries. Altogether, the appearance of the ENP was triggered by the Enlargement process of the ENP. The objectives and the broad scope of the ENP were a result of the preferences of the member states. The similarities of the process of Enlargement and the ENP can be traced back on the influence of the Commission and its experience in leading the process of Enlargement. As a consequence, a policy was
created which aims to do justice the different needs of neighbouring countries by applying the tools of enlargement. The dissertation complements the research on the role of the Commission. The close cooperation between the EUCO, the Council of the European Union and the Commission led to the ENP in its current form. The adaptation of Enlargement tools can be attributed to the Commission while the security and stability focus is a consequence of the preferences of the member states. The European Enlargement and the ambition for a more coherent approach for conducting European relations were the reasons why the ENP appeared on European Agenda. In the literature, it is argued that the mechanism of conditionality is only effective with a credible membership effective (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Considering the different preferences in the beginning and the broad scope of the ENP, this research does not suggest further adjustments and adaptations in line with the policy of Enlargement as for example a membership perspective and supports the research result of Börzel. Further research could be conducted if the Commission was able to extend its foreign powers further. In addition, it would be interesting to analyze the reasons for success of the ENP in some countries and if the success can be related to the instruments of the tools adapted during the Enlargement process or different factors.
10 REFERENCES


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11 Appendices

11.1 ENP-MAP

(“ENP Map,” 2014)