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CHAPTER 9


(WEAKNESS AND OBSTACLES)
9.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the discussion focused on the effectiveness of the selected ECs in achieving the overall objective of the Dutch NPT program, to develop the capacity and capability of participants in both the public and private sectors. The investigation went one step further to evaluate the efforts made by the selected ECs and by related organizations, in transferring the trained knowledge and skills back on the job settings as part of a broad-based capacity and capability building process to promote administrative reform in both public and private sectors. The results showed that MBA and WEC were more effective in developing the capacity and capability of participants (individuals) than the other selected ECs: MPA, NIAS, and WRTC. The same results showed that the process of transferring training back to work settings as MBA and WEC was more effective than the other selected projects. The aim of the chapter was to follow our methodology approach of investigation to illustrate which EC is most effective, and then provide the causal explanation based upon the LKS as one of the main hypotheses of this study.

It seems that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program did not provide all the necessary conditions for effective capacity and capability building process, within the contexts of (all) selected ECs. The capacities and capabilities which the NPT ought to have reformed or developed still represent the obstacles and weaknesses for some of the ECs. Some of the targeted organizations of the NPT program in Yemen fall back on earlier practices (Weick, 2000), so that change fails to occur.

We argue that there is a local knowledge deficiency, a lack of clear understanding by donors and their counterparts in recipient institutions about how institutions change. The main objective of this chapter is to examine practically, the validity of this hypothesis using the Dutch-Yemen NPT program as an example. Here I employ the conceptualization of local knowledge in Yemeni public sector institutions which we outlined in Chapter 4. Accordingly, the focus in my analysis is on the specific objectives of the NPT projects and investigating how the problem of local knowledge, is the causal mechanism of the success or failure of this aid program in achieving its objectives on the ground. This way of testing the effectiveness of international aid programs is known as the validity approach.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) In Chapter 10, we use “the associability approach” of measuring the effectiveness of aid programs, and we show why such local knowledge was downplayed or not incorporated during the policy design and implementation of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. In Chapter 2 we talked about several factors that prevent local knowledge from being incorporated during the policy design and/or implementation. It is possible that the different results of the NPT projects in Yemen are due to varying associations and interactions between people in incorporating LK during the policy design and implementation processes of these projects, or according to the different actors-networks creation processes around the projects. As explained in the previous chapters, in the policy-making and mid-levels there is only one created actor-
Following the introduction of the topic, the chapter is divided into six further sections. The second and third sections, present analytical background for the chapter and develops the main constructs and measured items related to the main objectives of the selected projects. The fourth and fifth sections provide the statistical analysis (quantitative analysis), as related to the main objective of this chapter. In section six, we trace the influence of knowledge and the existence of the “Local Knowledge Syndrome” within the practices of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. In this section, we try to show how the LKS prevented the Dutch-Yemen NPT program from achieving its objectives. It elaborates on the key local knowledge aspects (deficiency of practical knowledge), neglected by Dutch contractor at all three levels: operational, middle management and policymaking. The final section of the chapter presents a conclusion.

9.2 Analytical/Background Standings

There is a substantial body of literature on the effectiveness of donors’ institutional developments programs, as part of promoting public and private sector reforms in developing countries. In this chapter we limit ourselves in presenting only some related ideas and arguments. Previous research theoretical chapters have examined this important area. However, there is still a need for more theoretical and policy research into this vital area, to take into account both the explanation of the aid ineffectiveness (LKS) and the hypotheses of this chapter. For this reason, this section addresses the main objectives of the Yemen-NPT program and the related concepts used as a theoretical basis for forming the main hypotheses of this chapter.

There is a clear indication that the Dutch-Yemeni NPT program in general and the selected ECs in particular, have a practical philosophy to develop the Yemeni respective sectors on its basis or objectives. As we discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the Dutch-Yemen NPT program supported Yemen in order to help alleviate qualitative and quantitative shortages of skilled staff in both public and private sectors, and to do so within the framework of sustainable development directed towards reducing poverty. The Dutch-Yemen NPT program is an attempt to develop sustainable capacity and capability in the higher education sector which in turn provides for all the other public sectors and communities in the country. The specific objectives of network. These two levels were responsible in designing the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. On the operational level, there were different networks of actors which carried out the implementation processes of the different Dutch-Yemen NPT projects. One can argue that the differences of actor networks in the implementation process of these projects led to different results.
the selected projects of the NPT program (ECs) in this study typically included a set of interrelated approaches. Firstly, strengthening the organizational capacity through the development of an organization and (financial) management plan for the host organization, as well as training management and support staff in strategic planning, program management and finance, and leadership development. Secondly, improving human capacity through strengthening both existing staff and qualifying new staff in applied research skills, adult education methodologies, course development and writing, policy development and analysis, as well as by upgrading knowledge on the subject of the aid project. Thirdly, establishing an executive master program in public administration, business administration, and water management to offer civil service managers in the various public and private administration institutions, the possibility to obtain a university degree that will help them strengthen the organization and management of their respective department. Fourthly, establishing a new diploma programme on gender and development for BA graduates, preferably with working experience. Then establishing active consultancy units within the selected ECs, and finally developing local based-curricula, teaching/learning methods, and course and training materials, and equipping libraries and information centres with relevant materials (see the program documents).

Reading the Dutch /Yemeni NPT program’s basis, the reader will have the impression that the program has beautiful objectives as it has very beautiful words. In their implementation through most of the selected ECs, these objectives were destined to be just beautiful words and not translated into action. The selected projects with the respective selected ECs, especially those ECs which did not achieve good results (see Chapter 8), put great attention on occasional staff training and hardware, but neglected “institutional software – i.e. informal normative and organizational cultural changes – which determine how the institutional hardware performs in practice. The efforts of early comparative public administration scholars to draw attention to the normative foundations of the reforms and need to transform the culture, norms, and mental models of academic and administrative staff along with the changes in the formal organizational structures and rules, and equipment hardware delivery” (Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 1848).

The selected ECs, especially those that have been less effective according to the results of quantitative analysis, are currently facing challenges, because of their failure to achieve the overall and specific objectives. It is important to confront these challenges to cope with future problems. These challenges are occurring and
overlapping at three levels; the specific level (each project level), at the universities or middle management level and the level of policymaking and strategy. These challenges reflect the “Local Knowledge Syndrome” with its formal and informal aspects, as there was little consideration of how to incorporate local knowledge during the policy design and implementation of the Dutch-Yemen NPT programme and the related projects under investigation in this study.

In Chapter 4 we discussed various informal aspects of local knowledge, relating to the managerial functions of Yemeni organizations such as planning, organizing, controlling, directing, staffing and coordinating. The managerial behaviour of Yemeni organizations is heavily influenced by the informal system in the country and by society’s social structure and its values, norms and expectations of its people. For instance, the Yemeni civil servant’s role within his community and organization is shaped to a considerable extent, by the expectations of relatives, friends and employees. The top man or the leader of the organization, by virtue of his position in the organization, sees himself as the head of a family. He knows everything inside and out, he is the first and the last word is from him. Employees are perceived as members of that family. He makes decisions based upon an informal and unstructured manner. Society’s influence is similarly reflected in civil servants’ distinctively Yemeni styles in decision-making, management of conflict, interpersonal relations and strategic management (Muna, 1980:3). In addition, staffing, coordinating and training are heavily influenced by nepotism, loyalty, and personal connections.

There are other informal functions in Yemeni institutions such as attitudes toward time, attitudes towards women in management and the open-door policy function, which we reviewed in Chapter 4 and employ in our analysis in this chapter. The concern here is that donors have their own Western management principles, practices, managerial styles, skills, and knowledge that may differ from those advocated or practiced in the Yemeni civil service, based upon informal/traditional/managerial functions. Therefore, there is a need for donor contractors working in Yemen to build a deep understanding of such informal managerial functions and behaviors.

The analysis in this chapter tries to show that the actors involved in the process of implementing the Dutch Yemen NPT programme, could/should have done a better job identifying and addressing overall and specific content-related problems in each project; in other words “what targets and objectives the interventions should

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2 - To incorporate such informal functions and institutions requires interactions between the two parties: donors and their Yemeni counterparts. However, many factors can prevent the two parties from having effective interaction. This point is analyzed in Chapter 10, where we talk about the associability phenomena, the local knowledge problem and the effectiveness of foreign aid using the example of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program.
accomplish. They have not been as good at recognizing that how they promote reforms is as important as what targets they promote in shaping the outcomes of the reforms. The attention was geared towards reinforcing in a sustainable manner both the institutional and the human capacity of education and training at the operational level” (Baimyrzaeva, 2010: 172).

However changes are not only needed at operational level. Some actions also need be to taken at the middle management and policymaking levels. To investigate these, we follow two analytical steps. First, it is logical to look at the obstacles facing the ECs in training processes, by using different sets of constructs\(^3\) to assess the level of effectiveness in human capacity building and institutional development as part of the specific objectives of the different cases. We analyze the situation of the selected ECs or institutions and measure the obstacles facing these ECs regarding the training process of their participants. Three main constructs are developed and put forward, regarding obstacles facing the ECs at the operational level: (1) the quality of organizational and administrative settings, (2) the quantity of the staff members and (3) and the quality of the staff members. After conducting the analysis based on the above-mentioned constructs, mainly by using quantitative sources of data, we try to show why there is lack of capacity and institutional development in some ECs based upon LKS elements at the operational level. In this last part of this chapter as well as in Chapter 10, we extensively investigate the other LKS elements at the middle management and policy making levels, which work against the effectiveness of the training process and the transfer of training to the work setting. By looking at these LKS elements at the three levels, we develop an understanding of how deliberate institutional changes should be promoted by donors. “This knowledge deficiency seems to be among the key factors preventing donors from both effectively reforming themselves and promoting reforms in developing countries”( Baimyrzaeva, 2010:188);while fueling other failures, some of which have been presented in Chapter 8 of this study.

What follows is devoted to giving an accurate analysis in line with the secondary data and statistical information, gathered from the participants in the selected ECs, categorized and divided in accordance with the purpose of the obstacles to be shown. Therefore the sources of evidence in this chapter include quantitative techniques such as questionnaires, as well as qualitative techniques like observation and interviewing, and related reports of the programs under investigation.

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\(^3\) - The nature of these constructs and their theoretical standing is explained in the coming section.
The frequency distribution and the mean score methods are used to compare the assessments of the respondents from the selected ECs, because they show the manner in which data are distributed. The respondents were asked to indicate their agreement about the selected constructs measuring the obstacles and weaknesses facing the selected ECs on five-point Likert-type scale with 1= Strongly Agree, 2= Agree, 3= neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, and 5= strongly disagree. Based on the structure of the data, here and in subsequent instances we have combined similar categories of response and removed the neutral category when presenting the frequency distributions. Thus, we would expect 50% of the responses in each of the two categories, assuming that those categories make up 100% of the responses. Therefore, the number of the responses for each of the four points was then multiplied by its respective level of influence: with strongly agree and agree = high level of influence, and strongly disagree and disagree= low level of influence. To confirm the results of the frequency distribution, we use the descriptive analysis of mean scores, averaged to construct a composite measure of the level of influence of the related items. In other words, calculating mean score, a response of “strongly disagree” is given a mean score of 5, and “strongly agree” is given got a mean score of 1. The neutral point is 3, a response of “agree” is given a mean score of 2 and disagree is given a mean score of 4. This composite measure reflects an aggregate view of each EC based on the values of the total mean scores. This study also employs a variance one-way (ANOVA) test, as inferential statistic method suitable for interpreting the results of descriptive analysis.

9.3 The Main Constructs and Measured Items

There is a very long list of constructs which can measure the obstacles and weaknesses for the capacity and capability building of the ECs. It is impossible to include them all in a single study, and in this chapter we focus on the more related practical problems, which came out in interviews with different stakeholders and questionnaires from the participants. In addition, the constructs we look at here reflect the main objectives of the NPT projects as stated in their reports which we looked at in Chapter 4. We have derived three main constructs and twenty-one measured items to be examined for reliability and validity analysis using coefficient alpha:
Table 9.1 the Consistency and Reliability among the Variables and Measured-Items: Weaknesses and Obstacles in Achieving the Specific Objectives (Total Alpha = .884)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constructs and Measured Items</th>
<th>Alpha for consistency α= per item</th>
<th>α= per group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>C I: The organizational and administrative settings of the ECs</strong></td>
<td>α=.836</td>
<td>α=.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Effective organization and management</td>
<td>α=.796</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Everything is easy to carry out your study</td>
<td>α=.798</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Effective operation procedures</td>
<td>α=.800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Admin functions and duties are clear</td>
<td>α=.813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The rules and regulations do not cause delay</td>
<td>α=.834</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The admin staff within the education center deal with all students in the same manner</td>
<td>α=.829</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The academic staff within the education center deal with all students in the same manner</td>
<td>α=.806</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The tuition fee is reasonable considering what the students learn from the master degree</td>
<td>α=.814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The particular wishes of the students in terms of the time to follow the master programme are taken into account</td>
<td>α=.831</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>C II: The quantity of the teaching staff within the ECs</strong></th>
<th>α=.866</th>
<th>α=.884</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. There are qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen's sectors</td>
<td>α=.772</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen's sectors</td>
<td>α=.743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. There are sufficient teachers to supervise the practical work or thesis of the graduate students</td>
<td>α=.864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>C III: The quality of the teaching staff within the ECs</strong></th>
<th>α=.700</th>
<th>α=.884</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The attitude and working style of teachers are unique in Yemen</td>
<td>α=.624</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Teachers have the same level of understanding, skills and practical experience of education and research; work as a team in the EC</td>
<td>α=.634</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Teachers have the same awareness and agreement about common vision of the EC's functions</td>
<td>α=.651</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Teachers are very committed and eager to work for the education center</td>
<td>α=.654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Teachers have enough time to be available for the students</td>
<td>α=.623</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Teachers have access to the latest theoretical and practical developments of related subjects</td>
<td>α=.609</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Teachers are working to the highest standards</td>
<td>α=.652</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Teachers show that they have experience of working with Yemen's respective sectors</td>
<td>α=.634</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Giving skills and attitude-based training rather than information-based training</td>
<td>α=.625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The three constructs suggested above can be used to group the obstacles and weaknesses, facing the ECs as identified in the Yemen NPT documents, as important requirements for effective institutional development and human recourses capacity and capability building within the higher education sector. The three constructs meet the convergent and discriminant criteria of validity. The three extracted constructs have a considerable relationship. The correlation among all items in the three constructs does not exceed the cut-off point of 0.30 ($\rho = 0.40$ to $0.80$). The internal consistency of intuition measured by the overall coefficient alpha was above 0.70 ($\rho = 0.884$).
Thus the three different proposed constructs to test the obstacles and weaknesses facing the selected ECs are:

- (I) represented by the six items, examining the effectiveness of organization and management settings of the selected ECs;
- (II) which consists of the three items of quantity-based reform and sees if there are sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen's respective sectors;
- (III) Which is clearly linked to the quality-based reform, as it considers whether there are qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen's respective sector.

Reading carefully the above table 9.1, we can observe that every construct's measured items differentiate between each other and from other measured items in the other constructs. This means that it has “divergent validity”, which is “concerned with the extent to which a measure is novel in the sense of measuring something different from that provided by other measures” (Holton et al., 2007: 388). In this section of our study, the three constructs are nestled among each other and with other constructs. That is, each construct is embedded in the next construct and contributes to generating other constructs. For example, bureaucratic organizations and administrative settings are in turn embedded in the quality and quantity of the teaching and administrative staff, as well the quality of leadership. Likewise, the quality and quantity of the teaching and administrative staff, as well the quality of leadership, is embedded in the bureaucratic organizations and administrative settings (Kotter, 1996). The other weaknesses and obstacles are characterized by a great complexity of processes, linkages, and dynamics among the respective environment and organizations. We need a leadership with vision, so these ECs can build strategic links with respective organizations and sectors, thus transferring the training back to the work setting effectively, and observing the outcomes; in order to generate broad capacity and capability building as part of donor-promoted administrative reform process in the related organizations. This should go hand in hand with a systematic process of selecting the participants from these organizations (Kotter, 1982).

Unfortunately, given the above, it was impossible to avoid multicollinearity (measured items which are highly correlated). However, according to Hair et al, (1995) “some degree of multicollinearity is desirable, because the objective is to identify interrelated sets of variables or constructs” (1995: 374). Therefore, we can assume that multicollinearity is not a problem, and so we can use this data set for
further analysis.

There is a need for well-qualified and local experienced teaching staff to incorporate the training needs of the respective organizations in the training courses. Therefore, it is highly informative to examine these three constructs and their consequences, as they show the obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs in doing their function effectively in the local Yemeni environment, and the extent to which the selected projects established the selected ECs, have been effective in changing the formal and informal institutions and organizations in the targeted organizations (the selected ECs), at a specific place and a specific time.

### 9.4 The Organizational and Administrative Settings within the ECs

The first constructs (I) is clearly dominated by organizational and administrative obstacles and weakness constructs within the selected ECs. It has a total alpha value=.836, and in all items regarding this construct the alpha value is above .700. This construct comprises the following measured items: (X1) there is effective organization and management of the master programme; (X2) the administration of education center has done all its duties to make everything is easy for you to carry out your study in a good way; (X3) the education center has effective operation procedures; (X4) the functions and duties of the administrative staff are clear; (X5) the rules and regulations (approvals and decision-making) of education center do not take time and cause delay; (X6) the education center takes into consideration the particular wishes of the students in terms of the time to follow the master programme; (X7) the administration staff within the education center deal with all students in the same manner; (X8) the academic staff within the education center deal with all students in the same manner; and (X9) the tuition fee is reasonable considering what the students learn in the master degree. It appears that there is no need to consider eliminating any item related to the construct (I) as all constructs are highly correlated. The values of all constructs are all closely grouped, with the highest being X5=.834, and the lowest X1=.697, which means we can be confident to use this construct for analysis.

The results of the overall analysis reveal that there is a very large internal similarity in the assessment of respondents about the organizational and administrative settings. It is one of the main obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs in doing their jobs effectively. This is based on the mean score which is higher than 3 at 3.184 (s.d. =.73974).
Chapter 9

Table 9.2 the Mean Scores and Frequency Distribution of the Organizational and Administrative Settings within the ECs (N=227)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Frequency Distribution</th>
<th>Strongly agree and agree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree and disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2.0981</td>
<td>.52085</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3.3148</td>
<td>.62641</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAS</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2.8997</td>
<td>.51807</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.5427</td>
<td>.74524</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRTC</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.3086</td>
<td>.54024</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>3.1845</td>
<td>.73974</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The frequency distribution of responses and the distribution of the mean scores as related to organizational administrative obstacles and weaknesses, appear to be different based on the cross-case analysis. 74.5% of respondents at MBA and 60% at WEC “strongly agree and agree” that the organizational and administrative settings in the EC are strong. 12% at MBA and 26% at WEC “strongly disagree and disagree” that the organizational and administrative settings are weak and one of the obstacles facing the ECs. On the other hand, at MPA (22%), NIAS (41%) and WRTC (27%) a low proportion “strongly agree and agree” while a much larger proportion (54%, 26% and 50% respectively), “strongly disagree and disagree”. It appears that there is a wide consensus that MBA and WEC have organization and management, that is more effective and leadership more qualified than at MPA, NIAS, and WRTC.

In order to analyze the respondents’ opinions in more detail, a mean score scale was created by combining the nine constructs clustered in this construct. This data, as shown in Table 9.2 above, reveals that the mean scores of MBA and WEC for this component are below 3.0 (2.0981 and 2.5427 respectively), suggesting that the respondents perceive that MBA and WEC have effective organization and management and qualified leadership. The mean score of MPA and WRTC in this component are higher than MBA and WEC for nearly every item examined with total mean score of 3.3148 and 3.3086, respectively, suggesting that the respondents perceive MPA and WRTC as having less effective organization and management and less qualified leadership. Respondents in the NIAS apparently have similar assessments, suggesting that NIAS has a partly effective organization and management and qualified leadership. The mean scores were below the value “3” in nearly 4 items out of 9 items clustered in this component with a total mean score of 2,8997 (s.d.=.51807):
To interpret the above-presented results, we used the one-way ANOVA, as it is commonly used as an inferential statistic for testing of statistical significance, resulting in an F-value. The (ANOVA) test shows that the difference or the variation among the selected ECs in facing problems related to the organizational and administrative settings is significant as \[ F=30.318; DF= (4/222); P= .000 \]:

9.5 The Quantity and Quality of the Teaching Staff

The second and third constructs (II and III) are clearly dominated by the quantity and quality of the teaching staff obstacles and weakness constructs within the selected ECs. The total alpha values are .866 and .700, respectively, and in all items regarding first construct the alpha value is above the .80. The nature of these obstacles comprises three items in variable II and nine items in constructs III. These are: (X1) There are qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen's sectors; (x2) There are sufficient teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen's sectors; (x3) There are sufficient teachers to supervise the practical work or thesis of the graduate students; (x4) The attitude and working style of teachers are unique in Yemen; (X5) Teachers have the same level of understanding, skills and practical experience of education and research; work as a team in the EC; (X6) Teachers have the same awareness and agreement about the common vision of the EC's functions; (X7) Teachers are very committed and eager to work for the education center; (X8)
Teachers have enough time to be available for the students; (X9) teachers have access to the latest theoretical and practical developments of related subjects; (X10) Teachers are working with to the highest standards; (X11) Teachers show that they have experience of working with Yemen’s sectors; (x12) Giving skills and attitude-based training rather than information-based training.

All items in the constructs II and III are highly correlated and closely grouped. In construct II, the highest value is X3=.864, and the lowest X2=.743. Similarly in construct III, the highest value is V4=.654 and the lowest V6=.609. Thus, we can be confident in using these constructs to check the variation among the selected aid projects in terms of having good quality and quantity teaching staff.

The overall analysis reveals that there is a very large internal similarity in the assessment of respondents about the quantity and quality of their teaching staff, as there were the main obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs in doing their jobs effectively. This result is confirmed by the result of mean score as it is above the scale point of 3 at 3.1567 (s.d. = .57568).

Table 9.3 the Mean Scores and Frequency Distribution of the Quantity and Quality of the Teaching Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECs</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Frequency Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly agree and agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2.3710</td>
<td>.41121</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3.3168</td>
<td>.47791</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIAS</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.3089</td>
<td>.38561</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEC</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.8782</td>
<td>.56825</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRTC</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.4907</td>
<td>.43873</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>3.1567</td>
<td>.57568</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the frequency distribution of responses (see Table 9.3 above) and the distribution of the mean scores, as related to the quantity and quality of their teaching staff obstacles and weaknesses (constructs II and III), appears to be different based on the cross case analysis. About 60% and 50% of respondents at the MBA and WEC respectively “strongly agree and agree” that there is sufficient and qualified staff to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s respective sectors. In MBA 13% of respondents “strongly disagree and disagree”, that the quantity and quality of their teaching staff is one of the obstacles facing the ECs, and at WEC it is 35%. On the other hand, at MPA

4 It is important to note here that because the measured items in constructs II have the same “dimension and direction” as well as having the multicollinearity problem, as the items are related to the quantity and the quality of the staff members, we have combined the related items during this analysis. In other words, we have reduced the two constructs to one construct, and all the values in this section have been presented on a one scale construction.
(8%), NIAS (21%) and NIAS (21%), the number who “strongly agree and agree” about the same issue is in the minority, while a majority (52%, 40% and 66% respectively) “strongly disagree and disagree”. It appears there is a wide consensus among respondents that MBA and WEC have more quantity and quality teaching staff than MPA, NIAS, and WRTC.

In order to analyze the respondents’ opinions in more detail, a mean score scale was created by combining the twelve items clustered in both constructs II and III. The data, shown in Table 9.5 reveals that the mean scores of MBA and WEC for this component are below ‘3.0’ (2.3710 and 2.8782, respectively, with s.d. = .4112 and .56825) suggesting that the respondents perceive that MBA and WEC have sufficient and qualified teaching staff. On the other hand, the mean scores of MPA, NIAS and WRTC are 3.3168, 3.3089 and 3.4907 respectively (s.d. = .47791, 3.8561 and .43873), suggesting that the respondents perceive the MPA, NIAS and WRTC as having less sufficient and qualified teaching staff:

Figure 9.2 Means of Quantity and Quality of the Training and Teaching Staff

To interpret the above-presented results, we used a one-way ANOVA test. The results shows that the difference or the variation among the selected ECs in facing problems related to the quantity and quality of the training and teaching staff is significant as [F=32.632; DF= (4/222); P=,000]:

To conclude this section, the results of the statistical analysis suggest that the respondents perceive the MPA and WRTC, as having less effective organization and management and qualified leadership than MBA and WEC. Respondents in NIAS suggest that NIAS was partly effective organization and management and qualified leadership. Similarly respondents perceive MPA, NIAS and WRTC, as having less
sufficient and qualified teaching staff than MBA and WEC.

It should also be noted the same EC’s that showed low effectiveness in achieving the specific objectives of the NPT program in Yemen based upon the results of the quantitative analysis here, namely MPA, NIAS and WRTC, showed low effectiveness based upon the results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 8.

9.6 Policy Analysis Based Upon the Local Knowledge Syndrome\textsuperscript{55}

In this section we address some objectives set for the research in light of the findings drawn from the case studies, the LKS literature and conceptualizing. Different aspects about the local knowledge in the Yemeni public sector have been discussed in a great detail in Chapter 4 and briefly reviewed in section 9.2 of this chapter. Here we do not repeat all of the concepts and characteristics elaborated in Chapter 4. Rather, we discuss some aspects within the higher education sector and its institutions, and address some key impacts on the NPT programme at three levels: operational, middle management and policy-making.

9.6.1 NPT Program and LKS in the Direct Beneficiary Context

Decorative changes by the top man

As we argued in Chapter 6, the MPA-NIAS and MBA mission and strategy, approved by the universities administration, faculty and department, was to develop the capacity and capability of the host departments. However, in reality the MBA and MPA centers were established at university level instead of faculty level by the Sana’a University (SU) rectorate. Their establishment did not stem from a serious formal desire to have effective training or education centers for civil servants in the country, but rather the result of particular circumstances. The administrative and academic staff within the host department were not trained or informed about the coming projects during the designing phase; there were conflicts among the staff members of the host departments during implementation about the vision and mission of the projects\textsuperscript{6}.

\textsuperscript{55} - The source of data of the analysis in this section is mainly interviews and participated observations and secondary data, like project reports and related articles and books. As many of the interviewers refused to mention to their names within the text, I just put the names of them as a list at the end of the thesis.

\textsuperscript{6} - There are two things to note here. Firstly, many of the people I interviewed in Yemen told me that they did not get any info either from MOHESR or from NUFFIC. All they heard was that there was a Dutch program coming to their departments, under the name of NPT. There was confusion about the meaning of the NPT abbreviation, e.g., was it a national program for tarring? Secondly, the lack of knowledge of scientific departments as the direct beneficiaries of the projects until the implementation stage is strong evidence of non-incorporation of local knowledge during the project policy design. These two points are related to the associability approach or explanation of the local knowledge problem,
One conflict was between staff members who had no English, who argued that the study program should be in Arabic, and those who could speak English, who argued that the study programme should be in English. This latter group claimed that English should be used, as it is a language that assists in the understanding of means of communication and IT, and can help to absorb scientific and technical terminologies in a world racing to acquire the latest techniques and technical information. However, the majority of the staff members did not speak English, or their English skills were not good enough for them to train staff in English. In addition, it is difficult to find participants from the respective sectors in Yemen, which have sufficient English to follow a training course in English.

Another conflict was about the study program and whether it should be executive based or academic based. Most of the staff members did not know or tried to play around to keep the study program based on an academic perspective. Most of them simply did not understand the practical aspects of the respective sectors and they just focused their teaching on the theoretical aspect. This complicates the ability of knowledge acquisition in the light of the weaknesses in acquiring applied or practical skills. It seems that everybody wanted to ensure their future position in the project, and moreover, personally benefit from the project. No one cared about the problems Yemen faces and how to develop effective training for civil servants.

**Conflict management examples**

The top men in the SU and the other universities, the deans of the faculties, the directors of the ECs and the people who managed the projects from the Yemeni side limited the NPT projects to themselves in order to avoid such conflicts. The idea was either to keep the NPT’s external temporary fund for the university or for the purpose of showing that the university has training centers (centers are not similar to many offices in ministries and government institutions as they have computers with internet and super deluxe furniture but without practical use or real work). The top man always receives respect due to his position and power or by the norms within society and the top man should not be opposed by his subordinates. Thus there was relatively little opposition and resistance from staff members to their leaders or the top man’s quick decisions in solving the above-mentioned conflicts.

**The quick decision-making approach & the top-man**

The defining feature of administrative systems within Yemen’s higher education and are fully analyzed in Chapter 10.
institutions is the channeling of much of the bureaucratic activity towards the realization of other goals, rather than the achievement of program objectives. This is essentially a sign of systemic or institutionalized weakness. Additionally, changing the vision of donor contractors is an indicator of the lack of local knowledge, as changing the capacity building process from department-based to education center-based, coincides with the traditional vision of the top men of the respective universities and their limited followers. Donors should realize that there is no strategic planning behind such a change in the implementation approach. Rather it is based upon the quick decision approach, which has always dominated managerial behavior of Yemeni institutions. At the same time, donor contractors were careful about how to spend the money allocated for the NPT projects (money-money moving) and how to show to the stakeholder the results achieved on the ground, despite the ineffectiveness of some of these established centers. The Dutch donor contractor failed to act as an agent of change in the recipient departments, and did not involve all the actors, incorporate and understand their objections, and show everyone how to resolve the issues that emerged during the implementation process. Had they done so, everybody would have watched for those who object. The result would have been an institutionalization of the process instead of following the personal and interpersonal management process by the Yemeni counterparts during the implementation stage. Everyone would have compromised; he or she would make it known that they are responsible for their actions.

What one can identify is that the donor side and their limited respective actors chose the simple approach instead of passing on the difficult road. Greater efforts were needed to achieve a real local change, rather than a decorative change. We could have at the end had these outputs materialized, though it is possible that the capacity building objectives and the effectiveness of aid would not have materialized because there was a big fight, there is no sustainability, the center ownership was not established, and many other obstacles which we look at later in the chapter.

As we discussed in previous chapters, we can exclude MBA and WEC, because of their good quantitative results. WRTC can also be excluded as it was already established before the NPT started. Thus, looking at MPA-NIAS, we could described them as the centers of the seven NOs: (1) No institutional and regulatory frameworks to govern the establishment and control the their activities; (2) No ongoing fund to activate their activities and maintain continuity apart from the tuition fees; (3) No partnerships or possible partnerships based on short or medium term established
between the centers and government institutions or private companies; (4) No formal desire to activate the task of training process at ECs to push the development process of the civil service system; (5) No methodological and intellectual training frame to direct the process of building the curriculum and the training process, that is to say, no theory to direct the process of planning and implementation of the training process and skills development; (6) No sufficient and qualified teachers who are able to teach the characteristics of Yemen’s respective sectors; and (7) generally speaking, no effective administration and organizational structure (GOY, SCEP, 2010; see also Chapters 7 and 8).

**ECs without administration system**

The administration of any higher education institutions at all levels, and especially at the operational level, has to include two main dimensions, each of which completes with the other. The first is the academic dimension, which leads to academic organization and development, and the second is related to the administrative system of the academic and administrative activities. The success of an aid project aimed at building the capacity and capability of the higher education institutions, depends on changing the style of the administrative directions that both academic and administrative leaderships believe in and want to develop administrative system in all its dimensions; and according to awareness of the institution new objectives developed by the aid intervention and the requirements of its future prosperity.

As we saw in Chapter 4, the public sector in Yemen has a traditional public administration system as a result of the influences of the traditional social structure or the informal system. Similarly, higher education institutions suffer from poor standards because of social and political ties; procedures in appointments and promotions of both academic and administrative posts which fail to abide by current regulations; the absence of by-laws that stipulates powers and responsibilities; the absence of follow-up and evaluation principle; the absence of the reward and punishment principle; the absence of new administrative means; and weak training (AL Salahi, 2009; BA Abad, 2007).

The activities of the selected ECs varied in this regard. The MBA project paid attention to develop the administrative system and to build the capacity and the capability of the academic and administrative staff, while the MPA project paid little attention to it. The efforts of the MPA were limited to developing an administrative

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7 - These seven nos have been discussed and proved by the quantitative data presented earlier in this chapter.
system to manage its external funds. After the completion of the project, the traditional/poor administrative system came back. There was no practical change on the ground. In the absence of such changes and developments, and the absence of effective capacity and capability building for the academic and administrative staff, it would be difficult to say that the implemented aid projects enabled the ECs to administer the academic and administrative activities of the training process effectively, or that it would be possible for them to have the vision and leadership skills to promote the public and private sector reform processes.

There were a number of bottlenecks as a result of the absence of an effective administrative system. The first was the *de facto* selection of the EC directors. This process was done without a transparent procedure, and without any involvement on the part of the contractor. It was the task of the top man within the direct recipient organization to select directors based upon primordial ties such as family, friendships, “al was†a”, or by competing ties such as political and economic ties. This is especially the case for MPA so far, MBA at the first phase of the project, and WRTC. This decision created resentments in the host university departments, exacerbated existing factionalism and caused frequent open conflict between departmental staff. Furthermore, the non-transparent selection procedure is not limited to directors of the ECs, but also the selection of academic staff from the direct host, the scientific department within the respective university.

**Training process of Yemeni trainers and “feel-good” trips to the Netherlands:**

The teaching staff and the assistant teaching staff form the backbone in the ECs. The value of any higher education depends entirely on its teaching staff and the teaching staff’s educational competencies in fulfilling their duties. These duties vary and get renewed in order to achieve the goals set out for the ECs. As we have mentioned in former chapters, one component of the NPT projects in Yemen was to prepare, train and qualify teaching staff to equip them with the required skills to use modern technical and practical teaching aids. Unfortunately, this is the most

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8. The social groups and the NPT projects: the MPA project was under the supervision of the Al Saddah and Qadhis social groups. For example, the former director and the current (second) director are from the same social groups. In addition, most of the teaching staff or trainers were chosen because they belonged to these two social groups, as the top man of the center preferred. For MBA, economic ties were the main method of selecting the director. The director has experience about the issues the private sector suffers from as he is a big businessman in the country. The social-family ties in these two projects cannot be limited to the operational level but they also placed on the middle management and policymaking levels. As it is the case that the top-man of the higher education sector or the person who was in charge with the NPT program in Yemen is related to one of the above mentioned social groups and it was the case to use such informal ties to place close civil servants to his social group.

9. This evidence is discussed more in Chapter 10.
challenging type of institutional change, because local knowledge gaps are a result of the unplanned requirements and contributions of development, and not in terms of quantity or quality of the training. There are a number of local obstacles to this component in the selected projects, and we look at the most significant below.

Despite the long list of staff in the proposals submitted from the donors’ contractors and their Yemeni counterparts, there is shortage of specialized staff that have experience of working with Yemen’s respective sectors. Most of them are not qualified even for the most junior tasks outlined in the job descriptions in the NPT projects. If an EC has enough staff, they are not willing to collaborate with other ECs. There is no commitment and openness to change, nor an eagerness to learn to improve quality of training process and transfer\textsuperscript{10}. This is also, because there is no administrative system to impose responsibilities on the staff members to enroll in training courses. It is important to realize that staff members rarely have official meetings to discuss the problems facing their departments. Such things are only discussed by informal mechanisms, such as individual meetings or during the “Qat section in the afternoon” (see Chapter 4). How come the policy makers did not realize this situation and find a mechanism to gather them for training?

Although Dutch contractors have taken actions toward solving these problems, by organizing training workshops outside Yemen, such as Cairo or the Netherlands (“feel good” trips), most of these workshops were for a short time such as two weeks. These workshops cost huge amounts of money, but the impact on capacity and capability building may not have been effective, especially due to the weak capacity of most of the participants.

Additionally, staff have not updated their knowledge and the teaching methods that they possess and follow. One reason is the lack of necessary facilities, also most of them do not have sufficient knowledge of professional sufficiency principle, and some are not able to use the computer and information technology and communication (MSM, 2010).

\textbf{Alwasta as a method for attending training:}

On paper no “less” than 30 staff members (Administrative and Academic) in every EC got training by the NPT projects as part of the capacity and the capability building process, but because of the existence of “feel-good” trips the selection process of the participants was not based upon sound procedures, but on kinship and

\textsuperscript{10} - This point was clearly made by participants in the questionnaires, as the results showed. There are severe problems facing the ECs, although MBA and WEC are more effective in this regard than the others.
friendship ties and other political considerations. There was also the problem of seniority at the expense of competence. People were selected on the basis of seniority, even though they were not qualified to perform this mission. It is the problem of the top man in the operational level again. It is a deep-rooted custom in Yemeni universities to present the seniority before the qualification. One of the Dutch project managers I interviewed said that some of Yemenis who came to the Netherlands for training, did not do so merely for training proposes. For example, they may have tried to get *medical treatment* here, or wanted to come here as a tourist, or to visiting relatives in neighboring countries. The last purpose for people to take part in the training was to receive the allowances for the training. It was a surprise to the aforementioned Dutch project manager, that many conflicts took place over who should have the chance to go outside Yemen for training. As we explain in the next chapter, such conflicts were one of the problems facing the process of incorporating local knowledge during the policy implementation.  

**Seniority and Dutch trainers**

Even though some of the people who were selected had an incentive to learn and were qualified for the task, there was another problem which most interviewers focused around, related to the Dutch contractors’ side, that some of the trainers did not have PhDs and “only” a master’s. In terms of seniority, most Yemeni professors, with their PhDs, felt affronted at being trained by someone without one. As we mentioned earlier, qualification is not the standard for judgment that works in Yemeni universities, but seniority. This aspect is not limited only to the Dutch trainers, but also the Dutch managers who were sent to manage projects with their Yemeni counterparts at the local level. Many of the Yemeni professors did not pay any attention to them. The seniority phenomena led to a lack of interaction and a failure to establish a common understanding between the two parties in most cases. This in turn contributed to the lack of success of some of the selected NPT projects, which we talk about in detail in the next chapter.

The deviation of some of the projects away from the direct recipient departments and towards the establishment of new ECs, prevented many staff members in the direct recipient departments from participating in the NPT projects, including the training workshops. Excluding the MBA, the staff members who were selected for

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11 - The gender problem is also evident in the selection process of the participants. There is discrimination against women as there is low level of participation of women as trainers and trainees in the institutions and selected ECs.

12 Instead, they acted and are still acting against those ECs.
training, capacity, and capability building in the Netherlands and other countries did not belong to the ECs. The manager of the center only chose teaching staff personally. The staff members of the ECs belonged to the different faculties and departments in the respective Yemeni universities. For example, at WRTC at the University of Aden, of the more than 30 faculty members trained there, only two of them are still have a relationship with the EC. Through interviews in NIAS, we also found that about 70% of the trained staff members are no longer linked to the EC or never have been.

Normally, the staff members use 2-3 hours per week to teach and train the EC’s participants. These part-time staff members of the ECs practice several posts without having time to do any of them properly. This negatively affects the quality of training processes and internal efficiency. Apart from MBA, all the selected ECs are still suffering from the issue of inadequate intervention system for the selection and preparation and evaluation of the staff members.13

Most of the interviewed staff members were asked if they felt a part of the EC. 70% of them said that they were working part time in these ECs, only to improve their income. This affects the level of training process and the supervision process of the graduates, as when staff members perform a number of jobs they are not able to perform in one job well Furthermore the number of stable staff members was not sufficient in all selected ECs. In MBA there were 12, followed by WEC (9), then NIAS (7), MPA (5) and finally WRTC with 4. In MPA for example, the 5 staff members were insufficient for the almost 300 MPA participants. This may explain why only 6 students at MBA graduated in the past six years14.

The problem of the new staff and no strategic management

The process of qualifying new staff in applied research skills involved the ECs’ own human resources capacity. A large part of the projects’ budgets were allocated for training new staff with masters and/or doctoral programs in Dutch or other foreign universities. Despite the money spent on training these new staff members, they never found their way into positions within these selected ECs, with the exception of MBA. For example, in WRTC, five members of the faculty of the University of Aden were selected for doctoral degrees. Although they finished their studies on time and specialized in gender issues in Yemen, they could not return to

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13 - Some the other interviewees mentioned to me that some teachers became like a train, as you see him or her, at different times, in different ‘stations’ (universities).
14 - Information provided by MPA.
the WRTC and work as was planned by the NPT project proposal\(^\text{15}\). Another example is the MPA project. The project enabled two Yemeni students to do their MSc in Public Administration at Leiden University, despite their lack of capabilities in English/Dutch at that time. After graduating and returning back to Yemen they were not allowed to join the teaching staff to teach at the MPA program however, as Yemeni law for universities does not allow them to teach MPA students or participants. Instead, they were offered non-academic jobs and positions that did not meet their qualifications. On the other hand, for the MBA project, the new staff members who were selected for conducting Ph.D. degrees in MSM and other related subjects in Dutch universities are now working in the center and sharing the responsibility of the training process of the participants.

Although these new staff members could have been one of the main tangible results of the NPT projects, there are three concerns related to place and time knowledge. The first concern is related to the selection of those candidates and the level of the qualifications they needed. There was no open competition for candidates from the country and no strict conditions to help achieve the specific and overall objectives of the ECs or NPT projects. These candidates should have practical knowledge in the issues of the respective sectors in Yemen and have a high level of English and research skills, to be able to attend Dutch universities. Then they can truly operate as a Yemeni-Dutch connection, knowing and understanding both worlds, helping to increase the capacity and capability of the ECs and promoting the respective sectors’ reform process. However, when the term of reference of the projects was done, the informal system without strategic vision was very active, as staff members of the respective departments refused to send graduate students from outside of their departments\(^\text{16}\), as they saw new well-qualified staff members as competitors that could threaten their existence within the ECs, and their own academic interests.

The Dutch contractors experienced considerable changes during the lifetime of the projects. The WRTC was the only project were the staff was trained according the planning. For MPA-NIAS, the set up planned for the training of 6 faculty members through a doctoral program and 4 staff at MA level. For MBA, the set up planned for the training of 4 faculty members through a doctoral program and 6 staff at MBA level. For WRTC, the set up planned for the training of 5 faculty members through a doctoral program and 1 staff member at MA level. For WEC, new staff were not

\(^{15}\) - The staff members who currently work at WRTC are not specialized in gender issues.

\(^{16}\) - At that time the department had no staff members with an MA or MSc.
required as they had enough staff members. During implementation these plans was not considered feasible by the Yemeni side and at their request the training program was reduced to 2 staff at MSc level in PA for the MPA, and 2 doctoral programs and 1 MBA level for the MBA project. The departments were not able to mobilize further staff for training and also recruitment of new staff members from outside of the departments was not acceptable. For the WRTC the requirement remained the same but they changed the training location from Dutch universities to Arabic universities, especially in Egypt, because they could not find qualified staff members form their university who had the level of English required by the Dutch universities.

The second concern is linked to the (formal) rules and regulations in the Yemeni universities. People who hold a master's degree cannot teach or train. (ROY, GOV, 1995 Law for Higher Education). However, most of the grants for training faculty members through a doctoral program were converted to master's level due to the informal considerations of the people in the Yemeni side, as we mentioned above. Even the Dutch contractors did not realize this, as their thinking was that the new staff members would have a role in the training process in the future, as is the case in the Netherlands. This is one of the non-cognitive aspects which they faced with regard to local realities.

The third concern is related to the reality of the academic qualifications of the selected faculty members, as the quality of some faculty members was, for many reasons, mediocre. One reason is the appointment of faculty members who completed their BA or MA at low-quality universities, but are appointed, because of political or social pressures and ties. Dutch contractors bear some of the responsibility in the academic qualification of many of these appointments, because they funded these scholarships, despite knowing the level of the universities where they studied. Dutch contractors should put strict criteria on the table in the process of selecting them. There is a knowledge deficiency and this case has not received adequate attention from Dutch contractors. On the other hand, if the Dutch contractors had attracted non-faculty members, there was no there a component in their projects that took into consideration the process of recruiting the selected new staff in the education centers after graduation. This there would have been a sharp shortage in teachers and trainers, which would have affected the functional capacity of many of the training institutions.

Moreover, planning of scholarships and policy coordination are not taken into consideration, especially in aligning scholarships with the human resource shortages, in different specializations within the ECs. In other words, sending new members of
staff to study abroad was endorsed and approved without, an overall vision of the comprehensive development, or the capacity required of the outputs of these NPT projects. Instead, the donor contractors delegated this task to the Yemeni side. In Yemeni organizations, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the open-door policy is very active, which gave new staff the freedom to choose whatever topics they favored. This is analogous to a doctor giving their patient the freedom to choose the medicine that suits them, although the patient has no knowledge of how to treat themselves. It would be wise for the donor side to analyze the local realities in the specific place and find out deficiencies in the current staff members. After that, there should be a clear plan to send the new faculty members aboard for training, by identify specific topics for them that fill the existing weaknesses in teaching and training capacity in the ECs.

**Leadership replacing the trained staff members:**

The selected ECs are suffering from cuts in administrative organs due to non-commitment, a clear plan for appointments, and the termination of the justifications in equality of opportunity in many administrative practices. We mentioned in Chapter 6 and at the beginning of this chapter that the NPT projects in Yemen, established ECs and these education centers became “directly and personally” under control of the rectors of the respective universities (the top men). In all the selected ECs, the rectors of the universities changed the directors or the heads of these ECs. This is because the rectors of the universities were changed by the policy making level. The link between the ECs and the middle management (university structure), is based upon personal and informal links and not institutional links, these new rectors in turn changed the directors. In MPA, NIAS and WRTC, EC directors who had been working with donor contractors during implementation process were replaced.

The process of changing directors of the ECs by the “top men” of universities, led to a number of problems and challenges that impeded the growth and performance of the ECs. The first problem is related to the top man technique of managing an

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17 - It would also be advisable if they direct Ph.D. topics, e.g., in WRTC, to gender issues such as the relationship between men and women in the office in a Yemeni environment. Poor women are not on the agenda of the government and donors. Donors just deal with groups of women in every city in Yemen and it is the same faces benefit from foreign aid. It would also be good if there is a Ph.D. student looking into how to integrate poor women in the development process that also can suggest channels for donors to reach these women. I have seen an MA thesis of a student from WRTC which is about gender and IT. In traditional societies like Yemen, there is no need to study IT and gender, there are a lot more important topics. There has been no strategic thinking and plan for directing the study topics of new staff members to be relate to the development problems that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program is trying to deal with.
institution (see Chapter 4). The second problem is that the new directors of the ECs, changed the old staff members for new staff members, because of the “rule of the game” and there is no administrative system established to organize such things. The new directors of the ECs did not accept new staff members returning to the ECs. For example, at WRTC, 5 faculty members obtained a doctorate and then faced a big problem with the new leadership of the EC, on their return to work. The ECs did not have their own stable staff, but staff members from different departments in the university. This is why, as I mentioned before, the staff members trained by the NPT projects have already left the ECs. Most of the ECs have no own developed training capacity, especially in a human resources (administrative and academic) should run the training process itself\(^{18}\). An EC without a minimum human resource capacity is like a farmer who plants, but does not harvest.

Having analyzed most of the LKS aspects that prevented the Dutch contractors to build the capacity and the capability in the selected ECs at the operational level, the main thrust of the coming section is to provide an analysis on the LKS aspects at the middle management level. The main focus is on two factors: the organizational and administrative structures, and the quality and quantity of teaching and training staff.

Before starting the analysis in the middle management level however, it is valuable to analyze two aspects related to the operational level and the middle management level: (1) The curricula design and (2) the participants’ selection process. These two aspects have been tested statistically in Chapter 8 of this study. In this section, I try to combine the quantitative results to the LKS explanation as well.

Let us first consider the design of curricula. The curriculum is a big problem area in the NPT projects in Yemen. During the designing phase of the NPT, there was an agreement between NUFFIC and the respective universities, for the universities to make professors available to develop the curriculum as part of their normal activities. There was a lack of knowledge from Nuffic, as it was requesting its targets to develop their capacities to take the responsibility in developing the study curricula and writing the study courses. The other concern is related to the promises of the university rectors, that they would allocate Yemeni professors in the respective departments, without knowing their abilities and willingness to accomplish the mission.

During the implementation process, the Yemeni professors were unwilling to contribute to curriculum development unless they were paid. Unfortunately, because

\(^{18}\) - The relationship between the middle management level and operational level is clarified in the coming sections.
of the financial rules of Nuffic for the NPT projects, the Dutch contractors could not pay them, as Nuffic considered the curriculum development as the local contribution and obligation. Thus the professors in the respective departments refused to develop the curriculum and the Dutch contractors could not ask other professors from outside the departments for curriculum development; because there was no budget. The departments for curriculum became in some ECs, an individual initiative for local managers and some other professors that the local manager had personal or family ties with him or her. The curricula were then taken from academic departments at colleges. This made these institutes deviate from their target of offering training skills to grant theoretical qualifications, since skills-based learning was the actual target of establishing these centers.

The existing curricula, especially in MPA and WRTC, are old and far removed from the history of living science, as is the case in most Yemeni “academic” departments at colleges. It provides information and knowledge, typically fragmented and does not function in reality. They depend mainly on handouts and summaries of books, and have a lack of methodology and thus fail to stimulate creative thinking methods for resolving problems. The curricula rely on memorization and lecturing in the delivery of training material to their participants. Due to the lack of accompanying activities inside or outside lecture rooms and the lack of practical training, ECs are often incapable of giving participants skills and professions needed by the jobs and professions in the both public and private sectors. There is an absence of a clear practical framework, in building the curriculum, in planning and implementing the training process using integrated and lively practical and scientific knowledge. Most of the interviewees indicated that the ECs found it difficult to designing curricula well balanced between theory and practice. Especially in WRTC, the opportunities for practical application and field training in the respective organizations are rarely made available.

Curricula and gender issues

The WRTC was one of the most relevant choices or projects in the design of the program to deal with gender issues. However all of the projects were designed to deal with the gender issue. The aim was to promote the status of women within public and private organizations. This is by establishing cultural patterns of how women and men perceive each other’s roles in the work place. In public and private offices, most women are subject to harassment by male employees, especially those who work in
the northern side of Yemen, where there are more male-dominated environments (strong tribal areas). The chance to contribute to solving such a social dilemma, is to integrate some gender issues in curricula and develop some skills regarding equality in the workplace. It requires specializations that would ensure greater integration, contribution and participation of females in this type of learning, in order to make full use of both genders in the development process. However, looking at the current curricula and other activities of the selected ECs, it is really clear there was insufficient or (no) attention to gender factor. “Attending to this factor is culturally sensitive. It requires in the first place the competent involvement of the Yemeni colleagues. From the Dutch side it may require support for the development of awareness, sensitivity and exposure to successful models of intervention known from culturally similar contexts” (Visser, 2008:38).

**Open-door policy function**

The policy of admission or selection of the participants from the respective organizations for the training process for the capacity and capability building in the ECs was dependent on an open-door policy, which left participants the freedom to attend the ECs. This meant admission is without reference to the priorities of capacity and capability building plans. Many of the people, who I interviewed, stressed that these ECs acted like a body without a head. There is a lack of ability to coordinate and integrate admission plans with the respective organizations. The participants have to be compulsorily nominated for admission, in a coordinated effort between their organizations and the ECs. Interviewees noted that the ECs should be under the authority of the Yemeni Council of Ministers, to use them as factories to produce qualified leaders, with clear policy of re-assigning the graduates to different administrative levels. On the other side, the absorptive capacity of the ECs must be raised so they can absorb the largest possible number of participants from various agencies and institutions19.

The selected ECs became either civil society organizations like WRTC, or private

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19 If you read deeply into the backgrounds of participants, especially at the MPA center, you can clearly see that most of the students belong to the traditional social classes: Sadah, Qaddhi, and strong elders of Gabilih. These three social groups have misused the Yemeni state for its whole modern history and now they get this chance to be trained in new skills to be placed in stronger and higher positions within the government. They did not give a room for isolated social groups which do not have that big role in public life (see Table 4.1 in section 4.2 of Chapter 4) such as Khadam, Muza-yyna, and women to be trained and placed in the higher government offices. These latter groups only belong to the third level of administrative hierarchy as personnel, specialists and technicians and, sometimes, as military soldiers. In all the selected projects, I could not find a single participant from the Khadam social group. And women were the minority in all the selected ECs we saw in Chapter 7 when we analyzed the participants’ demographic profile.
training institutes, especially those with the focus on developing their profit rather than developing the institutional capacity and capability of the respective organizations in Yemen. Tuition fees can exceed U.S. $7000, which makes the process of training and qualification limited to the rich classes or influential people in both public sector and society, who are the basis of the administrative corruption and confusion in the public and private sectors\textsuperscript{20}.

While the above local knowledge concerns should be addressed at the specific level or in each project level, there are also local knowledge areas of concern that should receive particular attention at the universities or middle management level, which we look at now.

\textbf{9.6.2 NPT Program and LKS at the University Context}

The hope was that “the implementation of NPT interventions in different departments, schools and colleges of the university [would provide] an opportunity for reform and experimentation with new models in a university wide context” (Visser, 2007:21). However, the interviewees noted that the ECs, especially MPA and MBA, suffer from a lack of integration and coordination with the organizational and administrative structures in the universities. For example, the ECs are not part of the graduate schools structures in the universities at present. The certificates from these ECs are not documented and recognized by the graduate schools. This has hindered most graduates in completing their graduation processes\textsuperscript{21}. The graduate schools of the universities claim that, the training programme is not qualified to be a Master's Degree provided by the University itself. For example, the two participants in WRTC who have finished their studies so far could not document their certificates (see Chapter 8). The graduate school argued that as there are no supervisors in the university with specialties in their topic (gender issues), they should change their topics to be relevant to the specialties of their supervisors\textsuperscript{22}. As is the case in most of the selected ECs, there is a problem as training programs have no idea of what the study of gender issues should look like\textsuperscript{23}.

\textsuperscript{20} The tuition fees are between US$4000 and US$ 7000, which is very high in a society like Yemen where the average income is less than US$1 a day (see Chapter 4).

\textsuperscript{21} This is although one of the NPT program intentions at the inter-institutional level is to embed “the supported organizations in the post-secondary educational system of their country. It thereby strengthens the capacity of the supported organizations to relate to other organizations and institutions in the sector” (MinBuza, 2012:17).

\textsuperscript{22} This is linked to the aforementioned point that WRTC refused to appoint 5 Ph.D. holders who were sent to prepare their studies in gender issues as part of the WRTC project.

\textsuperscript{23} One of the Dutch local managers who worked in Yemen with WRTC informed me that they had faced a big challenge when presenting the gender theme to the respective organization in Yemen. The concept of gender in a male-dominated and tribal-Muslim society is linked with a lot of negative associations. The theme of gender is associated with a feminism theme in a negative sense, such as aggressive women, free women, promiscuity, westernized women and
In this regard, the ECs have no relevance with the universities context as such, considering the overall necessity for the NPT programme in Yemen to align the university policy and structure. Most of the staff members in the universities consider these ECs as extraneous. There is no sense of being part of the organizations. The ECs have independent financial procedures, without a link to the financial regulations of the universities. Many staff members, whether academics or administrators consider these ECs as a trophy. For example, the cost for a two hour lecture can exceed US$100. This is more than half of the monthly salary of an administrative employee. Added to this, there is a contradiction between the regulations and the laws of the universities and the regulations and the laws of these ECs, if the ECs have clear regulations and laws to organize their operations. This situation creates major conflicts between faculty members and the ECs on one hand, and the administrators and the ECs on the other. Actually, this administrative and regulatory situation hindered the work of the ECs and limited their effectiveness in the university level.

One interviewee stated that, Sana'a University was not able to be proactive in such projects or to have an agenda to put in or to tailgate these projects to the concerned parties within the university. The top man of Sana'a University and his involvement in the process of implementation had both pros and cons. It is good to have support from the higher level or the middle level, but bad when every issue or any problem has to go to the rector in order to be solved. There is no policy or administrative information or rules and regulations, to inform the middle management about their role. There is a problem of communication, as everything goes person to person. Therefore, when one goes to the SU channels, he/she does not know what the proper channel is, and so immediately goes to the top man, the rector. If he is supportive, he will meet your demands. In some instances, the levels below the rector became unsupportive. They choose to reject the project, as they feel they do not benefit from it, or as is the case the majority of the time, they are neglected or ignored and not informed correctly about the project, its structure, aims and objective, as well as its function within the structure of the university.

One very informative example which we mentioned above is the accreditation of diplomas of the participants in the different centers. SU did not approve their diplomas for senseless reasons. If the Vice rector for higher education at SU refused to approve these diplomas and there is problem in the quality of the service the ECs

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pro-homosexuality. Indeed it has been said that the reality of presenting gender is like presenting an evil to the Yemeni local counterparts.
provide, or these centers are doing something against the SU graduate polices; why
did they not stop them from operating? They should have not accepted them from
the beginning. Instead it becomes a personal conflict between the rector and the
graduate school. The structure of the SU is very weak and has to change.24

As mentioned before these EC's came to the individuals like the rector himself or
the top man of management, as he is only the person dealing with these centers. The
donors should put a condition that these centers have to be emerged with the local
counterpart organizations from day one. Within these conditions, the administrative
structures of these host organizations have to be reformed and they must accept these
centers within their rules and regulations. All the people in the host organization
should be trained, informed, and gain activities of the projects, in order to be
knowledgeable about the coming program. In SU and the other universities, only a
few people knew about the Dutch projects: the top man in SU, the dean of the faculty
and the person who managed the project, or the local coordinator. These projects
were limited to these people, in order to avoid all objections and conflicts of interest
from the different levels. This case also has to deal with the time allocated for the
projects. This is to convince everybody about the believes and structure and vision of
how to address the administrative structure of SU at that time. This is to show the
importance of the program and that everybody should be responsible for the success
of the program. If there are any objections, one should rectify them, before the program
begins.

Most of the interviewees pointed out that the process of implementation should
involve all the actors starting from the dean of the faculty, the top man in the
university, the Ministry of Higher Education; the Ministry of Planning, the
government cabinet and in some cases the presidential office. In doing so, we would
know if any person in any level had an objection to the success of the programme. We
could then address it and the person would then carry the responsibility. Then,
everybody would be eager for work, with some conditions to be associated. At the
beginning everybody has to be addressed, and all parties have to sign an agreement,
not the rector of the university, but all his assistance administration units. For
example, in SU, it should start from the department, the dean, the vice rector for
higher education, the custodian of SU, and so on. Therefore, the dean will put the
project on the agenda of the faculty council, and the same for SU council as the rector
will put the project in its agenda. Everybody will follow the same process to be

24 - The same problem happened in Aden University where the WRTC was implemented.
approved by the ministers’ council. Every administrative level will discover who is involved in the project or program. In addition, the actions at the SU board will address the project and no one can reject them later on saying they did not agree did not understand. No one can play games: either they should quit their job or sign the agreement. As we mentioned in the former section, in doing such a process, everybody will watch who will object and who will be implementing the process. The collective responsibility will be realized, as no one will work against his position he will be known that he is responsible. If there is objection, from the beginning, everyone will put his objection on paper. This will also help to incorporate local ideas from the different levels and all the problems will be solved earlier in the project process.

9.6.3 NPT Program and LKS in the Wider Sector Context

The information on local knowledge presented in the above sections, supported the idea that the issue of capacity and capability building within the public and private sectors, is not just a technical or professional issue; because building people is completely different from building stone. It basically needs developmental options, in front of the state and government that should present the donors to implement systematic methods. At the policy-strategic level, it was noted by most interviewees that there is no strategy and clear policies organizing the relationship between the ECs and the central government and its affiliates. Such a strategy must classify skills required for institutions to create a base of experts in different disciplines. There should be sub-policies or operational policies for capacity and capability process, highlighting the most important managerial skills, qualifications and requirements for training in these government institutions. These operational policies must include adequate financial budgets for capacity and capability process, and be according to the needs of various organizations and institutions. These things become more problematic when one starts looking for government policies that reflect these concerns. “Such policies are still often absent, deficient or not well developed. This reflects deficient capacity rather than lack of concern. It must thus be seen as part of the problem. It forces one to look outside the boundaries of individual projects and their immediate objectives and to focus on the context” (Visser, 2008:20). Work on changing the policy environment and other contextual conditions surrounding the various capacity building efforts, is essential before starting to design and implement NPT projects in Yemen. These policies will ensure the effective process of training and training transfer.
The Dutch government and Nuffic were dealing with, and relying on the policies of, The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MOHESR) as policy maker in this regard, but the current role of MOHESR in coordinating and supervising performance at middle management and operational levels is very limited. This is despite the fact that NPT projects targeted the middle management and operational levels. Formally, the role of MOHESR in the Yemeni higher education sector is confined to supervision and strategic guidance, and it does not perform an active monitoring role on this sector and its institutions (Al-salahy, 2009). In other words, MOHESR with its central departments and bodies is considered as responsible for placing the educational policies in universities, but it has no chance to monitor and supervise the performance of its institutions (the universities) in required manner. The plans and the policies of MOHESR are not strong or binding. They are not reliant on regulations and legislations, directed at fulfilling the aims of the overall development plans of the public sector and especially the civil service system in Yemen.

MOHESR suffers from very weak traditional organizational administrative structures. There are plenty of organizational factors that weaken its position and functions, as presented in Chapter 4 of this study. Together with the lack of the capacity and capability, there is absence of active planning in the field, in addition to a lack of transparency, a failure to question university decisions, and a failure to use information and data. It was predictable therefore, that MOHESR was not involved in the implementation of the NPT programme in Yemen. During the policy design and implementation of the NPT program, there was no attention paid to creating synergy and generating coordination mechanisms among all ECs in the respective universities. It was particularly important for the NPT program in Yemen to harmonize and synergize the different projects. However, this was absent from the thoughts of policy makers and implementers, on both the Dutch and Yemeni sides. Instead they simply followed the traditional procedure to divide the NPT program into isolated projects. This approach was criticized by many experts who I interviewed. They noted that this approach supported the policy of quotas between Yemeni universities, without a vision and a plan. The quota approach of allocation of the NPT projects was influenced by the vision of the top men within the central level of the higher education sector in Yemen, that that every university should receive its share.

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25 - It is clear that on the policy level “quality assurance systems, national policy frameworks, accreditation systems, etc. have to be developed to establish framework conditions in which post-secondary education organizations can improve their performance in their sector.” (MinBuza, 2012:17).
from the NPT financial funds.

Once more, the above observation relates to the argument of other interviewees, who noted that it was wise if the NPT programme mainly focused on developing the capacity and the capability, of the central level of the higher education sector in Yemen. There is evidence that the Center of Higher education has weak legal and administrative control over its related institutions. As mentioned above, mechanisms of authority and control management systems over institutions will help the center of the higher education sector, to achieve what is desired through the development plans and strategies.

Despite the importance of the NPT projects, they did not lead to concrete results, as the Ministry of Higher Education failed to make the direct recipient organizations accountable. In the plan of implementation process of the NPT projects, the Ministry of Higher Education was the main responsible body. Yet the role of the Ministry during the policy implementation in the universities was, limited to troubleshooting. There is no strategic link between the organizations who developed the plan of implementation, in co-operation with Nuffic, and the direct beneficiaries who implemented the NPT projects together with the Dutch contractors.

As many interviewees confirmed, it would be advisable for the NPT programme to target two universities at first. Some of the NPT projects will link between the universities and the Ministry of Higher Education, and other projects will build the capacity and capability in those two universities at all levels (rectors and their administrations, faculty levels, and department levels) and the Ministry of Higher Education itself. There are many advantages of adopting such a development approach. The first is it avoids the process of efforts and money dispersion, in implementing many projects in more than seven universities. Therefore, the possibility of having effective results will be higher, and the strategic link between these two universities with the Ministry of Higher Education will be strengthened. The second advantage is to use the first stage as a pilot, for other donors or the Netherlands to follow (or not), when capacity and capability building in other universities. The third advantage is that, the Ministry of Higher Education will be able to establish a harmonization process in conjunction with administrative, economic and social needs to reach the community\textsuperscript{26}. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, for now, remains a one-sided body, without even a sector for research studies.

\textsuperscript{26} - This point is elaborated on in the proposed framework for successful aid programmes presented in Chapter 10.
Achievement despite a poor policy environment

Although the poor policy environment was not taken into consideration by Dutch and Yemeni policy makers to make the NPT effective at the program level, some NPT projects (especially MBA and WEC) achieved some successes, as shown in the evaluation of the participants in the questionnaire and interviews as well as the researcher’s observations. Once more, the results of MBA and WRTC are a direct challenge to the explanation of the PCP approach, which is that foreign aid projects cannot work in a poor policy environment. MBA and WEC have comprehensive visions, guiding methodologies, educational and training packages to achieve the required balance between theoretical and practical aspects, and equipment that will achieve this kind of balance in the training process. In addition, MBA has good quality and quantity of staff. It has a clear policy to keep MBA in contact with its graduates, after they have finished their studies to benefit from their experiences in their work. Thus the MBA has an ongoing process, to develop its training program through the feedback of its former participants.

The explanations of this situation are that the processes of implementing MBA and WEC were effective in a specific place and time. The Dutch contactors and their Yemeni counterparts had effective interactions and associations, which led to an incorporation of place and time local knowledge and thus increased the effectiveness. This point is discussed further in the next chapter, based on the associability model for analysis. Furthermore, the Dutch contactors still have partnerships with MBA and WEC. The MBA project at Sana’a University has strong ties with the Maastricht School of Management, which has enhanced the validity of its degree program. The WEC project at Sana’a University has partnership with Wageningen University which has allowed it, for example, to develop a very successful research agenda alimented by non-NPT funding (Visser and Almoassib, 2008).

9.7 Summary of the Findings

This chapter contributes to the limited research on international development administration and public administration in Yemen, and on institutional change as related to the Dutch-Yemen NPT program. As such, the findings hold value for policy makers and people who are in charge of policy implementation regarding future/effective administrative, and other institutional reforms in the country. The examination of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program, does not only give aid the management of future aid programs in Yemen, as the institutional reforms needed
there are not unique. The similar and major features of local knowledge aspects of the public sector institutions can be found in most poor and traditional countries. By the same logic, the causal mechanism of local knowledge and (in) effectiveness of the Dutch-Yemen NPT program can be applied to other countries as well.

This analysis sheds light on one of the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: how does one explain the differences in effectiveness of the NPT program, in building the capacity and capability in the selected ECs? To investigate this question, we followed two analytical steps. The first tried to examine the extent to which the selected ECs achieved their main and specific objectives: (1) building the organizational and administrative structures, and (2) improving the quantity and developing the quality of staff members. The analysis in this step provides the explanation of why the analysis in Chapter 8, showed that some selected ECs were more effective in training than others. It was also clear in Chapter 8, that all the selected ECs were ineffective in transferring training back to work settings. The main source of data in this step of analysis was the questionnaire, which was given to the participants of the selected ECs27. We conducted overall analysis and cross-case analysis, by using different analytical methods such ANOVA tests and descriptive statistical methods such as frequency distribution, mean scores and others. Table 9.4 below summarizes the main results of the overall analysis and the cross case analysis:

Table 9.4 Summary of the Related Weaknesses and Obstacles Facing the ECs (N=227)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Constructs</th>
<th>Impact on Dependent Variable (the level of effectiveness in achieving the NPT’s specific objectives)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacles or Weaknesses</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The organizational and administrative functions</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quantity and quality of the staff members</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data analysis

(*) YES= Impact (Red color that the EC is weak and facing obstacles)
(**) No= No impact (Green color: the EC has strong capacity)
(ü) Evidence of the impact (ü*) = Part-evidence of impact

Based on the overall quantitative analysis, the results highlighted that the Dutch-

27 -In Chapter 7 we provided the sampling issues and the demographic profile analysis.
Yemen NPT program did not provide all necessary conditions for effective capacity and capability building process, within the contexts of selected ECs. In this regard, the same capacities and capabilities which the NPT ought to have reformed or developed still represent the obstacles and weaknesses facing the ECs. However, based upon the cross-case analysis, respondents perceive the MPA and WRTC, as having less effective organization and management and qualified leadership than MBA and WEC. Respondents in the NIAS suggested that, NIAS was a partly effective organization, management and qualified leadership. The same results were also found with regard to the second measure. The respondents perceive MPA, NIAS and WRTC as having less sufficient and qualified teaching staff than the MBA and WEC.

The second step of analysis turned our attention to some local knowledge elements, which were not incorporated during the policy design and/or policy implementation, thus explaining why there is variation among ECs in the results based upon the quantitative analysis in the first step. The main sources of data were the interviews, NPT documents, participated observations, related articles and books. This step therefore attempts to address the knowledge deficiency through a synthesis of empirical investigation, drawing from multiple data sources in order to propose a new explanation of why the Dutch-Yemen NPT program is not that effective in operating in the local Yemeni environment. Different local knowledge elements, especially the informal aspects, which were presented in Chapter 4, were employed in this chapter for analysis.

Dutch contractor’s lack of clear understanding of the existing institutions in the higher education sector environment in Yemen became clear after, presenting a lot of elements and examples influencing the effectiveness of the projects under investigation. It is really difficult to understand all of the intricacies of the complex institutional reform processes, or the institutions of a traditional country like Yemen. The most vivid examples of these intricacies in the higher education sector in Yemen are: violations of standards by social and political ties; procedures in the appointments and promotions of both academic and administrative posts; not abiding by the current regulations; the absence of by-laws that stipulate powers and responsibilities the absence of the follow-up and evaluation principle; and the absence of the reward and punishment principle. This applies at the three administrative levels: operational, university level, and the sector level.

It is difficult for a donor contractor with Western styles of management to understand the patterns of relations in a traditional society, such as nepotism, loyalty
and personal connections. These informal managerial functions, start from the selection of the directors of the ECs, to the selections of the trainers and trainees. Failure to change the vision of donor contractors is an indicator of the lack of local knowledge, to change the capacity building process from department-based to education center-based. The donor contactors simply went along with the traditional vision of the top men of the respective universities and their limited followers. Thus there was no “strategic planning”; it was based upon the quick decisions approach that has always dominated the managerial behavior of most leaders in Yemeni institutions.

The top men of the universities just established ECs, without building administrative systems to run them. These ECs suffer from a lack of integration and coordination with the organizational and administrative structures, at the universities/ middle management level. Instead they just have individual contact with the rectors or the top men at the universities. Furthermore, there are no synergy and coordination mechanisms among all ECs in the respective universities. ECs still suffer from an inadequate intervention system for the selection, preparation and evaluation of staff members. The existing curricula especially in MPA and WRTC are old and far removed from the modern science. They provide information and knowledge typically fragmented and does not function in reality. Furthermore, there is a low level participation of women as trainers and trainees in the institutions and selected ECs.

Interviewees noted that it would be wise if the NPT programme mainly started to focus on developing the capacity and the capability of the central level of the higher education sector in Yemen; because the center has weak legal and administrative control over its related institutions. Instead of implementing small projects scattered among the Yemeni universities by the policy of quota, it would have been better if the NPT programme targeted two universities at the first stage. Some of the NPT projects would then link between the universities and the Ministry of Higher Education, and other projects would build the capacity and capability in those two universities at all levels (rectors and their administrations, faculty level, and department level), and in the Ministry of Higher Education itself.

Despite the poor policy environment in Yemen, it was evident that MBA and WEC have comprehensive visions, guiding methodologies, educational and training packages to achieve the required balance, between theoretical and practical aspects, effective administrative systems; and provide equipment that achieve this kind of
balance in their training. We saw the same results in Chapter 8 and thus, with some confidence we can challenge the belief of the PCP approach that foreign aid projects cannot work in a poor policy environment.

The next chapter attempts to address the knowledge deficiency through the multiple theoretical elements of policy design and implementation reviewed in Chapter 3. It might be the case that the Dutch-Yemen NPT program faced challenges during the policy design but there are also differences among the related projects during the policy implementation, as we have seen more effective results of the MBA and WEC comparing to the other NPT projects.