Violence and the Vote
Understanding Electoral Violence in Post-Conflict Iraq and Afghanistan

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Abstract:

Electoral violence is an important aspect of democratization processes, especially in the context of post-conflict states. However, current scholarly literature has not analyzed this issue in depth, with case studies in the African context being predominant. This thesis seeks to address the gap in literature on electoral violence in a small way by developing three theoretical models to analyze the phenomena. It takes these models outside the traditional context of electoral violence research and into post-conflict states, Iraq and Afghanistan. Examining the electoral violence in the 2005 Parliamentary elections in both states illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the three models. Political institutions and actors as well as electoral processes appear to be the most important models for explaining electoral violence. The thesis also discusses some general insights the two cases provide on the overall state of theoretical understandings of electoral violence as they stand today.
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Introduction:

Elections are a prominent feature of modern politics, an essential element of consolidated democracy. Outside this context, democracy and election are also important for many post-conflict states, as tools of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding seeks to transform states and societies experiencing or emerging from violent conflict into ones that can sustain durable peace. Democratization and elections are not only actively promoted by the international community but have been a common demand of numerous popular movements. The consistent emphasis placed on the creation of an electoral political system reflects the belief that democracy and elections are necessary building-blocks of peace and order. However, the empirical record indicates that the relationship between democratization and peace is far from complementary (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Violent conflict and democratic processes such as elections coexist and interact. These risks can be even more serious in post-conflict societies, where recent violence and instability render them uniquely vulnerable. Despite academic interest in peace and conflict elections the most developed studies have focused on electoral design and the timing of elections. A largely unexplored topic is the potential for elections to generate a specific type of violence, electoral violence. There is still little in terms of developed theoretical frameworks which offer comprehensive explanations for the causes and conditions of electoral violence. However, rough models can be derived from existing literature and theoretical conceptualizations. Through the application of these models to case studies this thesis will seek to answer the question: under what conditions does electoral violence occur in post-conflict societies? A comparison of electoral violence in Iraq and Afghanistan will test the explanatory power of these theoretical models.

The study of electoral violence is relevant to both policy and scholarship. Evaluating the relevance of these largely untested models expands the potential for more focused and broader scholarly analysis. Elections show little sign of disappearing from the forefront of international peacebuilding, understanding why and when elections can lead to new violence is important for improving efforts to build stable, peaceful, and democratic political systems. Violent outcomes within the electoral process have the potential for a myriad of negative outcomes. The use of violence to effect political change is contrary to a democratic system, electoral violence undermines the legitimacy of a democratic state. As seen in cases across Africa corrupt, unaccountable patrimonial systems entrench themselves within an electoral system through strategic use of violence. Such regimes warp the mechanisms by which democracy represents and responds to the general population, inhibiting positive change. Electoral violence has consequences for peacebuilding and transitional politics. In the unstable environment of post-conflict states, any opportunity for violence is of interest to policy-makers and the population.
Armed conflict for electoral gain threatens not only the quality of the emergent electoral system but could spiral and even precipitate a return to civil war (Jarstad 2008, 19, Joshi 2012). The international community’s use of elections and democracy as tools of conflict management needs to take into account the potential power of these processes to escalate rather than ameliorate conflicts. If holding elections can create new patterns of violence, policy-makers and practitioners should understand under which conditions this occurs. Without a clear understanding of both the positive and negative consequences of elections, electoral violence will continue to mar democratization around the world.

The first section reviews the current literature on democratization, elections, and electoral violence. Section 2 covers with the theoretical framework, Section 3 the research methodology and case selection. Section 4 analyzes the case of electoral violence in Afghanistan. Section 5 deals with the Iraqi case. Section 6 compares insights from the cases and Section 7 concludes the thesis.
Section 1: Literature Review

Before reviewing the current theoretical literature on electoral violence it is important to first locate elections in the post-conflict democratization context and highlight the linkages with violent outcomes. Elections are a central element of the democratic process, a necessary component of consolidated democracy (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Elections allow for peaceful transfer of governance within political systems while holding political elites accountable to their publics. Citizens can exert an influence over the political system through their representatives governing the state. Elections embody an important vehicle by which democracy enables a non-violent and publicly legitimized form of political order (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). The dynamics of electoral politics comprise a vast field within comparative politics but the focus for this thesis is on their role in post-conflict states. The international community has championed holding elections as part of their active promotion of democracy in post-conflict states. Elections are touted as improving the legitimacy of contested governments emerging out of violent conflict, enabling citizens to at last engage with their political leaders and system (Weidmann and Callen 2013, 53-54). Elections are an important mechanism by which democracy manages conflict through nonviolent processes; ballots as substitute for bullets (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, 17-18). In post-conflict societies, this impression of elections is clear. The virtues of democracy and elections have been integrated into the common response of the UN and other international agencies to conflict-management and peacebuilding. Elections follow cease-fires and the establishment of basic infrastructure, empowering new domestic governments which can take the reins from the international community (Reilly 2008b, 167). This consistent emphasis on building democracy and holding elections in the post-conflict environment can be traced to the ideology of liberal internationalism (Paris 1997). Liberal internationalism firmly links democratization and elections with stability and peace. However, the empirical relationship between elections and peace has been shown to be far from straightforward.

Elections do not necessarily create peace and stability in post-conflict situations, a major dilemma identified by peace-and-conflict scholarship is the potential for democracy to encourage violence. Democratization processes offer “new opportunities and new motives for violence makers” (Höglund 2008, 83) and elections are no exception. The link between elections and various types of violence has been explored across a range of cases not limited to post-conflict states. Across studies, elections have been linked to violent outcomes. Seeking to explain variations in Hindu-Muslim violence in India, a relatively peaceful and consolidated democracy, Wilkinson pointed to electoral incentives as the key explanatory factor. He argued that ethnic riots “are often planned by politicians for clear electoral
Violent elections in Kenya attracted significant amount of academic attention. Gangs and militias were deployed by the state to win elections following the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012, Mueller 2011, 2012). These militias spawned new groups as political elites sought to use violence to win elections and protect themselves from pro- or anti-government militias or gangs. This “privatization of public violence” is argued to have combined with weak institutions and zero-sum politics to explode into post-election violence in 2007 (Mueller 2011, 113). A link between violent state repression and electoral contestation has also been made. In less democratic but still electoral systems like Iran, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Azerbaijan, violence was unleashed by state incumbents to prevent electoral losses (Smith 2012, Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). Across Africa, Reno noted that competitive electoral systems drove patronage-based regimes to rely on violent actors to protect their power. Reno presents potential rebel groups as being coopted into the electoral process, political elites utilize these groups to reinforce their privileged position within the system (Reno 2011). In some cases this process has led even insurgencies to become part of violent electoral systems. Elections have also been linked to other forms of violence such as harassment, street brawls, and intimidation (Straus and Taylor 2012, 33-34). Forcible land seizures and distribution in Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, and Kenya have been argued to be part of electoral strategies (Boone and Kriger 2012, Boone 2011). Terrorist attacks have also been linked to elections, quantitative studies have shown an increase in terrorist incidents around election days under certain conditions (Newman 2012, Aksoy 2014).

This potential for elections to enable violence can be even more pronounced in the post-conflict context. In the unstable environment of states emerging or transitioning from violent conflict, democratization and elections present heightened opportunities for violence (Jarstad 2008, 28-31). Elections have been studied in the context of conflict recurrence, where they can destabilize fragile post-conflict states, even precipitating a return to armed conflict. Flores and Nooruddin examine the effect of elections on the credible commitment problem in post-conflict states. They hypothesize that stronger democratic institutions allow elections to ameliorate the credible commitment problem. “When democratic institutions are well established, politicians find it harder to cheat during elections, renew violence when they lose, and subvert democratic norms when they win” (Flores and Nooruddin 2012, 561). If this institutional infrastructure is not in place, early elections and the threat of losing them increase commitment problems, encouraging returns to violence. Time must be invested to improve electoral infrastructure before elections are held; otherwise parties are likely to resort to violence either before or after they are held (Flores and Nooruddin 2012).
Another way violence and elections are linked in the post-conflict environment is through analyses of political actors. Groups wielding power in the wartime environment may be threatened with potential loss of power in new an electoral political system, encouraging spoiler behavior including violence (Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009, 540). If demobilization of armed groups is incomplete they can be used to influence the electoral process, the challenge of transforming armies into political parties who renounce violence as a means of political change remains vexed (Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009, Lyons 2004). Electoral outcomes in consolidated democracies are by definition uncertain. “But in post-war societies, the uncertainty of election outcomes is itself a source of tension, and a major threat to incumbent elites” (Reilly 2008b, 165). Elites during the civil war or conflict period may return to violence if they fail to win elections, dramatically illustrated in the case of Angola (Marcum 1993).

In states emerging from conflict, mobilization to win elections is often organized along conflict lines, potentially encouraging violence (Reilly 2002, 133). When conflict was ethnically based and these differences are reflected in the electoral system, processes of outbidding can lead to extreme rhetoric to win votes. Such rhetoric sharpens tensions, excludes minorities, and creates polarized pluralism; all linked to the potential for political instability and violence (Reilly 2008b, 178). Recognition of the post-conflict risks of elections is reflected in the wide range of literature on electoral systems. Responding to the conflict management challenges posed by elections the most developed academic work has focused on electoral design. Exhaustive work has been done on party construction and electoral system design to determine which systems best prevent conflict under a range of circumstances. Various models address a range of different social and political configurations; with particular interest in mitigating ethnic cleavages (Wagner and Dreef 2013, Reilly 2001, Lijphart 1977). However, these analyses are often more concerned with the intricacies of electoral system building rather than identifying the phenomena of electoral violence.

Though the summarized works illustrate a firm link between elections and in the literature, only recently have efforts been made to explicitly define and conceptualize electoral violence as a distinct category of violence. Existing quantitative and qualitative studies have focused on a diverse range of violent typologies when discussing this outcome. Two studies develop a more sound and consistent definition of electoral violence. In Höglund electoral violence is differentiated from other types of political and criminal violence by its motives, timing, actors, and activities and targets (Höglund 2009). Motives include a desire to affect election results, postpone elections in opposition its formation, or a rejection of the entire concept of elections. Timing is divided into three periods “1) the pre-election phase, 2) the day or days of the election, and 3) the post-election phase” (Höglund 2009, 415-416). The pre-election phase marks the shift from day-to-day politics to elections. Höglund defines the post-election
phase as the period leading up to the inauguration of the newly elected body. Höglund’s conception of the actors perpetrating violence is focused on armed actors, state forces, political parties, rebel groups, militias and paramilitary groups, and the nebulous category of other groups (Höglund 2009, 416-417). Activities are not clearly defined but targets are broken into four categories; electoral stakeholders, electoral information, electoral facilities, and electoral events (Höglund 2009, 417).

Staniland develops an even more fine-grained conceptualization based on the actors perpetrating the violence and their goals (Staniland 2014). These categories provide a clear matrix for identifying electoral violence illustrated in Table 1. Staniland divides actors engaged in electoral violence into four categories; state, non-state, opposition, and unaligned. The type of actor shapes the type of violence they are likely to employ but leaves open a wide range of options, for example opposition groups “may be in a position to do everything from low-level intimidation to full-scale anti-regime insurgency” (Staniland 2014, 108). The vertical axis of Staniland’s matrix takes the goals of actors and divides them as taking place within the political system, defined as intra-systemic, or anti-systemic when outside and against that system. A key insight of this definition is that “not all electoral violence involves trying to win an election” (Staniland 2014, 112). Anti-systemic electoral violence takes the electoral process as its target, directing violence against “candidates, voters, and the core electoral process as part of a broader campaign to overthrow or escape from a regime” (Staniland 2014, 111). From this matrix Staniland derives seven distinct types of violence, noting these are not mutually exclusive. Together with Höglund’s categories Staniland’s matrix provides a clear blueprint for analyzing electoral violence across cases.

Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Unaligned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intra-Systemic Goals</strong></td>
<td>Security forces deployed to manipulate election to maintain power [A]</td>
<td>Non-state ally used to help ruling party win elections [B]</td>
<td>Intimidation and protection against regime supporters [C]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Systemic Goals</strong></td>
<td>Parts of state seek to prevent or overturn electoral system using violence [D]</td>
<td>Non-state groups try to prevent or overturn electoral system in order to preserve power of their state allies [E]</td>
<td>Insurgents target electoral process to undermine democratic system and to destroy regime [F]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Staniland 2014, 108)
The relatively recent articulation of a clear definition for electoral violence highlights that this area is overlooked in the field of political science. As this literature review illustrates most substantial work has been on electoral violence in Africa, focusing largely on state-sponsored electoral violence. Violence in more consolidated democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes has also received attention from scholars. A persistent gap remains when it comes to electoral violence in post-conflict. An important sub-class of such states in the modern era is of those where the post-war system has been managed largely by external, international actors. For cases where elections may be the first held in decades, explicit theories on the causes and consequences of electoral violence remain vague. Electoral violence studies have been largely been case specific, comparing causes and outcomes in particular contexts rather than formulating generalizable theory. Theoretical work has been done on highly specified areas such as electoral design, where debates rage about the best party or electoral model for managing conflict, or on the role of international monitors on the quality of electoral processes (Daxecker 2014). This is changing rapidly as new projects on the topic are underway from a number of different directions. At the present moment however, the literature on electoral violence remains fragmented. With this in mind I have incorporated existing theoretical explanations from the literature into three categories for my theoretical framework. A review of the literature explaining why electoral violence occurs is thus folded into the following section, the theoretical framework.
Section 2: Theoretical Framework

Framework and Definition

The theoretical framework of my analysis is structured by three explanatory models identifying the conditions enabling electoral violence. Conceptualizing the causes of electoral violence around three models is based on the existing framework articulated by Höglund (Höglund 2009) but also include additional insights which I derived from existing literature. Relatively little purely theoretical work exists on electoral violence in general and even less in the post-conflict context. Thus my models are derived from insights and theories not explicitly designed for the scope conditions of this thesis, post-conflict states. Nevertheless, I believe that they contain potential explanatory power and exploring whether existing arguments operate in the same way outside of their descriptive context helps shed light on electoral violence. Before articulating the three models, I will follow Staniland’s critique of existing literature; “any analysis needs to begin with the simple question of who is acting and what is their broad goal” (Staniland 2014, 108). This requires a clear definition of the phenomenon of electoral violence. For this purpose Staniland’s matrix summarized in Table 1 provides a welcome foundation. This typology is the main tool enabling me to identify electoral violence in the case study context. Refining this definition’s emphasis on actors and goals are some concepts borrowed from Höglund (Höglund 2009).

Examining the targets and timing of violent incidents should help strengthen the focus of this analysis on truly electoral violence as opposed to other possible forms. The first step in assessing the relevance of these theoretical models will be to determine what type of electoral violence occurred in a case. Staniland argues that there are distinct logics of electoral violence shaped by who is committing the violence and with what goal (Staniland 2014).

The three theoretical models offered should help explain this logic and under what conditions types of electoral violence could occur. While based off Höglund’s three explanatory categories; the Nature of Politics, Nature of Elections, and Electoral Institutions (Höglund 2009), I have altered and expanded these somewhat. Under my conceptualization, the first model, Political Institutions and Actors, groups together arguments which take political systems and their incentive structures as explanations for electoral violence. This model focuses on the institutional conditions of a political landscape; its state system and political actors. The configuration of the political system creates the conditions and incentives for the range of electoral violence outcomes. The second model, Electoral Processes, looks at how factors intrinsic to the electoral contestation process create the conditions enabling violence. Finally, Electoral
Institutions identifies issues such as the rules of the electoral game, party design, and electoral administration as the key to understanding electoral violence.

**Model I: Political Institutions and Actors**

The first theoretical model points to the characteristics of political structures as enabling electoral violence. This model’s first major explanatory variables are connected to the characteristics of the state. Wilkinson notes that an alternative explanation to his electoral incentive model is that of state capacity (Wilkinson 2004). The strengths and weaknesses of state institutions, notably in law enforcement and the judiciary, affect the potential for rioting after elections. When these institutions are weak, the incentives for individuals to engage in violence are altered, making it a more attractive option. However, state capacity or lack thereof is illustrated by Wilkinson as not being enough to explain variation in electoral violence (Wilkinson 2004). A more convincing state-based argument has honed in on the relationship between electoral violence and the type of state. A number of authors point to neopatrimonial states as generating conditions which especially favor electoral violence (Reno 2011). There are a number of mechanisms identified which connect neopatrimonial states with the outcome of electoral violence.

One of the main mechanisms is that neopatrimonial systems undermine formal democratic institutions of a state. This has a number of implications for electoral violence. Weak democratic institutions, especially in post-conflict contexts, are identified as making it easier for groups to use violence during elections or return to armed conflict following electoral defeat (Flores and Nooruddin 2012). Neopatrimonialism undermines crucial democratic institutions by supplanting them with personalized rule based on networks of patronage (Mueller 2012). A second consequence of a neopatrimonial state is that violence in the electoral context becomes a more viable and acceptable tool. Patrimonial elites rely on privatized violence, channeled through personal patronage networks, to reinforce control. When elites are less constrained by formal legal and institutional checks they are more likely to use violent methods to secure or achieve power (Boone 2009). Patronage based regimes with an electoral system are thus especially vulnerable to electoral violence. With political and economic power tied to patronage networks, electoral competition can seriously threaten incumbent elites. In response, elites are more open to resorting to violence (Reno 2011). This leads to the state losing its monopoly of force creating a climate of violence and a culture of impunity for violent acts. In such an environment actors are constantly faced with violence but do not fear punishment for using it. This makes the choice of electoral violence more promising and attractive to a variety of actors (Orji 2013, 395). A third

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1 See Appendix
mechanism connecting state type to electoral violence is that in neopatrimonial states the checks on violence, the police and judiciary, are “vulnerable to elite manipulation and political pressure” (Höglund 2009, 421). The lines between civilian and military responsibility are blurred with little to no formal institutional control over the security forces, giving these forces too much power. In such cases the institutions designed to check political conflict and prevent it from escalating into violence are not effective tools (Höglund 2009).

The second explanatory variable of Model I is the character of actors present in the political landscape. Moving beyond the state, it examines other salient actors to explain why electoral violence occurs. Staniland’s definition of electoral violence provides an overview of actors involved and what type of violence they would use. Certain specific characteristics of political actors are identified as making them more likely to engage in electoral violence. For state incumbents the previously discussed state-related factors apply. Aside from the state, one of the most important actors whose characteristics should be analyzed are political parties. Political parties are “the agents of first resort for restraining violence or bringing it about” (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, 28). If political parties involved in the election are undeveloped or organized around armed groups party to the previous conflict they may be more likely to see violence as a political tool to influence elections. Extremist parties, through their rhetoric of difference and outbidding, also enable electoral violence as they seek to use violence to channel their political views against rivals (Reilly 2008b, Höglund 2009). Opposition parties are also more likely to use violence when they reject not the electoral process itself, but the rules under which an election is being held (Mehler 2007, 210).

One of the most important features of any political actor in the post-conflict environment is whether they remain armed. Armed actors who have not been demobilized or disarmed present the greatest potential for electoral violence. This can apply to any political organization, for example opposition groups contesting the elections. “The presence of armed actors makes it easier for a return to fighting if parties are dissatisfied with the outcome of elections” (Höglund 2009, 420). However, I believe that the presence of active armed groups who reject and seek to overthrow the established political order also impacts potential electoral violence. When political groups exist which define themselves in opposition to the government and electoral system they will use violence. The logic guiding this electoral violence is not to manipulate the outcome but prevent or disrupt the electoral process itself. Rebel insurgent groups who on political and ideological grounds reject electoral processes will engage in violence against elections to further their anti-systemic goals (Staniland 2014). Disrupting elections can undermine the state institutions they are fighting and serve as a demonstration of their commitment to fighting the political system represented by elections.
Model II: Electoral Processes

The Electoral Processes model emphasizes that certain characteristics inherent in the electoral process itself enable electoral violence. The most prominent mechanism is competition, discussed in numerous case studies and analyses. Competition enables electoral violence through a number of avenues. Competition increases the incentives for violence by threatening to change existing power structures, truly democratic elections have to allow the transfer of power between political groups (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). Increased competition raises the stakes for political players and increases the incentives to use violence. Sisk argues that “an underlying instigator of violence is the slipping of an incumbent regime’s grip on power” (Sisk 2012). This is supported by quantitative analysis on state repression during elections, when the competitiveness of elections increases incumbents are more likely to use violence (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). Competitive high-stakes elections also intersect with the potential for ethnic violence. “It seems likely that an ethnic party that expects...to win handily or to lose massively a local electoral contest has less of an incentive to foment violence in that seat. The incentives for ethnic polarization and ethnic riots follow the same general logic: the incentives are greatest in those seats where electoral races are closest” (Wilkinson 2004, 26). In the post-conflict environment these dynamics of competition can acquire even more significance. The stakes of winning or losing can involve being integrated into or locked out of newly emerging post-conflict power structures. Higher stakes generated by more competitive elections can threaten incumbents or motivate opposition groups raising the incentive to use extremist rhetoric, activate patronage networks, and ultimately employ violence (Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009). Where political armed conflict took place along ethnic or communal lines, elections “can be a matter of survival in the eyes of the parties competing for power” (Höglund 2009, 422).

Fear of losing can lead to both pre and post-election phase violence as “the fear of marginalization may create incentives for the politically weaker side to return to civil war.” (Joshi 2012, 744). This points to the possibility that competition and higher stakes are the motivating factors underlying the explanations of Model I. However, Wilkinson’s theory on ethnic rioting in Indian states offers a different expectation of competition. He argues that higher levels of party fractionalization have lower levels of violence than those with lower levels of party competition. Minorities in states with high levels of party fractionalization can extract promises of security to parties in exchange for their pivotal swing votes (Wilkinson 2004). Thus Model II offers two potential predictions on the relationship between competition and electoral violence, whether Wilkinson’s theory has any relevance in the post-conflict environment is something worth exploring.
The demands of having to win elections also enable potential violence. Using violence as intimidation has been shown as useful for political groups in weaker positions, in order to discourage opponents from voting. When opposition groups are almost completely marginalized they will resort to even more extreme violence, terrorism (Collier and Vicente 2012). In post-conflict settings, certain electoral mobilization patterns can be conducive to violence. The networks groups use to win elections can mirror those of mobilizing armed combatants and run along military lines. Extremist and ethnic rhetoric is thus employed in order to win elections, it is not the type of party which matters but the impetus created by electoral competition which creates the sort of party linked to more electoral violence. In order to win elections new spaces for potential violent action are created (Höglund 2009). Electoral contestation also creates new physical spaces where violence can occur. Elections force candidates and election workers into new public situations, increasing their vulnerability and exposure to violence by any number of groups (Höglund 2009, Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, 19).

Finally, the quality or perceived legitimacy of the electoral process can impact the potential for violence, “the step from fraud to violence is not a big one” (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000, 29). Electoral fraud has been identified as a focal point for generating individual action by creating opportunities where individuals feel more confident in protesting or violently rejecting the political system (Tucker 2007). Post-election phase violence has been linked by a number of authors to fraudulent electoral outcomes (Weidmann and Callen 2013, Tucker 2007, Collier and Vicente 2012). When the outcomes of elections are seen as fraudulent, the grievances created can lead to violent protest and rejection. Fraudulent elections which intersect with ethnic concerns have been argued to be even more likely to trigger violent responses (Gutiérrez-Romero 2014). Thus when the electoral process is highly competitive but also produces results marked by fraud and irregularities it opens up conditions required for electoral violence.

Model III: Electoral Institutions

The third model draws from the highly developed literature on electoral and party systems to focus on electoral institutions as the determinant of electoral violence. In contrast to the work underpinning the previous models, electoral design research has focused extensively on divided societies and a post-conflict environment. These arguments and theories are based on the belief that institutional engineering of the electoral system can create or prevent political outcomes, the central goal being to manage conflict (Selway and Templeman 2012, 1545). Electoral design is argued as managing the potential of elections to aggravate social tensions and generate violence by mitigating its competitive logic (Wagner and Dreef 2013, 289). Although this field has addressed a range of issues such as
constitutional arrangements, the most relevant areas for this analysis are its insights into electoral design and administration.

Centripetalism and Consociationalism are the two major competing models of electoral design in the academic literature, debate continues on which best serves peace and democracy. The two offer institutional prescriptions for creating a political order which manages conflict through peaceful and democratic means. The most important insights for my analysis are their arguments regarding voting and party systems. At the core of consociationalism is the logic that power-sharing should include the representatives of all politically relevant groups (Lijphart 1977). “These ethnic representatives participate in grand coalitions, are proportionally represented according to group size, are given substantial autonomy on issues of direct concern to their group and are granted legislative veto rights” (McCulloch 2012, 112). Consociationalism favors an electoral voting system which utilizes closed-list Proportional Representation (PR) voting. PR and consociationalism is so popular within academic and policy circles that it has become the de-facto electoral design of UN mandated elections (Reilly 2011). Centripetalism, conversely, seeks to improve representative inclusion through a system of moderate and cross-cutting political parties. According to Donald Horowitz, the centripetalist system introduces incentive to “make moderation pay”(McCulloch 2012, 111). The electoral system is recognized as one of the most important levers for inducing moderation. Centripetalism favors some form of majoritarian-preferential system which requires parties to make cross-cutting appeals and moderate rhetoric away from extremist positions. Parties are forced to appeal outside core ethnic support bases to win elections. Although these competing models have yet to establish which, if any, is demonstrably better, both have consequences for electoral violence. Although not explicitly designed around electoral violence, both aim to manage conflict. Taken to the logical next step, if they reduce conflict in general they should also generate conditions inimical to electoral violence.

The second element of electoral design for conflict-management is the configuration of party systems. Like competition, political parties are identified as central in the construction of consolidated democracy. Practitioners of democracy promotion favor political parties while academic scholarship has “placed parties at the centre of the modern democratic experience, arguing that strong parties are the sine qua non of successful democratization” (Reilly 2008a, 7). Parties manage conflict through their representative function, they represent social interests in the political system acting as intermediary between state and society (Bogaards 2008). This representative function delivers three values to political organizations and the populations they represent. These are the intrinsic value of inclusive representation,  

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2 For a detailed exploration of these often arcane systems see: (Reilly 2001, Horowitz 1991)
its instrumental value in securing resources, and its second instrumental function in increasing perceptions of security (Theuerkauf 2010, 125). How a political system delivers representation to ethnic parties affects the stability and potential for conflict, less inclusive representation makes conflict more likely (Theuerkauf 2010). Consociationalism and centripetalism have different ideas on how to provide this inclusive representation. Consociationalism favors the political articulation of ethnic or other social cleavages through non-ethnic parties. Centripetalism favors the political aggregation of these social cleavages through the creation of multi-ethnic parties (Bogaards 2008, 61).

Looking beyond the electoral design, another relevant aspect of electoral institutions is electoral administration. Höglund identified that “electoral administration can encourage or discourage electoral violence” (Höglund 2009, 422). Electoral administration affects issues such as the impartiality, transparency, and efficiency of an election, factors which are crucial in the post-conflict environment (Höglund 2009, 422). Of the electoral administration models, empirical evidence and experience has shown a trend towards independent and permanent electoral commissions which “represent a clear best practice in terms of electoral administration” (Reilly 2011, 14). Neutral electoral management bodies, independent of political interference by parties or the state are more likely to deliver credible and legitimate elections (Reilly 2011, 14-15). The presence of international monitoring has been argued to motivate elites, both state and non-state, to shift strategies of electoral violence to the pre-election phase (Daxecker 2014). When international actors impose specific configurations of electoral administration and regulation without consultation with all relevant political groups it can undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process (Randall 2008, 246). This lack of legitimacy has been connected to lower quality elections and an increase in the risk of electoral violence. When it comes to domestic groups, a study of electoral management bodies found that in semi-authoritarian regimes more inclusive bodies can help prevent electoral violence quote. When opposition parties are included within the electoral management body they are less likely to violently contest the results of the election, seeing these bodies as channels to express grievances (Bekoe 2012). In these ways electoral institutions can provide a valuable lens for explaining outcomes of electoral violence.

**Theoretical Conclusions**

These three models offer a set of potential casual variables for understanding and explaining electoral violence based on the host of different arguments currently in the literature. However, I recognize that these models are likely not mutually exclusive. Current literature on electoral violence is sparse and there is yet to be a comprehensive theory. I made the choice of separating these models based on the logic underpinning Höglund and supplementing them with potentially relevant insights from other
authors working on electoral violence. Although this division is somewhat arbitrary, separating them into these three categories can help identify not only which elements are most relevant in the post-conflict context, the focus of this thesis, but also tease out some of the dynamic relationships between the mechanisms described in the models. I have sought to provide my own ordering of a fragmented literature through these models. Comparing and applying them will determine whether and in what way these models interact and intersect in the empirical realm. Perhaps on the basis of these interactions new, more insightful and relevant categories can be constructed which offer sharper analytical insights into the phenomena of electoral violence.
Section 3: Case Selection and Methodology

In order to assess and evaluate the models outlined in the theoretical framework I have selected two cases to test these models in. These are the Parliamentary elections in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005. These set the scope conditions for my analysis, post-conflict states which are also heterogonous in terms of ethnic and communal differences. While Iraq and Afghanistan did experience significant violent conflict before, during, and after 2005 I nevertheless define them as post-conflict. I take the terminated conflicts to be the military interventions aimed at regime change. In both cases interventions led by the United States overthrew the previous incumbent government, Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian Ba’athist Iraqi state and Afghanistan under the Taliban. These conflicts were declared terminated in 2003 for Iraq and 2001 for Afghanistan.\(^3\) The following period of occupation and reconstruction I define as the post-conflict period. These cases present some interesting dynamics which make them worth studying. Firstly, the international community was deeply invested in creating democratic states and holding successful elections in both cases. Whether this was productive in terms of the potential to lead to a highly negative outcome, electoral violence, is thus a worthwhile study from both a practical and academic perspective. Despite similar circumstances the two cases only appear to have experienced significantly different levels of electoral violence. Iraq saw significant violence, including numerous assassinations, while Afghanistan was described by many as being relatively peaceful during the electoral process. Finally, the cases are outside the usual scope of existing work on electoral violence, which has traditionally focused on Africa. These cases thus provide fertile ground in which to explore the dynamics within and between the theoretical models in a new, untested environment.

Most theory on electoral violence has not explicitly dealt with explaining this phenomenon within the post-conflict environment. Assessing whether my models derived from existing literature contain insights into explaining electoral violence within this scope is the goal of the thesis. Given that the current models have yet to develop into comprehensive theoretical frameworks I am conducting less a theory test than working to contribute to theory development. In order to evaluate the potential explanatory power and the relevance of the three created models, the method of process tracing will be used. Process tracing, as articulated by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, provides a solid foundation for improving and analyzing the preliminary models of electoral violence. “When case studies employing process-tracing cannot test theories that underspecified, they can play an important role in development of theories” (George and Bennett 2005, 209). The current condition of theoretical work on electoral violence is

\(^3\) See Appendix
fragmented and focused on explaining specific configurations of violence, especially on the African continent. Thus, process tracing in this analysis will provide the means for developing these models further. Process tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process-the causal chain and causal mechanism-between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005, 206).

An important factor that makes process tracing especially relevant for this analysis is that it takes alternative paths to an outcome into account (George and Bennett 2005, 207). Processes tracing allows this analysis to examine the causal processes identified by all the models of electoral violence and examine how they work within the case study context. Conducting process-tracing within case studies can identify how the causal chains of independent variables converge or even identify interactions between a set of non-independent causal variables (George and Bennett 2005, 212). The theoretical models I created provide a set of casual variables which require evaluating and assessing. Given the variety of different factors potentially affecting the outcome of electoral violence, a few variables can be controlled for. The most important is the presence of an outside power, with US forces overseeing the political process in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Both are cases of weak states with heterogeneous societies. However, the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan do not present the opportunity for the traditional controlled comparison. The three models are not developed enough to provide clear, mutually exclusive independent variables that can be controlled for. This makes finding cases which are similar on all variables except one difficult to ascertain. Rather Iraq and Afghanistan present cases where “one or more of the several independent variables identified may have causal impact” (George and Bennett 2005, 214). I will thus trace the narrative of electoral violence in Iraq and Afghanistan through the lens of the different models. Doing so “can help to assess whether each of the potential causal variables in the imperfectly matched cases can, or cannot, be ruled out as having causal significance” (George and Bennett 2005, 214).

Process tracing does have a number of limitations, including for this analysis. Creating strong causal inferences requires well-defined causal pathways which is dependent on substantial evidence which may be difficult to obtain. The authors general warning holds for my specific case of electoral violence, where the existing literature and my own models “do not make specific prediction on all of the steps of the causal process” (George and Bennett 2005, 222). With the case studies being recent and in quite unstable states, information may not be comprehensive. Moreover the undeveloped state of the literature, especially theoretical literature, means that the theoretical framework for understanding electoral violence is unfortunately underspecified. However, if the study of electoral violence is to both broaden its scope of understanding and deepen its theoretical foundations, this study and its use of process-tracing is worthwhile. Even provisional insights will help to refine the existing models; it
identifies the strength of existing causal variables, expands their explanatory potential into the post-conflict context, and determines whether these models are exclusive or whether they interact in ways which may help develop new comprehensive cohesive models which can help explain this complex phenomena.
Section 4: Afghanistan’s 2005 Parliamentary Election

Background

Afghanistan has been in a state of conflict for over thirty years. Out of a civil war the Taliban movement emerged as powerful military and ideological force, quickly conquering most of the country. They also played host to foreign terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda which launched the September 11th attacks. In response, the US and its allies invaded the country, supporting the Taliban’s enemy the Northern Alliance (NA). This military action was authorized by the UN, which organized the Bonn Conference to lay out the political framework for a new, democratic Afghan state. The Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5 2001, aimed to reestablish permanent state institutions and laid out a precise roadmap for this process. Bonn placed particular emphasis on the creation of democratic institutions; reflecting the ideology of those involved (Ponzio 2011, 114). “The state-building effort was to include the introduction of core elements of the liberal canon: a centralised bureaucratically functioning state, democratisation, the extension of rights through a new constitution and an open economy” (Mac Ginty 2010, 587). Hamid Karzai was chosen as interim head of administration. Karzai was considered the most acceptable candidate due to his lack of association with any organized Afghan group, his Pashtun ethnicity, and his close links to the US (Suhrke 2008, 636).

The first step on the road to elections was holding an emergency loya Jirga, a traditional forum of tribal elders summoned by the King. Afghanistan’s elderly former king Zahir Shah duly summoned the loya Jirga in June 2002. It determined the government structure for a four year period of transition, the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA). 1051 delegates from across the country convened in Kabul, including many so-called warlords (Smith 2011, 31). Hamid Karzai was elected as interim President and Cabinet positions were distributed in a manner more proportional to Afghanistan’s demographics (Suhrke 2008, 637). Following loya Jirga the constitution writing process began in late 2002, written by a small body of experts. The commission’s major preoccupation was the type of political system which would govern Afghanistan. The divided minorities favored a mixed system and the Pashtuns a strong executive presidency (Suhrke 2008). The constitution’s drafters were closely tied to the Karzai administration and the draft constitution reflected Karzai’s views (Reynolds 2007, 48). International constitutional, legal, and electoral experts advising the drafters were kept at arm’s length (Smith 2011, 94). The legislative branch was to be bicameral; an Upper House, the Meshrano Jirga, and a Lower House, the Wolesi Jirga. The Wolesi Jirga functioned as parliament; responsible for the passage of laws, confirmation of ministerial

4 See Appendix
and Supreme Court appointments, and budget. Hampering the Wolesi Jirga’s development into an effective democratic institution was the ambiguous constitutional wording of electoral system. It called for the Wolesi Jirga to be elected through a system which would be a “fair representation of the people of Afghanistan” including quotas for women (Smith 2011, 151).

The Constitutional loya Jirga convened on December 14th, 2003 only receiving the final draft constitution five weeks prior. Dominating the contentious proceedings was the nature of the executive. Using procedural tactics and benefiting from the strong support of the US Ambassador Khalilzad, Karzai pushed through his vision. Washington favored the presidential system which would provide it with “a clearly identifiable Afghan partner whom it would know well and indeed preferred” (Rubin 2004, 12). In the drama surrounding the executive debates, the electoral system was largely ignored.

Presidential elections were scheduled for June 2004 and the pace of electoral organization moved rapidly. A Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) had been established in mid-2003, comprised of members of the Afghan Independent Election Commission and international UN commissioners. On the issue of electoral design the JEMB proposed a closed party-list PR system with special compensatory seats to insure women’s quotas. Karzai decisively rejected PR as an electoral design, wanting a system that would weaken political parties; representatives should stands as individuals known in their local community (Smith 2011, 154). The design selected to meet this criteria was the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system.

SNTV gives the voter a single vote to cast for a single candidate, but multiple seats are elected at the same time from a given district…candidates are elected by simply winning the most votes-if four MPs are to be elected from a district then the top four vote getters are elected-regardless whether they have a majority or minority of the votes or how far ahead of the next candidate they are. In theory one candidate could be elected with 90% of the votes while three other could be elected with 3% each (Reynolds 2007, 58).

Karzai won the election to become Afghanistan’s first elected president with 55.4% of the vote (Johnson 2006b, 137). The JEMB reported a voter turnout of 70%, there was almost no electoral violence on the day, and women turned out in large numbers (Johnson 2006b, Smith 2011). Despite a questionable quality level, the international community was quick to pronounce the elections legitimate (Dobbins 2008).
The 2005 Wolesi Jirga Elections

The 2005 Wolesi Jirga parliamentary election was seen as fulfilling a number of expectations. It was a mandate on the Karzai administration’s direction, it would generate embryonic political blocs that would prefigure more developed political parties in future, and would signal whether the political landscape would continue to be defined by around ethnic, religious, and communal differences (Johnson 2006a, 15). Despite renewed international pressure to alter the SNTV voting system, Karzai refused with backing from the US. The official election campaign period ran from the 17th of August to September 15th (Wilder 2005). Under SNTV rules candidates could not run on party platforms and party symbols would not figure on ballots. Individual candidates could belong to political parties and be endorsed by them but the system made traditional party politics difficult. Instead candidates invested time and effort in informing voters about their face, name, and ballot symbol. With roughly 6000 candidates across a largely illiterate country electoral success was dependent on popular recognition of face and symbol (Katzman 2006a).

To mobilize support, candidates focused on building local networks of support. Village elders, religious leaders, tribal chiefs, professional networks, and other representatives of organized communities were courted. Many candidates relied on religious, ethnic, or tribal appeals in order to win electoral support (Wilder 2005). Especially in rural Pashtun areas tribal affiliation was often key in mobilizing voter networks. While political parties could not contest the election as cohesive units, they were influential in delivering networks of support to certain candidates, especially in non-Pashtun areas. Former mujahedeen and warlord factions were able to support their candidates with money and manpower (Giustozzi 2009, Wilder 2005). Under SNTV local and national armed commanders enjoyed a distinct advantage, their fame and public status often made them the most recognizable candidates on the list. Large regional parties under established leaders, often warlords, were able to mobilize and discipline their candidates and support networks to vote strategically (Dimitroff 2006, 6). However, SNTV did create pressures, for example the Junbesh party of the Uzbek warlord Abdulrashid Dostum could not afford to support all their candidates. The highly personalized-charismatic structure of the party concentrated votes for the top leadership rather than more electoral successful even distribution (Giustozzi 2009, 198).

Although the electoral law banned candidates from running if they were associated with armed militias or were criminals in practice the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was not effective. In total 54 candidates were disqualified from running, “34 were disqualified for having links to illegal armed groups, 12 for holding a prohibited government position, five for having insufficient valid signatures to
support their candidacies, and three for violating the election Code of Conduct or law” (Wilder 2005, 15). This, however, was “out of more than 200 whose militia connections were established” (Giustozzi 2009, 92). Candidate campaigning was clearly focused on personalities rather than party, platform, or issue (Dimitroff 2006, 14). “Few presented ideological platforms, rather they are individuals allied with regionally and nationally powerful strongmen” (Reynolds 2007, 61).

Some broad alignments could be determined with a number of individuals and blocs being terms as pro-Karzai, in opposition to the Karzai government, and a significant number of unaffiliated. On September 18th 6.4 million Afghans turned out to vote, a voter turnout of approximately 50%, a decline from the 70% of the Presidential election. Polling indicated that voters were disillusioned with the Karzai government, the notoriety of many candidates, and security fears (Ghufran 2006, 86). The results of the 2005 election delivered a Wolesi Jirga which roughly approximated the ethnic divisions in Afghanistan. The seats were also fairly evenly split among pro-government, opposition, and unaligned blocs. Former mujahedeen, warlords, and militias commanders were clear winners; such individuals comprised half the Wolesi Jirga (Reynolds 2007, 62). On December 18th the parliament convened putting an end to the electoral period.

Electoral Violence

The 2005 election, in light of the violent conflict that had characterized the country for decades, was concluded by observers and participants as generally peaceful (Dobbins 2008, 162). However, incidents of electoral violence did occur, mostly in the pre-election phase. Using Staniland’s matrix identifies the most prominent opposition actor committing electoral violence with anti-systemic goals; the Taliban. The Taliban claimed they were uninterested in disrupting the election and would not attack polling stations on election day (IRI 2005, 11, HRW 2005). However, they were responsible for a number of incidents of electoral violence. The most extreme incidents of electoral violence were the assassination of seven candidates (Gathia and Hananuntasuk 2006, 29, Demetris and Ratcliffe 2005). In four of these assassinations the Taliban claimed responsibility or were implicated (HRW 2005, 7). Deteriorating security in the southern provinces led to a climate of fear and intimidation for voters, destabilizing the electoral process. This atmosphere of violence was cited as the reason the southern provinces had the lowest turnout rates; 29% overall with the most two most dangerous provinces having a turnout of 20.2% and 23.4% (Wilder 2005, 32-33). Amid many incidents of insurgent violence a number of explicitly electoral attacks were noted. In Paktika province an election worker was killed in July (Berman 2010).

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5 See Appendix
Taliban violence severely hampered the ability of candidates to campaign. Many candidates reported feeling insecure and unwilling to campaign outside their local area. Candidates in major southern cities, Ghazni and Kandahar, were unable to campaign in the countryside. Insurgent activity was severe enough that international and Afghan security forces were unable to guarantee the security of candidates in “no-go areas” (Dimitroff 2006, 7). Security also made districts inaccessible to international election monitors making information difficult to obtain.

While Staniland’s categorization captures the Taliban well, other actors involved in electoral violence do not fit as neatly. Actors participating in electoral competition did so to gain, consolidate, or legitimate power in the new post-war political landscape. Their goals were systemic but do not fit neatly in the state versus opposition dichotomy. Aside from the Taliban the main perpetrators of electoral violence were armed groups under regional warlords or local commanders. Across Afghanistan intimidation and death threats by armed militias and their commanders was rife in the pre-election phase (Gathia and Hananuntasuk 2006, 27-29, Wilder 2005, 36). Voters expressed fear of those candidates who were linked with militias and had committed past human rights abuses. Speaking out or campaigning against them was dangerous for candidates, voters, and journalists. Although intimidation appears to have been widespread, physical violence was substantially lower. In northern Takhar province three election workers were injured (Berman 2010). On the whole, militia commanders and warlords refrained from active violence, trying to build political structures rather than rely on armed coercion (Giustozzi 2009, HRW 2005, 9). Despite Afghanistan’s embryonic state some cases were reported of security forces threatening violence to manipulate the election. Local police and government officials were reported to have threatened community leaders to vote for specific candidates. In Ghazni police officials warned that if certain candidates and their campaigners tried to contest the election they would not be protected from insurgents (HRW 2005, 9-10).

Compared to the pre-election phase, election day was largely peaceful. In Nangarhar a grenade attack on the house of a candidate wounded five people (Berman 2010). US sources reported 15 people killed on the day but it is unclear whether this was directly related to the election (Katzman 2006a). Afghan National Army and police were responsible for security but there was a significant boost in the presence of international forces (Katzman 2006a, 3, Demetris and Ratcliffe 2005). No major security incidents occurred and the process was commended by for its tight security (Gathia and Hananuntasuk 2006, IRI 2005). The post-election phase also saw little electoral violence, although insurgent attacks continued apace. A significant cause for concern was the potential for post-election violence due to the so-called assassination clause within the Afghan electoral law. Under article 21(4) “an elected member [of the Wolesi Jirga] who is unable to take or continue to hold his or her seat is replaced by the unelected
candidate of the same gender who received the most votes in the relevant election” (Ennis 2006, 12-13). This seemed to bear fruit when two candidates were assassinated shortly after the elections. Mohammad Ashraf Ramazan was assassinated on September 27th (BBC 2005), while Esmatullah Mohabat was killed on December 4th (ICG 2011, 7). The death of these candidates caused protest rallies and drew attention to the issue, prompting a change in the law (Ennis 2006, 13). Ultimately, there was little electoral violence in Afghanistan’s first parliamentary elections. In a post-conflict context characterized by insurgent violence, untested political structures, a multiplicity of armed actors the elections did not result in major violent incidents. The three theoretical models provided allow a means of analyzing this perhaps surprising outcome.

Analyzing Electoral Violence

Understanding electoral violence in the Afghan case can be achieved through the lenses provided by the theoretical models outlined earlier. Model I focuses on political institutions and actors as enabling electoral violence. Neopatrimonial states with weak democratic institutions, privatized control over violence, a climate of violence and impunity, and weak institutional checks on the use of violence are important. Analysis of other actors is another element, armed actors within or opposed to the system, undeveloped political parties, and parties organized around armed groups will all make electoral violence more likely. Model II points to intrinsic electoral process, namely competition and stakes. When elections are more competitive and the stakes are higher, groups will have a greater incentive to use violence to win. Less legitimate elections encourage more violence. Model III emphasizes electoral design and administration, the PR or majoritarian voting systems are highlighted as managing conflict peacefully while an independent electoral administration improves legitimacy and thus potential for conflict.

Model I

Applying a model largely based around state-centric explanations for electoral violence has interesting implications for Afghanistan. Following decades of warfare, the post-conflict Afghan state was embryonic. This distinguishes it from cases in Africa, which form the basis for the theoretical focus on state characteristics as a causal mechanism of electoral violence. Afghanistan was not a neopatrimonial state at this time; there were no elites who were entrenched within the existing state structure because the state had yet to be consolidated. Karzai and many political parties and organizations were dependent on international support. Existing elites such as warlords had been driven out by the Taliban with the exception of the NA. Despite not being neopatrimonial, the embryonic Afghan state did manifest some of the characteristics which enable electoral violence. Afghanistan did have weak democratic institutions.
Almost every bureaucratic institution, let alone democratic ones, was seriously underdeveloped at the time of the 2005 election. This was not so much a function of neopatrimonialism than the extreme newness of those institutions following a foreign invasion. Afghanistan also had no history of strong institutions thanks to thirty years of war.

A second characteristic present in Afghanistan was a system of patronage, albeit not one integrated with the state. Local networks of patronage were undoubtedly of importance in the socio-political life of most Afghans, indeed these networks were vital after decades without any state presence in most communities. However these patronage networks were not yet integrated into the political structures of the Afghan state. Instead, existing elites sought to win political office to consolidate their patronage networks through electoral legitimacy and integrate into the future parliamentary structures. That this was a motivating factor for many candidates was apparent during the next major election in 2009, by when Afghanistan was defined as neopatrimonial (Maley 2013). The third important characteristic enabling electoral violence, the weakening of institutions designed to check violence, was also present in Afghanistan. Again this was a result of the embryonic nature of the Afghan state, where a centralized police and military had not yet been developed. While Afghanistan is a case with many of the state features that have been argued as enabling electoral violence, there was one important exception which explains the lack of such violence by the state. This was the lack of incumbent state elites who would take advantage of these conditions to perpetrate electoral violence in order to maintain power. Karzai and the executive were hardly entrenched incumbents, being recently elected and dependent on foreign support. However, while the state did not use violence in order to secure power, there is evidence that it manipulated the electoral process. The insistence on SNTV favored a strong executive. In 2004, with his US backing, this would automatically mean an executive headed by Karzai. With experts explicitly warning that SNTV would create a divided and fragmented parliament, it is plausible that Karzai saw it as a way to secure his power. This was borne out when the elected parliament proved small hindrance to the presidential administration, the pushing through of SNTV over international objections can be seen as a new incumbent nipping the threat of future electoral competition in the bud.

If Model I can explain why there was no state-led electoral violence, its focus on the characteristics of other political actors provides some insights. Afghanistan deviates from the existing explanations within Model I in that there were few developed political parties. The SNTV system precluded most political parties so those actors such as extremist parties were not present in the Afghan case. Using Staniland’s matrix in the Afghan context, almost every organized political group engaged in the elections could fall under the category of opposition; they all vied for future power within the nascent system. Political parties were mostly organized around armed groups and were relatively undeveloped.
Those actors most capable of electoral violence were the militia leaders and warlords who ran as candidates. Contrary to the expectations of Model I, these candidates belonged to the parties with the highest levels of cohesion and development (Wilder 2005, 18). Furthermore these actors were not constrained by state institutions and democratic procedures. The climate of violence and culture of impunity highlighted by this model was present in Afghanistan. That many of the militias and warlord armies were not fully disarmed was also widely recognized as a factor in the climate of intimidation and violence during the electoral process (HRW 2005, Wilder 2005). The empirical evidence shows that among many Afghans there was a strong perception that candidates linked to armed groups could intimidate and even kill with impunity (HRW 2005, 10-12). Despite all these factors, warlord and militia parties did not perpetrate large scale electoral violence, indeed they worked to keep violence down (Giustozzi 2009). The need for electoral legitimacy appears to have acted as crucial check on these actors’ use of naked violence. Model I thus fails to adequately explain why these groups despite all the factors favoring violence refrained from doing so during the election.

However, Model I’s emphasis on actors is useful when trying to understand the source of most electoral violence that did occur during the 2005 election. The majority was perpetrated by the Taliban. This organization was an armed actor with clear anti-systemic goals; they rejected the nascent Afghan state and were fundamentally opposed to the electoral process. The US Coalition and the Afghan Army were unable to defeat let alone disarm this group whose stated goal was war with the Afghan state (Ghufran 2006). The Taliban’s ideological commitment and material capacity to carry out violence was reflected in that they were responsible for the majority of the electoral violence in the pre-election phase. One important point is that the security situation around the electoral process was taking place within the context of occupation. A superior foreign military was present during the election period and put significant effort into preventing the violence from taking place. Although this can be argued as dampening the potential for electoral violence and even being a critical factor, the case of Iraq where there was a similar military presence calls into question whether foreign troops were a decisive explanatory causal variable.

**Model II**

Electoral processes help explain why there was little electoral violence in Afghanistan. Based on Model II’s competition mechanism it becomes clear that for those actors most likely to use violence the Afghan elections were not competitive and the stakes were low. Although it can be argued that for many candidates the 2005 elections were competitive, with many candidates and the confusing ballot system, this was not so for candidates and organizations with the greatest capacity for violence. The militia and
warlord candidates did not have to worry about winning elections; their fame and SNTV essentially secured their victories (Giustozzi 2009, Wilder 2005). Polling showed that most Afghans were most familiar with religious leaders, warlords, and local militia commanders as figures of authority. Parliamentary candidates came last in Afghans’ estimation of who held power in society (Ponzio 2011). The elections were thus most competitive for newly emerging parties and individual candidates which could not call upon these traditional forms of authority when courting voters (Ponzio 2011).

The general sense of disillusionment with the election by most voters also helped mitigate any threats posed by electoral competition to armed candidates. With many in the general public staying away from the polls, militia and warlord candidates could rely on their organizations to secure electoral victory without resorting to violence. These actors were aware that in the emerging political system they would require more than just armies but a measure of popular support. Especially weaker militia commanders focused on building political structures within communities, aware that their small armies could not deliver the necessary votes (Giustozzi 2009). Larger warlords sought electoral legitimation for their charismatic rule and attempted to adapt their organizations to electoral contest. These actors were able to make such changes largely secure in the fact that they faced little competition during this first election. Low competition can explain in large part why violence from actors likely to use it did not occur. Afghanistan also demonstrates a case where Wilkinson’s model appears irrelevant; no parties existed which needed minority votes and had to provide security guarantees. Candidates relied on ethnic and religious identifications rather than make cross-cutting appeals. No organized parties existed which could credibly provide such guarantees, with control over violence mostly in the hands of either foreign militaries or warlords and militias.

Another mechanism highlighted by Model II as enabling electoral violence was also not significantly present in Afghanistan, the increased vulnerability of electoral actors. Although SNTV demanded high levels of public visibility, many candidates did not campaign openly for fear of security (Gathia and Hananuntasuk 2006, Berman 2010). Only a handful of major rallies were organized, mostly by the largest parties in their traditional strongholds. Most campaigning was done through poster campaigns and other methods which reduced the risk of violence. Finally, the quality and perceived legitimacy of the 2005 election was generally good. Although irregularities were reported there was no large scale fraud or contestation of results (Wilder 2005, Katzman 2006a). Demonstrations did occur around the assassination of two candidates following the election but these too did not result in violence. The assassination of those candidates not killed by the Taliban does illustrate some actors may have used violence to win or influence an electoral result. On the whole however, the public was disillusioned with the candidate list, confused by the arcane electoral system, and unfamiliar with parliamentarians as
figures of power (Dimitroff 2006, 6). Elite political actors capable of using violence could be assured of victory, facing little competition and thus low stakes. The results of the election bear this out, with half the parliament consisting of warlords and mujahedeen fighters (Reynolds 2007, 62).

**Model III and General Conclusions**

The case of Afghanistan highlights some important issues with Model III. So much attention is to centripetal and consociational models that little work has been done on the consequences of other systems. Afghanistan used neither system, but SNTV system had a substantial effect on the dynamics of the 2005 election, including dynamics surrounding electoral violence. Though widely criticized by experts, SNTV precluded a number of identified pathways to electoral violence by preventing the creation of political parties (Dimitroff 2006, 6, Reynolds 2007). The larger consequences of SNTV, both negative and positive, on the evolution of the Afghan political landscape are beyond the scope this work. SNTV did create a fragmented and weak parliament whose negative impact has been documented by later scholars (Maley 2013). Electoral administration appears not to have played a very important role. The JEMB was recognized as being neutral. The electoral administration benefited from significant international assistance and oversight which helped make it acceptable to all parties and capable of delivering a fairly high quality election (Katzman 2006a, Wilder 2005).

In the short-term the SNTV system, despite its flaws, did not result in an election characterized by electoral violence. SNTV shaped many of the dynamics explored in the first two theoretical models. It prevented strong political parties from developing, weakening the potential for either extremist or moderate parties. Its vote system meant that those organizations that could successfully contest elections were those linked to well-known figures, mostly warlords and militia leaders. These actors had little fear of losing their races, their notoriety, political clout, and only having to win small vote shares meant they were secure. The Karzai government was also less threatened by electoral results, as no cohesive opposition parties could emerge. By cutting out parties, for good or ill, the electoral design underpinned most of the dynamics that prevented electoral violence during the 2005 election. The election appears to have delivered a parliament broadly representative of Afghan society. Whether it delivered a political system which is able to manage conflict in the long term and prevent future electoral violence is an issue for future exploration, though initial work on the 2009 election indicates an unpromising future (Maley 2013, Weidmann and Callen 2013).

6 See Appendix
Section 5: Iraq’s 2005 Parliamentary Election

Background

Iraq’s 2005 elections were part of a total transformation of that country as a result of the US invasion in 2003. By May 1st the US declared the end of major combat operations (Stansfield 2007, 163-164). The rapid fall of Saddam’s regime was accompanied by a large degree of political chaos as the US struggled to reconstitute authority. The US Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) enacted sweeping changes, most important were the abolition of the Ba’ath Party and disbandment of the Iraqi Army (Packer 2005, 191-193). The two core institutions of Saddam’s state were dissolved, greatly increasing political tensions and undermining order. Both the Ba’ath and the Amy had been largely Sunni organizations and as the minority religious group in Iraq they faced growing uncertainties. With the fall of Saddam the CPA now began to work with a number of opposition parties, mostly Shi’a exile groups and the two main Kurdish parties.

With the removal of the most developed institutions in Iraq, the foundation for the hydra of insurgencies was laid (Allawi 2007, 151). The US faced increasing resistance from a myriad of different groups, the most well-known of these groups was Al-Qaeda led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The US also faced armed resistance from the Shi’a movement led by the fiery cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and its armed wing, the Mahdi Army (Stansfield 2007, 176-180). With the security situation deteriorating the US decided to accelerate the transfer of power into the hands of Iraqis, sovereignty would be handed over by July 2004. The CPA appointed an Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), structured in order to represent the sectarian and ethnic divisions in the country. IGC’s identity-based composition served to institutionalize sectarian and ethnic differences in the political structures of post-war Iraq (Dawisha 2009, 245).

In addition to armed Shi’a resistance, the CPA faced political resistance from the Shi’a religious establishment and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. As head of the Najaf clergy, al-Sistani was the most influential and respected religious authority for Iraq’s Shi’a population. Al-Sistani proved a shrewd political actor; championing elections, which favored the Shi’a majority, at every turn (Cole 2006). Demanding elections as soon as possible, al-Sistani desired UN mediation in the formation of the new Iraq (Stansfield 2007, 173). With UN assistance plans for elections in 2005 were set up and negotiations resulted in the decision to form an interim Iraqi government to rule in the run-up to these elections, CPA rule ended on June 28th 2004 (Dawisha 2009, 246).
The new Iraqi interim government faced a host of problems in establishing a system capable of holding elections. Administrative work progressed rapidly, an electoral system had already been designed. Spearheaded by the UN a closed list PR system had been decided on, with the country being a single electoral district (Dawsha and Diamond 2006). This system would make the elections based on national identity and disadvantage local majorities within Iraq’s regions, leading to increasing Sunni calls for a boycott (al-Sheikh and Sky 2011). Despite concerns, the interim government had an electoral design and set up the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) to administer the elections. A timetable set January elections for a transitional assembly to write the official constitution enabling final general parliamentary elections in December.

While the institutional electoral infrastructure developed, security and sectarian conflict worsened at an increasing rate (Allawi 2007). In early 2004 hundreds of civilians were dying from violence every month, a March suicide attack on Shi’a holy cities drove those numbers to over a thousand (Allawi 2007, 266). Sunni insurgents of various types were mostly rooted in the Sunni Triangle but jihadi groups such as al-Qaeda launched attacks across the country. In November the US launched a massive operation to retake the city of Fallujah, killing in their estimates almost a thousand insurgent fighters but failed to stem the insurgency (Stansfield 2007, 181). The main Shi’a political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), had built up the powerful Badr Brigade militia. It had avoided clashes with the US to consolidate SCIRI control, now it was being integrated into the state security services (Allawi 2007, Mowle 2006). al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army had seized large territories and were in open rebellion against the US presence and Iraqi government. In August the US drove the Mahdi Army into a few mosques in Najaf. al-Sistani intervened, negotiating a ceasefire which enabled the Mahdi Army to avoid demilitarization and demobilization, remaining a potent militia force (Allawi 2007, 330). Other Shi’a militias connected to various political parties, religious groups, and even local mosques remained a constant presence. Al-Sistani’s intervention at the shrine of Najaf was also used as an opportunity to demonstrate his political influence and unwavering demand for elections (Allawi 2007).

Security concerns and fears of an electoral lock-out of power had led Sunni figures to try and postpone the elections. Al-Sistani’s display in Najaf meant that this would not be allowed to happen (Dawisha 2009, 248). On January 30th 2005 elections for the transitional assembly were held. With al-Sistani’s religious establishment rallying Shi’a support behind the ballot box, Shi’a voter turnout was 70%. Over 80% of Kurds, also keen to make their political presence felt in the new Iraq, turned out to vote in January (Dawisha 2009, 248). With Sunni insurgent leaders actively threatening the electoral process and others demanding boycott, the Sunni turnout was almost nothing. In Sunni cities such as Mosul turnout was 10%, in total about 75% of the Sunni voting population boycotted the election.
The results were apparent, the largest party was the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) a coalition of the major Shi’a parties supported openly but unofficially by al-Sistani with 140 of the 275 seats. Secondly were the Kurds with 75 seats, the secular Shi’a Iraqi List of Ayad ‘Allawi won only 40. Altogether the Sunnis won just 17 seats (Stansfield 2007, 182, Katzman 2006b).

Ministers in the new government were loyal to their party or ethno-sectarian group and formerly private militias began to enjoy material and bureaucratic support of the state (Dawisha 2009, 251). The constitutional drafting process motivated the Sunnis to seek a place at the table, realizing their loss of influence. The American envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, strongly supported increased Sunni participation. Recognizing the need to include Sunnis in a representative constitution and united Iraqi state, the most powerful parties coming out of the January elections brought Sunni figures into the process (Allawi 2007, 398). With the immense pressure of October 15th national referendum on the constitution, the document itself was vague, a set of bargains and compromises with many issues left unresolved (Stansfield 2007, 184-185). A new drama emerged surrounding the referendum which managed to pass only barely in the face of overwhelming Sunni popular rejection of the constitution. One consequence of these events was that moderate Sunni leaders were now convinced of the need to participate in the electoral process. Aside from the extremist jihadi groups who rejected the entire democratic system, “there were hardly any calls for boycotting the December 2005 election” (Dawisha 2009, 252).

The December 2005 Election

The December elections in Iraq were to elect a four year National Assembly that would create the new political order (Dawisha 2009, 252). Concern with the previous voting system had led to major changes. While still a PR system, the December elections were held on a governorate basis, 230 seats proportionally distributed across the country’s 18 governorates (Dawisha and Diamond 2006). 45 compensatory seats were allocated for party performance, those “entities that did not win provincial seats but garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election constituency been the whole nation” (Katzman 2006b, 3). This was done to improve the representation of the Sunni parties in the new national assembly. On October 28th party registration for the Iraqi general election closed, illuminating the electoral landscape. Although there were between 228 and 361 political entities and roughly 7500 candidates, it was clear that five coalitions would be the most important (Dawisha and Diamond 2006, 96).

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7 Different sources provide different numbers: 361 (Katzman 2006b) and 228 (Dawisha 2009)
The largest was a more religious UIA; jettisoning secularists and incorporating al-Sadr. The others were the Kurdistan Alliance, critically two Sunni parties; Iraqi Concord Front and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, and the secular Iraqi National List of Ayad ‘Allawi (Stansfield 2007). The election took place an environment characterized by violence and insecurity. The ongoing insurgency and various militias hampered the ability of candidates to campaign in person. Instead, campaign strategy focused on the media; poster campaigns, newspapers, television and radio debates, and endless campaign advertisements across all media (Worth and Wong 2005). Campaign issues were centered on the most pressing concerns; the chronic lack of security and economic development and themes such as federalism and the role of religion in the new state (Dawisha 2009). In contrast to their actions in January, most Sunni elites threw their full support behind the elections. “The Sunni religious establishment pulled out all the stops to ensure broad Sunni participation in the elections” (Allawi 2007, 441). Even some Sunni insurgent groups issued statements that they would not attack polling centers and Sunni campaigners (Allawi 2007).

Sunni parties focused on the security issue but instead of the insurgency raised the concern that the Shi’a dominated government was accepting if not actively supporting Shi’a militias, incorporating them into the new army and police forces (Wong 2005a, Dawisha 2009, 255). The Sunnis also opposed attempts at a federalist model which would favor the creation of rich Shi’a majority regions (Allawi 2007). The secular parties and even Sunni religious parties demanded the separation of religion from political institutions, advocated by the UIA. The UIA meanwhile deployed its religious credentials to full effect, with the backing of the Najaf clergy (Daragahi 2005, Worth and Wong 2005). An important symbolic boost was appropriating the image and blessing of al-Sistani, who had remained officially neutral during the campaign (Dawisha 2009, 256-257). The December 2005 campaign was also notable for its ethnosectarian local character. With these identities even more concentrated along geographic lines thanks to months of conflict, parties focused exclusively within their own areas. The Kurdish, Shi’a, and Sunni parties all largely ignored those governorates which were outside their ethnosectarian group (Dawisha 2009, 252-253). Within more heterogonous cities, campaigning was still localized in majority neighborhoods. Few parties made any cross-cutting appeals and instead focused on consolidating local support and eliminating any threat from rival parties within their identity group. The UIA thus waged a fierce campaign against the secular Shi’a parties, notably ‘Allawi’s Iraqi List.

Despite the poor security situation by the end of campaigning most parties had succeeded in creating strong national awareness and debate about electoral issues. On December 15th more than 12 million Iraqis voted in the election, a strong turnout of roughly 77%. The elections were extensively monitored though not directly by international observers. The IECI deployed 126,125 observers, the
political parties themselves had reportedly 272,295 observers, and there were between 949 to 1,330 international observers (Fischer 2006). However, the main international observation mission was based in Jordan, the EU did not send official monitoring, and international observers were unable to be present outside major urban centers (Lemieux 2011). The results of the election were only announced by the end of January 2006. Ethnosectarian loyalties had prevailed; the UIA and the Kurdish Alliance remained the two largest parties but together the two major Sunni parties secured 55 seats, with secular parties performing badly. Although in the run-up to the announcement parties on all sides alleged fraud, the final results were accepted. Although the election had delivered a new democratic government Iraq’s situation did not improve. In February a coordinated terrorist attack on one the holiest sites in Shi’a Islam precipitated Iraq’s descent into what was widely described as civil war (Allawi 2007, 447).

**Electoral Violence**

In addition to ongoing insurgent violence, Iraq’s election saw significant electoral violence. Using Staniland’s matrix the perpetrators of the violence were parties comprising the interim Iraqi state and state allies, mostly the militias controlled by the various parties within the UIA tent such as the Badr Corps. Other potential perpetrators were opposition parties contesting the election. All these actors had systemic goals; they wanted to win the election. Additional opposition actors behind electoral violence but with anti-systemic goals were the Sunni jihadi groups who totally rejected the electoral process. Given the chaotic situation, exact information on the violence and actors was difficult to determine. Another important point is that the lines between state and non-state ally actors as defined by Staniland were especially blurred in Iraq; the state was so new it had yet to develop distinct institutions.

Despite difficulties in establishing particulars, existing evidence points to substantial electoral violence surrounding the pre-election phase. Between November 1st and election day December 15th the IFES/EVER project reported “53 shootings, 25 bombings, 35 acts of intimidation and 48 incidents of vandalism, and 28 other kinds of incidents making a total of 229” (Fischer 2006). Between those dates there were 19 assassinations and 7 attempted assassinations (Fischer 2006). Other sources linked to the EVER project reported 86 deaths and 166 wounded due to insurgent related electoral violence. Attacks were conducted on 48 polling stations, 33 party members, 30 election security agents, 28 party supporters, 21 voters, and 19 party offices (Lemieux 2011, 44). The IECI described 8 violent incidents on election day with US sources report about 30 incidents (Katzman 2006b, Fischer 2006).

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8 See Appendix
Intimidation was prevalent as parties fought to consolidate their hold within local communities. The UIA conducted an extensive intimidation campaign against the secular Iraqi List in Shi’a communities. Posters were torn down by armed individuals, campaign workers were assaulted, and in Shi’a stronghold cities the party’s offices were attacked; by gunmen in Basra and Nasiriya and firebombed in Najaf and Karbala (Dawisha 2009, 253). Iraqi List also suffered more extreme violence; eleven members including a leading candidate were assassinated (Worth and Wong 2005). In more diverse cities the UIA was the victim of electoral violence, four campaign workers were shot in Baghdad (Daragahi 2005). Smaller parties were also targets, a coordinated attack on five offices of the Kurdistan Islamic Union occurred on December 6th (Worth and Wong 2005). However, those hardest hit by electoral violence were the various Sunni parties and candidates. Sunni campaigns faced not only hostility from the Shi’a groups but also from extremist organizations within the insurgency which were totally opposed to the electoral process. Ten members of the Iraqi Concord or Accord Front were assassinated including two prominent leaders, al-Qaeda claiming responsibility for one of the deaths (Wong 2005a). Clerics and campaign workers were targeted in attempted killings and kidnappings (Fischer 2006). The party claimed that many of these attacks were carried out not by the Sunni insurgency but by government backed Shi’a militias. The murder of two Sunni candidates two days before the election was blamed on the police (MacAskill and Steele 2005). Shi’a control over the government was also cited as behind the apparent arbitrary arrest of over 400 members of the Sunni party (Wong 2005a). Verifying many of these claims is problematic but IFES/EVER noted that “among corroborated perpetrators of violence were 43 cases attributed to Iraq state agents and 30 to party supporters” (Lemieux 2011, 44).

Security was ramped up during the elections by both the Iraqi security forces and the US coalition. The borders were closed and traffic in urban centers and between provinces was shut down (Lemieux 2011, 36). The US improved security in Sunni areas by allowing local militias and tribes to guard polling centers rather than Shi’a dominated police and army as in the rest of the country. Many Sunni insurgent groups also publicly pledged not to attack voters, but al-Qaeda under al-Zarqawi threatened death (Wong 2005b, Allawi 2007, 441). Post-election phase violence is ever more difficult to determine. Claims of fraud from different political parties was intense enough to postpone the results until the IEIC and an international team could investigate over 2000 complaints. Large scale protests and riots regarding the results did not occur, however (Dawisha 2009, 259). The IFES/EVER project also noted that while terrorist activity decreased in the days leading up to the election, electoral violence such as assassinations, intimidation and vandalism increased. This was associated with political conflict between competing parties and not insurgent violence (Fischer 2006). It is clear that despite claims that Iraq experienced electoral violence not much different from that in other Third World countries (Dawisha...
2009, 254), it was fairly serious in scale. The difference between Afghanistan, which had similar dynamics to Iraq, is striking. The application of the three theoretical models illuminates some factors which can explain this different outcome.

**Analyzing Electoral Violence**

**Model I**

Much like Afghanistan, state-based explanations for electoral violence in the case of Iraq run into some issues. Historically Iraq had a highly centralized and authoritarian state under Saddam Hussein but these institutions were swept away by the US. The 2005 Iraqi state was, like Afghanistan, embryonic. However, compared to Afghanistan, neopatrimonial structures were much more developed in Iraq. Many of the mechanisms by which neopatrimonial states are linked to electoral violence manifested in the Iraqi case. State actors committed electoral violence and this can be explained by Model I. The Iraqi state did suffer from weak democratic institutions. The previous regime had not contained any democratic institutions and the US lacked a concrete plan for developing them, leaving the interim government to appointed exile parties. There was little commitment to the democratic process as a significant check on the power of these new parties. Even strong domestic pressures for democratic elections by the Najaf clergy was a means to cement Shi’a influence over the new Iraqi state (Cole 2006). With new institutions being formed on the spot, there was little in terms of a legal and institutional check on the use of violence during the electoral contest.

Another feature of neopatrimonialism which encourages electoral violence was becoming entrenched in Iraq, privatization of violence. With the dissolution of the Iraqi military, communities, political parties, mosques, and other organized entities from all ethnosectarian groups armed themselves. These private armed groups grew as the security situation deteriorated, with highly developed militias becoming part of major parties; such as the SCIRI’s Badr Brigade and Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Allawi 2007, Mowle 2006). With the UIA coalition’s victory in the January elections those private networks of violence controlled by the ruling Shi’a parties began to be incorporated into state structures. This reflects another mechanism of Model I, the weakening of the police and judiciary. Shi’a parties controlled the Ministries responsible for security (Allawi 2007, 449). The complaints of Sunni candidates and the IFES/EVER reports illustrated that government agents linked with Shi’a militias were responsible for a number of acts of electoral violence (Lemieux 2011). That the ruling UIA felt threatened by electoral competition can be seen in the ferocity of its attacks on its major rival for Shi’a votes, the secular Iraqi List, and other parties. Exacerbated by the volatile and uncertain direction of Iraqi politics, the UIA did
not want to lose control of the state. With few constraints and powerful incentives to win, that the UIA’s used the state apparatus to commit violence against its electoral opponent can be understood.

However, the state and the UIA were by no means the only actors committing electoral violence, state-based explanations are not enough. Model I’s emphasis on political parties and other actors helps to understand broader patterns of electoral violence in Iraq. As argued, the presence of armed actors appears to have been an important factors underlining much of the violence. The dissolution of the Iraqi military brought trained individuals into various private political parties and insurgent groups rather than the state (Stansfield 2007). The more powerful Shi’a parties had armed wings and organized militias, more than capable of perpetrating violence during the electoral contest. Many opposition Sunni parties were linked to insurgent groups and had the capacity to use violence to further their campaigns. Although it is difficult to determine whether parties used insurgent connections to commit violence, it does demonstrate that Sunni parties were physically capable. The potential risk that the Sunni opposition might use violence because they rejected the rules of the electoral game was avoided by the inclusive changes in the PR system. Another danger highlighted by Model I, that of extremist parties was not particularly important in the Iraqi case, where parties campaigned firmly within their own ethnosectarian communities (Dawisha 2009). However, the overall political rhetoric of most parties during the campaign emphasized difference. This can be argued as sharpening the contrast between the different groups in Iraqi society and contributing to a climate of sectarian tensions, motivating much of the general violence in the country.

Turning to anti-systemic armed actors is also fruitful. Many Sunni opposition groups were totally opposed to the elections and were heavily armed. Groups such as al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups were operating relatively openly within the Sunni triangle region. These groups made public that they were against the elections and branded Sunni candidates as traitors. Many of the assassinations of Sunni candidates have been attributed to those insurgent groups (MacAskill and Steele 2005). By attacking the elections these groups could pursue their anti-systemic goals while removing alternative and rival political actors within the Sunni community. Other attacks carried out by such groups on electoral targets in the rest of the country demonstrated their commitment to actively resisting and undermining the emerging state (Stansfield 2007). Model I thus provides a good framework for analyzing and understanding electoral violence in Iraq.

Model II

While Model I provides a fairly sound analytical understanding of electoral violence in Iraq, Model II goes deeper in exploring motivations. While structural factors certainly made it easier for actors
to use electoral violence, looking at competition helps explain why they did. When compared to Afghanistan, elections in Iraq were much more competitive and had higher stakes for many actors. This can explain why in Iraq those actors who, thanks to the political and institutional structure were capable of committing electoral violence did so, whereas in Afghanistan they did not. Political parties in Iraq competed fiercely with each other, though within the confines of each ethnosectarian group. Unlike in Afghanistan where the warlords and militias did not really fear losing the elections, the Iraqi parties were determined to maximize their share of parliamentary seats (Dawisha and Diamond 2006). The Iraqi elections would clearly have a major effect on the new power structures of the Iraqi state and so raised the incentives to win for all parties, who wanted to be represented in the future political evolution of their country. This in turn motivated some of the electoral violence, with different implications for the Shi’a and Sunni parties. An exception to these dynamics was the Kurdish coalition, whose alliance insured they would receive almost all the Kurdish votes and be guaranteed a premier place in the new parliament. For the Shi’a parties competition appears to have driven electoral violence in the clash between the UIA and the Iraqi List. Both coalitions stood to gain or lose substantial power depending on their electoral performance and had to compete for votes within the Shi’a community. With a narrowly defined pool of potential votes, the demands of campaigning were raised. The UIA’s use of militias and state security agents to commit electoral violence can thus be seen as a consequence of not only its capacity but of an electoral logic; the need to eliminate its rivals for votes.

For the Sunni parties, the high stakes of the election was an important factor in the electoral violence directed against them. These stakes were raised by the risk of being locked out of power structures which were emerging following the US invasion. This danger was made abundantly clear after the January election where the Sunni boycott left them with almost no representation in the interim assembly. As a consequence they found themselves in a position of weakness when negotiating the constitution (Stansfield 2007, 184). This, coupled with the constitutional referendum, convinced Sunni elites that they had to compete in the elections. Doing so brought these parties in conflict with more extreme insurgents who totally rejected any electoral process. In this way the demands of electoral competition made the Sunni organizations targets of extremist groups and Shi’a political parties. Although Sunnis were in a weaker position it does not appear that they committed most violence targeted against the Shi’a parties. Instead, the competition between Shi’a parties and anti-system insurgent terrorism was behind this electoral violence (Fischer 2006). With the paucity of information, especially regarding the perpetrators of violence, and given the links of some Sunni parties with armed faction it cannot be ruled out that Sunni interparty violence occurred.
Some elements of Model II were not relevant in understanding electoral violence in Iraq. The threat posed by high competition in ethnic races did not materialize. Sectarian violence had largely concentrated each ethno-sectarian group into distinct electoral geographies, parties ran in largely homogenous areas. Like Afghanistan, the Iraqi electoral process did not lead to candidates and others becoming significantly more physically vulnerable. The dire security situation restricted most candidates to campaigning through the media rather than appearing in public, top candidates of parties without their own security forces were holed-up in strongholds such as the American Green Zone (Dawisha and Diamond 2006, 97). However, by competing in elections Sunni parties were brought into direct political conflict with Shi’a parties and radical elements within their community. For Iraq Wilkinson’s model for competition and fragmentation does not seem to hold. Because parties were uninterested in gathering votes from outside their ethnosectarian groups they had no incentive to issue security guarantees or indeed honor such promises.

Finally, the quality of the election does not seem to have been a major element in creating post-election day violence. Although there were numerous complaints the IEIC did address them with international help, claims of fraud did not result in violence as a response to electoral results. The extremely poor security situation following the election cannot be explicitly linked to the outcome of the election. Rather it appears the February attack served as a spectacular trigger for civil war; unleashing numerous underlying social and political tension already mixed with a climate of violence and insecurity (Dodge 2012). Whether the election played a role in shaping these tensions and contributed to the dynamics that led to this is hard to clearly identify. Competition thus appears to have been a driver of electoral violence in the case of Iraq. Some of Model II’s predictions about how competition can motivate parties to respond to electoral challenges with violence are borne out. While competition was a motivating factor it is important to recognize that the inter-party conflict took place within a structural context, identified by Model I, which made violence available as a tool of electoral contestation.

**Model III**

The theoretical model which looks to electoral institutions does not appear have much explanatory value in the Iraqi case. Electoral administration was not a major issue during the election; the IECI was accepted as neutral. Significant international assistance helped make it an acceptable arbiter of the electoral process. The deployment of thousands of monitors from the parties themselves indicated that good oversight and administration was both a domestic and international priority. On the electoral design front, the closed list PR system is one advocated by experts in policy circles and scholarly literature as being designed to manage social and political conflict. It was accepted by all parties and even altered following the January election to be more representative. The creation of electoral districts and
compensatory seats was designed to further mitigate conflict by including the Sunnis in the political process, a move beneficial to the creation of truly democratic and representative institutions (Allawi 2007).

Iraq’s electoral violence in the December election highlights that good electoral institutions cannot in and of themselves prevent electoral violence. Whether a different system would have exacerbated or reduced the potential for electoral violence is unclear. What can be concluded is that electoral design is important in that it shapes the dynamics of an election and interacts with the political environment. The PR system enabled parties and thus party competition which led to incidents of electoral violence but a system that represented Iraq’s organized and developed parties was necessary. Electoral institutions are one element shaping the electoral stage, encouraging certain patterns of behavior and restricting others. A clear empirical link between design and electoral violence, with information currently available, is difficult to make out. Compared to SNTV in Afghanistan, Iraq implemented an electoral design that served democracy and conflict management far better. Yet the country experienced significant electoral violence compared to the relatively peaceful Afghan election. The explanations given by Model I and II illustrate that the factors they identify can overcome even the best electoral design to create violent elections.
Section 6: Comparison

Comparing the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan through the lens of the explanatory models illuminates some general conclusions which contribute to further developing and sharpening theoretical approaches to electoral violence. When trying to understand electoral violence in the two cases, Model I and Model II offer critical insights. Model I provided a lens to identify the actors committing electoral violence, especially anti-systemic organizations; Taliban and various Iraqi insurgent groups. It also made a good argument for the importance of a political environment enabling electoral violence. Both cases took place in such an environment, the characteristics and mechanisms of political actors and institutions identified by the model did manifest. Despite these similarities in characteristics, there was a significant difference in the amount of electoral violence that took place between Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq experienced much more violence and Model I is unable to fully explain it. Some of its causal arguments can partially account for this difference; Iraq had a more intense climate of violence and impunity making electoral violence more available. Also, the state, the ruling UIA party, had more power to commit violence compared to the Karzai government; with no independent security forces. However, both countries had many armed actors who were barely constrained by institutions, ran in the elections, and could have used electoral violence. The crucial difference in explaining why in Afghanistan they did not while in Iraq many parties did, is provided by the mechanism outlined in Model II, competition. Although in both cases there were groups who could use violence for electoral gain, in Afghanistan they did not have to. For the warlords and militia commanders the Afghan elections were not competitive, under the system they did not fear losing. So instead of using violence they focused on developing political structures. In Iraq, by contrast, powerful parties had to compete with ethnosectarian rivals for a restricted pool of voters. High stakes, input into the direction of the new Iraqi state, further motivated parties who could use violence to do so to protect and expand their vote share. In Afghanistan there was no such motivation due to the lack of competition and stakes.

Model II provides the best argument for understanding differences in outcome within the scope of these cases. However, this scope illustrates some key limitations of Model II. All competitive high-stakes elections will not automatically create more violent ones. Competition is a hallmark of elections in consolidated democracies and these do not generate electoral violence. This underscores that although competition and other electoral processes are driving factors behind electoral violence, this occurs in a specific environment. Iraq and Afghanistan had elections that took place in a very specific political landscape that made electoral violence possible. Both elections were competitive and with major stakes for many candidates and parties, but not for the type of actor important for electoral violence. Identifying
these actors, the institutional context which enables them, and the reasons why they are important is given by Model I. Within this context, electoral violence is possible, determining whether it will occur and how intensely is then up to Model II.

An additional conclusion drawn from this research is that Model I can expand its scope. Model I and other literature on electoral violence should move beyond focusing on explicitly neopatrimonial regimes and look for other state typologies that exhibit the identified mechanisms. Electoral violence takes place outside of neopatrimonial regimes and is particularly important in a post-conflict environment where the state is not fully developed. In these embryonic states, like Iraq and Afghanistan, the structures outlined by Model I are replicated outside of the neopatrimonial context. Embryonic states emerging out of an armed conflict which has significantly weakened or dissolved the state show many of the characteristics ascribed to neopatrimonial regimes. Democratic institutions are weak, institutional checks barely present, violence is largely in private hands, and armed actors operate freely. Existing literature has rightly pointed to neopatrimonialism as creating certain mechanisms which drive electoral violence in Africa. What Iraq and Afghanistan show is that these mechanisms are not restricted to state type; future work should focus on identifying and deepening understandings of institutional mechanisms across typologies.

Of the three models the one with the least explanatory power was Model III. In Afghanistan, an electoral design was instituted which was widely criticized by experts as being one of the least capable of managing conflict. Iraq by contrast used the representative PR system, the prescribed design of consociational scholars and international organizations. Yet it was Iraq that experienced significantly more electoral violence. This suggests that electoral institutions do not have a major impact on the outcome of electoral violence in and of themselves. Centripetalist or consociational electoral designs may be better suited to managing social and political conflicts and building better institutions over time. In the short-run, however, for states at the beginning of transitions out of conflict, the two cases show that other factors take precedence when trying to understand electoral violence. Structural factors relating to the characteristics of the state, political actors, the prevalence of violence and arms, intrinsic electoral process which exacerbate conflict, and other factors highlighted by the two models trump design.

This leads to a valuable point of analysis about the validity of this thesis’ theoretical models; the dynamics they describe are not mutually exclusive. The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan show that each model alone fails to provide a fully adequate explanation for electoral violence. Certain dynamics, such as state characteristics and the level of competition, interact to generate conditions which drove or prevented electoral violence. These interactions need to be explored further so that new models are developed which
provide more cohesive and linear causal relationships between variables and the outcome of electoral violence. Finally, an important insight provided by the cases is the potential importance of the first elections in post-conflict states. It may be of interest to study elections in the following years to compare changes in the patterns of electoral violence. The three models provide some guidance for such a study, examining their mechanisms over time might illuminate new insights and connections. Such expansion of theoretical work and doing new case studies in contexts outside of those covered in the literature can synthesize to create deeper and more focused understandings about this complex and important aspect of the democratic process.
Section 7: Conclusion

The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate that electoral violence in post-conflict states is an important political phenomenon. While current literature has yet to address the issue with the theoretical rigor it deserves, enough work exists to begin to form preliminary models of explanation. The three models developed by this thesis have found useful tests in the two cases. In their own way the models have provided a framework for understanding electoral violence and the processes which enable or prevent it. However, it is important to understand the implications and limitations of this research. Afghanistan and Iraq are fairly unique cases, far removed from the traditional field of electoral violence studies. The initial post-conflict elections examined took place in circumstances of foreign occupation where political and state institutions were being born. These moments were ones where political dynamics and personalities were fluid and subject to a range of potential variables which could affect socio-political outcomes. The explanatory power of the models coupled with the scope conditions of the two cases create significant limitations for the generalizability and further application of the dynamics identified. However, in providing a structured approach to electoral violence, the three theoretical models have generated insights which can inform future empirical and theoretical work. By taking the fragmented electoral violence literature, ordering it, and applying it in outside contexts, this thesis has illustrated the strengths and weakness of our current tools for analyzing electoral violence.

This has consequences for policy as well as scholarship. States transitioning out of conflict and international peacebuilders will need to consider the danger posed to democratization efforts by electoral violence. Elections may be vital for birthing new democratic institutions but they can also generate new violence with a range of negative consequences. In Iraq the electoral violence between parties further entrenched ethnosectarian differences within the political structures of the new supposedly democratic state. In Afghanistan, despite low electoral violence, the electoral design created a weakened and fragmented parliament with deleterious future consequences for the country. As both cases have shown, design is not enough to manage conflict; there is no electoral system which works as panacea on structural factors which generate electoral violence. Underlying institutional factors and the dynamics of an election itself need to be considered when holding elections in the fragile environment of post-conflict states. Iraq and Afghanistan show that the path to democracy is fraught with new opportunities to commit violence. As long as elections continue to be held and as long as the international community favors post-conflict democratization through electoral processes, electoral violence will remain a salient topic.
**Works Cited**


Appendix

Dates of Conflict Termination:

Iraq: April 9th 2003 (Katzman 2015b, 1).

Afghanistan: The Taliban regime fell on December 9th 2001 with the fall of their last stronghold of Kandahar. A potential alternate date is May 1 2003 when the US declared an end to major combat (Katzman 2015a, 8).

Definition of neopatrimonialism:

A comprehensive definition of neopatrimonial states comes from authors Bratton and Van de Walle: In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive retains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. As with classic patrimonialism, the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office. In contemporary neopatrimonialism, relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic office less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons. (Bratton and Walle 1994, 458)

Afghanistan Election Tables

Table 2.1: Bonn Agreement Transitional Benchmarks

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</table>

Source: (Reynolds 2007, 49)
**Table 2.2: Wolesi Jirga Seats by Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Legislative Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Estimated Population Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>249</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Reynolds 2007, 61)

**Table 2.3: Wolesi Jirga Seats by Affiliation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLITICAL PARTY OR FACTION</th>
<th>LEADER</th>
<th>SEATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Government Parties/Factions/Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Jamiat-e Islami – Rabbani faction</td>
<td>Rabbani</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Jamiat/Nahzat-e-Milli Factions</td>
<td>Ismail Khan, Atta, Ahmad Wali Masood</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mahaz-e Milli Islami Afghanistan</td>
<td>Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Afghan Millat Party</td>
<td>Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tanzim Dawat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan</td>
<td>Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayaf</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hazara/Shi’a factions (Hezbi Wahdat, Harakat Islami, Others)</td>
<td>Khalili, Anwar</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tanzem-e Jabha-ye Milli Nijat-e Afghanistan</td>
<td>Sebghatullah Muqedi</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nuzhat Hambastagee Milli Afghanistan</td>
<td>Sayed Ishaq Gailani</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hezb-e Hambastagee Milli Jawana-ye Afghanistan</td>
<td>Jamil Karzai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other pro-Karzai/pro-government individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Pro-Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Opposition Parties/Factions/Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hezbe-Afghanistan Nawoon</td>
<td>Younas Qanooni</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hezbe-Junbesh-e-Milli Afghanistan</td>
<td>Dostum/Sayed Noorullah</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hezbe Wahdat (Mardom)</td>
<td>Mohammad Mohaqeq</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hezb-i-Islami factions</td>
<td>Farooqi, Sabawun, Gulbuddin</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Shi’a Factions (Hezbe Wahdat, Harakat, Eqtedar)</td>
<td>Akbar, Jawed, Kazemi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Others</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Pro-Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Aligned Parties/Factions/Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Jabha-ye Democratic-e Milli (14 party alliance)</td>
<td>Baktash, Ehsas, Kohistani, Naseri, Nemat, Piroz</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Left parties</td>
<td>Uloni, Aryan, Ranjbar, Tanai</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Hezbe Piawand-e-Milli (Ismaill Party)</td>
<td>Sayed Mansur Nadin</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total No Clear Faction Alignment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Non-aligned or no clear faction alignment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Wilder 2005, 5)
## Iraq Election Table

### Table 3.1: December 2005 Election Results by Party and Affiliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slate/Party</th>
<th>Seats (Jan. 05)</th>
<th>Seats (Dec. 05)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SCIRI<del>30; Da'wa</del>28; Sadr~30; Fadila (Virtue)~15; others 25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Concord Front (Sunni). Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Congress (Chalabi). Was part of UIA list in Jan. 05 vote</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Turkomen Front (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Independent and Elites (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) pro-Sadr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan Islamic Group (Islamist Kurd)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafidain National List (Assyrian Christian)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering (Sunni, secular)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummah (Nation) Party. (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Katzman 2006b, 6)