Leaders’ self-perceived prototypicality, trust and punishment

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Abstract

In this research we hypothesize a relation between leadership prototypicality and trust, because prototypical leaders have greater identity overlap with their group than non-prototypical leaders. Secondly we hypothesize that punishment behavior of prototypical versus non-prototypical leaders will differ (i.e. prototypical leaders experience a bigger drop in trust and therefore will punish harsher). Thirdly we hypothesize: punishment will result in an increase of self-perceived prototypicality for prototypical leaders. We did a lab study with students, manipulating their leadership prototypicality. We then introduced a norm violation in a common goods dilemma. A positive relation was found between leadership prototypicality and trust. There was no relation between self-perceived prototypicality and punishment and interaction between punishment availability and leadership prototypicality. No relation was found for leadership prototypicality and punishment harshness. Limitations to the study were an experimental setting and a specific research group.
Leadership research has mainly focused on the effects leaders have on their followers. Chemers (2001) describes effective leadership in terms of chosen behavior by a leader and the effect of this behavior on followers. In our research the focus is on the effects followers have on their leaders. Followers' behavior can have an effect on the leader and his behavior. Provided as such, we can get greater insight in how leader versus follower behavior interacts, and what this means for leadership. To get a better understanding of the influence leaders have on their followers, it is important to realize that followers could possibly create the leader that leads them. This assumed interaction between leaders and followers can be taken into account by future leaders. Therefore it is of importance to get greater insight to how this interaction works.

One perspective on leadership and the effect leaders have on followers is known as the instrumental perspective of leadership: the purpose of leadership is distributing power, goods and stimulating wanted behavior. Leadership is mainly seen as a tool which can be used to achieve goals. The social identity perspective argues that leaders and followers can derive a part of their identity from the groups they belong to. Ascribing self-identity to groups by leaders and followers, creates social dependence of the groups. The social identity perspective makes us wonder if there is more than a one-way relation between leaders and followers (Chemers, 2001).

Giessner and Knippenberg (2007, 2009) categorize leaders in two groups: prototypical and non-prototypical leaders. Leaders’ prototypicality can be seen as: does the leader represent the group and its characteristics? Prototypical leaders embody the group and its group identity and non-prototypical leaders don’t represent the group characteristics. Self-perceived prototypicality can be described as the leaders' prototypicality, estimated by the leader himself. Leaders' prototypicality could relate to the interaction between leaders and followers.
The relation between leaders' prototypicality and leader-follower interaction can be explained by trust and punishment behavior. Is there a relation between leaders' prototypicality and their trust in followers? We predict that prototypical leaders trust followers more. Secondly, the trust of leaders can be violated. What happens if prototypical leaders face norm violators. Will their trust in followers and self-perceived prototypicality change? And is there a relation between punishment harshness and leaders' prototypicality? We hypothesize a bigger drop in trust for prototypical leaders which will result in harsher punishment behavior for trust-violators. Thirdly, the effect of punishment availability on leaders' prototypicality is positive and increases ingroup trust (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013). We hypothesize the same effect in a leader-follower context.

Social identity theory and prototypical versus non-prototypical leaders

Social identity is, as Taifel describes: “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership” (1974, p.69). The social identity is formed by groups that have emotional impact on us. As Hogg (2001) describes, we choose which group belongs to our identity due to self-categorization, a process in which we categorize our identity in terms of relevant group identities.

Leaders are group members with disproportionate influence, having the possibility to divide prestigious goods or to change attitudes, opinions, behavior or the destiny of group members. Leadership can be seen as an leader-follower interaction. This means that a leader can have influence on the group, but that a group can also have influence on a leader. A social identity perspective on leadership consists of the idea that leaders as well as followers derive a
part of their identity from groups to which they belong. Group membership can have influence on both followers and leaders their behavior (Chemers, 2001).

Group prototypicality can be defined as the degree of similarity to the group prototype, a mental representation of the characteristics that define a group in comparison to relevant other groups (Hogg, 2001). An important variable in the social identity perspective on leadership is self-perceived prototypicality of the leader. That is the extent to which the leader feels like he represents the group characteristics and group norms. Leaders’ self-perceived prototypicality has influence on leaders’ actions.

**Being a prototypical leader: trust of the leader in followers**

A prototypical leader links his self-concept to the identity of the group that he leads (van Knippenberg, 2011). Belonging to the same group and therefore sharing the same identity results in high levels of trust between strangers (i.e., between leader and followers) (e.g, Foddy, Yamagishi, & Platow, 2009). The level of identity overlap between followers and the leader is greater in a group with a prototypical leader in comparison with a group with a non-prototypical leader. We therefore assume that this stronger shared group-identity by leader and followers leads to higher amounts of trust by the prototypical leader in his followers.

Following from the above literature we hypothesize: 1. Prototypical leaders trust followers more than non-prototypical leaders. Belonging to the same group and therefore sharing the same social identity will result in high levels of trust between leaders and followers. Prototypical leaders trust followers more because they feel that they belong (embody) the group and represent its members (e.g, Foddy, Yamagishi, & Platow, 2009).
Punishment and prototypicality

But what happens if followers violate trust? Social dilemma’s, in which the collective interests are in conflict with private interests, are used to measure cooperation in groups. Social dilemma's are also used to simulate norm-violations.

We want to focus on the leader-follower trust relation. This relation can either be one of high-trust or low-trust. Trust in a group context could possibly tell us more about this leader-follower trust relation. In research by Balliet and Van Lange (2013), a comparison is made between high-trust groups and low-trust groups and the promotion of cooperation by punishing norm violators. In their discussion on punishment and trust, they state that in high-trust groups the act of punishment is seen as a benevolent thing and is much more effective for promoting cooperative behavior. Cooperative norm enforcers, in other words the punishers, get an enhanced status and reputation when punishing norm-violators in high-trust groups. Secondly, people in high-trust groups feel more guilty when violating a norm and will therefore start to cooperate in response to punishment. In low-trust groups norms are less shared and enforced, so when a norm is violated, punishment of those norm-violators will be less seen as of interest to the collective.

We hypothesized that prototypical leaders will have an high-trust relation with their followers. When group norms are violated, the prototypical leader will probably feel that his trust has been misused. A prototypical leader will have a high-trust relation with group members, which probably motivates him to enforce norms. The prototypical leader will punish in order to reestablish trust and cooperative behavior in the group and assumedly will see this as a benevolent thing for the group. Non-prototypical will have a lower trust relation with their followers. They will not see punishment as a benevolent act for the group. We therefore hypothesize: 2. Prototypical leaders will punish more harshly when group norms are violated.
LEADER’S PROTOTYPICALITY AND PUNISHMENT BEHAVIOR

What happens with the leaders' prototypicality after the punishment? The research by Giessner and Knippenberg (2007, 2009), as read in Knippenberg (2011), states that self-perceived group prototypicality intrinsically motivates group-oriented behavior, because prototypical leaders ascribe group interests to self. We argue that leaders’ prototypicality is linked to the trust they have in their followers and that trust in group members by itself can lead to self-perceived prototypicality. In high-trust relations, punishment is seen as a benevolent act for the group. If the leader perceives the punishment as of interest to the group, they could perceive themselves as more prototypical after the punishment (Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). On the basis of the above mentioned research we hypothesize: 3. Prototypical leaders will feel more prototypical after punishing norm violators.

**Method**

**Participants, design and procedure.** Our research focused on randomly selected participants (N = 184), divided randomly in 2 conditions (prototypical leaders versus non-prototypical leaders). Participants were all students studying at the University of Leiden (127 women, 57 men, $M_{age} = 21.9$ years, $SD_{age} = 2.7$, age range: 17-35 years). We recruited through social media such as Facebook and impromptu recruitment at the Faculty of Social Sciences. Participants got 6 euro or 2 credit for 60 minutes of participation.

**Descriptive information.** The participants got instructions on a computer screen and were able to respond to questions by entering values or answering multiple-choice questions. Before the research started our participants got an informed consent, which consisted of some general information and the important notification that they could stop the experiment at any time if they wanted to. Participants put their signature down, agreeing that they read the informed consent.
The participant then gave us some personal information: gender, age and the amount of times the participant participated in a Social Psychology experiment through a digital survey.

**Social Dilemma.** Then the participants got information on a computer screen about the experiment; "There is a team consisting of three players (A, B & C). Those players divide a public account consisting of 30 coins each worth 30 eurocents. These coins can result in additional money on top of the six euro or two credits payment for the study. The dilemma, also referred to as the common goods dilemma, is leaving the coins in the public account or taking an amount of 10 coins or less into a private account. All the coins left in the public account multiply by 1.5. Afterward the coins are divided amongst the three players. An amount of 30 coins in the public account is the best for the group outcome: 15 coins for each player. Coins taken from the public account are good for the individual outcome if other players don’t take coins from the public account. Those individual players will receive their takings and an equal share from the public account." In previous research a commons good dilemma was used to look at trust of group members and the implications of punishment (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). To check if participants understood the workings of this dilemma, we gave them some multiple-choice questions in which we asked about the different outcomes: "i.e. player A takes 10 coins, is this beneficial for the group outcome?" If participants understood the common goods dilemma, they continued with the actual process in which we determined who became the group leader.

**Leadership prototypicality.** After the common goods dilemma was introduced with three players, a fourth and final role was mentioned: the team leader.

We told participants: "Team leaders protect the group goals and what is best for the group outcome." We then manipulated leadership prototypicality. We gave three fictional people and
one real participant a MAI leadership questionnaire. This questionnaire focused on a personal vision of leadership and personality traits (see Appendix A for an exact copy of the MAI leadership questionnaire). We told them that we wanted leaders that were most similar or different to the team in terms of questionnaire results. All the participants became team leaders of what they thought was a real team of 3 people (labeled A,B,C) because they were either similar from them or different from them in terms of personality traits. With the described method we manipulated leadership prototypicality (cf. van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005).

**Measures before norm violation.**

*Self-prototypicality.* We proposed three statements to our participant that they could agree with on a 7-point scale with 1 = *totally disagreeing* and 7 = *totally agreeing* with the statement. We asked our participants if they represented the group, if they had a lot in common with their group and lastly if they had an overlap in personality with the group (α = .73) (cf. van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg, 2005).

*Interpersonal trust.* Trust was measured with an trust inventory. Items in the trust scale were for example: will team players play in favor of the group outcome? And can they be trusted to leave coins in the public account? We incorporated 8 items in this scale (see Appendix B for the entire trust inventory). The questions formulated as statements could be agreed with or disagreed with on a 7-point scale (α = .93).

*Norm violation.* Because our research focused on punishment behavior by the leader, we had to introduce a situation in which a norm was violated. Secondly, the norm violation had to be made salient for our leaders. The norm violation was introduced after the prototypicality manipulation. The team leaders got the following results from players A, B & C: player A took
three of the ten coins from the public account, player B took nine of the ten coins from the public account and lastly player C took two of the ten coins from the public account. The asymmetry of the outcome would cause, as suggested by Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, & Bembenek (2003), a general feeling of injustice and unfairness towards player B. We also asked beforehand if the behavior shown by player B was in conflict with the group goals or interests (van Knippenberg, 2011).

Measures after norm violation.

Punishment behavior. Participants could then punish player B if they perceived player B’s behavior as in conflict with group interests. Firstly, they had the power to reallocate coins from player B to an offshore account. These coins weren’t used in the experiment again. This type of punishment was considered as a moderate form of punishment. Secondly, they were able to reduce the amount of payment in euro for participating in the research. The role of the team leader (our research participant) started after the norm violation happened. The leader was asked if he wanted to punish player B. He could reduce coins from the earnings of this player (options ranging from 0 - 17 coins). Secondly, the leader got an option to punish player B by reducing the standard payment (0 - 3 euro).

Self-prototypicality. We measured leaders’ self-perceived prototypicality after the norm violation by using the same questions ($\alpha = .69$).

Interpersonal trust. We also measured their trust in followers again ($\alpha = .94$).

Analysis

Measures before the norm-violation.

Self-prototypicality. A two sided independent t-test was conducted, with leader’s prototypicality as the independent variable and self-perceived prototypicality before the norm
violation as the dependent variable. According to the scores on self-perceived prototypicality, leaders in the prototypical condition ($M = 4.79, SD = 1.09$) perceived themselves significantly more prototypical than leaders in the non-prototypical condition ($M = 3.12, SD = 1.10$), $t(182) = 10.23, p = .001, d = 1.53$.

*Trust.* A two sided independent t-test was conducted, with leader’s prototypicality as the independent variable and leader’s trust in subordinates before the violation as the dependent variable. According to the scores on leader’s trust, prototypical leaders ($M = 4.08, SD = 1.37$) trusted their subordinates significantly more than non-prototypical leaders ($M = 3.56, SD = 1.12$), $t(173) = 2.84, p = .001, d = .42$.

**Measures after the norm-violation.**

*Punishment.* An independent t-test was conducted to compare prototypical and non-prototypical leaders on the opportunity to punish by reallocating coins or subtracting money from the payment for the research. The scores on punishing by subtracting coins indicate that prototypical leaders ($M = 6.25, SD = 2.89$) didn’t reallocate coins from player B significantly more than non-prototypical leaders ($M = 6.10, SD = 3.43$), $t(178) = .33, p = .739, d = .05$. The scores on subtracting money from the payment in euro indicated that prototypical leaders ($M = 1.85, SD = 2.22$) didn’t lower the payment of player B significantly more than non-prototypical leaders ($M = 1.66, SD = 1.99$), $t(182) = .61, p = .541, d = .09$.

*Leader’s self-perceived prototypicality.* A two sided independent t-test was conducted, with condition as the independent variable and self-perceived prototypicality after the violation as the dependent variable to compare prototypical and non-prototypical leaders after the norm violation. According to the scores on self-perceived prototypicality post-norm violation, leaders in the prototypical condition ($M = 3.81, SD = 1.26$) perceived themselves equally prototypical as
leaders in the non-prototypical condition ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.16$), $t(182) = 1.74, p = .385, d = .26$.

Thus the difference between prototypical and non-prototypical leaders in self-perceived prototypicality disappeared after the norm-violation and option to punish.

**Trust.** According to the independent t-test we conducted, post norm-violation there was no difference in trust when comparing prototypical leaders ($M = 3.39, SD = 1.09$) with non-prototypical leaders ($M = 3.44, SD = 1.29$), $t(182) = -.29, p = .773, d = -0.04$.

**Comparing pre norm-violation with post norm-violation.**

**Self-prototypicality.** A paired-sample t-test was conducted and showed that prototypical leaders ($N = 91$) significantly dropped in their self-perceived prototypicality from pre-violation measurement ($M = 4.79, SD = 1.10$) to post-violation measurement ($M = 3.81, SD = 1.26$), $t(90) = 7.76, p = .001, d = 0.83$. On the other hand non-prototypical leaders ($N = 93$) significantly differed in their self-perceived prototypicality from pre-violation measurement ($M = 3.12, SD = 1.10$) to post-violation measurement ($M = 3.50, SD = 1.16$), $t(92) = -2.81, p = .006, d = -0.34$.

To take a look at punishment behavior by prototypical and non-prototypical leaders, we did a regression analysis incorporating the possibility to subtract euro from player's earnings and the interaction between condition and the possibility to downsize player's earnings. Condition significantly predicted the differences in self-perceived prototypicality $b = 1.33, t(180) = 3.28, p = .001$. Condition also explained a significant proportion of variance (23%), $p = .001$. Subtracting the coins ($b = .07, t(180) = 0.22, p = .83$) did not predict the differences in self-perceived prototypicality, neither was there an interaction between Condition and subtracting an amount of coins from the players earnings ($b = .003, t(180) = .05, p = .959$). Both accounted for 2% of explained variance.
To take in account the effects of punishment in different forms, we did a regression analysis incorporating the possibility to subtract money from the earnings for the experiment. Condition significantly predicted the differences in self-perceived prototypicality $b = 1.52, t(180) = 6.47, p < .001$. Condition also explained a significant proportion of variance (23%), $p = .001$.

The possibility to subtract an amount of euro from the participant ($b = .41, t(180) = 1.45, p = .26$) did not predict the differences in self-perceived prototypicality, neither was there an interaction between condition and subtracting an amount of euro from the participant’s earnings ($b = -.098, t(180) = -1.13, p = .259$). Both accounted for 2% of explained variance.

**Discussion**

Our research had as main purpose to give greater insight on the topic of leadership, seen as an interactive process between leaders and followers. Our main interest was the influence of followers on leaders. With 184 students, studying at the Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, divided in two conditions, we looked at the differences between prototypical leaders and non-prototypical leaders in an experimental setting. We found results that can give us insight in the domain of prototypicality and how it changes due to norm violating behavior by followers.

As we expected, leaders’ self-perceived prototypicality has a significant relation with the amount of trust they have in their followers. This is consistent with the recent findings of Foddy, Yamagishi & Platow (2009), but then translated to a leader versus followers situation. They suggest that with greater identity overlap, trust is greater amongst strangers. As Knippenberg (2011) describes, a prototypical leader has greater identity overlap with his followers.

Prototypical leaders trusted their followers more before the norm-violation.

Secondly we hypothesized that punishment by prototypical leaders would lead to an increase in self-perceived prototypicality. In contradiction to what we predicted, the self-
perceived prototypicality of a prototypical leader decreased significantly and trust in his followers also decreased. On the other hand non-prototypical leaders slightly increased in their self-perceived prototypicality and in the trust they have in their followers.

The results are in line with a perspective Balliet and Van Lange (2013) propose. The theory suggests that punishment is especially effective in low-trust societies. This is because in high-trust societies, members expect contributions to the public good and they see punishment as an unnecessary cost to stimulate contributions. Translated to leaders in relation to followers context, prototypical leaders with trust in their followers, can see the availability of punishment as an unnecessary thing because they trust their subordinates. They get disappointed when subordinates violate the norms and their trust drops. Punishing won’t restore their trust because they don’t see punishing as a way to justify the breach of trust between them and followers.

As Balliet and Van Lange (2013) continue to state; in low-trust societies punishment is seen as a means to get people to cooperate. Cooperation is less expected without an incentive to do so. Punishment assures members that others will cooperate. Translated to the context of leaders versus followers, a non-prototypical leader can see punishment as an incentive to stimulate cooperation. When a norm is violated, non-prototypical leaders see punishment as justification and retribution for the norm violation. Trust of a non-prototypical leader than increases because they believe that the punishment by itself created an incentive for future cooperation. Because they believe that followers will cooperate more, their trust in followers increases. And with the increase of trust also the leaders’ self-perceived prototypicality increases (Foddy, Yamagishi & Platow, 2009).

Thirdly, there was no difference between the way prototypical leaders and non-prototypical leaders punish. We tested two different punishment options: subtracting coins from
the private earnings of player B and subtracting euro from the payment participants received for the research. We predicted that prototypical leaders would punish harsher. This prediction is in line with what Balliet and Van Lange (2013) state, in high-trust groups norm enforcement is seen as a benevolent thing by all members, including a leader. Actually this prediction has been contradicted by the decrease of trust prototypical leaders experienced. Prototypical leaders also experienced a drop in self-perceived prototypicality. Therefore we can assume that punishment is not seen as a benevolent thing by the leaders. According to the results, prototypical leaders perceive punishment as a malevolent act for their position in the group.

Limitations of current research

The study was conducted in an experimental setting. In a field setting, many other factors play a part in the behavior prototypical or non-prototypical leaders show. We used a target group of mainly younger students with an academic background. The question is if we can generalize the results to a field setting where leaders most commonly are older and not necessarily have an academic degree.

During the research we did not check the perceived salience of the norm-violation. We manipulated the norm-violation, because we made it salient. We did not measure the salience perceived by our participants of the norm-violation. In another set-up, we could have said something about the relation between perceived salience and punishment harshness.

Future implications

Future research could look at leaders' view on the role of harshness in punishing followers. We assumed that the positive effects of punishment availability (i.e. higher trust of prototypical leaders) relate to a positive perception of punishment itself. But is the perception of prototypical leaders more positive towards punishment itself? It is likely that leaders in general
see the function of punishment but assume harsher punishment does not promote more cooperation.

Secondly, it is also important to look at the motives prototypical leaders versus non-prototypical leaders have for increasing punishment harshness and to explore the existence of a punishment norm. With a punishment norm, we mean a rationalized norm about the harshness of punishments and what is reasonable. Such a norm could be: "it is not fair to take all the earnings of player B."

Lastly, the biggest question is why all the differences in leaders' self-perceived prototypicality and trust in followers vanished after the norm-violation and possibility to punish. The combination of a trust-violation and option to punish, might activate a psychological mind reset. Can it be that leaders automatically and unconsciously objectify their perception toward a group after a norm-violation and punishment execution?
References


Appendix A

Leiderschapskwaliteiten – vragenlijst

Voordat we aan het volgende onderdeel gaan beginnen, gaan we nog een gevalideerde (dat wil zeggen, al uitgeteste) vragenlijst afnemen die leidinggevende capaciteiten meet. Deze vragenlijst, onderdeel van een meervattende vragenlijst naar management kwalificaties (de MAI, de management assessment inventory), wordt reeds geruime tijd in het bedrijfsleven gebruikt en is daar zeer betrouwbaar gebleken. Wanneer je op enter drukt kun je beginnen met de vragenlijst.

De MAI bestaat uit een aantal stellingen waarbij je steeds moet aangeven in hoeverre je het met de stelling eens of oneens bent. Het gaat dus om steeds om jouw mening. Er staan steeds 5 hokjes, lopend 1 (oneens) tot 5 (eens).

Klik steeds met de muis op het hokje dat jij het meest van toepassing acht. Als je dat gedaan hebt, kun je vervolgens met de muis op OK klikken, dan wordt het antwoord opgeslagen.

Het leiderschaponderdeel uit de MAI bestaat uit 26 vragen.

1. Wanneer ik een oplossing zie voor een probleem, leg ik die zo snel mogelijk voor anderen.

2. Als ik eenmaal een besluit genomen heb, blijf ik erbij

3. In een team behoort slechts 1 leider te zijn

4. Ik vind het vervelend een onbekende groep mensen toe te spreken

5. Wanneer eenmaal binnen een groep een besluit is genomen dient dit niet in later stadium opnieuw ter discussie worden gesteld

6. Ik vind het leuk nieuwe mensen te ontmoeten

7. Als leider moet je je vaak anders voordoen dan je werkelijk bent
8. Het sanctioneren van overtredingen is in het algemeen een effectief middel om soortgelijke overtredingen in de toekomst te voorkomen.

9. Wanneer ik een beslissing moet nemen weeg ik eerst uitvoerig alle mogelijkheden af.

10. Een leider moet vooral creatief zijn en nieuwe oplossingen aandragen.

11. Als ik zelf ergens van overtuigd ben weet ik ook andere te overtuigen.

12. Bij het nemen van beslissingen ga ik eerst voor mezelf na wat de mogelijkheid reacties van andere kunnen zijn.

13. Moeilijke beslissingen neem ik liever zelf.

14. Een duidelijke hiërarchisch onderscheid tussen leidinggevende en onderschikte is essentieel voor het bereiken van succes.

15. Het creëren van een goede sfeer is voor een leidinggevende onderschikt aan een succesvolle uitvoering van de te verrichten taken.

16. Ik kan de stemming van andere goed aanvoelen.

17. Wanneer een lid van een groep herhaaldelijk slecht presteert, is het voor de groep meestal beter wanneer deze persoon de groep verlaat.


20. Ik tracht zoveel mogelijk onderlinge conflicten in een groep te beperken.

21. Ik ben in staat complexe situaties snel te doorzien.

22. Hoe groter de groep des te langer het duurt voor een beslissing genomen wordt.

23. Goede leiders durven risico’s te maken.

24. Als ik iets wil bereiken, zet ik meestal door.

25. Mensen die altijd twijfelen ergeren mij.
26. Ik heb idee dat ik veel invloed heb op ander mensen

Appendix B

Interpersonal trust scale (trust inventory)

De stellingen die hieronder staan gegeven kunnen beoordeeld worden van een 1 (totaal mee oneens) tot een 7 (totaal mee eens).

Ik denk dat andere groepsleden...

1. Geneigd zijn zo veel mogelijk muntjes voor zichzelf te pakken
2. Geneigd zijn vooral aan hun eigenbelang te denken
3. Geneigd zijn het eigenbelang boven het groepsbelang te stellen
4. Geneigd zijn weinig muntjes in de gezamenlijke pot te laten
5. Te vertrouwen zijn om vooral aan het groepsbelang te denken
6. Te vertrouwen zijn om hun eigenbelang opzij te schuiven
7. Te vertrouwen zijn om iets goeds te doen voor de groep
8. Te vertrouwen zijn om geen muntjes voor zichzelf te pakken