Informal Power as a Tool of Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Libya.

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International Studies: International Relations MA Thesis

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July 9, 2015

9996 words
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Introduction

Muammar Gaddafi's rule of Libya was characterized as eccentric, comical and brutal. Once labeled as the "mad dog of the Middle East" by President Reagan, Colonel Gaddafi was one of the longest serving world leaders when his regime collapsed. Hailing from a Bedouin background, and ultimately becoming the 'King of Kings in Africa', Gaddafi experienced eight Presidents of the United States, eight British Prime-Ministers and six Secretary-Generals of the United Nations in his 42 years in power. The longevity of Gaddafi's authoritarian regime is an exceptional case in the history of world politics, although not that exceptional in the Middle Eastern context. As of 2010, Libya's system of governance seemed to be as steadfast as other long-standing rulers in the Middle East. Ali Abdullah Saleh had served as Yemen's president for 33 years, Hosni Mubarak had ruled Egypt for three decades, the Assad dynasty had been in charge of Syria since 1970, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia for 23 years.

Street protests erupted in February 2011 in cities and towns across Libya. Within days, the situation escalated. High ranking government officials and diplomats defected and unleashed scathing condemnations of Gaddafi's violent response, while in the east, officers and soldiers alike declared their loyalty to the Libyan people. During the Arab Spring, the authoritarian leaders of Tunisia and Egypt stepped down after weeks of street protests. Libya did not follow suit and


This thesis focuses on the Gaddafi-regime's response to the protests. How did Gaddafi almost regain power, following widespread civil unrest and the fracturing of the state, and which role did the use of informal power play in this? Some scholars argue that the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East is rooted in the incompatibility between Islam and democracy.\footnote{Alon Ben-Meir, “Is Islam Compatible with Democracy,” Huffington Post. July 8, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/is-islam-compatible-with_b_3562579.html}

Other scholars provide a different view on the absence of democracy in the Middle East. Oliver Schlumberger's Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes is divided in four dimensions that are relevant in understanding the durability Arab authoritarianism.\footnote{Oliver Schlumberger, ed. Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).}

This framework analyses the durability of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes by focusing on state-society relations, features of the political regimes themselves, the position of the armed forces in the economy and the regimes' relations with international community.\footnote{Oliver Schlumberger, “Arab Authoritarianism,” in Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes, ed. Oliver Schlumberger (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 10.} Although sharing a common authoritarian streak, the political regimes of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya did not share the same characteristics in these four dimensions. The ideology and symbolism that legitimized the Libyan regime's rule, and the domestic and foreign policies that shaped Libyan state-society relations, as well as Libya's position in the international community, were all greatly influenced by Gaddafi's dominance over the political process over the course of 42 years.

This thesis puts forth the hypothesis that shifts Schlumberger's four dimensions did ultimately lead to the fall of Gaddafi's regime. The regime's international position is identified as a dimension that accounts for its durability, and the NATO-intervention was essential in the fall of the
In this way, the framework supports the course of events in Libya. What this thesis shall argue however, is that Gaddafi's use of informal power was an essential element in the regime's initial survival, and, militarily speaking, near-victory over rebel forces. The second part of this argument is that this use of informal power led to the regime's demise. This thesis shall take Libya's uprising as a case-study to determine the importance of the a regime's ability and willingness to use forms of informal power in times of crisis. This would add to Schlumberger's framework that the use of informal power by a regime can strengthen its durability, but that the international position of a regime that uses informal power in times of crisis, can also constitute a critical factor its downfall.

1. Methodology

Gaddafi's response to internal upheaval during the Arab Spring is a case-study, whereby the Libyan regime's response to social unrest and its durability is held against Schlumberger's four dimensions that account for the durability of Arab authoritarian regimes. The case of Libya can provide an insight into the dual effect of the use of informal power. It can add to Schlumberger's theoretical framework, to show that the use of informal power strengthens an Arab authoritarian regime's durability, while the fall of the Gaddafi-regime can also be used to argue that, in certain circumstances, the use of informal power can lead to the fall of an Arab authoritarian regime. This dual effect of the use of informal power is underrepresented in Schlumberger's framework on the durability of Arab authoritarianism.

Elements of a Political Personality Profile of Muammar Gaddafi can explain to what extent his political behavior was driven by psychological forces. A Political Personality Profile analyses

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appearance, speech, language, intelligence, evaluation of reality and ego defenses. It can provide an insight into which imagery and symbolism Gaddafi wished to project and how his political behavior effected the course of events. Previous instances of Gaddafi’s political behavior will also be included, to show how Gaddafi’s personal actions influenced Libya's interaction with other states. Sources that interacted with Gaddafi will provide the basis for these arguments. This method is a tool to establish the extent of Gaddafi’s personal influence in dealing with the unrest, which is an element of the use of informal power.

This thesis uses both primary and secondary sources. These include the works of scholars and eyewitness accounts. Furthermore, this thesis uses televised news reports and amateur footage. These are used to provide a description of events so they can be placed in Schlumberger's framework.

2. Theoretical Framework

This thesis will combine both realist and constructivist perspectives of international relations in providing an explanation for which motives lay behind the military intervention in Libya. Some scholars, among them Marsh, state that the military intervention is best explained from a realist perspective, whereby the involved states intervened to further and protect their interests. Other scholars, such as Davidson, stress the importance of combining realism, constructivism and liberalism, to explain the military intervention. It integrates the role of international norms, threats to national interests, prestige, and the minimization of electoral risk, as factors that led to the

12 Post, “Political Personality Profiling”, 138.

This thesis does not set out to define the most adequate model for the analysis of the NATO-led intervention. Rather, the focus of this thesis is on the Libyan regime's response to the civil unrest, which caused the international community to intervene. Both perspectives can be complementary to each other, as they can be used to assess whether Gaddafi's use of informal power effected the durability of Libya's authoritarian regime.

3. Conceptual Framework

Oliver Schlumberger's *Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes* provides four dimensions that are relevant in understanding Arab authoritarianism. The first dimension, state-society relations and political opposition, is laid out by Heydemann. This covers the national-populist social pacts that have structured state-society relations in the Middle East and account for the durability of Arab authoritarian regimes, as opposed to its coercive capacity. Heydemann argues that the durability of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes is determined by the adaptability and flexibility of national-populist social pacts.15

The second dimension relates to the features of the political regimes themselves. It concerns the political architecture, the constellation of forces within regimes and their specific strategies of power maintenance.16 It also covers the repressive capacities, the degrees of non-democratic legitimacy through symbol politics, patronage systems and control of the rules of the political and


16 Schlumberger, “Arab Authoritarianism,” 11.
economic games. According to Schlumberger, sources of nondemocratic legitimacy are religion, ideology, and the extent to which material welfare is perceived by the population. Sluglett describes the weakness of Arab authoritarian states, how they maintained power, and what role the make-up of society played in this. It relates to an absence of a middle class that engages in politics to enhance their interests and a general lack of political participation. It further lays out the role of democratic rituals for legitimizing the authoritarian regime, citing that the Soviet Union and Saddam's Iraq used democratic rituals to legitimize the rule of these regimes. Lawson focuses on the regime's key actors, namely private property holders, state officials and the military. The degree to which an economy is institutionalized, and the extent of the corporate autonomy of the armed forces, influences the dynamics of political reform and authoritarian rule. An important concept in the Libyan context of this dimension is informal power. Paoletti argues that the Libyan state consisted of four power structures, namely, the formal state structure, and the informal power structures of Gaddafi and his family, the inner circle of the regime and tribal allegiances.

The coercive power of states is an important factor, which has to be included in this framework. Eva Bellin's contribution to Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance describes the coercive capacity of Middle Eastern states and which factors contribute to the degree of coercive power. These are: revenues of natural resources, persistent support of

17 Ibidem.
international patrons, the patrimonial character of state institutions and the limited degree of popular mobilization for democratic reform. Heydemann's later work on the coercive power of Syria's authoritarian regime in dealing with its civil unrest, provides an insight into the durability of the Libyan regime during the Arab Spring. According to Heydemann, the Syrian regime's durability hinged on its ability to restructure its security forces and adapt its security tactics, in order to deal with large-scale civil unrest and the ensuing armed insurrection.

The third dimension covers the economic context of Arab authoritarianism. Droz-Vincent analyzes the role of the military in Middle Eastern economies and how this strengthens the ruling regimes. The durability of an Arab authoritarian regime depends on the manner in which the army is autonomous from the regime in its economic activity, its internal management, and the extent to which the army exerts influence on the political system.

The fourth dimension of this conceptual framework relates to Arab authoritarianism in the context of the international community. Sayyid explains how certain factors, especially the lack of commitment to democracy-promotion by G8 members, created an overall international political environment that is fundamentally inhospitable to political change in the Middle East. The international dimension that relates to the coercive capacities of Middle Eastern states is described by Brownlee. According to him, Middle Eastern regimes have been able to use force without being restrained by foreign pressure to respect human rights or enable democratization.

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The case of Libya will be set against Schlumberger's framework with, among others, Kawczynski, Lacher, Meredith, Taylor and Vandewalle, providing the Libyan context. Firstly, the pre-Arab Spring Libyan system of governance shall be analyzed through Schlumberger's framework. This shall provide an insight into what extent the Libyan regime's durability can be accounted for through this framework. The coercive power of the regime shall be analyzed through Bellin and Heydemann their work on the forms of resistance and government responses. Secondly, this thesis shall analyze the shifts that occurred in Schlumberger's four dimensions in Libya during the Arab Spring. Thirdly, an argument shall be made to what extent the use of informal power secured a near-total military victory over rebel forces. Lastly, an analysis shall be provided of the extent to which the arguments that legitimized the NATO-led military intervention were based on this use of informal power by the Gaddafi-regime.

4. Libyan State-Society Relations and Political Opposition

The interaction between the state and the people and between the state and political opposition, determine the formal and informal arrangements that exist between these parties, as well as the organization of the political system, according to Heydemann.28 Heydemann argues that the adaptability and flexibility of national-populist social pacts, consisting of formal and informal modes of governance, determines the durability of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes.29 In Heydemann's model, formal institutions provide the means to manage mass politics, but also constrain the regime to a certain extent to a formal set of rules, while this model also consolidates informal governance.30 Heydemann goes further by describing the challenges to the national-

30 Ibid., 27.
populist social pacts, namely that the level of political participation broadens, or that so many people choose to work through informal rules outside of the state's control, that the authoritarian regime becomes marginalized.\textsuperscript{31}

The Libyan political system had no institutionalized political parties or political opposition. Gaddafi's \textit{Green Book} specifies that parliaments in modern traditional democracies are undemocratic, that political parties are dictatorial instruments of power and that political oppositions have a negative impact on societies due to them undermining the ruling government.\textsuperscript{32}

The absence of institutionalized political opposition parties meant that Libya had no institutionalized space for political contestation. To this end, an analysis of the features of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Schlumberger's second dimension, shall provide an insight into the relation between formal and informal arrangements, structures of resource allocation, legitimacy and governance, and political and social organization of society.

5. Features of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The features of the political regimes concern the political architecture, the constellation of forces within regimes and their strategies of maintaining power.\textsuperscript{33} It also covers the repressive capacities, the degrees of nondemocratic legitimacy through symbol politics, patrimonial networks, and control of the rules of the political and economic games.\textsuperscript{34} An analysis of these elements can provide an explanation for the durability of Gaddafi's system of governance through the relation

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 37.

\textsuperscript{32} Gathafi \textit{The Green Book}, 6-9.

\textsuperscript{33} Schlumberger, “Arab Authoritarianism,” 11.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
between formal and informal power arrangements.

After the bloodless coup of 1969, the new constitution formalized the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), consisting of military officers and headed by Gaddafi, as Libya's highest political authority. The RCC appointed the Council of Minister, and the RCC-members directly ran every ministry, apart from the Ministry of Oil. In 1971, Gaddafi's speech in Zawiya laid out a vision of 'popular rule', whereby local, provincial and national assemblies took place in order to reduce the power of traditional identities and institutions, while banning all political activity outside this framework. Fifteen of the seventeen ministries were turned over to civilians, diminishing the political power and ability to set up patronage networks of RCC-members, apart from Gaddafi.

Sluglett states that an absence of a middle class that engages in politics to enhance their interests, and a general lack of political participation are important factors in the durability of Arab authoritarianism. The new Libyan system supposedly enhanced the political participation of the population. However, Gaddafi's revolutionary experiment was abandoned by a lack of participation. This may seem to constitute a failure, but it was the beginning of a division between the formal and informal political power structures.

Gaddafi's speech in Zuwara in April 1973 launched the Popular Revolution. This upheaval in the political system entailed the removal of existing political, legal and administrative structures, the removal of bureaucrats deemed hostile towards revolutionary change, the purge of former elites

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 82.
38 Ibid., 83.
40 Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 82.
41 Ibid., 84.
42 Ibid., 83.
in the media, government and universities, while popular committees were established in all public and community organizations.\textsuperscript{43}

The first installment of the \textit{Green Book} was published in 1975.\textsuperscript{44} It laid the economic and political organization of society.\textsuperscript{45} The system of governance it contained, was that local congresses chose district-level working committees, that together formed the General People's Congress, the highest formal institutional power.\textsuperscript{46} The \textit{Green Book} replaced Sharia law, while unions, sport clubs and professional associations and other forms of organizations were banned.\textsuperscript{47} Any existing structure or grassroots organization outside the official framework was removed from society. Gaddafi stated that it was a system that promised bottom-up power to the people, but in reality, it cemented Gaddafi's top-down domination over every aspect of political life in Libya.\textsuperscript{48} Ronald st John describes how the ideology of the \textit{Green Book} was vague and depended on how the 'Brotherly Leader' explained it, which differed from place and time, which is an indication of Gaddafi's personal influence over the political process.\textsuperscript{49} Control over the budget, police, army, foreign policy and oil sector was placed outside the formal power structure of the General People's Congress.\textsuperscript{50}

Sluglett stresses the importance of democratic rituals for legitimizing the authoritarian regime.\textsuperscript{51} In theory, the General People's Congress was an elected legislative body. The Libyan system supposedly was the most democratic form of governance, as it removed all barriers between

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} Daniel Kawczynski, \textit{Seeking Gaddafi: Libya, the West and the 'Arab spring} (London: Biteback Publishing, 2011), 22-23.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Kawczynski, \textit{Seeking Gaddafi}, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Vandewalle, \textit{A history of modern Libya}, 104; Kawczynski, \textit{Seeking Gaddafi}, 27.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Sluglett, “The Ozymandias Syndrome,” 102.
\end{itemize}
the population and the state.\textsuperscript{52} Lawson focuses on the key actors of the regime, namely private property holders, state officials and the military. The degree to which an economy is institutionalized and the extent of the corporate autonomy of the armed forces, influences the dynamics of political reform and authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{53} The implementation of the directives of the \textit{Green Book} saw the private sector disappear, with all revenues of oil exports set outside the control of the General People's Congress, this way greatly increased the regime's ability to set up patronage networks.\textsuperscript{54} The corporate autonomy of the armed forces was non-existent, as control of all resource revenues and security forces lay within the informal power structure.

This system where the interaction between formal and informal power structures strengthened the authoritarian regime, was solidified in 1977 with the establishment of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.\textsuperscript{55} In 1979, Gaddafi resigned from the General People's Congress, enabling him to sit above the formal power structure by separating formal and revolutionary authority, and to blame the formal power structure for any failure.\textsuperscript{56} According to Vandewalle, Gaddafi removed himself from the formal power structure, but still made all important decisions and retained all power within a small elite.\textsuperscript{57} The RCC-members all came from less prestigious tribes.\textsuperscript{58} Since an unsuccessful coup of 1975, the amount of Gaddafi's tribemen in security and army positions increased.\textsuperscript{59} In this way, tribal loyalties were instrumental in maintaining Gaddafi's system

\textsuperscript{52} Gadhafi, \textit{The Green Book}, 16.
\textsuperscript{53} Lawson, “Intraregime Dynamics,” 116.
\textsuperscript{54} Vandewalle, \textit{A history of modern Libya}, 104-107.
\textsuperscript{55} Kawczynski, \textit{Seeking Gaddafi}, 27.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, 31.
\textsuperscript{57} Vandewalle, \textit{A history of modern Libya}, 121.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 100.
In his forty-two year rule, Gaddafi sought to legitimize his position as 'Guide of the Revolution'. Schlumberger states that religion, ideology and material welfare are sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. Gaddafi possessed no religious authority, nor was his tribal background rooted in the traditional power structures. Apart from ideology, namely the Green Book's definition of democratic participation, the separation of formal and informal power structures granted Gaddafi various forms of nondemocratic legitimacy. Control of Libya's oil-revenues lay outside the formal power structure. With Gaddafi as Libya's central patron, Brownlee asserts that the people had no incentive for collective action against the regime, as long as the oil-revenues were distributed among the population, which constitutes nondemocratic legitimacy through material welfare. The economy being placed outside of the formal state structure, excluded alternative forms of economic patronage networks. These revenues furthermore contribute to the degree of coercive power of Arab authoritarian regimes, according to Eva Bellin. With control of these revenues placed outside the formal state structure of the General People's Congress, Gaddafi had firmly rooted the coercive power in the informal power structure. Other factors that relate to the coercive power of the state are: the persistent support of international patrons, the patrimonial character of state institutions and the limited degree of popular mobilization for democratic reform. In all these aspects, Gaddafi's system of governance maintained control of the coercive power of the state in the informal power structure. Libya's formal state institutions were of no threat to the informal power structure, as the oil-revenues and security services were controlled outside the formal power structure of the General People's Congress. The absence of legal political opposition parties and virtually every other form of grassroots organizations, meant that the degree of popular mobilization was limited and of little

60 Schlumberger, “Opening Old Bottles” 237-238.
61 Vandewalle, A history of modern Libya, 78.
62 Brownlee, “Political Crisis,” 56.
63 Bellin “Coercive Institutions.” 21.
64 Ibid.
threat to the regime.

6. The Libyan Military and the Economy

Droz-Vincent describes the role of the military in Middle Eastern economies and how this strengthens the authoritarian regimes. The autonomy of the army in its economic activities, in its internal management, and the extent to which the army exerts influence on the political system, determine the durability of Arab authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{65} The military becomes the backbone of Arab authoritarian regimes, due to its monopoly on the use of force, and its economic and social functions, as a result from it being allocated a large portion of the state budget and the expansion of the military into the civilian economic sector.\textsuperscript{66} The link with the durability of Arab authoritarian regimes lies in the officer corps becoming part of the elite and exerting control over defense budgets, combined with the rank-and-file achieving financial security and enjoying privileges.\textsuperscript{67} In this way, the armed forces have little to gain from regime-change or a process of democratization that would alter the economic activities and societal position of the military.

The argument of the armed forces of the backbone of Gaddafi’s regime is undermined by the notion that Gaddafi, according to Salama, kept the regular military forces weak so they could not topple him.\textsuperscript{68} Gurdon and Schuler confirm the idea that Gaddafi deliberately kept the regular armed forces weak, while militias and units commanded by direct relatives were relatively strong to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors,” 199-203.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid, 203-204.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Viviana Salama, “Qaddafi Military Spending Below Sweden, leaves Authority Gap,” \textit{Bloomberg}. March 2, 2011
\end{itemize}

counteract the potential threat of the military.\textsuperscript{69} Also, the Libyan regular forces were organized in smaller units than in other Arab states, had less officers, little training and deliberately did not have an effective organizational structure.\textsuperscript{70} Droz-Vincent cites the economic activities of the military and its access to oil-revenues as elements that strengthen the durability of Arab authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{71} According to Taylor, this was not the case in Libya, where the regular armed forces had little influence over the defense budget nor a strong economic position.\textsuperscript{72} The great amount of military spending by Libya seems incompatible with this. However, buying large quantities of military hardware can act as a deterrent against foreign powers, while inadequate distribution of military equipment among regular armed forces and insufficient training, maintains the regular military as a weak institution, and diminishes its threat to the regime. Some estimates state that the Libyan military only had around a quarter of the personnel available needed to operate the military hardware it possessed.\textsuperscript{73} The poor performance of Libyan regular armed forces in its engagements with Israel (1973), Egypt (1977), Chad (1978-1987), Tanzania (1978-1979) and the United States (1981, 1986 and 1989) confirms the characterization of the Libyan regular armed forces as a weak fighting force.\textsuperscript{74}

In the Libyan case, the regular armed forces played an insignificant role in the economic arena. Rather, the organization of the security forces outside the formal state structure, and tribal allegiances were the pillars on which the durability of the Libyan authoritarian regime depended.


\textsuperscript{71} Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors,” 199.

\textsuperscript{72} Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 162.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid. 168.

\textsuperscript{74} Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 86; Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 168.
7. Libya’s International Relations

Libya's international relations underwent many changes during Gaddafi's 42-year rule. As the Revolutionary Command Council took power Kawczynski and Vandewalle claim that the RCC's ideology, namely the pan-Arab nationalist agenda and the regime's anti-Western stance, were sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. The pan-Arab nationalist agenda manifested itself in proposed unions with Tunisia in 1974, Algeria in 1975, Syria in 1980 and Morocco in 1984, which all constituted varying degrees of failure. Gaddafi's personal influence on the Libyan system of governance, in combination with his erratic behavior, resulted in contradictory policies that diminished the chances of success of any collaboration with other nation-states. In 1973, Gaddafi called upon the Egyptian people to implement a Libyan-style revolution, as the proposed unification process stalled. Later that year, Israel had shot down a Libyan passenger plane that had strayed into Israeli airspace along the Egyptian border. Gaddafi ordered an Egyptian submarine, that was based in Libya, to attack the Queen Elizabeth II in the Mediterranean on its way to Israel. President Sadat stopped this plan before it was carried out. Relations deteriorated, which culminated in a month-long border war with Egypt in 1977. President Sadat remarked that Gaddafi was one hundred percent sick. President Numeiry of Sudan, who had similar dealings with

77 Ibid., 66.
79 Ibid., *Seeking Gaddafi*, 66.
80 Ibid., 67.
81 Ibid.

During the 1970's and 1980's, Gaddafi provided financial, material and logistical support to non-state actors, among others, Abu Nidal, Carlos the Jackal, the Rote Arme Faktion, the Black Panthers, the Nation of Islam, the Irish Republican Army, Charles Taylor's NPFL, Foday Sankoh's RUF and Polisario.\footnote{Robert Fisk, The great war for civilization: The conquest of the Middle East (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 1089; Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 38; Meredith, “The State of Africa,” 351; Charles M. Waugh, “Charles Taylor and Liberia,” (London/New York: Zed Books, 2011), 115.} Kawczynski defines Gaddafi's support for these groups, which he personally oversaw, as 'random and ill-informed'.\footnote{Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 35.} Libya's actions on the international stage caused it to be placed on the list of state-sponsors of terror by the United States in 1979.\footnote{“Libya (03/09),” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/libya/120759.htm} Apart from this entanglement in foreign conflicts and terrorist networks, some specific instances of terrorism defined Libya's international position for the years to come. In 1986, the La Belle discotheque in West-Berlin, which was frequented by American serviceman, was bombed, with involvement of the Libyan Embassy in East-Berlin.\footnote{Fisk, The great war for civilization, 1090.} President Reagan characterized Gaddafi as 'the mad dog of the Middle East' in a televised speech after the terrorist attack.\footnote{Ronald Reagan calls Colonel Gaddafi Mad Dog, YouTube video, 0:27, posted by “Iconic,” December 10, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dqn9Hwf-H0} The United States responded by bombing Tripoli and Benghazi, targeting Gaddafi's residence, the Bab al-Aziziya complex in an apparent attempt on Gaddafi himself.\footnote{Ibid., 1093.} Another instance of Libyan state-sponsored terrorism was the bombing of a Pan-American Airlines passenger plane in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland.\footnote{Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 105} Gaddafi's rhetoric and foreign policy adventures had already strained relations with the West. Now,

Gaddafi’s unsuccessful attempts to achieve Arab unity diminished Gaddafì’s sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. Economic problems due to sanctions, removed Libya’s oil wealth and material welfare, as a source of legitimacy. In the 1990’s, Gaddafì refrained from supporting anti-Western non-state actors, in a bid to ease economic sanctions and establish ties with the West, although this removed his anti-Western stance as a source of nondemocratic legitimacy. During this time, Gaddafì focused on Libyan relations with African states, and implemented efforts to strengthen the position of Africa as a power-block. Gaddafì did this in order to break Libya free from its isolated position, and to establish himself as a leader in Africa, thereby creating a source of nondemocratic legitimacy.\footnote{Ibid.} Gaddafì had not lost his sense of grandiosity. In 1999, he called for the establishment of the United States of Africa at an Extraordinary Session of the Organization of African Unity in Sirte.\footnote{Ibid.} In 2008, he gathered two hundred African kings and traditional leaders to crown him as the ‘King of Kings’, a clear example of trying to create a source of nondemocratic legitimacy.\footnote{Ibid., 681.} Libya improved relations with the West by extraditing two suspects of the Lockerbie-bombing in 1999, and accepting responsibility in 2003.\footnote{Kawczynski, Seeking Gaddafi, 178-179.}

According to Brownlee, an explanation for the durability of Arab authoritarianism is strengthened by the ability of Middle Eastern regimes to use force, without being restrained by foreign pressure to respect human rights or enable democratization.\footnote{Jason Brownlee, “Political Crisis,” 43.} Sayyid argues that the lack of commitment to democracy-promotion by G8 members, has hampered political change in the Middle
East.\footnote{Sayyid, “The International Dimension of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism,” 217.} This may have been the case before the Arab Spring, but it does not account for shifts in the international relations-dimension of Schlumberger's framework during the uprising.


In 2003, Gaddafi made a move to further normalize relations with the West by dismantling Libya's Weapons of Mass Destruction program.\footnote{William Toby, “A Message from Tripoli: How Libya Gave Up its WMD,” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists}. March 12, 2014 http://thebulletin.org/messag-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834} This was however, a choice of necessity. Libya's economy was hit hard by the sanctions that were imposed by the UN Security Council after the Lockerbie incident, combined with a decrease in oil-revenues.\footnote{Youssef M. Sawani, in: Ricardo Laremont ed. \textit{Revolution, Reform and Revolt in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond} (New York: Routledge, 2014), 84} The expensive WMD program was not expected to be successful to the point where continuing it would reap more benefits than shutting it down.\footnote{Sharon Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” April 22, 2004. CRS Report for Congress 2.} From this point on, Gaddafi banked on improving relations with the West, and the economic and security-related benefits this brought with it to maintain his regime.
8. The Uprising Begins.

Few foresaw that the death of one fruit vendor in Tunisia would set off a chain reaction throughout the Middle East, shaking the foundations of the ruling authoritarian regimes. Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire on the 17th of December 2010, after he was mistreated by the authorities.\textsuperscript{102} The tale of corruption, injustice and abuse of power reverberated around the Arab world.

In Tunisia, president Ben Ali stepped down from power and fled to Saudi Arabia on the 14th of January.\textsuperscript{103} The day after, Muammar Gaddafi gave a televised statement in which he denounced the overthrow of the Ben Ali.\textsuperscript{104} Gaddafi blamed foreign involvement as being the source of the unrest, and he legitimized his own rule by using rhetoric from his \textit{Green Book}. The Wikileaks disclosures on the Tunisian regime's corruption were branded as a foreign plot to create chaos, and Gaddafi legitimized his own rule by urging Tunisia to implement Libya's system of governance, claiming that the Great Libyan Arab Socialist Peoples Jamahiriya possessed the most democratic form of governance.\textsuperscript{105}

Human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil arrested in Benghazi on the 15th of February, after which a few hundred protesters demanded his release.\textsuperscript{106} The next day, thousands more were on the streets of Benghazi chanting for the downfall of the regime.\textsuperscript{107} The regime responded by releasing Terbil and

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\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.


several jailed Islamists, while blaming the West for the unrest. On the 16th, the Gaddafi regime employed its coercive power by using force against the protesters. Footage, supposedly shot in Benghazi, shows regular police forces on the streets with pro-Gaddafi demonstrators carrying sticks and wearing yellow construction hats. This is not just the use of security forces, control of which rests outside the formal state structure, yet still are part of official institutions. The use of armed loyalist counter-protesters constitutes the use of informal power, through the mobilization of regime-supporters in an unofficial capacity. According to Taylor, Gaddafi had already flown in mercenaries from neighboring African states to counter potential instability within the armed forces.

The 'Day of Rage' on the 17th of February, that was called for on social media, saw violence flare up across Libya. Tens of thousands of protesters flooded the streets in Benghazi, Derna and Al-Bayda in the east, and Zintan, in the West. In Al-Bayda, protests turned into violence. In the eastern city of Derna, protesters threw rocks at police forces, who responded with gunfire. These developments constitute a major shift in state-society relations, the first dimension of Schlumberger's framework. Crowds besieged Benghazi's main military barracks, where soldiers opened fire. Videos allegedly shot on this day, show groups of 'yellow hat mercenaries,' wearing green scarfs to identify themselves as Gaddafi-loyalists, engaged in running battles with


110 Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 150.

111 Ibid., 148.


protesters.114 Youths were not the only ones to stand up against the regime. Lawyers and judges demanded the formation of a new constitution.115 Although the security forces and financial resources were controlled outside of the formal state structure, the fact that the Gaddafi-regime was having problems within its formal state structure was a worrying sign.

Gaddafi had sent the Minister of the Interior General Abdel Fatah Younis Al-Obeidi to Benghazi with a contingent of special forces to relieve the embattled garrison. Instead of doing this, Younis gave the remaining loyalists the chance to flee the city, and by the 20th of February, Benghazi's military garrison had either fled or sided with the protesters.116 In Misrata protesters controlled the streets, Libya's third-largest city, situated between Tripoli and Gaddafi's hometown and stronghold Sirte.117 In Tripoli itself, protesters marched on Tripoli's Green Square and attacked government buildings.118 On the 22nd, General Abdel Fatah Younis Al-Obeidi gave a televised statement, in which he resigned from his position and declared his allegiance to the revolutionaries.119 Not only was he a prominent member of Libya's security apparatus, nor just a leading regime figure in the informal state structure, but he was also a founding member of the Revolutionary Command Council. This shows that Gaddafi's coalition management, essential for the functioning of the informal state structure, was failing, as prominent regime figures, diplomats and military personnel defected.

One of Gaddafi's sons, Saif al-Islam, who did not hold a position in the formal state structure, gave a televised statement in which he blamed foreign powers on the unrest, as well as

114 Yellow Hats, YouTube video, 0:21, posted by “freeeelibyan,” June 11, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQBfIK_5yHM


117 Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 150.

118 Ibid.

mistakes made by the army and police. He stated that continued protests would lead to chaos and war. On the 21st, Gaddafi dispelled rumors that he had fled to Venezuela, in a televised clip of 22 seconds. The footage showed that it was shot in the Bab al-Aziziya complex in Tripoli. With the state falling apart, and the informal power structure cracking, it could have been of critical importance to show loyalist forces that Gaddafi had not fled. The next day, Gaddafi gave a one-and-a-half hour televised speech from the same place, with the sculpture of a golden fist clenching an American fighter jet featuring prominently in view of the camera. Labeled by commentators as bizarre, this speech contained an important message. Gaddafi ended the speech with words that would be repeated around the world. Gaddafi blamed foreign powers, such as Qatar, for the unrest and stated that he would lead a march that would purify Libya 'inch by inch, house by house, street by street, person by person'. The last words were: 'It's the time to work, its time to march, its time to triumph, no going back, to the front'. This message is not as bizarre as commentators made it out to be. Just days into the unrest, Gaddafi draws a clear line that his regime will do anything to regain control, and that retreat is not an option.

Gaddafi addressed a crowd of supporters at Tripoli's Green Square on the 25th of February. In this speech, he spoke of arming the population and that Libya would burn. Gaddafi's use of informal power provided the means to strike back. Taylor describes how Gaddafi and his inner

121 Ibid.
122 Gaddafi Speaks from His Car 21/02/12, YouTube video, 0:28, posted by “sheriny83,” February 21, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rN0AqeMedWc
125 Ibid.
circle assessed the defections and forces opposed to their regime, and set out to consolidate what forces they could muster, convening tribal meetings and mobilizing loyalist forces in Tripoli and Sirte.\(^{127}\) Lacher describes that the weakness of the state institutions were to blame for their rapid disintegration, but also that these institutions fell apart along tribal lines, with some siding with the revolution.\(^{128}\) Al Jazeera broadcast recordings of phone calls between top Libyan regime figures that showed this process of coalition management. In the recordings, Gaddafi himself, Saif al-Islam, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi and others discussed the necessity of maintaining the allegiance of certain tribes, which tribes remained loyal, which tribes the regime needed to regain full control, as well as the importance of Gaddafi’s sons Khamis and Mutassim as military commanders.\(^{129}\) With the formal state structure fractured, the regime fell back on patrimonial networks, which was possible due to control over the budget and security forces being placed in the informal power structure.

A ragtag rebel force from Benghazi advanced westward from along the populated coast. Disorganized and chaotic, the performance of this improvised army showed no signs of being skilled in the art of warfare.\(^{130}\) Any rebel advance turned into a headlong retreat when missiles, artillery or air force jets struck near their position.\(^{131}\) In addition to Al-Bayda, Derna, Tobruk and Benghazi, the sheer size of the rebel army and the dismal state of loyalist forces led to the rebels

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127 Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 150.


132 Ibid.
advance through Ajdabiya, Brega, Ras Lanuf and Bin Jawad. The next town on this route was Gaddafi’s hometown and support base of Sirte. In western Libya, protesters and defectors had seized control of Misrata, situated between Sirte and Tripoli. According to Brahimi, Libya’s division between formal and informal power structures, and the tribal relations that were part of the informal power structure, was responsible for the loss of control in such a short period of time, but that this system also provided Gaddafi with the opportunity to use coercive power from through informal power structures.

After securing Tripoli by force, Gaddafi counter-attacked. The Gaddafi-regime employed assets that were still at their disposal, such as Libya’s air force, remnants of the regular armed forces, and the elite 32nd Reinforced Brigade, led by Gaddafi’s son Khamis, and supplemented by mercenaries and irregular forces. The 32nd Reinforced Brigade attacked Zawiya, on the 2nd of March. At the same time, loyalist forces attacked Misrata, and the eastern towns of Ras Lanuf and Brega. The disorganized rebels did not stand a chance against the heavy weaponry used by Gaddafi’s forces. After a string of victories, Gaddafi-forces advanced with tanks into the city centers of Misrata and Benghazi on the 16th of March. This use of coercive power was possible due to the absence of restraint for the regime by state institutions, a result of the division between formal and informal power structures. According to Lacher, only the security forces centered around Gaddafi


137 Taylor “Arab Uprisings,” 154.

This turnaround of events shows the regime's adaptiveness to shifts in the first, second and third dimensions of Schlumberger's framework, namely, state-society relations, the features of the political regimes and the military. Heydemann's assertion that the durability of Arab authoritarian regime rests with the extent to which the regime can adapt to shifts in the national-populist social pacts, shows that Libya's absence of institutionalized political opposition and the non-existence of other forms of grassroots organization, resulted in the regime proving adaptable to the crisis, because of the division between informal and formal power structures in Libya's system of governance. Sluglett's emphasis on democratic rituals became irrelevant, as protesters demanded the downfall of the regime. Lawson's assertion on the corporate autonomy of the armed forces, also became irrelevant in assessing the durability of Gaddafi's regime. As stated by Droz-Vincent, the lack of commitment of the regular armed forces to the regime can be explained through their absence in the economy. However, in Libya's system, the army was so weak that the regime could not effectively employ it, or count on its loyalty, but at the same time, the regular armed forces were not strong enough to defeat the regime. Although shifts in these dimensions played a role in the country falling apart, this constellation of forces made it that the regime was able to use coercive power to regain control, because this coercive power was rooted in the informal power structure. Libya's system of governance, with its division between formal and informal power, with the revenues of natural resources and control over the security forces vested in the informal power structure, made it that the formal power structure was not in a position to threaten the system of governance, or constrain the use of coercive power by the informal power structure. In addition to

139 Lacher, “Families, Tribes and Cities During the Libyan Revolution,” 140.
142 Lawson, “Intraregime Dynamics,” 110.
143 Droz-Vincent, “From Political to Economic Actors,” 203.
this, according to Heydemann, a regime's durability hinges on its ability to restructure its security forces and adapt its security tactics, in order to deal with large-scale civil unrest and the ensuing armed insurrection.\textsuperscript{144} Control of these revenues, as well as the patrimonial character of state institutions, are what Bellin describes as crucial elements for the state to retain its capacity for coercive power.\textsuperscript{145} Gaddafi's regime was able to fall back on an inner circle, and restructured the security forces to use coercive power against the threat it faced.

The international community condemned Gaddafi's use of force. The Arab League had suspended Libya from its meetings on the 23\textsuperscript{rd} of February.\textsuperscript{146} On the 27\textsuperscript{th}, President Obama called for Gaddafi to step down and leave Libya, stating that Gaddafi had lost the legitimacy to rule Libya.\textsuperscript{147} This refers to the level of coercive power the regime employed from within the informal power structure. Just as the protests and violence spiraled out of control, so did Libya's position in the international community. The fourth dimension of Schlumberger's framework shifted, as opposed to Sayyid's and Brownlee's assumptions that the international community lacked the commitment to promote democracy or restrain coercive power.\textsuperscript{148} In addition to many states condemning Gaddafi's use of force, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on Libya that included an arms embargo and freezing Libyan assets.\textsuperscript{149} As Gaddafi loyalists were close to victory in Misrata and Benghazi, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on the 17\textsuperscript{th} of March.\textsuperscript{150} This Resolution imposed a no-fly zone

\textsuperscript{144} Heydemann “Syria's Adaptive Authoritarianism,”

\textsuperscript{145} Eva Bellin “Coercive Institutions.” 21.


\textsuperscript{148} Sayyid, “The International Dimension of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism ,” 43.


over Libya and allowed for any necessary measure to protect civilians. Pro-Gaddafi forces were bombed in Benghazi and Misrata, the road leading to Benghazi was littered with bombed military hardware.151 Governmental and military infrastructure was targeted. Libya's air force, air-defense capabilities and naval forces were destroyed.152

Marsh states that the reasoning for the military intervention in Libya is best explained from a realist perspective. The Obama-administration determined that the unrest in Libya threatened the interests of the United States. A conflict in Libya, and continuing instability due to the regime's response could destabilize the Middle East and harm the economic and security interests of the United States and certain European states.153 Other explanations from a realist perspective could include a fear of Gaddafi returning to anti-Western policies, as he had proved capable of adapting his claims to sources of nondemocratic legitimacy through shifts in his domestic and foreign policies, and of the regime's durability, despite having been isolated in the international community in the past. In response to international pressure, Gaddafi blamed Al-Qaeda for the uprising and portrayed the image of Libya as a democracy, wherein he himself did not have an official position, and thus could not resign.154 Through this, Gaddafi tried to construct an image of the conflict where, through a realist perspective, the crackdown was necessary to maintain stability in Libya and to combat Al-Qaeda. When including constructivism and liberalism, as Davidson does, it adds to the realist perspective that the intervening states responded to Gaddafi’s crackdown by invoking collectively held humanitarian norms, threats to national interests, prestige, and the minimization of


electoral risk, as the factors that led to the intervention. A diplomat who was present during the negotiations remarked that the states pushing for Resolution 1973, stated that an intervention was deemed necessary to prevent a bloodbath in Benghazi. The actions of the Libyan regime were constructed as having diminished the legitimacy of the Gaddafi-regime to rule Libya through the violation of collectively held norms. Whether from a realist or constructivist perspective, the adaptive capacity of the regime to counter the uprising were initially successful, but this adaptability, and the tactics employed, resulted in the international community to intervene.

The NATO-air campaign and support for the rebels spelled the death sentence of the Gaddafi-regime. The 'Guide of the Revolution' eventually made a desperate last stand in his hometown of Sirte. Surrounded from all sides, NATO-forces bombed his convoy while trying to flee the city. The dictator, who had taken on superpowers, was dragged from a drainage pipe, mobbed and lynched.

12. Conclusion

The Libyan case shows the importance of informal power structures in times of crisis for the durability of an authoritarian regime. Gaddafi had ruled Libya for 42 years when the Arab Spring erupted. Within days after the protests started, Libya experienced a collapse of the regular armed forces, disintegration of formal state institutions, defections of regime-insiders, and condemnation

157 Borghard and Pischedda. “Allies and Airpower in Libya,” 64.
159 Ibid.
by the international community. Gaddafi adapted to the situation and rallied his forces.

The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constituted a system of governance that was unique in its kind. The regime’s system of governance Gaddafi’s domestic and foreign policies provided various sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. During its reign, the regime proved adaptable to changes within Libya, as well as to changes in the international landscape, and proved able to shift its policies to pursue other sources of nondemocratic legitimacy. The formal political system, based on Gaddafi’s *Green Book*, and the informal power structure that Gaddafi created, maintained Gaddafi’s regime during his 42-year rule. The features of this political system, the role of the armed forces and formal institutions, the absence of institutionalized political opposition and grassroots organizations, all contributed to the longevity of Gaddafi’s rule. The division of formal and informal power, placed the economy and the security services within the informal power structure. This constellation of forces rooted the monopoly on maintaining patrimonial networks, and the coercive power of the state, within the informal power structure. The regime was able to fall back on these patrimonial networks and Gaddafi’s immediate family to quell the unrest, whereby the formal power structure was marginalized. This use of informal power nearly secured a victory over insurrectionist forces.

Gaddafi’s regime proved adaptable to shifts in the dimensions of Schlumberger’s framework during the initial phase of the uprising. The case that this thesis has made, is that this adaptability, through the use of informal power structures, made it possible for the regime to almost regain control during the uprising, but also led to a military intervention from which the regime could not recover. This duality of informal power was underrepresented in Schlumberger’s framework.
Bibliography.


