Shared Authority

Local cooperation in the construction of colonial governance on Java in the early 1830s

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...gij zult daarenboven leeren inzien, dat insgelijks de Javaan, sedert wij hem naar billijke wetten regeeren, sedert zijn persoonlijke rechten, zijn eigendom werden gewaarborgd, veel gelukkiger en meer welvarend is dan vroeger; en dit vooral omdat men hem wijselijk het genot blijft schenken: de bevelen rechtstreeks van zijn eigen hoofden te ontvangen.

# Table of Contents

List Maps and of Illustrations .................................................................................................................. 5
Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 7
1. From Company to state .......................................................................................................................... 16
   1.1 The cultivation system: ideology and practice ............................................................................... 17
   1.2 Moving beyond the cultivation system ......................................................................................... 21
2. Sources of authority ............................................................................................................................... 24
   2.1 Modes of authority ......................................................................................................................... 24
   2.2 Differences in statecraft ............................................................................................................... 27
   2.3 The base for cooperation ............................................................................................................. 36
3. Knowledge for power: the settlement of a symbiotic relation .............................................................. 40
   3.1 The information network .............................................................................................................. 41
   3.2 Direct encounters: methods of rule ............................................................................................... 50
   3.3 The resident as local king ............................................................................................................. 62
4. Obstinacy of allies .................................................................................................................................. 66
   4.1 Evil-doer or scapegoat? The case of the revolt in Pasuruan, 1833 ............................................. 67
   4.2 Disruptions in Cirebon .................................................................................................................. 73
   4.3. Improvements in control? Murder on Sumatra ......................................................................... 75
   4.4 The paradoxes of shared authority ............................................................................................... 77
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 79
Appendix 1: Javanese titles and ranks ..................................................................................................... 82
Appendix 2: Explanatory list of persons .................................................................................................. 84
   1. Governor-Generals of the Dutch East Indies (1808-1844) ............................................................. 84
   2. Dutch colonial officials .................................................................................................................... 85
   3. Javanese rulers, chiefs and other native servants .......................................................................... 90
Maps ......................................................................................................................................................... 92
Glossary ..................................................................................................................................................... 96
List of references ........................................................................................................................................ 109
List of Maps and Illustrations

Maps

Map 1: Java’s administrative divisions at the conclusion of Daendels’ term, 1811. ............................... 92
Map 2: Java’s administrative divisions, 1832-1866.................................................................................. 92
Map 3: The Dutch East Indies, 1840........................................................................................................ 93
Map 4: The principalities: Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Mangkunegaran on Central Java. .................... 94
Map 5: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Semarang. ............................... 95
Map 6: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Pasuruan.................................... 95

Illustrations

Figure 1: Johannes van den Bosch ........................................................................................................... 18
Figure 2: The regent of Pekalongan receives members of the Binnenlands Bestuur .................................. 54
Figure 3: P. Sijthoff, resident of Semarang, and his golden payong ......................................................... 56
Figure 4: Pangeran Adipati Arya Mangkunegara IV ............................................................................. 63

Cover image: An assistant-resident with regent Raden Adipati Aryo Tjondroadinegara of Kudus and a controleur. Source: 3517 (foto, albuminedruk), Nederlands-Indië in foto's, 1860-1940, Koninklijk Instituut voor taal-, land- en volkenkunde (KITLV).
Preface

In the prevalent image of colonialism, the biased depiction of European artists, writers, scientists and eventually colonizers of non-European cultures created the stereotypes of the colonized domains and people that for these Europeans legitimized European rule over their colonies. Typical colonial thinking comprised a feeling of superiority, expressed in the relations the European dominators enforced and maintained in the areas they controlled in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To a modern-day historian, this attitude obviously seems conceited, complacent, and, most of all, outdated. But even half a century after colonial domination, the traces of orientalist thinking remain vivid in academic and non-academic debates, (re)creating rigorous distance between West and East. Very clear boundaries in the roles of the colonizer and colonized state were persistently maintained in historiography, giving each historical figure a strictly delineated task in history.

That the distance between east and west is not as obvious as alleged in current historiography becomes very clear when studying precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial societies without focussing merely on differences and demarcations. Though cross-cultural differences have been a constant obstacle in the fluent mutual understanding of all parties in colonial systems, the borders in the relation between colonizer and colonized became much vaguer and more hybrid than we usually imagine. Studying the colonial relationship of Europeans and Asians shows remarkable similarities in the historic perception of different peoples and different cultures, and makes us reconsider or own biases and perceptions of the societies and cultures of the areas we travel and explore. This thesis is the product of archival research conducted in Jakarta. More than once, I cursed this city and the country of which it is the capital for its bureaucracy, complicated and incomprehensible unwritten rules, or lack of tranquillity and air-conditioning. But being biased may have been a major contributing factor in my frustrations.

For me, not only history, but also the environment where I studied helped me to overcome my biases. I am very grateful to staff of the ANRI for helping me in conducting my research, but also for providing me with great insight into Indonesian culture, bureaucracy and all other puzzling peculiarities a naive European student encounters when visiting the insane metropolis that surrounds the National Archives of Indonesia for the first time. My research and stay in Jakarta were made considerably easier by working closely together with the archivists of ANRI. Thanks to the hospitable people working at ANRI, I learned a lot about Indonesian history, but perhaps even more about modern day Indonesia.
Introduction

At the end of the eighteenth century, Dutch presence in Asia had been rooted for two centuries on a commercially driven trading company-system. The VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), the Dutch East India Trading Company, had become the largest actor in the Indian Ocean trading zone, shipping tons of various goods among cities and trading factories across the Asian seas. However, during the last years of the eighteenth century, the Company collapsed under influence of rapid political and economic change in Europe and Asia, while the Dutch state transformed radically as a consequence of the disruptions of the Napoleonic Wars. The VOC went bankrupt, and ceased to exist in 1799. While the British started to increasingly dominate South- and Southeast Asia, the Dutch maintained their position in Indonesian archipelago. The focus was put on Java, which had been the home base of the VOC’s headquarters for two centuries, but Dutch control over the other islands remained relatively weak. During the eighteenth century, the VOC had gradually consolidated its control over Java by intervening diplomatically and militarily in the internal disputes of the ruling dominant kingdoms of Mataram and Banten. In the Preanger (or Priangan) area, the mountainous area in West-Java, VOC officials had enforced contracts with the local nobility for the production of coffee, tea, and other valuable cash crops. The vast production of these cash crops replaced the VOC-trade in spice, silk and other products, and was reorganized in 1830, when Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844, in office 1830-1833) implemented the cultivation system.

This system utilized the native population of Java by forcefully employing the peasants on the cash-crop fields. These peasants were mobilized by their own native heads, who were recruited by the Dutch as agents of the new system. The implementation of this type of control over the entire population of Java was a new step in the complicated process of the settlement of the colonial state in the Dutch East Indies. The historic study of the cultivation system has accentuated its economic impact on Java and the moral problem of forced production and colonial exploitation in general. Cornelis Fasseur, Robert Elson, Robert van Niel and Jan Breman discussed the outlines of the system’s economic policy and its effect on the Netherlands and Java. However, the role of the native heads as

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3 Non-English concepts, words, and terms are displayed in italics, (only) when used for the first time, and all of these are incorporated in the glossary at the end of this thesis.
4 For a full review of all persons in this thesis, see appendix 2.
intermediaries in the Dutch system makes the 1830s very interesting from the perspective of the expansion of colonial governance as well. The system was still new and fresh, while neither the Dutch officials nor the Javanese heads knew how to interpret the exuberant ideas of Van den Bosch, as Dutch concepts about how to cooperate with the indigenous on such a large-scale elite were still flexuous and not fully developed. This thesis attempts to readdress the 1830s from a perspective that focusses on the formation of colonial governance. It seeks to examine how and why the Dutch penetrated so deep into Javanese politics, by investigating the relation between the Dutch and Javanese controllers and the exercise of colonial governance on local level. This relation, as I will argue, formed the bedrock of the Dutch colonial state in the nineteenth century.

Colonial statecraft became of increasing importance during the nineteenth century. In various regions all over Asia, European colonizers started to organize overseas governance. Whereas in the early eighteenth century in South- and Southeast Asia the trading companies had predominantly controlled their businesses via trading treaties and political bonds with native rulers, the region underwent profound change during the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, most colonies were shaped into distinctive political and administrative units, centrally governed through bureaucratic administrations. British India for example, was ruled under charter of the East-India Company until the Indian Mutiny of 1858, after which the British slowly consolidated the entire Indian subcontinent under the centrally organized rule of the British crown. British India is believed to have produced the models of ‘indirect rule’ (see below) that were later consciously adopted elsewhere in the empire. Standardized by Sir Frederick Lugard’s ideas in the Dual Mandate of 1922, indirect rule became a vital element in setting up economically profitable colonial state-production of rubber and other resources. All over South- and Southeast Asia and Africa, the influence of European colonial powers shaped not only the borders and administrations of, but also the local dimension and territoriarity within the twentieth-century decolonized states. Mary Davies’ recent dissertation about chieftaincy in Malawi shows that use of indirect rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century could strongly reshape the role of local chiefs, within the framework of the colonial state. According to Davies, “the idea that chiefs could be political actors came to the fore”, which created new breeding ground to draw authority from. Moreover, this always happened in cooperation with native elites and chiefs.

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The establishment of colonial states was not a carefully planned process. In fact, even under influence of European domination plenty of indigenous rulers in the Dutch East Indies maintained a high level of sovereignty during the era of the formation of the colonial state. As this thesis will try to show, the colonial state-institutions of the Dutch East Indies had an informal, impermanent, personal, malleable and negotiable character.\(^{10}\) Cooperation with the local nobles, chiefs and administrative elites was a sheer necessity. As Carl Trocki notes, European administrators possessed both the will and the capability to destroy old orders and thus believed they had the power to create new orders, but eventually they were not able to create “what they imagined.”\(^{11}\) Often they blamed this gap between aims and achievements to the ‘laziness’, ‘incompetence’, or other aspects of moral and cultural inferiority of their Asian counterparts with whom they cooperated. Although military and economically stronger, the Europeans were simply “too thin on the ground to undertake the task of day-to-day administration on any but a fairly high level.”\(^{12}\) Effectively, the former trading partners became the essential middlemen in the establishment of the colonial administration.

**Direct rule and indirect rule: the residency system**

Ideas about how the colonial state was to be shaped varied widely in the European discourse about expansion in Asia, but a clear ideological difference can be noted between indirect and ‘direct’ rule. Direct rule proposed the creation of a strong administrative European body that immediately controlled the colonies’ daily routine, legal apparatus and economy, while indirect rule used ‘native’ authorities, ancient ruling dynasties and local administrative elites to carry out rule under supervision of their European masters. However, this division does not reflect the reality of colonial government on the ground. As exemplified by Michael Fisher on India, to the British officials and politicians, indirect rule on the model of the traditional princely states in India remained not just a method, but also a goal or an ideal type in itself over the nineteenth century.\(^{13}\) When the East India Company shifted its character from primarily a commercial to a political entity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the relation with the Indian states altered.\(^{14}\) The Company installed so-called *residents*, officials residing close to the courts of these states, charged with managing these relations. To the colonizers, indirect rule provided an ideal form of localized government that helped them to maintain distance from, but at the same time hold a firm grip on the Asian and African masses, by controlling their indigenous rulers. However, in order to cooperate with the native rulers the residents had to adopt practices and rituals drawn from the native diplomatic traditions, and as the contacts with the native

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11 Trocki, ‘Political structures’: 81.
12 Ibidem: 81, 87.
13 Fisher, *Indirect rule*: 2, 4-5.
14 Ibidem:66.
princes intensified and the duties of the residents expanded over the course of the nineteenth century, it became less clear whether they were practicing indirect or direct rule.\textsuperscript{15} The residency system in India had grown into a unique but paradoxical institution. While ideologically direct rule tried to enforce Western rule and exclude indigenous influence, and indirect rule aimed at incorporating and using indigenous structures, both seem to have intermingled easily throughout different levels of control. As Fisher and J.S. Furnivall have noted, the theoretical difference between both was not that great in practice. The terms are ideal-types, not precise nor technically defined, and as a result they were ideologically different but practically mixed and hybrid.\textsuperscript{16}

In the decades after the downfall of the VOC, a residency system similar to the one in British India’s princely states took shape. During the British interregnum on Java of 1811-1816, Governor-General Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781-1826) had split up the existing nine residents of Daendels into sixteen residencies, and under the reorganizations of Governor-Generals Godert van der Capellen (1778-1848, in office 1816-1826), Leonard Du Bus de Gisignies (1780-1849, in office 1826-1830) and Van den Bosch, 25 residencies in total were formed up until 1840 (see map 2).\textsuperscript{17} As the practical irrelevance of the division between indirect and direct has been pointed out, the question arises how Dutch officials, while so ‘thin on the ground’, were able to exercise control and implement a taxation system that regenerated the Dutch colonial economy and made Java one of the largest cash-crop producers of the nineteenth century. More specifically, how was colonial rule in the residencies, on local level, exercised? How did Dutch residents, yet unexperienced, manage social relations with their Javanese counterparts? And to move beyond the geographic limits of my subject: can we identify specific methods or instruments of colonial officials in their attempts to rule in cooperation with native elites? Answering these questions will hopefully help us understand the practice of colonial rule, and the meaning of the relation between the Dutch and the native elites on Java and other parts of the colonized world of the nineteenth century.

The Dutch residents each controlled a residency divided in up to five \textit{regencies} that all stood under native supervision of high noblemen the Dutch called \textit{regents} or \textit{Bupati}. As I will argue, the relation between residents and regents was of crucial importance. The resident was the highest Dutch authority ‘on the ground’. In the words of the novelist Multatuli, the most famous critic of the cultivation system: “It is these residents who actually represent the Dutch reign over the Javanese

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Fisher, \textit{Indirect rule}: 6, 66-67.
\item From West to East these were (in modern spelling): Banten, Batavia, Buitenzorg, Karawang, the Priangan, Cirebon, Tegal, Pekalongan, Banyumas, Bagelen, Kedu, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Jepara, Rembang, Madiun, Pacitan, Kediri, Surabaya, Pasuruan, Madura, Probolinggo, Besuki and Banyuwangi. During the nineteenth century, the boundaries of the residencies changed several times due to administrative reorganization.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
population. The people do not know the Governor-General nor the members of the ‘Raad van Indië’ (the advisory body under the Governor-General), nor the directors in Batavia. They know just the resident, and the officials who govern them.” On the other hand, the regents held the key to controlling and manipulating the population. The connection of a resident to ‘his’ regents was thus decisive for the success of local governance. Historiography so far has acknowledged the importance of the relation between residents and regents. Dutch colonial governance in the nineteenth century has been described as a ‘dual administration’, of two layers of control: a native and a Dutch one. But Dutch authors who used this term, like Wim van den Doel and Fasseur, mostly concentrated on colonial governance at high level, and ignored the importance of local cooperation. Fasseur and Van den Doel both concluded that the policymaking of the High-Government not always reached down to the regents, but so far it has remained unclear why.

At this point there has never been an in-depth study into the exact methods of the residents in dealing with the regents in the formative years of the Dutch colonial state. This thesis will thus try to fill in this gap and investigate the connection between residents and regents. It follows the examples of Benedict Anderson, Soemarsaid Moertono and Sartono Kartodirdjo, who, among others, have described the underlying concepts and functioning of Javanese states, and Benjamin Schrieke and Jan Bakker, who have both connected these concepts to what Max Weber called the patrimonial state. I will use Max Weber’s difference between traditional and rational authority to examine the Javanese regents’ and Dutch officials’ positions prior to and after the introduction of the cultivation system. The observations of these authors clarify the difference and similarities between both Dutch and Javanese types of statecraft, which helps us to create understanding of the roots of colonial governance. Highly interesting is the work of Heather Sutherland. Published in 1979, her book thoroughly discusses how Dutch colonial offices and Javanese native rulers exercised influence on each other in what she calls “an unequal political partnership, the essential hinge of which was the sustained contact between the Binnenlands Bestuur” (‘BB’; the European civil service) “and the Pangreh Praja” (the native colonial civil service under Dutch control; lit. ‘rulers of the realm’). Because Sutherland’s work mainly deals with the transformation of the priyayi-elite (the native aristocratic elite) and the role of the Dutch in this process on the long term (throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century), this thesis may be

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18 Multatuli, Max Havelaar, of de koffieveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Prometheus/Bert Bakker, 1998): 93. Quoted Dutch primary sources are translated into English.


21 H. Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: the colonial transformation of the Javanese Priyayi (ASAA Southeast Asia Publication Series no.2; Singapore: Heinemann, 1979): xix, 2.
considered a prequel to her work. It tries to define the ground elements that gave shape to this relation.

I should also mention the creation, growth, and professionalization of the Dutch colonial army, officially founded in 1830. Initiated in the aftermath of the Java War, one would expect the colonial army, or KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger), to become of great importance. Indeed, the presence of this army in the archipelago maintained a certain menace looming behind the Dutch presence. The increase in the military expenses, the incorporation of regents in the KNIL, and the establishment of Fort Willem I in Ambarawa near Semarang consolidated Dutch military power on Java. However, the role of the army remained limited, as threatening with violence often was just as effective as using it, and the troops were mostly deployed in the wars on Sumatra, and rarely on Java. Firmly controlled via bonds and treaties with loyal regents, diplomacy became more important than muscle flexing in setting up the cultivation system and a colonial state. For this reason I will not incorporate the role of the KNIL in this thesis, but rather focus on the role of diplomacy.

Methodology and sources

The only way to directly perceive the practice of local rule carried out by the residents is by studying the archives of the residencies. These can be found in the ANRI (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia), the National Archives of Indonesia in Jakarta. These residency archives contain all correspondence between Dutch officials and native rulers. They include massive amounts of letters from and to native rulers on all local levels of governance. Most archival material is correspondence between residents, assistant-residents (the rank below resident) and controleurs (the rank below assistant-residents), and regents, district heads and village heads. These letters are sometimes in Javanese (when written by native heads), and sometimes in Malay, but often translated into Dutch, and give great insight into the Dutch-Javanese relation. The residency archives are the only source through which one can discover the cross-cultural interaction on Java in the 1830s. They allows us to illustrate the Dutch vision on and understanding of the Javanese nobility, but also the Javanese attitude towards the Dutch. Unfortunately, the archival material is difficult to use for profound systematic research, as not all of it has been inventoried, and large parts are not in great physical shape. On top of that, the majority of the archival material is one-sided, Eurocentric, and incomplete. One can find numerous letters of a certain regent to a resident without being able to trace the resident’s replies, and Dutch reflections on the Javanese society are very extensive while Javanese perceptions on the Dutch are much harder to find, even though numerous Javanese letters have been preserved. However, by studying correspondence between the Dutch and Javanese, a number of elements that define the roots of colonial government can be perceived. To get a grip on the vast amount of correspondence, I specifically focused on correspondence between residents and regents and reports written by Dutch
officials about the local native aristocracy. To make efficient use of the limited time I had, I used a rather opportunistic approach. I selected those residencies of which the archives have been inventoried best and made accessible, and browsed to the bundles that seemed to contain the type of correspondence (‘incoming’ or ‘outgoing’ letters for specific year) and reports I was looking for. It could take days before I finally got my hands on one of those wonderful bundles that literally bulge with interesting reports and letters, but always they were definitely worth the trouble it took finding them.

By doing so I have selected interesting and so far unexplored material from the residency of Semarang on Central Java. Correspondence between the residents and various regents reveals interesting details about the local Dutch-Javanese encounter and supports the idea that the favour and reliability of the regents, and the diplomatic abilities and character of the resident mattered most. Other case-studies I used are mentioned in historiography, and are great to elaborate on by using new information from the residency archives. Of great quality is the research of Vincent Houben, who writes interesting chapters on the relation between Dutch officials and native rulers at the court of the vorstenlanden or principalities (on Central Java), the princely states that remained de facto independent from the Dutch. The case of Surakarta, one of the principalities, will be elaborated on in chapter three, amplified with material from the residency archives in ANRI. Finally, interesting cases of obstinacy and tensions between Dutch officials and the local elite and people were found in the archives of Pasuruan and the outer territories on the West-Coast of Sumatra. The former case is mentioned in the work of Elson and Van Niel, but not described in detail, the latter was found in the National Archives of the Netherlands in the Hague.

The kind of archival material I use can give us new insights into the actual reality of colonial rule. It supports the claim that the concept of direct or indirect rule do not cover this reality, but that colonial rule was personal, and, as I will attempt to clarify in chapter three and four, just as patrimonial as traditional Javanese rule. The concepts of traditional and legal authority as well as different concepts of statecraft intermingled in the colonial world. These insights support Van Niel’s claim that the colonial state was most of all a ‘system of men’.

I will bear in mind the warnings of Ann Laura Stoler, that the colonial system’s archival records are hardly objective and do not provide us with neutral and complete concepts of the colonial society,

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24 Van Niel: *Java under the Cultivation system*: 88.
as they were written by the people who were products of this society themselves. The construction of archival material is problematic and can lead to misconceptions between those who constructed it and those who read it nowadays, as Stoler noted. By treating the archives not merely as a source of historical information, but as subjects of the colonial government, and thus of themselves, we can overcome these problems. In general, we should realize that the study of colonial rule is problematic when “the tools of analysis we use emerged from the history we are trying to examine.” This is exactly why I choose to incorporate the ideas of Weber, Anderson and Indonesian scholars such as Kartodirdjo and Moertono. They can give us tools that are not directly related to the colonial world. On top of that, the local archives in Jakarta show a more detailed and profound picture of the formation of the early colonial state, certainly concerning the 1830s. Elson for example carried out a lot of research in Jakarta and successfully changed our view on the impact of the cultivation system on the village communities of Java. Stoler uses neither the archives in Jakarta, nor the work of Dutch or Indonesian scholars, and therefore she might have gotten an incomplete picture of the colonial archives and reality. By making intensive use of the residency archives, we can enlarge our knowledge of the relation and cooperation between Dutch and Javanese in the context of early colonial state-formation, and thereby revise our perception of Dutch colonial rule in its totality.

Two important issues should be mentioned here. The first is about language. All outgoing letters of the material I used are in Dutch, but the incoming letters are not. Incoming letters from regents were usually translated by the clerks of the residents’ offices, but not always, and not always in Dutch. The majority of letters I use were translated into Dutch, and roughly ten percent of them was translated into Malay. With some assistance of the staff of ANRI I was able to interpret these as well. The untranslated letters were not taken into account for this thesis, as the translated ones provided more than enough material. A second problem is the limitation of the archival material concerning locality and historicity. As Fasseur, Van Niel and Elson have noted, the implementation and practice of the cultivation system knew many regional varieties. This applies to my own findings, and supports

28 H. Schulte Nordholt, ‘How colonial is this effort to establish a new standard for an ethnography of the archive?’ in: Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 165/4 (2009): 560-2. Though Stoler’s considerations are certainly worth to take into account, her own archival research seems rather limited and focusses on documents derived from high governmental levels. Along the archival grain does unfortunately not include a list of archival sources (which seems a great lack in a book about archives), so it is not easy to keep an eye on the exact sources Stoler used.
29 Fasseur, Kultuurstelsel en koloniale baten: 10; Elson, Village Java: 42-3, 324.
the general claim that colonialism was neither monolithic nor unchanging throughout history.\textsuperscript{30} The representativeness of my case-studies is therefore hard to judge. As mentioned, I selected my sources strictly based on accessibility, physical condition and relation to current historiography. Because we simply do not yet have comprehensive accounts on the local elaboration of dual rule, I can only vouch for a comparison among my sources from Semarang, Surakarta, Pasuruan and Sumatra. The conclusions drawn from the case studies that I used should thus never be overstated, and always seen in the right context of the versatility and hybridity of colonialism. However, these cases alone give us enough fresh information to point out the first important revisions of the relation between Dutch and Javanese. The few examples I used already enable us to get as close as possible to a better view on the reality of colonial governance on the ground.

I hope to make clear that the residency archives show that in the Dutch-Javanese encounter the colonizer did not always construct the colonized.\textsuperscript{31} A story of politics, diplomacy and institutionalization set in the years in between the era of the trading companies and large-scale imperialism, the first steps of the development of colonial governance were taken based on the relation between the residents and the regents. The former influenced the latter, and both depended on each other. A paradox of mutual and conflicting interests, the colonial relationship between Dutch and Javanese founded colonial governance in the Dutch East Indies.


1. From Company to state

Java became the centre of Dutch agricultural production during the nineteenth century. Until then the island was of lesser importance, producing mainly rice and timber, not the most interesting goods in the inter-Asian trading network of the VOC compared to the opium from China, the textiles from India and the spices from the Moluccas. However, the disruptions of the French, American and Industrial revolutions, the fall of the Batavian Republic and the demise of the VOC at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century caused heavy disruptions that heralded the end of Dutch trade in these valuable goods. At the same time events like the slave rebellion on and independence of Santo Domingo from 1791 onward and disruptions in the Antilles and Brazil caused a steep decline of sugar and coffee production in the colonies in the West, and created room on the global market for these increasingly popular products. Van den Bosch knew that profits from the western colonies were decreasing, and contrived the cultivation system as a solution to pull the Dutch economy out of the doldrums and reengage in the competition with other European powers (especially the British), by giving the industry a major impulse with investments in similar products in the eastern colonies. During the nineteenth century, Java became one of the most predominant suppliers on the market for coffee, sugar, indigo and tobacco. However, the shifts in power and policy during the first three decades of the nineteenth century exemplify that the road to this outcome was long, curvy and difficult. In this chapter I will briefly sketch the developments that led to the introduction of the cultivation system on Java, the basic structures of Van den Bosch’ colonial ideology and policy and shortly describe the intense and heated historiographical debates about the system.

Initially the Dutch were rather hesitant in deciding about a colonial policy after the demise of the VOC. Ideologically the government doubted between a liberal, laissez-faire approach of free-trade and a more conservative policy of forced cultivation as had existed in the Preanger regencies under the VOC. The most important propagandist of the liberal-enlightened ideology was Dirk van Hogendorp. His ideas were mainly opposed by Sebastiaan Cornelis Nederburgh, who favoured a more

34 Apart from his published work, this is very clearly stated by him in a final report Van den Bosch wrote just after he arrived back in the Netherlands, going against Merkus’ critics, in which, probably very excited about ‘his’ venture on Java, he really displays his conviction and determination most firmly. See: NA Koloniën: 4233 ‘Geheime verbalen 1834, nrs. 68 - 114’: ‘N111’, 23 May 1834.
detached policy, as he was convinced that the Netherlands would not be able to ‘educate’ the Javanese properly or intervene in Javanese policy successfully, but should rather make use of existing, indigenous structures to concentrate on generating profit instead of establishing good governance.

While the Netherlands were under Napoleonic rule, Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels (1762-1818, in office 1808-1811) laid the foundations of the Dutch colonial state by taking the first steps in introducing a modern bureaucratic administration on Java and Mudara. Raffles had sought to reduce the influence of the regents by imposing a system of landrent – taxation on land imposed directly on the peasants. Raffles despised the position and cultural importance of the regents; an enlightened liberal, he had a strong aversion against the traditional but powerful authority of these chiefs and favoured contact with the village heads, who he thought stood closest to the peasants. Governor-General Van der Capellen acknowledged the problems the regents had with their recent degradations, and he standardized their titles as connected to their positions in 1820, but due to lack of centralization and institutionalization their positions remained uncertain and problematic throughout Java. This hesitant and fluctuating policy towards the regents created the breeding ground for tensions between Dutch and Javanese and a negative attitude towards European dominance in general. A local prince in Yogyakarta, Pangeran Dipanagara, profited from these tensions and rallied support for a large-scale rebellion against the Dutch authorities, culminating in the bloody and destructive Java War of 1825-1830. This war had left a deep impact on the island and shocked the colonial officials. Java had become a colonial problem, for which king William I was in urgent need of a solution. He found this solution in the ideas of Johannes van den Bosch.

1.1 The cultivation system: ideology and practice

Van den Bosch was a self-made man. Born in a patrician family as the son of a barber surgeon he started his career as an officer in the Dutch East Indian military. A strong leader and decorated war-veteran (see figure 1), he quickly ascended in rank. After a dispute with Daendels he returned to the Netherlands, where he engaged in the political debate about colonial policy. His first writing criticized Daendels’ policy and responded to Raffles’ critique on VOC-rule and exploitation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Raffles was surprised by the Dutch lack of knowledge about Javanese culture and statecraft after two centuries of presence and blamed them for continuing a policy aimed at

Figure 1: Johannes van den Bosch (1780-1844), portrait by Cornelis Kruseman, 1829 (Portret van Johannes, Graaf van den Bosch, Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlands-Indië, minister van koloniën). The appearance of Van den Bosch in this painting is clearly one of a courageous and strong high army officer, decorated with the ‘Militaire Willems-Orde’, holding his plans firmly in his hand and a map of Java behind his right elbow.

Source: Rijksmuseum, object number SK-A-2166.
merely seeking direct financial profit supported by cruelty and violence.\textsuperscript{40} The English attitude towards the Dutch never was very positive: what started as “grudging admiration” turned into disdain as the British became more aware of the Dutch military and commercial weaknesses in Asia in comparison to the recent British successes.\textsuperscript{41} According to Raffles, the Dutch were cruel and rapacious in their relentless pursuit of profit, and had seriously damaged and undermined the ingenious state structures in the Indonesian archipelago, blocking possibilities for modernization and development.\textsuperscript{42} Van den Bosch, in his turn, was not impressed by these critiques, referring to the failed liberalizing experiments of the British on Java, which had resulted in Raffles handing back a bankrupt colony in 1816.\textsuperscript{43}

For Van den Bosch the purpose of the Dutch possessions in the archipelago was clear: Java was what he called a \textit{wingewest}, a crown domain of the Netherlands to be used solely to generate large agricultural profits.\textsuperscript{44} Van den Bosch was not impressed with the Javanese societal establishments, which he thought were “still in state of childhood.”\textsuperscript{45} He figured that there were only two ways to put the Javanese peasants to work in service of the Dutch: either via barter trade on a very basic level or by obligating them to work on cash crop fields. The latter he thought needed to be systematized by collecting taxes on production, using the regents and other native rulers.\textsuperscript{46} According to Van den Bosch, under Daendels and Raffles the regents had become detached from the Europeans and the only way to make use of the Javanese labour force and to prevent a new war was by regenerating and improving the relations with the regents by including them in the Dutch colonial system.\textsuperscript{47} He strongly opposed the idea of liberalizing or educating Java’s native population with western ideological concepts, as he thought Javanese people were not able to understand those and were not interested in a replacement of their “superstitious mysticism.”\textsuperscript{48} It was thus important not to interfere in local politics, but to make use of local ideologies and local structures of governance. Van den Bosch did not see the Javanese

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\textsuperscript{40} T.S. Raffles, \textit{The history of Java, in two volumes, with a map and plates.} (2 parts, London: Black, Parbury and Allen, 1817), Part I: xxvii-xxx, xxxviii-xxxix, 60-6.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibidem: 5-7, 10.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibidem: 12-3
\textsuperscript{44} The arguments of Hogendorp and Nederburgh and their followers formed an important part of the arguments of conservative and liberal politicians of the 1850s and 1860 in fighting and defending the cultivation system, see below.
\textsuperscript{45} J. van den Bosch, \textit{Brief, inhoudende eenige onpartijdige aanmerkingen, op eene memorie, onlangs in het licht verschenen, onder den titel van: Staat der Nederlandsch Oost-Indische bezittingen, onder het bestuur van den gouverneur-generaal Herman Willem Daendels, ridder, luitenant-generaal &c., in den jaren 1808-11.} (‘s Gravenhage: Johannes Allart, 1815): 3.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibidem: 3-5, 8.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibidem: 8-9.
\textsuperscript{48} Furnivall, \textit{Netherlands India}: 109-10.
\end{flushright}
peasants as full trading-partners, but as a workforce, necessary to carry out colonial agricultural production for the global market, ruled via their own traditional administrative elite.  

Van den Bosch drew the attention of King William I when he founded the so-called ‘Maatschappij der Welldadigheid’ (Benevolent Society), that tried to help poor people in the Netherlands by building ‘free-colonies’, small agricultural communities, where poor people were sheltered and helped to start new lives as farmers. In 1827 Van den Bosch was appointed Governor-General of the Dutch colonies in the West, where he imposed financial reforms that stimulated economic growth and turned loss into profit. It was eventually the combination of the crises on Java and the career making of Van den Bosch as an army general, successful colonial administrator and a social reformer that convinced King William I of the man’s vision.

Van den Bosch arrived on Java in early 1830, and immediately started making transformations to implement the cultivation system. The cultivation system was grafted on the idea of forced cultivation of cash crops by demanding 20% of the agricultural grounds to be used for plantation of coffee, sugar, tobacco, indigo and other cash crops. In addition, the Javanese peasants were expected to spend 66 days of labour on herendiensten, construction and maintenance work in their region in service of their masters, to create the necessary infrastructure. Crucial for carrying out and managing the system were the regents, the local native provincial rulers, who received an additional reward depending on the amount and value of their lands’ yield. The local chiefs and population received plantloon, wages depending on the delivered quantity of cash crops. Automatically, local and regional heads were involved in the Dutch wage-system, laying hands on large percentages of production yields while putting heavy pressure on the population’s labour capacity. Effectively the system was grounded on forced labour, and the heavy burden of the herendiensten combined with the large impact of cash-crop cultivation put increasing pressure on the Javanese peasant communities.

Ideologically, Van den Bosch’ system was more than just one of taxation. It incorporated comprehensive thoughts on the design of the structures of the (colonial) Javanese society and the role of the regents. Because of the ‘deep reverence’ the regents enjoyed from the Javanese people, and to give the peasants the impression that they were still governed by their own rulers (although these were transformed into colonial agents), Van den Bosch thought it was absolutely crucial to preserve

49 Van den Bosch, Nederlandsche bezittingen in Azia, Amerika en Afrika, in dezelve toestand en aangelegenheid voor dit rijk, wijsgeerig, staathuishoudkundig en geographis beschouwd. (2 parts; Amsterdam/’s Gravenhage: Van Cleef, 1818): iii-v.
51 Fasseur, Koloniale baten: 21-2.
But since Van den Bosch did not believe in enlightening local populations with Western administrational ideas, he pleaded for a policy of abstinence: an administration that made use of the strong positions of the local rulers, and abstained from attempts in educating or ‘liberalizing’ the Javanese peasants. By placing the regents under the authority of the residents and rewarding the regents with a percentage of the profits, Van den Bosch incorporated the local rulers in the Dutch administrative system and gave them an interest in generating large profits. The deployment of this system compelled peasants to grow and deliver valuable cash crops for the government and secured large and constant supplies of these export goods from Java to the homeland. However, Van den Bosch never designed a clear, coherent outline of how to realize his plans: often he was confused about the best methods of realizing his ideas himself, and sometimes he changed his views about colonial matters. In order to save his idea from liberal critics, he camouflaged rather than conveyed his ‘real intentions’ in his writings, making actual policymaking even more difficult for his inferiors. The thoughts of Van den Bosch, radical, often inconsistent and sometimes unclear, have generated a lot of attention and commentary, which has overshadowed opinions about Dutch colonialism in the 1830s. The cultivation system therefore was judged more often by the ideas and professions of its founder than its actual workings. But this was simply because the actual workings were way too varied to capture in a single critique.

1.2 Moving beyond the cultivation system

Not many subjects raised more political controversy in and after the nineteenth century than the cultivation system. Initially a debate between liberal and conservative parliamentarians in the nineteenth century, it focused on the problem of the formation of a state-monopoly on agricultural production. In the 1830s already, (ex-) colonial officials such later Governor-General Pieter Merkus (1787-1844, in office 1841-1844) criticized the system for its illiberalism, as the state held a monopoly on trade in all cash crops, and claimed that the financial results were very poor due to lack of knowledge, inefficiency and agricultural mismanagement by the local officials. The greatest eyesore

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53 Elson, Village Java: 43.
54 Ibidem. See also: N.G. Pierson, Koloniale politiek (Amsterdam: P.N. Kampen & Zoon, 1873): 87-95 and Van Niel, Java under the cultivation system: 8-12, 15-9.
56 P. Merkus (red. Den Oosterling), Kort overzigt der financiële resultaten van het Stelsel van kultures onder den gouverneur-Generaal J. van den Bosch (Kampen: K. van Hulst, 1835): 1-12. See for the most comprehensive examples of nineteenth-century critiques: N. van Elten, iets over den voorgaanden en tegenwoordigen staat van Nederlandsch Indië, vergezeld van eene beoordeling van twee vlugschriften getiteld: "Kort overzigt der financielle resultaten van het stelsel van kultures onder den gouverneur-generaal J. van den Bosch" en "Blik op het bestuur van Nederlandsch Indië onder den gouverneur-generaal J. van den Bosch, voor zoo ver het door den zelven ingevoerde stelsel van cultures op Java betreft" […](s-Gravenhage/Amsterdam: Van Cleef, 1835); R.W.J.C. Bake, Kunnen en moeten er veranderingen gebracht worden in het kultuurstelsel op Java? (Utrecht: B.
for Merkus and his allies was the monopoly the NHM, or Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Society, founded in 1825 by king William I), had on transporting colonial production to the homeland. The debate got an emotional twist when the first (ex-) colonial civil servants started publishing about their experiences in the colonies. Among the most troubling aspects were the *knevelarijen* or maltreatments of the local population by their own heads. This is exemplified by the observations of Inspector of Cultivations Louis Vitalis, who unexpectedly visited a plantation, and saw “dozens of greybeards, all heads or members of the local board of the desa (village), who were tied up with both thumbs to a rope, which was thrown over the branch of a tree, so that the unfortunates were barely able to touch the ground with their toes”, simply because the regent was dissatisfied with production levels. In another district he found “village heads tied up completely naked on the ground, the arms bound crosswise, exposed to the burning heat of the sun, which also happened on orders of the regent.”

These kind of accounts were heard more and more during the nineteenth century, as politicians and scholars started to publish about the effects of the system. Former preacher Wolter van Hoëvell (1812-1879) took the lead in hammering on the indebtedness of the Netherlands to the ‘ignorant’ Javanese population in parliamentary debates. Eventually Multatuli’s famous *Max Havelaar* became the most important indictment to address the problems of Dutch colonial exploitation. The ‘moral’ argument has remained omnipresent in debates about the cultivation system up until today. Although the second half of the twentieth century saw a shift in historiography that dealt with the question of the impact of the system on the development of Java’s economic development, making a moral claim seems inescapable. Cees Fasseur, Robert Elson and Robert Van Niel have revised the classic view of Clifford Geertz’ “agricultural involution.” Geertz claimed that the cultivation system structured Java into stagnation and dependence and blocked local, rural economic development on Java, but the accounts of Fasseur, Van Neil and Elson proved otherwise. Still, Jan Breman was eager to accuse those authors of ignoring “the darker side of the coin.” Essentially he used new research-data to repeat the arguments of classic authors and nineteenth-century liberal Dutch politicians or former colonial bureaucrats and modern authors like Geertz, grafted on the moral rejection of forced labour used to prove the negative impact of colonial cash-crop production on Java.

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Dekema, 1854); W. van Bosch, ‘Tien jaren kultuurstelsel, 1851-1862’ in: TvNI 1 (1865) I; and: J.J. Haselman, ‘Over de kwijting der landrenten in arbeid en in geld’ in TvNI 2 (1866) II.

57 L. Vitalis, *De Invoering, werking en gebreken van het stelsel van cultures op Java* (Zaltbommel: Joh. Noman en Zn., 1851): 5.


60 The polemic is way too comprehensive to consider in its entirety. Within the limited space of this thesis I tried to capture the most important arguments, taking into account the most important classic and modern authors. An explanation of the most important persons and their arguments is essential in understanding the debate.
system has therefore been rather repetitive, overshadowing the importance of the principles of the
dual system and colonial rule. The case of the impact of the system on Java has extensively been dealt
with, as have Van den Bosch’ views. But since these views rarely reached down to the daily reality of
the residents, more emphasis should be put on the actual practice of the system. Technically, Van den
Bosch and his successor Jean Chrétien Baud (1789-1859, in office 1833–1836) created a system of
forced cultivation during the 1830s, but, as I will show, the interpretation and implementation of Van
den Bosch’ plans depended on the pragmatism of the residents and the regents. That explains the
regional differences in the adaptation of the system on Java, and the importance of studying these
contacts.
2. Sources of authority

The dual system as designed by Van den Bosch was grafted on interaction between Dutch officials and Javanese nobles. Both parties were used to different types of rule, governance and state-formation. To understand governance in the 1830s, it is important to learn about governance prior to these years. This chapter seeks to discover the outlines Javanese and Dutch ideas about statecraft in order to frame the possible modalities for cooperation in the nineteenth century. To determine specific characterizations of state formation, Max Weber’s three different types of authority prove very useful. His principles of rational and traditional authority have been used extensively to explain Western and Javanese ideas about statecraft. Evidently, ideas about power and authority are changeable and dynamic. In medieval Europe, the idea of power was obviously not the same as in Europe of the 1800s, just as pre-Islamized Java had different power concepts than Java in 1800, even without considering wide regional and local differences. The abstractions I make however are as I hope to show applicable to the Javanese state and the Dutch state around 1800, so prior to the introduction of the Cultivation system. From then onward, due to mutual influence of Dutch and Javanese authorities on Java, exercise of governance becomes too complicated to use these strictly demarcated types of authority separately.

2.1 Modes of authority

Weber distinguished three ideal types of authority: traditional, charismatic and legal (or rational) authority. A ruler who holds traditional authority is obeyed because of his traditional status, based on the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. Charismatic authority is based on the specific characteristics of an individual. Legal authority is supported by rational grounds, resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules.\(^61\) This division provides a simplified, yet somewhat abstracted classification that does not always project reality but can clearly distinguish the values of native Javanese rulers from the values of Dutch officials. Weber is useful here because the idea of a traditional ruler applies very well to the actual reality of statecraft on Java.

It is safe to say that most traditional rulers hold supernaturally legitimized authority. On Java, this supernatural power is known as *kesekten*, the indicator of the inherent quality of persons and things able to exercise power over their environment.\(^62\) A traditional Javanese king, as explained by Soemarsaid Moertono, was an exponent of a micro-cosmos, which was the Javanese interpretation of...

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the half of the cosmos that belonged to ‘the world of man’, whereas the other half, the macro-cosmos, belonged to ‘the supra-human world.’

Ceremonies and symbolism were of essential importance in order to mobilize this power. As exemplified by Benedict Anderson kings on Java rather focused on accumulation, concentration, and preservation of power than its actual use. Powerful, regal titles such as Susuhunan and Panembahan (considered powerful because they were used by the Wali Sanga, the legendary prophets who spread Islam on Java), and names of powerful ancestors provided in clear-cut means to enhance the prestige of a ruler. A Javanese ruler would also concentrate around him so-called pusaka: all kinds of regalia that a ruler usually inherited from his predecessors and that were believed to contain unusual amounts of supernatural power. The most famous example is the kris (a traditional Javanese dagger), but other weapons, payongs (traditional parasols that throughout the archipelago showed off power depending on its size and colour), sacred musical instruments, and even extraordinary human beings, such as albinos, dwarfs or fortune-tellers could also function as pusaka. Being heirlooms, pusaka emphasized the continuity of the strength of a ruling dynasty. The loss of pusaka was interpreted as a sign of the impending collapse of the dynasty, while adding new pusaka would have the opposite effect. As I will show in chapter three and four, use of pusaka remained important during the colonial era.

In practice, the concentration of power on a ruler was usually interpreted via expressions of welfare, fertility, prosperity, glory, and stability. The moment these signs diminished under influence of certain manifestations of disorder such as natural disasters or wars, thefts, murders and greed would be interpreted as diffusion of the ruler’s power and strength. Accumulation of power was possible by, for example, expressing strict asceticism, which means making use of the ability to concentrate or focus on one’s inner power to absorb power from the outside in different forms including fasting, going without sleep, meditation, sexual abstinence, ritual purification, and various types of sacrifices. Absorbing outward power is an important element in expressions of Javanese culture such as wayang: usually two contrasting iconographic opponents, such as good and evil or male and female show interaction, and overcoming the differences of these opponents leads to growth of power. Rulers therefore regularly used the ability to contain or control opposites in their claims to power.

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65 Moedjanto, *The concept of power in Javanese culture*: 122.
As stressed by Anderson, the above-described conception presumes power is concrete rather than abstract, an “intangible, mysterious, and divine energy which animates the universe,” and that there is a vast and constant amount of power in the universe.\(^{70}\) In the Javanese concept, power is homogenous rather than heterogeneous; all power relations are of the same kind or shape, and power does not raise the question of legitimacy. Since there is a fixed amount of power that is “derived from a single homogenous source, power itself antecedes questions of good and evil, and therefore it would be meaningless to the Javanese way of thinking to claim the right to rule on the basis of differential sources of power.”\(^{71}\)

The culture and philosophy of enlightenment have had a great impact on the feudalized forms of power as it had existed in pre-modern Europe. A new political culture of change in ideas about power and rule expressed itself during and following the American and French, and industrial revolutions. Anderson adequately contrasts Javanese concepts of power with nineteenth-century West-European ones. In post-enlightenment Europe, power became an abstract concept that strictly speaking does not exist. It became a formula to indicate certain patterns of social interaction, commonly used to describe relationships.\(^{72}\) In this concept, power’s sources are heterogeneous, meaning it is not derived from a ‘supernatural’ source in a ‘macro-cosmos’, but rather acquired via social-skills or status, wealth, organizations, weapons and so forth. In addition, accumulation of power is not limited, since it is not, as in the Javanese concept, defined as a constant and limited source. Finally, power is morally ambiguous, which follows from the secular conception of power as a relationship between human beings.\(^{73}\) It is more of a social contract than a force solemnly received by a ruler. The difference with kesekten is that in Europe people started to play an active role in the concept of power, showing strong interaction with their ruler, while on Java power ‘worked’ in just one direction: from the ruler down to the people. Only a reduction of population could affect a ruler’s power.

As mentioned, these changes in power-concepts were still in progress in the era this thesis deals with. Eventually, the above-described changes motivated the process Weber called modernization. The modernized Western world of the early twentieth century according to Weber rested on mechanical rather than spiritual foundations, in which cultural values are constrained by the ‘iron cage’ of material goods and acquisitiveness.\(^{74}\) This new socio-cultural situation brought along several overlapping tensions between the “moral or spiritual order and the material order and between

\(^{70}\) Anderson, *Language and power*: 22.
\(^{71}\) Ibidem: 22-3.
\(^{72}\) Ibidem: 21.
\(^{73}\) Ibidem: 21-2.
aesthetic culture and social modernity. The process of rationalization can explain these tensions. Rationalization represents itself as an intellectualization of abstract cognitive processes, in amongst others knowledge and observation, commodification, standardization and in terms of efficiency, legislative administrative procedures and bureaucratization. Rationalization is a significant contributor to what is called ‘disenchantment’, explained by Weber as the loss of a sacred sense of wholeness and the connection between self and the world by magic, sacred traditions, holiness, religion in general and myths. Eventually disenchantment contributes to rationalization as well, as it makes the world less mysterious, and reshapes the manner in which objective knowledge can be interpreted. It secularizes the world on the one hand, and increases the scale, scope and power of science, the law, bureaucracy, and so forth on the other, adding increasingly to the westernization of local elites as mentioned in the introduction and described by Sutherland. Prior to 1830, Java had not known such as process of disenchantment yet, which explains the difference between Javanese and European power-concepts.

2.2 Differences in statecraft

The traditional Javanese state: patrimonial monarchies

The relevance of Weber’s ideal types becomes clearer when studying Javanese and European statecraft. For traditional rulers, family-relations played a crucial role. When these family members or the household of rulers started to dominate the states’ administration, Weber speaks of patrimonialism. A patrimonial ruler remains in power by making sure all important offices are hold by family members, and ties with officials are of personal nature. As shown by various scholars, such as Schrieke, Bakker, Sartono Kartodirdjo and Moertono, Javanese kingdoms had a clear patrimonial design. Schrieke’s work is particularly interesting, as he was a colonial official himself for many years and later became one of the most renowned Dutch scholars in Indology. Bakker’s theoretical but useful outline provides in a close reading and explanation of Weber’s long, thorough conceptualization. According to Bakker patrimonialism as an ideal type is “relatively unknown”, and therefore he establishes six major characteristics himself, that are summarized below:

1. Authority is vested in the hands of one central ruler (or a small oligarchy with one man as head). The chief ruler makes most major decisions, holds all state power and is in the ultimate

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75 L.A. Scaff, ‘Chapter 5 - Weber on the cultural situation of the modern age’: 102.
76 Ibidem: 104-5.
78 Jenkins, ‘Disenchantment, enchantment and re-enchantment’: 12. The process Sutherland describes is an extensive one; disenchantment within the priyayi elite took place during the course of the 19th century and knew many regional and chronological differences. See: Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: 14-8, 43-4, 130-4, 160-3.
position of authority. There is no separate body of independently powerful landholders who challenges the rulers authority (without causing major disruption of state organizational structure), and all land is owned by the ruler.

2. All control of labour and land is centred on the patrimonial ruler and court, so all economically significant property is the ruler’s patrimony, or treated as such.

3. Consequently, there is no separate independent body of powerful landholders. All aristocracy is tied to the ruler’s court, while its members are dependent officials tied to the state apparatus.

4. Everyone in the state is liable to the patrimonial ruler, based on membership of some group. Farmers pay tax not individually but as members of a community, while the aristocrats collect tax for the patrimonial ruler and not for themselves or on their own authority.

5. There are no political rights for the population or any individual based on a legal-rational sense; rights are based on ‘tradition’, of which the limits cannot be exceeded easily by either the patrimonial ruler or his subjects.

6. No group of individuals has any economic property rights in a capitalistic sense: the patrimonial ruler is the only owner of property of which the rights are based on his tradition and discretion.79

Note that this situation is profoundly different from feudalism. As stressed by Furnivall, on Java people were of greater importance than land. In feudal Europe a man was liable to service because he held land, but in Java a man held land because he was liable to service.80 According to Weber, patrimonial authority is an outgrowth of patriarchal authority within the extended kin household, where the patrimonial ruler is not merely a patriarch.81 This means the family of the patron forms the most important authoritarian body after the patron himself. Bakker has pointed out the significance of patrimonial rule successfully, but he focused specifically on aspects of production and property-rights. I will attempt to show that the patrimonial system applies to Java in terms of politics and statecraft as well.

According to Schrieke, the central government of precolonial Javanese kingdoms was essentially an extension of the ruler’s personal household and staff, in which officials were granted their positions

79 Though directly derived from Weber, Bakker cunningly constructed these six characteristics as a supportive element for his thesis in relation to the problems in economic development on Java. They are thus somewhat forced. Still, they capture the basic ideas of Weber on the ideal patrimonial state and are useful to study rulership on Java. See: J.I. Bakker, *Patrimonialism and imperialism as factors in underdevelopment: a comparative historical sociological analysis of Java, with emphasis on aspects of the cultivation system, 1830-1870* (Unpublished PhD-Thesis; Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1979): 27-30.


81 Ibidem: 30.
and the perquisites that go with them as personal favours of the ruler.\textsuperscript{82} So the king’s aristocracy consisted of relatives and family-members, whose rank and position was determined by their distance in kinship from the king. The closer to the king a noble stood in kinship, the more powerful he was. Family members were therefore the closest advisors of the king, and had profound influence on state policy.\textsuperscript{83} Functionaries in the royal administration who had strong ties to the royal family, preferably in kinship, occupied the highest ranks in the military and clergy and were called mantri’s.\textsuperscript{84} While the royal family used powerful, royal titles, these mantri’s used specific administrative titles (as displayed in appendix one).\textsuperscript{85} Together they formed the administrative elite in an enclosed group, clearly demarcated from the commoners as a ruling class: the priyayi. Its members carefully preserved this distinction.\textsuperscript{86} As pointed out by Sutherland and Kartodirdjo, this gap grew under the influence of Dutch presence.\textsuperscript{87}

Apart from the internal, the external court relations of Javanese kingdoms were of a patrimonial kind as well. As Merle Ricklefs explains, “the physical isolation of populated territories and poor communications on Java strengthened the difficulty of maintaining centralized authority.”\textsuperscript{88} When a king’s empire grew in size, these “perennial difficulties” could really problematize maintaining tight administrative control in the peripheral areas.\textsuperscript{89} As a result, a local “ministerialis assigned to govern some remote province” could easily ignore central authority and develop his own political ambitions.\textsuperscript{90} This is what had happened for example at the end of the fifteenth century when the suzerainty of the empire of Majapahit weakened and the rulers of Demak and Gresik declared their independence and established their own kingdoms.\textsuperscript{91}

Here we touch upon Anderson’s famous ‘beam of light analogy.’ Anderson depicts the expression of power by a Javanese ruler as a cone of light, plugged into the socket of the macro-cosmos and spreading its light all over the patrimonial state. The strength of the light is influenced by the ruler’s personal abilities and concentration or asceticism (though there is, as mentioned, a fixed amount of ‘light’ or power), while the lights diminishing radiance, a consequence of to the increasing distance

\textsuperscript{85} See appendix 1. Sartono Kartodirdjo, \textit{Modern Indonesia}: 130-1.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibidem: 113-27, 132-49; Sutherland, \textit{The making of a bureaucratic elite}: 45-85.
\textsuperscript{88} M.C. Ricklefs, \textit{A history of modern Indonesia since c. 1200} (4\textsuperscript{th} ed., Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2008): 17.
\textsuperscript{89} Anderson, ‘The idea of power in Javanese culture’: 34.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibidem; Schrieke, \textit{Indonesian Sociological Studies} vol. 1: 184.
\textsuperscript{91} Kwee, ‘How strangers became kings’: 296.
from the bulb, is Anderson’s apt metaphor for the ruler’s power in his court and periphery. Simply put: the physical distance from the court determined the strength of the ruler’s power in a certain area. Therefore, the traditional Javanese state was defined by its centre, not its periphery. Borders did not matter in Javanese political thought, but the capital of the realm did.

Anderson’s metaphor helps us to explain what Moertono’s calls the mandala-system. The mandala was a geopolitical, overarching structure of precolonial inner-kingdom relations, relating to boundaries and to contact with foreign states. In a mandala, a central ruler resided at the court and ruled directly over the negara agung (the core regions or crown domain). The mancanegara (outer territories or peripheries) within the Mandala were not under direct administrative control of the central ruler, as the ties with the relatively autonomous leaders or overlords in the periphery (the Bupati), and the central emperor in the capital were patrimonial. As Anderson points out, the rulers in the mandala and the central ruler were a priori each other’s enemies. In most Malayan kingdoms, “the king’s dignity was given public recognition in the behaviour of great chiefs towards him in the political ceremonies in which the unity of the state was revalidated, and yet the chiefs lived in hostility with the sultan and had little to do with him except in consultation and co-operation to preserve the state in its external relations, including its defence.” Since power in the Javanese concept had a limited and constant quantity, an increase in power in one place meant an equivalent diminution elsewhere; therefore the division of power on Java within Moertono’s mandala-system would always be interpreted as logical and universal. In the words of Moertono “the doctrine emphasized the cult of expansion, a necessary spur to the struggle for existence, self-assertion and world domination, and the dynamic factor calculated to disturb the equilibrium of inter-state relations.” Hence, the logical result of ideal of inter-mandala relationships was a unity of all political entities where the ebb and flow of power seized because it had found its balance.

In practice this unity was never reached. The early Buddhist and Hindu kingdoms on Java prior to the arrival of European powers were primarily inland states (with exception of Majapahit and Demak), where, as mentioned, it was difficult to maintain centralized authority. The solution for controlling the large, mountainous areas was found in a system of a pseudo-feudalized form of rule, with considerable power granted to vassal lords. The most powerful kings stood at the top of a large mandala-based empire and functioned as the central authority in almost every aspect of life, as

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92 Anderson, Language and power: 24-34.
93 Ibidem: 44.
94 Gullick, Indigenous political systems of western Malaya: 54.
95 Ibidem: 44-5.
96 Soemarsaid Moertono, State and statecraft: 71, n. 207.
97 Ibidem: 45.
explained by balancing and manipulating the interests of those below him by appearing to have supernatural support. He would also try to impel neighbouring rulers to submit to his authority, especially those who possessed a large population and were able to attract local as well as foreign traders. Constant competition among Javanese rulers to become the pre-eminent overlord was thus not uncommon, and Javanese kingdoms were often based on conquest, diplomacy, and formation of coalitions.

The Javanese empire of Mataram is a good example. Founded and expanded by continuous conquests and diplomacy and ruled feudally by a traditional monarch, Mataram became the preeminent power on Java in the seventeenth century. Coastal regents were required to pay homage to the Susuhunan, and those regents the Susuhunan considered uncooperative risked being put to death. Although Clive Day calls these regents “nearly sovereign (...) independent kings”, Schrieke stresses the process of binding between the Susuhunans and regents, as the Susuhunans would attempt to keep the regents close to the court by, for example, using marriage policy, or replaced them in order to terminate any aspirations to independence and keep their land in his ‘cone of light.’ In the words of Gregory Moedjanto, the power of the kings of Mataram was eventually so great in their subjects’ points of view, “that they were often described as the owners of everything in the world; not only the owners of a country or of property, but also the owners of one’s very life.”

In summary, Java never had absolutist monarchs but patrons. They were rulers who held an administration of essentially a hierarchical line of separate, self-sufficient, and highly autonomous units of power, vertically linked by the personal ties between power-holders. The Javanese state was therefore organized around the central ruler’s ability to accumulate, withhold, and express power, and as long as he could maintain this ability, the beam of the bulb of light would spread out over his realm, supported by the sub-autonomous regents in the periphery.

*The nineteenth century colonial state: bureaucratic governance*

That Weber’s theoretical outlines describe a process rather than a status quo is unsurprising. European rule over the dominions overseas was obviously designed in accordance with European ideas about statecraft, but the practice of rational authority in what Weber called the ‘bureaucratic state’ remains

100 Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and statecraft*: 20.
101 Kwee, ‘How strangers became kings’: 295.
104 Kwee, ‘How strangers became kings’: 296.
107 Moertono, *State and statecraft*: 104.
difficult to investigate, as just as “historically there has been a purely patrimonial state” (as Weber remarked), there has never been a purely bureaucratic state.\textsuperscript{108} Still, it is interesting to compare the process of the colonial state-formation on Java in the first three decades of the nineteenth century with Weber’s conceptualization, as it clearly shows that maintaining central rule was likely more difficult than the Governor-Generals expected.

Pre-nineteenth century European states had limited ability to impose its schemes on society. In the words of James Scott: “The eighteenth-century European state was still largely a machine for extraction. (...) State officials lacked the consistent coercive power and the fine-grained administrative grid, or the detailed knowledge that would have permitted them to undertake more intrusive experiments in social engineering.”\textsuperscript{109} The conditions to construct states machineries to undertake these experiments were being met during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Scott, three elements found these developments: (1) the aspiration to administrate nature and society, which he calls “high modernism”, (2) the unrestrained use of modern states’ power to achieve these designs, and (3) a weakened or prostrate civil society that lacks capacity to resist these plans.\textsuperscript{110} In the post-Napoleonic Netherlands, political struggles under William I and II (exemplified by the Belgian Revolution and the continuous degradation of the kings power, certainly after the Dutch constitutional reform of 1848), suggest that the developments of state-formation, in accordance with these three elements, happened in a somewhat faltering manner. Elements such as a strong, wealthy citizenry kept the king’s power in balance. However, on Java the colonial government experienced a strong growth of power from 1800 onward. After the Java War, Dutch governance became much more stable and undisputed, as native Javanese heads rather cooperated with than resisted the Dutch. Moreover, the cultivation system reveals the exact strive for ordering nature and society Scott defines.

In the minds of Raffles, Van den Bosch and other colonial officials the ‘empty grounds’ of the colonies provided in the ideal platform to induce state formation and create society to their own likings. Their ideas are a very clear output of the administrative aspirations described by Scott. Perhaps we could even say that in the East, these aspirations were even more easily distributed than in Europe, when we take into account the gradual Dutch expansion and the consolidation of Dutch rule from 1815 to 1830 on Java. During these years, increasing scientific interest and research, governmental institutionalization and economic expansion are three basic processes that illustrate the expression of Scott’s ‘high modernism’ on Java.

\textsuperscript{108} Weber, \textit{Economy and society}: 237.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibidem: 88-9.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century administrative organizations grew enormously in size and in importance in European states, due to the emergence of a new political order and a range of economic and social changes, such as technological and industrial developments, population growth and of course the tarnishing of ancien-régime politics. The consolidation of numerous more or less independent political units in 1500 into twenty-odd states in 1900 marked the unification of Europe in nation-states that centred themselves around a capital. Huge and centralized administrative structures could not develop in the absence of a powerful centre. The centre, especially in culturally heterogeneous communities with specific historical traditions, relied in such structures, to subdue and replace provincial power holders, establish central authority and collect taxes. After the Napoleonic Wars, the creation of the Kingdom of Netherlands as a buffer-state against France marked this type of centralization. Being a kingdom, one could easily think the political situation in the Netherlands was not that different from the Javanese: power was in hands of an aristocracy, commonly shared via patrimonial relations. The difference lies in Weber’s disenchantment. The separation of state and church, the protestant character of the dominant part of Dutch society and the altering position and political role of the king had growing influence on the Dutch political landscape. The Dutch bourgeoisie in the cities had always enjoyed high social positions, comparable to the landholding nobilities. Moreover, the Netherlands became increasingly institutionalized, and as the balance of power in Europe kept the country away from the immediate threat of war, the ‘mercantile spirit’ of the Dutch resurrected, giving the growth of the Dutch urban bourgeoisie a major impulse. The position and role of the king changed drastically. Whereas the stadtholders of the Dutch Republic and their families took part in warfare, international political disputes and power plays, king William I spend most of time reading and signing reports, minutes, bills and statutes and was under constant administrative pressure. The Dutch king had become an official himself, whereas a Javanese regent would leave all his administrative duties to his patih, his chief minister. The Javanese kingdom remained traditional, while the Dutch state, especially in comparison to the Javanese one, was slowly transforming into a bureaucratic state.

The process of disenchantment and rationalization are the key concepts that led to the formation of bureaucratic states. Based on early liberal thought about authority and bureaucracy of authors like John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, Weber defines six major characters that are recognizable today in modern bureaucracies. In sum, a bureaucracy should be (1) managed by rules, (2) formed by a hierarchical construction, (3) strictly separated from personal interests, (4) conducted on the base of

112 Ibidem: 3.
written documents, and (5) bureaucratic work should be done by qualified persons, who (6) are appointed only because of their technical qualities.\textsuperscript{114} Obviously, in the ideal bureaucratic state, rational, professional, and technical bureaucratic governance rejects the practice of patrimonialism, nepotism or rule by any kind of nobility or aristocracy. The personal relations the kings in the Javanese mandala enjoyed with their regents are incompatible with strict Weberian bureaucracy. According to Weber under the influence of Protestantism people were stimulated to find a clear and uniform goal, shaped into a vocation. Though this is not an undisputed argument, Weber does show that there was a stimulus in Northern European countries during the nineteenth century that created the Berufsmensch, a man of vocation that methodologically sought fulfilment and identity in his profession.\textsuperscript{115} The official, whether he is a clerk or an army officer, needs to see his vocation as his Pflicht or duty. This means the holding of an office should not be exploited for rents or emoluments in exchange for the rendering of certain services, but an acceptance of the duty to serve not a person but a community, and thus fulfil an impersonal and functional purpose.\textsuperscript{116} Salary or raises should not be the (only) motivation for doing a job well; the self-discipline within the concept of vocation is considered more important. These requirements were difficult to reach in the early nineteenth century in general, but certainly on Java. Any pure type of bureaucracy was never realized due to all kinds of corruption, nepotism, and other kinds of ‘non-bureaucratic’ behaviour. But the strivings of men like Raffles and Van den Bosch do capture the same spirit that is apparent in Weber; a strong, professional will and a motivation to change and reshape society according to their ideals. Highly enthusiastic themselves, men like Raffles and Van den Bosch expected the same motivation from their subordinate officials, but as I will show in the next chapters, this expectation was rather vain.

A closer look at the European presence in Asia in this era of ‘high modernization’ shows increasing interest of European officials in shaping society. For instance, British rule in India under governance of Lord William Bentinck (1774-1839, in office 1828-1835), increasingly impregnated the indigenous roots it was initially based on. Inspired by liberal and utilitarian doctrines Bentinck reformed the colonial administration, tax-system, army, and implemented education laws to propagate western education and tutor the Indian population.\textsuperscript{117} Under Daendels and Raffles Java was subjected to visions that fit in this tradition. Both tried to create an overseas version of European order and rule, as they planned an institutionalized colony based on educated elites (see below). However, in Van den Bosch’ perception

\textsuperscript{115} Weber, Economy and society: 958-9.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibidem: 959.
\textsuperscript{117} See for an account on Bentinck’s administrative and military reforms: S. Mukherjee, Indian administration of Lord William Bentinck (Calcutta: Bagchi, 1994) and for the ideas that influenced his policy: E. Stokes, The English utilitarians and India (2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) and J. Rosselli, Lord William Bentinck: the making of a liberal imperialist, 1774-1839 (London: Chatto and Windus for Sussex University Press, 1974).
the task of the colonial state was to develop profitable export-production to support the economy of the mother country. The plans of the Governors of 1808-1830 largely remained plans and never had the chance to develop, as sooner or later a new Governor-General would take over and execute his own plans. Van den Bosch considered Java completely subordinate to the home country and wanted to keep the size of Dutch territory, in the aftermath of the Java War, limited.\textsuperscript{118} As the European-styled modernization of Java continued, Van den Bosch’ motives were focussed more on the homeland than the colony. He considered the forceful, experimental changes of Daendels, Raffles, and Van der Capellen the cause of the Java War, and for this reason he favoured his personal version of indirect control by integrating the regents into the Dutch administration.\textsuperscript{119}

According to Van den Doel, the process of colonial state-formation did not differ that much from developments in the West. Following Joseph à Campo and Houben he defines the process as “the establishment and reinforcement of factual sovereignty and effectual rule over a clearly delimited territory and the creation of bodies that improve contact between state and people by a foreign power, without nullifying the power and influence of this foreign power.”\textsuperscript{120} À Campo also sees “eventual independence” (on the very long term) as its goal combined with a “larger degree of legal and political equality,” but this relates more to the effective ideological expression of the ethical policy of late nineteenth century than to the doctrine of the cultivation system.\textsuperscript{121} The core of the colonial administration and methods as proposed by Van den Bosch followed the same principles Weber idealized, but in a strict European sense, which meant Javanese servants (usually those of mixed European and Javanese blood) were only allowed to work at the bottom of the administrative apparatus.

Summarizing, we can see some major differences between state concepts of Europe and Java when we take Anderson’s, Van den Doel’s and À Campo’s observations into account. In contrast to the Javanese state, the Western state tended focus on its borders rather than its centre; the demarcation of the territory defined the area of the state. Instead of the bulb of light’s diminishing radiation, the whole state was to be under the same amount of power, no matter how far from the centre. Second, legal rule, under influence of disenchantment, denounced the use of personal, patrimonial relations: there was simply no place for anything but professionalism in the ideal Western bureaucratic system. We will have a closer look at the historical context of the VOC’s and its successors’ policy to show that this ideal was never reached.

\textsuperscript{118} J.N.F.M. à Campo, \emph{Engines of empire: steamshipping and state formation in colonial Indonesia} (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2002): 28.
\textsuperscript{119} Van den Doel: \emph{De stille macht}: 20; Houben, \emph{Kraton and Kumpeni}: 21.
\textsuperscript{120} Houben, \emph{Kraton and Kumpeni}: 19; À Campo, \emph{Engines of empire}: 26.
\textsuperscript{121} À Campo, \emph{Engines of empire}: 26.
2.3 The base for cooperation

Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the VOC had become increasingly involved in political games all over the Indonesian archipelago. The Company defended alliances with Javanese nobles, who “hated each other more than they hated any foreigners”, and got dragged into Javanese affairs by “opportunistic requests for support in civil conflicts.”

Finally, “a stable equilibrium was reached in which the Dutch found themselves playing what Ricklefs calls a ‘mediatory role’ as ‘ultimate arbiters of insoluble disputes.’” Using diplomacy, intrigues and – only when unavoidable – military action, the VOC used local chiefs as its agents to expand its commercial and social influence over Java, the archipelago, and other parts of South-, East-, and Southeast Asia. The VOC never became the overall dominator on Java, but in those areas where it became most heavily involved (like the Pasisir ports and the coffee producing Priangan), its political impact was considerable. Economically the Company stimulated production while politically it mingled in the Javanese tradition of “weaker kingdoms dependent on the goodwill of peripheral elite, to be overthrown by a usurper.”

Collecting vassals all over Java, the VOC became a major player in several mandala systems, although it was never able to ‘police’ the whole island. Effectively, nor the VOC nor the Javanese aristocrats had a clear vision or policy for Java: politics determined policies and persons were of greater importance than these policies. Still, the Indonesian states acknowledged the growing Dutch naval supremacy and were eager to determine their diplomatic relations with other states based on their relation with the VOC, for example in exchange for Dutch protection. The VOC awarded titles and ranks, as the Dutch styled themselves as prominent representatives of ‘the supreme Dutch king in Holland.’ This was eagerly adopted by the Javanese regents by expressing the superiority of the Government-General in kinship terms (as was custom in Javanese nobility), by calling him eyang (grandfather), while the Javanese ruler was called wayah (grandson). By doing so, the Dutch let the regents interpret their own

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historical explanation of the Dutch legitimation of rule.\textsuperscript{128} Similarly, from the 1830s onward, the Dutch represented the relationship between resident and regent as one between an elder and a younger brother.

Daendels’ and Raffles’ administrations both instigated a wave of institutionalization and bureaucratization. The exercise of control was reformed directly by dividing Java in 5 prefectures and 30 regencies and centralized by putting all officials under direct control of Batavia where the two major bodies of the central administration, the \textit{Gouvernement Generaal} and \textit{Gouvernements Secretarie}, were founded. In 1819 these bodies were merged together into the centralized \textit{Algemene Secretarie} (General Secretariat), under the \textit{Algemeen Secretaris}.\textsuperscript{129} The system of corrupted VOC-officials was disposed of and forcefully replaced by a modernized bureaucratic administration. Daendels split up the island’s government into a ‘European’ and a ‘Native’ part, the \textit{Binnenlands} and \textit{Inlands Bestuur}. Under Daendels, every residency was put under control of a resident, and three years later Raffles introduced the position of assistant-resident.\textsuperscript{130} The assistant-residents were assisted by controleurs, each responsible for a number of districts within the regency.\textsuperscript{131} Every civil servant received a strictly demarcated function and a constant payment, as an attempt to replace the corrupted governance of the VOC and the traditional rule of the regents by rule of law.\textsuperscript{132}

Daendels’ forceful style towards the regents aimed at centralization of Java was not very conducive for the relation between the Dutch and Javanese rulers.\textsuperscript{133} Known as the ‘thundering marshal’, he must have left quite an impression on the princes and sultans of the ancient realms, who were used to much more delicate forms of communication. Raffles did not want to do business with the regents at all: he believed a system of landrent, imposed directly on the village chiefs, would stimulate direct contact between the government and the people, about which he had a much more positive opinion than the Dutch.\textsuperscript{134} Raffles preferred direct control of Java under European rule, and was determined to reduce the influence of the regents, whom he considered lazy, spoiled, elitist, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{130} Sutherland, \textit{The making of a bureaucratic elite}: 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Elson, \textit{Village Java}: xxiii.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} Van den Doel, \textit{De stille macht}: 38-40.
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Sutherland, \textit{The making of a bureaucratic elite}: 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} Hugenholtz, \textit{Landrente op Java}: 10-2, 22-3, 291; Van den Doel, \textit{Het rijk van Insulinde}: 20.
\end{itemize}
less incapable of controlling territorial domain than the village chiefs. Van der Capellen continued this policy, this time with ethically driven motivations to protect the rights of the Javanese villagers.

This wave of institutionalization reformed Java into an increasingly bureaucratic unity. However, the arrival of Van den Bosch after the Java War marked a return to more conservative, commercially driven policy. Van den Bosch enforced the position of the regents by making their position hereditary, but this practice knew many regional varieties and this inducement remained informal: when the Javanese custom of hereditary succession threatened the state’s interests the promise of hereditariness was easily broken. But Van den Bosch’ ideology gave the regents much more political freedom, which strengthened their power and greatly enhanced the approachability of the provincial courts, enabling the residents to come in contact with regents more easily. By formalizing these kinds of Javanese principles according to Dutch law, the cultivation system legalized the basic realities of “Javanese morality” into “statutes”, as already observed by Multatuli. By guarding instead of affecting the prestige of the regents, Van den Bosch’ policy made use of, instead of denying the traditional authority of the regents.

The reforms of Daendels and Raffles never really changed the malfunctions in bureaucratic practice (such as corruption) on higher level. Moreover, as I will elaborate on in the next chapter, the level of professionalism of civil servants during the 1820s was very low, and it was not until 1842 that laws obligated education and appointment of civil servants based on qualities rather than patronage or corruption. Up until then, patronage among civil servants and their superiors, surprisingly similar to the Javanese use, was a common phenomenon in the Dutch bureaucracy. The residents and their officials of the 1830s were half-heartedly educated and only partially the ideal civil servants of Weber. While the basic Weberian framework of bureaucratic, institutionalized administration was already there, the men of vocation that should have signified the system were still largely absent. It is for this reason that Van Niel called the civil administration and governance in the East Indies a “system of men rather than laws.” The individualistic character of the administration in which residents functioned stimulated wide personal latitude in interpreting and applying the principles of the cultivation system and rules and regulations. Van Niel describes the civil administration as paternalistic, liberal, autocratic and vague; especially the orders from the Government-General to the residents were vague.

135 Ibidem: 18.
137 Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: 12.
139 Van den Doel, De stille macht: 67; Fasseur, De Indologen: 34-9.
140 Fasseur, De Indologen: 23-9.
141 Van Niel, Java under the cultivation system: 88.
142 Ibidem; Day, The policy and administration: 225.
and most resident carried on their work according to their own understanding.\textsuperscript{143} These residents lived in a “native” environment, i.e. in a big house “in the countryside”, not rarely with one or more Javanese (or other native) women, surrounded by natives and supported by an extensive household with native servants, contrary to the civil servants in Batavia and Buitenzorg, who lived in a European colonial, Dutch environment.\textsuperscript{144} As Van den Doel noted, for the average resident on Java his demanding function was not just a job or position, but a lifestyle.\textsuperscript{145} So the residents and their staff, probably especially in the residencies further away from Batavia, were in closer contact with the regents and other local chiefs than with the Government-General. The colonial transformation of the priyayi elite as pointed out by Sutherland thus cannot be seen separately from the influence of the priyayi on European controllers.\textsuperscript{146}

This is very interesting: in the ideal of the European governors of the early nineteenth century, Java needed to be reigned centrally, under the modernizing influence of bureaucratization and institutionalization, countering the authentic Javanese political order, but practically these governors encountered the same difficulties as the Javanese kings. The radial distance between the king and regent in the mandala is comparable to the increasing gap between the Government-General and the residents in the early colonial state. The residents were thus, just like the regents, cut-off from their immediate relation with the Government-General. The regents, who in general already enjoyed a high level of autonomy in the mandala-system, in fact became independent actors under the European bureaucratic administration, stimulated by the return to traditionalism of Van den Bosch after the reforms of Daendels, Raffles and Van der Capellen had sidelined them.

This policy was hard to continue regionally, since the level of professionalism and modernity of the residents was not very high. So the above described similarities in the relations between regents and residents can only be explained when we take into account that because of the turn in policy of Van den Bosch the regents were stimulated to use traditional authority. The residents and regents, both locally settled and much further away from the central government than intended, were forced into a system of cooperation. The regents had been sidelined for more than a quarter of a century and gladly took part, and so the Daendels-Raffles reforms had indirectly stimulated their willingness to cooperate. It is crucial now to find out how residents and regents cooperated, and identify the connection between both by looking at mutual correspondence. Here we can find the crucial link in the establishment of colonial control.

\textsuperscript{143} Van Niel, Java under the cultivation system: 90-1.
\textsuperscript{145} Van den Doel, De stille macht: 15.
\textsuperscript{146} Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: 36.
The introduction of the cultivation system reset the relation between the Javanese heads and western officials. The residents became the spearhead of colonial rule, replacing the ancient political system of ruler-centred states. The position of resident grew from trading company representative to the highest political authority in the region. In every residency, the resident had the overall responsibility for generating agricultural profit, which could only be achieved by employing the native aristocracy and population. Sufficient provision of information about and a good relation with the local aristocracy was therefore of essential importance. Naturally, the regents never spared any effort in trying to profit from their renewed, enforced positions. In this chapter I will display the techniques and strategies used by both the residents and regents to cooperate and compete. The archival material from the 1830s shows us a diverse, complex and paradoxical, yet also intriguing and peculiar kind of relationship that contributes to rather than refutes the conception of colonial rule as a ‘system of men.’

Correspondence and reports about immediate contact between Dutch officials and native chiefs found in the ANRI sheds new light on the complex relation between ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’, showing that the former was not always in the lead. If we want to find out how both parties cooperated in the system of dual control, this kind of archival material is our closest and most complete source of information. As mentioned in the introduction, most material was mainly collected out of opportunistic motivations. By sifting the archival material, specifically interesting cases showed up. In this chapter most of these cases come from the local archives of Semarang and Surakarta. The archives of Semarang contain particularly interesting correspondence with the regent of Grobogan (see map 5). Its revealing letters tell us much about the relation between the residents of Semarang and this regent. Semarang was of great importance for rice-cultivation and the production of timber, while cash crops such as sugar, coffee and tobacco were of lesser importance. The city of Semarang had been in the hands of the Dutch since 1678 and had become an important colonial trading centre.

Very interesting as well are the relations with various regents around the courts of Surakarta and Yogyakarta. As principalities, these residencies enjoyed a high level of autonomy, although in practice they were subjected to the Dutch supreme sovereignty. An interesting example is the position of one of the minor principalities called Mangkunegara, a vassal state of Surakarta (see map 4). The rulers of this state became the closest allies of the Dutch in the entire region. A specific case about throne-succession in Surakarta has been described by Vincent Houben, who uses archival material from the National Archives in The Hague (which largely consists of copies of material in the ANRI). Detailed files

in the ANRI and a reinterpretation of letters from Van den Bosch to Baud give us a clearer view on the Dutch’ perception of their own relations with the noble courts in the principalities.

3.1 The information network

As a consequence of the reforms of Van der Capellen and Van den Bosch, the job of resident became partly administrative and partly diplomatic. Though most residents considered themselves representatives of the Dutch Government in the first place, and administrator (in a sense that they could intervene in matters of police and jurisdiction), in the second, some residents in the 1830s still complained about having only “moral influence” and merely being able to “guide and reprimand” the regents. Overall, the residents depended on their ability to win over the cooperation of senior native officials. The regents on the other hand were becoming part of an administrative body that needed their prestige in order to carry out influence successfully. The Dutch promise of profit shares, prestige and consolidation of power interwove the regents tightly with the Dutch administration. In order to be able to realize cooperation, both the residents and regents needed reliable intelligence about each other. Knowledge was power, so this paragraph peruses the colonial intelligence network and the techniques used in the colonial system of careful acquisition, preservation and distribution of information.

First, let us take a look at what has already been written about colonial intelligence gathering. The colonial information network of nineteenth century British-India has been thoroughly researched and provides foothold in grasping the importance of colonial knowledge. Christopher Baily concluded that the British had to overcome many difficulties to penetrate into the already existent but rather decentralized and oral information networks, but eventually succeeded in overtaking and transforming these networks into written ones, structured to their own preferences. Dependent on local elites, the British penetrated so deep into the existing structures of the native states that, according to Nicholas Dirks, they eventually created not only a colonial identity, but also traditions that are now considered authentic for India. As described by Bernard Cohn, forceful linguistic, educative, cultural and other transformative strategies co-effectuated the process of colonisation. According to Cohn, the British entered a new epistemological space in India, which required a network of collecting,

148 Houben, ‘Native states’: 120.
149 Ibidem, 119-120.
150 Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: 11.
153 Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: 33-5, 45-56.
recording and interpreting information through different methods that Cohn calls ‘investigative modalities’. By clustering information structures and the observational groups in these modalities the colony became manageable. Constantly reducing complex existing structures into their own “interpretational rational metonyms” enabled the British to reshape colonial control and thus the colony itself in its entirety. The deep connection between native and colonial circuits of information can thus be seen as the underlying medium of colonial management in British-India.

On Java, the VOC headquarters in Batavia had maintained a large inter-Asian network of correspondence and intelligence gathering to support its commercial activities. While this network functioned relatively smoothly, correspondence between the ‘nodding points’ in Amsterdam, Cape Town and Batavia often faltered. As a trading empire the VOC’s network never aimed at nor sufficed in providing information to govern vast amounts of land, let alone an entire island. The foundations of the VOC network were therefore removed by Daendels, whose policy of centralization aimed at generating more constant and complete information relevant for executing governance. This policy was continued with increasing success by the British, as illustrated by Raffles’ profound History of Java (1817). Formalization of the early information network happened after the British interregnum, when several steps were taken to regulate by decree the obligation of residents to provide the Government-General with adequate and constant amounts of information. So-called commissioner-generals were appointed to check whether these steps were actually carried out. The Dutch based themselves, as shown by Charles Jeurgens, on principles of rule that the British had introduced during the interregnum. Specific laws, initiated by Raffles but ratified by Van den Capellen compelled the residents to traverse their districts on a regular and systematic basis, to gather information about the ‘general mood’ of the population and the native chiefs, and report continuously to the Government-General. Journeys like these had been undertaken by high VOC-officials prior to the nineteenth

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155 Cohn, *Colonialism and its forms of knowledge*: 162.
century, but never on such a systematic basis, and never motivated by regulations and ambitions of governance.

Scott’s ‘high modernism’, as explained in chapter two, showcases the project of knowledge gathering. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, European scientists, missionaries and other travellers started to investigate the unknown with new, overwhelming enthusiasm. The practice of professional maritime and scientific knowledge-gathering had supported the construction of ‘administrative exploration networks’ throughout South-Africa and South- and Southeast Asia very well during the VOC-era, by generating geographic and ethnographic information and compiling maps. In the 1820s the influx of scientists surged, and they brought along sophisticated techniques and procedures of observation to gather information. Professionalized scientific studies, ranging from geological, climatic and natural to anthropologic, cultural and linguistic science were instigated by the Dutch government in order to ‘rediscover’ the colony. Stimulating a new attitude of trying to understand the native world, the presence of this new group of scientists and other persons that were not civil servants created the breeding ground for the colonial government to take the first steps in regulating information gathering and control. Scientific knowledge, the remains of the old VOC-network and the regulation of information gathering were the first steps of the Dutch Government, centrally and locally, to construct governance. Increasingly, the hunger for knowledge institutionalized the provision of information, and vivified Cohn’s ‘investigative modalities’ on Java.

The institutionalization of knowledge made the resident offices the prime mappers and sources of information-production. It was because of this practice that colonial governmental archives were created, which makes us more aware of Stoler’s notion that archives are not just a source for finding historical, but also “artefacts in themselves, displaying the customs of and the very substance of colonial politics and rule.” More experienced colonial officials knew how to play ball with their superiors in Batavia; knowledge played an important role in colonial politics and the possession of

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specific knowledge had influence on the importance of an official. The staff in Batavia played a similar game with its superiors in The Hague. This raised the concern of the Minister of Colonies and the rest of the Dutch government about communication within the Dutch colonial state apparatus.\textsuperscript{165} Moreover, the practice of distorting communication and manipulating the information stream by residents and higher officials in Batavia had a deep impact on the actual division of information, of which traces remained preserved in the paper archives.\textsuperscript{166} This means that information received in The Hague had already passed different lenses and had probably undergone massive editing and manipulation. This information-stream emerged from the link between regents and residents.

To problematize the spread of colonial information even further, this link was already infected, as shown by Stoler. According to her, the architects of and functionaries in the colonial empire attempted to construct “social kinds and racial categories to frame the illusive amount of structures, processes, information and events” that emerged under their noses, but consequently suffered from an epistemic anxiety when they found out they did not know what they thought they knew.\textsuperscript{167} Stoler uses the multi-layered writings of colonial servant F.C. Valck on the murder of a planter family on Sumatra in the 1870s, as an example of clashes between colonials and colonized and the vulnerability of the colonizer’s knowledge, and thus also the limits of his power.\textsuperscript{168} Though set in a different timeframe, Stoler’s characterization succeeds in exemplifying the precariousness of colonial knowledge. On the other hand, as mentioned in the introduction, Stoler primarily uses reports and letters derived from the higher levels of the colonial government, all from the archives in The Hague. In her argument a not yet identified cultural or political distance between residents and regents caused the epistemic anxiety now lodged in ‘particular archival forms.’\textsuperscript{169} I will try to add to Stoler’s observations by emphasizing that colonial agents were part of the same system as the native rulers, who were both entangled in close relationships, and that actions based on gathered knowledge influenced both. The cases displayed below make clear that the reality of colonial rule on the ground was much more complex than anticipated by the Government-General.

\textit{Local intelligence gathering}

Influenced by the reforms of Daendels, Raffles and Van der Capellen, residents started to construct their own local information networks in order to sufficiently satisfy the needs of the Government-Generals and Ministers of Colonies. Communication networks were intensified. Maintenance of roads and mail-service through herendiensten, such as Daendels’ \textit{Grote Postweg}, became a major concern

\textsuperscript{165} Jeurgens, ‘Information on the move’: 56.
\textsuperscript{167} Stoler, \textit{Along the archival grain}: 38-9, 41-3.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibidem: 182-234.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibidem: 20.
of the residents and one of the main stimuli behind the physical growth of the information network.¹⁷⁰ In Semarang in 1833 for example, the resident threatened to fire the native personnel responsible for taking care of the carriages and horses, after complaints from his superiors in Batavia about the slow and poorly organized post service in his residency.¹⁷¹ This kind of clear emphasis put on the importance of well-organized mail services illustrates the growth of the Dutch information network.

The practice of gathering information became quickly standardized. Special decrees from 1820 and 1823 ordained residents to create extensive reports based on statistic data, like the geographic position of villages, population growth, the names, ranks and titles of local heads and so on, all to be send to Batavia.¹⁷² From then onward, residencies were mandatorily quantified and systemized using scientific methods, in order to collect all available statistics about every single desa, district, regency and all of its chiefs. As a result, one of the residents’ prime-references for information about their residencies was the work of former residents. Specific reports, the Memorie van Overgave (Final Memorandum) were drawn up, in which a resident, at the end of his term, presented all information concerning the state of the residency and the local ruling houses.¹⁷³ This was not institutionalized until at least 1849, so it remains unclear if it was mandatory or not, and if every resident made these kind of final reports. The practicability of the measures imposed by Van der Capellen and Van den Bosch in general always remained doubtful; the practices and techniques of residents varied widely. The first thing most residents probably did when they started in a new residency was looking at these reports and corresponding with their predecessors and immediate colleagues.¹⁷⁴ The experience of a resident, based on what he saw with his own eyes, was still the most reliable source of information. Three specific methods jump out in the residents’ attempts to collect intelligence. Occasionally residents requested information directly from the regents. A bundle in the archives of Semarang contains empty, pre-designed forms about desas, with a request from the resident to fill in the name and exact location of residence of every villager.¹⁷⁵ Otherwise controleurs or other officials were sent out to specific regencies to verify the location of the desas and fields and carry out population censuses. Lists with

¹⁷⁰ Van den Doel, Het rijk van Insulinde: 15. The ‘Grote Postweg’ was a project that in fact connected and improved multiple existing roads in order to create a single route from the Eastern to the Western tips of Java. It was constructed within one year for a minimum of costs, by thousand Javanese laborers as a form of ‘herendiensten’, but thousands of them died during the work due to several contagious diseases and bad working conditions.


¹⁷³ Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 97.

¹⁷⁴ See for example: ANRI: K.16 Surakarta (1646-1890) 475 ‘Nota over deze Pangeran, 1847’: containing reports of a resident about the ruling noble family in Surakarta including tips on how to approach them and how to perceive their deeds.

the names and locations of desas, the number of households, cash-crop fields and a survey of details concerning the local heads and population are omnipresent in bundles with correspondence in the colonial archives. For the Dutch this was an easy way to oversee the residency. Obtaining accurate data of regents however could apparently also be problematic: the regents of Grobogan, Kendal and Demak in Semarang for example were suspected of manipulating data in order to increase their salaries. The regents of Grobogan and Demak also both claimed the same village, inhabited by 400 people, to be under their realm. Verifying all data obtained from the regents was not possible as according to the resident there was simply not enough manpower to monitor all regencies at the same time.

A second type of information gathering, specifically to inform about the regents’ activities and behaviour, was sending in spies. Usually these were native civil servants that had gained the resident’s trust. Typically these were so-called magang, unpaid apprentices, usually young priyayi who attached themselves to and lived with the family of an official. The magang and the official developed a valuable tie, giving room to various forms of intrigue beneath the surface of official policy. Reports of using spies do not appear often in the archival material, which might indicate that they were used only as a last resort, when the regents’ behaviour awoke serious suspicion. The regents probably carried out this practice as well by sending translators or family members to the residents’ office with a double agenda: making contact with the residents and managing official business, but also keeping their eyes open and acquiring information. This is one of those undisclosed practices that did not make it into the archives extensively, but Bayly showed that it was widespread in India. While traces of Javanese spies are not easy to find, the resident of Semarang in the early 1840s did have suspicions of native officials spying on him, which he noted down in his reports to warn his colleagues for “exceptional curiosities” by their Javanese servants.

The resident of Semarang was very much concerned about the behaviour and loyalty of his regents. Therefore he compiled detailed files about them and their families. Intense communication with the courts stood at the basis of extensive accounts on births, marriages, successions to the throne and other positions, and many other events, while spying and communicating with nobles outside the

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176 Semarang 2255 ’Uitgaande brieven aan de Regenten in de residentie Semarang 1827, 1829, 1830, 1831-1833, 1835’: letter 377, assistant-resident to the resident of Semarang’, 2 August 1833.
177 ANRI: Semarang 2265: files of 25-27 June, 1836.
178 Ibidem.
179 Sutherland, The making of a bureaucratic elite: 31-3. The magang-phenomenon was actually something of the later nineteenth century and was not yet fully shaped and routinized in the 1830s, but there are many signs in the archives (see below) that do implicate residents making use of the services of trusted Javanese priyayi-servants.
180 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 126-9;
181 Baily, Empire and information: 60-1, 95-6.
182 ANRI: Surakarta 476 ‘Voorstel van een huwelijk tussen Pangeran A. Mankunegoro en (...) 1848’: ‘Tweede Rapport over de rijkbestierder, 1846’.
court informed the resident about the daily activities, behaviour and attitude of the regent. Based on reports by predecessors and on research by his servants the resident of Semarang constructed family trees and lists with the names and titles of the noble families. These files were kept in the local archives and served as the main reference for new residents to get a grip on information about the ruling houses in the residency. In 1846, the resident of Surakarta received a bundle with all names and titles of the current Sultan complete with an overview of the history of the residency and the local noble families since VOC-times. In a letter to the official who had sent this to him, he expressed great delight since it would show him which family members “would remain loyal to the government.” The bundle was apparently constantly extended, as files in new hand scriptures showed up after every few pages, signed by different persons in different places and on different dates, up until 1861. This bundle easily provokes the idea of the resident having it lying in a drawer, as his prime, encyclopaedic reference point about the regencies’ noble families under his control, to which new chapters were constantly added. The bundle also includes all kinds of observations about the state of the local colonial army and the attitude towards the Dutch of the local elite. Apparently, residents constructed their own small clusters of information, simply as reference for other officials to get insight into the relations with the local noble houses. However, all files in this document, including the small guiding notes from when the file was sent around or replaced, are signed by residents and assistant residents, which indicates that the bundle was not accessible for everyone. Intrinsic knowledge of the noble families was valuable, so the division and accessibility of this kind of information must have been strictly regulated.

The inspection tours of Raffles and Van der Capellen can be considered a third form of intelligence gathering. The residents paid visits to the most important noblemen during these tours, and were obliged to draw up memoranda of their meetings and send these to Batavia. The Surakarta bundle of 1846-1861 was most likely partly the result of this practice. Visits to the regents’ courts were obviously important in terms of diplomatic contact, but by simply perceiving the daily comings and goings at these courts with their own eyes, the residents must also have gotten their fair share of information about the local nobility.

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183 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 96.
185 ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Rapport t.a.v. de prinsen in Surakarta, 1846’.
The problem of language

Acquiring information was the first step, interpreting the second. Many of the reports and letters sent by a regent needed to be translated first, as very few residents were capable of understanding local languages like Javanese and Madurese. Some of them did not even understand Classic Malay (the diplomatic lingua franca at the time). Language skills were considered important but Dutchmen who spoke Malay or Javanese fluently were rare in the 1830s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, administrative professionalism among residents was not at Weber’s optimum. Most lower BB-officials, many of whom were Indo-Europeans or native Javanese of noble families, had neither the discipline nor the interest to educate themselves in written Javanese language, administrative- and management-skills, or local history. For Javanese nobles, writing for example was a profession that belonged to those trained in it, and many of the regents were probably illiterate.\(^{188}\) An attempt to stimulate language training for Dutch and natives was taken up in 1832 in Surakarta when the Institute for Javanese languages was founded, largely on the initiative of a Dutch-bible translator named Johan Gericke, but, just like former attempts by Van der Capellen, it did not become a success.\(^{189}\) It took until the 1840s before proper schools for Dutch children as well as those (Indo-) Europeans that aimed for a career in the BB were opened as a result of the reforms in colonial education of Baud.\(^{190}\) In 1842 a two-year course in East Indian subjects was founded in Delft to train higher BB-officials, such as future residents and assistant-residents.\(^{191}\) But colonial rule in the 1830s was constructed on personal skills and talent in social interaction with the native elite; sheer lack of education and failure in practicability of regulations prevented an overarching method from taking shape.

Prior to the first steps in professionalizing the BB, residents thus relied on interpreters or translators, who received information directly from local heads, requested by the local government. The translators stood at the bottom of the administrative body and could be either natives or Indo-Europeans who had learned Dutch or (less often) Dutchmen who had learned the local language and Malay.\(^{192}\) However, as displayed in the archives, these translators did not “move in realms of life and thought which they wished to keep hidden from the rulers” as happened in India according to Baily.\(^{193}\)

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189 Van den Doel: *De stille macht*: 52; Fasseur, *De Indologen*: 60-3.

190 Ibidem: 64-6; Sutherland, *The making of a bureaucratic elite*: 15.

191 Fasseur, *De Indologen*: 93-7.

192 See for example: ANRI: Semarang 2329 ‘Traktementen ambtenaren 1832’ and 2321 ‘Dienststaten van het voltallige Europesche en Inlandsche bestuur in Semarang 1837’. These bundles contain specifications of military personnel and civil servants, and also about the career of translators and interpreters and their payments. Whereas a translator earned 30 to 60 guilders a month (dependent on the number of years in service), a soldier earned only 10 to 15 guilders, whereas a high-ranking officer like a colonel earned about 250 guilders per month. ANRI: Semarang 2321: ‘Traktementen: Cornelis Krijgsman, Martinus Martens en P.L.A. Nijs’.

Disloyalty amongst personnel on Java was easy to trace. Most translators were part of the residents administrative body, “employed as clerk”, earning about 30 to 60 guilders per month (depending on years of service and capability), and thus incorporated into the official bureaucracy. They stood under supervision of a (Dutch) Senior Translator, who earned up to 200 guilders per month and was able to check the work of all of the other translators. The body of translators was of major importance, as they held the key to interpreting all correspondence. Quite often, these senior translators formed a group related by kinship that became tightly attached to the noble courts. Some of the Translators managed to create confidential relationships with the regents, as happened in Surakarta between translator C.F. Winter Sr., who was of Indo-European descent, and Susuhunan Pakubuwana VII in the 1860s. However, their Dutch supervisors always expected the translators to remain the loyal agents of the colonial system. Often translators stood in contact with the chief minister of the regent, the Patih, who was burdened with the daily administrative governance of the regent. The Patihs had similar positions as the Senior Translators, since many of them functioned as the intermediate between the residents’ and the regents’ offices. They were the closest advisors of the regents, but officially in service of the Dutch bureaucracy, like the regents themselves. The Patihs were involved in all discussions and consultations with the regents that concerned the Javanese realm and political activities. So whereas the regents were the sacred traditional power-holders, the patihs were the ones that carried out actual political authority. Though the government could dismiss patihs, many of them were cunning and powerful enough to politically survive their regents and remain in the saddle for longer than any other colonial official, either Javanese or Dutch. Sasradiningrat II for example was Patih at the court of Surakarta from 1812 to 1846, and witnessed the reign of Pakubuwana IV to Pakubuwana VII, dealing with quite a number of residents. He had family ties to the royal family, and enjoyed great trust of the people, but was not very fond of the family for various reasons. According to Houben, he was cunning and knew how to do business with the Dutch, but managed to keep them at enough distance to carry out his own agenda.

The Patihs and Translators were deeply integrated in the Dutch bureaucratic system. In fact, together with the residents and assistant-residents they formed its very spine. The complex

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194 ANRI: Semarang 2321. There are numerous examples of Chinese, Javanese and Dutch names on salary-transcripts showing salaries between 30 to 60 guilders, and for those with a more outstanding record or a lot of years of service salaries up to 80 guilders per month. The resident also made use of the services of a ‘native writer’ (‘inlandse schrijver’) who just copied draft letters on official paper, and earned only 15 to 30 guilders per month.

195 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 92.


198 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 126-7.

199 Ibidem: 129

200 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 129-30.
involvement of these functionaries creates a colonial reality very similar to the one defined by Baily and Cohn in British-India. But on Java residents did not just suffer from “the basic fear of lack of indigenous knowledge and ignorance of the ‘wiles of the natives’, (...) their secret letters, drumming and ‘bushy telegraphy’ and the nightly passage of seditious agents masquerading as priests and holy men.” Their fear was of a different, more political kind, and likely not merely epistemic. Mostly, it was fear for rebellion and disruption that caused the residents to send in spies and keep a close eye on the whereabouts of the regent. Distrust was the dominant underlying sentiment, even if both parties enjoyed a good relationship. The regents and residents knew each other’s culture, habits, uses, political techniques and rule – and that is why they ‘feared’ each other. So it was not despite, but because contact with regents and the existence of the extensive information network that residents distrusted or ‘feared’ the regents.

3.2 Direct encounters: methods of rule

The practice of the residents and regents to collect information about each other served one basic purpose in the end: to profit as much as possible from the new system and each other’s resources. Locally, the new system soon became one of mutual interests, in which the residents and regents depended on each other. The communication and information networks formed a major pillar for the establishment of a workable situation to enhance control and serve all interests. But overall, the Dutch structurally penetrated deeper into Javanese society than ever before. Various methods were used by the Dutch in an attempt to impregnate and control the world of local aristocracy. By using native etiquette, awarding gifts and titles, and sometimes involving themselves directly in court politics, the Dutch maintained close contact with their Javanese counterparts.

Hormat, gifts and titles

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries VOC officials had become increasingly experienced in dealing with indigenous rulers all over Asia, especially in the Indonesian archipelago. Numerous sultans, rajas, princes and other nobles were approached and manipulated by ‘opperhoofden’ (head-merchants) and residents, then nothing more but representatives of the trading company, to settle trading-contracts. However, the idea of Dutch cultural or moral ‘superiority’ had grown as the VOC became increasingly powerful on Java, and was endorsed by Van den Bosch’ policy. Supported by this sense of superiority, the Dutch residents socially enjoyed a greater status than the regents did, although the residents were heavily influenced by the priyayi in both their professional and personal

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201 Baily, Empire and information: 6.
202 All these letters were incorporated into the Daily Journals of the Castle of Batavia. For the period of 1683 until 1744, an astonishing amount of more than 4300 letters have been preserved and were incorporated in the so-called ‘Daily Journals of Batavia Castle’, accessible online via: http://www.sejarahnusantara.anri.go.id/marginalia/.
behaviour when performing diplomatic duties.\textsuperscript{203} The result was that eventually Dutch officials started requiring use of ‘native etiquette’, or hormat, for example when visiting the regents’ kratons.\textsuperscript{204} Hormat was the whole practice on Java of paying respect in humble behaviour towards those that are socially placed higher than you. The Dutch cunningly and eagerly made use of hormat.\textsuperscript{205} More and more it became a product of the colonial administration as the Javanese were dependent on the goodwill of higher officials for their progress, and thus inevitable tended to use hormat traditions as an “institutionalized form of sycophancy.”\textsuperscript{206}

Sycophancy is clearly visible in the communication between Dutch and Javanese, both written and spoken. VOC letters to Asian kings, heads and officials were highly diplomatic in tone, using long preambles and salutations (partly depending on the importance and status of the ruler), and so were the letters of the rulers to the castle of Batavia. However, when the Dutch started dominating the political scene on Java, their tone became less humble and more forceful. In the 1830s, little was left of their carefulness, and as residents and regents started corresponding on a weekly, if not daily basis, the letters of a resident became increasingly curt and abrupt. Typically, regents sent polite requests for salary increases or complained about workload to the resident. For example, a letter from the regent of Kendal (a regency in Semarang) to resident Pieter le Clercq (?-1839, in office 1828-1834), about a request for an increase of salary for his family for coffee production started as follows (Classic Malay in Dutch spelling):

“Ini soerat dengan tabee banyak begitoe dan segala hormat (…) dari Pangeran Ario Prawiro Diningrat di negri Kendal kapada toean P. le Clercq Resident njang hormat di negri Semarang.” (This is a letter with many greetings and all respect from the prince Arya Prawiro Diningrat of Kendal to the (or: his) master, the honourable resident P. le Clercq of Semarang.)\textsuperscript{207}

Constructions like “njang dengan banyak hormat” (with much respect or honour) and “toean Resident poenja banyak hormat” (the very honourable master Resident) are often repeated. Samples from bundles of letters from residents to regents show that the letters of the resident of Semarang to this regent are straight to the point and skip all of these formalities.\textsuperscript{208} In 1833 for example we find correspondence between the same resident and the regent of Demak (in Semarang), about a new

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{203} Sutherland, \textit{The making of a bureaucratic elite}: 36.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibidem: 37; Van den Doel, \textit{De stille macht}: 82.
\textsuperscript{206} Sutherland, \textit{The making of a bureaucratic elite}: 37.
\textsuperscript{208} Due to the chaotic state of the physical archives it is hard to find the appropriate answers to specific letters, if still existent.
\end{flushleft}
house for a controleur, build under supervision of the regent. While the letters of the regent are similar in tone to the one quoted above, the resident’s letters are short and keep informing about the status of the construction works, urging the regent to hurry up (the house was not finished before the end of this resident’s term).\textsuperscript{209}

Illustrative is the attitude of the resident of Semarang towards the regent of Grobogan, known by the Dutch as ‘Maas Toemmengoeng Majoor Noto Rojo’ (Mas Tumenggung Marmo Nataraja, Bupati Purwodadi Grobogan). Known as a troublemaker, this regent was very unpopular among Dutch officials. In early 1834, he kept sending in requests for financial support for a former penghulu (a local Islamic priest, sometimes chief).\textsuperscript{210} The local controleur der landbouwinkomsten (inspector of agricultural incomes) knew from other nobles that this penghulu had to cede two fifths of his income as a wedding priest to the regents’ wife and that he also paid land rent to the local Demang (district head) for renting rice-fields, of which also a share flowed to the regent. Therefore it was decided to pay eight guilders to the penghulu directly as a monthly pension (which doubled his income), without involvement of the regent, to prevent the regent from laying his hands on this pension as well.\textsuperscript{211} A strong signal, bypassing the regent and preventing him from gaining extra (illegal) income, this measure was harsh – Nataraja was reported to have been not amused, which reflected on the mood of the population – but apparently considered necessary.\textsuperscript{212} Keeping these ‘difficult’ regents in control without disturbing the ‘general mood’ in the regency was a tricky game in which the resident had to balance Dutch and Javanese interests.

A cultural difference of which the Dutch keenly tried to take advantage in addressing the Javanese aristocrats was the division of the Javanese language into registers. The Dutch tried to stimulate the use of Krama (High-Javanese) by natives, as this was a sign of respect, allowing them to distinguish themselves socially by use of language.\textsuperscript{213} In the principalities, the princes were therefore expected to address the Dutch in High-Javanese.\textsuperscript{214} However, the proficiency of the residents in Ngoko (Low-Javanese, the proper register used in response to Krama) or even basic Malay differed enormously. Improper use of language, especially Javanese, was considered slightly offensive and could impair the social relations between residents and regents.\textsuperscript{215} In 1834, the new resident of Semarang, Hendrik le

\begin{footnotes}
\item[209] ANRI: Semarang 2264: Letters from the resident of Semarang to the Regent of Demak of 6 April, 20 May and 25 May 1833.
\item[210] ANRI: Semarang 2260: Letters of 15-18 January and 3 February 1834.
\item[211] Ibidem.
\item[212] Ibidem.
\item[215] Sutherland, \textit{The making of a bureaucratic elite}: 37.
\end{footnotes}
Roux (1795-?, in office 1831-1834), paid a visit to Nataraja in order to arrange an event at the regent’s *pendopo*. According to the report “the resident thought the regent behaved incorrect according to his rank” and was reprimanded for “his use of low Malay.” Nataraja, imaginably still in dispute about being overruled earlier that year, responded agitated when the resident, whom he knew did not understand Javanese, assigned an interpreter from the regent’s household who understood some Dutch.\(^{216}\)

Javanese language played an important role in *priyayi*-etiquette, and speaking flawed Javanese or making abuse of the situation as resident le Roux did was (and still is) considered very discomfiting, or even offending, especially towards high Javanese nobles. Nataraja must have been puzzled by the in his eyes idiosyncratic behaviour of the resident. He became angrier with the Dutch and the general mood of the population in the regency was reported to turn sour as the regent who felt insulted apparently refused to conduct his daily activities for a few days.\(^{217}\) Though he was known as a restive and stubborn regent, the Government-General probably did not want to risk more trouble or even a revolt, as Grobogan was of major importance for the production of rice, and later in 1834 Le Roux was replaced.\(^{218}\) The necessity of refurbishing and protecting the position of the regents, as noted by Elson, was stronger than the urge to keep the residents in office. As Baud would have remarked, “The government would sooner dismiss ten residents than one regent.”\(^{219}\) After all, residents were mobile and dynamic, often spending not much more than three or four years in a residency before moving on to another, while the regents were bound to the people and the lands they ruled.\(^{220}\) Though discontinuity affected local policy since every new resident had his own style, ideas and attitude, the practice of reassigning residents proved to be an effective way of maintaining peace and stability in the local Dutch-Javanese relationship.\(^{221}\) The residents had very good reasons to make use of diplomatic, cultural traditions. It was after all the most powerful instrument to demand respect in ‘indigenous’ terms. Since Van den Bosch had never really designed a clear plan for approaching regents, most residents had to improvise. For a Dutch resident, using hormat traditions was the easiest way to culturally penetrate into the local world and show off authority. During meetings that must have been somewhat primly, lower placed persons were supposed to sit on the ground, while the resident and the regent sat in chairs. The social position of the resident, the assistant-resident, other

\(^{216}\) ANRI: Semarang 2264: files of 10-13 March 1833: ‘Rapport over de uitbesteding van groot equipement’.


\(^{218}\) ANRI: Semarang 2264: files of 24 March, 1-4 April and 20-24 April 1833.

\(^{219}\) Quoted by Elson, ‘The famine in Demak and Grobogan’: 44-45, n.13: 69.

\(^{220}\) Sutherland, *The making of a bureaucratic elite*: 19.

\(^{221}\) Sutherland, *The making of a bureaucratic elite*: 19; Elson, ‘The famine in Demak and Grobogan’: 45.
Figure 2: The regent of Pekalongan (middle), Raden Adipati Arya Wiryodinegara, receives members of the Binnenlands Bestuur, 28 June 1869. Left from the regent presumably the new resident R.P.W. MacGillavry and right of him presumably the new regent of Batang, Raden Adipati Arya Puspodiningrat. On the chair left in front of the pendopo presumably the patih of Pekalongan, Raden Mertonegoro. Personal ranking is clearly represented in this picture: the regent sits in the middle, surrounded by the Dutch officials sitting on chairs on the veranda, the patih is sitting slightly lower than them while the Javanese officials are all sitting on the ground.

Dutch officials, the regent and the regents’ household and staff was emphasized by physically positioning them, as clearly visible in figure 2. Posing for a photo, the Dutch officials surrounded the regent, stressing their proximity to the throne quite literally, while the pathi and lower court-members sat lower and on the ground, illustrating the order of people in the colonial setting.\textsuperscript{222} Elitist, ‘regal’ behaviour became increasingly common among residents, who demanded the highest forms of respect. An interesting example is the practice of carrying around a golden payong.\textsuperscript{223} Though taken in 1904, when this practice was much more common and widespread than in the 1830s, figure 3 is an excellent example of a proud resident using a payong, a pusaka and a native object, carried by a Javanese servant, as a status symbol. It was the absence of a deliberate outline by Van den Bosch for imposing Dutch rule and a sheer lack of foundations for bureaucratic development, such as proper education, that stimulated the residents to make use of what was available. Javanese methods of rule, either through objects of power or language, were just as useful as Dutch.

Another method comprised the practice of exchanging gifts, which has always been an important diplomatic instrument in Asia and Europe. The VOC always made sure to send enough highly valuable gifts or cash money to maintain good trade-relations with rulers all around the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{224} Among Asian rulers, “gifts of right to lands, titles, emblems, and honours by kings to their subjects became, in cultural terms, the dynamic medium for the constitution of political relations (...), acceptance of gifts entailed loyalty and service (...), and gifts were the fundamental signs of sovereignty, which, as long as it emanated from the centre, was distributed and displayed at every level within the kingdom.”\textsuperscript{225} For the kings, regents and lesser nobles on Java it was a natural way to show respect and gain favour by sending gifts to whomever they considered a prime overlord, which from the 1830s onward was the resident. The resident of Semarang for example requested specific art-objects and vegetables from the regent of Kendal, though his wife had send back a similar package containing art-objects, rice and timber from the regent of Demak, claiming she did not have enough storage space for it.\textsuperscript{226} It appears that this was mostly a political act: the resident of Kendal attempted to raise the pension the government paid to his mother and got approval from the resident to write to the Governor-General on his behalf, while the regent of Demak was recently reprimanded for misbehaviour and

\textsuperscript{222} Illustrations of persons from the 1830s are rare. The photos I use are therefore from later eras but do capture the points I make adequately enough to use them.

\textsuperscript{223} Van den Doel, De stille macht: 82.


\textsuperscript{226} ANRI: Semarang 2255: ‘Brief van “Mevrouw Leerman”[?] aan “de Radeen Arjoe Toemmengoeng van Damak”, 20 June 1829.
Figure 3: P. Sijthoff, resident of Semarang, and his golden payong in 1904. The function of the payong as a status symbol is quite clear here. The traditional outfit and humble look of the carrier and smart, neat dress and proud stance of the resident seem to underline the allure of the resident’s position.

Source: 2603 (foto), Nederlands-Indië in foto’s, 1860-1940, Koninklijk Instituut voor taal-, land- en volkenkunde (KITLV).
maltreatments, for which the resident had considered firing him.\textsuperscript{227} Denying the gifts from Demak was probably a method to ignore any pleas, while accepting the bribes of the regent of Kendal showed approval.

The resident of Semarang had no choice really but to take part in the gift-culture: in April and May 1834 it happened at least four times that he received gifts and a request in return, which in all cases helped to solve different kinds of small political or personal problems.\textsuperscript{228} Especially remarkable is the case of Lurah (village chief) ‘Wereio Sentono’ (Wereya Sentana) of the desa ‘Sadee’ in the regency of Grobogan, who requested the resident for compensation of a couple of cows that had been killed and eaten by a tiger. In return, the Lurah intended to send the resident the skin of the tiger, which he had just killed.\textsuperscript{229}

The Government-General became increasingly worried about the practice of gift exchange. Accepting gifts from those regents that had interest in ‘bribing’ the resident did not comply with the policy of abstinence Van den Bosch proposed, and could stimulate corruption. Reason enough for Governor-General Baud to send out an announcement at the end of 1834 to strictly regulate, and eventually prohibit the practice of sending gifts or payments by barter.\textsuperscript{230} Accepting goods like timber, wood, house-hold goods and oil was no longer allowed. The regents and residents, for whom this practice had become a very important diplomatic instrument, sought all kinds of ways to evade these new regulations, for example by registering gifts as tax-payments.\textsuperscript{231} The reality of local cooperation was based on practices the Government-General did not want to acknowledge, leaving the residents no choice but to carry out a policy they constructed themselves, even if that meant ignoring the instructions of their superiors in Batavia.

The awarding of (indigenous) ranks and titles by residents can be considered a final important method of governance. During the VOC-era, it was already customary to award those allied rulers that had distinguished themselves by their loyalty with new titles or promote them to a higher rank. When the Pangreh Praja was put under the direct control of the BB and became part of the Dutch administration, handing out titles became much more important. The regents, as part of the Dutch system, received administrative legitimation from the Dutch. During the first three decades of the nineteenth century the entire system of indigenous titles was integrated and transmitted into the

\textsuperscript{227} ANRI: Semarang 2255: ‘Brieven van de Resident van Semarang aan regent van Kendal’, 25 June en 2 July 1829’.

\textsuperscript{228} ANRI: Semarang 2260: letters of 6, 12 and 30 April and 19 May 1834, in Malay.

\textsuperscript{229} ANRI: Semarang 2260: letter of 6 April, in Malay.

\textsuperscript{230} ANRI: Semarang 3346 ‘Staat van het verrichte persoonlijke diensten bij de Inlandse hoofden per desa, 1835/ Opgave desas af sonder voor het verrigten der persoonlijke diensten bij de inlandsche hoofden’: ‘Ordonnantie van Baud’, 6 November 1834.

\textsuperscript{231} ANRI: Semarang 3346: ‘Brief van de regent aan de resident van Semarang’, 14 January 1835.
European administration. For example, a resolution of Van der Capellen from 1820 determined that all regents would receive the predicate of Adipati, Tummengung or Ngabehi according to their loyalty and integrity.\textsuperscript{232} Official titles were equalized with European military ranks, and resolutions of 1820 and 1824 further arranged the regulations concerning combination of predicates and titles, though the authority connected to these titles was limited to the regency where they were received.\textsuperscript{233} The system of titles, as incorporated into Dutch bureaucracy, was under continuous alteration, but it certainly helped translating the Dutch administration into native terms, and at the same time politicized the indigenous ranking system into Dutch administrative terms. The instalment of the adequate Priyayi officials became much easier when done in their own traditional political perspectives, and encouraged the population to accept their native rulers whilst functioning within the Dutch framework.

\textit{Dutch involvement in court politics}

In their attempts to get a grip on the local noble families, the Dutch did not avoid direct intervention. In the principalities, the ties with those noble families that had already allied with the Dutch under VOC-rule proved very useful in the 1830s. The former Mataram Empire and its noble houses had been under increasing Dutch influence since the eighteenth century. In Surakarta, the Dutch installed Susuhunan Pakubuwana VI in 1823 despite fierce opposition within the court.\textsuperscript{234} He was considered a cumbersome king, as he had sympathized with Dipanagara during the war, but he was still favoured over the other candidates.\textsuperscript{235} Though initially distrustful, Pakubuwana VI developed a more conciliatory attitude towards the Dutch during the Java war.\textsuperscript{236} However, in 1830 he undertook an activity that was perceived as plainly rebellious, as he sneaked out of the kraton and went to his ancestors’ family graves at Imogiri without the resident’s permission.\textsuperscript{237} This sneaky behaviour was considered highly unworthy of a Susuhunan, and the Dutch were well aware that “even in the eyes of the Javanese this act was considered just as unlawful, disrespectful as dangerous”, and that this “opportunity should be used to remove this young king from his throne, before his prideful, idiosyncratic behaviour would disrupt Java’s peace.”\textsuperscript{238} A committee of three experienced colonial officials, resident Johan van Nes (1795-1874), Directeur der Kultures Jan van Sevenhoven (1782-1841) and army officer Huibert Nahuys van Burgst (1782-1852) (see also appendix 2.2), was installed to examine the situation and reform local governance. The committee found support among Pakubuwana’s (Javanese) rivals and started to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} L.W.C. van den Berg, \textit{De inlandsche rangen en titels op Java en Madoera} (2\textsuperscript{nd} edition; ’s Gravenhage: Nijhoff 1902): 8.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Ibidem: 9.
\item \textsuperscript{234} ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Overzicht geschiedenis van Surakarta’, 1 November 1861; Houben, \textit{Kraton and kumpeni}: 24.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Houben, \textit{Kraton and kumpeni}: 26-33.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Ibidem: 24.
\item \textsuperscript{237} ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Overzicht geschiedenis van Surakarta’, 1 November 1861.
\item \textsuperscript{238} ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Overzicht geschiedenis van Surakarta’, 1 November 1861.
\end{itemize}
undermine his position. Eventually Pakubuwana VI was dismissed and replaced by his uncle, Pangeran Adipati Purbaya, who reigned as Pakubuwana VII.\footnote{ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Overzicht geschiedenis van Surakarta’, 1 November 1861.}

Pakubuwana VII was much more popular among the Dutch; under his rule “peace and prosperity in the residency of Surakarta were beyond all expectation.”\footnote{Ibidem.} But trouble was far from over. The new Susuhunan did not have any legal male heirs, which raised uncertainty about the future of the throne.\footnote{Ibidem.} This was a returning theme in the politics of Surakarta. Over the years, resident Frans Valck (1799-1842, resident of Yogyakarta 1831-1841) regularly corresponded with the Governor-General and other residents who had some experience in the principalities about possible candidates for the throne.\footnote{ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Rapport t.a.v. de prinsen in Surakarta 1846’.} Aware of the importance of family ties, Valck mentioned he brother and the nephew of the Susuhunan as potential successors. They were the candidates that were the friendliest and most obedient towards the Dutch while still standing close to the Susuhunan.\footnote{Ibidem.} The Dutch worried about succession rights all over Java, but due to the high status and relative autonomous position of the influential Susuhunans, matters around the throne of Surakarta always were just a bit more relevant.

In the principalities, however, the Dutch had proved themselves of strong influence long before the nineteenth century. In 1754 the Dutch had awarded one of their old-VOC allies in Mataram, Mas Said (a son of Susuhunan Pakubuwana II), with an independent status in the former mancanegara of Surakarta as prince Mangkunegara I (r. 1757-1797).\footnote{Houben, Kraton and kumpeni; 4. See for an extensive account on the role of Mangkunegaran I in Javanese history: A. Kumar, Java and modern Europe: ambiguous encounters (Richmond: Curzon, 1997): 53-88.} He received the title of Pangeran Adipati and was granted rule over 4000 Cacah’s (households or families, used as a unit of measurement for land and population on Java to determine taxation rights), in the newly created principality of Mangkunegaran (see map 3).\footnote{ANRI: Surakarta 474: ‘No. 476: “Brief resident H. MacGillavry”’, undated.} Mangkunegara I was very supportive towards the Dutch and in 1790 the Governor-General made the important decision of granting him an army legion and awarding him with the rank of colonel. Mangkunegara I and his successors remained loyal, for which they constantly received rewards, like extension of the cacah’s and Karya’s (agricultural lands), or knighthoods (Mangkunegara was knighted in the Order of the Dutch Lion; see figure 4).\footnote{ANRI: Surakarta 474: ‘No. 476: “Brief resident H. MacGillavry”’, undated; ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Overzicht geschiedenis van Surakarta’. Many Javanese nobles received knighthoods from the Dutch government as a recognition for their services and loyalty. However, the Order of the Dutch Lion was seldom awarded to non-Dutch civilians or officials, which stresses the uniqueness of the position of Mangkunegara I in the Dutch pecking order.} Pangeran Adipati Prangwadana, the grandson of Mangkunegara I, inherited the title of his grandfather. As Mangkunegara II (r. 1797-1836), he commanded a standing legion and became the most prominent
military leader on Central Java.\textsuperscript{247} After the British occupation Mangkunegara II was slightly distrusted because he had sympathized with the British regime. When the resident paid him a visit for the first time after Java was returned to the Dutch, the Pangeran’s troops were wearing British uniforms, and the resident worried if his loyalty was not somewhat too flexible.\textsuperscript{248} Of even larger concern was the balance of power in the region; the Dutch could not allow the Mangkunegara family to start politically overarching the Susuhunan of Surakarta, since this could endanger the balance of power as preserved by the Dutch.\textsuperscript{249}

The next successor, Mangkunegara III (r. 1835 – 1853), was a great relief for the Dutch. He referred heavily to his grandfather’s loyalty and achievements (Mangkunegara I was known to have participated in the defence of the kraton of Yogya against the rebels quite fiercely during the Java war), just to prove his own loyalty. In the ‘Act of Covenant’, that was settled in 1835 and formally approved the extension of the Dutch alliance with the Mangkunegara’s, Mangkunegara III promised never to take up any action to the Dutch or to the “legal ruler of Surakarta, his royal highness Pakubuwana IV”, and avoid any confrontation with other regents in the area.\textsuperscript{250} Later on, a Dutch resident wrote:

“The current Pangeran Adipati Ario Manku Negoro is a man of about 45 years old. He is not only very much affected to the Dutch Government, but actually has the urge to associate with the Dutch, as the Dutch cause appears to have the highest priority for him. He has a kind and mild nature and leads a modest life, on which his extravert dealing with women makes an exception. He is somewhat indolent and lacks autonomy and is very indifferent about managing finances.”\textsuperscript{251}

This was exactly what the Dutch needed. Mangkunegara III formed a stable element in the dynamic and competitive political scene of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, but to the Dutch he did not seem a very strong ruler and seemed to lacked political cunningness and vigour, and thus was easy to control. He was well known and respected because of his grandfather’s achievements and reputation, and therefore considered a legitimate ruler by his population. Above all, he was exceptionally loyal to the Dutch cause, and liked engaging in personal relationships with Dutchmen. While other principality families were continuously rivalling each other, this “ignorant” Pangeran Mangkunegara III remained loyal to the Dutch and together with his legion formed a stable, strong and controllable element. Mangkunegara III appealed directly to his grandfather’s merits and achievements (see figure 4), and

\textsuperscript{247} ANRI: Surakarta 476: ‘Overzicht geschiedenis van Surakarta’; Houben, \textit{Kraton and kumpeni}: 113.
\textsuperscript{249} Houben \textit{Kraton and kumpeni}: 197.
\textsuperscript{250} ANRI: Surakarta 474: ‘Acte van Verbond 25 mei 1835 met Pangeran Adipatti Arie Prabenn Prangwiedono’.
\textsuperscript{251} ANRI: Surakarta 475.
his successors did the same, since they knew that the Dutch, in their need of solid, traditional authority, would recognize the heredity of their predecessors’ ranks, titles and positions, and could guarantee a stable income and a continuous position as an independent ruler. The Mangkunegara’s passed on the very uniform and even the knighthoods as if they were pusaka, which, perhaps, they became indeed. Mangkunegara III and his family became increasingly rich and powerful during the 1830s and 1840s. This regent family clearly took advantage of of the Dutch stimulus behind the use of traditional power in order to remain in power and accumulate more wealth.

The Mangkunegaras provide in an excellent example of regents that had allied with the VOC and remained close allies of the Dutch during the colonial era. They were among the strongest pillars on which the Dutch were able to construct colonial rule on Central Java. Throughout the island the residents were concerned with the division of power among regents. In similar ways, Javanese regents were concerned with their heirs. The grandson of Sasradiningrat II, the path of the Sunan of Surakarta, was send out on an inspection of the roads between Surakarta and Grobogan in 1834, in preparation of his function as regent.252 This grandson, Raden Ngabehi ‘Sastrowidakdo’ (Sastrawidakda), was the direct heir of the regent, as his father had already died.253 On his way to Selo, a small village on this road, he passed to pay homage to the local ruler in name of his father and the residency, Sastrawidakda was reported to have contemplated tirakat (a religious practice of seeking solitude and meditation to temporary retreat from the world of men, and get in contact with ancestors and spirits to seek legitimation of ones actions), near or in an old, empty grave.254 Contemplating tirakat is an example of the type of concentration or asceticism that according Anderson influenced the ‘beam of light’, which is why Sastrawidakda was so keen on practicing it.255 The residents in Surakarta and Yogyakarta had carefully built up an extensive information network of carefully selected officials, so a local mantri reported the event directly to the residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta.256 They contacted his father, the regent. Contemplating tirakat was considered highly undesirable for a soon-to-be regent. It was regarded to be something from a former era, not fitting in the practice of modern colonial rule, something for ascetic priests rather than modern regents, and, moreover, it was also something that had inspired Dipanagara in his actions, which is why it was considered (like many other religious practices) highly dangerous.257 The heir of a regent was not allowed to be religiously inspired or behave like ascetic priests in Dutch conceptualized rule. The regent was well aware of this and forbade his

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252 ANRI: Semarang 2260: letters of 30 April, 19 and 26 May, 1834. Sasradiningrat II was also regent over a district in Surakarta. Actually, in this specific file Sasradiningrat II is referred to by his previous title of ‘Majoor Sosrowijjoj’ or Major Sasrawijaya II (see appendix II.3).
253 ANRI: Semarang 2260: letters of 30 April, 19 and 26 May, 1834.
grandson to make any trips in the future, while the native officials who accompanied him were all fired.258

3.3 The resident as local king

The Dutch concern with regents sometimes made them involve themselves in internal court affairs even more forcefully than already mentioned. In Yogyakarta, one of the princes who had switched sides to the Dutch during the Java War, Pangeran Adipati Mangkudiningrat II, started to behave ‘vexingly’ to the Dutch. He was known as a ‘liar and a troublemaker.’ During Eastern 1831, it was reported that every night a group of boys gathered at his house and partied, which was considered “quite offensive” by the native civil servants. At one of these parties, as the story went, Mankudinigrat II apparently offended some of the higher Javanese officials, by spreading out the story that their regent did not take appropriate care of his kris, one of the most powerful pusaka. However, this story seems to have been twisted and exaggerated by a clerk that worked at the residents office, so it might not have been exactly true, but this does not change the fact that the story did have a great impact on the local population.259 Also, there was a rumour that the first wife of Makudinigrat II illegally traded in and was addicted to opium, which was eventually confirmed by one of the resident’s spies.260 Even worse, Makudinigrat was under suspicion of supporting a band of robbers, hiding them at his house and instigating robberies throughout the regency of Kedhu. His and his wife’s “rebellious character and actions” were strongly disapproved of by the resident. The moment these ‘rebellious actions’ were ‘proven’ (the report of the spy appears to have functioned as primary evidence), the resident reported to Van den Bosch, and both were convinced that Mankudinigrat planned on overthrowing the Sultan of Yogyakarta to seize the throne.261 He was therefore arrested and exiled to Ambon in the beginning of 1832.262 Another prince, Pangeran Adipati Prabuningrat, a political rival of Mankudinigrat, was also a close ally of the Dutch. During the Java War he commanded the defence force of the kraton of Yogyakarta as a colonel in service of the Dutch East-Indian Army. In 1832, confident about his relation with the Dutch, he requested for his wife to be promoted to the rank of Ratu (queen), and his son to that of Pangeran Adipati (prince). While the second request was granted, Van den Bosch, who visited

261 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 242;
262 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 242-3; Carey, The power of prophecy: 595-7.
Figure 4: Pangeran Adipati Arya Mangkunegara IV, grandson of Makunagara III, in the Colonel costume he inherited from his predecessor and decorated with the Order of the Dutch Lion.

the principalities and spoke with Prabuningrat in person, denied the first. After Van den Bosch had left, Prabuningrat started to display impetuous discontent about another regent and his wife who had been ranked above him.263 He accused the Dutch of ungratefulness and disloyalty and started to ignore the resident’s orders. Van den Bosch concluded that this prince also planned to instigate a rebellion, and he was arrested and sent into exile as well.264 Writing to Baud about this matter, Van den Bosch makes an interesting remark:

“The rest in the principalities wasn’t disturbed for a single moment because of these events [the exile of Mangkudiningrat II and Prabudiningrat], which proves that we master the game and are able to continue the adopted state system by treating the Javanese rulers with all forms of modesty and courtesy, but on the other hand never accept on of them to deviate from the right path (…)”265

Van den Bosch was apparently convinced that the Dutch were perfectly able to control the regents on Java without causing disruptions and unrest. His confidence in the Dutch capability of controlling Javanese politics was partially correct. The extensive intelligence networks proved that the Dutch were trying, both successfully and unsuccessfully, to penetrate into the Javanese world as deep as possible. By using court diplomacy, handing out titles, gifts, and military positions, the Dutch indeed took part in local political games in Surakarta and Semarang, exercising profound influence on the noble houses. On the other hand, local differentiation should be taken into account: in Grobogan the Dutch were thinner on the ground and thus needed to be more careful in dealing with the regent. Moreover, the residents in the 1830s were still largely dependent on the regents for most of their information and advice.

A rehearsing, concluding analysis of my source material makes clear that personal relations and the characters of the regents and the residents mattered. Resident Le Roux in Semarang had a difficult relation with the regent of Grobogan, causing local governance to falter, while in Surakarta the good relations with the Mangkunegara family outside the direct borders of the city contributed to the maintenance of stability and security. Regents made use of the Dutch system, while the Dutch made use of the native system. Even though the residents did not possess the traditional authority of the regents, they did acquire a political role comparable to that of the traditional Javanese king in the mandala. Just like the precolonial overlords, the Dutch became the pivot in a political network of multiple regents who all tried to profit from their ties with the centre as much as they could, while attempting to remain as autonomous as possible. Of great importance were personal ties, intrigues and court diplomacy, practices that, indeed, apply well to the idea of a patrimonial state. With the

263 Houben, Kraton and kumpeni: 242.
instalment and consolidation of the residency system on top of the ancient Javanese ruling class, the Dutch became the new overlords. The residents had to use a paradoxical combination of his own legal and the regents’ traditional rule that in the best scenario had profound influence on the population of the residency, and in the worst did not reach further than his own office. Pragmatism glued these differences together, and therefore we can only conclude that local authority was conducted not by a system of rules or ideas, but by a system of men of both ends of the chain, in which Dutch officials and Javanese nobles were of equally great importance.
4. Obstinacy of allies

Though the precarious colonial relation seemed to have started to support a more or less stable regime, at least to the benefit of the Dutch government and the power of the regents, the 1830s knew plenty disruptions and minor revolts. Actions of sabotage such as stealing and burning cane were usually repressed by the colonial government, but every now and then, these actions developed into more serious forms of ‘unrest.’ Though not omnipresent in the archives, these cases are very revealing in many ways. They show the underlying tensions in the relation between regents and residents, between local and central government and different opinions about the cultivation system.

The former chapter examined the colonial relationship in its totality. In this chapter, I will focus specifically on period of ‘unrest.’ Rooted on three major archival cases I will show how the government interpreted uprisings of unrest, which in one case led to panic on both sides of the colonial chain, and in other cases had no clear implications at all. This chapter stresses the impossibility of rhyming pragmatic rule with the interests of all involved parties, stressing again that it were mostly personal capabilities and personal ties that mattered. My first case is treated in the work of colonial official and author Salomon van Deventer (1816-1891), and mentioned in the accounts of Elson and Van Niel.

It took place in the residency of Pasuruan, East-Java, in 1833 (see map 6). Pasuruan was the heart of sugar production. The sugar mills in Pasuruan in the 1830s were largely in the hands of Chinese free entrepreneurs, who had contracts with the government for regular amounts of production. Sugar cane was grown on the fields in possession of the regents, which was the major cause for the unrest of 1833. My second case deals with a disruption in indigo production in the Cirebon residency in 1830-1831, and is particularly interesting because of its political consequences. The final case deals with the murder of a resident on Sumatra, and serves as a contrast to Java, to show how a different setting implied a different approach, though not a successful one. After all, on Sumatra, Dutch control was still in its earliest stage and the incessant wars made the officials’ jobs much more difficult.

Well visible in all these cases is that the paradoxical character of the patrimonial-bureaucratic colonial state crystalized during these disruptions. While both residents and regents attempted to take continuous advantage of each other, constant frictions and tensions maintained a distance between the Javanese and Dutch. The Java War of 1825-1830 had really shaped the mind-set of the officials of

266 Elson, Village Java: 96, 142.
268 Elson, Village Java: 53-4. See the sugar contracts with free-entrepreneurs in the archives of Pasuruan, in: ANRI: Pasuruan 9.2 ‘Suikercontracten 1831’ and 35.3 ‘Suikercontracten 1832’. Almost all of these contracts are signed by Chinese and written in Mandarin.
the colonial government in the 1830s. In line with Van den Bosch’ detached policy of non-involvement, residents had to consider Dutch law as their prime reference point in case a regent misbehaved, even though concerning the Javanese population, knowledge and ratification of adat-law was encouraged. But this proved problematic. In Semarang in 1838 for example, a nobleman named ‘Kartorojo’ (Kartareja), the son in law of a Demang in Grobogan, was found guilty of illegal gambling by the infamous regent Nataraja of Grobogan. Nataraja confiscated all of Kartareja’s possessions and locked him up in a pig cage, an extremely humiliating punishment for a Muslim. These kinds of maltreatments, as well as ignoring and bypassing the Dutch legal system were a thorn in the side for the Dutch, who intended to once again reprimand Nataraja. However, though he had a history of disputes with the Dutch, Nataraja was not prosecuted, and though the direct reason this time is not mentioned in the archives, again the resident of Semarang was replaced the same year. Preserving order and peace was the more predominant urge in order to maintain colonial rule and support agricultural production, more important than keeping up the appearance of rule of (Dutch) law. But that this type of rule was not always compatible with the reality of managing the residency is shown by the disruption in Pasuruan.

4.1 Evildoer or scapegoat? The case of the revolt in Pasuruan, 1833

In August 1833, an estimated amount of about 5000 villagers gathered and occupied the alun-alun (the central square) of the city of Pasuruan, demanding a release from the burdening cultivation of sugar. For a week, they refused to leave, claiming that their local heads did not listen to their complaints. For the local resident, Van Nes, this was a frightening and worrying week, during which he corresponded intensely with the Government-General in Buitenzorg. A large amount of paperwork has been preserved of this small revolt, displaying the whole process and aftermath of this midsummer week of rebelliousness and tensions and the court cases against its prime suspects.

So what exactly happened? At the end of August, Van Nes received message that the inhabitants of several villages had laid down their work in the sugar fields. He left the city of Pasuruan to inspect the situation himself and according to his following letters and reports, villagers in several desas in the districts of Gemping, ‘Ngimpit’ (Ngempit), Widongon and ‘Radjassa’ (Rejoso; Rejasa) (see map 6) complained to their regent and his patih on the 29th and 30th of July 1833 about having to cut and

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harvest unripe rice to make space for sugarcane. Earlier that year, the residents’ office had awarded new contracts for sugar production, which incited a drastic demand for sugar cane. A major contributory problem was that the peasants had to walk large distances to bring the cane to the sugar mills. However, the regent did not take the villagers’ complaints serious, and had them sent away. The situation intensified, until on 2 August 1833 almost 5000 villagers gathered and marched to Pasuruan city, where they occupied the alun-alun and refused to leave until the resident had heard their complaints and demands. Van Nes, in fear of a major revolt, immediately started corresponding with Buitenzorg to gain advice. He received a rather lame answer of Baud (then Governor-General ad interim in absence of Van den Bosch, who had just left for an inspection journey to Sumatra). Baud advised Van Nes to contact Major General Frans David Cochius (commander of the Dutch East-Indian Army since 1832) for further assistance, and urged him not to use violence. Apparently, Baud considered sending in the experienced resident Burchard Elias of Cirebon (1842-1845, in office 1830-1838) to intermediate, and wrote a letter to Van den Bosch, which he considered “quite the sufficient steps that could be taken for the moment.” It is not very clear what exactly happened the next few days, but apparently, van Nes succeeded in appeasing the situation without much support of the Government-General. He invited two representatives of the rebellious group to question them about their complaints, and a few days later the villagers received a letter from van Nes in which he promised change and no extension of sugar cultivation until stated otherwise, after which the villagers returned to their desas.

For Van Nes, the most important question was about who had initiated and organized the revolt. A group of villagers was arrested days after the revolt. In one of his letters to the Governor-General he immediately expressed suspicions of “evil agitations by disgruntled Chinese and Javanese who had not been able to acquire their desired sugar contracts.” Soon, the prime suspect in this case became the brother of the former regent and uncle of the current regent, known by the Dutch as ‘Demang Raden

272 ANRI: Pasuruan 81.2 ‘Rapport van den Resident van Pasuruan aan zijn Excellentie den Heere Gouverneur Generaal over de plaats gehad hebbende beweging in die residentie op den 3 & 4 August. 1833.’
277 Westendorp Boerma (ed.): Briefwisseling: Baud to Van den Bosch, 8 August 1833: 122-3.
278 ANRI: Pasuruan 2.1: Letter of 14 August 1833.
280 ANRI: Pasuruan 2.1: Letter of 8 August 1833.
Pandja Tedja Koesoemo’, (Demang Raden Panji Tejakusuma). Tejakusuma had been fired from his post as Demang of ‘Kebontjandie’ (Keboncandi; see map 4) by van Nes earlier in 1833 because of drunkenness and misbehaviour and was suspected to have had plenty of motives to take revenge and to show off power to his population.281 During the summer of 1833, Tejakusuma was reported to have travelled to all districts in the residency in “a very secret manner”, “hiding from Dutch officials.”282 According to the Dutch files, he had a great deal of influence on large parts of the regencies of Pasuruan, since he was able to speak Javanese as well as Madurese and knew most local heads and lots of the villagers personally.283 Being a brother of a regent, he still possessed power in the eyes of the population, no matter if the Dutch expelled him from his official functions. Van Nes was well aware of that, and suspected the former Demang of abetting to take revenge for his dismissal.284 Surely, Tejakusuma had felt aversion against the Dutch and it is possible that he regarded his noble position as a Demang, which he obtained from the predecessor of Van Nes, in different terms than the Dutch did.

The Dutch brought the former Demang to Surabaya for detainment a few days after the revolt for further questioning, together with a group of 23 ‘disobedient’ villagers that were accused of involvement in the protest, under suspicion of “bad behaviour” and theft.285 There, the judge confronted him with being spotted sneaking around in the districts of Rejasa, Widongan, Keboncandi, Ngempit and Gemping in Pasuruan. The ex-Demang explained that he only wanted to buy sugar and bamboo for the celebration of Mawlid (the celebration of Mohammed’s birthday) in the district of Widongan, and had to travel through the other districts to get there.286 When he visited a Chinese sugar mill owner in Windongan he was caught by a controleur der cultures, who was coincidentally around to carry out a standard inspection.287 According to the controleur, the ex-Demang suspiciously hid himself from him, but the Demang himself claimed that instead of hiding he was just trying to capture his dog that had run away.288 Though this obviously sounded much like a pretext, it was difficult for the judge to disregard the denial of the ex-Demang. During the interrogation, the ex-Demang repeatedly denied all involvement, claimed that he was just being defamed by his political rivals, appealed to the good relation he had with the former resident of Pasuruan, and stated that he was completely in favour of the Dutch regime and that he regretted having a worsening relation with the

283 Ibidem.
284 ANRI: Pasuruan 81.2: ‘Rapport van den Resident van Pasuruan’.
287 Ibidem.
288 Ibidem.
current resident Van Nes. He also eagerly pointed out that his nephew, the regent, was “very arrogant and proud, and contrary to the former regent dissociated himself from and did not enjoy the thrust and love of the villagers, who were extremely dissatisfied with him”, and “was also too young to be a capable regent anyway.” The judge continued questioning the arrested villagers, who all told him completely different and contradictory stories, often blaming each other with the wildest accusations. Most of them denied any involvement and claimed to be very satisfied with the situation in Pasuruan and their workload. Some of them blamed Demang Tejakusuma for provoking people in the villages, while others defended the Demang’s actions and blamed the other Demangs and their fellow captive villagers of false accusations to make their own case look better. Some of them, like a certain Pa Ngadisa (Pak Ngadisa; mister Ngadisa) from the desa of Grongon even denied really knowing Tejakusuma at all (which is not very likely; middle-high ranking nobles like Demangs were usually well-known throughout the residency, especially when they took the effort of travelling around). When the judge confronted the villagers and the Demang with each other’s contradicting statements, they kept coming up with other excuses. The frustrated judge wrote to Van Nes that though he shared the suspicions against the Demang and some of the villagers, he was not able to prove the accusations. The Demang was set free and relocated to the residency of Rembang, while Van Nes was still convinced of his involvement. The case of the villagers was somewhat more problematic: sending them back to their villagers was problematic; they could instigate revenge or stimulate the rebellious mood, so in 1834 it was decided to exile them all to residency of Krawang in West-Java, far away from Pasuruan.

Striking is the response of the other Demangs in Pasuruan and the stance they take against their own villagers. First of all, it was only because of their cooperation that these villagers could have been arrested and brought to Surabaya. In the translated letters they send to the Dutch government in Pasuruan, they all stated that they were happy to have gotten rid of “these terrible bandits and robbers, who always caused trouble and never obeyed their commands.” The Demangs accused them of not having a steady job, being sources of ‘unrest’, provoking other peasants to stop planting sugar cane, and plotting against the government. They were stereotyped as overly violent.

289 ANRI: Pasuruan 81.1: ‘Resolutie 1833 “Afschrift nr. 1111”’.
290 Ibidem.
291 Ibidem.
292 Ibidem.
293 Ibidem; Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XX’: 472.
294 Ibidem: 473.
295 ANRI: Pasuruan 81.1: ‘Resolutie 1833 “Afschrift nr. 1111”’.
296 ANRI: Pasuruan 81.1: Brieven van de Demangs (Letters from the Demangs), Letters ‘A’ - ‘I’ from the Demangs in Pasuruan to the resident of Pasuruan, 2, 4, 10, 12, 13 and 16 September 1833.
troublemakers with “terlalu branie” (much swagger).297 One of the Demangs even expressed hope that ‘his’ captured villagers were to be expelled from his district.298 These Demangs sought cover in the Dutch legal system, anxious to get involved in the prosecutions and actually made cunning use of the Dutch system to get rid of alarmingly assertive villagers and possible future competitors or rivals, who, by revolting against the Dutch, showed a very disturbing disobedience to them.

In Pasuruan, one of the most important sugar-producing residencies, and eventually over the whole of Java, the revolt had some impact during the next years. The fired Demang was not proven guilty, much to the frustrations of Van Nes. Several Chinese sugar mill owners were accused of involvement, but this could not be proven as well and it remained unclear how the villagers organized themselves and who had taken the lead during the revolt. The Hague acknowledged the problem of overexpansion of the sugar fields and the consequences this had for the peasants. Possibilities to get every single peasant within a radius of half-an hour walking of a sugar mill were investigated, but no sugar factories were closed during the next two years.299 Eventually Van Nes himself initiated several reforms in the planting of sugar, and called for timely and honest payments, better working conditions and further advancement in the growing of sugar cane without affecting the rice fields. Most important, he promised the villagers to prevent further expansions of sugar production in the near future. The same year the Raad van Indië acknowledged his measures.300 Van den Bosch urged advancements in technological improvements and education of peasants, but most of the reforms in Pasuruan seemed to have been undertaken by Van Nes himself.301 However, the sugar production in Pasuruan never seemed to have suffered deeply during the next few years: in 1835 it was reported that the production surpassed even “the wildest expectations”, and indeed it had doubled the production quota.302

300 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XX’: 470-3.

71
Further interpretations and the significance of the Pasuruan revolt

Sugar cultivation had indeed been introduced and expanded in Pasuruan with strong zeal and vigour; the soil and climate in this residency were unusually favourable for growing sugar and the efforts of Van Nes and his predecessor Hendrik Jacob Domis (1782-1842) in organising sugar production supported the development of sugar into a major export commodity. Van Nes was a hardliner concerning handling those elements in the local elite who could keep up to his standards. To avoid the people being exposed to the oppressions and extortions of the chiefs, Van Nes used a policy of discharging any indigenous officials who did not follow his exact standards of efficient agricultural management. Van den Bosch was so impressed by the role of Van Nes in rearranging the internal political situation in Yogyakarta and Surakarta in 1830 and his skills in controlling the Pasuruan rebellion, that he proposed him for the position of Governor-General. Baud however had some sincere objections against Van Nes because of his recent divorce, which had apparently caused public gossiping in Batavia about the “morality of man and wife.” Van Nes, according to Baud, “had lived with a wife of one of his superiors”, and therefore Baud was unsure if a man of such “impurity” was deemed fit for the highest position in the colonial government.

The shallow support of the Government-General to Van Nes during the revolt might therefore have something to do with the absence of Van den Bosch. Baud, not yet as experienced as Van den Bosch and reserved against Van Nes was not certain how to respond to the panicked messages from Pasuruan and therefore only send advice to consult with officials nearby for diplomatic or military assistance. Apparently, Van Nes was also not well prepared for such an unexpected outburst of emotions, and could only pander to the villagers’ demands. On top of that, accepting the complaints of the Javanese peasants was problematic, which relates to the reason why the Demang was arrested and accused of abetment. Van Deventer, who had worked as a civil servant in Pasuruan for seven years in the 1840s, identified the revolt in Pasuruan as a clear testimony against the very nature of the Cultivation system. The peasants protested against the heavy work-load, which was played down by the Government-General prior to and after the revolt. Subtraction from landrent payments and indifference and detachment of the regents towards their own population was already observed and identified by the local governments, but ignored. The official view of the Government-General, in accordance with Van den Bosch’ personal ideas, was that the Javanese population and regents were

303 Van Niel, Java under the Cultivation System: 31-2.
304 Elson, Village Java: 188.
305 Ibidem: 32.
307 Ibidem: 134.
308 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XX’: 466.
incapable of organizing agricultural production of cash crops themselves without Dutch guidance. Often the reports of agricultural production from Buitenzorg on the Minister of Colonies’ desk mention the “indifference”, “lack of knowledge” and “ignorance” of the regents and peasants when it came to planting and harvesting of sugar, coffee and in particular indigo. This strengthened Van den Bosch in his belief in a liberal policy adapted to the character and institutions of the Javanese. Van Nes agreed with Van den Bosch on this subject. He had concerns about the morality and ethics of the heads, as before the 1833 revolt he had received complaining peasants more than once, whom contrary to the heads he considered “active and manageable.” Van Nes was able to negotiate his way out of the public unrest, but never really trusted the regents, and suspected them of intentional distortions and abuse of the system. According to Baud, the revolt was most obviously attributable to the “promptings of some evildoers.” Though a few “overzealous” servants might have overburdened the village communities by allowing too fast expansions of the sugar fields, the director of cultivations in Pasuruan assured him that even taking into account the recent unrest, “nowhere the cultivation system would meet serious resistance by the peasants when the initial and obvious difficulties are overcome.” Resident Van Nes therefore needed a scapegoat, to cover up the uprising problems and defend the continuity of the cultivation system in Pasuruan. Although Van Nes and the judge in Surabaya made a solid case against Demang Tejakusuma, his involvement in the rebellion should only be seen as part of wider dissatisfactions.

4.2 Disruptions in Cirebon

The Pasuruan-case was not the first time the Government-General blamed ‘evildoers’ for causing rural unrests. In Cirebon 1830 we find another case that shows very clearly how unrests could sharpen local and inter-local relations, and affect the debate about the efficacy of the cultivation system. In the beginning of December 1830, a small group of peasants in the desa ‘Istana Sangar’ refused to continue working in the indigo fields, which threatened to cause ‘unrest’ in the entire residency. Though easily resolved by exiling those that were held responsible, the aftermath of the unrest caused some early debate on the actual implementation of indigo cultivation. Apparently Merkus and Adriaan de Salis (1788-1834, resident of Kedu in 1830), both members of the Raad van Indië, started corresponding

311 Furnivall, Colonial Policy: 286.
314 Ibidem: fol. 3.
with the resident of Cirebon, Elias, sharing their concerns about the latest expansions of the indigo-fields, which they both considered the most important cause for the unrest. In a resolution of June 1831 (incorporated in Van Deventer’s ‘Bijlagen’) dealing with the situation in Cirebon, Van den Bosch showed great discontent about this practice and subtly reminded his colleagues that “the supervision of all servants is the responsibility of the Governor-General (...), and communication with the residents and other officials should always happen under his supervision.” Van den Bosch was eager to point out, just as in the case of Pasuruan, that the unrest was the result of abetments of the Kuwu (village chief) of the desa Pegagan, who was immediately exiled to Banda. Van den Bosch clearly did not appreciate the fundamentals of the cultivation system being related to the chaotic disruptions of 1830. He rather pointed at agricultural mismanagement of the regents (most of whom were still untrained in cash-crop cultivation), or overenthusiasm or even unprofessionalism by Dutch officials. The principles of the cultivation system were holy, and questioning them in their earliest stage was unacceptable for him.

According to van Deventer, the complaints by the Javanese peasants were unreliable, as “it was a Javanese habit to express the exact opposite of one’s true motivations.” Vitalis, assistant-resident of Cirebon at the time, claimed that under the pressure of the latest expansions some local regents, who had managed to use the cultivation system completely to their own advantage though distortions and methods of exploitation, heavily lost influence and grip on the production of indigo. They therefore started all kinds of intrigues, such as ordering the cultivation of indigo on the villages’ rice fields, the exact same thing the peasants in Pasuruan complained about in 1834. So the argument of Van den Bosch and loyal residents like Van Nes points to troublemakers and evildoers as scapegoats, while such critics as Merkus and De Salis are seen as trying to take political benefit from the events by attacking Van den Bosch’ brainchild. Considering this, arguments such as those of Vitalis, which focus on the political games of intrigues played by the regents and residents, are more convincing and aligned with the daily practice of government routine. In this light, it is interesting to know that ten years later the production of indigo in Cirebon was terminated due to disappointing results and massive resistance by the peasantry. Likely, something was wrong with indigo production, but it took the colonial government ten years to acknowledge this. Very interesting as well is that in the annual report of Cirebon of 1830, the unrest is mentioned but not elaborated on. It appears that in the

317 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen tot de kennis van het landelijk stelsel op Java XVIII’ in: TvNI 3 (1865) II: 230-345 127-133 (‘Resolutie van den Gouverneur-Generaal in rade, van den 26<sup>de</sup> Julij 1831, no. 24’).
318 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XVIII’: 133.
319 Ibidem: 129, 131-3; Elson, Village Java: 197.
320 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XXVIII’: 442.
321 Vitalis: De Invoering, werking en gebreken: 4; Van Deventer ‘Bijdragen XX’: 442.
resolution of 1831 Van den Bosch ordered to keep the affair secret and that “the papers of the investigation should all be sent to the Governor-General, and that the concerns the research might have raised could be disposed of.”323 Clearly the political game, with the continuation of the cultivation system at stake, had started, and apparently Van den Bosch and his opponents were well prepared to play it dirty.

Any obstinacy of the allies was eagerly adopted by opponents of Van den Bosch as an argument against his system. This is one of the reasons that disruption of peace was something that had to be regulated and dealt with immediately. Rather than deviating from the pre-set course, Van den Bosch, and with him several important officials and residents, used abetments of troublemakers and evildoers as an explanation of the obstinacy of their allies. Unrest was interpreted in a beforehand determined colonial conception, into which the actual reality was crammed in order ‘to save the system.’ At the same time, native rulers used the Dutch bureaucratic system in their own favour and had a fluent and dynamic notion of adat, as both Van den Bosch and Baud were aware of.324 Reading between the lines shows that central control and regional control were more separated than Van den Bosch allowed anyone to admit. Openly accepting the occasional failure of indirect colonial control would have been “incompatible with the pretence of absolute social dominance.”325

4.3. Improvements in control? Murder on Sumatra

Giving the cases described above, one might wonder why the control of what in a later era was called “the cork that kept the Netherlands afloat” was left to a handful of half-heartedly trained ‘improvisers’, controlled by a Government-General that seemed not to have been able to carry out an undisputed policy. No matter how pragmatic or politically cunning some of the residents were, colonial governance on Java in the early 1830s was based on a symbiotic relation with noblemen that continuously tried to abuse the core and pushed hard against the limits of the system for their own advantage. Old rivalries continued, and the presence of the Dutch became an extra instrument as shown by the Pasuruan-case. Dutch policy towards higher nobles needed to be prudent, and posed no immediate threat to the existent internal political hierarchy. The regents were simply too important. Stimulated by disruptions as described above, the urge to reform the relations with the regents increased during the 1830s. An expressive example of these urges can be found in a report of M. Francis, the Adjudant Komnmisaris Inspecteur voor de buiten-Etablissementen of Sumatra (the assistant commissary-inspector for the outer-territories), to be found in the National Archives of the Netherlands in the Hague.

323 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XVIII’: 131.
324 Breman, Control of land and labour: 105.
325 Ibidem: 106.
The report narrates how the assistant-resident of Bencoolen, named Julius Hendrik Knoerle, was murdered by a crowd in a country house at the outer coffee plantations near Bencoolen in the summer of 1833. Knoerle, who had been the personal adjutant of Van den Bosch prior to his appointment as assistant-resident of Bencoolen, is described by Francis as a terribly unpopular assistant-resident, who fuelled the hate of the heads and population in his residency against the Dutch by intimidating the local population and behaving aggressively. A few days before he was murdered, he demanded that a grandson of the regent of Soengi Lamoen delivered him a kerbau (buffalo) on very short notice (for unknown reasons). When this grandson failed to do so on time Knoerle had him arrested and his house set on fire (in fact, some eye-witnesses stated that he even lit the fire himself). Family members of the grandson died in the fire and all his possession were burned. On another occasion, Knoerle fined and slapped another regent in the face when this regent held a wedding party for which Knoerle had not given his permission. The stay of Knoerle at the poorly protected house near the coffee plantation combined with these two events provided the immediate inducement for the people to murder him and his two (Sumatrese) sentinels. Though Francis and his superior, Van Sevenhoven, agreed on taking strict measures (such as putting high bounties on the heads of the murderers and requesting extra military assistance), and though they took notice of the “illness” (probably malaria, which might have affected his mental stability) Knoerle had suffered from the months prior to his murder, they clearly stated in their reports that the aggressive behaviour of Knoerle was extremely harmful to the Dutch cause. A letter from Van Sevenhoven, at that time Regeringscommissaris (Government Commissioner, Dutch representative in the outer territories) of Padang, to The Hague, intensely criticized the “rash behaviour of a civil servant” (referring to Knoerle), claiming that the government itself was the main victim. Van Sevenhoven expressed the desire of “treating the regents and other heads on Java more openly, as, in order to unite their interest with that of the Dutch, it was paramount not to insult them or hurt their authority in any way.” He thought it was a simple necessity to learn to “understand their religious principles as well as their domestic organizations, morals, habits and adat, and make Dutch rule indispensable for them, which can only take place by kindness towards them and act with wisdom.” Therefore Van Sevenhoven plead fiercely for not only

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327 Literary “The river Lamun”, most likely a small area around a small river then known as Lamoen or Lamun, which is no longer traceable.
329 Ibidem.
330 Fasseur, De Indologen: 82.
332 NA Koloniën: 4233: “Brief N68”.

76
improving education home and abroad, but also for selecting those civil servants with “gentle characters.”

The case of Knoerle is set in a completely different scene than Java: apart from the difference in peoples and cultures Dutch power was considerably weaker on Sumatra. The wars with the religiously inspired Padri’s (early 1800s-1837) prevented the Dutch from getting a stable foothold on the inner parts of the island. Still, precisely in these areas diplomacy was crucial to secure stable relations with local rulers. Obviously Knoerle’s aggression only worsened the opportunities to reach a peace, security and control on Sumatra, hence Van Sevenhoven’s harsh judgment.

4.4 The paradoxes of shared authority

Fasseur sees a ‘colonial paradox’ primarily in the Dutch political ideology of maintaining peaceful relations with the heads and people around the Dutch power holders, in contrast to the practice of expansion of the Dutch state on and outside Java. However, the internal paradoxes in the distorted relation of the central government with local, badly trained officials can be noticed even more. Most residents could only give shape to rule in their own manners, according to their own perceptions, ‘investigative modalities’ or ‘idioms’, which led to totally different responses by native rulers as exemplified by the divergent cases of Van Nes and Knoerle. The diplomatic approach of Van Nes and the aggressive style of Knoerle are both grounded on the same lack of centrally organized pragmatism.

Governance founded on cooperation with the regents depended on the character and personal qualities of the residents and the willingness of the regents to cooperate. The Government-General’s response towards aggression and violence by colonial servants (either Dutch or Javanese) was forceful intervention; bearing in mind the shock of the Java War, maintenance of peace and order formed the ultimate credo of settling governance within the framework of the cultivation system. The behaviour of Knoerle fell outside this framework, and in this case, the people responded before the Government-General could act.

Reality-checks like the murder of Knoerle put continuous tension on Dutch rule, but at the same time increased the urge for improvement. The more capable residents, like Van Nes and Elias, resolved most difficulties diplomatically. Those residents that used their eyes and ears and possessed the cunning to operate within the indigenous network, by making use of the best elements of traditional and legal rule, were able to keep most difficulties and uprisings under control. Hard, cruel involvement in less stable areas where cooperation in local information networks did not yet exist proved to be unrewarding. By operating carefully and eliminating less cooperative nobles, stability could be

333 Ibidem.
remained. Only by being aware of who was who in the complicated landscape of Javanese noblemen was manipulation possible during situations of ‘unrest’. Only within his own safely created network was a resident able to exercise his influence in the early years of colonial governance.

The absence of a well-defined blueprint caused the central and regional governments on Java to intervene in the social framework with ‘local pragmatism’, applied to the situation as it was, based on decisions taken in the heat of the moment. The public administration functioned based on patrimonial principles constructed on the intertwined interests and methods of the Dutch and the Javanese. The constant vacillating policy of the Dutch created room for the regents, Demangs and village chiefs to impair the roots of the cultivation system which caused the disruptions that could only be resolved by disregarding Van den Bosch’ principles, using a carefully constructed but yet vulnerable information network.\textsuperscript{335} By negotiating hesitantly with the regents and forcefully intervening when needed – exiling those isolated elements that could be disposed of was the most important instrument – colonial rule was divided and defined. When a situation really got out of hand, disruptions and unrest that emerged in its meeting point demonstrate the distrust of the Dutch against their Javanese counterparts. This tension, between the intertwined relation of mutual interests and distrusts, stresses the paradox of carrying out a combination of native and colonial authority.

\textsuperscript{335} Breman, \textit{Control of land and labour}: 6.
Conclusion

In the 1830s, the cultivation system of Van den Bosch provided in an ideological framework that seemed to be a sophisticated form of indirect rule. In this thesis, I tried to emphasize that this was not the case, and that, indeed, indirect rule was rather hypothetical than pragmatic. The residents were not able to follow the ideal type of Van den Bosch. Instead, they sought and found their own ways in dealing with the demands of their superiors in the colonial centre and the obstinacies of the native rulers in the provinces.

Local governance on Java in the early colonial era has not yet received the attention it deserves. Heated scholarly and non-scholarly debates about the positive and negative effects of colonial exploitation on the economic and political development of Java always remained morally inspired and repetitive, without moving the discussion much forward. Moreover, no major studies have focused directly on the actual practice of colonial governance during the first stage of the formation of the Dutch colonial state. Sutherland, Van den Doel, Fasseur and others have touched upon important matters concerning the sources and effects of close cooperation between the Binnenlands Bestuur and the Inlands Bestuur. But the crucial connection between the residents and regents, the actual platform for the practice of local governance, has remained undiscovered. Historians so far focussed on describing processes of change on a long term, without emphasizing the importance of the 1830s. I consider these years to have been the formative years of the establishment of colonial governance in the Dutch East Indies.

As explained, the background and effects of Van den Bosch’ ideology and policy and cannot be understood without having knowledge of first, the interaction the VOC showed with local rulers on Java in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, and second, the reforms of Daendels and Raffles which had sidelined those rulers. The policy-changes of Daendels and Raffles during the early nineteenth century created the problems Van den Bosch was determined to solve. To the Dutch king, Van den Bosch was the ideal trouble-shooter, whose leadership had proven valuable in the homeland and the colonies in the west. For the regents, his plan provided an opportunity to regain power and accumulate more wealth and political influence. Based on Raffles’ administrative reforms, Van den Bosch created the very first format of provincial governance by a residency-system. But he had never been a resident himself. Because of the administrative distance between centre and periphery, or Government-General and residents, the local situation was hard to assess for the central government in Batavia. The colonial ideology did simply not reach down to every outer corner of the island, because the reality in the provinces was so different from what the Government-General imagined. This created various forms of exercise of colonial authority, in which contrary to the ideal of distant, bureaucratic,
institutionalized governance, the Dutch residents were compelled to closely take part in the local political scenes, shaping their own mixed version of direct and indirect rule. Contact with the regents was crucial, and the willingness of the regents to cooperate depended on the social skills and personal experience of the resident. To manage the relation with the Javanese indigenous elite, the residents used various techniques. Large-scale information networks based on correspondence, observation and occasional espionage generated precious local knowledge, used reciprocally by both the regent and resident to manipulate the social orders of the colonial and native world. By taking part in the delicacies of Javanese court-diplomacy, using hormat-traditions, the residents were able to communicate even without being fluent in the local languages. In lack of professional education, the residents relied on their own experiences and skills. The most capable residents were those who were able to put aside their immediate distrust against the native world and were able to communicate with the regents by taking part in the local traditions and playing the political games of intrigue, espionage and diplomacy. The mind-set of the Java War made the Dutch extremely careful in their approach towards the Javanese nobility; regents were replaced or fired only when considered unavoidable, and usually as an instrument in local political games, taking advantage of local rivalries. But as shown by the cases of Grobogan and Pasuruan, this was a tricky game, and though Van den Bosch expressed great confidence in the Dutch capabilities of governing Java in the case of the exile of Mangkudiningrat II and Prabudiningrat, the success of his policy fully depended not on his ideological framework, but on the cunningness and capabilities of his residents.

The lack of pragmatism in Van den Bosch’ ideology, and consequently the various strategies and techniques of governance used by the residents explains why historiographical terms like ‘direct’ and ‘indirect rule’ cannot reflect reality. The endeavours of the residents did not express colonial domination, nor a mentality of abstinence, but showed that the boundaries in the relation between the Dutch colonizing official and Javanese colonized noble were permeable and shifting. Every regent was both an ally and a possible threat. But no matter how potentially perilous the position of the regents was, to the Dutch their traditional authority was essential in claiming authority and controlling the peasant masses. The paradox of early colonial governance is that Van den Bosch’ system created not an institutionalized, but a patrimonial political system. The local colonial networks of the 1830s remind us strongly of the model Anderson and Schrieke used to explain the principles of Javanese indigenous rule: a decentralized form of governance, based on personal experience and pragmatism, where informal, patrimonial relations mattered more than institutions and regulations. Though not based on kinship, the importance of personal contact, the gap between centre and province, the lack of professional education, and the interference of residents in non-bureaucratic uses such as gift-exchange and awarding of titles make Dutch colonial rule in the early 1830s very much comparable to the precolonial situation on Java. This changed during the following decades under influence of
stronger involvement of the Dutch government, the construction and institutionalization of educational facilities, and various socio-political, technical and economic transformations. With that, the whole nature of colonial governance and the ideology behind the cultivation system changed. Eventually the system was abolished in 1870, but by then it had already undergone such profound changes it probably would have been barely recognizable to Van den Bosch or any colonial servant working on Java in the 1830s.

The practice of colonial governance remains an intriguing topic. In many cases it appears to be paradoxical and confusing. The residency-archives in Jakarta never seem to provide a complete and veracious picture. The intrigues and political games residents played with regents have left files that are informative concerning the colonial reality, but also very subjective and pragmatic, which makes the colonial world as represented in the archives hard to grasp. But when we remain aware of the aims and interests of the officials who compiled the archives, they are fascinating and give us the closest and most complete view possible on the actual, everyday reality of colonial governance. We should therefore give these archives the attention they deserve. They are about colonial practice instead of policy-making, and display unique perspectives and invaluable insights into the daily routine of colonialism we may otherwise not know of. Creating more knowledge about this very routine of colonial governance will be the next step in developing a more complete picture of colonial rule.
Appendix 1: Javanese titles and ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Van den Berg Classification</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Translation/meaning</th>
<th>Dutch interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal titles</td>
<td>Susuhunan</td>
<td>Emperor</td>
<td>Emperor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sultan</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>King</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Panembahan</td>
<td>Title for certain members of the royal family</td>
<td>Prince, king</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pangeran</td>
<td>Prince</td>
<td>Prince</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratu</td>
<td>‘Ruler’, queen</td>
<td>Queen</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Noble titles                | Pangeran                     | Prince              | Occasionally to this title the military rank of ‘Colonel’ was linked |
|                             | Ratu                         | ‘Ruler’, queen      |                       |
|                             | Raden                        | ‘Lord’, king        | Lord, king            |
|                             | Mas                          | Form of address     | Noble title/predicative |

| Administrative titles       | Bupati                       | Landruler           | Regent                |
|                             | Path                         | ‘Vizir’, chief minister | Vizir, chief-minister |
|                             | Jaxa                         |                     |                       |
|                             | Wedono                       | Minister, chief     | District head         |
|                             | Demang                       | Middle-ranking noble, tax-collector | District head |
|                             | Mantri                       | Minister            | Minister              |
|                             | Rangga                       | Administrative title |                       |

| Predicative titles          | Adipati                      | Lord                | Noblemen, ‘duke’, title awarded to regents |
|                             |                              |                     | To this title the military rank of ‘Lieutenant-Colonel’ was linked |

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337 These titles can be awarded to a native ruler by either the Dutch Government or a higher native ruler, but in general are received by birth right. Van den Berg, *Inlandsche rangen en titels*: 2.
338 Titles that are only used in combination with (immediately preceding or following) one of the above-mentioned titles, in this case indicating a noble rank, but not nobility or a noble position. These titles were used by the Javanese as administrative titles, but the Dutch Government started to use and award these to indicate bureaucratic ranks.
Note: The use of these titles and ranks (between which the difference is not always clear) was subject to frequent change, as administrative titles could become noble, and honorifics could become titles. Different titles could thus be used in different manners, depending on time and place. Under Dutch influence, predicative titles and honorifics were administratively regulated. Most regents held the title of Raden (which always remained purely a noble, hereditary title), by birth, and thus styled themselves Raden Adipati, Raden Tummengung or Raden Ngabehi, depending on the administrative rank they received from the Dutch. Regents who proved very loyal or capable were awarded with the title of Pangeran. Royal and noble titles were always hereditary, while the heredity of administrative and predicative titles differed per place (bendara was for example hereditary in Malayan kingdoms, but not on Java).

340 These titles do not hold any legitimizing meaning in themselves, but are used among inferior nobles to address or talk about superior nobles, as a predicative preceding the ‘main’ title.

341 Non-hereditary titles, not used to indicate noble or administrative ranks nor attached to other titles, but used as personal awards to express courtesy or stress the glory of a ruler.
Appendix 2: Explanatory list of persons

In this appendix a list of Governor-Generals for the relevant period of this thesis: from the reorganizations of Daendels to the term of Pieter Merkus. In addition a list of the Dutch officials in service in the 1830s and their careers, and a list of the Javanese nobles, chiefs, and native servants, mentioned in this thesis.

1. Governor-Generals of the Dutch East Indies (1808-1844)\(^{342}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Governor-Generals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Napoleonic rule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808-1811</td>
<td>Herman Willem Daendels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Jan Willem Janssens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under British governance, 1811-1816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>Gilbert Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, first Earl of Minto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811-1816</td>
<td>Thomas Raffles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816</td>
<td>John Fendall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors-General of the Dutch East Indies under the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1816-1844</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816-1826</td>
<td>Godert Alexander Gerard Philip van der Capellen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Hendrik Merkus de Kock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826-1830</td>
<td>Leonard Pierre Joseph du Bus de Gisignies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-1834</td>
<td>Johannes van den Bosch (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833-1836</td>
<td>Jean Chrétien Baud (see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836-1840</td>
<td>Dominique Jacques de Eerens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840-1841</td>
<td>Carel Sirardus Willem van Hogendorp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-1844</td>
<td>Pieter Merkus (see below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{342}\) See: Van Goor, *De Nederlandse koloniën*: 382.
## 2. Dutch colonial officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name and dates</th>
<th>Functions in the Dutch East Indies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Baud, Jean Chrétien** (1789-1859) | - 2\(^{nd}\) clerk (“Tweede Commies”) in Batavia (in Dutch and later British service) 1810-1811  
- 2\(^{nd}\) translator (“Tweede Translater”) in Batavia 1812-1814  
- Chief clerk of the British Government Secretariat in Batavia (“Hoofdcommies Britse Gouvernementssecretarie te Batavia”) 1814-1816  
- Government Secretary in Batavia (“Gouvernements-Secretaris te Batavia”) 1816-1819  
- Secretary of the Government-General (“Algemeene Secretaris van de Hooge Regeering” te Batavia) 1819-1821  
*Returned to the Netherlands* 1822-1824  
- Functionary at the ministry of Colonies in The Hague 1824-1832  
- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 1833-1836  
- Minister of Colonies 1840-1848  
- Member of Parliament 1850-1858  
- Lieutenant of Engineers 1798-1801  
- Adjutant of the Governor-General 1801-1802  
- Captain of Engineers 1802-1804  
- Adjutant of the Governor-General 1804-1808  
*Returned to the Netherlands, diverse military and non-military functions* 1808-1827  
- Commissioner-General of the West Indies 1827-1828  
- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 1830-1833  
- Commissioner-General of the Dutch East Indies 1832-1834  
- Minister of Colonies 1834-1840  
- Member of Parliament 1842-1844 |
| **Bosch, Johannes van den** (1780-1844) | - Lieutenant of Engineers 1798-1801  
- Adjutant of the Governor-General 1801-1802  
- Captain of Engineers 1802-1804  
- Adjutant of the Governor-General 1804-1808  
*Returned to the Netherlands, diverse military and non-military functions* 1808-1827  
- Commissioner-General of the West Indies 1827-1828  
- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 1830-1833  
- Commissioner-General of the Dutch East Indies 1832-1834  
- Minister of Colonies 1834-1840  
- Member of Parliament 1842-1844 |

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**Le Clerc, Pieter**  (1787-1839)\(^{345}\)

- Secretary of the Government-General 1821
- Resident of Kedu 1821-1825
- Resident of the Preanger regencies 1825-1826
- Resident of Cirebon 1826-1827
- Governor of Moluccas 1827-1828
- Resident of Semarang 1828-1834

  *Returned to the Netherlands* 1834-1837
- Resident of the Preanger regencies 1837-1839

**Deventer, Salomon van**  (1816-1891)\(^{346}\)

- Various unknown functions in Batavia 1839-1842
- Editor in chief of the *Javasche Courant* 1842-1844
- Chief Clerk of the Department of Goods and Civil Warehouses\(^{347}\) 1844-1849
- Secretary of the residency of Pasuruan 1849-1857
- Assistant-resident of Buitenzorg 1857
- Inspector of Finances 1857-1859
- Resident of Banyumas 1859-1860

  *Returned to the Netherlands, and published his famous ‘Bijdragen tot de kennis van het landelijk stelsel op Java’* (1865-1866)
- Resident of Pasuruan 1866
- Member of the Raad van Indië 1873-1876

**Domis, Hendrik Jacob**  (1782-1842)\(^{348}\)

- Inspector of Finances 1809
- Resident of Semarang 1809-1827
- Resident of Pasuruan 1827-1831
- Resident of Surabaya 1831-1834

  *Published several books based on his years as a colonial servant.*

**Douwes Dekker, Eduard, alias Multatuli**  (1820-1887)

- Clerk at the General Accounting Office (“Algemene Rekenkamer”) 1839-1842
- Controleur at the Westcoast of Sumatra 1842-1843

  *Suspended* 1843-1845
- Secretary of the resident of Karawang 1845-1846
- Clerk (“Commies”) at the resident’s office of Bagelen 1846-1848

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\(^{347}\) “Departement der Producten en Civiele Magazijnen.“ Merged with the “Directie der cultures” into the “Departement of “Binnenlands Bestuur” in 1866.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Elias, Burchard Joan</strong> (1799-1871) 349</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Secretary of Menado 1848-1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assistant-resident of Ambon 1851-1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to the Netherlands 1852-1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assistant-resident of Lebak 1856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chief Clerk of the Algemene Secretarie in Batavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Director of the Government Printing Office (ad interim) 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secretary of the residency of Batavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secretary-General at Buitenzorg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resident of Cirebon 1830-1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Secretary-General Ministry of Colonies 1838-1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Governor-General of Suriname and Curacao 1842-1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates uncertain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Knoerle, Julius Hendrik</strong> (?-1833) 351</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Lieutenant in the Dutch East Indian Army 1830-1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Adjutant of Governor-General Van den Bosch 1830-1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assistant-resident of Benkulu 1831-1833</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Merkus, Pieter</strong> (1787-1844) 352</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Civil Servant 1st class (“Ambtenaar Eerste Klasse”) 1815-1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chief Clerk of the Algemene Secretarie in Batavia 1816-1817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Deputy Secretary-General of the Algemene Secretarie 1817-1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Attorney General and “Advocaat-fiscaal” (Public Prosecutor) of the Supreme Court of Justice in Batavia 1819-1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Governor of the Moluccas 1822-1828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- President of the Supreme Court 1828-1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Member of the Raad van Indië 1829-1830, 1830-1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regeringscommissaris of de Vorstenlanden 1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned to the Netherlands 1834-1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Member of the Raad van Indië 1834-1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under redundancy pay 1836-1838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regeringscommissaris of Sumatra 1839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Governor-General ad interim, Vice President of the Raad van Indië 1840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies 1841-1844</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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349 See: [http://www.parlement.com/id/ytq01mg5piza/b_j_elias](http://www.parlement.com/id/ytq01mg5piza/b_j_elias) [4-11-2014]. See also: KITLV, 647: ‘Namenlijst der residenten.’


351 Van Deventer, ‘Bijdragen XX’: 480; Fasseur, De Indologen: 81-2.

352 Molhuysen and Blok, **NNBW** 2: 898-901.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nahuys van Burgst, Huibert Gerard baron (1782-1858)</td>
<td>Council of Finances and Domains[^354]</td>
<td>1805-1807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissionair and Inspector of Roads and Postal Services (“Commissaris en inspecteur der wegen en posteriën”)</td>
<td>1809-1811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrator of Woods (“Administrateur der Houtbossen”)</td>
<td>1811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Yogyakarta</td>
<td>1815-1818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commissionair of the government of Borneo</td>
<td>1819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Yogyakarta and Surakarta</td>
<td>1818-1823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Surakarta, Commissionair of the government of Yogyakarta</td>
<td>1827-1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to the Netherlands</td>
<td>1831-1835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of the Raad van Indië, General-Major titular</td>
<td>1836-1838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nes, Johan Frederik Walraven van (1795-1874)</td>
<td>Member of the Supreme Court of Justice in Batavia[^356]</td>
<td>1823-1826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistent-resident of Surabaja</td>
<td>1826-1827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Yogyakarta[^357]</td>
<td>1827-1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident ad interim of Surakarta</td>
<td>1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Pasuruan</td>
<td>1831-1839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to the Netherlands</td>
<td>1839-1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Semarang</td>
<td>1842-1845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of the Raad van Indië</td>
<td>1843-1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-President of the Raad van Indië</td>
<td>1851-1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roux, Hendrik Martinus le (1795-?)</td>
<td><em>Unknown</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assistant-Resident of Semarang</td>
<td>-1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Semarang</td>
<td>1831-1834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Bangka</td>
<td>-1843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Returned to the Netherlands</td>
<td>1845-1856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident of Kediri</td>
<td>1846-1857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


[^354]: ‘Raad van Financiën en Domeinen.’


[^356]: Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië.

[^357]: For a full overview of the residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, see: Carey, *The power of prophecy*: 808-810.

| **Salis, Adriaan Maurits Theodor de** (1786-1834)\(^{359}\) | - Private Secretary of Daendels 1802[?]–?  
- Various unknown functions ?-1817  
- Resident of Surabaya 1817-1820[?]  
- Resident of Yogyakarta and Surakarta 1820[?]–1825  
**Returned to the Netherlands** 1825-1826  
- Resident of Kedu 1826-1830[?]  
- Resident ad interim of Surabaya 1830[?]–1834  
- Member of the Raad van Indië 1830-1834 |
| **Sevenhoven, Jan Isaak [Izaak] (van)** (1782-1841)\(^{360}\) | - Advocaat-fiscaal of the Supreme Court of Justice in Batavia 1815-1817  
- Resident of Kedu 1817-1818  
- Resident of Cirebon 1818-1821, 1821 and 1826  
- Regeringscommissaris of Palembang 1824-1825  
- Resident of Surakarta 1825-1827  
- Resident of Yogyakarta 1830  
- Regeringscommissaris of de Vorstenlanden 1830  
- Resident of Cirebon 1827-1830  
- Resident of Yogyakarta 1830  
- Directeur der cultures 1831  
- Member of the Raad van Indië 1832  
- Regeringscommissaris of Padang 1833 |
| **Vitalis, Louis (Ludovico)**\(^{361}\) (Dates unknown) | - Superintendent of Incomes (“Opziener der Landelijke Inkomsten”) in the residency of Cirebon 1823-1828  
- Controller of Rural Incomes (“Controleur der Landelijke Inkomsten”) in Cirebon 1828-1830  
- Assistant-resident in the Vorstenlanden 1830-1833  
- Assistant-resident of Cirebon 1833-1834  
- Resident of Tegal and Pekalongan 1834  
- Inspector of Cultivations 1833-1838 |
| **Valck, Frans Gerardus** (1799-1842)\(^{362}\) | - Assistant-resident, and later resident of Karawang 1823-1826  
- Resident of Kedu 1826-1830 |

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\(^{359}\) Van der Aa, *Biographisch woordenboek* 17-1: 26-8.  
\(^{362}\) KITLV 647, ‘Namenlijst der residenten’; see also: Stoler, *Along the archival grain*: 228.
### 3. Javanese rulers, chiefs and other native servants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names, titles, alternative names and dates</th>
<th>Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dipanagara</strong>, Pangeran (Raden Mas Ontowiryo) (1785-1855)</td>
<td>Leader of the Java War 1825-1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kartareja</strong></td>
<td>Unknown; nobleman in or near Grobogan Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mangkudiningrat II</strong>, Pangeran Adipati, Colonel Raden Tumpongnggung Mankuwijaya (Mangku Vijaya) (dates unknown)</td>
<td>Pangeran Adipati Mangkudiningrat Granted the principality of Kalibawang in fief 28th April 1831. Exiled to Ambon in December 1831. 1824-1831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mangkunegara I</strong>, Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Arya (Pangeran Sambernyawa, Raden Mas Said) (1726-1795)</td>
<td>Founder and first ruler of the Mangkunegaran Principality, vazal state of the Dutch 1757-1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mangkunegara II</strong>, Kanjeng Gusti Pangeran Adipati Arya (Pangeran Surya Mataram, Pangeran Surya Mangkubumi, Pangeran Adipati Prangwadana) (1768-1835)</td>
<td>Adipati of Mangkunegaran 1796-1835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nataraja</strong>, Mas Tumpongnggung ‘Major’ (Notorojo; Notorojo; Bupati Purwodadi Grobogan) (Dates unknown)</td>
<td>Regent (bupati) of Grobogan Fired in 1839. ?-1839</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title and Notes</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prabuningrat</strong>, Pangeran Adipati (Wiranagara, Raden Tumenggung; Mas Mukudin; Wiraguna) (1790-?)&lt;sup&gt;365&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Yogya Army Commander (&quot;Wedana Gedhe Prajurit&quot;)</td>
<td>1828-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Titular Major</td>
<td>1830-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>1830-1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pangeran Adipati Prabuningrat Exiled to Banda in 1832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sasradiningrat II</strong>, (Sosrodiningrat II), Kanjeng Raden Adipati (Sosro Dinningrat II; Pangeran Mangkupraya; previously Sasrawijaya II [Sasra Vijaya; Sosrowijoyo], Raden Tumenggung)&lt;sup&gt;366&lt;/sup&gt; (?-1846)</td>
<td>Patih of the Sunan of Surakarta</td>
<td>1812-1846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sastrawidakda</strong>, Raden Ngabehi (Sastrowidakdo) (dates unknown)</td>
<td>Son of Sasradiningrat II, position unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakubuwana IV</strong>, Kanjeng Susuhanan Prabhu Sri (Sunan Bagus; Raden Mas Subadya) (1768-1820)</td>
<td>Sunan (or: Susuhunan) of Surakarta</td>
<td>1788-1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakubuwana VI</strong>, Kanjeng Susuhanan Prabhu Sri (Sinuhun Bangun Tapa; Raden Mas Sapardan) (1807-1849)</td>
<td>Sunan of Surakarta Removed from throne and exiled to Ambon in 1830</td>
<td>1823-1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pakubuwana VII</strong>, Kanjeng Susuhanan Prabhu Sri (Raden Mas Malikis Solikin) (1796-1858)</td>
<td>Sunan of Surakarta</td>
<td>1830-1858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prawiradiningrat</strong>, Pangeran Raden Tumenggung Arya (dates unknown)</td>
<td>Regent of Kendal</td>
<td>1830s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tejakusuma</strong>, Demang Raden Panji (dates unknown)</td>
<td>Demang of Keboncandi</td>
<td>?-1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wereya Sentana</strong> (dates unknown)</td>
<td>Lurah of desa Sadee</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>365</sup> Carey, *The power of prophecy*: 100, 553,961,

Maps

Map 1: Java’s administrative divisions at the conclusion of Daendels’ term, 1811.


Map 2: Java’s administrative divisions, 1832-1866.

Map 3: The Dutch East Indies, 1840.

Map 4: The principalities: Surakarta, Yogyakarta and Mangkunegaran on Central Java.


Map 5: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Semarang.


Map 6: Overview of the administrative divisions in the residency of Pasuruan.

Source: Smulders, Kaart aangevende 1° de verdeeling van Java en Madura. (Edited by Maarten Manse, 2014.)
Glossary

Adat

Indonesian native customary law, consuetude, norms and values.

Lit.: ‘habit’, ‘tradition’, ‘custom’ (Arabic: ‘ādah’). Customary Javanese law, used by Dutchmen to control and legitimize the legal system for the Javanese population.

Adipati

High predicative noble-title, ‘duke’.

Lit.: ‘overlord’ (Sanskrit: ‘Adhi’ [over, supra -chief] and Pati [lord]); predicative title, used in conjunction with other titles (often with pangeran; see below), to indicate a senior prince or nobleman, often with an extensive apanage and a quasi-independent position at the court.  

Adjudant Komnmisaris

Assistant commissary-inspector for the outer-territories (Dutch governor over the outer-territories in Sumatra).

Inspecteur voor de buiten-Etablissementen

Algemene Secretarie

General Secretariat,

Dutch colonial administrative office supporting the Governor-General.

Alun-alun

Central square in Javanese towns, usually in front of the regent’s residence or kraton.

Arya

High predicative administrative title.

367 Large parts of this glossary are based on Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies vol. 2: 457-62; Van den Berg, Inlandsche rangen en titels and Carey, The power of prophecy: 839-44.

368 Carey, The power of prophecy: 839.
Lit.: ‘someone from one of the three high castes’ or ‘man of high caste’ (Sanskrit); title used for high-ranking administrative officials.

**Assistant-resident**  *Dutch colonial official, below resident* (see below).

**Bagus**  *Honorific.*

Lit.: ‘handsome’, ‘nice’, ‘good’ (Malay; used for males).

**Batig Slot**  *Profit gained out the production of cash crops on Java that flowed to the Netherlands.*

**Bendahara**  *Administrative position in classic Malay kingdoms, comparable to vizir or ‘patih’ (see above). Bendara’s were usually appointed by Sultans (see below) with whom they shared the same lineage.*

Lit.: ‘lord’ (Javanese), probably derived from ‘Bhandagara’ (Sanskrit: treasury).

**Binnenlands Bestuur**  *European civil service in colonial Java.*

Lit.: ‘interior administration’ (Dutch).

**Bupati**  *Regent, landlord. Native head of a regency* (see above).

Lit.: ‘landlord’ (Sanskrit: ‘Bhu’ [earth], ‘Pati’ [lord]); ruler of a specific limited area.

**Bureaucratization**  *Term Weber uses to identify the modernizing process that formed modern bureaucracies: states managed by rules formed by a hierarchical construction, strictly separated from personal interests conducted on the base of written documents and run by rightly qualified civil servants* (see below).
**Berufsmensch**  
*Servants that are qualified for and conducted their job based on professionalism, competency and out of vocation.*

Lit.: ‘man of vocation’ (German).

**Cultivation system**  
*(Cultuurstelsel)*  
*Dutch tax-system on Java from 1830 to 1870, that made use of the Javanese aristocracy so set up large cash-crop plantations.*

**Cacah**  
*Household, used as a unit of measurement for land and population on Java to determine taxation rights.*

Lit. ‘to count’ (Malay/Indonesian).

**Controleur**  
*(kontroleur)*  
*Dutch colonial official, below the assistant-resident.*

Lit.: ‘controller’, ‘overseer’, ‘inspector’ (Dutch).

**Controleur der landbouwinkomsten**  
*Inspector of agricultural incomes, Dutch colonial official in the residency responsible for checking agricultural income.*

**Controleur der cultures**  
*Inspector of cultivations.*

**Demang**  
*District head.*

Title of middle-ranking provincial official on Java with special tax-collecting responsibilities, residing at court of a higher noble. (Javanese/Malay).

**Desa**  
*Village or complex of houses on Java, usually with ricefields and orchards attached in rural areas.*

**Dual Mandate**  
*Mandate written by Sir Frederick Lugard in 1922 that proposed state-sponsored colonialism in British Tropical Africa via indirect rule.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eyang</td>
<td>Style the Javanese were expected to use in respect to the Governor-General. Lit.: ‘grandfather’ (Javanese).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor-General</td>
<td>Highest Dutch colonial official on Java, highest authority in the administrative body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grote Postweg</td>
<td>‘The Grand Post Road’, large, important road on Java constructed under the Governorship of H.W. Daendels in 1808 that connected East to West Java and therefore improved the (economic) connectivity on the island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gusti</td>
<td>Noble honorific, lord, preceding title. Lit.: ‘lord’ (Javanese, Malay).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herendiensten</td>
<td>Construction and maintenance work executed by the population of Java for the regents (for 66 days annually), under mandate of the cultivation system. Aimed at improving Java’s infrastructure and stimulate the local economy, but imposed a heavy burden on the Javanese peasants. Lit.: ‘Lord-services’ (Dutch).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hormat</td>
<td>Respect, honor, used to prescribe cultural and lingual behavior on Java.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indology</td>
<td>In the nineteenth century the study of history, languages, law, religions and philosophy of the Dutch East Indies, preparing Dutchmen for colonial service in the Indies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaxa</td>
<td>Prosecutor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lit.: ‘supervisor’ (Sanskrit: ‘Adhyaksha’ [supervisor, inspector]), on Java especially member of judiciary, in modern use public attorney.

**Kanjeng**  
*Noble honorific, preceding title.*  
Lit.: ‘your foot’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Kang’ [pronoun] and ‘Jeng’ [foot]).

**Karya**  
*Agricultural lands used as a measurement to determine production output.*  
Lit.: ‘work’ (Malay/Indonesian).

**Kerbau**  
*Buffalo.*

**Kesekten**  
*Supernatural power a Javanese ruler was thought to receive straight from the macro-cosmos.*  
From: ‘Sekti’, lit.: power (Sanskrit: ‘çakti’).

**Knevelarijen**  
*Extortions, ‘maltreatments’ and abuses of Javanese regents of their own population to punish or deal with peasants that acted against the interests of the regents.*

**Krama**  
*Highest register of Javanese, polite and formal style, used by persons of lower status to persons of higher status, for example subordinates to bosses, or between those of the same status when they do not wish to be informal. The other registers are Ngoko (intermediate form) and Madya (informal form).*  
Lit.: ‘moral’, ‘norm’. ‘custom’ (Javanese).

**Kraton**  
*Palace or residential compound of a Javanese ruler.*
Lit: ‘ke-ratu-an’, residency of the ratu (see below).

**Kris**

*Javanese dagger, often considered to possess supernatural powers.*

**Kuwu**

*Title used for village chief, mostly used around Cirebon and Indramayu.*

Lit.: ‘chief’ (Javanese).

**Kyai**

*Honorific used for senior noblemen.*

Lit.: ‘venerable’. Usually Kyai is used for older noble’s, especially teachers of religious and spiritual disciplines. Also used to refer to special kris or other pusaka (see below).

**Landrent (landrente)**

*Taxation system in which the colonial government considered itself owner of all ground and rented this to the local chiefs and population who had to paid tax over this land. On Java introduced by Raffles in 1813.*

**Lungguh**

*Landholdings or apanages on Java, usually distributed as gifts or payments by regents to apanage holders.*

Lit.: ‘seat’ (Javanese).

**Lurah**

*Village chief.*

Lit.: ‘chief’ (Malay).

**Mancanagara**

*Periphery or outer regions of a kingdom (as distinct from the inner areas near the court or capital [see below: Negara agung]), governed by semi-autonomous bupati (see above).*
Mandala
"Political structure of inner kingdom-relations among different rulers."

Lit.: ‘circle’ (Sanskrit).

Mantri
"Minister."

(Sanskrit).

Mas
"Form of address; predicative title or honorific."

Lit.: ‘gold’ (Malay); used as a prefix to combine with and emphasize other titles.

Max Havelaar, of de koffi-veilingen der Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappy
"Novel by Eduard Douwes Dekker published under the pseudonym of Multatuli in 1860, which became one of the most important critics against the cultivation system and Dutch colonialism in general of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."


Memorie van Overgave
"Final Memorandum (of resignation or transfer); final report a resident presented at the end of his term in a particular residency to his successor."

Ngabehi
"Commander, predicative administrative title."

Lit.: ‘he whose rule stretches over all’ (Javanese/Sundanese: From: ‘kabeh’ (Sanskrit: everything); title of (usually military) officials.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Negara agung</strong></th>
<th><em>The core regions or crown domain under direct authority of the central ruler (as distinct from the outer areas [see above: Mancanegara]).</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Lit.</em></td>
<td>‘general state’ (Malay).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Paduka</strong></th>
<th><em>Noble honorific, preceding title.</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Lit.</em></td>
<td>‘shoe’ (Sanskrit).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Panembahan</strong></th>
<th><em>Noble title.</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Lit.</em></td>
<td>‘Object of reverential salutation’ (Malay: from ‘Sembah’ ['honorable greeting']); high princely title used for older or highly respected members of a ruling family who were closely related to the ruler. [369]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Pangeran</strong></th>
<th><em>Prince.</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Lit.</em></td>
<td>‘the one who is waited for’ or ‘object of attention’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Angher’ [to wait for someone]; title used for Javanese princes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Pangreh Praja</strong></th>
<th><em>Java’s colonial native civil service in the areas under direct Dutch rule.</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Lit.</em></td>
<td>‘rulers of the realm (Old-Javanese).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Panji** | *Title used for young men of high nobility.* |

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[369] According to Schrieke Panembahan means ‘object of veneration’, while Susuhunan is translated by him as “‘royal foot’ (placed upon the head of vassal paying homage)”, but etymologically Van den Berg’s explanation seems to make more sense.
Lit.: ‘nickname’, ‘honorific’ (Old-Javanese); a title given to youths who served as intimate retainers of the rulers and to military commanders at the courts.\footnote{Carey, \textit{The power of prophecy}: 842.}

**Patih**

\textit{Chief minister, ‘vizir’}.  
Lit.: ‘lord’ (Sanskrit); title used for chief ministers, ‘vizir’ or chief advisors of a ruler.

**Patrimonialism**

\textit{Title used by Weber to identify a (state) structure in which personal or patrimonial relations between a ruler and his officials (often kinship-related) are most important and determine policy.}

**Patriots**

\textit{Political faction in the Dutch Republic in the late eighteenth century struggling for the removal of the Prince of Orange and the settlement of a new republic.}

**Pendopo**

\textit{Typical pavilion in front of the regent’s house.}

**Penghulu**

\textit{Islamic priest and head of a religious hierarchy on Java and Sumatra.}

Lit.: ‘chief’ (Malay).

**Pflicht**

‘\textit{Vocation}', term Weber uses to identify the burden of civil servants to carry out their jobs.  
Lit.: ‘duty’ (German).

**Plantloon**

\textit{Wage received by the Javanese peasants during the cultivation system, depending on the yields of cash-crop production.}
Lit.: ‘planting salary’ (Dutch).

**Prabhu/Prabu**

*Predicative used as a part of royal titles, ‘emperor’, as distinguished from ratu.*

Lit.: ‘Master’, ‘supreme lord’ (Sanskrit). Prabu is the Javanese form of of Sanskrit Prabhu.

**Preanger (Priangan)**

*Mountainous region in West-Java.*

**Priyayi**

*Aristocrat or official, member of governing elite on Java; also characteristics of this class.*

Lit.: ‘the younger brothers of the king’ (Javanese).

**Pusaka**

*Heirlooms or holy regalia, handed down from generation to generation, often considered to possess supernatural powers (see also: kris).*

Lit.: ‘treasure’, ‘heirloom’ (Sanskrit).

**Raad van Indië**

*Colonial advisory body of the Governor-General.*

Lit.: ‘Board of the Indies’ (Dutch).

**Raden**

*Javanese noble title; ‘king’.*

Lit.: ‘Lord’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Hadyan’ [lord] with the predicate ‘Ra’ [predicate used for addressing honoured persons]).

**Raja**

*Asian (royal) ruler.*

Lit.: ‘king’, ‘ruler’ (Sanskrit).
Rangga  *Predicative administrative title.*

Lit.: ‘head’ (Sanskrit: ‘Warangga’); title used for different types of Javanese officials.

Ratu  *Queen, Austronesian word for ruler.*

Lit.: ‘Lord’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Tu’ [lord] with the predicate ‘Ra’ [predicate used for addressing honoured persons]). Became increasingly used just for female rulers.

Regeringscommissaris  *Government Commissioner, Dutch representative in the outer territories.*

Regency  *Dutch standardization of an administrative body; ruled by a regent (see below).*

Regent (Bupati)  *Native head of a regency (kebupaten).*

Residency  *Colonial provincial administrative body on Java since the reign of Daendels. Consisted of multiple regencies, ruled by a resident (see below).*

Residency archives  *Local archives of the residencies in the colonial archives of the National archives of Indonesia in Jakarta.*

Resident  *Dutch colonial official, highest authority in and head of a residency, represented the Dutch colonial government in the residencies or provinces.*

From: ‘resideren’ (Dutch: ‘to reside’).

Sawah  *Wet ricefield.*

Sultan  *King.*
Islamic title, equal to king. Lit.: ‘ruler’ (Arabic, from: ‘salat’: ‘to rule’).

**Susuhunan**

*Javanese emperor.*

Lit.: ‘Object of veneration’ (Old-Javanese: ‘Suhun’, from the verb ‘Anuhun’ [to cary something on the head, to treat something respectfully]); title for the rulers of Mataram from 1624 onwards and for the rulers of Surakarta from 1755 onwards (after the partition of Mataram). Comparable to ‘Emperor’.  

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**Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië**

*Journal of the Dutch East Indies; nineteenth century journal founded by the Dutch preacher W.R. van Hoëvell that ran from 1838 until 1894.*

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**Tirakat**

*Religious practice of retreatment and practice of meditation and asceticism.*

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**Tummengung**

*High predicative administrative title.*

(Probably from Old-Javanese: ‘Tu’ [lord] and ‘Manggung’ [resistant]), title used for Javanese high-ranking administrative officials, usually awarded to *bupati* (regents; see above).

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**Tuan (tuwan)**

*Lord, honorific.*

Lit.: ‘old’ (Malay).

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**VOC**

*Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (lit.: United East-Indian Company; the Dutch East India Trading Company), active in large parts of the Indian Ocean hemisphere and other parts of Asia and South-Africa, from the beginning of the seventeenth until the end of the eighteenth century.*

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| **Vorstenlanden** | Principalities, the indirectly ruled states of Central Java in Yogyakarta and Surakarta. |
| **Wali Sanga** | The nine legendary preachers, saints or apostle’s of Islam on Java. |
| **Wayah** | Term the Dutch used to style their Javanese counterparts, regents, and other native rulers. |
| **Wayang** | Javanese puppet theatre. |
| **Wedono** | District head, minister. |
| **Wingewest** | Dutch term for the colonies, used, by Van den Bosch to stress that the crown-domains of the Dutch in the colonial world needed to be used by the Dutch solely to make profit and be beneficial to the mother country, and not to ‘spread civilization’ or educate the native inhabitants. |
| **Lit.** | ‘region/area of profit’, ‘colony’ (Dutch). |
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Abbreviations:

ANRI – Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (National Archives of Indonesia, Jakarta)

APR – Arsip Periode Kolonial (Archives of the Colonial Era)

KITLV – Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies)

NA – Nationaal Archief (National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague)

TVNI – Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië (Journal for the Dutch East Indies)

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