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**Author:** Dalen, Dorrit van  
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At this point we can take up the question to be answered in the next three chapters, namely, how al-Wālī fashioned himself as a scholar and made his work significant for his environment. As a first step, this chapter will present an analysis of the most important pillar of his reputation, *The peerless method for understanding the science of theology* (*Al-manhaj al-farīd fi ma’rifat ‘ilm al-tawḥīd*). This text has been highly regarded in more quarters than any of the other texts that bear his name, both in his own time and later. Thirty-two copies of it are still extant. Most of them are kept in libraries in Nigeria, while some are in Niger, Ghana, and Mali. A number of copies that were collected in Segou are now in Paris.292 The fact that *The peerless method* (and al-Wālī’s own versified abridgement, *Sweet water source of the inmost attributes of the Lord*) has been passed on and preserved so often demonstrates that it has answered the needs of audiences that have discussed, appraised, and cited it.

The origin of the text—of which al-Wālī was not the sole author—is complex, and this makes it a rich source of information. In the first place, it is a text that is situated in the heart of the field of Ash’arī theology, or more specifically *tawḥīd*, the science of God’s oneness.

Secondly, *The peerless method* is a commentary on a canonical text, the ‘*Aqīda al-ṣughra* or ‘small creed’, (hereinafter ‘the *Ṣughra*’), by the North African theologian al-Sanūsī. Composing a commentary is a specific way of translating and passing on selected knowledge from one environment to another. In general, commenting concerns knowledge with authority, which is deemed important as a point of reference in the social or intellectual life of the commentator. It is about the explanation and interpretation of canonical texts (or music or painting) in terms of the specific culture of a different time, place, ethnic background or class; about linking canon to cultural identity. As such, commentaries say as much about the culture of the interpreters as about the interpreted text. In an exceptional essay on the genre of commentary writing, A. Hughes argues that, while negotiating between two worlds, interpretations of canonical religious texts present an authoritative view of the basic values of the community for which they are written; they are intended to be normative for a new community which they provide with their own code and legitimacy. In the relation between canonical text and commentary, the former facilitates the latter. ‘Commentary may think with the text it interprets; it is almost never about it.’293 The aim, then, of this chapter is to uncover what *The peerless method* really is about, and how it links canon to the cultural and political environment of central sudanic Africa in the seventeenth century. It will allow us, in chapter 7, to discuss al-Wālī’s relation as an author to this message of *The peerless method*.

Thirdly, this commentary stems from a Fulfülde oral tradition of teaching Islam, which was based on al-Sanūsī’s *Ṣughra* and had existed since the sixteenth century, and which al-Wālī claims to have only translated. In the nineteenth century this tradition was known as the *kabbe*, a name which, for convenience, will also be used here, although it is certain neither whether the term was used in the seventeenth century, nor to what extent today’s *kabbe* versions correspond with the earliest forms. The composers of predecessors of *The peerless method* are anonymous, but the reader must be warned that I will often speak in the plural of the authors of *The peerless method*.

The method in this chapter is twofold. First it will analyse the relation between *The peerless method* and the traditions on which it is based. It will then explore the meaning and intention of the resulting

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292 ALA II, 35, 36.
text. A close comparison of *The peerless method* with the *Ṣughra* on the one hand and with what we know of the *kabbe* tradition on the other, will reveal the choices that were made, and the ideas that were either adopted or left out. The adaptations will uncover motivations that were relevant to the cultural, social and historical environment of seventeenth-century central sudanic Africa.

For the present study, I used copies of four manuscripts. I closely studied manuscript Hunwick 178 (kept at NU) and another that is kept in the library at the University of Ibadan in Nigeria, catalogue number 48. I later compared these with two manuscripts from the Segou collection in Paris, numbers 5650 and 5541. Mistakes that were made in copying both Hunwick 178 and the Ibadan manuscript suggest a direct relation between these two. In both versions the number of mistakes (not always the same ones) increases towards the end. Both copyists seemed to become less and less captivated by the text as it became more repetitive. Although Hunwick 178 has more mistakes than Ibadan 48, my references are to the former, because this copy is more easily available, and its handwriting is in general clear. The manuscript is not an original but a photocopy. References are to numbers I gave the photocopied pages, starting with 1 where the text starts with the *basmallah*, and ending with 57.

1. Roots: al-Sanūsī’s *Ṣughra*

In al-Walī’s lifetime al-Sanūsī’s *Al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra* had been a canonical text in North and West Africa for quite a while: very soon after it was written, the West African Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Hawdī (d.1505) produced a versification, copies of which are now in libraries in Boutilimit, Segou and Timbuktu. A few decades later, one of the most respected scholars of Timbuktu, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd b. ʿAbd b. Abī Bakr b. Baghayogo al-Wangari (1523—1594), made another versification, and dozens of copies of the *Ṣughra* itself were found in almost all of the West African collections. In the nineteenth century, commentaries and versifications were also made in other languages, such as Hausa, and numerous commentaries written in the Mashriq.

Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī was born in 1428 near Tlemcen, a town in the mountains in today’s Algeria, which had been one of the main cultural centres of the Maghrib since many centuries. He died there in 1486. He wrote about law, algebra and medicine, but was most famous, perhaps even during his own life-time and certainly soon afterwards, for his ‘creeds’, the *‘Aqīda al-kubra* (or *‘Aqīdat ahl al-tawḥīd wal-tasādīd al-mukhrīja min zulamāt al-jahl wa-raqbat al-taqīd*), the *‘Aqīda al-wusta* (also called *Al-jumal* or *al-murshida*), and the *‘Aqīda ahl al-tawḥīd al-ṣughra*, which is also called *Al-ṣughra* or *Al-Sanūsīyya* or *Umm al-barāhīn* (‘Source of proofs’). They are all similar in content, treating the same theme of the Ash‘ari doctrine on the attributes of God and of the prophets. The *Ṣughra*, as it is referred to in *The peerless method*, is elementary, while the longer texts, including a separate ‘introduction’ and commentary by al-Sanūsī (*al-muqaddima*), discuss more topics more extensively and polemically, criticising Christian, Mu‘tazili, and other points of view. All these texts have played an essential role in teaching theology in North and West Africa (as well as in Egypt and Asia) up to the twentieth century, but the *Ṣughra* was and is by far the most popular and the

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294 My copy bears two numbers: 82 and 48.
296 For the author see ALA IV, 33. Ms Arabe 5484 (Paris) was consulted.
297 Hall & Stewart 2011, p. 137; See also A. Berbrugger, ‘Abd Allah Teurdjman, renégat de Tunis en 1388.’ In *Revue Africaine* 5 (1861), 262; Hiskett (1975, 68, 69) writes about a poem in Hausa that shows much similarity with the *Ṣughra*. I found two short poems (in Arabic) that resemble the *Ṣughra* or *The peerless method* in Chad, copies of which are kept in the library of Leiden University. For comments from the Mashriq see GAL II, 250.
most highly respected. In *The peerless method* it is presented as a text that al-Sanūsī found on the ‘preserved tablet’ (*al-lawḥ al-mahfūz*) that is believed to contain all books of the Revelation.

Al-Sanūsī’s theological work was that of a scholastic, a master of *kalām*. It deals with God’s ontology from an axiomatic point of view, from where His attributes are deduced. From there the logical implications for the relation between God and man are deduced. Al-Sanūsī’s thought is permeated with the terms and concepts of Aristotelian logic, usually designated by the Arabic term *mantiq*. His ‘proofs’ are indeed *barāhīn* (sg *burḥān*): they follow from a methodical argument within the logical framework. The word is to be distinguished from another type of ‘proof’ (*adilla*, sg *dalīl*), which is the unmistakable sign of something else, the way smoke is the sign of a fire. The *Ṣughra*’s nickname *Umm al-barāhīn* was deserved.

By contrast with the abstract character of this work, as a person al-Sanūsī was remembered as an ascetic, as a pious and humble man, and as a good teacher with special sympathy for the poor and those who lacked formal education, but also as someone who shied away from social interactions, especially whenever the authorities were involved. His lifestyle helped to win him the reputation of a ‘walī ’, a ‘friend of God’. Al-Sanūsī was often held to know things that could not be known by reason, to see truths the eye cannot perceive, and to be blessed with the ability to perform miracles. Moreover, he was said to be descended from al-Hassan, the son of ‘Ali ibn Abī Tālib and grandson of the prophet Muḥammad. *The peerless method* presents him as one of four men in history who possessed three exceptional blessings, being *sharīf*, *walī* and *ālīm* (descending from the Prophet, ‘holy’ and learned).

After his death, people would appeal for his intervention in heaven, for instance to ask God for rain.

Even a short while after his death, al-Sanūsī’s writings were already held in high regard. There once was a man who upon his death appeared before God with al-Sanūsī’s *Ṣughra* in his hand. Because of that book God saved him from hell, so a friend of this man was told, when the dead man appeared to him in a dream. The flip side of the coin was that, according to the author’s biographer, a man who admitted to the angels Nakir and Munkar that he had never read any of al-Sanūsī’s creeds, was immediately beaten by them with iron rods.

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298 E.I.; Hall and Stewart, in Krättli & Lydon 2011, 137. Today in northern Nigeria the text is best known as *Umm al-barāhīn*, and it is taught in secondary schools. In Indonesia it is still in print as *Al-‘aqīda al-sanūsiyya*, in a popular series of booklets called *kutub kuning* or yellow books. I thank dr. N.J. Kapteijn for showing me some copies printed in the 21st century.

299 Hunwick 178, 9.


302 Ibn Maryam 1908, 244, 245. Ibn Maryam says that there are many anecdotes about al-Sanūsī’s miracles and relates two of them. The first is the miracle of the meat that would not cook, which is also told in *The peerless method* and was mentioned in the previous chapter. The second is about a woman who had lost the key to her house. She desperately tried to enter the house, but did not succeed, until she laid her hand on the lock, crying ‘by the glory of my lord Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī!’ Then, when she pulled, ‘the house gave way’. The image of unlocking doors and knowledge again emphasises al-Sanūsī’s educational gift.


304 Brosselard 1861, p. 247.

305 Brosselard 1861, p. 247.

306 Berbrugger 1861, 264.
Al-‘aṣīda al-ṣughra is an excerpt of a work on tawḥīd. It presents the quite abstract main issues of this field of learning without much explanation. The lack of clarification, however, is perhaps compensated for by al-Sanūṣī’s concluding remark that this entire theology is contained in the shahāda, the testimony that there is no other god than God and that Muḥammad is His prophet. Each of the two parts of the shahāda, he wrote, embodies knowledge of the attributes of God and the prophets, which can and should be internalised by repeating the words often, ‘until they mingle with one’s flesh and blood’. One wonders whether the phrase is one of the reasons for the Ṣughra’s great popularity in many parts of Africa and Asia, because it may have been read as a ‘free’ offer of all this philosophical knowledge to each Muslim: even if a believer could not reproduce the logical arguments, this paragraph seems to suggest, still, as long as he remembers the shahāda, he or she is always a vessel and a custodian of such knowledge, and thus a respectable member of the community of Muslims.

Another reason for the Ṣughra’s popularity was undoubtedly its brevity. All over the Islamic world, short texts were more often commented on than longer ones. The entire text of the Ṣughra takes up no more than eight or ten pages in modern print, but it is useful to give an even shorter paraphrase of it, and I do this below. The excerpt is actually based on three editions: J.D. Luciani’s edition, with a translation and a selection from comments by al-Sanūṣī himself and by al-Ḍasqūqī (d. 1815) and al-Bajurī (d. 1861); an edition of al-Sanūṣī’s own Sharḥ umm al-barāḥin, and an edition and translation by M. Wolff with primarily grammatical and philological notes and a translation by M. Wolff. Other sources that help to understand the text are Luciani’s introduction and notes to al-Sanūṣī’s Muqaddima and to al-Laqaqī’s Jawharā.

After the basmallah, al-Sanūṣī immediately comes to the point:

Know that judgement concerns three categories: the necessary, the impossible and the possible. The necessary is that of which non-existence cannot be thought; the impossible is that of which existence is incompatible with reason; the possible is that of which existence as well as non-existence can be thought of. Every adult is held by Law to know what is necessary, impossible and possible concerning God and the prophets.

God has twenty attributes that are necessary to Him, starting with the following six: existence; existence without beginning; eternity (existence without end); being unlike temporal things; existence by itself without the need for anything to define that existence (without mukhayyīs); oneness—that is, not being composed of elements and having no equal. The first of these attributes is essential (naṣfīya), while the other five are negative (they define what He is not).

God has seven necessary attributes that are ‘substantive’ or ‘real’ (ma‘ānī): power and will (which have as object everything that is possible), knowing (which has as object everything that is necessary, possible and impossible), life (which has no object), hearing and vision (which have all that exists as their object) and speech (without word or voice and having the same object as existence without beginning; eternity (existence without end); being unlike temporal things; existence by itself without the need for anything to define that existence (without mukhayyīs); oneness—that is, not being composed of elements and having no equal. The first of these attributes is essential (naṣfīya), while the other five are negative (they define what He is not).

307 Wisnrowsky 2004, 159.
312 Delphin and Luciani translate the term صفات المعاني with ‘idées réelles’. The term ma‘ānī played a role in the philosophical discussion about ‘meaning’ as ‘a form or essence insofar as it is apprehended by any cognitive faculty [senses or intellect] and serves as an object for that faculty’. Modern philosophers speak of ‘intentionality’. This notion of ‘intentionality’ built on Aristotle’s understanding of cognition. See D. Black, ‘Psychology: soul and intellect’ in The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. P. Adamson and R.C. Taylor (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 311 ff.
knowing). God has seven necessary attributes that are ideal (ma’anawiya), related to the first seven: he is powerful, willing, knowing, living, ‘hearing’, seeing and ‘speaking’.

God has twenty impossible attributes, the opposites of the first twenty: non-being; having been created; being finite; being like temporal things and taking up space, being limited in space and time or having interests; depending on something else to define Him; not being one; having no power to create, and an attribute such that it is impossible that anything exists that was created without his willing or knowing it. It is impossible that he should act as a natural force, causing things involuntarily (bi l-ta’līl) or with the force of a law of nature (bi l-ṭabā’). It is impossible for God to be unknowing or defective in any way concerning anything that can be known. It is impossible that He dies, or is deaf or blind or without speech.\footnote{Thirteen impossible attributes are listed. The last seven are the opposite of the seven necessary real attributes. If the opposites of the seven ideal attributes had been added, the text would have been more than repetitive, but the total number of impossible attributes would add up to twenty.}

It is possible for God to do or not do anything possible.

The proof of God’s existence without beginning is the creation of the world. If the world had come into existence by itself, from a situation where being and non-being were equal, there would have been a moment where being had gained precedence over non-being, without the interference of an external cause. The proof of the necessity of His eternity (without end) is that if He could be non-existent in future, then His existence without beginning would have to be denied too, because His being would then be only possible, not necessary. The proof of God’s being different from temporal things, is that if He were similar to them, He would have to exist in time, which is unthinkable. The proof that He exists by himself, is that if He depended on something to make him appear, He would be an attribute, and an attribute cannot have other attributes. And if He needed a creator, He would have had a beginning. The proof of His oneness is that if He were not one, nothing would exist, because He would be powerless. The proof that God necessarily has power, will, knowledge and life is that, if He lacked one of them, none of the created things would exist. The proof that He necessarily has hearing, vision and speech is in the Book, in the sunna, and in the unanimity of the first Muslims (ṣahaba). Also, if He did not have them, He would have imperfections, whereas it is impossible that God has imperfections.

The proof that it is possible for God to do or not do what is possible, is that if one could imagine that realising or abandoning something possible were necessary or that it is impossible for God, the possible would become necessary or impossible.

God’s prophets have the following necessary attributes: truthfulness (ṣadaq), faithfulness (imāna), and being transmitters of what they have been commissioned to transmit. The contrary is impossible: they cannot lie or betray their mission by doing something forbidden or disapproved of by religious law, or hide anything they have been commissioned to transmit. What is possible for the prophets is all events that can befall people, such as illness and other accidents, as long as they do not harm their dignity.

The proof that the prophets are necessarily truthful is that, if they were not, God would have lied when he confirmed by miracles (mu’jiza) the truthfulness of His messengers. The proof that they are necessarily faithful is that, if they did something forbidden or disapproved of, those things would be acts of obedience, for God has ordered us to imitate the prophets, and He does not order what is forbidden or disapproved. The proof that human events can befall them is that it has been observed to be so. This may happen either to assure them of greater rewards in the hereafter, or to establish an example for others, or to inspire people to accept their fate or to show that worldly things are contemptible in God’s eyes, and that He does not mean that this world should be the place where prophets and saints receive their reward.
All this is included in the words ‘There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is His prophet’, because they mean: there is no creature that is in need of nothing outside him, or is needed for everything outside him, except God. ‘There is no god but God’ encompasses the necessary, the impossible and the possible, which every adult must know. ‘Muḥammad is His prophet’ encompasses belief in the other prophets and angels and books of revelation and the Day of Resurrection, because Muḥammad has brought belief in all these. Although they have only a few letters, the two expressions of the shahāda encompass all the knowledge that a Muslim adult must have. The adult who is of sound mind (al-ʾāqil) must repeat the shahāda often, so that its meaning mingles with his flesh and blood. Then, God willing, he will behold many secrets and wonders.

The second, and main, part of The peerless method comments on the Ṣughra by explaining and illustrating each statement in the original, as I will discuss below. In a few instances, the explanations are drawn directly from al-Sanūsī’s own commentary (Sharḥ) and introduction (Muqaddima), which were apparently known to the author(s) of The peerless method or of its precursor.\textsuperscript{314}

For instance, the Ṣughra distinguishes between the cognitive categories of the necessary and the impossible, of ‘that which the mind cannot think of as absent’ and ‘that which the mind cannot conceive to exist’, but it does not elucidate this. In The peerless method (PM), however, the point was considered important enough to be worth expanding on. The necessary is divided in two, it states, and paraphrasing al-Sanūsī’s Muqaddima, it explains

that which is self-evidently necessary (darūrī) and that which is necessary after rational consideration (nazarī). What is self-evidently necessary is, for instance, the impenetrability of a body. What is necessary after consideration is, for instance, the prior existence of God. You don’t perceive this necessity until you consider what would follow from the negation. The impossible is what the mind cannot conceive of as existing. [PM adds:] The impossible is divided in two: [PM quotes from Muqaddima:] that which is self-evident and that which is impossible after rational consideration. It is self-evidently impossible, for instance, for a body to be free from movement and immobility at the same time. What is impossible upon rational consideration is, for instance, the existence of an idol next to our Lord, the majestic and powerful. [PM adds again:] You do not perceive the necessity until you consider what would follow from the negation.\textsuperscript{315}

This passage is all the more significant in that it gives a first glimpse of The peerless method’s views on knowledge. In his longer text, which is addressed to other scholars of theology, al-Sanūsī had given a place to this typically kalām distinction between self-evident knowledge and insights that can be reached only after a thought process, but apparently he did not consider it essential in the context of the shorter, more popular creed.\textsuperscript{316} For the author(s) of The peerless method, by contrast, the distinction was important to the message they wished to transmit. The examples of nazari knowledge

\textsuperscript{314}Passages that are quoted from al-Sanūsī’s Muqaddima occur in Hunwick 178 notably on p 14 (‘judgement is the assertion or the negation of a thing’) and on pp 15 and 16, when the categories of judgement based on experiment and rational judgement are discussed: The peerless method comments: ‘There are four categories of experimental/custom-related judgement (ʿādiya)
- that which relates the existence of something to the existence of something else
- that which relates the non-existence of something to the non-existence of something else
- that which relates the existence of one thing to the non-existence of another
- that which relates the non-existence of one thing to the existence of another

The link of existence with existence is like the link between the presence of food and the presence of satiety; the link between absence and absence is like the link between the lack of food and the lack of satiety; the link between existence and absence, is like the link between the presence of hunger and the absence of food; the link between absence and existence is like the link between the absence of hunger and the presence of food.

\textsuperscript{315}Cf. J.D. Luciani 1908, 38, 39.

\textsuperscript{316}Hunwick 178, 15, 16. Cf. Luciani 1908, 48-51.

\textsuperscript{316}See Van Ess 2007, 42,43.
that are given make one realise that the topic of the Ṣughra and The peerless method falls entirely within this category of things that are essential to the religion and need to be turned over and over in the mind.

Given the awareness of al-Sanūsī’s other theological work on the part of the author(s) of the commentary, it is interesting that some of the themes and explanations that al-Sanūsī discussed there at length were not incorporated into The peerless method, such as the relation between legal judgement and divine law, and the concepts of ‘appropriation’ (kasb) and unbelief (kufr). Al-Sanūsī’s views on these last two are closely related, and they are particularly relevant for this study: as I will argue below, The peerless method rejects them on purpose. Let us look more closely, then, at al-Sanūsī’s understanding of kasb and unbelief.

Regarding kasb al-Sanūsī expressed the prevailing Ash’arī view. He rejected both the determinist view of the Jabrīya, that all human acts are like trembling, over which man has no influence at all, and the opposite view, of the Mu’tazila and the Qadarīya, which held that a human being has his own independent will in all acts in which he feels no constraint—voluntary movements for instance—and can produce certain effects himself through a force he has received from God. This would imply, said al-Sanūsī, that God produced only what we cannot produce ourselves, such as colours or trembling. The correct, Sunni doctrine was, he argued, that all acts come from God, whereas ‘voluntary’ acts coincide with a human being’s incidental force, which does not produce these acts nor has any effect in and of itself. The human being is free in the sense that he generally does not feel compelled either to act or not to act. He has ‘a share’ in his acts, consisting of the relationship between his incidental force and the act produced in him. Through that relationship he appropriates (yaksabu) the effect of the acts within himself, but not their effects outside of him. The effects outside of him are concomitant with God’s will, the effects within himself are the basis of his responsibility for the law.

A belief that human beings are free to produce certain acts and their effects themselves, so that there exists causality outside of God, amounts to associating something else with God, and is therefore a form of polytheism (shirk). Al-Sanūsī lists six forms of shirk:

1. Believing that there exist two independent Gods (as do the magians)
2. Believing that God is composed of more than one deity, as Christians do
3. Adoring others than God with the aim of coming closer to Him, as the pagans of the first jahaliyya period did (shirk al-taqrīb)
4. Adoring others than God, in imitation of others, as the pagans of the last jahiliyya period did (shirk al-taqīlīd)
5. Believing that causes that we experience have effects of their own, as philosophers do
6. Doing anything for reasons other than God

He continues with a list of seven sources from which innovation (bid’a) and unbelief can develop:

1. The belief in an ‘essential necessity’ that makes God act through a logical causality or a natural force, and not by divine will
2. The belief, held by the Mu’tazila, that God’s acts depend logically on interests or motivations (al-aghād) to realise what is good and prevent what is bad
3. Imitation by clinging (to one’s madhhab; ta’assab) without searching for the truth
4. Experimental induction, i.e. the belief, based on experience, in inevitable relations between certain things
5. Complex ignorance, that is, not knowing the truth and ignoring the fact that one does not know it
6. Attaching supreme importance to what the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth seem to mean, without a distinction between what is possible and what is impossible

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317 Luciani 1908, 58-72.
318 Luciani 1908, 237.
319 Luciani 1908, 96-108.
320 Luciani 1908, 112.
7. Not knowing the rules of reasoning that allow one to know what is necessary, possible, and impossible, as well as not knowing the Arabic language, including lexicology (‘ilm al-lugha), inflection (i'rāb) or rhetoric (bayān).

It is especially important that a good part of al-Sanūsī’s views on possible sources of unbelief revolves around the relationship between God’s omnipotence and free will or causality. The Fulani commentary, on the contrary, does not (except in one instance) refer to this matter because, as we will see, the view on unbelief expressed there is linked, not to an understanding of causality, but to social issues.

Al-Sanūsī’s dialectic mostly uses the Mu'tazila as the party to whose views he opposes his own. Apart from their ‘false doctrine’ regarding causality and man’s free will in certain cases, as well as God’s obligation according to logic to consider the well-being of people, al-Sanūsī also discusses, in his Muqaddima and his Šarh, the Mu'tazilis erroneous belief that it is impossible that God would punish someone who has not transgressed any of His laws; the idea (based on a grammatically wrong interpretation of a phrase in the Qur'ān) that there are things that God has not created; the notion that God has no real (ma‘ānī) attributes, and a few other Mu’tazila errors.

It is also noteworthy that The peerless method refers to the Mu'tazilis only once, where the first of God’s necessary ideal (ma’anawiya) attributes, His being powerful, is explained: ‘It is related to the first of the substantive attributes, power. This is different from the point of view of the Mu'tazila, who say that it is [directly] related to [God’s] essence. But if it were linked to the essence, as they claim, the essence would be substantive, and his uniqueness would be denied.’ Otherwise, al-Wālī leaves the Mu'tazilis in peace.

2. The Kabbe tradition

In the first lines of The peerless method, Al-Wālī wrote that he translated commentaries in Fulfulde that several learned Fulani before him had made on al-Sanūsī’s ‘Aqīda al-ṣughra. These commentaries existed most probably only as oral texts, but if they were anything like The peerless method, they must have been the beginning of a long tradition of religious teaching. In its form, The peerless method strongly resembles texts from a Fulani tradition of teaching tawḥīd that is still alive, in a region stretching from today’s Senegal to Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Niger. At least since the nineteenth century, this teaching has been called the kabbe in Fulfulde, a word that is derived from a root that means ‘to tie’, just like ‘aqīda in Arabic. The translation of the Arabic word into Fulfulde covers the cultural translation of al-Sanūsī’s text to the context of the Fulani’s ‘missionary’ work. In the kabbe, the idea of the purpose of the Šughra was transmitted, and concepts were explained in a way that was appealing to a new audience, and were organised and presented in ways that joined in with the discursive culture of the Fulani.

The roots of the kabbe must lie early in the sixteenth century, when al-Sanūsī’s Šughra was already circulating in its original form and in versified versions in the most western part of West Africa, as manuscripts show, from where Fulani brought it eastward. What the content of the kabbe was in al-Wālī’s time can only be guessed at, because its oral transmission has always been an important

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321 See Hunwick 178, 49, where an explanation is offered of the words in the Šughra ‘This must be the case if you presume that one of the existing things has an effect through its own nature. If you presume that [something] has a self-working [causal] effect through a force that God has made in it, as many of the ‘ignorant’ claim...’ Here al-Sanūsī’s sentence is broken off, in order to give three different categories of ‘ignorant philosophers’ and their ideas of cause outside God. The passage is abruptly ended by the remark that this (cause outside of God) ‘is also impossible’.
322 Hunwick 178, 23.
323 As far as we know, Fulfulde prose was hardly ever written down, until the 19th century. Brenner and Last 1985, 434.
324 Brenner 1984, 79.
characteristic, and up until the twentieth century it was indeed the only way in which the text was preserved. And even of the recent expressions of the kabbe not much has been committed to paper. But there are some sources that describe the tradition. To begin with, a short description by Paul Marty from 1921 tells us that in some of the most western regions of Africa the kabbe is a form of teaching tawḥīd, based on al-Šānumī’s Umm al-barāhīn and preceded by an introduction which includes information about the Qurʾān as the first of four holy books, before Pentateuch, Psalms and Gospel. These three elements -Umm al-barāhīn as the core of the text, its didactic character (for instance introducing new topics with the phrase ‘what is the meaning of...?’ and the use of metaphor and repetition), and an added introduction about more general aspects of the Muslim faith - are also found in other kabbe versions, as well as in The peerless method. A few other versions have been discussed in detail by L. Brenner, both in his book about the Malian șūfi šaykh Tierno Bokar (d. 1940), who was the author of the ‘catechism’ called Mā al-dīn (‘What is religion?’), and in an article about one of the latter’s pupils, the Malian historian and world-famous author Amadou Hampâtè Bâ (d. 1991), who collected several versions of the kabbe and also made a new version of it himself in Fulfulde. Brenner also found references to the kabbe in the archives of two French colonial officers from Senegal and Niger. And, together with a Fulani colleague, he wrote down a version of the kabbe that had been recorded on tape in the 1960’s by Boubou Hama in southern Niger. They translated part of the Fulfulde text into English.

The traces and descriptions of kabbe versions from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries confirm much continuity especially in their educational aspects. As oral texts they were aimed at an illiterate audience: non-Muslims who were candidates for conversion, as well as members of the broader Muslim community who wished to expand their understanding of their religion. In stories about its origin the kabbe is often presented as a recent discovery by a specialist of religion who wishes to make difficult information available to people without (much) formal education. More than once the stories also mention the instruction to and by women, who were often excluded from formal education.

The kabbe’s teaching methodology is very well adapted to the purpose of including as many common believers as possible. Like religious poetry in Fulfulde, the kabbe was clearly marked by techniques to facilitate memorisation, like repetition and the use of pairs or phrases. Most remarkable is the version developed by Tierno Bokar, who supported the teaching of his Mā al-dīn to illiterate people by means of a pattern of lines and dots, each of which represented an item in the catechism. The kabbe versions also share a devotion to the clarification of abstract theological concepts, through metaphor and analogies with elements of daily life.

Another characteristic of the recent versions is the association with Sufism. Especially in the teachings of Tierno Bokar and Amadou Hampâtè Bâ, the mystic element is strong. The older, oral Nigerien version says that the kabbe concerns one branch of the study of tawḥīd, of which ‘there are two branches,[that of the study of] the manifest and the hidden’ The manifest has to do with the knowledge of jurisprudence and other Islamic sciences and of what is permitted and forbidden. ‘What is hidden

325 As far as I know they are still transmitted only orally, in some quranic schools in various West African countries where there is a strong Fulani influence.

328 The first report is entitled ‘Islam dans la Résidence de Dori’, 31 July 1899. Archives Nationales du Sénégal, AOF Série G, 15-G-186. Professor Brenner has generously given me a copy of his own handwritten copy of part of this report. The second report is quoted at some length in his West African Sufi, 83.
329 Brenner did this work together with Almamy Malik Yattara. Unfortunately the translation could not be finished and was never published, but I am much indebted to professor Brenner for kindly allowing me to photocopy his drafts.
concerns purification... it is ṣūfī knowledge and it is called the knowledge of truth.”³³¹ That may not prove that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Sufism was as important in the ķabbe tradition as it later became. It may be that it has gained importance in these texts since the nineteenth century, when the influence of Sufism in the region as a whole increased.³³² On the other hand, since many elements of the ķabbe tradition are quite constant, there is no reason to doubt that from the beginning it accommodated—in its text or context—an approach to religious knowledge through mysticism.

The status of the ķabbe has not always been the same across times and places. Marty, for instance, described it in Futa Djallon in the beginning of the twentieth century, as part, not of popular Islam but of formal Islamic education, in which it was taught only in the superior cycles, which only a minority of students followed. In other regions, mastering the text came to function as a rite of passage that must have been widespread among Fula: Marty and French-colonial reports, as well as Boubou Hama, mention that in certain communities from Senegal to Niger, a Fula man could marry, or slaughter an animal, after he had finished his study of the ķabbe. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries at least, it was this study that made him a full Muslim and an adult member of his community.³³³ It is plausible that, as Brenner suggests, such practices had already developed into a sectarian cult by the end of the eighteenth century and that the advocates of the ķabbe, the kabbenkoobe, were the mutakallimūn against whom ‘Uthmān dan Fodio raised serious objections, because they excluded faithful believers for no valid reasons, and spread confusion and dissension among Muslims.³³⁴ Though he was admired by Dan Fodio’s son, al-Wālī seems to have had a hand in turning an inclusive educational tradition into a tool of partition.

3. **The peerless method builds on both**

And then: some Fula have commented on the Ṣughra by shaykh al-Sanūsī in their own language. I have wished to put that in Arabic in order to study the lessons from it. I have named this *The peerless method to knowledge of the science of theology.*

This is how al-Wālī starts his work, which, at first sight, indeed seems to be nothing but an Arabic translation of a model example of the ķabbe tradition. Like the modern examples, *The peerless method* is divided into two parts, a preface about other issues than the Ṣughra, and the actual commentary on al-Sanūsī’s text on God’s attributes. The preface takes up slightly more than a quarter of the entire

³³¹ The passage in Brenner’s notebook is: ‘The religion which the Prophet brought us is divided in two parts, the fundamentals and the commands. Fundamental religion consists of faith, and the knowledge [of/and] upright behaviour. It is the knowledge of tawḥīd. It is called the ķabbe. It is called the knowledge of essence, it is called the knowledge of attributes. One who [understands] the attributes will come near to what he seeks. There are two branches [to this study]: the manifested and the hidden. The manifested is Islam and the knowledge of doing what is right in Islam. It is the knowledge of fiqh, and is called the knowledge of the branches, or knowledge of the permitted and knowledge of the prohibited. And it is called the knowledge of practice.’

³³² Even so, the versions recorded in the twentieth century have given rise to different interpretations of this aspect. Marty and Brenner for instance have opposite views of the meaning of ‘ilm al-hurif in the ķabbe. Marty writes that, using knowledge that is transmitted through the ķabbe (for instance that the shahada is contained in the name Allah, and that the letters of this name correspond with the number 66, which is therefore sacred) many cultured Fula are devoted to combining words, letters and numbers, but that there is nothing mystical about such activities; that they are *au fond* not different from the ‘intellectual recreation’ favoured by European scholars in the Middle Ages or offered on the last pages of our own journals and magazines. (Marty 1921, 352) Disagreeing with Marty, Brenner explains that the manipulation of numbers and letters is more than recreation, that it reflects an elaborate religious understanding of creation and of the relation between the visible and the invisible world. (Brenner 1984, 91) While both interpretations seem right for different groups of people, their different understandings must also be seen against the background of their work. Marty was partly responding to French colonial officers and travellers who saw students of the ķabbe as members of a secretive sect and the ķabbe itself as an obscure sort of ‘Kabbala’, an image he wished to correct. One of Brenner’s intentions is to correct an image of African Sufism as being devoid of the spiritual dimension.

³³³ Brenner 1985, 83-86.

³³⁴ Brenner 1987, 47.
text. The second part comments on—al-Wālī uses the verb *sharaḥa*—or rather explains *Al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra* in the peculiar way in which commentaries were often composed: al-Sanūsī’s entire creed is wrapped up in it. It is followed word for word, and the comments are added in a way that sometimes even disturbs the syntax and the logic of the original sentences.335

Below I will first discuss textual characteristics that seem to be part of the oral *kabbe* tradition: the introduction, the organisation of the text in order to facilitate memorisation, and the translations of abstract concepts to the life-world of an audience that had no education in theology. As a written text, *The peerless method* still shows clear traces of this oral tradition, and it was intended to be not only read, but also to be heard, as is vividly evoked at the end of the preface: ‘Know! That is, be aware of your foolishness, wake up from your sleep, rouse your brain and understand what I say, so that the beginning of the speech does not escape you, for he who lets the beginning slip and [then] listens to the middle or another part, will not understand a thing.’336

In the past decades, increasing attention has been given to the ways in which oral and written practices have complemented each other in the transmission of knowledge in different fields of literature and scholarship in Islamic culture. Within that field of interest, S. Ali has focussed on the influence of orally transmitted traditions on written texts.337 His work—like that of J. Vansina and W. Ong before him in the wider field of intellectual history and literary studies—shows that two main principles underlie oral traditions in cultures of primary orality, that is among people who had no writing at all: performance and memory, whereby performance is related to the adaptability of traditions, and memory to continuity. In orality, narratives must be organised in a way that makes it easy to remember them and pass them on—for instance, through repetition and the use of parallel terms and phrases, antithetical phrases, epithets and formulas; and they must be composed in a way that allows the narrator to hold the attention of his audience, for instance by assimilating the alien, objective world to the more immediate, familiar interaction of human beings; through narration as opposed to more abstract ideas in written texts; through the use of an agonistic tone, celebrating physical behaviour, featuring both violence and praise, in a highly polarised world of ‘good and evil, vice and virtue, villains and heroes’.338 All of these figures of style will be recognised in the formal analysis of *The peerless method* below.

Later, in the section ‘Tradition with a twist’, we will turn our attention to a specific element in the content of the text: the point where *The peerless method* diverges from both the *Ṣughra* and the *kabbe*.

**An introduction for new Muslims**

The preface to *The peerless method* shares many similarities with other expressions of the *kabbe* tradition. It reads like an introduction, not so much to the topic of God’s ontology, but to the culture and society of Islam at large. It is not directly related to the text of the *Ṣughra*, but it is in a way true to the character of al-Sanūsī’s creed, in that it presents Islam to a wide audience. Thus, *The peerless method* opens with remarks about the conventions of Islamic text, such as starting by invoking the name of God. It asserts God’s power over Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs (as is done in the Nigerien *kabbe* version in Brenner’s notebook). Then it places Islam in the context of other religions of the Book and tells us that the basmallah contains all the knowledge God has revealed to the various prophets, both in a way that is almost identical to what Marty described in writing of the

335 This suggests that the first written version was noted as two texts: al-Sanūsī’s as the main text, with the comment added between the lines.

336 Hunwick 178, 14.


There are a few topics in the introduction to *The peerless method* for which I have not found parallels in the other *kabbe* versions, but these may well have existed. This is true, for example, of a paragraph on blessing (*ni‘ma*) and notably the blessing of the *shahāda*, which can protect against murder, abduction, theft and even hell. Other examples are details about the prophet Muhammad’s status among people, and the concept of *sharīf*. Much later in the text—not in the preface, but also rather separate from the abstract discussion of God’s attributes—there are explanations of the essence of angels and *jinn* (they are made of ethereal substance, finer than wind; less ethereal than wind is water, and after that comes earth and the substance of human beings), as well as a presentation of the archangels and their various realms of authority. And throughout the text various other concepts and social roles belonging to a Muslim culture are introduced, such as *ahl al-bayt*, *sahabah*, *shurafā’*, different types of shaykhs, the *fāqih* and other leaders, and the ‘saint who knows God’, *al-wāli al-‘ārif bi Allāh*. The importance of praise, prayer and worship is emphasized. All together, the text touches on everything one needs to know to act as a good Muslim. *The peerless method*—especially the introduction—is a shop-window full of samples of law, hadiths, Sufism, terminology, mythology, classical poetry, folklore and more.

The preface ends with sixteen tales about miracles that al-Sanūsī is said to have performed or witnessed, thus bearing witness to the special blessing he received from God, and therefore to the value of his *Ṣuḥra*. These were evidently part of the original text that al-Wālī had translated, because he noted twice (indicating the addition with the phrase ‘here ends what I added’) that he had come across a similar story elsewhere, where it was told about someone else. Such narratives do not seem to be part of the more recent versions of the *kabbe*, but they are rooted in the *ṣūf* lore about ‘holy men’ in the Maghrib. Some of the miracles have other people as beneficiaries: through mediation by al-Sanūsī they find gold (symbolic of course for God’s truth), or peace, either in the hereafter or in this world. According to other anecdotes, hidden knowledge was unveiled to the shaykh and God favoured him in other ways, for instance by lifting him up into the sky one day, when pupils asked whether holy men could fly.

Two of these anecdotes deal specifically with causality. Apart from the story about the meat that would not cook (see chapter 3), there is one about a *jinn* who came, in the form of a snake, to where al-Sanūsī was sitting with some pupils, and wrote the words: ‘Nothing in all of creation has any effect.’ In other words: the only cause of anything there is, is the uncreated God. To West African

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339 Hunwick 178, 1.2: (About the reason why the orthography of the *bā* in the opening word of religious texts, *bismallāh*, is usually long) ‘Some say that it is long to substitute the *alif* that is suppressed, and some say it is long because it contains all the knowledge (*jami‘ al-‘ulām*) that God has sent down. It constitutes a hundred and four books. He sent ten down to the prophet Adam and fifty to the prophet Seth (peace be with him), ten to the prophet Idrīss (peace be with him), ten to the prophet ‘Īrāhīm (peace be with him), the Psalms to the prophet Dāwūd (peace be with him), the Torah to the prophet Mūsā, the Gospel to the prophet ‘Isā (peace be with him), the Qurān to the prophet Muhammad, God bless him and grant him peace and honour and nobility. A hundred books are contained in three books and three books are contained in the Qurān, and all of the Qurān is contained in sūrat al-baqara and sūrat al-baqara is contained in the *fātiha*, the *fātiha* is contained in the basmallah and the basmallah in its opening and its meaning (*ma‘nāhā*) ‘in Me was what was, and in Me will be what will be’. Therefore it is called the connecting *bā*: it connects all knowledge. Cf Marty 1921, 352.

340 In Ash‘arī theology man is not predestined for heaven or hell. It is one of the differences al-Wālī mentions between Ash‘arism and Matūridiyya.

341 Hunwick 178, 51, 52...

342 Hunwick 178, 10.
Muslims, these two little stories were signs of the powers God invested in the ‘saint’. We may also recognise them as translations of an abstract scholarly theme for an audience without philosophical training. As we saw, the subject of causality played an important role in al-Sanūsī’s theology and in his discussions with other theological schools. One of the anecdotes that translates his stance on causality into a narrative, and translates the metaphor he used—of the prophet untouched by fire—into a meal that remains raw over the fire, originates from the region where he lived, as do many of these stories. It can be assumed that the same is true of the story of the snake. Apparently, when the kabbe originated, the stories were considered to be part of a fixed corpus of tales about al-Sanūsī, designed to demonstrate his closeness to God (wilāya) and to explain a theme that was important in his theology, the theme of causality. However, in the course of time, causality faded into the background in the kabbe, and for al-Wālī the theme was not a priority, as will be argued later in this chapter. That said, the presence of these anecdotes in al-Wālī’s version is an example of how elements that had lost their original meaning and function nevertheless survived for quite some time and even after the text had travelled quite some distance, because the text as a whole had a special significance of its own. The same may be true of other elements in the text that we will come across below.

Organisation of the text

After the preface to *The peerless method*, the Ṣughra is followed sentence by sentence. Despite this tight framework, the commentary manages to introduce some independent ideas and push others to the background, by not giving them much, or any, attention. Many of the choices that were made are related to the organisation of the text and determined by the oral context, not only of the kabbe tradition, but also of *The peerless method* itself. As mentioned in chapter 2, in central sudanic Africa the transmission of the culture of Islam has in the first place been oral. Even written, scholarly texts were produced to be recited from memory or read aloud to students and to be memorised by them.

Memorisation was important, not only because many people were illiterate or had limited access to written sources, but also because memorisation and reciting from memory were highly respected, not only in Islam. In the Middle Ages and the pre-modern period, even when writing was in principle available, memorisation was regarded, not as a passive method of learning but, on the contrary, as an art that was also essential for the creation of new knowledge. Ideas about this art and its methods influenced the organisation of long texts.

These ideas were based on the understanding of the working of the brain by Aristotle and some of his commentators in the Muslim as well as the Christian world, such as Ibn Sīna, Ibn Rushd, Galen, and Thomas Aquinas. In their view, the brain receives impressions from the senses. These are brought together by the image-forming ability into an ‘image’ that has a likeness to the observed things, and into an instinctive ‘feeling’ that colours the images. Then thinking makes these images available to the mind, so that it can use them to form thoughts and ideas. Since thoughts are made of mental images, which are stored and recalled in memory ‘locations’, memory is the basis of the inventive powers of the mind. Memory storage was to be undertaken in such a way that images were readily and immediately accessible. This meant they had to be organised. The basic principles for that arrangement were division and composition. A sophisticated technique was to divide text into verses and paragraphs that could be linked to particular markers and that could also serve as markers for more text such as glosses. The markers were composed into numbered sequences or linked to the alphabet or to a picture of a house with rooms, a hand with fingers that had joints, an angel with wings that had feathers, and so on.

In *The peerless method*, division and composition were applied *con gusto*. For example, where the actual commentary on the Ṣughra starts, and includes a quote to the effect that rational judgement

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comprises three categories, it adds that ‘altogether there are twelve fundamental principles: five of shari‘a, four of experience, 344 three of reason. 345 The five principles of the shari‘a are given in an oppositional pair: ‘Wājib (obligatory) and its ‘next in line’ mandūb (recommended), and ḫarīm (forbidden) and its ‘next-in-line’ makrūh (disapproved of), and in the middle mubāh’ (allowed or neutral). 346

The peerless method then arranges into seven chapters all that a Muslim adult should know: that God’s essence does not lack anything; that it is different from other beings; and that He is described by attributes of which none is lacking; what His substantive, negative and ideal attributes are (three separate chapters), and what the consequences of the 20 attributes are. 347 And when al-Sanūṣī adds— not in the Ṣughra, but in his Muqaddima—that the necessary refers to either what is evidently necessary or what appears to be necessary upon reflection, The peerless method, typically, spells out what the necessary refers to two things: what is evidently necessary and what appears to be necessary upon reflection. 348 Sometimes it is as if the author (or authors) get carried away by the habit of dividing and numbering, to the point that the didactic benefits seem doubtful. Thus the impossibility of God’s lack of oneness is subdivided into six sorts; the impossibility of a lack of will on His part into four sorts. 349 These divisions surpass al-Sanūṣī’s discussion of God’s impossible attributes, and are also more detailed than the corresponding paragraphs in the Nigerien oral version of the kabbe.

The most conspicuous way in The peerless method of ‘explaining’ or reorganising statements from the Ṣughra is to follow and note down every logical step in the argumentations behind them, even when only small variations occur. This technique is also applied in the kabbe version from Niger, but not as exhaustively as in The peerless method. The examples below also illustrate the way in which the explanations are inserted into the text of the Ṣughra. The phrases in italics are from al-Sanūṣī’s base text.

Impossible with regard to the truth of God are twenty attributes. They are the opposites of the first twenty necessary attributes: non-existence—non-existence is the first of the twenty attributes that are impossible regarding the truth of God the Exalted, and it is the opposite of the first of the twenty necessary attributes, which is existence. The necessity of existence negates non-existence of His being and attributes. Being created—being created is the second of the twenty attributes that are impossible regarding the truth of God the Exalted. It is the opposite of the second of the twenty necessary attributes…. 350

...And so on until the twentieth attribute. The fourth impossible attribute, resemblance to temporal things (al-mumāthala li l-ḥawādith), touches on an issue that was central to the Ash‘ari doctrine—namely, the reconciliation between God’s incomparability to anything created and Quranic expressions about God’s hands, vision, throne, and so on that do leave room for some sort of

344Hukm al-‘ādiya refers to judgement based on observation or experience notably when causality is explored. The four principles in this category concern that which relates the existence of something to the existence or the non-existence of something else, and that which relates the non-existence of something to the existence or non-existence of something else. For instance relating the absence of hunger to the presence of food, etc. J-D. Luciani translates ‘ādiya with expérimental.

345The judgement of what is necessary, impossible and possible.

346Hunwick 178, 15.

347The choice of the number seven is of course not unique to the kabbe tradition. The north African scholar and poet Ahmad al-Maqqārī al-Tilimsāni (d. 1632), whom al-Wāli quotes a few times, had written that ‘the student’s efforts with the pursuit [of these matters] is not finished until he knows of seven issues he needs to know’. Hunwick 178, 33.


349Hunwick 178, 30-31.

350Hunwick 178, 26. Compare e.g. with al-Laqānī, who says nothing more about the impossible attributes than: Les contraires de ces attributs sont impossibles à l’égard de Dieu. Il est impossible par exemple, qu’il occupe un coté d’un objet, c’est à dire qu’il soit dessus, dessous, devant, derrière, à droite ou à gauche. Luciani 1908, 14.
resemblance (tashbīḥ) between God and created beings. Al-Sanūsī gives some explanation for this attribute (see in italics below), and The peerless method also puts in an extra effort:

A question was asked, ‘What is resemblance to temporal things?’ and the shaykh [al-Sanūsī] answered that He would be like a body. It was asked, ‘What is a body?’ and the shaykh answered, ‘[It would mean] that His exalted essence would take up a measure of the empty space. Being a body, however, is the first kind of the ten resemblances that are impossible regarding the reality of God, because of the necessity of His being different from temporal things. The necessity of His being different from temporal things negates that, or that He would be incidental, needing a body. Being incidental and needing a body, however, are the second kind of the ten impossible resemblances regarding the reality of God, or He would be in the realm of bodies, and would be above a throne or below it, or to the right or the left of it. But being in the realm of bodies is the third kind of the ten impossible resemblances regarding the reality of God. The necessity of His being different from temporal things negates that, or He would have spatiality and the throne would be above that [spatiality] or under it or to the right or the left of it. But spatiality to Him is the fourth sort of the ten resemblances that are impossible regarding the reality of God, because of the necessity of His being different from temporal things, and the necessity of being different from temporal things negates that, or that He would be confined by place. It is said that He is in paradise or on a throne or a chair, or in the heavens or on earth, but confinement to a place is the fifth sort of the ten impossible resemblances regarding the reality of God….351

Some methods of organising information have been associated especially with Sufism. For instance, The peerless method introduces a new classification of the twenty attributes, dividing them between God’s divinity (ullūḥīya) and His lordship (rubūḥīya). There are eleven attributes of divinity and nine of lordship. Why this partition into nine and eleven is appealing is not explained. But, while nine and eleven play no significant role in Sufism in other cultures,352 both numbers are significant in the kabbe of the twentieth century. There, nine represents matter and materiality—the realm of God’s lordship or governance,353 while eleven, as Amadou Hampêté Ba explained, represents the spiritual world. It is the mystical light of God’s essence and the key to the name of Allah, since eleven is the added numerical value of the letters that make up ‘huwa’. To know the secret of the number eleven ‘is to know how to make God smile’.354

The authors of The peerless method were obviously familiar with ‘ilm al-hurūf, the science of letters (also called sīmīya), which is related to ‘ilm al-awfāq, the science of ‘correspondences’ between the laws that govern the manifest universe and those that govern the hidden reality. These branches of learning could be used for divination, a contested practice, but they were solidly based on the generally accepted understanding that the manifest and the hidden worlds are interconnected. The rules that govern the one are assumed to be similar to those that govern the other. Therefore, the study of rules in the manifest world of humans and animals, minerals, stars, numbers and letters can bring one closer to the hidden truths regarding God. God himself cannot be known, but His laws and His attributes can. Although ‘ilm al-hurūf and ‘ilm al-awfāq are sometimes described as magic, the techniques were studied in the framework of the regular Islamic sciences.355


353 Brenner 1984, 96.


The peerless method explains, for instance, that God has sent 313 or 314 or 315 messengers, numbers that corresponded with the numerical value of the name Muḥammad.356 The preface also presents a number of terms of which each radical is linked to an idea that explains it. The word al-shaykh, for example, receives the following treatment: Alif stands for being close (‘alifā) as in the words of the prophet ‘those who will be near me on the Day of Resurrection are those of good deeds’. Lām is softness (fātn) of the heart in obedience to God, shīn is thankfulness (shukr) for His blessings, yā is commending what is good and prohibiting what is bad (ya’amār bi l-ma’rūf wa yanḥī ‘an al-munkar) and khār is fear (khawf) of sinning against divine law. The words Allāh, Muhammad and al-faqīh are explained in a similar way. The interpretation of the orthography of the letter bā as the first word of a text (see note 339 above) is another example.

Playing with the first letters of words fits into an old tradition, probably going back to pre-Islamic Indian cultures, that was especially popular among mystics and poets, to convey the deeper meaning of concepts to their readers. The meaning accorded to the letters that make up ‘Allah’, for instance, is the same as that proposed by the school of the great mystic Ibn ‘Arabī.357 But the method was used more widely than that. It was also applied at a didactic level, where it was elaborated, for example, into the ‘golden alphabet’, a genre of poetry designed to make it easier to learn the alphabet.358 It is suggested here that, in The peerless method, too, the practical purpose of this playing with words and numbers was at least as important as the mystical one, and that it served here as a mnemonic aid rather than a method of esoteric science.359 That is the function of the method in this text, which places its primary emphasis on reason, as we will see below.

Metaphor and closeness to the human lifeworld

What is especially interesting here is the way in which some concepts from the scholarly culture within Islam were translated to the lifeworld of common people, through the use of metaphors and analogies with local practices. It is at this level that cultural translation is most explicitly at work, and again I suggest that The peerless method inherited this from its Fulfulde model. For example, one impossible attribute of God is (al-Sanūsī’s sentences in italics, PM in roman type.)

that His exalted essence would be clad by incidental things, like hunger and repletion, or illness and health, or skinniness and fatness, or sadness and happiness. Attributing incidental things to His exalted essence [involves] the seventh sort of the ten improbable resemblances regarding the reality of God. Or that smallness like a speck of dust…or that greatness like an elephant could be attached to His exalted essence.360


The name has three mīms. Each word mīm, consisting of the letters mīm, ya, mīm, has a numerical value of 90. The numerical value of one mīm is 40, the value of the yā’ is 10. Therefore three mīms make 270. The three letters of the name of the letter dāl add up to 35: Dāl is 4, lām is 30, alif is 1. The value of the ḥā’ is 8. 270 plus 35 plus 8 makes 313. If the letter ḥā’ is counted as ḥ plus alif, 8 plus 1, the outcome is 314 and if the hamza is also counted, it makes 315. Hunwick 178, 39. The letters are discussed in this sequence, as in ancient Arabic dictionaries: the first, then the last, then the middle radical.


357 Maribel Fierro makes a similar point in an article about the Andalusian sufist Ibn Masarra (d. 931). He was a philosopher who, she argues, was interested in showing the practical concordance between the Qur’ān and philosophy. [His] kitāb al-ḥurūf, in which he deals with the letters found at the beginning of some Koranic verses, does not aim at magical interpretation or predicting the future, but intends to show that the Koran is nothing less than an explanation of creation.’ M. Fierro, ‘Opposition to Sufism in al-Andalus.’ In Islamic Mysticism Contested. F. de Jong ed. Leiden: Brill, 1999. 179.

360 Hunwick 178, 26-29.
Aspects of the human and the bovine body, which the cattle-herding Fulani know so well, are used to clarify the very abstract notion that God’s oneness is incomparable to anything earthly.

The oneness of His being negates three ‘defects’: the composition (tarkīb) of His being, manifoldness (ta’addud), and the number of components and parts (kamiya ittiṣāl wa infiṣāl). Composition of being concerns six things: skin, blood, flesh, sweat, bone and marrow. Multiplicity of being concerns the multiplicity of members, from head to toe. ‘Number of components’ concerns the parts of substance. Every created body exists by the composition of substance in relation to its example. The oneness of being means that God’s being is not composed of two or more substances. And number of parts would imply that there is another being like God’s being, but the oneness of His being negates that. The oneness of His attributes negates three deficiencies as well: composition, manifoldness, and the number of His attributes.

Composition, where attributes are concerned, regards, for instance, fat, skinny, long, short, beautiful and ugly. Manifoldness, where attributes are concerned, regards, for instance, white and the like. A single cow can be white-footed, or be white from breast to belly, or have a white tail, or a white back. The oneness of His being negates all that.\(^\text{361}\)

Other abstract concepts are translated into terms of social life in central sudanic Africa. This happens, for example, when the prophet Muḥammad’s status among people is considered. In more-mainstream theology, his status is also discussed, but there the discussion revolves around the issue of ‘isma, the eminence or infallibility of prophets—that is, the quality that God gives to certain souls so that at times they can rise to a spiritual level where they can hear divine speech. A question often discussed in that context is whether Muḥammad had been without sin all his life, or only after he took up his mission; and if he had sinned before that, to what extent? But this is not how his authority is discussed in The peerless method. Here, the question of the extent to which the Prophet is like other people is answered with the information that he was different in the sense that he could marry whomever he wished, without paying a bride-price, and that he did not even pay a bride-price if he wished to give a woman in marriage to someone else.\(^\text{362}\) The notion is not without a basis in the Qur’ān, which says, ‘We have made lawful unto thee [the prophet Muḥammad] thy wives unto whom thou hast paid their dowries ... and a believing woman if she give herself unto the Prophet and the Prophet desire to ask her in marriage—a privilege for thee only, not for the (rest of the) believers’. (Q. 33:50) There is also a ḥadīth about the Prophet’s taking the ‘slave girl’ Safiyya after a battle, in order to marry her. When asked what he had paid her as dowry, he answered that her manumission served as her dowry.\(^\text{363}\) Finally, there is the ḥadīth related by Aisha that the prophet did not die before God allowed him to marry whatever woman he wished.\(^\text{364}\) The sources are irrefutable, but the choice of this privilege to describe Muḥammad’s standing among men is nevertheless remarkable. In particular, the assertion in The peerless method that he could forfeit paying a dowry for a woman whom he wanted to give in marriage to someone else, seems to have been made with a view to local circumstances, and is in contrast with what the Qur’ān says.

Most informative are the elucidations regarding the shahāda. As we saw, Al-Sanūṣī had considered the confession of faith to comprise, in a symbolic way, all there is to know about God and the prophets (each part represents part of the doctrine of the attributes) and perhaps also in a mystical way: frequently repeating the shahāda could lead one to behold ‘boundless secrets and wonders’. More or less in line with this thought, in its comment on this statement The peerless method gives examples of the blessing the shahāda can bestow on the person uttering it, notably when used in dhikr—that is, ‘remembrance’ or repeated utterance as practiced in Sufism but also by non-ṣūfī Muslims: one man who had performed dhikr with the shahāda had a son who was born with the parts of the shahāda written on his left and right shoulder. Another, who had done the same, proved to be blessed when he

\(^{361}\) Hunwick 178, 19.

\(^{362}\) Hunwick 178, 5.


\(^{364}\) Al-Nasā’ī, kitāb 26 Nikāh. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal,Kitāb 41, 180, 201.
was killed, and when his blood was shed it formed the words of the *shahāda*.  

(On the other hand, *The peerless method* warns that someone who repeats the words just because he believes they can guarantee him a place in paradise and rescue him from calamity in this world and the next, is an unbeliever.)

However, the preface also presents a remarkably practical view. First it states, in line with the conventional Ash‘arī view, that, as long as it is pronounced by someone who firmly believes in *and* complies with the sunna and acts as a Muslim should, the *shahāda* is the key to paradise. But the authors of *The peerless method* are aware that, for their audience, more than paradise is at stake, and that the idea of paradise and hell is part of the Muslim religion that does not resonate deeply with believers in the sudanic culture. Their audience of relatively new believers wishes to know what is in it, here on earth, for the person who pronounces the double creed. The answer to that question is that he who pronounces the *shahāda*, even if his faith is defective, will not be murdered, or enslaved (or abducted: là yustaraqu), and that others will not consume what is his. Murder, enslavement and theft were the real-life terrors in a society suffering from unrest. To be enslaved was a threat to everyone, but specifically to those who were considered non-Muslims. The passage shows clearly that the message of *The peerless method* was addressed to people who felt that threat, much more than the threat of suffering in hell.

**Mysticism and reason**

It is not easy to gauge the attitude of *The peerless method* towards mystical understanding. The word *ma‘rifa*, which appears in the title, is often translated by modern scholars as gnosis, and might be interpreted as an indication of a ṣūfī approach. However, in Arabic theology and philosophy the word was just as often synonymous with *‘ilm*. In *The peerless method*, both approaches to knowledge—the mystical and the rational—are represented. The text pays its respects, in the introduction, to the ṣūfī al-Shādhili; there is the list of miracles associated with al-Sanūsī, which are characteristic of the ṣūfī tradition in the Maghrib. In the last pages, the stages on the path towards surrender to God are mentioned, and there is a reference to the existence of a sort of reality that is beyond ordinary perception, notably in the context of an elucidation of the character of the prophet Muḥammad. The Prophet has a perfection of beauty that is hidden from common people. It is so bright that they cannot see it, but God has created a stronger perception in us, through which some do behold it.

Bobboyi is of the opinion that *The peerless method* `strives to attain a synthesis between *Tawḥīd* and *Taṣawwuf‘*. But the question is: could it not be the other way around? Could it be that al-Wālī, with the political climate of Bornu in mind, tried to undo the synthesis between *tawḥīd* and *taṣawwuf‘* that we find in the original oral *kabbe* and that was developed further in its modern oral expressions, with the aim of privileging the rational study of God’s oneness? It is striking how, in *The peerless method*, the logical demonstrations of God’s oneness are all spelled out in detail, and how quotes from al-Sanūsī’s *Muqaddima* are introduced to stress that an understanding of the truth about God’s eternity or uniqueness can only be had by rational consideration, while references to mysticism are more cursory. When, at the end of the text, the question is asked, ‘how it is that all knowledge just presented is contained in the words of the *shahāda*?’, the answer is a sort of excerpt of what preceded, but does not speak, for instance, of a relation between words and divine truth. Neither is there an explanation of the doctrine of the unity of creation (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), which makes it possible to gain knowledge about divine truths by observing phenomena in the physical world. And in his versified ‘abridgement’ of *The

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365 Hunwick 178, 55.
366 Hunwick 178, 55.
367 Hunwick 178, 5. If *yustaraqu* is a form X of the verb *raqqa*, the meaning here is ‘he will not be enslaved’. If it is a form VIII of *saraqa*, the meaning is ‘he will not be stolen, abducted’.
368 Rosenthal 2007, 211.
369 Hunwick 178, 51.
370 Bobboyi 1992, 100.
The best way to make the point, in the end, is not to highlight what is missing. However, before we move on to more positive indications of the separation of, rather than a synthesis between, two modes of religious exercise, one thing must be underlined. The peerless method does not deny that there is knowledge of an esoteric quality that can be acquired only through spiritual understanding. The existence of two types of truth—the one to be attained by spiritual, the other by intellectual effort—was commonly accepted. As in other parts of the Muslim world, Sufism had been a part of religious experience and practice for many centuries. In West Africa, moreover, Sufism was beginning to be organised into brotherhoods and special communities in the seventeenth century, but was not yet as separate, culturally and socially, from other forms of Islam as it was later to become. The peerless method does not contest the mystical road to understanding—rather, it attributes to it only minor significance for the ordinary Muslim. That al-Wâlî did not suppress the references to mysticism is understandable. The Fulfulde text he translated was too well known as it was, which was exactly why it served his purposes, as I will argue in chapter 7. A canonical text cannot be altered too much without losing its authority. The primary indicate of al-Wâlî’s ambivalence towards mysticism is the much greater emphasis in the rest of the text on rational cognitive learning. That is the subject of the next part of this chapter.

4. Tradition with a twist

There is one important issue on which The peerless method diverges significantly from the content of the Šughra and introduces its own views. This is where ignorance and imitation (taqlîd) are concerned, and the person who is ‘guilty’ of it, the muqallîd. The theme does not occur in the modern kabbé versions, so we can concentrate on a comparison of the issue as it is discussed in The peerless method and by al-Sanûṣî.

As we have seen, the latter had said that every legally competent Muslim adult (the mukallaf) is held by divine law to know what is necessary, impossible and possible with regard to God. The Šughra presented this knowledge as essential to one’s faith or religion. It could be obtained by reading the Šughra and by reciting the shahada, which contained it all. The peerless method starts to unfold its own view of knowledge at the end of the preface:

knowledge (‘ilm) is essential to the doctrine of faith. It relates to the truth, by means of proof (dalîl). Because, if people do not know, it does not matter whether this is from simple ignorance or complex ignorance, or whether they are doubting or mistrusting, or mislead or blindly accepting [imitating].

Farther on in the text, The peerless method comments on al-Sanûṣî’s statement that it is possible for God to do whatever He wishes (‘As for that which is possible to the Exalted, it is doing or refraining from everything possible’) by remarking that God can judge in whatever way He wishes. Therefore a Muslim adult must know a number of things, and ‘it is no excuse [to say]: “I have worked hard, but I am not capable.” That is rather a sign of disqualification.’371 Apparently this remark about the duty to study was so important that it was squeezed into the commentary in a place where at first sight it does not seem to belong. For what do the earthly dweller’s intellectual efforts have to do with God’s capacity to judge? The remark makes sense only if the intention is to say that God will judge believers first and foremost for the intellectual knowledge they have acquired.

What else did al-Wâlî say about the relation between belief and knowledge or ignorance? As was the convention, he distinguished between simple and complex ignorance. Simple ignorance (al-jâhâl al-basîf) was that of the person who, when asked about God’s being, says, ‘I do not know’, which means

371 Hunwick 178, 32.
that he is willing to learn. There was nothing wrong with that. Complex ignorance (al-jahal al-murakkab) was the ignorance of people who do not recognise that they do not know the truth, and was a source from which unbelief could develop. The peerless method, however, expresses quite a different view. Here, ignorance in any form, simple or complex, is categorically condemned as unbelief. Four types of unbeliever are identified, two of which are ignorant, while for the other two their ignorance or understanding is unstable: first, there are those who neither have nor ask for knowledge, because their ignorance is ‘flat like the grass’; second, there are people whose ignorance is complex—that is, who are ignorant without knowing it; third, there is the doubter (‘he who is equal to both sides shifting all the time and equally between truthfulness and lying. [Each time], whenever one side prevails, the other is mistrusted’); and fourth, there is the imitator. The short description of each category is concluded with the words, ‘there is agreement that he is an unbeliever’. The text does not further discuss the first three categories. Rather, all attention goes to the imitator.

The imitator is he who pledges the twenty attributes without [their] proof (dalîl), and it is said that the imitator is he who accepts the words of the ‘ulamâ’ without proof and [then] falls back to blind acceptance’.

And again: ‘There is agreement that he is an unbeliever.’

Was there in fact such a consensus? It is useful here to stop and consider the question in some detail, before evaluating the assertions of The peerless method. First of all, al-Sanûsî himself had never suggested that the verdict regarding taqlîd was a matter that had been decided. It is true that he was convinced of the need to keep pondering the ontology of God, but his view on imitation seems to be more nuanced than is sometimes assumed. His ‘Aqâda al-ṣughra starts by stating that every believer has the duty to use reason to understand the proofs of God’s reality that are provided by the science of theology. In his own commentary (Sharh umm al-barâhîn) on the Šughra, al-Sanûsî says that, when he wrote that every mukallafl must know what is necessary, impossible and possible with regard to God, he specifically said ‘know’ (innahu ya’rifû) and not ‘settle for’ (innahu yajzamu). What one needed for faith, he said, was knowledge based on proof.

‘Taqlîd is not sufficient. It is a resolution that corresponds with the principles of belief, but without the proof for it. [The word ‘know’] refers to the duty of knowing and the fact that taqlîd is not sufficient. That is the opinion of numerous experts such as shaykh Abû al-Ḥassan al-Ash’ârî and the qâdî Abû Bakr al-Bâqillânî, Imâm al-Ḥaramayn (al-Juwaynî), and Ibn al-Qîsgîr also relates this on account of Mâlik. But there are various interpretations regarding the obligation of knowing. Some say that the imitator is a believer, although he is disobedient, because he leaves aside the knowledge which is produced by true understanding. Others say he is a believer and is not disobedient, except when he is capable of understanding the right meaning [and yet leaves it aside]. Others say: the imitator is fundamentally not a believer, but yet others criticise that.’

He then mentioned famous scholars—al-Qushayrî, qâdî b. al-Wâlid b. Rushd, Ibn al-‘Arabî, and Abû Ḥâmid al-Ghazâlî and his followers—who believed that knowledge of God could also come from faith or inspiration and that one could be a good Muslim without independent intellectual reflection, by ‘blindly accepting’ the knowledge of religious experts. In his Muqaddima, al-Sanûsî simply termed these people competent (muḥaqiqîn) and left it at that. In the Sharh he added more critically, ‘but

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372 Luciani 1908, 112- 125.
373 Hunwick 178, 14.
374 K. el-Rouayheb e.g. in his inspiring article mentioned before (‘Opening the gate of verification’) regards al-Sanûsî as someone who was unambiguous and outspoken in his condemnation of taqlîd. El-Rouayheb 2006, 269.
375 Sharh, 1932, 14, 15.
this is in most cases (fi aghlabin) not true—\(^{377}\) that is, in most cases it is not true that firm belief can be reached or maintained without sustained reflection on God’s being.

By the way, this may also be seen in the context of al-Sanūsī’s ongoing discussion with Ahmad Ibn al-Zakrī, his fellow townsman whom I referred to above and who defended the view that one could have faith without a perfect understanding of the theological arguments behind religious tenets. Indeed Ibn Zakrī argued along with al-Ghazālī that the faith of ‘simple’ souls and old women was the most sincere and solid of all, and that honest worship was enough for those who lack the education or understanding that the learned possess.\(^{378}\) The discussion between the two men and their followers may have accentuated their differences and put more emphasis on al-Sanūsī’s insistence on reason and intellect. In any case, al-Sanūsī wrote that the risk one runs in trying to do without reflection is that one will lapse from faith into doubt and unbelief. He regarded taqīḍ as a weakness that could eventually lead to unbelief, but not as a form of unbelief in its own right.

In fact, in keeping with Ash‘arism, al-Sanūsī was rather careful when it came to defining what unbelief is at all.\(^{379}\) He mentioned only two unambiguous forms of kufr: consciously adoring other divinities than God, and denying that Christians and Jews are heathens. A substantial part of his Muqaddima is devoted to explaining that only he who adores an entity other than God is an unbeliever, and that it is very difficult to define any other categories of unbelievers. Even the greatest theologians—and he gives examples of qaḍī Iyāḍ, Malik and al-Bāqillānī—could not say anything definitive about it. The exclusion of anyone who professes Islam, he argued, must be avoided at all cost, for ‘it is better to forgive a thousand unbelievers than to spill one drop of blood of a believer’.\(^{380}\) He enumerated a number of excuses for those who follow a certain opinion without being aware that it implicitly leads to denial of the truth. Among his examples are the view that voluntary acts are brought forth by an independent force in man, and the ideas that God resembles a body, and that He has ideal but not substantive attributes.\(^{381}\) All those who hold such erroneous opinions on topics that are central to al-Sanūsī’s theology are nevertheless excused, he says, if they do not realise that the logical consequences would affect the concept of God’s oneness. It is true that al-Sanūsī stressed the necessity of studying tawḥīd and the rules of reasoning, but he does not judge that harshly those who went by the wrong information out of ignorance.

That al-Sanūsī’s view of taqīḍ was nuanced, or at least complex, is also confirmed by the distinction he makes in his Muqaddima between vicious and praiseworthy imitation (al-taqīḍ al-raḍi and al-taqīḍ al-hasan). He understands the former as the adoration of others than God, in mimicry of parents and ancestors, as the pagans of the ancient period did.\(^{382}\) Yes, such imitators were unbelievers. But the imitators—perhaps ‘followers’ would be a better translation here—of Mu’tazilis and Murji’is, whose theology he disputed vigorously, were not unbelievers, let alone ‘imitators’ of his own doctrine, people who subscribed to it without understanding it completely.\(^{383}\) On the contrary, al-Sanūsī approved of praiseworthy imitation, ‘such as the imitation by believers of the sunni scholars in the field of applied law’. This imitation ‘is considered by most authors to be sufficient, if a person is firmly convinced of the Truth, or if he lacks the capacity to understand the evidence.’\(^{384}\)

In spite of all this, if al-Wālī derived his categorical rejection of taqīḍ from al-Sanūsī, he was not the only one. Some of al-Sanūsī’s commentators, for instance a certain Yahya al-Shawī (d. 1685) and ‘Isā al-Saktānī (d. 1652), both theologians in the Maghrib, shared a disparagement of imitation, which they

\(^{377}\) Sharḥ 1932, 16.

\(^{378}\) Brosselard 1861,255.

\(^{379}\) Kaysh 1993.

\(^{380}\) Luciani 1908, 102, 103.

\(^{381}\) Luciani 1908, 98-106.

\(^{382}\) Luciani 1908, 88,89.

\(^{383}\) Luciani 1908, 120, 121.

\(^{384}\) Luciani 1908, 120, 121.
based on the opinion of the master from Tlemcen.\footnote{El-Rouayheb 2006.} In the same period, a group of ‘ulamā’ in the west Saharan town of Sijilmasa apparently indulged in ‘inquisitory practices’, based on the view that those who could not produce the answers to philosophical questions regarding \textit{tawhīd} were unbelievers.\footnote{Al-Hajj 1974/77, 7. al-Yūsī, al-Ḥ. b. Mas‘ūd. (no title) Arabe 1273, BN.} It seems, then, that the idea of the ‘imitator’ as an outsider circulated in West Africa on a wider scale.

But we know this because a contemporary of these inquisitory ‘ulamā’, al-Ḥasan b. Mas‘ūd al-Yūsī (d. 1691), criticised them sharply, explaining that one who did not know all the desired details could certainly be a true believer.\footnote{El-Rouayheb 2006. For the Maghrhebian al-Yūsī see GAL II 455, S I 675.} ‘Aḥmad b. ‘Isā al-Anṣārī (d. 1826 in Sudan) was hesitant: he wrote a commentary on the \textit{Ṣughra} in which he remarked, of the duty to know what is necessary, possible and impossible with respect to God, that one must avoid calling others doubters, and that there are different opinions about the imitator; that al-Bāqillānī for instance says that the faith of an imitator is true.\footnote{A. b. ‘Isā al-Anṣārī, \textit{Sharḥ umm al-barāḥin} ‘alā al-Sanūsīyya. Al-Qāhirah: n.d. 1962, 9.} Another commentator, Muḥammad b. ‘Aḥmad al-Dasūqī (d. 1815), was more explicit. Commenting on al-Sanūsī’s own commentary, he wrote: ‘The words that the imitator is not a believer are regarded as dubious, because it would imply \textit{takfir} on the part of most common believers, and they are the majority of the umma.’\footnote{M. b. A. al-Dasūqī, \textit{Ḥāshiya} ‘alā sharḥ Umm al-barāḥīn. Al-Qāhirah: n.d. 1912, 67.} Of course these commentators are from other regions, and partly from a later period than al-Sanūsī or al-Wālī. But their opinions serve to demonstrate that among Ash‘arī theologians, \textit{taqlīd} was never an issue that had simply been decided. Against that background, the insistence in \textit{The peerless method} that it had been so decided is striking, and draws our attention to the central importance of the theme of ‘blind acceptance’ versus learning and knowing in this text.

The position of \textit{The peerless method} is clear: Muslims had to gather intellectual, as opposed to intuitive, knowledge about their religion, and to use their intellect (‘\textit{aql}) to understand it. This point is emphasised by a stylistic turn. Where al-Sanūsī wrote ‘know that rational judgement consists of three categories’, \textit{The peerless method} repeats (words from the \textit{Ṣughra} in italics): ‘\textit{Know}, you who are eager to enter the group of friends of God, that al-‘aqūdah al-sughra teaches you what you must know of \textit{tafsīr}, hadith and \textit{fiqh}. Rational judgement consists of three categories.’ The word ‘\textit{know}’ has been cut loose from al-Sanūsī’s sentence and appropriated by the commentary, emphasising the essential importance it has for its authors. \textit{I‘lam} (know) is of course a very common word in texts about religious doctrine. It has been used for centuries almost as a conjunction, to posit a thesis and begin a sentence. The literal meaning in those cases fades to the point that in translations the word often disappears altogether. Here, however, the imperative is anything but casual. Isolated in terms of both syntax and quotation, it takes on a solemn character and recalls the sacred word of the archangel Jibrīl to the prophet Muḥammad, \textit{tawrāt}, recite! At the same time it is linked to the idea of people entering, as if it were transferred from the abstract categories of judgement of the \textit{Ṣughra}, to a place where it stands as a heavy gate, guarded by ‘ulamā’ who will ask for the password.

As the text of \textit{The peerless method} progresses, the figure of the imitator is ever more present. There is increasing emphasis on the exhortation to learn, ‘so that you are not an imitator’. Starting about halfway through the text of the commentary, sentences from the \textit{Ṣughra} (in italics in the example below) about God’s necessary ideal and real attributes are time and again expanded by the added formula,\footnote{W. Ong describes the formula as a ‘more or less exactly repeated set of phrases or expressions […] in verse or prose, which […] have a function in oral culture more crucial and pervasive than any they may have in a writing or print or electronic culture.’ Ong 1982, 26.} ‘if you are asked about proof—according to reason/according to revelation—of [x], then say [y], so that you are not an imitator.’ For instance:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Al-Qāhirah: n.d. 1962, 9.} \end{quote}
‘If you are asked about the proof of the existence of God the Exalted, according to reason, then say, so that you are not an imitator: ‘as for the proof of God’s existence according to reason, that is the creation of the world.’

At times, the proof from reason that the believer is supposed to be able to reproduce is quite complex, like this example about the creation of the world (which is part of the proof that there is a Creator):

And if you are asked about proof for the world’s creation, then say: ‘the proof of the creation of the world, that is of this earthly world, is its being inseparable from properties that are accidental in time, like movement and rest and such things, for instance uniting and dividing; and that which is inseparable from properties that exist in time, is itself temporal.

If you are asked about the creation of the accidental, then say: ‘the proof of the creation of the accidental is the observation of its transformation from non-being to being and from being to non-being.’ If the accidental properties were eternal, then they could not be non-existent. But their non-existence has been observed in numerous bodies, just like their opposite, existence. So the observation of the transformation of occasional things is proof of their creation, and the link to temporal occasional things is proof of their creation, and their creation is proof of their existence in time, and their existence in time is what is pursued. Praise God who guides us when we desire this proof of existence according to reason.

The reasoning reflects the standard kalām argumentation for the existence of the Creator. It was well known among scholars in the historic heartlands of Islam, who had studied works on such topics as uṣūl al-dīn by al-Bāqillānī (kitāb al-tamhīd) or al-Ash’ārī (kitāb al-luma’). But, judging from Hall and Stewart’s ‘core curriculum’, not many West African scholars can have been familiar with such works, and even if they had been, the reasoning seems hardly fit for testing the basic religious knowledge of the common believer. For al-Wālī however, basic knowledge was really not enough. Whoever wrote this paragraph—an earlier Fulani scholar or al-Wālī himself—was interested in science at a high level. As usual in Ash’ārī kalām, the proof from reason is followed by proof from revelation (in this case Q 14:10: ‘Can there be doubt concerning Allāh, the creator of the heavens and the earth?’). Then follows a most suitable verse from ‘the poet’, that is Abū l-‘Abbās al-Maqqārī, who wrote: ‘Our proof for the existence of the world is, when you are learned, that the world was created.’

The point is that in The peerless method al-Sanūsī’s connection between the shahāda and knowledge is, if not entirely replaced, nonetheless overshadowed by a connection between imitation and unbelief, because the intention of The peerless method was to draw a line between ‘imitators’ and believers. It maintained that the person who, when asked, could not reproduce the required proof, would be considered an imitator, and therefore an unbeliever—and that was that. Where did this intransigent view come from? I suggest three influences: first, a local concern with obedience, notably to the ‘ulamā’; second, the sudanese tradition of reform described by Hiskett; and third, a contemporary reform movement in the Middle East.

Obedience to ‘ulamā’

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391 Hunwick 178, 33.
392 Hunwick 178, 33.
394 Hunwick 178, 33: دلیلنا علی وجدان العالم ان کبت عالمیا حديث العالم: Abū l-‘Abbās A.b.M. al-Maqqārī al-Tilimsānī al-Mālikī al-Ash’ārī b. al-Tatā’ūn Shihāb al-Dīn(GAL II 296, S II 407)was born at the end of 16th century in Tlemcen. He taught history in hadith in Fez, then went on to teach in Mecca, Damascus and Cairo. His Manzūmat یدا’ت al-dajjuna fi ِitiqād ahl al-sunna, from which this line is taken, is a profession of faith in fivehundred verses. It is part of Hall & Stewart’s ‘core curriculum’. Two thousand copies of it appear to have been made during his lifetime.
As we saw in the previous chapter, things were changing for ‘ulamāʾ in this period: the spread of Islam to rural areas, the rise of popular Islam, and an increasing number of specialists of the religion, not all of whom had the same scholarly education, fed the idea that ‘ulamāʾ could be ‘bad’. At the same time, some influential ṣūfīs claimed that the intellectual learning of ‘ulamāʾ was not the only way to gain knowledge of the truth. Moreover, the good relationship between ‘ulamāʾ and the ruling class, which had lasted more than five centuries, now appeared to be less strong. Now, the rejection of the imitator dove-tailed with, and may, indeed, have originated in the collective concern of ‘ulamāʾ with classical book learning, who were losing some of their status among Muslim communities. At the same time, this rejection answered the needs of rural communities, which were struggling to define their new Muslim identity. Both factors—the latter will be further explored in the next chapter—belong to the social history of central sudanic Africa.

In accordance with Ashʿarism, al-Sanūsī had written in his Muqaddima that any truthful doctrine must be in agreement with both reason and tradition, but he had left it to his readers to find examples from revelation to support his tenets. In many cases, The peerless method does supplement proof from reason (dalīl al-ʿaql) with citations from tradition (dalīl al-naql)—that is, the sunna or the Qurʿān. For the student of theology, proof from reason and proof from tradition functioned in the same way at a cognitive level; only the source or method of proving were different. As we have seen, dalīl is proof in the sense of an unmistakable sign. ‘Proof from reason’ did not mean that the student was supposed to ‘invent’ his own logical proof, but that he must remember and be able to reproduce the proof that had been established before by authoritative scholars, just as he had to learn which Quranic verses or ḥadīths proved certain theses. Both types of information depended on the specialised knowledge of scholars.

Against this background, the imitator in The peerless method is not someone who follows pagans or the wrong ‘ulamāʾ, but someone who does not pay due attention to the ‘ulamāʾ and what they stand for at all. He is someone who repeats single phrases from the Muslim tradition and who merely poses as a believer—someone who has picked up scattered details about Islam but who cannot reproduce enough propositions and proofs regarding the attributes of God and the Prophet, including quite complex philosophic lines of reasoning from the Muʿtazila repertoire.

In contrast, the believer was the person who had memorised—in Arabic, not in his mother tongue—parts of text on the subject of tawḥīd. In actual practice this was the person who was regularly spending time with an ʿālim, sitting at his feet to hear the text and memorise it. Indeed, popular texts from a tradition that expounded ‘the benefits of learning’ tell students that ‘he who is not present at the place of a scholar for 40 days in a row is [one of the people who side] with Pharaoh.’395 The believer, then, was the person who visited the ‘ulamāʾ, paid his respects to them, and submitted to their authority. In the preface of The peerless method it says, intricately but tellingly:

> Verily, God created four kingdoms. One in the east, one in the west, one in the south and one in the north. They never stop exclaiming, each morning and evening. Those who are in the east [exclaim]: If only we had not been created! And those in the west: If only we knew, when we were created, why we were created! Those in the south [exclaim]: Alas, if we knew why we were created, we would act according to what we knew. And those in the north: Alas! If only we had not acted according to what we knew, we would have resigned from what the ‘ulamāʾ prohibit us!396

What this means is that the knowledge that ordinary human beings have is always insufficient. Only the ‘ulamāʾ have the knowledge that can bring salvation. And relevant salvation in this cultural context

395 See e.g. Falke 11 and Falke 269.II
396 Hunwick 178, 8 has ‘north’ again where other manuscripts have ‘south’. Hunwick 178 and Ibadan 82/48 mix up the verbs ﻋﻤﻞ and ﻋﻠﻢ in the sentences about the people in the south and the north. Apparently the passage did not appeal much to the copyists. But mss Arabe 5541 and 5650 (Paris) solve that problem, and are the sources of the translation given here.
was in this life, here and now. It was to be a member of the Muslim community and not an outcast. And it was the knowledge of the ‘ulamā’ that made the difference.

**Bad Muslims**

The distinction between good and bad Muslims, and therefore the discussion about the grounds for anathematising (takfīr), had long been a central theme for reformers in all parts of the Muslim world, including West Africa. Here, qāḍī Iyād (d. 1149) had written, in his famous *Kitāb al-shifā*’, that unbelief was in the first place ignorance of God. He differentiated between three kinds of unbelievers: born unbelievers (such as Jews and Christians), apostates, and those who were to be adjudged unbelievers on account of their actions and beliefs. Committing a sin, even a capital one such as murder, adultery or treating the prophets with levity, made one a sinner, but not necessarily an unbeliever. But denying revelation and divine law by doing things that only an unbeliever would do, or saying things only an unbeliever would say, like declaring the drinking of wine or other sins lawful, did make one an unbeliever.397

As we know from his letters to Askia Muḥammad and Muḥammad Rumfa, al-Maghīlī adopted this view. He also discussed other grounds for takfīr that were related to diverging intellectual positions. Maintaining, for instance, that God is knowing but has no knowledge, as did the Muʿtazila, while being aware of the logical implication that God is thus denied one of His necessary attributes, made one an unbeliever in the eyes of some, said al-Maghīlī, although he acknowledged that there was no agreement on the matter.398 He also warned against the mixing of the Muslim faith with practices related to traditional beliefs.

The next discussion of the theme that is well documented and preserved is that between ‘Uthmān dan Fodio and his teacher, shaykh Jibrīl b. ‘Umar. It took place more than a century after the period in which al-Wālī was active, but it responds to developments that had been building up in the eighteenth and possibly the seventeenth century. It can therefore add to our ‘oblique’ view of the second half of the seventeenth century, and it will allow us to compare al-Wālī’s ideas with those of one of his readers. Shaykh Jibrīl maintained that people who were disobedient by virtue of having committed a grave sin were unbelievers, and that even those who refused to listen to what ‘an intelligent person says’ while they themselves were ‘of little knowledge’ and befuddled by ‘fanciful opinions on their Islam’ were unbelievers.399 What intelligent people would say, according to Jibrīl, was that someone who commits sins such as having more than four wives, not veiling his womenfolk, partaking in or allowing the mingling of men and women, taking women in tribal warfare and depriving orphans of their rights, necessarily becomes an unbeliever.400 Arguably, this view was in keeping with the idea that doing things that only unbelievers would do made one an unbeliever. Hiskett commented ‘the teaching of Sheikh Jibrīl b. ‘Umar set off a controversy in the Sudanese towns, centred round the relation of “disobedience” (here synonymous with non-Islamic local custom) to unbelief’.401

Dan Fodio was much troubled by the extremely judgemental attitude of his venerated shaykh and of many others around him, and referred to al-Maghīlī and al-Suyūṭī to justify his view that a sinner was not an unbeliever. In the course of his career, he wrote a few dozen sermons and treatises warning against anathematising. He specifically rejected the practice, which had become quite popular by then,

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397 See Hunwick 1985. 118-120. Ibadis too accepted the idea that sinners are not unbelievers. Ibadism was important in the region for at least the early history of Islam. See Chapter Two.
399 The text of a poem on the subject by Shaykh Jibrīl is rendered in Bivar and Hiskett 1962, 141-143.
401 Hiskett 1962, 591.
of questioning people on their knowledge of religion and accusing them of unbelief if this knowledge was insufficient.\textsuperscript{402}

Nevertheless, obedience was an issue for Dan Fodio too. In his \textit{Nur al-albāb} he wrote that there are Muslims, unbelievers and groups about whose status there is no agreement. He divided unbelievers into the same two categories: al-Maghālī and qāḍī Iyād. Believers were also found in three groups: they were the ‘ulamā’, the students (\textit{talabā}a) and those who listen to the ‘ulamā’ and follow their example—almost a social category. One of the groups about which there was no agreement was made up of the ignorant who had entered Islam but did not understand on what it is based, and yet did not pursue \textit{taqlīd}—‘they pronounce the \textit{shahāda} without sound belief, but do not study or question the ‘ulamā’ or attend their gatherings, because of their lack of interest: in the eyes of God they are unbelievers, but insofar as they do nothing in word or deed that reflects unbelief, their fellowmen must accept them as Muslims.’\textsuperscript{403} As a great social leader, Dan Fodio was more moderate than his teacher regarding sin and much more moderate than al-Wālī regarding \textit{taqlīd}. But even for Dan Fodio the decisive matter, the question that made one an unbeliever or not ‘in the eyes of God’, was whether one studied and attended the ‘ulamā’’s lessons. By this time, the ‘ulamā’’s grip on the Muslim community was a major issue.

Hiskett, Hunwick and Brenner have convincingly demonstrated the continuity of reformist themes, terminology and quotations from qāḍī Iyād to al-Maghālī and then to ‘Uthmān dan Fodio. How this tradition developed in between these landmarks, which are each three centuries apart, is still largely unknown, but \textit{The peerless method} adds another link to the chain of its transmission. It demonstrates that the promotion of anathematising was not so much initiated, as Hiskett remarked, but rather elaborated on by shaykh Jibrīl, because before him, in al-Wālī’s time, it was already a burning question. ‘Uthmān dan Fodio rejected the austere stance in the matter of unbelief his shaykh Djibrīl, of al-Wālī, and of the sectarian ‘mutakallimān’ who used the knowledge recorded in \textit{The peerless method} to test people’s devotion. But he shared al-Wālī’s idea that faith and loyalty to the ‘ulamā’ were as good as synonymous.

Fundamentally, \textit{The peerless method} is preoccupied with determining what sorts of people did or did not belong to the community of believers. The commentary, in spite of the many lines that were added to the \textit{Ṣughra}’s ruminations about God’s attributes, is in the end not so much about abstract principles of faith or theology, but about the practical matter of sifting the wheat from the chaff in daily life. Within this tradition, the theme of \textit{taqlīd} served as the litmus test that demonstrated whether a self-professed Muslim was wheat or chaff.

\textit{Influence from the Middle East}

It has been suggested that, from the late eighteenth century onwards, the movement of reform in central sudanic Africa was influenced by Wahhabism.\textsuperscript{404} It is a fact that Wahhabism also explicitly rejected imitation of medieval scholarly opinions and propagated the doctrine that disobedience in religious matters involve unbelief. Nevertheless, \textit{The peerless method} shows that, in sudanic Africa, a rigorous position regarding the imitator had developed well before Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792) was born. On the other hand, African theologians such as al-Wālī were evidently influenced by discussions in the Middle East, notably in the holy cities, where pilgrims from the far

\textsuperscript{402}Brenner and al-Hajj; Brenner 1984, 84-85; Brenner and Last 1985a, 436. In this light, Bello’s and Dan Fodio’s admiration of al-Wālī is the more remarkable. One ground for it was al-Wālī’s work on grammar. Dan Fodio also agreed with al-Wālī that listening to the ‘ulamā’ was crucial for the status of a believer. But he disagreed with the tendency expressed so strongly in \textit{The peerless method}, to exclude people on account of not having all the answers to theological questions.

\textsuperscript{403}Brenner 1987, 52-53.

\textsuperscript{404}Hiskett rejected this view in 1962, 593 ff, and later wrote that ‘the western sudan was not immune to intellectual and spiritual currents from the Islamic world beyond the Sudan. Powerful among these currents was the rise of Wahhabism’. See \textit{The Course of Islam in Africa}, 1994, 109.
corners of the Muslim world met ‘to imbibe the doctrines and ways of recentered Sunnism.’ In al-Wālī’s day, a lively debate was taking place there about the relation between taqlīd and ijtihād, of which he must have been well aware. On one of his journeys to Mecca, he was reported to have visited Muhammad b. ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Bābīlī (1592-1666). This remarkable man, a Shāfi‘ī, published only one book, because modesty held him back from writing anything that would not add significantly to what others had already done before him. But he had a great reputation as a jurist and a teacher of ḥadīths, and many of his students would go on to earn fame in their own right. One of these was Muhammad Ḥāyā, who was to become one of the teachers of ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Al-Bābīlī studied not so much the chains of transmission of ḥadīths, as had been the vogue for centuries, but rather the texts themselves and their meaning as sources of law. This formed the core of his reformist ideas. John Voll identified al-Bābīlī as one of the focal points of a network of revivalist ‘ulamā‘ in Cairo, Madīna and Mecca, who all shared this pursuit to return to the sunna and the Qur‘ān as the direct sources of sharī‘a, by way of individual unrestricted ijtihād instead of taqlīd.

Students and scholars who participated in this network were from various geographical regions, including Persia, North Africa and India and also from various legal schools. Some of them were Ḥanafī, more were Mālikī, but most were Shāfi‘ī. Strict adherence to one of the schools or its legal doctrine was not as important to them as it had been in earlier periods. Moreover, many of these revivalists subscribed to a ṣūfī tariqa, and often to more than one. They were not opposed to mysticism as such. But as Voll pointed out, there was certainly a tension within their circles, between their appreciation of the popular ways of the ṭuruq and the ‘ulamā‘’s struggle to uphold the more formal tenets of religion.

This tension is further analysed in the previously mentioned article on reform in pre-modern Islam by B.M. Nafi. He shows how sentiments in these circles turned against the excesses of popular Sufism, but also against the ṣūfī understanding of two separate fields of knowledge, one concerning inner truth, the other, the rules of outer truth, to which the sharī‘a belongs. These scholars objected in particular to the idea that knowledge of inner truth could be gained without a good measure of knowledge of the outer truth or strict compliance to the sharī‘a. Others among them accused Sufism of asserting too close an association between the divine and the contingent in their doctrine of wuṣūd. On the other hand, the reformers felt that many philosophical systems, including the Ash‘arī interpretation of God’s attributes, had gone too far over the centuries in their abstraction. In any case, the position of the Qur‘ān and the Sunna as the fundamental sources of religion and law had to be reasserted.

Al-Wālī was clearly interested in this reconsideration of the Qur‘ān and the sunna. Many examples from both sources were added in The peerless method as proof of God’s attributes, and many were also included in Valid arguments. It is possible that al-Wālī also heeded the concerns discussed in the court-yards of al-Bābīlī, about extravagant ṣūfī customs and the excessive importance that some ṣūfīs accorded, in the eyes of the reformers, to the intuitive path to the knowledge of inner truth. Listening to and participating in these discussions, al-Wālī can hardly have missed the link with what he had heard or seen himself of ṣūfī’s such as shaykh ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Jalīl in Kalumbardo, the shaykh who was so proud of the knowledge he obtained without learning, and was moreover suspected of preaching disobedience to Bornu’s ruling class. The opinions of al-Wālī’s Caireen and Middle Eastern peers must have strengthened his own conviction that the value for religion of cognitive learning—that is, of the type of ḥazīn knowledge in which the ‘book-learned’ ‘ulamā‘ were specialists—had to be emphasised. And that is exactly what he did in his version of The peerless method.

5. Conclusion

405 Bulliet 1994, 177.
406 Voll1975, 32-39. See also Levtzion 2007, XII.
The peerless method builds on two traditions of canonical texts: al-Sanūsī’s written Al-‘aqīda al-ṣughra, and the oral commentaries on it that Fulani ‘missionaries’ transmitted to new Muslims in a large part of West Africa, and which were called the kabbe. Comparison between The peerless method and these other traditions offers an opportunity to investigate why the former was composed in the first place. Two questions arise: Why did al-Wālī write his version, and what was its message? I will explore the first question in chapter 7. The second was the subject of this chapter.

The second part of The peerless method follows the Ṣughra sentence by sentence, so that there seems to be little room for independent ideas. Nevertheless, I have argued in this chapter that the Fulani commentators, ending with al-Wālī, did more than just explain a canonical work in their own language. The first kabbe commentaries had translated the Ṣughra in a double sense: linguistically and culturally, from Arabic to Fulfulde and from the North African environment, where Islam had been the religion of the majority much longer and was taught in numerous madrasas, to the religion’s frontier in sudanic Africa. They added ideas stemming from their experience as educators about the organisation of a text in order to facilitate memorisation; from previous discussions they raised certain issues and left others out, and they inserted new notions. In short, they adapted al-Sanūsī’s text for their own audience.

However, the purpose or the general drift of the first Fulfulde comments was comparable to that of the Ṣughra. Al-Sanūsī’s ‘small creed’ was a scholastic work, with an educative aim. It was meant to impart to believers more knowledge of the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of the attributes of God, the central doctrine of Ash’arism. Written in an environment where fushā’ Arabic was widely understood, the Ṣughra was intended to imbue Muslims with the sense of duty needed to understand basic principles of their religion, and to make better Muslims out of the majority of believers. The final lines of al-Sanūsī’s text take into account that intellect was not the only route to the knowledge of religious truth, and declare that it could also be reached by methods of mysticism, in particular by internalising the knowledge represented by the words of the shahāda. Essentially, al-Sanūsī’s aim was the commitment to Islam of as many believers as possible. It was an inclusive goal, with an aspect of emancipation.

The same can be said of the oral kabbe tradition. It reformulated the Ṣughra and expanded it, explaining it to Muslims in West Africa and adding general information about the culture and the religion of Islam, so that new converts would know what Muslims do. It did so in Fulfulde, the language of the ‘missionaries’ and their first audience. Kabbe versions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries continued to address a very broad audience. They, too, present their content as one of two equally important ways to obtain religious knowledge—notably, knowledge about the manifest laws and principles, and knowledge about hidden truths, which could be obtained by following the path of the mystic.

In The peerless method, however, the first characteristic that the kabbe and the Ṣughra share—inclusiveness—is replaced by its opposite. A further characteristic of the kabbe—its presentation of rational knowledge along with a recognition of the equally valid possibility of mystical knowledge—seems to be pushed into the background in The peerless method. The result is a marked tension between an approach to religious knowledge as esoteric and the more orthodox approach to knowledge as something that can be had by means of reason.

The text features various references to Sufism. However, one of the supposed indications of Sufism, the literary method of explaining concepts by attaching meaning to each letter of the word that represents them, may well have served the practical purpose of a mnemonic aid. As I have argued, the method does not necessarily signal an interest in ‘ilm al-ḥurūf, the mystical means to discover hidden truths through the study of values that letters share with other realms of creation. Other references to Sufism are weighed down by the strong emphasis, throughout the text, on reason, on nazarī knowledge obtained through intellectual reflection, and on the transmission of ḥadīths and knowledge of the Qur’ān—all sorts of knowledge that only cognitive learning can impart.
The peerless method does not address believers who aspire to reach the exalted level of friends-of-God, and not even individuals who seek salvation in the hereafter. It addresses individuals who need to know the basics of Islam, so that they are not considered ‘imitators’, unbelievers, or outcasts. Apart from knowledge of God, these basics include knowledge of Islamic social life, in which one must know one’s place, and that of the shaykh, the faqīh and the imam. In other words, the objective of the authors of The peerless method was the transformation, not of the soul (as with Sufism), but of society.

In the society thus envisaged, there is no place for imitators, because they are unbelievers, without exception and without doubt. This notion of the imitator as an unbeliever is the most idiosyncratic element that The peerless method adds to the Ṣughra. The idea does seem to be related to the practice that the Maghrībi scholar al-Yūsī recorded in the same period, of testing people’s knowledge of tawḥīd. But it had not, up until then, been integrated in a serious scholarly work. And surely, The peerless method’s pronounced stance against taqlīd fits into a trend, which grew in the seventeenth century, whereby the rational sciences grew in popularity. It was also in keeping with the insistence on ijtihād in certain circles in the Middle East. But in The peerless method, all the inspiration is put to this specific use of defining the muqallid in a way that no other sunni theologian had followed. That the imitator is an unbeliever is far from a casual idea. The author or authors rather hammered away at it with a repeated formula. The ‘imitator’, who does not accept the importance of study and reason, is the motor that turns the inclusive character of the Ṣughra and the kabbe into exclusiveness, into a method of defining who does and who does not belong to the community of Muslims.

The aim of this chapter has been to find out what The peerless method is really about. Commentaries, Hughes wrote, use canonical sources to express the basic values of a new community. A basic value of the new Muslim communities in the central sudanic countryside of the second half of the seventeenth century was firmness of belief, as opposed to doubt or ambiguity about religious and therefore social loyalties. Another text by al-Wālī begins with greetings to the Prophet, his companions and ‘those who consolidate faith and are steadfast in certainty’.

Firm belief and commitment were at the core of a new Muslim identity, which was expressed by a communal lifestyle with new daily routines of prayer and formal learning. The peerless method reflects and reinforces this identity, because it is about marking the cultural boundary between dedicated Muslims and ‘doubters’, between people who

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sit down with an ‘ālim to learn and others who do not and who are therefore suspected of loyalty to their traditional religion. The role of the ‘ālim was crucial: in a time when Islam expanded to the countryside and the position of the ‘ulamā’ was changing, their specialised knowledge was presented as indispensable for the ordinary believer who does not want to be mistaken for an unbeliever.

The analysis of *The peerless method* has also shown that the author of its final version, al-Wālī, negotiated between different levels of Muslim culture. To begin with, his basic material—consisting of the ‘mainstream’ Ṣughra and the regional tradition of the kabbe—had a hybrid character. I have argued that al-Wālī himself was inspired on the one hand by ideas he had discussed with peers in Cairo or Mecca, in the circle of the Shāfi’ī scholar of hadīth al-Bābilī. On the other hand, his *Peerless method* responded to social dynamics at the local level—that is, to the need of both ‘ulamā’ and ordinary believers to rethink their role as Muslims in a time when Islam was spreading to new populations. This last issue will be further explored in the next chapter.