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In short, among the possessions of the Ottoman dynasty there are two-hundred and sixty populous trading ports. Of these cities importing and exporting cargo, the port of Izmir is the most famous. For in all the world there are eighteen unbelieving [Christian] kings that have befriended the Ottoman dynasty and all their bailies [consuls of the Italian city-states] and consuls reside there. And their merchants bring products from all over the face of the earth and goods from all the peoples of the world. Every year a thousand ships come and go to have their goods sold in this city of Izmir. Thus, this place has become a truly shining trading port adorned with bustling quays. And because of these malevolent Frankish ships arriving, half the city of Izmir resembles the land of the Franks [Western Europe]. And if someone strikes an unbeliever of rank, doormen and watchmen immediately encircle the man and, without showing any mercy whatsoever, bring him straight before the judge. Whether the judge kills him or the unbelievers, then and there the corpse is lost to the Muslims. On one side, therefore, the place is sinister like Malta and modeled on the land of the Franks. But because of the charm of this city’s light-blue sky there are such attractive tavern-waiters, young monks and unbelieving unripe beauties with their locks let down – as to bring the minds of lovers still further to the same disorder as that of a beauty’s hair. Of such qualities are the beauties born of the tavern-keep. And the markets and bazaars of this Frankish quarter are very richly adorned. In its public squares stand seven churches, which they call places of worship, where they can perform their corrupted rites and evil ceremonies. These are sinister places brimful with Patriarchs and priests. And all the houses of the polytheists [those professing the Holy Trinity, here; Greeks and Armenians] are in the northern part of the city; many more houses of impious unbelievers [here; Franks] being situated among the buildings along the [outer] harbor’s shore. In going back and forth between their ships and [these] their houses in boats, they always fire a canon from every ship [in salute]. As it is their custom to do so night and day, the city of Izmir is never spared the canons’ noise.

Evlia (1671)²⁰¹

History

Considering 17th-century Izmir as a double city consisting of distinct Ottoman and European parts not only strengthens our awareness of the city’s

²⁰⁰ Here, Evliya draws heavily upon the Persian-Ottoman lyrical tradition to sing the praises of Izmir’s Frankish quarter. The motif used is that in which intoxication with the love of God is likened to the intoxication caused by the consumption of inordinate amounts of wine. In this topos the object of the metaphorical alcohol-induced enamoredness is the person filling the glasses; the tavern-waiter. This is usually a young monk since the Islamic prohibition of alcohol meant that wine was only (supposed to be) available in Christian monasteries. Cleverly toying with the possibilities offered by both the unsuspect language of the accepted literary topos and the absence of gender in the Turkish language, however, Evliya is in fact paraphrasing the very real alcoholic and (hetero)sexual pleasures to be had in the taverns of the European quarter (see infra).

²⁰¹ Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 96-97 (my translation).
history as a frontier; it also forces us to think about what defined and separated the city’s parts in the minds of its inhabitants and visitors. As such, the interest of Evliya’s description above not only lies in its being a rare Ottoman narrative description of the city’s situation, but also in its providing a clear illustration of contemporary attitudes towards the city’s constituent communities. While everyone, be they Ottoman or European, seemed to agree wholeheartedly upon the basic polarity between the Turkish and Frankish zones, the status of the Armenian, Greek and – to a lesser degree – Jewish elements was never so clear. The following sections will discuss the historical causes of this ambivalence, its development in light of a growing European presence, and the history of that privileged presence as embodied in the Ottoman capitulations.

From “the Community of Non-Muslims” to “Frank Street”
As the foregoing has shown, the dichotomy between East and West, land and sea, Muslim and Christian, Turk and Greek played an important part in shaping Izmir, in body as well as in soul. Due to the geographical characteristics of the city’s location this dichotomy was translated to one of North-South, lower-upper on the ground. Among other things, it is apparent in the location of the city’s two fortresses and in the distribution of its population over quarters according to creed.

After the Battle of Manzikert (1071) opened up Anatolia to the full thrust of Central-Asian migration, centuries of growing Turkish population pressure, a crushing Mongolian invasion (Timur Lenk’s of 1402) and the subsequent restoration of the Ottoman emirate had combined to press Izmir’s Byzantine/Greek population north; ever further away from the ancient agora, the inner harbor, and eventually from the last vestige of its former independence, the lower castle. Guarded opposition, always at least partially military, was superseded by cautious cohabitation. A cohabitation, nevertheless, in which the former frontier still lingered as ethno-religious and administrative separation. The definitive incorporation, in 1424, of a now marginalized Greek element into the Ottoman polity, although not doing away completely with the lingering frontier of a status aparte, did formally dissolve the Greco-Turkish duality.

This did not, however, mean the end of the East-West dichotomy in Izmir. For as the Greco-Turkish dimension was losing relevance (through increased incorporation of the Greeks into the Ottoman polity), the East-West quality of Izmir’s inner frontier was given a new lease on life by Latins (and later Franks) representing the Western side of the equation. We have already noted how the Venetians and Genoese had acquired increasing power in the region, leading to a formalization of the Genoese presence in Izmir in 1304, how a Frankish contingent had taken the lower castle in 1344, and how Latins and Franks had jointly taken over where the Byzantines were forced to leave off. With the departure of the Knights Hospitallers in 1402
and the Ottomans firmly in control of the city and its bay from 1424, the military and political power of the Latins no longer extended to the Anatolian coast. Nevertheless, their commercial influence, though diminished, seems to have been uninterrupted.

There is no definitive proof for it, but in all likelihood the presence of Latin and perhaps even Frankish resident merchants in Izmir survived the string of Seljukid, Byzantine, Aydınoglu, Timurid and Ottoman takeovers. Mercantile evidence apart, as much is also suggested by the existence of privileges awarded the Venetians and Cyprus by the Seljuks of Rum in 1207, the Genoese by the Byzantines in 1304, the Holy League (i.e. the Papacy, Venice, the Knights Hospitallers and Cyprus) by the Aydınoglus in 1348, and the Genoese and Venetians by the Ottomans starting from the mid-14th century onwards.²⁰² Although Izmir is not explicitly referred to in these documents, the frequency with which it was fought over, was used as a naval (victualing) base, and was maintained as the regional seat of government does signal an unceasing desire to capture it for its commercial riches and implies that the various rulers must have pragmatically protected its commercial routes and ventures in times of military upheaval and administrative transition. It is this pragmatism that accounts for the common practice among all heirs to the Byzantine possessions to confirm the privileges awarded by their predecessors and often to extend them significantly.

Given the continuity of Izmir’s status as commercial center during many otherwise tumultuous stretches of its history, it is fair to assume that the Genoese quarter of 1304 with its loggia, bath, bakery, church and so on was in fact the first incarnation of 17th-century Izmir’s Frenk Mahallesi. Even so, one should take care not to ascribe too much value to the continuity of European trade through Izmir. It would be tempting to construe its history as one of steady growth, promoted by stable resident “foreign” merchant communities somehow impervious to the vicissitudes of the great historical changes that were occurring in the region. In fact, though a general need was felt to protect the city’s international commerce, its masters did not command the full length of the trade routes running through their territories. On their end they could attempt to keep the risks and costs of transport to a minimum and guarantee proper conditions for an uninterrupted flow of commodities, but what happened further along the routes was beyond their control.

²⁰² For the texts here referred to, as well as others, see, e.g., İnalcık, “İmtiyāzāt”, 1182b-83a and throughout. See also Dölger, Regesten 4; and Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatie. There are many corpora of Byzantine, pre-Ottoman and Ottoman privileges, treaties and capitulations and even more discussions of their history. See the bibliographies of the articles cited above for further reference.
Aside from fluctuations in supply and demand, the fortunes of individual European nations trading through Izmir – as elsewhere – also very much depended on the policies of their home governments, not only with regard to commerce but, more decisively, to questions of war and peace. Venice, for instance, spent much of its life as a republic aggressively pursuing absolute mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean. Not content with competing against the Genoese and others for a piece of the trade plying between Western Anatolia and the Levant to the Western Mediterranean seaboard, its ambition was instead to conquer it entirely, entrepots and ports of call included. This drive for imperium naturally put it at odds with Western Anatolian powers, provoking an endless string of wars with their Byzantine, Genoese, Aydinoğlu, and Ottoman competitors. By comparison, Genoa’s more modest policies put it at an advantage where trade with stronger Western Anatolian partners was concerned. While Venice was time and again barred from participating in Izmir’s trade because of its “win or lose all”-attitude, the continued presence of Genoa’s merchants gave it an edge in knowledge of local circumstances and the cultivation of trade networks, which it would use to its advantage as long as its alliance with the Spanish Crown gave it enough leverage to out-trade its rival.

The political and military fortunes of a nation surely had consequences for its capacity to trade on its own terms. At the same time, a reversal of fortune did not necessarily mean the end of a nation’s trade. Halting trade requires more commitment and control than many a modern state can muster (compare, for instance, problems with modern unilateral or even multilateral embargos), let alone any medieval or early modern state could. In a sense, this should not come as a surprise, as trade has a greater claim to eternity than the relatively recent inventions of the empire, the dynastic state or the nation-state. The appropriation of trade nodes, routes and income is central to the process of state formation, the state’s struggle to impose itself and steer and appropriate trade for its own purposes ageless (in our current age of globalization and the multinational this should be more apparent than ever). Consequently, trade with the enemy is of all times and places, and pre-Ottoman and Ottoman Western Anatolia is no exception. Most often,

203 See Lane, Venice, 406-21. Lane, perhaps over-sympathetically, attributes Venice’s drive for Ionian and Morean dominion to the need to prevent future incursions into the Aegean.

204 On Venetian and Genoese trade in the Ottoman emirate see, generally, Fleet, European and Islamic Trade. Herman van der Wee, “Structural changes in European long-distance trade, and particularly in the re-export trade from south to north, 1350-1750”, in: The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) is more concerned with larger trends and structures, and does take the comparison into the 17th century.

though not always, such trade has been illicit – conducted under the cloak of darkness or, by daylight, under flags of other nations.

In the Levant, trading under another nation’s flag typically also meant paying consular fees (consulage) to that nation’s representative and enjoying his protection under a capitulatory regime, which could be regarded as acquiring a second “nationality” abroad. The resultant fluidity in the composition of merchant communities renders unreliable any statements about any given nationalities’ absence from Izmir: as much as they hold true legally and officially, they tell us little about any nationality’s physical presence or absence. This means that our conclusion about the existence and composition of a pre and early-Ottoman “European Izmir” is necessarily couched in fairly general terms, namely that a mostly Genoese merchant community of varying size, and possibly including other Latin and Frankish nationalities, appears to have survived along Izmir’s northern shore amid the tumultuous replacement of the Byzantine by the Ottoman Empire.

The survival of Izmir’s European element meant that as Izmir’s Greek element was absorbed into the expanding Ottoman polity and the city’s inner frontier seemed to dissolve, another element “foreign” to the Ottoman system was there to take its place as “the other”. Thus, the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman shifted to run between the Greek quarter and the European part of the city along the northern shore later called Frank Street (see Map 11).

The Changing Character of the Frontier

Speaking about the polarity between Muslim and non-Muslim being superseded by one between “Ottoman” and “non-Ottoman” can be misleading: it seems to suggest a superseding of religious by national loyalty. In fact attempts at creating a real Ottoman national identity encompassing all the empire’s subjects only date back to the mid-19th century (most notably with the Ottoman Law on Nationality of January 19, 1869), and even then proved unsuccessful. It is equally true, however, that the concept of nationality in the modern sense, and of an international law based on it, was already maturing in Europe at the time we are discussing.206

Just as was the case with the eventual solidification of Ottoman millets, the supersession of religion by nationality as a foundation and embodiment of sovereignty and statehood for now still remained primarily a theoretical proposition, applicable to actual practice in fits and starts as circumstances

dictated. Ages of theoretical refinement, of confrontations with practice and of eventual syntheses lay ahead; and on the ground loyalty would for a long time still be commanded primarily by kin groups, professional associations and religious affiliation. The mindset we clumsily call “early modernity” definitely existed, in 17th-century Europe, and through the flow of people and goods also in the Ottoman world. But as European and Ottoman societies adapted to the economic, social, religious and political challenges of the early modern age through their own versions of early modernity, there was no sudden break with previous organizing mechanisms and systems, or the beliefs and behaviors associated with them. A specifically early modern sensibility, and the institutions through which it thrived and developed, existed side-by-side with what was eventually to be relegated to the past. In an Ottoman setting this might mean that the developing notion of the “nation” as a more restrictive ethnic or sovereign entity might coexist with its corporative interpretation (as with tâifes; “nations”, in the now archaic sense), perhaps even being applied to the very same collective and its members. The chances of this happening of course increased with the cultural distance between the beholders.

As the standardized wording of Ottoman capitulations, diplomas and orders makes clear, the Ottomans considered European representatives first and foremost as members of Christendom (kudvet-i ümera-ı ’l-millet-i ’l-mesihîye), representing the interests of a specific Christian ruler or state (Nederlanda elçisi/konsolosu), as well as advancing those of that nation’s resident merchant community and its protégés (Felemenk gemileri bâyrağ altında yürüyen tüccar tâifesî or Nederlanda ve ona tab’i olan bazergan tâifesî).207 This Ottoman perspective (and the capitulatory system it engendered) could accommodate European diplomats representing the interests of their compatriots residing in Ottoman lands (like millet başısı), and even their simultaneously serving those of the foreign states they served (as proper elçîs). But the realities of Ottoman-European contact and exchange were infinitely more tangled than this.

Throughout the 17th-century Dutch representatives in Istanbul repeatedly sought from Ottoman court official confirmation of the capitulary article that “The consuls and dragomans who are employed by their ambassador are exempt from tribute, kassabiye-tax and extraordinary taxes (tekalif-i ’örfiyye), as has become usual.”208 Ottoman officials were particularly disinclined to abide by the part where dragomans employed by the Dutch were exempted from harâç.209 They often implicitly or explicitly disputed the legality of Ottoman

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207 See Istanbul, BBA A.DVN.DVE 22/1.
209 Hence the frequency with which reaffirming orders (ferman) to that effect were requested (and obtained) by European representatives. See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684,
“zimmis’ being freed from the very tax that marked their submission to Ottoman dominion, and their enjoying the fiscal and legal privileges extended to Franks while simultaneously remaining under Ottoman rule and relying on Ottoman justice and protection when it suited them. But this was missing the point: the improvised status halfway between Ottoman and European of which these fiscal privileges were part had been intended to enable native diplomatic staff to handle their employer’s sensitive information without fear of undue fiscal, legal (or extra-legal) Ottoman pressure to divulge it. As such, it initially served its purpose well enough.

This perception of functional effectiveness changed as the selling of nominal vice-consulships and dragomanships became standard practice in the second half the 17th century as a result of the intense competition between the European nations for the third-party carrying trade. European representatives’ selling Ottoman diplomas to their Ottoman wholesalers cum brokers cum money-lenders in an attempt to monopolize their trade and local networks unhappily coincided with the privatization, and the Köprülüs’ subsequent maximization and politicization, of the collection of the very same taxes. The tensions around the seemingly practical and mundane question of fiscal liability, brought to the surface by European commercial aspirations and Ottoman administrative developments, in fact had their deeper causes in a series of cultural misconceptions which were at play throughout the tectonics of Ottoman-European contact but which converged on both sides’ diverging classification of communities (socio-economic, professional, religious, fiscal, sovereign, national) and what obligations and rights membership thereof entailed. Consider the example of the Jews of Izmir and their relations with the Dutch:

In 1668 Dutch resident Justinus Colyer reports home that he has obtained an imperial order (ferman) addressed to the customer of Izmir that he is not to collect baraç (çizye) from the brokers of the Dutch nation. During this period, the brokers to the Dutch nation are invariably Portuguese Jewish subjects of the sultan. As far as Ottoman administration is concerned this double-sorted them into the ethno-religious taife of subject Jews and the professional taife of simbars (middlemen/brokers). Membership in both is officially organized and marked by fiscal and legal obligations and entitlements determined and explicitly conferred by Ottoman censuses and diplomas. Crucially, the order must have mentioned dragomans instead of brokers (as countless others do, and don’t, respectively). In reporting back home Colyer attempted

64a-65a: additional privileges obtained during Dutch resident Justinus Colyer’s first audience with substitute grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 6 August 1668; and The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088: Inventory of fermans etc. regarding the Dutch nation, 1690-1709.

210 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a.
to cover up that the nominal dragomans he arranged this confirmation for were in fact his nation’s brokers: he did not want to over-inform the home authorities about the risky business of reselling Dutch protection and Ottoman tax-exemption.

However reliant they were on their Jewish dragomans and brokers financially, diplomatically and commercially – and although, perhaps out of sheer economic necessity, they had a higher tolerance for them than their fellow-Franks – individual Dutch nations nevertheless preferred to give them the minimum protection they required and to stop far short of letting them into their nation and having them partake in national decisions or enjoying Dutch legal and fiscal privileges fully. It must in fact have been clear to all concerned (be they Ottoman, Jewish, or Dutch) that a nationalization of middlemen was not in anyone’s interest and, in any case, forbidden by Ottoman law. The downside of this flexible and oblique arrangement was that neither side was exactly sure how neutral and/or trustworthy those men in the middle really were. Nor was it clear whether these berat-holders (*beratlıs*) were the nations’ clients or, in fact, their patrons.

In this respect, it is telling that Dutch consul Van Dam expressed worries that Izmir’s Jewish leadership was attempting (and with some success) to fully subject the Dutch consul and merchants to its own interests. What’s more, failure to comply with the commercial demands of the Jewish nation would frequently be retaliated with a “battelation”, i.e. a formal embargo by the city’s Jewish community. Such embargoes were so detrimental to Dutch interests that they were considered unbearable and to be avoided or cut short at any cost. Their influence over the flow, conditions, and composition of Ottoman-Dutch trade begs the question whether Izmir’s Jews were really just buying and selling in the service of the Dutch, or if it would be closer to the truth to claim that the Dutch carried trade for the Jews in exchange for a cut of the extra profit they made from trading under the Dutch capitulations.

For the Dutch, it always remained to be seen to which nation and justice the Jews of Izmir would turn to achieve their aims. Would it be to the Jewish, to the Dutch, or to the Turkish? Seen from the Dutch point of view, Jewish loyalty was first and foremost to the Jewish *taife*, which the Dutch almost considered to be at once an ethno-religious grouping and a professional association – one that had Dutch affairs in a stranglehold and could and would manipulate them if it was in the community’s interest. It would seem Izmir’s Jews considered their statuses as Dutch protégés and Ottoman

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211 Disdainfully adding “as it is in the habit of doing with its own people”: The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677.

212 For instances of embargoes, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677; and The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677.
subjects as supplementary, and only truly relevant in so far as they impacted their fiscal, commercial and legal affairs. Indeed their attachment to the Dutch nation or their Ottoman overlords was not sentimental or principled; such adherence was strictly reserved for (and claimed by) their own tightly organized community.

It was within this context of national meanings and attitudes that, in February 1677, the Dutch consul to Izmir Jacob van Dam received a petition by the Jewish creditors of his nation demanding their outstanding loans to be repaid immediately. Since the document was not in Dutch but in a *pidgin* form of Italian used by all nations in the Levant for international communication (as a *lingua franca*), it was apparently intended for broader dissemination and/or reuse outside the Dutch nation. The loans with which it dealt, by now amounting to 7,254.50 Lion Dollars, had been taken out from 1671 to forward representative expenses that Izmir’s Dutch merchants had not been willing and/or able to meet, particularly in light of the near-annihilation of Dutch Levant trade during the Dutch War of 1672-1678 (with England, France, Cologne, and Munster). The Jewish creditors in question were “Abraham Leon, Efraim Arditte, Nisim and Jeuda Amatto, and Haim Algranatte, sons of Ishac Algranatte, Hebrew merchants of this place”, all of them Portuguese-Jewish Ottoman subjects of Izmir and in all likelihood Dutch protégés.213

Shortly after the initial Algranatte/Amatto-petition Van Dam was handed a memorandum by the Jewish creditors, adding that non-compliance would force them to bring the matter to the local *kadi*'s court.214 Their willingness to do so and their warning against it are illustrative of three attitudes that

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213 The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Haim Algranatte, Jehuda Amatto and Nisim Amatto to Jacob van Dam, undated [shortly before or on 10 February 1677]. The Algranatte, Amatto and Arditte in this correspondence are more commonly referred to as Algranati, Amato and Ardit – all still current names in Izmir and beyond (cf. Mathilde Tagger, “Epitaphs of the Rabbis from Izmir (Smyrna)” (July 2001), *Turkey in Laniado's Book (17th-19th Century)*, http://www.sephardicstudies.org/pdf/Laniado.pdf (accessed 16 June 2011). Prior to this offensive by the creditors, and as soon as a Dutch convoy of significant size finally managed to make it to Izmir again, a sizeable part of the debt had already been partitioned by Van Dam and Colyer, and disputed by the Izmir nation. The partitioning, per the consignments aboard the convoy under Engel de Ruyter (which arrived in Izmir on 30 August 1675, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 13 September 1675), directed letters of exchange to be handed over to “Abraham de Leon et Efraim Arditi” and to “Nissim et Juda Amatos” for 1,000 and 2,100 Lion Dollars respectively, see The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 7 October 1677. Another “Algranate” is mentioned in consul Van Dam’s correspondence with the States General, when he recounts how one of the merchants of his nation (by the name of Jacob van Crayestejn) had met with accidental death while secretly fleeing Izmir because of his debt to Joseph Algranat, see The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Van Dam to States General, 8 April 1679. Ardit family members also figure as English protégés in 1702/3, cf. Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 246n65.

214 The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677.
typically motivated and underlied crosscultural contact in Izmir: firstly, that the Jewish creditors felt secure enough as Ottoman subjects to bring to Turkish justice a case against the Dutch that did not necessarily require its intervention from a jurisdictional point of view (since it involved non-Muslims only and might therefore have been settled in any consular or Jewish court); secondly, that neither party trusted the other’s national justice enough to rely on it decisively, and that neither national justice was expected to rule objectively in such high stakes cases; and thirdly, that the kadi’s court (mahkeme), representing the ultimate law of the land, would predictably rule in favor of those holding adequate written proof supported by credible witnesses (here; the Jewish creditors and their nation) without paying too much interest to the relative status or power of the parties or to secondary evidence or testimony – which discouraged clandestine trading and ensured that the European nations avoided Turkish justice as much as they could for fear of inadvertently inviting further official scrutiny of their affairs.

The matter that brought the issue of the old debt to a head was the total breakdown of wider commercial relations between the Jews and Dutch of Izmir over the tariff according to which the latter were to tax the former for their consignments with them. The Jews were unconvinced that the Dutch consul indeed extended them considerable courtesy (courtoisie) and taxed their goods for consular and ambassadorial duties at a significantly lower rate of one to two-thirds of that paid by the merchants of his own Dutch nation under the old tariff.215 As a result, the Jews had refused to pay consulage over their latest consignments and demanded Van Dam show them the concept of the new tariff that the Directorate had sent over for annotation. The consul defended himself saying that in applying the old tariff with courtesy he had followed common practice as he had found it upon his arrival, and that he would tax them according to the new tariff if and when it had been formalized. But in the meantime the Dutch had in fact already begun applying the concept tariff to their own trade, while taxing the Jews as of old.216 Van Dam’s high-handed final opinion was that the Jews had no ground to complain and should simply be glad to be allowed to enjoy Dutch protection because their trading under the Dutch flag already saved them 2% to 4% in Ottoman customs duties (because of the capitulatory privilege reducing their customs rate to 3%).

215 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677: “Memorie of notitie hoedanigh de coopluyden van onse Nederlantsche natie en die van de Joodsche natie tot Smirna de Ambassaet en conculaetrechten van de onderstaende goederen hebben betaelt, waerbij blijkt hoeveel, het differeert dat die van de voorsz. Joodsche natie minder daervoor hebben betaelt, en gevolgellijck meer courtoisie hebben genoten als de voorn. onse natie”.

216 See The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 29 August 1676.
The Jewish protégés responded by registering their protest against this discriminatory and unlawful practice in the chancery of the English consul, and by having their communal authorities declare an embargo against the Dutch. This fourth Jewish *batellation* against the Dutch in under ten years completely halted Dutch trade in Izmir precisely at the time it had finally started to return.217 With Dutch buying, selling and shipping completely halted because of the embargo by his nation’s Jewish wholesalers, brokers and financiers, Van Dam fell back on his trademark undiplomatic pigheadedness and retreated into an exasperated and righteous indignation, perhaps hoping the Jews would lift their boycott as soon as the Dutch spring convoy sailed onto the horizon.

Apparently the consul had unwisely underestimated the importance his Jewish protégés attached to percentage points of fiscal advantage gained or lost, as he had the swiftness and heaviness of the influence they could wield back home. A mere two and a half months after they had turned to the English to register their complaint, the nation’s creditors handed Van Dam a severe reprimand and resolution by the States General concerning his treatment of them. This order of 21 December 1676 was not sympathetic justice. It showed that the Jewish protégés knew perfectly well how to mobilize their interests over vast stretches of Europe, via Italy, and all the way to the coast of the North Sea. They had managed to obtain a formal complaint from the Grand Duke of Tuscany (on behalf of the influential Jewish community of Livorno) and had arranged for Amsterdam’s wealthiest Jewish merchant Jacob de Pinto to take up their cause and have the DLH and the States of Holland and West-Friesland lodge a formal complaint with the States General on their behalf.218

Having remained oblivious to the forces that had been aligned against him back home (due to a considerable lapse in the relaying of correspondence), Van Dam was caught completely off-guard by the reprimand and responded with a sincerely emotional yet shockingly disrespectful reply to the States-General. In it he vehemently defended himself against the complaints made by Jacob de Pinto of Amsterdam on behalf of the Jews of Izmir to the effect that he unjustly treated them as third-party shippers on Dutch vessels. Dismayed by the highest Dutch authority’s bending to outside pressure at the cost of its own representative abroad, he stressed how Izmir’s Jews controlled Dutch trade as *Ottoman* subjects and with full *Ottoman* backing. Going on to explain that they had expected to be included in the new tariff on equal footing with “Christian subjects of our lands”, but had found to have been categorized by Dutch authorities as foreign merchants shipping with the Dutch, Van Dam surmised that their complaint – far from being

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217 See *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 February 1677.
218 See *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 21 August 1677.
provoked – served only their own particular interests without reckoning with the interests of the United Provinces, or with those of its respective Jewish inhabitants. According to Van Dam, the disloyal and self-serving attitude of Izmir’s Jews was exemplified by their demanding fiscal treatment as Dutch nationals, while also simultaneously and continuously attempting to get the utmost from their association with the Dutch by calling upon Ottoman authorities to the detriment of Dutch national interests.219

The States General in their turn responded by giving Van Dam permission to leave his post and return to Holland to speak in his own defense (unfortunately for Van Dam they subsequently retracted this permission for fear that he would leave too many loose ends and would fail to return to his post).220 None of this, however, forestalled their second formal reprimand to Van Dam, which was issued 12 July 1677.221 In the meantime, the Dutch nation’s Jewish creditors still had nothing to show for their efforts but a lot of unrest within Dutch ranks. Which is why on 21 August 1677 they again threatened to go to the kadi if the nation’s debt of 7,254.50 Lion Dollars was not promptly settled.222

Stuck in Izmir without any prospect of defending himself in person, Van Dam on 22 October 1677 offered the States General another emotional but informed written defense. In it he (presciently, as we will see later on) warned them not to overextend their protection of Ottoman Jews lest it might appear to the Ottomans as an attempt to nationalize its subjects (and their wealth). I will here reproduce part of his plea (in my translation) because it touches directly upon the problem of nationality in crosscultural affairs in the early modern Ottoman Empire:

Meanwhile I feel obliged to stress beforehand, as a loyal minister should, my fear that it will prove perilous for some Jews, born to this country and thereby being reyas or subjects of the Grand Turk, to be admitted to our protection and thereby to be allowed to enjoy the privileges enshrined in our capitulation, most specifically concerning the payment of customs, which is what they covet most, as was told to me a while ago by one of the most notable Jews

219 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to States General, 20 April 1677. That Van Dam was not exaggerating the measure of control his Jewish protégés could exert, nor their willingness to halt Dutch trade or their closeness to Ottoman authorities, is corroborated by Daniel-Jan de Hochepied, Antoine Galland and others. De Hochepied, in touching upon the controversy, explains that “each Dutch raggion (company) has 2 to 4 Jewish brokers that exclusively handle their business” (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a), a service they could only perform by virtue of their status as Ottoman merchants, Dutch protégés and holders of berats detailing the rights and obligations of both. See Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 141-42.

220 See The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam, Johan Calckoen and Dutch Nation of Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 28 July 1677 to 22 December 1677; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 36a.


222 See The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 21 August 1677.
here, that he wanted to acquire our protection for that reason alone, because he and his nation were being severely maltreated by the customer, while still having to pay 6-7% for their goods, where our nation only pays 3%, so that I fear that the customer here will oppose this on his own strength, or will write Constantinople to say that this state of affairs hurts the Grand Turk's treasury as far as his income from customs is concerned, which might well invite an avanía, especially since the Turkish ministers are looking for ways to levy avanías from the Franks (Christians), and the more so this vizier, who is very covetous.\footnote{The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to States General, 22 October 1677 (reproduced here as Appendix 2, document 9).}

In the end Van Dam was forced to stay on for another ten years, overseeing repayment of this and the nation’s many other debts as Dutch trade with Izmir continued to pick up. Yet the problematic relation between protection and nationality remained unsolved. (In a way it survived into our modern age, which saw the unilateral Ottoman abolition of the capitulations in September 1914, their forced restoration by the Allies in August 1920 in the Treaty of Sévres, the violent disentanglement of Izmir’s nationalities with the city’s destruction by fire in September 1922, and finally the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923.) This is not to say that attempts were not repeatedly made to determine and fix the boundary between protection and nationality, but the documentary record certainly merits the conclusion that all parties concerned (European consular authorities, protégés, Ottoman administration) were less than consistent in their attitudes toward either status and the grey areas in between – perhaps because such clarity allowed too little room for local manoeuvering.

A case in point is an inventory of Ottoman imperial orders (fermans) regarding the Dutch issued from 1690 through 1709. The first orders restate the principle that no Ottoman customs may be demanded from consular staff (including dragomans; i.e. beraths/protégés) and that no poll-tax may be demanded from native staff. Then, in 1694, the Dutch request and obtain an Ottoman order to the effect that “Portuguese Jews, after having resided in Ottoman lands for longer than a year, have to pay duties and customs as subjects of the land”, signaling that the Dutch authorities had made up their minds and intended to draw a hard line between its own Portuguese subjects and their relations in the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of the territorial fluidity within the said Jewish community. National sovereignty was clearly catching up with ethno-religious group identities as a determinant of legal status. Still, all the following orders collected in the inventory are blanket restatements of the previous orders that no customs and poll-tax may be demanded or collected from any Dutch berath.\footnote{The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088. In his 1975 dissertation, Necmi Ülker refers to the original Ottoman transcript of the ferman in Istanbul, BBA MH 108 (AH 1107 / AD 1695/96): Ülker, \textit{Rise of Izmir}, 232.}
The case of the Jews and Dutch of Izmir (and Amsterdam) perfectly illustrates the diverse interpretations and interactions of the concepts of protection (professional and religious) and nationality (ethno-religious, geographical, and sovereign) at play in an early modern center of crosscultural trade like Izmir. Throughout the period, and between all Izmir’s European and minority communities (whether Jewish, Armenian, Greek, or Dutch, English, French, Italian) similar discussions were taking place (though not necessarily as pronounced as the one in our example). Both the European and the Ottoman states appear to have been looking for a mutually accepted delineation between communities whose members they considered subjects (or even just preferred trading partners\textsuperscript{225}), to discover time and again that the individual “subjects” (or “partners”) in question were increasingly adept at slipping past their national (or monopolistic) constructs.

As we have seen, such exceptional room as the convergence of historical acceleration and cultural distance created could lead to many misunderstandings. These were not necessarily destructive; not for the states on either side (because their commerce depended on able middlemen whether they liked it or not), and certainly not for the middlemen in question. Belonging to one, or more often, several “nations” or \textit{taife}s and being aware of the way in which the meanings attached to those categorizations shifted and multiplied across time and geography could carry a lot of promise for someone plying between cultures. By purposefully framing either side’s understanding of the other, their relations, and his role in them in terms advantageous for his trade the middleman could carve out a narrative space between them that was his to inhabit and thrive in. In the words of Richard White, who invented “the Middle Ground” as a specific field of socio-historical analysis, in an explanation of behavior that neatly applies to the utilization of various interpretations of the concept of “nation” by Ottoman-European middlemen:

\begin{quote}
By middle ground I meant, I realized in ways that I did not fully grasp when writing the book, two twinned things. First, I was trying to describe a process that arose from the willingness “of those who … [sought] to justify their own actions in terms of what they perceived to be their partner’s cultural premises.” Such actors sought out cultural congruencies, either perceived or actual.” These “often seemed – and, indeed, were results of misunderstandings or accidents.” Such interpretations could be ludicrous, but it did not matter. “Any congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to work and take on a life of its own if it is accepted by both sides.” This was and is a process of mutual and creative misunderstanding.\textsuperscript{226}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{225} See, \textit{e.g.}, Dutch demands that “all foreign nations, coming to enjoy Dutch protection, should address [the Dutch consul] in writing and therein declare to adhere to that protection and renounce all others” (my translation): The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674.

Such strategic dissimulation, even if it used instead of openly resisted the mindsets and conditions of the larger collectives to which allegiance was still owed, is typically what early modernity had to offer in the way of individualism.227

Mostly disingenuous but sometimes blatant, individualism such as this was an increasingly available alternative to assume in the “unimaginable chaos” of identity that marked the transition from the Middle Ages to modernity.228 If that is the diagnosis for Europe’s heartlands, it is not surprising that the condition was even more pronounced in further-off centers of European trade like Izmir. Although contemporary and pre-WWII sources mostly hide it to present a city neatly segregated along communal or national lines, historical evidence indicates that a willfully constructed, maintained and elaborated social, economic, legal-administrative cross-over zone that — within boundaries — permitted individuals considerable leeway did in fact exist beneath the deliberately constructed dominant narrative of organized and policed segregation so often attested to. This mental middle ground comprised three fields of structural crosscultural interaction: inter-European, European-Ottoman non-Muslim, and European-Ottoman Muslim.

In the first field, due to physical proximity and cultural similarity, interaction was intense in all spheres, in the form of social, economic and legal-administrative cooperation and competition. It was not unusual for consuls of one nation to simultaneously take on representational tasks for others.229 Resident or passing Europeans who were not automatically sorted under a specific nation’s diplomatic authority through the automatic protection of a capitulation freely sought that of any they preferred.230 This spirit of mutual


229 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 122: cover of the folder (Francesco Lupasoli is appointed chancellor to the Dutch consulate of Izmir); and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668 (the Dutch nation is informed of the likelihood that their chancellor Lupasoli might be hanged for being a Venetian spy, and request his dismissal). Cf. O. Schutte, *Repertorium der Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers, residerende in het buitenland: 1584-1810* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 302-80.

230 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 13 September 1675 (concerning the protection of the Danish subject “Marco di poco Broes”, elsewhere in the correspondence referred to as “Mattio de la Broen” and “Marco di P.sz Broen”); The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 4 December 1676 (in which Dutch resident Colyer discusses the delivery of the child of one Abraham Meijer, “a Swissman, who acting as factor for a number of Dutch merchants, incurred a considerable bankruptcy on their account, and for that reason moved from Dutch jurisdiction to French protection”); and id.: John Finch to Justinus Colyer, 22 October 1677 (where English ambassador John Finch complains to his Dutch colleague about consul Van Dam affording protection to a Venetian bankrupt by the
politeness (with the occasional violent aberration) was generally also in evidence during official occasions, festivities and outings.231 What was accepted for persons, was even more common for ships, and doubly so for goods: ships routinely changed flags *en route*, and often sought the protection of other nations’ fleets.232 Considering that foreigners’ (*forastiere*) goods made up a large part of any cargo leaving Izmir, it made sense for all fleets to award any friendly ship additional protection when needed.233

name of Pizzimano, previously denied any further Venetian and, shortly before also, French protection). As for visiting travelers registering with consular authorities on arrival (a practice called “immatriculation”): although they commonly did so with the consul of their own nation (see De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 22: immatriculates with Dutch consul Jacob van Dam; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b: *idem*; and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 71: immatriculates with French consul Henri Dupuy) this was not without exception (see, e.g., Dumont, *Nouveau voyage*, 271 (immatriculates with Dutch consul Daniel-Jan de Hochepied)).

231 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 151: Daniël-Jan de Hochepied’s and Cornelis de Bruyn’s descriptions of the Dutch and French nations’ joint celebration of the Peace of Nijmegen. For Izmir’s Dutch treasurer’s complaint about the excessive costs involved, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 22 January 1679. On an Anglo-Dutch excursion to Ephesus, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23a-b; and De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 28-34. On intermingling in the countryside, where all nations held summer residences *cum* hunting lodges, see, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Nicolas Legouche in Jacob van Dam’s chancery, 14 August 1674 (although this and the following documents deal with the violent consequences of a dispute between members/protégés of the French and Dutch nations). Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 133 also mentions the Anglo-French violence of Easter 1678.

232 Cf, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676: *Particuliere aantekeningen en briefwisselingen van leden van de familie De Hochepied; afschriften van stukken betreffende algemene politieke aangelegenheden, betreffende de Nederlandse politiek in de Levant en betreffende het consulaat in Smyrna, verzameld door de consul Daniel Jan de Hochepied; verzameling afschriften van stukken betreffende de Levantse handel in het algemeen, betreffende de internationale politiek, alsmede van brieven, ontvangen en verzonden door de Nederlandse consul te Smyrna en van akten van de Nederlandse kanselarij aldaar, 1611-1685.* This reconstruction of Dutch consular archives (shortly after their loss in the 1688-earthquake) by De Hochepied contains much valuable and scarce information — among which a 1676-memorandum by the DLH detailing Dutch shipping with Izmir from 1668 to 1671 (i.e. during its greatest success, just prior to the Dutch War of 1672-1678); and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 25 September 1679 (Dutch treasurer Jacobus van der Merct commenting on the departure of the latest Dutch convoy, taking one English and two French vessels along).

233 See, e.g., *id.*: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 10 December 1674 (on English ship *The Hunter*, or *Il Cacciatore*, being taken by Tripolitan corsairs, and the subsequent requests for restitution and compensation lodged with English consul Paul Rycaut, among which a large claim by Dutch factor François Schregels – the (mis)handling of which prompts Van Dam to add that this is part of the reason why the English have lost the profitable carrying trade to the Dutch); *id.*: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675 (in which Van Dam complains that all cargo off the last English convoy, whether it be French, Dutch, Venetian, Genoese, Jewish, or Armenian, has been taken to customs and kept there, the English treating the Dutch as if they were subjects of the sultan); *id.*: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 29 August 1676 (in which the Dutch treasurer of Izmir calculates the consular duties
But inter-European contact in Izmir was not limited to business and pleasure, it was equally pervasive in both the most exalted and the most prosaic spheres of life. Both religious establishments, menial employment and shops along the eastern (landward) side of Frank Street provided ample occasion for structural inter-European contact.\(^{234}\)

The image of this outpost of multinational yet heavily integrated European civilization along Ottoman Izmir’s bay proved highly seductive to contemporaries (and moderns), who often got caught up in the romance of a miniature outpost of Western values and practices doggedly resisting a full Ottoman embrace. As a result, too little has been made not only of the frequency and depth of European contact with Ottoman non-Muslims and Muslims, but also of the specifically Levantine social and cultural forms these communities embraced and shared in order to be able to interact and move around as smoothly as possible. This middle ground of language, dress, social norms and commercial practices was a delicate mix of Italian and Turkish forms, modes and styles. Inherited from the Latin communities that pre-dated the Ottoman conquest of Anatolia, the Black Sea and the Aegean (i.e. the Levantines), this Levantine way was the proven commercial and cultural standard to which, until well into the 19th century at least, all newcomers had to adjust as rapidly as possible to survive and thrive as Westerners in the Ottoman world. The adjustment was not necessarily a difficult or halfhearted one – as much is gathered from the enthusiasm with which especially Dutch merchants employed and stuck with Italianized versions of their names (even in letters home), their easy conversion to Mediterranean tastes in food, drink and interior decoration, and the apparent ease with which they switched between Turkish and formal European and Sunday dress and, one might add, habits and morals (although the French appear to have been more steadfast in their sumptuary preferences – being known for always going about as French gentlemen, and as a consequence continually having their tricombe hats knocked off their heads by Muslim varmints).\(^{235}\)

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\(^{234}\) See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 24a (where De Hochepied says that “most artisans or workers used by the Franks … are most all French subjects, native to Marseilles and its surroundings” (my translation)) and a similar statement on 39a; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 114 (on the French nation of Izmir “Il y a de plus 40 ou 50 familles qui font au moins 160 personnes: de gens tenant auberge, médecins, apothicaires, chirurgiens, barbiers, tailleurs, cordonniers. J’y ai vu aussi deux médecins qui ne sont pas mariés. Il y en a de plus une vingtaine qui ne sont pas mariés tant tailleurs que cordonniers et cuisiniers, qui sont la plupart au service des Anglais et des Hollandais.”); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b; and Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-27 (on Frank Street’s three Roman Catholic churches – Jesuite, Capuchin, and Franciscan – and their mixed congregations and protectors).

\(^{235}\) See, e.g., throughout The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124, where the members of the Dutch nation often sign with Italianized versions of their names (a few, in italics, consistently sticking
In discussing the cultural flexibility of European merchants whose successful business kept them in Izmir (and Istanbul) for years on end, we have automatically arrived at the second field of crosscultural contact making up Izmir’s mental middle ground; that between European and Ottoman non-Muslim. It will be apparent from the foregoing and the following pages and chapters that contact between the two was intense in the professional sphere (in trade, retail and services) – but not only there. European merchants spending many years, and often the rest of their lives, in Izmir and Istanbul often became fully integrated in Levantine society. Naturally, these men were not only well at home in their brokers and wholesalers businesses and homes, but as a consequence also in their wider quarters, inns, taverns and

to the Dutch spelling however): Marco di Pietro Broen, Giovanni Calkoen, Christoffel Capoen, Giovanni Charelles, Abraham en Daniel Cosson, Jacob en Henrico van Craijesteijn, Giovanni Eiigelis, Benedetto Gluck, Adriano Groeninx, Dionis Houset, Arnout Kerkrinek, Cornelio van Laer, Giovanni Lepla, Gasparo de Lespaul, Guglielmo Marcquis, Henrico Mesteecker, Giovanni de Moll, Cornelio van Persijn, Pietro van de Poel, Guiglielmo van Pradelles, Philippo van der Sanden, Francois and Galenus de Schregel, Daniel de Slaemdeler, Guglielmo Slaers, Huberto Snellewaert. That this was not common practice among Dutch (Levant) merchants in general or within specific merchant families, may be inferred from The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 219b-220a: a petition by Amsterdam’s Levant merchants to the States General. The petition figures many fathers and elder brothers of Izmir’s Dutch merchants, who sign their names in proper Dutch spelling. See, e.g., Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 146-49; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 27-28 on the consumption of Izmir’s Franks. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 151 on the food and drink served in the double feast thrown by the Dutch and the French to celebrate the Peace of Nijmegen. See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 43b and 77b-80b, highlighting both the advantages (in moving about beyond non-Muslim areas) and discrete disadvantages (offending Muslims) of going about a la turca (while behaving as Christians). See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Willem Theijls in Justinus Colyer’s chancery, 18 November 1681, details the Italian-Dutch-Turkish interior of the house of Van Breen, as well as his keeping of slavegirls, his family life, his Turkish dress, his Sunday dress, and so on; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 121-22 speaks of 23 Dutch Izmir merchants, of which 3 are married to local women; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 13 March 1678, on the 3 Dutch Istanbul merchants married locally; and, id.: Justinus Colyer to States General, 6 July 1678, on the problem of protecting merchants married to local women. See, e.g., Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 315 and 334, on European merchants use of prostitutes and concubines (315): “Plusieurs de nos Francs qui craignent le sous Bachi, en ont puis de cette sorte [temporary marriage licenses obtained upon payment to the kadi], car il n’y a pas de sureté ici à voir les filles de joye, quant même elles seroient Grecques, les Turcs étant la dessus tout-à-fait intraitables. Je ne sçay quelle raison les fait agir, car ils ne croyent point du tout que la simple fornicaition soit un peché, & toutefois ils ne soufrent pas un lieu public; le sous Bachi en fait une recherche si exacte, qu’il ne lui en échaperoit pas un, & quant il surprend un homme sur le fait, il faut qu’il finance, & considerably, autrement les coups de bâton jouent leur jeu. Quant à la pauvre malheureuse, on l’a fait promener par la Ville, montée sur un âne, avec une tripe de boeuf au cou, le visage tourné vers le derrière de la bete, & tenant la queue à la main au lieu de la bride, après quoi elle est vendue esclave au premier acheteur. Accord. De Bruyn, Reizen, 154, on, respectively, temporary marriage (kelvin) and “The treachery of the Greeks. The head-tax for male children. The faults of Greek women. The dangers of Franks consorting with them. The punishment of Greek women prostituting themselves.” 158
brothels (as vice versa). Intermarriage also was not uncommon: almost invariably with Ottoman Greeks, never with Jews and almost never with Armenians (although “Greek” sometimes figured as shorthand for all non-Jewish and non-Armenian Ottoman Christians). 236

The third field, that of structural interaction between Izmir’s European Christians and Ottoman Muslims, is at once the most and the least visible of the three. Official relations between the two are well documented, as in audiences and other national presentations with the city’s kadi and other officers and administrators (legal and administrative interventions and protests, the giving of presents upon festive occasions, and so on). 237 On the other extreme, and barely leaving a trace in the sources, we encounter private relations between Europeans and Ottoman Muslims: acquaintances, friendships

236 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b, on Izmir’s Venetian consul Lupasoli having married locally; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 13 March 1678, on François de Brosses, Jan van Breen en Jan Croesen (Dutch merchants of Istanbul) having done the same, as well as on the many local wives of the French; idem: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678, on Colyer’s Dutch doctor Henning Wolde’s local wife; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 25a-b, on Samuel Pentlow (English merchant of Izmir)’s local wife; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 115, on the French Capuchin parish where “c’est ordinairement le père supérieur qui fait les fonctions paroissiales, et qui fait le prêne en grec vulgaire pour se faire entendre aux femmes, qui sont presque toutes du pays, quoique mariées à des Français ou à d’autres Francs …”. The “local” wives of Jan van Breen, his partner François de Brosses, and Jan Croesen are identified (throughout The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 01.03.01 98, 1.02.20 1060 and 1.03.01 124) as Elisabeth Violier, Laïsa Violier, and Maria Violier, all daughters of master watchmaker Jean-Pierre Violier of Geneva (“Jean Pierre VIOLLIER (1618-)” (21 September 2008), Société Genevoise de Généalogie, http://www.gen-gen.ch/?a=20&p=473&Perma=1&IndFN=Jean+Pierre&IndLN=VIOLLIER&OrigIndID=71839&BYearFrom=1618&BYearTo=1618 (accessed 5 June 2011)), and in any case not Greeks (although often referred to as such). A register of marriages, contracted in private houses by the ministers of all European representatives, includes two marriages of Jean-Pierre’s (the first marriage by Samuel Roger, chaplain to English ambassador John Finch, the second by Dutch minister Eduard Danckertsz), testifying to the enduring interwovenness of the Swiss watchmakers of Istanbul (subjects of the sultan) and the capitulatory nations. On the Greek wife of Samuel Pentlow, and the trouble she encountered upon her husband’s demise because of their house in the Greek quarter and her status as an Ottoman subject, see my “Towards Classifying Avanias”. On European-Greek prostitution and concubinage, see note 235.

237 See, e.g., The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b-23a, on an audience of the Dutch nation with the Kadi of Izmir concerning the taking of provisions by the Dutch Smyrna-fleet; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 29 December 1677; id.: “discrepant thirteen” of the Dutch Nation of Izmir to DLH, 13 December 1677, on consul Van Dam’s preparations to repatriate, including the formal presentation of his self-appointed substitute (Johan Calkoen) to the kadi, and the other nations’ congratulations on the occasion; id.: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 30 April 1679, being an account of Dutch consular duties (and their expenditure towards salaries and presents for dragomen, Janissary guards and Ottoman officials) from 1675 to 1679; accord., for the English nation, Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 224n48, listing presents made upon the arrival of an English convoy to Izmir’s kadi, customer, governor, naip, Greek metropolitan, castle guardian, reyvoda, Janissary chief, mufît, and three ayan.
and familial relations.\textsuperscript{238} Obviously, there existed a large grey area between these sub-fields of European-Ottoman Muslim contact; that of wheeling and dealing. Here, Europeans and Ottomans fused the professional and the private to mutually strengthen and support professional and private relations. This is where clients, employees, servants and slaves became advisors, investors, friends, and patrons – where the principal character of relationships was invested with added meanings to make them as complete and inseverable as possible. To those trying to control what was happening on the ground this was a zone of corruptibility and immorality, to those on the ground in Izmir (and Istanbul, and Aleppo, and elsewhere) it was that of commercial reality and necessity.\textsuperscript{239} Lest we imagine the heart of Izmir’s mental middle ground as an idyllic harmony, it was in fact a place of rampant illegality and bribing: all European sources from Izmir testify to continuous efforts of every European nation to have Ottoman officials allow all manner of illicit dealings (smuggling, theft, prostitution, coining, and so on), as they do to Ottoman

\textsuperscript{238} As glimpsed in, e.g., North, \textit{Life}, where comings and goings at the English embassy are discussed in some detail; Galland, \textit{Journal}, records many passing acquaintances and persistent friendships with Ottoman Muslims; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124, throughout the folder detailing the disputes of 1672, 1674 and 1675 between consul Van Dam and his nation, where we read that Dutch factors Legouche and Van Broen (part of the “disobedient band of 13” that had formed against Van Dam) were lodged in the countryhouse of Izmir’s \textit{voyvoda} in Seydiköy, where they invoked their Ottoman host’s authority when under threat from their own consul (one imagines they, as well as Franks of other nationalities, were also occasionally entertained in the \textit{voyvoda’s köşk} (pavilion) at the far end of Frank Street (see infra)); The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 25a-b, on deceased English merchant Samuel Pentlow’s close friendship with chief customer Hüseyin Ağā.

\textsuperscript{239} See, e.g., Laurent d’Arvieux, \textit{Mémoires} (Paris: C.J.B. Delespine, 1735), i: 125-27 on a comedy performed at the French consulate in 1657, with Muslim families attending; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 19 June 1673, where Colyer requests permission to hire the grand vizier’s private doctor Alexander Mavrocardato as his own; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Mercet to DLH, October 1677, for expenses declared “general” by consul Van Dam, but disputed as being “private” by his nation (presents to his dragomans, to the \textit{kadi}, to the \textit{naip} upon his wedding, to Derviș Ağā, to the sons of Kara Mustafa Paşa, towards bloodmoney for a Turkish mariner found dead on the consul’s doorstep, to the \textit{voyvoda} upon the circumcision of his son); The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: three accounts of Pieter Smout for the years 1672-74 testifying to the merchants regular trade relations with two Muslim merchants; \textit{id.}: Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation Izmir to Justinus Colyer, 14 October 1675, on Derviș oğlan (or; ağā), secretary to the province of Bosnia and “great friend of the nation” offering his services to the Dutch in their attempts to undo the new customs regulations; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 43a, on a Turk living in Kadıkeflake being employed by customer and consuls to look out for ships and announce their imminent arrival; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 1 May 1678, in which Colyer informs the States General that he has hired Alexander Mavrocardato, by now the Porte’s chief dragman, to promote Dutch affairs while away on campaign with the grand vizier; and, \textit{id.}: DLH to States General, 13 September 1679, where they second Mavrocardato’s hiring, complement his past efforts on behalf of the Dutch, and request that the gratuity awarded him not exceed 500 Lion Dollars.
power brokers’ actively seeking rewards in return for the promise of shutting their eyes.

If we observe 17th-century Izmir with questions of individual and group identities in mind, it becomes apparent that its long history as a frontier and a center of crosscultural trade added extra flexibility and options to the relation between individual and nation, to relations between individuals from different nations, and to relations amongst nations. This historically determined flexibility with regard to individual and group nonconformity had served the city, its merchants and their home governments (in Istanbul/Edirne as in Europe’s capital cities) well as long as the latter did not manage to truly project their jurisdiction to Izmir’s quays. That is; as long as rules were made in the centers and it was left up to local culture and initiative to deal with, around or without them to everyone’s satisfaction.

But from around the middle of the 17th-century, when cities, dynasties and states were starting to settle into a new balance after the manifold challenges of the long 16th century, they increasingly came to view such crosscultural freewheeling as a challenge to their authority and a liability for their mercantilist policies of protectionism and expansion.240 The growing appetite and capability of early modern states for systematically enhancing their sovereignty put a particularly heavy strain on the nations and nationals of Izmir. The marshaling of assets and populations in the service of monetary and territorial expansion not only required further fiscalization and centralization, but also stricter allegiance and obeisance. This limited the opportunity for sincere feedback (voice) from those who had to implement (i.e. live and trade with) policies thought up elsewhere, making it more likely that they would voice their objections by privately disregarding public policies and resisting their practical implementation (a dissimulated exit).241 One of the outcomes of the stress put on the mental middle ground described above was that it became more compact and was hidden from view even further.

The increase in pressure to identify more fully with the needs and wishes of one’s state was most strongly felt among the European communities, who had after all been furthest removed from the power projected by their centers. Until the early 17th century these communities had been pragmatic groupings of merchants centered around whoever, against a modest fee, would and could best protect their interests. Whether these representatives were fellow countrymen or not was of little importance; allegiances could be switched as circumstances dictated and formal organization was minimal. A


Dutchman, for instance, could come from the Spanish or the United provinces and might choose to seek the protection of the Dutch consul, but also that of the Venetian, the French or the English. The choice made could depend on personal preference, religious affiliation or quite simply on the kind, origin and destination of the merchandise he was shipping. Although it proved exceedingly difficult for home governments to change this situation and turn Levant commerce to their own profit and direction (i.e. integrate it into their wider economic policies), they all made continuous and concerted efforts to do so; in the course of the 17th century a barrage of rules, procedures and orders was issued through which the European nations in the Levant were formally (re)constituted and demarcated from each other.242

Efforts at reconstitution and demarcation were not limited to the European communities amongst themselves. A logical next step towards the “nationalization” of the Levant merchants and their trade was demarcating them from the Ottoman context, affirming the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman and securing a designated and increasingly extraterritorialized European zone in Izmir. One method of doing so was through the consistent misinterpretation of the capitulations – regarding them not as revocable privileges awarded by the sultan, but as treaties carving self-administered European enclaves out of Ottoman territory – and the bringing subsidiary administrative rules and measures in line with this interpretation.243 Another was the administrative and moral discouragement of more than polite relations between European merchants and locals.244 The purpose of such inter-

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242 Such as new tariffs (in which the diverging rates paid by nationals and protégés were laid down per commodity), oaths of allegiance to the home authorities and its representatives, procedures detailing where diplomatic assistance was warranted and where not (particularly where national and personal financial liability began and ended, especially in cases in which national lines were blurred by intermarriage or international over-familiarity), and so on: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 32a-35b; Heeringa, Bronnen 2, #59; W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Het ‘in train brengen’ van het in 1675 voor de Levant ontworpen formulier (1675-1680)”, Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/7 (1909). My “Towards Classifying Avanias” compares Dutch and English efforts to limit the liability of their nations, institutions and states for private and professional crosscultural liberties taken by individual merchants. To no surprise, it turned out that separating the private from the professional and the crossculturally modest from the licentious to determine a subject’s right to diplomatic assistance was impractical, if only because in cases where personal or national attachments and losses involved were deemed too great, nations and representatives were strongly inclined to turn their burden (i.e., of cases that had escalated beyond the possibility of local resolvement through silent diplomacy) over to the authorities back home by presenting them as unprovoked injustices brought upon them by the typically untrustworthy, avid and cruel “Turk”.

243 See İnalci, “İmiyyâzât”.

244 In cases where Dutch- or Englishmen who were less than popular with their representatives and/or nations got into trouble that could be attributed to careless or over-ambitious crosscultural enthusiasm, diplomatic and national indifference could be severe. See, e.g., the case of the lethal beating received by secretary to the Dutch embassy François de Brosses (1680) in the Ottoman Imperial Council (see infra), or the unsympathetic representa-
pretations and the resulting measures was, firstly, to prevent the alienation of the subjects and capital of the expatriate community, and, secondly, to make the frontier between Ottoman and non-Ottoman impermeable in all but commercial matters – and then only in one direction, namely that from Ottoman to non-Ottoman. Combined with the first European efforts at protecting Ottoman Christians en masse and at circumventing the controlled Ottoman economic system with its wholesalers and inflexible pricing, these attempts amounted to the European quarter being used as a base of operations for expansion.245

The increasing push and pull exerted by the home governments caused considerable friction in the European communities of Izmir. Their members – some merchant “adventurers” in the truest sense – had grown accustomed to relative freedom from many of the restraints Western society imposed on them. In essence, they had been able to do as they pleased as long as the books were kept in order, as profits were regularly remitted to their principals back home, and as any quarrels with Ottoman officials were solved on the local level. For some, there were not many temptations beyond those of a commercial nature (smuggling, usury, to name but a view) and the promise of their families back home, their religion and culture, and their loyalty and obedience kept them in place.

Many others, though, assumed lifestyles that would have been impossible and unacceptable back home; deviating from their proper social station, abandoning the church, or taking on Ottoman customs. Such individualistic freedoms were not easily abandoned once acquired and made sure that part of the European merchants of Izmir (or Istanbul for that matter) would always respond to the home governments’ pull by pulling back harder. Aside from the unappealing prospect of returning fully to the fold of a nation progressively subdued by all the institutions of state and religion from which they had managed to free themselves, the more independent merchants’ objections were above all practical. The biggest fortunes were to be made by not relying on the consular and commercial system of your nation too much (nor, we should add, too little), by bridging the divide and cultivating alliances with local officials and families beyond the scope of competitors, principals and the state, in short; by not accepting a rigid physical or mental boundary between Ottoman and non-Ottoman.246

245 On the successes and failures of Dutch (and other nations’) attempts to capture Ottoman mohair trade at its source in Ankara, see Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 84-133.

246 This was particularly apparent during the period of greatest Dutch success in Izmir (from around mid-century until the Dutch War of 1672), when more than half of the Dutch
Although merchants’ home states condemned any crossing to the Ottoman side, they welcomed movement in the other direction. As much as they disapproved of European merchants crossing over to become clients of some Greek or Jewish wholesaler, they did approve of Greek or Jewish Ottomans tying themselves to Frank Street.247

The contradiction apparent in attempting to enforce a physical and mental boundary, only to encourage incoming traffic across it, aptly illustrates the requirements of late-17th and 18th-century European policy in the Levant. If the purpose was to enhance sovereignty, jurisdiction and economic control, the method was to extend it over as many people and sources of wealth as possible. In a colonial situation such expansion would typically occur at the cost of a weaker native authority and would be directed outward from a fortified European center, or “factory”. In the Levant, there could be no physical or direct expansion against Ottoman will and all such attempts were necessarily indirect and limited to increasing economic leverage and fostering religious bonds.

In this way, Izmir’s European quarter slowly but certainly became not a base of operations for expeditions into the Ottoman interior, but a commercial and religious center that, instead of focusing on direct economic expansion, increasingly aimed at accumulating jurisdiction and loyalty through protection and greater economic interdependence. This process, however, was only just beginning in the period under discussion here: Louis XIV’s nation systematically evaded consular duties and jurisdiction, and did well by it. See all the Dutch archival series in the bibliography; and W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “De klachten, tusschen 1672 en 1675 ingebracht tegen Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna (1668-1688)”, Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/6 (1907); id., “Het ‘in train brengen’”; id., “De dertien “discreperende” kooplieden te Smirna (1685-1687)”, Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/8 (1910); id., “Een lang uitgestelde reis: episode uit onze Levantschen handel”, Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 5/4 (1917). For the English and the French, see also, generally, North, L’île; Galland, Journal; and the other references supra in the extensive notes (230 through 239).

247 As much is clear from the protection policies of the French, English and Dutch. See (resp.) Ulker, Rise of Izmir, 216: M. Barbier, M. Fouribée, Sr. Zacharie Vulaque, Sr. Mousé Abenassera, Christofy Amira, and Isaac Abenassera (French dragomans of Izmir in 1700); idem, 246n65 (English protégés of Izmir in 1702/3): Paulo di Giorgio, Nicolachi di Luco, Jeanachy di Giorgio, Christopho di Paulo, Cercheis di Sapher, and Zaccaria di Jacob (dragomans), Mose Arditi, Abram Arditi, Babriel di Pietro, and Morat di Avanee (sons of dragomans), Aratoon Sapher (broker to Sercheis Chellabee), Yanny di Luvanis (butler), Dimitreée di Arvas (underbutler), Nicola di Monali (baker), Francesco di Billio (gardener), Marco di Macale (undercook), Georgio di Pietro (undercook), Antonio di Gasaro (lise), Arvas di Mirian (lise), Batista di Giorgio (minister), Antonio de Noir (barber), Giovanni di Crokio (fiddler), and 7 servants to the dragomans; Appendix 2, document 1 (selected dragomans of Izmir in 1671): Constantin Amira (Dutch), Michael Attalas (Venetian), Isaac Berbignan (Dutch), Porlo Homero (English), Spiro di Niccolo (Genoese), Giacomo Sandernara (Dutch); and Appendix 2, document 9 for the Dutch protection of Ottoman Portuguese Jews.
France was as yet the only state to have declared its promotion official policy.\footnote{See notes 51 and 52.} Although the larger European nations in the Levant had always competed with each other for the favors of their districts’ most powerful commercial players and communities, the number of protégés had remained fairly modest as a result of effective Ottoman bureaucratic controls on the Ottoman diplomas arranging protection (berats).\footnote{Maurits van den Boogert has written extensively about Ottoman procedures and controls on protection through Ottoman diplomas (berats) indicating employment by a European representative: \textit{id.}, “European Patronage in the Ottoman Empire: Anglo-Dutch Conflicts of Interest in Aleppo (1703-1755)”, in: Hamilton et al., \textit{Friends and Rivals}; \textit{id.}, “Consular Jurisdiction in the Ottoman Legal System in the Eighteenth Century”, in: \textit{Ottoman Capitulations}; Van den Boogert, \textit{The capitulations}. The Ottomans carefully recorded which nations were provided with how many berats (and often also for whom). However, there were occasional attempts to recall all outstanding berats for verification: these were not aimed at taking stock of an otherwise unknowable amount of berats issued, but rather at uncovering any that were deemed to be held in contravention of a stricter interpretation or change of the legal criteria underpinning their original issuing.} Whether the number of individually protected persons (i.e. beratlıs) went up significantly as European projects for extending and deepening sovereignty gained momentum is doubtful, but it is certain that Louis XIV’s attempts at acquiring French protection over whole nations of Ottoman Christian (i.e. not through individual berats, but through the insertion of new articles in the French capitulations) indeed formed an integral part of his policy towards full French mastery of the Levant trade.\footnote{On French plans for a monopoly on trade (and, therefore, protection) in the Levant, and the Ottomans’ reaction to them, see below under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman control”.

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In considering the drive to increase sovereignty and the impossibility of outright expansion as coming to redefine Izmir’s East-West boundary, we have so far overlooked one crucial aspect: ideology. Relatively closed to Europeans and relatively open to Ottoman Christians and (to a lesser extent) Jews, the physical and mental boundary between Ottoman and European Izmir was near absolute for Ottoman Turks. Although early nationalisms were inclusive when compared to modern-day exclusive (ethnicity-based) interpretations, including Muslims was considered beyond the pale (unless they were Christian converts to Islam wishing to revert) – all the more since it would challenge Ottoman sovereignty to the detriment of European diplomatic and mercantile interests.

As it turns out, the incorporation of the “Community of non-Muslims” into the Ottoman polity, the European quarter’s subsequent assumption of the role of the “other”, and the inherent transformation of Izmir’s East-West divide from one based primarily on religion to one based on nationality did
not fully override the previous situation. Formally, the frontier now separated European and Ottoman, but to many (be they Ottoman Muslim, Ottoman non-Muslim or European) this new divide was above all an echo of the old religious frontier, formal differences notwithstanding.\textsuperscript{251}

The result was complex, and indicative of the shifting identities of early modern Europe: a situation in which there were as many mental and physical frontiers as there were parties involved. First of all, many Europeans and Turks regarded the Christian communities of Ottoman Izmir as a sort of appendage of the European quarter, culturally in any case. These communities themselves, meanwhile, cherished their middlemen-positions in justice as in commerce. Although they will have felt a measure of spiritual affinity with Frank Street’s Christians, most were keenly aware that their advantageous position as European protégés depended first and foremost on their allegiance to the sultan; i.e. on their remaining Ottoman subjects.\textsuperscript{252} Running through the main currents of such group attitudes was a broad range of undercurrents; the diverse attitudes of people living diverse personal and professional lives.

Within the formally clear but otherwise murky setup described above, Izmir’s Jews occupied a particular position, both geographically, administratively, economically and socially.\textsuperscript{253} As we have seen, geographically, the Jewish was the only non-Muslim community incorporated in the Turkish part of the city and as such clearly distinct from the Christian quarters to the north. Administratively, the Jews constituted an organized minority (\textit{taifé}) like the Greeks and Armenians, but their more defined internal organization and relative proximity to Turkish power enabled them to obtain additional communal

\textsuperscript{251} Cf., generally, Turner, \textit{Frontier}, where the development of a distinct frontier society is conceptualized as passing through three phases, corresponding to three waves of increasingly deep settlement (that of the pioneer, of the settler, and of men of capital) washing over each other and pushing the frontier ahead of them. (19-20) “As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics.” (4) In the same vein, we might conceive of Izmir’s proceeding Ottomanization as changing the status and character of the city’s polarity without completely supplanting its older characteristics; culturally, Izmir’s new (national) frontier retained an undercurrent of the older (religious) frontier.

\textsuperscript{252} It is easy to overstate this inter-Christian affinity. In reality, an age-old and deep chasm separated the Eastern and Western churches. It was only in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century that the West began sustained efforts to increase its understanding of Eastern rites, partly out of scholarly interest, partly with the goal of reuniting the church. European traveler-scholars such as Paul Rycaut enthusiastically catered to this demand: Paul Rycaut, \textit{The Present State of the Greek and Armenian Churches, Anno Christi 1678: Written at the Command of His Majesty} (London: John Starkey, 1679).

\textsuperscript{253} Cf. Minna Rozen, “The Ottoman Jews”, in: \textit{Cambridge History of Turkey} 3, throughout, but especially 259-63, comprising “The Jews vis-à-vis the Ottoman state”, “The Jews vis-à-vis the ambient society” and “The ambient society vis-à-vis the Jews".
privileges, such as the payment (and manipulation) of their poll-tax as a fixed lump sum (ber vech-i maktu’). Economically, they relied on their diaspora networks throughout Europe and the Middle East to trade and invest, in turn investing profits in loans to Ottoman and European merchants alike.\textsuperscript{254} From this strong basis in international trade and helped by the leverage acquired through finance, they managed to displace the Greeks as chief partners and middlemen (financiers, wholesalers, warehousemen, dragomans, shippers) to the Europeans in the second half of the 17th century (a position the Greeks would later recapture under British patronage).\textsuperscript{255} Socially, the Jews were at their common disadvantage. In the Middle East they were viewed with the familiar combination of disapproval and apprehension, though decidedly less so than in Europe and with correspondingly less disruptive consequences for their lives and livelihoods.

Relative closeness to the Turkish center, stronger communal emancipation, economic influence, lower social standing with Europeans than with Turks: such factors determined, and were further determined by, the Jewish taifé’s preferment of strengthening autonomy under Turkish rule over gravitation towards Frank Street on any other than its own terms. Highly indicative of this attitude is the community’s preference for Turkish courts and procedures, especially in cases against European debtors. Jews almost never applied to consular courts and were well-represented at the local kadi’s court:

\begin{quote}
Ils entretiennent aussi un des leurs auprès du cadi sous le nom de kiaia [i.e. kethüda, or commissioner], lequel est instruit de toutes les procédures de la justice, pour être comme leur procureur et leur avocat, et ils lui font une pension de 150 écus pour sa peine, qui était autrefois de 400 écus.\textsuperscript{256}
\end{quote}

As a consequence of these circumstances and attitudes, Izmir’s Jewish ward – firmly integrated in the Turkish part of the city yet also separated from it, closely involved with the European nations yet remaining at arm’s length – took no part in the blurring of inter-Christian socio-religious borders in the northern part of the city and became the preferred (though often reviled) intermediary and buffer between European and Turk.


\textsuperscript{255} See Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 150-54.

\textsuperscript{256} Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 141.
The Capitulations

In the preceding paragraphs we have sketched the development of the frontier between Christian and Turk, and later European and Ottoman, in Izmir. First the physical and mental displacement of the native Greek element by a Latin one; then the Latin quarter’s evolving into a European quarter; and the rise of absolutism, mercantilism, religious protectionism and proto-nationalism, with all the consequences this entailed for community identities and loyalties. Out of necessity those sketches were rather rough ones. They were of processes and trends not easily identifiable with the specific documentary sources or the specific historical events of traditional history. And although the state, diplomacy, politics and administration indeed account for a mere fraction of history, we shall for now have to neglect the personal, the social, the economic and many other spheres of life in order to arrive at a more coherent history of European presence in the Ottoman Empire, and, by extension, in Izmir.

The most convenient thread to follow for such a history is that provided by the succession of Ottoman capitulations. From the Ottomans’ entry into the Balkans in 1352 to their definitive abolishment through article 28 of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, these privileges and their precursors embodied the legal framework for all Ottoman relations with Europe. Adopted from various types of treaties and charters of preceding polities (the Byzantine, the Seljukid, the Mamluk, &c.), the instrument in Ottoman hands developed into a coherent system for the governing of international relations at home. The history of these Ottoman capitulations is a complex one, but as their origins and development are crucial to understanding the conditions under which European nations were present in the empire, we should devote some attention to it before moving on.

As was the case with most previous regimes in the region, the Ottomans did not maintain reciprocal relations with the European states with which its subjects traded. Instead, all permanent relations with such states took place on Ottoman soil. Previously, it had been common in the region to regard international diplomacy and local commercial relations as belonging to different if occasionally overlapping spheres. According to this logic, terms of peace were negotiated between heads of state through their representatives, while commercial charters were awarded to individual merchants or communities through their own. Certainly, terms of peace could include stipulations on the administration and the trading conditions of foreign communities, but this often amounted to little more than the incorporation in a treaty of such abovementioned terms of trade. In short, though commercial privileges

257 For the Ottoman capitulatory system, see İnalci, “İmtiyāzā”; and Van den Boogert and Fleet, Ottoman Capitulations, throughout.
could be inserted in a wider treaty between two polities, their application
would still be restricted to specific communities in specific places.

The Ottomans’ most significant innovations in adopting the practice of
awarding capitulations were twofold: they vastly increased their geographical
and administrative scope and with the increased leverage thus created, used
them as instruments for diplomatic and commercial policy. As their realm
grew and their economy increasingly became a redistributive one, the view
that commercial relations must be inextricably bound up with diplomatic
relations became dominant in Istanbul. In their own response to the chal-
lenge of the age, and on a par with Europe’s mercantilist and centralizing
policies, the Ottomans, partly out of political ideology and partly out of the
very real necessity to cater for Istanbul’s wolverine appetite, thoroughly in-
strumentalized their international commercial relations. Diplomatically, this
translated into a practice in which the awarding of privileges served as the
proverbial carrot to entice European states into alliances, while their possible
withdrawal was the stick with which to beat them back to the preferred polit-
ical course if they seemed to stray. Of course this approach only worked so
long as Europe needed Ottoman trade more than the Ottomans needed
Europe’s (and when this balance definitively shifted in Europe’s favor in the
nineteenth century, it was Europe that increasingly wielded the capitulatory
stick).

As mentioned earlier, the process through which the Ottomans adopted
and expanded capitulatory practice dated back to the mid-14th century. By
that time the advancing emirate had far outgrown the political vacuum be-
tween Byzantines, Latins and the Turcoman successors of the Seljuks of
Rum in Bithynia and needed to secure its position amongst and against them.
Being the frontier principality that it was, it seized on the possibilities offered
by its position at the node between three major political and commercial
complexes by playing the balance between them through intensified alliance
politics, simultaneously increasing the commercial scope of its alliances. This
is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the exact timing and
degree to which various predating instruments for conducting foreign com-
mercial and political relations contributed to the full-fledged Ottoman ca-
pitulations of later date; let us merely note that it combined aspects of three
interrelated strands of instruments adopted by the Ottomans (in chronologi-
cal order): localized commercial privileges, peace treaties with commercial
clauses, and privileges granted to tributary states.258 A short discussion of

258 There are now two approaches to, or perspectives in, the historiography of the Otto-
man capitulations: the older one regards them first and foremost as being descended from
(bilateral) commercial privileges and peace treaties, and only belatedly joined to (unilateral)
tributary instruments; the revisionist sees a reverse relation and regards the tributary relation-
ship as the essential inherited characteristic of the evolved capitulatory system. The first per-
spective has been promoted by contemporaries and moderns alike, partly to support claims
these more or less consecutive strands and the capitulations that superseded them may serve to introduce which nationalities were present in Izmir under what historical-diplomatic conditions.

With regard to pre-Ottoman (localized) commercial privileges, it should be said beforehand that these are too many in number and diplomatically and geographically too varied for their history to be summarized in an orderly fashion. Suffice to say that it was common practice among pre-Ottoman regimes, be they Christian or Muslim, to attract commerce to their territories by conferring formalized privileges on favored trading partners.259 If their relations with the privileged parties allowed it, Ottoman conquest of the territories concerned was usually followed by confirmation, and often extension, of such previously awarded privileges.

It is important to note, however, that the character and scope of these privileges did not develop linearly. Depending on the period and place from which one proceeds, they can be seen as having developed from bilaterally agreed treaties to unilaterally awarded privileges or conversely; and from empire-wide to local validity or the other way around. We need not go into the former development too much here. Instead, let us merely state the basic law governing capitulatory relations: a polity’s capacity for unilateral action is as great as its relative power. This is to say that as one party acquires power and another loses it, the nature of the agreements between them will change too – if not on paper than at least on the ground.

As for the latter development; it is clear that the oft-cited capitulations the Fatimid and Mamluk rulers of Egypt granted to France, Venice, Genoa, Castile and Aragon, the Kingdom of Cyprus, Naples, Ancona, Marseilles, Crete and Narbonne from the 1150s to the 1390s, became more limited and local in character as Mamluk power waned and as first Seljukid, then Turkish rulers selectively confirmed them.260 A similar movement occurred at the opposite, northwestern end of the Anatolian power vacuum, as the retreating Byzantine empire was succeeded by various Turkish principalities that chose to continue the privileged status of the Venetians, Genoese and other Latins. Conversely, the rise of the Ottoman successors to this combined Byzantine-Latin-Central-Asian heritage signaled the approaching end of such diplom-
ic fragmentation. As Ottoman power grew and centralized, individual localized privileges would increasingly be absorbed into wider Ottoman international arrangements such as peace treaties.

The first Ottoman peace treaty usually associated with the inception of a uniform capitulatory regime is that concluded with Genoa in 1352 against Venice. It was followed by similar peace treaties with commercial dimensions: a treaty with the Holy League (Venice, Byzantium, Genoa, the Knights Hospitallers) in 1403, confirmed with Venice in 1411, and followed by a string of renewals and confirmations until 1479, but also at least two separate treaties with the Knights Hospitallers and one with the King of Naples. Although much of the phraseology and organization of the Ottoman capitulations proper can be retraced to them, there is one crucial difference, namely that these documents were bilateral (and in the case of treaties with the Holy League even multilateral), where the defining character of the later Ottoman capitulations is their unilateralism.

It is in the third strand, that of the documents codifying tributary relationships, that we first encounter the insistence on unilateralism that would become the hallmark of Ottoman dealings with Europe. Proceeding in large part from the abovementioned corpora and incorporating several other local pre-Ottoman treaties, concessions and laws, the privileges granted to the Republic of Ragusa (modern Dubrovnik) from 1430, to the Latin communities of the former Genoese colonies of Galata (in modern Istanbul) and Scio (Chios) from 1453, and to the previously Venetian-protected Duchy of Naxos (i.e. the Cyclades) from 1537, betray a strong Ottoman preoccupation with somehow bringing relations with non-Muslim states (and their subjects) more fully in line with Islamic law. Unilateralism was to be instrumental to the Ottomans’ attempts.

It is no coincidence that this phase in the development of the capitulations coincided with the Ottomans’ taking Constantinople (in 1453) and establishing the seat of government there. What for a century and a half had been one of many Turkish emirates in Asia Minor, was by now clearly becoming a real empire, with aspirations to boot. It has been said that “empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system”. In the Ottoman case, this might be considered doubly so, since the state religion, Islam, was imperialist in the truest sense. It formally distinguished only between a “land of Islam” and a “land of war”

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261 For dates and texts, see, resp., İnalci, “İmtiyāzāt”; and Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics, 104-84.
and regarded the complete absorption of the second into the first as its ultimate fulfillment. Imbued with this ideal of empire, yet also confronted with the reality of limited power and the necessity of economic continuity, the Ottomans restyled their relations with trading partners, allies and befriended states. Although most of their predecessors’ and their own concrete policies were continued, and although the negotiations leading up to new capitulations and the language used in them betrayed a waning bilateral heritage, their theoretical, legal, basis was reconfigured to correspond more closely to the new balance of power, as well as to Islamic law. As far as the Ottomans were concerned the relationship between foreign powers and the sultan would no longer be one of more or less equal partners, but one of petitioner and petitioned.

It is easy to see why the instruments best suited to the Ottomans’ purposes were those regulating their relations with tributary states. Not only is a formal tributary relationship the embodiment of asymmetry between otherwise autonomous states, it also takes up an unclear position somewhere between the domestic and the foreign spheres. In a legal-religious system that left no space for lasting peace, truce or relations with non-Muslims from beyond the “land of Islam” (dar ül-Islam), it formed the perfect model to fashion other lasting foreign relations after.

The first fully independent state to receive capitulations in the proper unilateral sense was Venice. After a string of Ottoman-Venetian peace treaties from 1408/9 to 1479 the sultan’s dealings with the Republic of St. Mark acquired definite tributary form in 1482. Although the previous treaties had already included a number of tributary arrangements for Venetian possessions or protectorates under Ottoman overlordship (viz. in the Archipelago, Crete, Cyprus, Albania and Dalmatia) and although Venice’s diplomatic relations with the sultan had therefore already been an amalgam of tributary and independent relations for some time, their form had remained bilateral.

The capitulation granted by Beyazid II in 1482 changed the diplomatic form and legal basis of relations, though not their scope and practice. It was preceded by negotiations commenced by the sultan, included the adjustment of mutual boundaries and previous tributary arrangements (remission of a tributary debt of 100,000 ducats and confirmation of a yearly tribute of 5,000

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264 See supra under “The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities”.
265 I.e. in truly unilateral diplomatic form, see De Groot, “Historical Development”, 579): “… ‘proper’ capitulations, in the accepted meaning of charters of fiscal and commercial privilege given by the Ottoman sultans. The Ottoman term is ‘ahdname. The diplomatic form of the documents may vary from a sultanic decree, ferman, to a fiscal ordinance, berat, or general order, nisan, i.e. an order without formal addressee in its heading but beginning with the so-called nisan formula, or to the most solemn documents, the sultan’s letter (name, name-i hümâyün) or ‘ahdname with the titles of the Ottoman ruler (intitulatio) and those of the addressee (inscriptio) in full.”
instead of the old 10,000), its further contents corresponding in large part to that of the 1479 peace treaty. The continued privileges, all of which would also find their way into the capitulations later granted to Venice and its competitors, were the following:

… mutual prohibition of damage and offence, reciprocal obligations of restitution of booty, reciprocal permission of sojourn in each party’s territories with exemption from special levies and duties; inclusion of the Duchy of Naxos; reciprocal assistance at sea to merchant ships and men of war alike; punishment of piracy; prohibition of reprisals for debts incurred by each other’s subjects; restitution of fugitive non-Muslim slaves or payment of compensation to their owners of 1,000 akçe; refraining from appropriating shipwrecked goods; attribution of intestate inheritances of Venetians to the state of Venice in the absence of any heirs; permission for the bailo to live in Istanbul with his “embassy family” and recognition of his jurisdiction over the Venetian community with the right to invoke the assistance of the Ottoman chief of police (subaşı) of Istanbul.266

As the above summary of its circumstances and articles makes clear, the Venetian capitulation of 1482, though unilateral in form, was still in fact bilateral in context and content. In De Groot’s words, this peculiar concoction made it possible for the Ottomans “to reduce the reality of lasting peaceful foreign relations with the ‘unbelievers’ of the dar al-harb to the legally acceptable fiction of these being no more than domestic arrangements fitting with the legal principle of aman, safe-conduct to be given to non-Muslim visitors to the dar al-islam or of hudna, truce with the enemies of Islam, or even of zimma, legal protection given to non-Muslim subjects. Foreign commercial and political relations, which were in fact conducted on a basis of reciprocity and bilateralism, could thus, by subtle legal formulation, be reduced to administrative ordinances of the home government, in one word to ferman, sultanic commands.”267

A policy of “deliberate obfuscation” using the Islamic legal terminology of safe-conduct, truce and protection thus enabled the sultan to maintain he was acting in accordance with Islamic legal theory while the reality of daily practice showed him to be at lasting peace with Christian partners and allies, even allowing their nationals to settle in the empire. The legal justification through which aman, hudna, and implicitly even zimma, were awarded to capitulatory powers and their subjects went something as follows: privileges had not been awarded to harbi (i.e. those from dar il-harb, the “land of war”) persons or states per se, but only to those that had acquired the sultan’s protection or safe-conduct (‘aman) through offering him a promise of sincere friendship (dostluk) and/or submission (ubudiyyet). His acceptance of that promise and his oath (‘abd) to uphold the truce (musalahba) as long as the con-

266 Ibid., 589; text in Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats, 370-76.
dition of friendship was met and mutual benefit derived from it, had qualified them as protégés (müstein) and permitted them to remain in Muslim lands for the space of one year without becoming non-Muslim subjects (zimmis) liable to the poll-tax payable by obedient non-Muslims (çizye, baraç). This temporary legal arrangement was complemented with an implicit one, namely that the unworkable one-year term for liability to the poll-tax need not apply as the merchants operating under capitulary privilege did so as subjects of tributary states, not through any temporary personal arrangement.

From the Ottoman viewpoint – and this brings us back to the imperial aspirations mentioned earlier – relations with the capitulatory communities living in the empire lay in the domestic sphere. Initially this had been a legal-theoretical proposition only, but in the course of the 17th century (when maximization of sovereignty became a key driver for European and Ottoman foreign policy) the Ottomans increasingly utilized the legal fiction of an Ottoman-European tributary relationship as a stratagem to keep Europe’s diplomats and merchants at bay and claim and assert Ottoman dominance in relations. The concretization of the tributary fiction in Ottoman relations with Europe for a while had the desired effect between 1666 and 1683, as practical relations were reconfigured and European merchants, diplomats, trade organizations and even states and sovereigns became increasingly circumspect in their dealings with Ottoman administration and in mercantile practice (as detailed below under “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control”).

Accordingly, these communities’ administrative and legal status within Ottoman administration should be fashioned in likeness of the millet’s (see the discussion in “The Status of the Non-Muslim Communities”): the consul should function much as a millet başı (the officially sanctioned head and representative of his millet) and a lump-sum tribute was collected in lieu of the individual or lump-sum poll-tax paid by zimmî-subjects. In official language the process of obfuscation and incorporation was especially pronounced as the same terminology was applied across the empire’s domestic and foreign affairs. The terms taife and millet, for instance, were employed for both non-

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268 Although such a reassertion of the Islamic legal prerogative of unilaterality in relations implies the development and implementation of an Ottoman fundamentalist policy (see supra), to draw such a conclusion would be to grossly overstate the importance of religious beliefs in the shaping of Ottoman policy and practice in international relations and trade. Instead of (once more) falling into the trap of Ottoman finesse (and our own prejudices), we should recognize that Ottoman policy (just like any other consciously thought out) originated in a certain world view only to be continuously reshaped and redirected by military, political, legal, economic, social and personal realities, necessities and considerations before and during its implementation. In the Ottomans’ concretization of unilaterality as a strategy to capture control over foreign diplomatic activity and trade in the empire, we see a concrete goal (capture) for the attainment of which a strategy (concretization) was selected from among those available within their specific (Islamic) world view.
Muslim and capitulatory communities and *baraç* was used to designate both the poll-tax payable by non-Muslim subjects (originally *cizye*) and the tribute due from tributary states.

From the European viewpoint, however, this legal window-dressing for internal Ottoman consumption mattered little as long as practical relations were conducted on the old footing and previous privileges were continued or augmented. And so, the drive for ever more advantageous Ottoman capitulations could proceed in earnest, with the *Serenissima* obtaining renewals and confirmations of her 1482-capitulation in 1513, 1517, 1521, 1540, 1567, 1573, 1575, 1576, 1595, 1604, 1615, 1619, 1625, 1641, 1670, 1706, 1733, and 1734.269 This drive for increased privilege acquired a competitive edge when the Ottoman-Venetian-bred system was extended to include other states, namely France from 1569 (renewals and confirmations in 1581, 1597, 1604, 1618, 1673, and 1740), England from 1580 (followed up in 1601, 1604, 1614, 1624, 1641, 1662, and 1675), and the Dutch Republic from 1612 (and, again, in 1634 and 1680).270

Within the sequences above a number of decisive evolutions in the capitulations’ form, contents and functions may be discerned. On a general level, there is the transition from the capitulations’ codifying a real tributary relationship to their formulating a symbolic one. As is to be expected, this shift coincides with the capitulatory system’s application beyond the semi-tributary Ottoman-Venetian relationship, that is to say, with the first proper French capitulation of 1569. In this newly invented symbolic tributary relationship, the act of requesting privileges and promising friendship figured as submission and the presenting of gifts as tribute. In the course of the further development of the capitulatory system, the originally explicit references to such “submission” and “tribute” increasingly became implicit.

At the same time that the tributary nature of capitulatory relationships was becoming ever less explicit, a seemingly contrary development from bilaterality to unilaterality was also taking place.

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270 See, e.g., De Groot, “Historical Development”; and İnalçı, “İmityazat”. 175
We have discussed how the growth of Ottoman power and imperial aspiration led to a reorganization of international relations, away from the equality of bilateral treaties and towards the supremacy of unilateral capitulations (a development that was mirrored in that towards incorporation of the European communities on the ground on Izmir). It has also become clear that this was at first mostly a matter of style and form, not of content; a matter of bridging the gap between the legal responsibility resulting from Ottoman claims to Islamic empire on the one hand and maintaining the necessary commercial relations and political alliances with *dar ül-harb* on the other. The resulting ambivalence in the capitulations was of the essence for the Ottoman sultans: mighty as they were, their power would always fall short of being able to force a truly unilateral international relationship upon the capitulatory states, or of asserting their legal initiative and lawmaking power (*örf*) through sultanic law (*kanun*, including the capitulations) without taking account of Islamic law (*şeriat*). This being said, the 17th century certainly saw efforts in these directions and as the capitulatory system matured its legal ambivalence and bilateral heritage were increasingly – though never definitively – done away with. Both, seemingly contradictory, developments may be regarded as expressions of sultanic power, towards the Ottoman and wider Muslim world on the one hand and towards Europe on the other.

On the level of the privileges granted there were three interconnected processes at play; the augmentation of privileges, their theoretical validity for ever wider stretches of Ottoman territory, and their extension over an increasing number of nations. We cannot discuss here the evolution of all the capitulatory privileges in the course of over four centuries, but let us discuss the most important ones consecutively.

The Ottoman capitulations were originally designed to enable Venetian merchants to trade with Ottoman territories in safety and on advantageous terms. Therefore, their oldest and most important articles date back to the first proper Venetian capitulation of 1482 (also see De Groot’s quotation above). It established the following basic rules: safe passage, reciprocal assistance at sea, restitution of booty and shipwrecked goods, compensation for fugitive non-Muslim slaves, punishment of piracy, diplomatic protection of non-capitulatory merchants and their goods, advantageous customs rates for capitulatory trade, exemption from other internal Ottoman duties (market taxes, administrative taxes and so on), permission to sojourn in the sultan’s dominions without danger to life or belongings, representation by consuls and ambassadors, these representatives’ jurisdiction in exclusively communal affairs, their non-liability for debts incurred by their nationals, and their right to invoke the assistance of the Ottoman chief of police (the *subaşı*).

Later Venetian capitulations fine-tuned or added unto many of these articles, most importantly those concerning Ottoman court-cases involving Venetian subjects and protected persons (first Venetian witnesses were made admissible, then it was specified that such cases could only be heard when
the dragoman of the Venetian nation was present) and those dealing with tribute/poll-tax (married and unmarried Venetian merchants – and, by implication, protected persons – residing in Ottoman lands would not be liable to haraç).271

With the French acquiring their first fully Ottoman capitulation in 1569 privilege increased significantly. In 1517 the sultan had already confirmed France’s Mamluk privileges for Egypt, but now these were extended over the entire Ottoman realm in a full Ottoman grant. In one sweep (and with one article) France obtained all privileges contained in the Venetian capitulations, as well as some additional ones: “assistance and salvage in cases of French shipwreck; freedom of traffic; individual legal responsibility; execution of French testaments or delivery of intestate inheritances to the consul; release of French slaves; exemption from the payment of cizye, obligatory presence of the dragoman of the French at trials before the kadi; internal French law suits within the competence of the French consul; visitation of ships only at Istanbul and the Dardanelles (Çanakkale, Kale-i Sultanîye) on departure; friendly salutation at meeting on the high seas of French and Ottoman ships”.272

In 1581 the French were explicitly granted the (previously exclusively Venetian) right of extending diplomatic protection to non-capitulatory nations. Already implied in the article of the 1569-capitulation stating that all Venetian privileges would be applicable to the French, it was now explicitly confirmed that the protection of the French flag could be extended to the Venetians, the Genoese, the English, the Portuguese, the Catalans, the Ancônitans, the Ragusans, and any other nations that the French had protected in the past. Furthermore, France was given permission to set up consulates in Alexandria, Tripoli, Algiers and any other Ottoman ports designated for international trade.

France’s and Venice’s institutional advantage came to an end when the English were awarded their first capitulation in 1580. It was based on the Venetian and French capitulations then in effect and consequently included a similarly reduced customs tariff of 5% for English exports. The English removal from Venetian and French protection dealt a sensitive blow to the interests of the older capitulatory states. Not only were their rising English competitors now permitted to compete with them under their own private jurisdiction (signifying a significant loss in consular and ambassadorial duties for protected goods), their acquiring the same tariff also meant competition on equal terms. This situation was compounded in 1601, when England gained the capitulatory privileges of a reduced customs tariff of 3% and protection of the up-and-coming trade from the Dutch seafaring provinces, and

271 See Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics, 398: article 40.
again in 1604 when France’s new capitulation explicitly removed the Venetians and the English from French protection.\textsuperscript{273}

In 1612 the Dutch received their own capitulation, modeled after the most recent French and English capitulations. The Dutch were at once awarded the reduced tariff of 3\% and were expressly permitted to open consulates in all designated Ottoman ports (factories/scales), including in the ordinarily restricted ones on the Black Sea and those of Alexandria, Tripoli of Syria, the Archipelago, Tunis, Algiers and Cairo.\textsuperscript{274} The striking generosity of privilege awarded a new capitulatory state aside, this capitulation was noteworthy for something other as well: it marked the disappearance of the instrument’s most important reminder of tributary origin. Although the Dutch presented the sultan with gifts around the amount previously explicitly accepted as tribute from Venice, France and England, no payment of tribute was mentioned in their capitulation.

The disappearance of references to tribute as a precondition for relations does not mean that all language reminiscent of tributary relations had disappeared. Its formulae continued to echo through in the vocabulary of unilateralism: “with letters sealed by sincere friendship”, “the requests contained therein”, “the petition for friendship and privilege”, “the petitions were met with acceptance”, “as long as [the States General] will remain steadfast in friendship and devotion following this aforementioned promise, I too accept their friendship”.\textsuperscript{275} Stripped of all references to tribute, however, the fixed sequence of phrases that had previously marked the exchanges leading up to the fastening of a tributary bond, did little more than lend a tributary slant to a testament of full sultanic power and prerogative.

Nevertheless, the omission of direct references to tributary relations signals an important development with regard to the capitulations’ legal basis. With it, the chancery of Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617) was taking another step away from the instrument’s bilateral heritage, but not automatically towards greater conformity with Islamic law. Over the years – as capitulations had been awarded to the non-tributary states of France, England and the Dutch Republic and as the articles they contained had become wider in scope and relevance – it had become apparent that they embodied an institution rather than an ad hoc-arrangement. Confronted with the increasingly ritualistic character of the capitulations’ tributary basis and exchanges, but also with a form of open-ended truce and protection (\textit{hudna} and ‘\textit{aman}) that could hardly be justified outside a tributary arrangement, the Ottomans were taking ever more care to compensate by stressing their basis in sultanic initiative and

\textsuperscript{273} See ibid., 597 and 600.

\textsuperscript{274} Ibid. Text in De Groot, \textit{Ottoman Empire}, 241-42 and 255: article 34.

\textsuperscript{275} My italics. See the full transliteration and translation in ibid.
their unilateral character. The removal of references to tribute further narrowed the capitulations’ already shaky basis in Islamic law (şeriat) since the proper Islamic legal conditions of safe-conduct (‘aman) had never fitted capitulatory relations to begin with. In response, their diplomatic form was made significantly more majestic and unilateral, so as to stress their basis in the legal alternative of sultanic initiative (‘örf). Beginning in the reign of Ahmed I we can discern a preference for the heavier diplomatic forms of the full ‘ahdname (letter of promise, i.e. capitulation) or the sultanic letter (name-i hümâyüm) over the more straightforward sultanic order (the ferman) and its fiscal variant (the berat, or diploma). It seems that the legal ambivalence already hinted at a few paragraphs earlier was indeed less a static given than a balance to be tipped in the sultan’s favor.

Until the mid-18th century no further changes of significance were made to the capitulations’ form and legal principles (except perhaps for their increasingly figuring as supplements to peace treaties). The competition over their privileges continued unabated however. In 1665, Genoa was removed from French protection with her own capitulation and (like the Dutch in 1612) was at once awarded the reduced customs tariff of 3%. More importantly, the French in 1673 acquired precedence over the other capitulatory nations, saw their right of protection over non-capitulatory foreigners confirmed, were accorded the protection of Frankish ecclesiastics and of French and other western Christians on pilgrimage, and finally saw their customs tariff also reduced from 5% to 3%. Through their capitulation of 1675, the English were extended all privileges previously granted to France, Venice, Poland and other capitulatory states, including protection of non-capitulatory foreigners.

The coping stone of the capitulatory system followed more than a half-century later, in 1740, when the French were the first to be awarded most-favored-nation status. Henceforth any increase in privilege awarded other nations could automatically also be claimed by them. As more and more other powers acquired similar status, the once separately awarded charters became a homogenous textual corpus from which all recognized foreign partners could draw.

**Demography**

Now that a short history of the Ottoman capitulations has introduced a more formal chronology to our discussion of the European presence in the Ottoman Empire and has highlighted the capitulatory conditions under which subjects of European states lived and traded in Ottoman port cities and their satellites, it is time to focus on the structure within which these subjects operated in Izmir specifically. Our summary history above has shown the following capitulatory states to be operating in the Ottoman Empire in 1678: Genoa (under her capitulation of 1665), Venice (capitulation of 1670), France (capitulation of 1673), England (capitulation of 1675), and the
Dutch Republic (capitulation of 1634). As is attested to by Galland (as by other sources), merchants of all these states were indeed living and trading in Izmir.276

The administrative structure supporting and, to an extent, governing these merchants’ expatriate lives and trades was the result of a complicated interplay between administrative powers – viz. the issuing of capitulations and additional orders by the Ottoman central government, of commercial directives and diplomatic instructions by European central governments and trade organizations, and of decisions by local Ottoman officials based on local administrative practice and records. Certainly, the capitulations set the general conditions for their presence in terms of commerce, administration and representation: they stipulated the tariffs according to which customs would be paid; barred certain strategic goods from trade; specified how, where and when customs would be collected; created an internal jurisdiction by indicating in what cases Ottoman officials should not become involved and when they could be called on for assistance; and appointed a representative at the “Threshold of Felicity” (Istanbul), empowering him to nominate deputies to represent the merchant communities in his care.277

Yet, the capitulatory regime indeed only set the general conditions under which trade was to be conducted. The results of application (and non-application) to the practices of daily life and trade varied heavily under the influence of nationality, local circumstance and historical timing. More directly put, the lives and trades of all European nations in the Ottoman Empire were organized differently in accordance with the history, needs and wishes of their governments and principals back home and they proceeded in various towns and cities under conditions determined by local and international trade, administration and relations. Perhaps the best way to understand how capitulations and capitulatory practice relate, is to compare them to a civil code and the practice of everyday life, respectively. Although civil law invisibly insinuates itself into our lives to become part of our morality and daily conduct, it in fact rarely swings into full view as we go about our everyday lives.278 In fact, we often navigate the law’s edges of permissibility, regularly zigzagging over its edges and back again. It is only when such transgressions result in civil conflict, since they are not acceptable to all parties in-

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276 See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-27 and 150-51.

277 It should be stressed that what the Europeans considered to be their representatives’ accreditation by the sultan, was their appointment upon nomination as far as the Ottomans were concerned. According to the same logic consuls and vice-consuls were nominated by their chief in Istanbul or institutions back home and appointed by the sultan.

278 See Kitty Calavita, *Invitation to Law & Society: An Introduction to the Study of Real Law* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 37: “The ability of law to create social realities that appear natural by inventing many of the concepts and categories we think with, means that it insinuates itself invisibly into our everyday worlds and wields extraordinary power.”
volved (or made so by mitigating negotiations), that the law (and its enforcement) come into action.\textsuperscript{279} Just as civil law does not effectively govern our lives, so the capitulations did not govern foreign presence and trade in the Ottoman Empire.

What the capitulations did do, is provide the legal-administrative framework for European merchants’ activities in the Ottoman Empire. Through them, European representatives were appointed to the Porte (the Ottoman government) and put in charge of the consuls in the factories. What the Ottomans expected from these consuls was not outlined in the capitulations exclusively, but was worked out in more detail in fiscal ordinances (berats) issued by the Porte to complement the capitulations. These documents were handed over to their bearers, the consuls, to be produced to Ottoman officials as legal proof of the competences the bearer had received from the sultan. For all practical purposes these were “diplomas”, listing the consuls’ duties and rights with respect to Ottoman administration and to their nations. Through their adjusting and formalizing existing consular practices and tying them in with the international diplomacy of ambassadors and resident envoys, the capitulations imposed a preferred, increasingly uniform, formal structure and hierarchy on all European affairs in the empire. As discussed previously, actual commercial and administrative practice within the structure thus set up was then adjusted through commercial directives and diplomatic instructions from Europe, as through the policies of local Ottoman officials.

This is not to say that between this Ottoman legal framework, European governments’ and trade bodies’ interpretations of it, and its application by local officials, there was barely room to maneuver. By leaving the practical administration of international commerce in the hands of lower officials in charge of day-to-day administration the Ottomans had for most of the 17th-century made sure that there was no unnecessary interference by high-level officials, so that – within the fiscal and economic limits that were deemed essential to the Ottoman system – a zone of contact was maintained in

\textsuperscript{279} See Calavita, \textit{Invitation to Law}, 34: “E. Adamson Hoebel Karl Llewellyn (1941) … pieced together a picture of a traditional system of law organized around two main functions. The first was to set the parameters for ordinary life so people could ‘go around in more or less clear ways’ (20), ‘trouble cases’ inevitably arose – for example, in the form of disputes or egregious violations – and then law made a flamboyant entrance to clean up the ‘social mess.’ As Hoebel and Llewellyn found with the Cheyenne, law in contemporary Western society sets the ground rules and stays in the background, only commanding attention when trouble comes. We nonetheless sense its routine strictures … The impulse to abide by law’s restrictions may vary across time, culture, social class, personality type, and punishment severity (a topic of what are called compliance studies), but even violators usually modify their behavior to minimize detection.”. This process is a significant part of “the gap between the law-on-the-books and the-law-in-action” that is “a canonical concern for law and society scholarship” \textit{(ibid., 9)}.
which Ottoman and European merchants could fend for themselves and deal with each other in relative freedom.²⁸⁰

To return to our discussion of the relation between law and the practice of everyday life: the fact that two (or more) parties (and subsidiaries) in relations may collude to act against law (here; the capitulations) does not have consequences in and of itself. In a manner, transgressions are in the eye of the beholder, and if its contemporary beholders saw no problem with what they were arranging between themselves, who are we to decide that one party must have been forcing another through bribes or threats, even if there appear to have existed some misgivings about the collusion. In analyzing capitulatory relations – or really, counter-capitulatory relations – allowance should be made at every level for the possibility that transgressions were in fact (and perhaps against the impression given by the documentary evidence available) often the result of agreements between those pulling the strings on that specific level and in that given context. Such an interpretation – according to which law is a guide to action in case of irresolvable disputes between those directly involved instead of a set of rules everyone must necessarily always obey – neatly fits early modern society and administration in general, and the Ottoman’s in particular. In the Ottoman Empire, as in many other societies, law was “one of the major points of contact between state and society” and first and foremost an instrument for the resolution of conflicts (i.e. “restitutive”), as opposed to a semi-sacral system for exemplary punishment per se (i.e. “repressive”).²⁸¹ Seen in that light, European utterances of frustration with Ottoman legal or administrative proceedings were probably as often the sore loser’s complaints about failed exchanges and compromises, as expressions of sincere shock about perceived corruption.

The more or less uniform diplomatic hierarchy achieved through sultanic decree happened to be a perfect conduit for extending the already noted European drive towards centralization to the Levant. In this, joining commercial to diplomatic affairs by bringing consuls definitively under the jurisdiction of ambassadors proved especially effective. As chosen headmen gave

²⁸⁰ See Faroqhi, *Economic and Social History* 2, 480-83: “The Ottoman State and Foreign Traders”. But see Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World*, where the argument is set forth that “Izmir in the late sixteenth century blossomed into a regional market and commercial hub … despite Istanbul’s objections” (18), and that Izmir’s low-level administration was a consequence of Ottoman inability or unwillingness to recognize the city’s international development for the overwhelming trend it was and take timely administrative measures to protect their own interests from that development’s unwanted consequences.

way to consuls firmly embedded in diplomatic hierarchy, the often irregular correspondence to and from the factories became more regular and detailed. Partly in response to the wish of those higher up to remain informed of what happened under their authority, the increase in correspondence was certainly also the natural result of the heightened answerability that came with the stricter definition of merchants’, consuls’, ambassadors’, trade organizations’ and governments’ duties and responsibilities. If higher authorities can be held responsible for your actions and will in turn hold you to account for them, it is best to keep minute and verifiable records (preferably of the kind that cast you in a favorable light). Hence the identification of hierarchically organized administration, i.e. bureaucracy, with the production of written records, filing and archiving. It is thanks to the 17th-century formalization of consular affairs that many details from the lives and trades of European merchants in the Levant were committed to paper at all, and it is bureaucratic practice we should thank for enabling us to study organized series of such papers in a number of European national archives.

So, between these papers and the available Ottoman ones, what do we know about capitulatory practice in Izmir on a non-individual, national, level? What was the place of the European quarter within the city’s administration and society? And how were its Genoese, Venetian, French, English, and Dutch parts made up and organized?

Measures of Liberty
As Evliya makes abundantly clear, Izmir’s Muslims will have cared little for the difference between the city’s Franks and its Greeks and Armenians. The only thing many will have felt they needed to know was that these were Christians not Muslims. They will no doubt have noticed the Franks’ different dress and housing, as well as the exaggerated and improper pride and pomp with which processions of these “unbelievers” regularly marched through the city on their way to audiences or funerals. Perhaps they will even have considered their privileged status with a mixture of envy and disapproval, or simply with disinterest. But whether they were envious of the liberties and advantages permitted these foreigners, disapproved of their unbecoming displays of status and wealth, or looked on them with a stoicism born from the certainty of being far superior – it will not have escaped them that here were unbelievers permanently residing in the land of Islam to whom not many laws of that land seemed to apply. If Izmir’s Muslims couldn’t be bothered with the finer points of Christian doctrine, they will have found it all the more difficult to make sense of the leeway afforded the Franks in comparison to the subjected Greeks and Armenians.

The incomprehension and irritation caused by a position so special being occupied by nations considered inferior was never quite grasped by the Europeans. On their part, they appear to have had – or at least showed – little sensitivity for the tension between Islamic law, sultanic law and administra-
tive practice their somewhat demanding presence could occasion. Just as many Muslims will have preferred to think of the subjects of the capitulatory nations as a peculiar kind of *zimmis*, and therefore equally dependent on the goodwill of the Islamic community, so most Europeans claimed a measure of independence not fully warranted by their *müstemin*-status. They envisaged an *alafranga*-life of far greater freedom than back home, under full protection of the Ottoman state, but with few obligations for them to fulfill in return.

Since the hazy status of the non-Ottoman nations was bred into the Ottoman capitulatory system, the measure of liberty and autonomy permitted the Europeans in capitulatory practice was perpetually in flux. The inherent distance between conflicting Ottoman and European interpretations of capitulatory status could only effectively be bridged by shared interest. Such shared interest, particularly in a situation where several nations were competing against each other for most favorable conditions, was necessarily of a volatile nature. If this was already the case in Istanbul, it was even more so in the factories, where local officials were more often than not primarily occupied with interests that yielded results within the short term of their tenure. Plainly, this bridge, this constantly renegotiated “middle ground” of shared interest, could be a cut-throat place of fast business, short-term yields and fierce competition for economic and political leverage. As a cut-throat market, it was also a place where professional conflict easily spilled over into the personal sphere. There were some alleviating circumstances, however.

Within the European quarter, a sense of shared Christian-European culture softened at least some of the edge of professional competition – although increasingly less so as the 17th century witnessed the evolution of a loosely organized European community of merchants into a number of more tightly organized and competing trading nations. Then there was the timetable of economic activity, in which the biannual arrival of convoys from Europe (in July-August-September, and in January-February-March) occasioned periods of frantic buying and selling alternated by long spells of relative inactivity during which merchants of all nations sought each other’s company for entertainment and vacationing. Furthermore, the fact that the Ottoman economy was a redistributive one meant that European merchants did not operate in a free market and therefore did not compete with each other in all aspects of trade. In buying and selling competition was limited and relatively

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282 See, e.g., De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 22-23; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22b, on the plague regularly visiting Izmir, the Europeans’ fleeing to the countryside, and/or locking themselves in their houses with some other families to combat boredom; De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 28, on European hunting, fishing and feasting; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: The “discrepant” Dutch merchants of Izmir to DLH, 14 August 1674, on several conflicts fought out in and around Seydiköy; Ülker, *Rise of Izmir*, 43: “most Europeans did not do business during weekend and either vacationed in their cottages located outside of Izmir or else were hunting in the countryside”; and the examples of international excursions and travel cited supra.
indirect, centering not on the conditions obtained from producers but on those obtained from a limited number of wholesalers (as well as, not to forget, from providers of contraband). Instead, the points of fiercest competition between European merchants were favorable shipping rates and tax duties – which is where Ottoman administration re-enters the equation.283

It appears that in Izmir the bridge between Ottoman and European may have been broader, the distance it covered less forbidding, than in Istanbul or Aleppo. In Istanbul, the seat of supreme imperial authority, infinite care was always taken to safeguard the distance between the court and European envoys. If, in an audience, an European was permitted to walk this bridge and enter the presence of the sultan, it was not on his feet, but in prostration and without being able to enter into conversation. It was not much different formally meeting with higher officials: face-to-face communication was sporadically permitted (through a translator of course), but wholly on the Ottomans’ conditions.284 Any real business of deliberation and negotiation was conducted by sending go-betweens (dragomans) back and forth between residences. It was easier arranging matters lower down in hierarchy, although the close proximity of sultanic and grand-vizieral power generally made officials tread carefully; arrangements and personages were easily overturned.285

283 See, e.g., North, Life, 123; Daniel Goffman, “Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City”, in: Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 87-93 and 105-10; Faroqhi, Economic and Social History 2, 517-20; Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “Commercial Growth and Economic Development in the Middle East: Izmir from the Early 18th to the Early 20th Centuries”, in: Ottoman Izmir, 7-8 and throughout; Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”, 18-45.

284 There are countless contemporary descriptions of audiences with Ottoman high officials and the sultan. For a good summary of the protocol and procedures involved, see the article on the divan-ı huveyrun (imperial council) in Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Encyclopædia metropolitana (London: B. Fellowes, 1845), 18: 153-56, and esp. the section on the diplomatic audience at 156: “Capājis BAbis support the stranger under the arm with one hand, and bow down his head with the other. The ambassador then delivers his speech, which is repeated in Turkish by the Dragoman of the Porte to the Grand Vezír, and by him to the Sultán. No answer is returned, except in very extraordinary cases.” Also see the examples in the section on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa infra.

285 See North, Life, 58-66, where North recounts various dealings and sincere friendships with several holders of high office, his having constructed a “sopha room, wherein he might receive, and entertain the Turks, that came to visit him, after their own way”, his borrowing a sancak bey’s galley slaves for construction work, his selling his house to a rich Turk to rent it back to avoid any problems upon his eventual repatriation, his private cultivation of the chief customer, how he made loans to the palace and other high officials and made sure they were repaid, and his audience with the sultan (“The great officers about the Grand Signor, with whom he had transacted, and (with such respects as became him) familiarly conversed, told his Majesty that there was now, in the city of Constantinople, an extraordinary gower [unbeliever], as well for person as abilities, to transact the greatest affairs; and so, in the ordinary conversation with the Grand Signor, he was often named for somewhat considerable, besides his acting as hasnadar of the English nation under their ambassador. The Grand Signor declared, he would see this extraordinary gower; and accordingly the merchant was told of it; and, at the time appointed, an officer conducted him into the Seraglio, and carried him about until he
In Aleppo, the restrictions imposed on European merchants were stricter than those in Istanbul. Merchants appear to have had difficulty moving around freely, periodically locked themselves in reserved national hans, had frequent conflicts with local guilds and esraj (the fraternity of descendants of the prophet) upon venturing out, and – like the city’s general population – suffered excessively from overbearing (military) governors-general (beylerbeyis). As much is confirmed by contemporary accounts.286

By contrast, Izmir’s Europeans were allowed a greater measure of private and professional liberty, both as individuals and as nations. This difference in attitude may be attributed to several factors. Qua mentality, Aleppo was an old regional center of Arab civilization with a mostly indigenous population, instead of a heterogeneous frontier town. Economically and socially too, its characteristics were not those of the frontier town and the trading port, but rather those of the ancient caravan center (relaying part of its well-organized luxury trade through the small ports of Alexandretta (modern Iskenderun) and Latakia. Conjuncturally, its international export business was (temporarily) eclipsed by Izmir. Aleppo’s marketing of the locally and regionally produced goods Europe increasingly sought as industrial input lagged behind Izmir’s, with a contracting market being the result – and if growth ends and crisis looms, it is always the outsider or “other” who suffers disproportionately, if not economically then at least socially.

Izmir, on the other hand, was a much younger Ottoman boom-port with a largely imported population, inevitably better geared to accommodating outsiders and “otherness”. It had overtaken Aleppo as demand from Europe shifted from the luxury goods brought by long-distance caravans to the regional produce of Izmir’s fertile hinterland (it lay closer to the new source, shortening the expensive overland route, as had previously been the case with Aleppo). The predominance of regionally produced exports also gave the regional population a greater stake in the international trade going through Izmir, even if it was mostly indirectly.

But most importantly for our questions, Izmir’s administration appears to have developed in such a way as to specifically accommodate and facilitate

came to a little garden, and there two other men took him by the two arms, and led him to a place where he saw the Grand Signor sitting against a large window open, in a chamber not very high from the ground; the men, that were his conductors, holding each an arm, put their hands upon his neck, and bowed him down till his forehead touched the ground; and this was done more than once, and is the very same forced obeisance of ambassadors at their audienc- es. After this, he stood bolt upright as long as the Grand Signor thought fit to look at him; and then, upon a sign given, he was taken away and set free again by himself, to reflect on this his romantic audience.”). Again, also see the section on Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa infra.

286 See Bruce Masters, “Aleppo: The Ottoman Empire’s Caravan City”, in: Eldem et al., Ottoman City, 46-47 and throughout; as well as the work on 18th-century Aleppo by Van den Boogert (in the bibliography) and Marcus, Middle East on the Eve of Modernity, 75-101 and 145-54.
(rather than roughly impose itself on) the city’s history of crosscultural trade and the diversity it thrived on. That is also how official interference with Izmir was generally interpreted during the restoration of Ottoman power in the region under grand viziers Mehmed Köprülü and his son Fazıl Ahmed Paşa. With his successor Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa’s taking over the reins of power, however, high European hopes that the restraint and benevolence of Köprülü-power they had experienced would be continued, were abruptly smashed. Or were they?

*Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control*[^287]

Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa (c1635-25 December 1683), third vizier from the famed house of Köprülü, is to this day remembered as one of the most terrible Ottoman statesmen to have ever held office. In the course of his career as grand admiral (1661-1666), deputy grand vizier (1663, 1666-1670, 1676), and ultimately grand vizier (1676-1683), the opinions held of him by the European representatives in Istanbul – even before the fiasco of Vienna – declined steeply from “a wise and experienced person, of a smooth behavior” to “this grievous oppressor of all Christendom”.[^288]

At first sight, the reason for Kara Mustafa Paşa’s unpopularity with his European contemporaries appears to have been money, which he extracted from their communities in a “stream of avanias during the years 1676-1683”.[^289] But surely Kara Mustafa was not the first grand vizier to do that; his two adopted relatives and predecessors Mehmed and Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü, for instance, were responsible for some famous reportedly unjust (i.e. in violation of the capitulations) financial demands and penalties of their own without their reputation with the Europeans suffering greatly from it. In fact, all their complaints aside, Europeans living and working in the Levant seem to have been realistic enough to regard commercial and legal disputes with their hosts as part of the trade.

If the accustomed commerce-related conflicts are not wholly responsible, what, then, made relations with Kara Mustafa so unbearable and, more importantly, is there any need to reconsider the received image of him? The following pages will argue that there is indeed such a need, and that understanding how the historical distortion around his person was produced, as well as what it hides from scrutiny, is of the essence for our understanding of

[^287]: A shorter version of this section was previously published as Olnon, “‘A most agreeable and pleasant creature’?”, in: Ottoman Capitulations.


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Izmir at this crucial junction in its history, of the Ottomans’ and Europeans’ designs for it, and of how they worked out.

The general image we have of this grand vizier is to no small extent determined by the emotionally charged descriptions of his character by his European contemporaries. As a matter of fact, the sheer number of vehement denouncements historians have had to account for, has made it very difficult for them to consider the history of his rule in a detached manner. In this respect, it is worth noting that there exists no Ottoman equivalent to the European litany handed down to us.

An explanation for the extreme dislike displayed by the Europeans might be sought in Kara Mustafa’s policy of ruthlessly subjecting even the most fundamental diplomatic rules and capitulary articles to the conjunctures of his rule, or – put more favorably – to the needs of the state he served. To illustrate the shape this deliberate policy took and the manner in which it transformed how Kara Mustafa was perceived even before the Vienna campaign, we will take a look at the correspondence of Justinus Colyer, Dutch envoy (first resident, then ambassador) in Istanbul from 1668 to 1682. From his correspondence a small collection of encounters will be presented that is both illustrative of the attitudes with which this statesman and the European representatives sent to his government approached one another, as it is indicative of the policies and politics underlying these attitudes.

Where the correspondences of the other European representatives in Istanbul become extremely hostile immediately after Kara Mustafa’s becoming grand vizier, Colyer’s is one significant exception begging to be explained. Unfortunately, Colyer’s correspondence has not received the same measure of attention as that of De Nointel, Finch or even his Venetian colleagues. This we can attribute to the fact that it is in the Dutch language and concerns the eventually declining commerce of a geopolitically important but minor European power. But this relative insignificance is also an advantage, for it allows us to compare between Kara Mustafa’s politically laden relations with the French, English and Venetian envoys and his politically neutral relations with the Dutch. An added advantage of regarding the period through Justinus Colyer’s correspondence is that his envoyship (1668-1682) encompasses almost completely Kara Mustafa Paşa’s stay as deputy grand vizier and grand vizier (1666-1683), thereby providing a unique opportunity to trace his exceedingly terrible reputation in a continuous fashion and with a oneness of voice.

But before going over to Colyer’s correspondence, let us first establish more firmly the nature of Kara Mustafa’s reputation and the stations marking his rise to power.

On 6 August 1668 Dutch Resident Justinus Colyer had his first ever audience at the Ottoman court in Edirne (Adrianople). Quite impressed with the entire proceedings and with his auditor in particular, he entered the following
“Description of the person, stature and years of the Caimacam of Adrianople” in his day book:

The said caymacam is twenty eight to twenty nine years of age, of great intellect and eloquence; a most agreeable and pleasant creature. He has a large broad beard, and is of average stature. He never wears gold, silver or silk clothing; this being a general order of the empire, but solely applicable to the grand vizier and the said caymacam, so as to avoid them stooping to avanias for the sake of splendid robes.290

Interestingly, the kaymmakam, or deputy grand vizier, referred to is indeed this very Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, would-be conqueror of Vienna in 1683, and a strong candidate for the title of most vilified Ottoman statesman in history. Considering this, one might be tempted to ascribe Colyer’s sympathetic description to his inexperience at the time. He had first arrived in the Ottoman Empire only five months earlier and had not yet been in direct contact with those at the top of Ottoman hierarchy. But in another equally positive account of this official from the – more experienced and considerably more authoritative – hand of Paul Rycaut (English consul in Izmir from 1667 to 1678), dated 1680, he is referred to as “a wise and experienced person, of a smooth behavior, and a great courtier”.291 Furthermore, in a report prepared in 1675/76 for the marquis de Nointel, French ambassador in Istanbul from 1670 to 1679, it is said that “L’humeur du Pacha est fort bonne, quoiqu’elle soit un peu prompt.”292

But these and other such statements may be considered exceptions. Much more current are the extremely hostile accounts, mostly of later dates. In the relazione of his embassy, Giovanni Morosini di Alvise, Venetian bailo in Istanbul from 1675 to 1680, tells us that Kara Mustafa Paşa was “Nato per castigo de’ popoli in luogo oscuro dell’Asia in vicinanza di Trebisonda [Trabzon; sic] e tra il più vili domestici” and that he was “tutto venale, crudele e

290 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 63b. The published version of this daghregister, and particularly Colyer’s description of Sultan Mehmed IV, later caused great scandal in the Dutch Republic and such an international incident that the States General had to denounce and retract it: “A pained, morose and extremely melancholy creature. A large scar on his countenance, which Sultan Ibrahim his father, with the intent of killing him, inflicted on him with a knife. A sharp nose, two pointy erected moustaches and no beard beneath. He has no less than seven fistulas or fontanels. Is absolutely no lover of women, but more so of hunting. Cruel and very bloodthirsty at heart.” The printed version: Justinus Colyer, Oprecht journael, … (The Hague: Heirs of H. Jacobz. van Wouw, 1668).

291 Rycaut, History of the Turkish Empire, 333. For general overviews of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa’s life and career, and for the opinions Paul Rycaut and other contemporary commentators held of him, see Anderson, English Consul, 242 and throughout; and Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, throughout and esp. the bibliography at 592a-b.

ingiusto”. Around 1680/81 John Finch, English ambassador in Istanbul from 1674 to 1681, characterized him as “a Vesier who is of a temper to doe anything for money and nothing without it” and referred to him as “this grievous oppressor of all Christendom”.

Nor did the initial enthusiasm of our positive commentators persist. On 27 February 1679, eleven years after his first meeting with Kara Mustafa, Justinus Colyer’s admiration had turned into severe frustration as he described him as “extremely avid and intransigent in all his dealings”. He was joined in this by Jacobus van der Merct, treasurer to the Dutch consulate in Izmir, who wrote home on 21 October 1681 describing him as “a griffin with ravenous claws, since he proceeds solely with violence and sheer tyranny” and by Jacob van Dam, Dutch consul in Izmir from 1668 to 1689, who, on 4 March 1679, described “a man of great enterprise and exorbitant procedures against the Christian nations”. Judgments became even harsher after the events before Vienna had run their course. In the second edition of his great History (published in 1700) Rycaut remembered him as “a person of violence, rapine, pride, covetousness, false, perfidious, bloody, and without reason or justice”.

Modern history has felt little need to add or adjust. Kara Mustafa was until relatively recently still universally recognized as a “despote de basse espèce, barbare corrumpu, qui porta au plus haut degré l’avidité d’argent proverbiale des Turcs”, and now at best as “un vizir assez exceptionnel tant dans ses exigences financières que dans sa xénophobie”.

It should come as no surprise that an event like the second Ottoman siege of Vienna, which caused considerable panic throughout Europe, would mar forever the reputation of the person responsible (although the stark contrast with the opinions held in the West of that first Ottoman besieger of Vienna, Süleyman the Magnificent, raises some interesting questions in this respect). After all, it is the winners who write history. But even when leaving the Vienna issue aside and concentrating on the 25-odd years of Kara Mustafa’s career preceding his downfall, it becomes clear that something had already gone terribly wrong in his relations with the European representa-

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294 Abbott, _Under the Turk_, 359.

295 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to the States General, 27 February 1679; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 125: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, 21 October 1681; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 4 March 1679.

296 Paul Rycaut, _The history of the Turks: Beginning with the Year 1679 … until the end of the year 1698, and 1699_ (London: Robert Clavell, 1700), 1.


tives and communities much earlier on. That “something” – as indicated above – lies at the heart of our investigation.

Little can be said with certainty about Kara Mustafa’s life before his first becoming a public figure in 1656. Most probably, he was born in the village of Marinca near Merzifon around 1635 as the son of a cavalry officer (sipahi), who was said to have served under Köprülü Mehmed Paşa during his career in the Asian provinces. It is not certain when, but at some time during his youth, probably as a teenager, Kara Mustafa was introduced into the Köprülü household to enhance his opportunities of starting an administrative career, as was common for ambitious and intelligent Ottoman youths with well-connected fathers. Köprülü had him educated alongside his natural son Fazıl Ahmed; an indication that Kara Mustafa enjoyed a position of some preference to other iç oğlan (young servants/pages) taken into the household. He is reported to have held a number of positions within the household’s inner service (enderun, privy), eventually being employed as Köprülü Mehmed Paşa’s telhisci (referendarius; “the official who presents his employer’s memoirs and reports to the sultan”) shortly after his assuming the grand vizierate on 15 September 1656. It was in this capacity that, in September 1658, he brought Sultan Mehmed IV the news of the Ottoman army’s taking of the Transylvanian fortress of Yanova. As a reward the sultan made him küçük mirahor (master of the lesser stable). On 15 February 1660 Kara Mustafa was promoted to the governor-generalship of Silistria (Silistre beylerbeyiliği, on the Walachian border). In April 1661 he superintend the journey of Tarhan Sultan (the sultana-mother, or, valide sultan) from the court in Edirne to Istanbul, after which he was promoted to the rank of vizier and appointed to the governorship (valilik) of Diyarbakr.

Upon the death of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa and his son Fazıl Ahmed’s succession to the post of grand vizier (31 October/1 November 1661), Kara Mustafa Paşa was appointed grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet (kapudan-ı

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299 What we do know has been skillfully summarized in Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, which is not only an excellent overview of Kara Mustafa’s life and career, but also a very good guide past all the pitfalls in the European and Ottoman accounts recording his rise and fall. Also see Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i ʿOsmani (Istanbul: Matbaa-yi Amire, AH 1308-1316 / AD 1890-1898), 402, which, however, is erroneous in its chronology.

300 On the different positions Köprülü Mehmed Paşa held during these years see M. Tayyib Gökbilgin and R.C. Repp, “Köprülü”, EI2, v: 256a-63a (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 256b-57b.

301 A function which brought him into close contact with the sultan, since it involved the “care and maintenance of the sultan’s privy stable or khāşt ākbur located in the second court of the Topkapı Palace opposite the kitchens” and particularly of “a small number of exceptional show horses belonging to the sultan personally”: R. Murphey, “Mīr-ākbur”, EI2, vii: 88a. In this context it should be remembered that Sultan Mehmed IV was called avcı (“the hunter”) for good reason: J.H. Kramers, “Mehemmed IV”, EI2, iv: 982a-b.

302 For the regency of Tarhan Sultan and the Köprülü, see ibid.
which he remained until February 1666. While retaining his kapudanlık, he also became deputy grand vizier (sadaret kaymmakamı) during Fazıl Ahmed’s Hungarian campaign of 1663. This made him both the second and third highest ranking official of the empire. His tenure as grand admiral was largely taken up by naval preparations for Köprülü’s prolonged campaign for the final reduction of Venetian-held Crete (the last campaign in the drawn-out War over Candia, 1645-1669).

In the extensive reassignment of posts preceding the departure of the grand vizier’s army for Crete, Kara Mustafa was first removed from the office of kapudan and promoted to the rank of second vizier (February 1666), and subsequently made deputy grand vizier again (9 May 1666), which he remained for the full duration of the grand vizier’s absence from court (15 May 1666-27 June 1670). As during his kapudanpaşalık, Kara Mustafa’s activities as kaymmakam were aimed largely at sustaining the grand vizier’s efforts on Crete. Apart from the setback of being demoted to the rank of third vizier (31 July 1666) to make room for the promotion to second vizier of another favorite of the sultan, his tenure and standing at court seem to have been relatively secure during this period. After the capitulation of Crete (5 September 1669) and the grand vizier’s return to Edirne, Kara Mustafa was dismissed from his sadaret kaymmakamlığı, but maintained his rank and popularity with the sultan as a courtier and rikāb kaymmakamı (deputy of the stirrup). He joined the Polish campaign of 1672 as a reasonably successful commander, and was appointed chief plenipotentiary to negotiate a cessation of hostilities that turned out to be very favorable to the Ottomans (annexation of Podolia; protection of Ukraine). Although holding no high administrative office for some four years, his influence at court remained undiminished; as part of the circumcision festivities held in Edirne he was affianced to the sultan’s youngest daughter (i.e. became namzef, 29 May 1675).

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303 From April to November: Danişmand, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi 3, 431-32.
304 Ibid., 436-40.
305 Rikāb, literally meaning stirrup, was used to refer to “the service of the sultan or simply his presence”. “It is from this connection that we have the use of the words rikāb-i buynayın or rikāb in the sense of interim or substitute. When the Grand Vizier moved from place to place, the government was thought to go with him and there was appointed “to the sovereign a substitute for the Grand Vizier who was called rikab kā’immakami’t”. J. Deny, “Rikāb”, EI2, viii: 529a.
306 For descriptions of these festivities, at which all European representatives at the Porte (the Ottoman government) were expected to be present, see John Covel, “Extracts From the Diaries of Dr. John Covel, 1670-1679”, in: Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant, ed. J. Theodore Bent (London: Hakluyt Society, 1893), 171-…; and Yusuf Nabi, Vekâyi-i ibtan-i sebzadegan-i hazret-i sultan Mehmed Gâzî, available in transliteration as A.S.Levend, Yaṣuf Nabi’nin Surnameesi (İstanbul: n.p., 1944). Her name is given as “Küçük Sultan” by Heywood (id., “Karâ
The year 1676 marked the ending of the grand vizierate of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and his succession by Kara Mustafa Paşa. During the last phase of Ahmed Paşa’s illness, his public functions had already been taken over by Mustafa (from 28 July 1676 onwards). Then, on 3 November 1676 – while accompanying the sultan from Istanbul to Edirne in the capacity of yol kaymmakam – he received his appointment to the highest post of the empire; a post he held until his execution in Belgrade on 25 December 1683.

So when and how was it, that this promising statesman, so strongly connected to the Köprülü house and careers, and expected to continue the policies of his predecessors with respect to the European merchant communities residing in the empire, begot this reputation of terror?

Strikingly enough, it was not during his years as kapudan (23 December 1661-6/19 February 1666), an office which by its nature implied a considerable amount of contact with European shipping. What’s more, the port city of Izmir, home to the largest and richest European trading communities of the empire, was under threefold control of the kapudanpaşalık: The city itself was freehold property (basi) of the chief secretary of the admiralty (tersane-i ‘amire kethüdası), who administrated it through a kadi (judge cum civil administrator); the province (or sancak) of Suğla of which it was part, with its capital at Urla, was governed by a derya beyi (fleet governor) appointed by the kapudan and answerable to him alone; and as part of the kapudan’s beylerbeyilık (governor-generalship) the security of the city, its bay, its province, and even part of its hinterland and surrounding shorelines, the upkeep of its fortifications, and the availability of vital supplies were all the direct responsibility of the kapudan himself.307 We can be absolutely certain that the European communities and their consuls and ambassadors would have commented extensively upon any unfriendly behaviour. But even during Kara Mustafa’s active command in the region throughout 1662 nothing much out of the ordinary was reported.

It is at the very end of his service as kapudan and during his succeeding tenure as sadaret kaymmakam (9 May 1666-17 June 1670), that we start to hear the first complaints (308) about Kara Mustafa:

[He] was subsequently put in charge of naval preparations for the planned final reduction of Crete. His actions at this time, in attempting to commandeer for transport purposes ships of the European maritime powers, were resisted by their representatives at the Porte, and contributed materially to the exaggerated accounts concerning him which became current in Europe. 309

Although these commandeering actions were not taken lightly at the time, they were not the reason behind what Heywood rightly terms “the exaggerated accounts”. Naturally, there was much protesting and posturing. But after all was said and done, irritations had not run so high as to overcome prudence – as we may infer from the positive descriptions of kaymmakam Kara Mustafa of still later dates. The Europeans in the Levant were well aware of the sensitivity of the issue of Crete and of the immense importance the Porte attached to the final attempt to gain the entire island. As their petitions make clear, they also realised that in this, Kara Mustafa was merely following orders. At this point, the most irritating side to his behaviour would have been his unwillingness to accept bribes to make the commandeering-problems go away. This willingness to forgive (if not to forget) is evident in Colyer’s correspondence on the case of d’Onde Tobias (the ship “The Old Thobias”):

Having arrived in Izmir aboard a Dutch convoy of seven ships on 12 April 1668 to take up their positions as Dutch consul of Izmir and Dutch resident to Istanbul respectively, Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer were summoned before the local kadi on 30 April 1668. There, they were confronted with a ferman (command; order) from Istanbul drawn up “in the first quarter of the noble moon of Zilkade, in the year 1078”. 310 In it, kaymmakam Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, who had just returned from a

308 There had been some commandeering of French vessels in 1661, but this was rightly perceived to be a consequence of France’s strained relations with the Ottoman Empire during the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1645-1669. Duparc’s Recueil des instructions 29 provides a clear overview of the Ottoman-French controversy during this period.


310 Between 13 and 22 April 1668.
stay at Lárisa with the sultan\textsuperscript{311}, ordered the requisitioning of a Dutch ship for grain transports from Izmir to Köprülü’s besieging army on Crete:

Command of the Grand Signor, given to his kaymmakam of Constantinople, addressed to the kadi, kapıçibasi [commander of the guard], günêtik emini [customer; customs collector] and Dutch Consul of the scale or port of Smyrna. \textit{Be it known unto you that my highest order will be; that, it being very necessary at present that larger quantities of grain be sent to the island of Candia, 25,000 kilos of grain will be sent thither from the scale of Smyrna on a Dutch ship, being big and strong, which will be chartered, and the moneys needed to that end, will be taken, and you will pay those to them [the Dutch] out of the revenue of the aforementioned scale and the customs, and draw up a public act of the money given them. And my notable command also orders that the said grain be laden into the said ship as soon as possible, and will be dispatched in all hurry and haste to the said island, …\textsuperscript{312}

Van Dam and Colyer immediately went to work, attempting to have the order reversed. They petitioned the kadi of Izmir, the grand vizier, as well as his kethüda (steward; personal representative) Mahmad Ağa, calling upon them to honor the article of the Dutch capitulation designed to protect the Dutch against commandeering (\textit{angariye}; corvée) – but to no avail.

The Dutch capitulation then in force was that of 1612 (confirmed in 1634). The only article that dealt with commandeering was article 47:

\textit{ve kalyülnleri u gemileri her kangi iskelede olursa tamâm günêtiklerin \‘abdnâme midibince verdikden sonra ba'zı angariye içîn alikomayalar ve angariye teklîf eylemeyeler \}/ After their galleons and ships have paid full customs duties according to the capitulation in whatever scale it may be, they may not be detained for some corvée (angariye) nor may it be proposed.\textsuperscript{313}

Naturally, the kaymmakam was also aware of this article and had circumvented it by not exacting \textit{angariye} pure and simple, instead turning it into a forced lease, just as he had done, and would continue to do, in similar

\textsuperscript{311} “so as to observe more closely the progress of the siege of Kandiye”: Heywood, “Karâ Mustafa Pasha”, 590b.

\textsuperscript{312} See this dragoman’s translation and several other documents on the case in The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123, specifically: Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer to DLH, 5 May 1688. The Dutch had been relatively fortunate, as the French had already been forced to send eleven ships and several more requisitioned French and English ships were awaiting departure in Izmir harbor. The reason behind this bout of Ottoman commandeering was that the Venetians had recently destroyed seven large Ottoman ships off Crete: Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 527-29.

\textsuperscript{313} De Groot, \textit{Ottoman Empire}, 244 and 257. \textit{Angariye} (“angary” in English) is the requisitioning by a belligerent state of neutral possessions, and refers to the right of belligerents to destroy or use in case of need, neutral possessions within their territory or on the open seas, be it in defence or in attack: \textit{Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal op CD-Rom} (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 2000).
cases with the other European trading communities. But there is a more significant reason for the failure of the petitions; the near-complete control both the grand vizier and his deputy exerted over the chain of authorities involved in the order and in fact over practically every official concerned with the administration of foreign commerce. During the administrations of Köprülüızade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa the offices of poll-tax collector of Istanbul, poll-tax collector of Izmir and Chios, customs collector of Istanbul, customs collector of Izmir and Chios, and steward of the grand vizier were all firmly linked to each other, to the palace-faction (sultana-mother; valide) and through friendship, marriage, and employment to Fazıl Ahmed’s as well as Kara Mustafa’s households.314

Faced with so formidable a network of alliances, the Dutch stopped petitioning and decided to give in. In a general meeting of the Izmir nation it was decided to use “d’Oude Tobias”, the most run down barge they could muster.315 The nation bought the ship from its captain for 10,200 pieces of eight (reals), which it advanced with interest.316 In the end, the ship never made it past Chios for fear of cruising Venetian men-of-war. It had lain there for three months before Colyer, during his first audience with Kara Mustafa, pledged to indemnify the Ottomans for half its cargo and obtained permission to have it unloaded and released.317 The Old Thobias returned to home waters in 1669 and was never to return to the Levant again. Part of the 10,220 pieces of eight was recouped by reselling the ship to its captain, and the interest and costs of the ship’s release by collecting an additional consular duty of 1.25% from the next Dutch convoy to arrive in Izmir.318

6 May 1668, the day after the Dutch nation of Izmir had decided to place d’Oude Tobias at the Ottomans’ disposal and had agreed upon an apportionment of the projected costs of the resident’s first audience at court, Colyer embarked for Istanbul to take up his embassy. His ships arrived there on the 25th and he entered the city in procession on the 31st. After settling in, preparations immediately began for the journey to Edirne, where he and Van

314 See Table 15 infra.
315 As much is admitted in the correspondence home, but may also be verified from a list of all Dutch ships (incl. the ambassadorial and consular duties levied from them according to the worth of their cargo) that made port in Izmir between 12 April 1668 and 31 October 1671. The convoy under commodore Hendrik van Toll with which Van Dam and Colyer had arrived in Izmir, had included seven merchantmen; “The Old Thobias” was about 60% smaller than the bigger vessels in the convoy: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-9b: DLH to States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676.
316 In the Levant in 1668 the common exchange rate of the piece of eight, or (eight-)real, was about 110 akçes (that of the Lion Dollar 100 akçes). See note 320.
317 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a.
318 Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 537.
Dam would present their credentials.\(^{319}\) Having received 28,000 akçe from Kara Mustafa to meet preliminary expenses, Colyer and his train left for Edirne July 26\(^{th}\).\(^{320}\) Van Dam and his train left Izmir on the 19\(^{th}\) and the two parties met up outside Edirne on the 29\(^{th}\). During its stay in Edirne from 3 to 24 August, the Dutch delegation felt it was treated with extraordinary magnanimity, receiving gifts and treatment on equal footing with the representatives of the Porte’s most valued European allies, particularly from Kara Mustafa.\(^{321}\)

This partiality was also in evidence during Colyer’s audience with him; he not only received the resident with courtesy, but also accorded to Colyer’s every request concerning mercantile affairs, issuing four dragomans’ berats to Colyer and no less than fifteen ferman’s in favour of the Dutch to several Ottoman officials in Istanbul, Izmir and Chios.\(^{322}\) When he left Edirne, Colyer had good reason to look upon Kara Mustafa as positively as he did.

The remainder of Kara Mustafa’s tenure as kaymakam passed without the Dutch coming into any major conflict with him. In the course of 1669 and 1670, there were some trade related disputes between a number of Dutch factors of Izmir and their Ottoman creditors, felt by the Dutch to have been

\(^{319}\) For the full account of Colyer’s arrival in Istanbul and his audiences at Edirne, see Colyer, *Oprecht journael*.

\(^{320}\) The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 53b-54a. In the Levant in 1668 28,000 akçe were worth about 120 Venetian ducats, 255 Spanish eight-reals, or 280 Dutch Lion Dollars: Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 144. According to Colyer’s account of 17 September 1668, the total expenses of the audience amounted to 7,500 Lion Dollars: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 73a. This amounted to slightly more than Colyer’s total annual salary as it was fixed in 1675 - 5,000 eight-reals and 7,500 guilders: Schutte, *Repertorium*, 308. At the time one eight-real was reckoned worth slightly more than 2.5 guilders (a rix-dollar). By way of comparison, the fixed part of the salary of the kadi of Izmir was 500 akçe per day (appr. 1,825 Lion Dollars a year), a captain or a pilot in the service of the Dutch navy received a monthly salary of about 30 guilders (appr. 144 Lion Dollars a year), a sailor of about 11 guilders a month (appr. 52 Lion Dollars a year): respectively, Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89: “Ve beş yüz akçe mevleviyetdir”; J.G. van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en Regenten* (The Hague: Martinus Niijhoff, 1970), 439-80; and C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800* (London: Hutchinson, 1965), 337-41.

\(^{321}\) These were specified as the German Emperor, the Grand Duke of Moscovy and the King of Poland. Kara Mustafa bestowed 25 vests (tabards) upon them, which was a considerable honor since the French and English had never received more than 12. Gifts from the sultan included 10 live sheep, 100 hens, 50 white breads, 20 sugar breads, 20 wax candles, 25 eight-reals a day for the table, 230 eight-reals for furniture: W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Eenige lotgevallen van Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna van 1668-1688”, *Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde*, 4/6 (1907), 102-3.

\(^{322}\) Normally, audiences would be given by the sultan and his grand vizier, but since Fazıl Ahmed was in Crete conducting the siege, deputy grand vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa observed his functions. These dragomans’ berats (diplomas for the embassy’s interpreters) and ferman’s (imperial orders) have all been lost, but fortunately an elaborate description of their contents does still exist in The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a.
instigated by the kadi of Izmir for his own profit. Kara Mustafa’s involvement in these seems to have been limited to adjusting them; that is, to negotiating settlements between the parties (informally) as referee and (formally) as acting president of the divan-i himayun (“the imperial council”; the Ottoman cabinet and supreme court in Istanbul). Although the rulings in all these cases were in favour of the Dutch, there was some irritation about the expenses they had to make to get the cases heard to begin with, and about the “fees” Kara Mustafa charged for his services.

In March 1670 all European ships then in the harbour of Izmir were commandeered for troop transport. This time the order came directly from Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, who was demobilising his army from Crete after its capitulation (4 September 1669). Consul van Dam managed to get a number of ships sailing under the Dutch flag released from this duty by sending his chief dragoman to Crete with a petition and some presents. Some problems with the kadi of Izmir aside, matters were resolved with relative ease. Kara Mustafa, whose importance as kaymmakam was declining steadily as the grand vizier resumed the reins of government, was not involved.

Upon his brother’s return to the court in Edirne in 27 June 1670, Kara Mustafa was relieved of his office of sadaret kaymmakami. Perhaps having fallen out of favour with Fazıl Ahmed (for having schemed against him during his long absence, it was rumoured), he was removed from real administrative power. But the grand vizier did not stop there; he also loosened Kara Mustafa’s grip on the administration of foreign trade by ridding himself of his “particular friend” customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), for whom Kara Mustafa had procured promotion from the Izmir to the Istanbul customs.

Just as the war with Venice over Crete had prompted his father Mehmed Köprülü to invest in Izmir’s defences (325), so Fazıl Ahmed now focussed his attention on the city and initiated the Izmir-leg of his vakf’s construction program. The new bedestan and gümrük were completed in 1675, but building

323 See generally, The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6911; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676 204b-9b; id. 684, 73b-80a; Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 533-38.
324 The customs collector of Istanbul was also the empire’s chief customs collector, to whom all other customs collectors were answerable. These officials were tax-farmers; they purchased their “farm” (iltizam), i.e. their right to collect customs, on an annual basis through a bidding procedure. The relation between Kara Mustafa and Hüseyin Ağa (I) figures prominently in all contemporary accounts, but see Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 123 and 170-71 in particular. Galland tells us Hüseyin Ağa felt the grand vizier might move against him and left his post to make the pilgrimage (hac), which was a common method of officials out-of-favour to get out of the way before they got hurt.
325 On Mehmed’s strengthening of Izmir’s defences, see ibid., 103; and Iconomos, Étude sur Smyrne, 42-43.
on the other structures continued under Kara Mustafa’s supervision until their completion in 1677. This meant that the introduction and enforcement of the accompanying procedures was left up to Kara Mustafa, whose reputation in the eyes of the Europeans would diminish considerably because of his determination to position the vakf and make the most of its potential for trade regulation and taxation.

Kara Mustafa Paşa had survived the reversal which had been the result of the return of the grand vizier through the personal protection of the sultan. After two years at court he rebuilt his career during Fazıl Ahmed’s Polish campaigns, in which the sultan took an active interest. During these campaigns he proved himself a capable commander and tough negotiator. In 1672 he concluded a cessation of hostilities with the Poles at Buçaz (Buczacz), which was so harsh that the Polish Diet refused to ratify it, opening the door to the Polish and Ukrainian campaigns of ’73, ’74, ’75 and ’76. As the grand vizier’s health declined (from November 1674 onwards) Kara Mustafa’s power increased, a process culminating in his assuming the functions of grand vizier in July 1676 and finally in his appointment to the grand vizierate in November of the same year.

The first months of Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate were spent in Edirne; with the latest news from court reaching the European representatives in Istanbul through their own and the Porte’s dragomans. A change of grand viziers usually brought about considerable changes in the empire’s key posts and all news was feverishly analysed for hints of the new administration’s policy regarding European political and mercantile affairs. 31 January 1677, Colyer first reported home on the subject:

The changes regarding the high ministers of this realm since my last of 9 November of the previous year, are the following. The paşas or governors of places and frontiers adjoining Christendom have been moved and have most been sent to other governorships in Asia Minor. The kaymamak of Constantinople, kapudan paşa, or admiral of the sea, and the bostancıbaşı, being the chief forester, have all been continued in their charges. Süleyman Ağa, chief secretary [kethüda] of the late grand vizier, has been made master of the great stable [büyük mirahor]. One of the sultanas or concubines of the grand signor, called the wife sultana [haseki sultan], was delivered of a young princess. The paşa, recently appointed by the Porte over that of Tunis, was violently rejected by its inhabitants, and has returned here. That paşa, to obtain that governorship, spent vast treasures, and principally to the aforesaid Süleyman Ağa, who alone enjoyed 600 purses from him, each purse being 500 rix-dollars. The current grand vizier having become acquainted with this, as well as with the exorbitant moneys that the bostancıbaşı of Adrianople, one of the favourites of the grand signor [the sultan], who was to construct a new building there for the sultan’s women

327 Gökbilgin and Repp, “Köprülü”, 260b; and Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 590b.
(during the emperors stay here last year), is charging for it, has brought both great men to account; such that much is feared for their persons. The entire court will return here towards the month of March, at which time the Christian ministers will have to personally congratulate him on his high office with extra presents.328

All considered, Colyer thought it safe to conclude that Kara Mustafa would continue most of the policies of his predecessor, and it was hoped that this would be in the same spirit of uprightness for which Fazıl Ahmed Paşa was remembered, by the Dutch and the English at least. The almost immediate reappointment of Hüseyin Ağa (I) as chief customs collector, although not welcomed in equal measure by all European merchant communities, seemed at least to confirm their expectations. Less then a month after the new grand vizier’s festive return from Edirne of April 12th, French ambassador De Nointel, ranking highest among the European representatives in Ottoman protocol, was the first to put the assessment of the corps diplomatique to the test.

Because of their at times barely concealed sympathy and even intelligence and military support for the Austrians during the 1664 Battle of Saint Gotthard and for the Venetian defenders’ efforts on Crete, the French had not been on good footing with the Köprülüüs. Previous French ambassadors had personally suffered the consequences of their own and their king’s actions, to the extent of being imprisoned in Istanbul’s Yedikule tower.329 In spite of this recent history, Louis XIV and Colbert had developed great designs for the Levant and for the future of Ottoman-French trade and relations, and expected the Ottomans to cooperate. The plan was to gain a complete French monopoly of the Levant trade and full and exclusive access to the Red Sea and the overland trading routes connecting the Mediterranean to the Far East. With these instruments the French would displace the other European trading nations from the Levant as well as the East India trades. In this vision, the Ottomans would cooperate for the sole purpose of increasing tax revenue: they would have greater control over the flow of trade through their domains, with the added advantage of adding to their revenue taxes from the rerouted Cape trade now flowing through their territories. Apart from the Ottomans’ commitment to these grandiose designs, ambassador De Nointel (1670-1679) was expected to obtain the Porte’s sincere apologies for its treatment of his predecessors, and acknowledgment of his status as equal to the sultan and as standing above all other rulers.

328 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Justinus Colyer to States General, 31 January 1677; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 31 January 1677.

329 On Ottoman-French relations during the grand vizierates of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa, Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, see Vandal, Odyssey d’un ambassadeur, i-xvi, and xiii for the yedikule episode).
Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü had no intention of signing over the empire’s entire international trade to one nation for the delusion of gaining more power through it. Aiding France as it was engaged in a series of wars for the domination of Europe’s richest entrepot the Dutch Republic (the Franco-Dutch and Franco-Allied wars of 1672-1678) was not an attractive proposition to the Ottomans. This not least since France had proven itself fickle in its friendship during his own and his fathers Cretan and Austrian campaigns, and since the king of France was arrogating for himself a rank equal to his own lord’s. He had renewed France’s capitulation in 1673, giving it rights equal to the English and confirming its right to protect French clergy in the Ottoman Empire (which, incidentally, they went on to willfully misinterpret as their right to protect all Christians in the Ottoman empire, including those – Orthodox, Protestants – that had strayed from the mother church) and had left it at that. Now, with a new grand vizier heading government, De Nointel was ordered to see if he could revive their plans, at the very least (re)gaining undisputed precedence over the representatives of all other nations.

Due to De Nointel’s insistence on an adjustment of protocol in favour of the French, his audience of 2 May 1677 ended in utter disaster, wasting any chance of French diplomatic success with the Ottomans for years to come and destroying De Nointel’s career in the process. The Dutch resident gleefully described the audience and the subsequent course of events in a letter to the Board of Directors of Levant Trade, dated 24 May 1677, which merits extensive quotation because of the insight it provides into Kara Mustafa’s politics and the European envoys’ response to it:

The second instant [2 May 1677] the first audience with the current grand vizier was permitted to the Lord ambassador of France; who, having ridden on horseback from his palace [the French embassy in Pera] to the channel [the Golden Horn] with very great pomp in the morning, having passed the same in twenty barges, and having arrived in that prince’s seraglio [serail], was led into the room of the kethüda or chief secretary of the grand vizier, where he was told to await the return of His Excellency from the divan (being the [supreme] court). Three hours had passed before the said minister was advised that the grand vizier had left the divan, and another hour before he was advised to come to the audience chamber. This long and unusual waiting being perceived as an affront (which it indeed is) by the French ambassador, deliberately inflicted on him in the presence of the assorted nations, His Excellency, entering de said audience chamber and seeing the seat of the grand vizier (being a bench or stool on top of a large sofa covered with tapestries, which is a place elevated one and a half feet) and his own beneath the said sofa on the floor, at once instructed his chief dragoman to pick the bench up and place it on top in the front of the sofa. Which having been thus executed, His Excellency too stepped onto the sofa, and intending to seat himself on the stool, was at once given notice that his place was not on top, but beneath the aforementioned sofa. This disconcerted the said ambassador to such a degree that he himself took the said stool up from the front of the sofa, and placed it close and to the right-hand side of the seat or bench of the grand vizier (which was high above), at once
seating himself on it. Many great men of the empire being present there, and the grand vizier having been informed by them and by his chief page of that act, immediately ordered Mr. Alexander Mavrocordati [Mavrocordato], chief dragoman of the realm, to explain to the ambassador his error and add that he should kindly refrain from an action so extravagant. But this falling on deaf ears, the çavuşbaşi, being the chief executor of orders, was commanded to de facto remove the said stool from the sofa and put it down on the floor where it had been placed before. He [the çavuşbaşi] presently and with great fury appeared in the audience chamber and in a loud voice, and with an attitude of perfect contempt for his people, ordered the said bench (on which the ambassador was seated) to be taken from under him. Which was executed with such skill that the Lord ambassador could scarcely save himself from tumbling down. Seeing himself stripped of all honour and civility, but on top of that showered with all sorts of public ignominy and vicissitudes, and doubtlessly fearing worse, he stepped off the said sofa and departed, saying in parting that (if he were treated in such a fashion) he did not even want an audience with the grand vizier. Which having been reported to His Excellency, prompted the following response from him: let him have it with him who be damned, then. The following afternoon and evening the grand vizier, of his own accord and with great courtesy, had the Lords ambassadors of England and of Venice, as well as the States General’s minister, yours truly, informed of his wish to receive them the next day. To this day, this courtesy has never been practiced by any grand vizier. But the current, after all being no less highly placed than his predecessors, wanted merely to find out how the other ministers would look upon the encounter described above. The Lord English ambassador responded that his indisposition didn’t allow him to perform the said call, this because (so I have been informed), firstly, the grand vizier had given precedence to France in that ceremony, and, secondly, that he, being an ambassador of a king who did not yield to France, now found himself implicated in the actions of the said French ambassador. The Lord ambassador of Venice, and the States General’s minister have not felt those impediments, and as a consequence have not attached ourselves to the circumstances of another, but have in this adhered to the old custom, namely that the Christian ministers, be they from a king or from a republic, in their first audience with a newly appointed grand vizier of this realm are generally received below the sofa. And had the Lord ambassador of France not previously been treated with such disdain as having to wait for so long, I am sure that he would not have let himself be carried to such extremities. The 3 instant [3 May 1677] at ten in the morning the aforesaid Venetian minister had his audience seated on a stool below the sofa, during which some difficulties occurred because the chief dragoman of that republic wanting to mediate, the grand vizier objected and ordered the abovementioned Mr. Mavrocordati to relate what the ambassador wanted to make known. At first not being obeyed in this, the affair stood to end very badly for the chief dragoman on account of the grand vizier’s quick-temperedness, but the Lord ambassador prevented this with great foresight by shortening his compliment. Colyer had his own audience that same day and was again received with exceptional courtesy, being allowed as a mark of respect to ride his horse through the palace gate, past the guardsmen and officials lined up across the outer court, and right up to the palace steps where he was received by the

330 The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 24 May 1677.
Porte’s abovementioned chief dragoman, Mavrocordato. He was not taken to the steward’s office to wait, but was led straightway to the audience chamber, where he was again welcomed by Mavrocordato, who showed him his stool beneath the sofa and introduced him to the chief officials of the empire. The grand vizier presently appeared amid loud cheers, greeted the ambassador in passing by bringing his right hand to his chest and bowing his head, and stepped onto the sofa. The grand vizier’s bench and Colyer’s stool were picked up and put directly opposite one another, one on top of the sofa, the other below it. Being seated, Kara Mustafa personally bid him welcome, referring to him as “Lord ambassador” (“elçi bey”). Colyer thanked him, congratulated him on his appointment, and presented him with the required gifts. While coffee, sherbet, rose water and incense were brought in and taken, he and Kara Mustafa Paşa discussed Europe’s current wars, with Mavrocordato interpreting the whole time. The audience ended with the usual ceremony, the grand vizier taking his leave of Colyer with two nods of the head.331

Regarding the French and English ambassadors’ audiences, Colyer tells us that De Nointel afterwards tried to obtain another audience by “capitulating” on the subject of the stool, but was denied one, while the English ambassador, John Finch, had gone into hiding in his country house. He also mentions that the resident of Genoa had not been able to obtain an audience.332 Colyer ends his letter with the remark that “the government under the current vizier will to all appearances be very severe”, which, however, was not in reference to his contacts with Europe, but to the methods by which he eliminated any internal threat to his position, as is illustrated by a list of the high Ottoman officials whose severed heads had recently been displayed in front of the palace and in Istanbul’s public places.

It is at this juncture that we see Kara Mustafa’s reputation receive its first serious and irreversible dents; less than a year into his grand vizierate and as a direct consequence of his first rapports in that capacity with the European representatives in Istanbul. The failed audience exasperated De Nointel and Finch (who had inadvertently and without necessity allowed himself to be drawn into a similar position). Stalling audiences was a proven tactic of the

331 On Ottoman ceremony in general, see A.H. de Groot, “Marāsim, 4: In the Ottoman Empire”, EI2, vi: 529b-32a; and Ö. Nutku, “Mawākib, 4: In the Ottoman Empire”, EI2, vi: 858a-65b. The ceremony used by Kara Mustafa Paşa in receiving Ottoman grandees is described in Galland, Journal, ii: 199-200 and 204-5 (“Les différentes manières de recevoir le Grand Seigneur, le Visir, le Moufti et les autres”).

332 The episode figures prominently in all contemporary diplomatic correspondence from Istanbul, as well as in histories of the period; see the bibliography, e.g., Masson, Histoire du commerce; Vandal, Odyssee d’un ambassadeur; Duparc’s Recueil des instructions 29; North, Life, 74-76; Abbott, Under the Turk.
Ottomans to gain space for political manoeuvring and to make it clear to the Europeans that audiences and privileges were not a right but a grant. But categorically being denied an audience was something usually reserved for states on the brink of war with the Ottomans. Strictly speaking, it rendered the capitulations of the states involved worthless. For without confirmation of their privileges, the ambassadors had no supreme authority to turn to in case of disputes.

In their letters home, both the English and French ambassadors attributed what had happened exclusively to what they considered to be the base character and ignorance of the grand vizier. Capitalising on prejudices prevalent in Europe at the time to masquerade their own inadequate handling of the affair, they suggested that the cause of the grand vizier’s refusal to grant them an audience was the “proverbial arrogance and avidity of the Turks”; meaning that he was trying to find out what they would be willing to sacrifice for a second chance and took pleasure in humiliating them. Unfortunately, these biased explanations have found their way into even much of the more recent literature on Kara Mustafa Paşâ, in which he is invariably described as an extortionate xenophobe. Explanations like these, however, ignore the fact that Colyer had no problems whatsoever during his audience; quite the contrary. To ascribe this to his willingness to go along with Kara Mustafa in sitting below the sofa or in using the Porte’s dragoman Mavrocordato is also not quite convincing, for it fails to account for the marked difference between the events preceding the actual audience of De Nointel and that of Colyer.

If we credit Kara Mustafa with slightly more capabilities and insight, and take the international arena in which he was operating into consideration, a more realistic picture emerges. In light of the evidence available on his conduct throughout his grand vizierate, we may certainly assume that, confronted with the excessive demands of Louis XIV and his ambassador, he did his utmost best to press home the point that the sultan and his ministers considered themselves superior to the French king and his emissary. But any explanation of what took place during and following these audiences, should also take into account Kara Mustafa’s preoccupation with European affairs and their bearing on the Ottoman position. Not only was his grand vizierate marked by an endless succession of campaigns against Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, this preoccupation was also evident in his diplomatic contacts with Europe. In this respect, it is more than revealing that he continued Fazıl Ahmed Paşâ’s experienced foreign affairs advisor Mavrocordato, and, what’s more, personally insisted on making active use of his expertise in all his contacts with the European envoys.333 If we add to this

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333 The Phanariote Alexander Mavrocordato (1637-1719) succeeded Panagiotis (Panaioti Nicousios) to the office of imperial dragoman in 1673. Having studied medicine in Padua, he
the fact that in giving audiences Kara Mustafa regularly inquired after the latest political and military developments in Europe and – in doing so – proved well-informed about its wars (334), it becomes clear that his diverging treatment of De Nointel and Colyer must be considered a calculated political act. After all, the Dutch were fighting a war for their very survival as an independent nation against an alliance headed by France, and this survival was considered by many as a crucial obstacle to any further increase in the French king’s power and realm. All of which is not to say that Kara Mustafa’s diplomacy was as clever as his predecessors.

Almost seven months later, the antagonism that was the result of the events of 2 and 3 May had still not been mended. 25 November 1677 saw the end of the month of Ramadan and the start of the festivities marking the breaking of the fast (şeker bayramı). On this day, the foreign envoys usually sent their dragomans to congratulate the grand vizier during an audience and present him with gifts to a certain fixed value. But the interpreters of English ambassador (Finch) and Genoese resident (Spinola) were refused their audiences: the former because his employer had avoided having his ever since the “stool”-incident, the latter because he had already been in Istanbul for two and a half years without having presented his credentials and the gifts from his kral (king).335 Here too, it was claimed that the sole motive behind Kara Mustafa’s behavior was his lust for money. But just as with the first audiences discussed above, the grand vizier’s treatment of the Dutch and Venetians contradicts this.

After intense negotiations the grand vizier agreed to receive Finch and Spinola as soon as possible (but without setting a date), provided they compensated for their previous disrespect by adding to their usual gifts “current gold sequins” to the value of 5,000 Lion Dollars for the grand vizier, and the same to the value of 1,000 Lion Dollars for the grand vizier’s steward and the reis ül-küttab (secretary of state). This increase in gifts worried was not only Fazıl Ahmed’s and Kara Mustafa’s foreign affairs advisor but also their, as well as the sultan’s, personal physician. On the Phanariotes, see J.H. Mordtmann, “Fener”, El2, ii: 879b-80a. On Panagiotis, see Galland, Journal, i: 18n1-19. On Mavrocordato, see Stourdza, Europe Orientale.


335 The reason for this is not entirely clear. Colyer claims it was because the Genoese resident did not want to present the required gifts to Kara Mustafa Paşa: The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 December 1677. This is not unlikely, since the value of Genoese trade, and thereby of the amount of money the resident could spend on relations, had become negligible when compared to that of France, England or Holland. This will have made it very difficult for the Genoese to keep up with these competitors in spending, and would have required the resident to advance the costs involved without being certain of their repayment by the home authorities, with no small chance of bankrupting him.
the other representatives, who complained that the English and Genoese had increased their gifts regardless of the consequences of their actions for the other nations. Their worries proved premature however, for the presents offered by Colyer and Venetian bailo Morosini were graciously received, although they had not been increased.\textsuperscript{336}

Up until this point, the European representatives in Istanbul had not been unanimous in condemning Kara Mustafa Paşa. The rather obvious distinction between those denouncing him and those considering him as severe but fair a grand vizier as his predecessor, was whether they were treated as representing allies or foes. This in its turn depended on the geopolitical situation as well as on the manner in which they approached him.

This changed between 1 and 18 January 1678. On that last day, Colyer informed the States General that “every day, we see the maxims of this present government incline more and more to the extreme prejudice of all Christian nations”. The immediate cause of his alarm was an order (ferman) issued by the grand vizier:

\textit{Now the grand vizier at the beginning of this month had notice given to all Christian public ministers that each of them should hand over to a specially commissioned kadi a list of all his merchants that had got married in these parts, of the names and number of his dragomans, and of the names and number of his indigenous servants; and also that all consuls and dragomans of the entire realm would within the space of three months have to request new berats from the Porte on pains of being considered ordinary subjects; and, regarding the dragomans of this country, that they will have to pay the haraç to which all natives of the realm that are not Turks [i.e. Muslims] are liable, which is in direct violation of all capitulations.}\textsuperscript{337} And for all these matters no other explanation can be given, except that it is the will of him who holds the power to carry them out. The specific purpose of which is to bring all Christian [i.e. European] merchants that have contracted marriages here under the said haraç, and to gain a good sum of money from the new berats.

For fear of new avanias, all public ministers have provided the aforementioned lists to the

\textsuperscript{336} The “usual” gifts, to which the English and Genoese had added now added money, consisted in “gold, and woollen cloth, as well as satin and tabby [watered taffeta] vests”. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{337} Although the existence of this ferman is widely attested in both archival and printed sources (but erroneously as having been issued in December 1677), I have so far not been able to locate an Ottoman copy or original. Nevertheless, we can claim with some certainty that it did not order haraç to be levied from all dragomans in the service of European ambassadors and consuls regardless (“and, regarding the dragomans of this country, that they will have to pay the haraç to which all natives of the realm that are not Turks [Muslims] are liable”). Considering the tendentious nature of Colyer’s correspondence on the matter (see infra), it is more likely that what is discussed here, is a further qualification of the previous sentence, and in reference to those dragomans that have upon re-examination not been considered eligible for new berats since they were not actually dragomans but only held their posts nominally.

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said kadi, and undertaken to convey orders to their respective consuls and dragomans residing beyond this place [Istanbul] to comply with the notice given.\textsuperscript{338}

The \textit{ferman} caused considerable distress among the European communities of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman subjects that were under their protection. Not so much because of the measures it dictated, but because of their wider implications. The \textit{baraç} tax was not a financial burden the Europeans and their protégés would not be able to bear.\textsuperscript{339} Similarly, obtaining new \textit{berat} – though more costly – was also not an insurmountable financial drain on the embassies since they would be reimbursed by selling them to the recipients.

The real problem was that the plans of the grand vizier, if carried through, would disrupt the entire system that enabled the European merchant communities to conduct their trade through their Ottoman connections. As we have seen, European merchants in the Ottoman Empire conducted their trade through Ottoman wholesalers and brokers with the assistance of Ottoman dragomans and warehousemen, all of them protected non-Muslims (\textit{zimmis}). These Greek, Armenian and Jewish Ottoman middlemen were drawn with the Europeans by virtue of those articles of the capitulations that offered to Ottoman personnel of European embassies and consulates the same exemption from Ottoman taxes it did to protected foreigners (\textit{müstemim}). Although many of these Ottoman connections were not exactly personnel, they were extended this European protection through nomination to a “nominal” dragomanship or vice-consulship by one of the European representatives in Istanbul, with conferral of their office being effected with a \textit{berat} granted by the Ottoman central administration. In this context, the question of their having to pay \textit{baraç} or not was not merely one of purchasing the protection of the Muslim ruler (here; the Ottoman sultan) for a few dollars, but encompassed further liability to a number of commercial dues and taxes (\textit{tekalif-i örfiyye}) which

\textsuperscript{338} The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 18 January 1678 (my translation).

\textsuperscript{339} The non-Muslims of Izmir, for instance, are reported to have paid it at a rate of 2 to 4 Lion Dollars annually. On the non-Muslim communities of Izmir and the \textit{baraç} they paid, see Ülker, \textit{Rise of Izmir}, 230-34; Galland, \textit{Voyage à Smyrne}, 135-43; and De Bruyn, \textit{Reizen}, 153. See also Claude Cahen and Halil İnalci, “Djizya, 1: General; and 2: Ottoman”, \textit{EI2}, ii: 559a-565b, which confirms the amounts. It has to be kept in mind, however, that these were nominal rates; the actual rate at which a given individual paid, could vary considerably, depending on what nation he belonged to and the arrangements that nation made internally to fulfill its fiscal obligations \textit{en group}. Thus, Galland, \textit{Voyage à Smyrne}, 136 and 140-41 tells us it was customary for the Jewish and Greek \textit{taifes} to exempt their religious leaders from the tax and make up for the difference by increasing the burden for others. Similarly, the richer members of a \textit{taife} (among which were the – officially exempt – dragomans) could be expected to contribute in proportion to their wealth to spare poorer ones.
could amount to much more. Liability to those taxes would effectively negate the competitive edge they had gained through European protection.\textsuperscript{340}

But as we have seen, the Ottoman “employees” of the Europeans were not the only ones the \textit{ferman} was aimed at: European merchants that had taken \textit{zimmi} wives were also to be subjected to \textit{haraç}. Such a measure would effectively “naturalize” those merchants and their families to Ottoman subjects. This was not only of great consequence for the merchants themselves, but also for the European officials representing them, since they stood to lose some of their richest subjects.

The articles of the capitulations which Colyer and his colleagues claimed the order was in contravention of (but to which the Ottoman government and its poll-tax collectors no doubt considered it a long overdue specification), ran as follows (in the Dutch capitulation in force at the time):

\begin{itemize}
  \item [art. 32:] ve anlara tābī olub memālīk-i mabriṣemizde mümtemekkin olanlar eger evlū olsun ve ergen olsun rıchverlik edenler anlardan harāc taleb olunmaya
  \item [art. 33:] ve ɛlçileri bidmetinde olan kûnsluslar ve ɛrcümānlar olageldiği üzere barācdan ve kassābīyyeden ve tekalīf-i ‘ırfiyyeden mu’af olalar
  \item [art. 34:] ve Ɂıskenderiyye ve Tarābulus-i Şām ve Ɂezā’ır ve Ɂınus ve Ɂezā’ır-garb ve Mısır iskence ve Ɂ各地lar ta’līf-i ‘ırfiyyeden kûnsluslar’ın tebdīl edilb gönderdikde kimesne māni’ olmaya
  \item [art. 32:] From the subjects of the [Dutch Provinces] who have become residents in our well-guarded dominions, whether married or bachelor, and exercising trade, tribute (harāc) may not be demanded.
  \item [art. 33:] The consuls and dragomans who are employed by their ambassador are exempt from tribute, kassābīyye-tax and extraordinary taxes (tekalīf-i ‘ırfiyye), as has become usual.
  \item [art. 34:] Nobody may present obstacles when [the Dutch] appoint consuls to the scales of Alexandria, Tripoli of Syria, the Archipelago, Tunis, Algiers, Cairo and other places, change them, appoint men capable of such a task in those places and despatch them.\textsuperscript{341}
\end{itemize}

The first thing we must conclude from these articles, is that the order was not in direct contravention of them. The capitulations were susceptible to varying interpretations depending on many circumstances, such as the goodwill of local officials or the Porte, the conduct of the European merchants or nations in question, etc..

With regard to article 32, the Europeans claimed they could marry whomever they wished, whether they were subjects of the sultan or not.

\textsuperscript{340} On the protection system, see, generally, Maurits Hubrecht van den Boogert, “Ottoman Dragomans and European Consuls: The Protection System in Eighteenth-Century Aleppo” (PhD diss., Universiteit Leiden, 2001). For further reference to the protection system and \textit{haraç}, see İnalcık, “İmțiyyâzâr”; J. Schacht, “Amān”, \textit{EI\textsuperscript{2}}, i: 429a-30a; L. Fekete, “Berāt”, \textit{EI\textsuperscript{2}}, i: 1170a-71a; B. Lewis, “Berāt”, \textit{EI\textsuperscript{2}}, i: 1171b; Cahen, “Dhîmma”; Cahen and İnalcık, “Djizya”.

\textsuperscript{341} Transliteration and translation: De Groot, \textit{Ottoman Empire}, 241-42 and 255.
Although their assertion had legality beyond the capitulations (342), this had always remained a controversial matter and there had been many cases where a tax-collector, kadi, or governor had tested the proportionate strength of both principles by trying to levy baraq or other taxes reserved for Ottoman subjects such as inheritance-tax (kassamiye; resm-i kismet). Such cases then had to be resolved by giving presents and bribes to the officials involved, or to various officials in the central administration to obtain an order confirming the applicability of the capitulary article in question. Since this had to be done with some regularity, the European trade organisations pressed the ambassadors and consuls to discourage and prevent as much as possible such “mixed” marriages.344 That this policy did not succeed we can infer from the frequent reiteration of orders to that effect.

The ferman was also not in direct violation of articles 33 and 34, since it did not order all Ottoman dragomans and vice-consuls to be made liable to baraq. As indicated above, this would have meant completely lifting their protection, making it virtually impossible for them to exercise their duties.

342 Accord. Khadduri, War and peace, a summary of Islamic jurisprudence and Ottoman law on relations between Muslims and non-Muslims: “Once the harbī becomes a musta’mīn, he is allowed to bring with him his family and children; to visit any city of dār al-Islām except the holy cities of the Hijāz; to reside permanently in dār al-Islām, if he accepted the status of dhimmī and paid the jizya; and to marry a dhimmī woman and take her back with him to dār al-harb (conversely, if the harbī were a woman and married a dhimmī man, she had no right to take him with her to dār al-harb since this might constitute potential power for use against dār al-Islām).” (166) and “If the musta’mīn, after he returned to dār al-harb, leaving his property in the dār al-Islām, suddenly died; his property could not be taken out of dār al-Islām by his heirs; instead, it would be confiscated by the State. But if the musta’mīn died while he was in the dār al-Islām, the amān granted was still valid for his property; his heirs could therefore take it out of the dār al-Islām if they wanted to do so.” (168).

343 See Cengiz Orhonlu, “Kassāmā”, EI2, iv: 735b-6a; and İnalcık, “İmtiyāzāt”. The articles in the Dutch capitulation of 1612 exempting the inheritances of Dutch subjects from kassamiye, or from seizure by the sultan if there were no known/recognized heirs, ran; “[art. 7:] If a subject of the Dutch Provinces dies, Treasury officials may not interfere with his goods contrary to the capitulation, saying that they are the property of unknown owners, or on any other pretext.”, “[art. 9:] The dividers of inheritances (kassāmā) and the cadis may not demand the duty on the division of inheritance.”, and “[art. 29:] If a person dies, his goods and possessions must be given to whom he has bequeathed them. If a person dies intestate, they must be given to his local partner by way of his consul. Nobody may interfere”: De Groot, Ottoman Empire, 251 and 254, transliteration on 238 and 241.

344 Two such cases are discussed extensively in my “Towards Classifying Avanias”. Daniel-Jan de Hochepied tells us that consular protection was henceforth withdrawn from English and Dutch merchants who had taken local wives (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 49a-50a). For instructions concerning such marriages and the actions to be taken against merchants contracting them, see the States General’s draft regulation of 1673 and order of 1675 in W.E. van Dam van Isselt, “Het ontwerp-regeeringsreglement voor de Levant van 1673 en het Formulier van 1675”, Bijdragen voor vaderlandsche geschiedenis en oudheidkunde, 4/6 (1907), 407-28; and the Levant Company’s instructions to James Chandos (John Finch’s successor to the Istanbul embassy): Kew, NA SP 105 145, 82-92.
We can be absolutely certain that the Porte had no intention of dislocating the foreign trade of the empire by making it impossible for the Europeans to function within the Ottoman context. Therefore, we may safely discount Colyer’s assertion to the contrary as an exaggeration designed to alert the home front to the seriousness of the problem.

As becomes clear from Colyer’s further correspondence on the matter (and as is corroborated by a number of other sources), the grand vizier’s order was aimed at curbing the practice of the European representatives of selling berats (for nominal positions), which was rightly perceived to erode the Ottoman tax-base. However modest the losses might have been when compared to the 19th-century protection system, the phenomenon clearly worried Kara Mustafa. On March 13th, Colyer further informed the States General about the matter:

More and more each day, they continue to treat the Christian nations here very badly, and to utterly destroy the capitulations with the sole purpose of eventually making not only all our merchants, be they married or bachelor, tributaries of this realm, but also of subjecting them to its laws, thereby extracting their masters’ subjects and goods from the jurisdiction of their respective Christian ministers to the total ruin of all commerce. Our and the other capitulations clearly state that married and single Franks [Western Europeans] should not be made to pay baras, which is tribute. This, the grand vizier has now interpreted to the contrary with regard to those married, and has given strict order to collect the tribute from them. By this they are brought under the law of the land, outside our protection, and their goods in life as in death under the violence of the Turks. All complaints, arguments and remonstrances were rejected, and the requested audiences about this with the grand vizier were refused with threats. All ministers are stuck and stand with their hands tied, and the dragomans dare not raise the matter for fear of being treated very badly. I have several times addressed the Lords ambassadors of England, France, and Venice, and suggested it might be wise to jointly, but separately, submit our memorandums on this serious matter to the grand vizier. They showed willing to do so, but none of them has so far started. … We have three merchants here, who are married; De Brosse, Van Breen, and Croesen, whom I hope to liberate from the said tribute by giving each of them a title of consul of some small scale hereabouts. At the moment I am attempting this, but success is not assured. But the principle matter meriting your attention, is the consequence and outcome, for it is very clear to us that, if the interested kingdoms and republics of Christendom do not take joint action, all unmarried merchants will with certainty be treated in like manner, and they themselves as well as their effects will be placed beyond the authority of the ministers (as indicated above), which would make it inadvisable for anyone to send his effects here. For a tributary that dies here, whether he has children or not, the Turkish hand is immediately put on his home, and if there are children, it divides the inheritance and collects ten to a hundred for itself; and if there are no children or known heirs of the same blood, the inheritance is kept under the rule of Turkish justice until a legitimate heir appears.345

345 My italics. The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 1 March 1678.
The grand vizier had left Istanbul to join the sultan’s hunt shortly after having issued the *ferman*. But since this was a matter of such consequence that it needed his constant support to be enforced (as we will see below), execution of the order was delayed until the signing of the Treaty of Zurawno with Poland and his return to Istanbul in the second week of March. Upon the court’s return to Istanbul, final preparations for the upcoming Ukrainian campaign immediately started, feeding assumptions of the European representatives that the sole purpose of the *baraç* order had been to raise money for the campaign. And indeed, with Kara Mustafa back in Istanbul, the *voyvoda* (district governor) of Galata rather half-heartedly started collecting the poll-tax from some European subjects. In order for us better to understand subsequent events, it is necessary to discuss them in light of their broader administrative and political context.

Galata and Pera, across the Golden Horn from Istanbul proper, were the townships where the majority of Istanbul’s non-Muslims and all Europeans resided under the protection of their embassies. Together with the township of Üsküdar, on the other bank of the Bosphorus, they constituted the district of *havas-i refi‘* or *haslar kazası*, which was administratively separate from Istanbul proper and had its own civil and executive governors; a *kadi* and a *voyvoda*. The district belonged to the *havas-i hümayun* (private estates of the sultan; imperial lands) and its tax revenues were assigned to the imperial treasury. In the period under discussion, the treasury annually farmed out the tax revenues from the district as *iltizam* tax farms. The collection of *baraç* from the non-Muslims of Galata and Pera was one of these farms. In 1678, the tax farmer (*mültsezim*) that had contracted to collect this *baraç* was Kara Mustafa’s client chief customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), who had also purchased the post in 1672. For the collection of his revenues, particularly in cases where payment was refused and duress or force was necessary, he depended on the *voyvoda* and his irregulars (*sekban*), who were specifically appointed to safeguard the treasury’s interests.

And so it happened that the *voyvoda* of Galata, when confronted with the refusal of the assessed Europeans to pay the desired *baraç*, decided to arrest a

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346 A full contemporary Dutch translation of the treaty of Zurawno (or Zarnów as it was known in Europe at the time; Izvence in Turkish), dated 7 March 1678, can be found in *ibid.*, 13 March 1678.

347 Hüseyin Ağa obtained the poll-tax farm in 1672 (Galland, *Journal*, i: 87) and also held it in 1678 (Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 123 and 126). In that last year, he travelled to Izmir with two galleys in his capacity of *baraç*-collector to collect from the English nation there 100,000 Lion Dollars, which was the Ottoman administration’s claim on the inheritance of the deceased English merchant (Samuel Pentlow), who had taken a *zimmî*-wife and residence: Van Dam van Isselt, “Avaniën in de Levant”, 547; and Olnon, “Towards Classifying Avanias”. On *hass*-lands and their administration, see Orhonlu, “Khâss”. On *haslar kazası*, also see Halil İnalcık, “Istanbul”, *EI2*, iv: 224a.
number of them – only to release them again without any payment having been made upon complaints of their representatives. At first sight, this sudden change of heart might seem strange. But it can be accounted for if one considers some of the changes in government that had resulted from Kara Mustafa’s departure. Antoine Galland, who had arrived in Izmir on March 8th and followed the matter from there, tells us that;

… on avait déjà commencé de l’exiger [the haraç] de quelques Français à Constantinople. Mais on cessa de le demander depuis que le Grand Séigneur fut sorti et qu’il eut passé sous ses tentes, hors de la ville, pour se mettre ensuite en campagne. L’on a su que ce fut sur une forte contestation qui se forma sur ce sujet entre le mussabib [gentleman in waiting on the sultan/favourite], le grand vizir et le douanier, Hussein Aga, qui avait mis dans la tête du vizir de faire cette contravention aux privilèges accordés à tous les princes chrétiens comme une invention ingénieuse pour tirer une bonne somme d’argent.

This favorite of the sultan, who temporarily managed to suspend Kara Mustafa’s order as soon as the Ottoman court and army had left Istanbul (19 to 21 March) was (Musabib) Mustafa Paşa. He had married the sultan’s daughter Hâtic Sultan in 1675 and was now engaged in a struggle with the grand vizier for ascendancy at court. But this was not the only power struggle being fought out over Kara Mustafa’s control over the financially important customs and poll-tax farms. As we will see further along, another competitor of the grand vizier (who in the end would cost him his head), Kara Ibrahim Paşa, also got involved.

In the first days of April, with the army and court still encamped at an hour’s distance of Istanbul in preparation for the march to the front, the European representatives had sent their dragomans to congratulate Kara Mustafa’s newly appointed kaynnakam ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abdi Paşa on his high office. During these audiences, the new deputy grand vizier had refused to listen to any of their complaints concerning the imposition of haraç and had successfully insisted on an enlargement of the gifts usually presented on such occasions, adding “flatly; these are different times now, they should know that the grand vizier is present here, and they should be

348 Colyer mentions the arrest and release of his physician Henning Wolde (The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678), and Galland that of several unidentified Frenchmen (Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 123 and 126).
349 Ibid., 123.
350 †1686. Ibid., 272n4.
351 Kara Ibrahim Paşa had started out as a protégé of Kara Mustafa Paşa, but gained such prominence that he became a threat to his patron’s position, and eventually managed to persuade the sultan to have him executed. See I. Parmaksızoğlu, “İbrahim Paşa, Kara”, EI2, iii: 1001b; and Richard F. Kreutel, Kara Mustafa vor Wien: 1683 aus der Sicht türkischer Quellen, ed. Karl Teply (Graz: Styria, 1982), index and throughout). Also see note 355.
352 On this official, see Fr. Babinger, “‘Abdî Pasha”, EI2, i: 97a.
careful that no complaints are made to him.” 353 Then, on the 30th of April, the campaign was launched and the army and court left the environs of Istanbul. With the commanding presence of the grand vizier out of the way, Colyer immediately detected a change in atmosphere. He had pleaded his cause with Kara Mustafa’s interpreter and advisor Mavrocordato, who had undertaken to obtain the new berats for him during the campaign. Colyer had furnished him with the funds to effect the purchase and had good hopes of arranging the matter in the court’s absence by handing out bribes. 354

On 6 July, however, the matter was still unresolved and Mavrocordato’s berats had still not arrived. But Colyer had been able to make some progress by petitioning Kara Ibrahim Paşa, who had obtained the sadaret kaymmakamlığı while also keeping his post of kapudan (grand admiral). It appears he had deliberately cultivated this connection and was now reaping the benefits. 355 Since the departure of the court the voyvoda had started apprehending some Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Venetians over the haraç. Their ambassadors had thought it too dangerous to resist publicly the execution of the grand vizier’s order and had arranged the matter privately by compensating the voyvoda, without openly acknowledging their merchants’ liability to the poll-tax. Colyer took a different course and asked Kara Ibrahim to hear him against the voyvoda. His request was accepted, but it took until 17 August until the hearing actually took place, the reason for the delay in all likelihood being haraç-collector Hüseyin Ağ’a’s preoccupation with the Pentlow-affair (see note 347). During the hearing of 17 August Colyer produced the Dutch capitulation and the voyvoda a hatt-ı şerif (an imperial decree written the sultan himself) to the effect that Europeans who had taken zimmi wives were liable to all imperial taxes, after which the kaymmakam promised to consider the matter. Over the next couple of days of sending Dutch chief dragoman Theijls to the divan to see where matters stood, it became clear to Colyer and his nation that they too would have to

353 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 23 April 1678.
354 “Sir Mavrocordato has accepted to advance our cause in the army and has promised to send us the new berats and commands [ferman]s for the consuls, dragomans and merchants. This, on the condition that we provided him beforehand with all the funds necessary to obtain them, which we have done today. Meanwhile, our merchants have in the matter of the haraç not been molested any further then with threats, but beyond execution. Every day we can now observe more clearly that it is solely about money.” Ibid., 1 May 1678.
355 Ibid., 13 March 1678. The missive describes Colyer’s audience of 7 March 1678 with kapudan Kara Ibrahim Paşa; an audience which he, by his own admission, intentionally had during the court’s absence (when it was on hunting expedition). Colyer tells us that Kara Ibrahim “is a gentleman about fifty years of age, of good appearance, and one of the favour- ernes of the sultan.” The discussion mainly concerned the Western Europe’s navies, their movements and their ships’ technical specifications. Significantly, Kara Mustafa’s and Kara Ibrahim’s tenures as kapudan signalled the full adoption of sailing galleons as the basis of the Ottoman fleet: Uzunçarşılı, “Bahriyya”, 948a.
pay off the voyvoda if they wanted to keep him at bay. It seemed that even with Kara Ibrahim holding the second and third highest posts of the empire (that of sadaret kaymamakam and kapudan-ı derya) and presiding over the proceedings, the divan could not bring itself to rule against the grand vizier on this matter and commit itself openly to Kara Ibrahim’s cause.356

Until Kara Mustafa’s return to Istanbul on 20 April 1679 matters stayed as they had stood after all European nations had persuaded the voyvoda to stop arresting more merchants. But the grand vizier’s return to Istanbul immediately tipped the scales again. With his position very much strengthened after a year in the proximity of the sultan and a successful campaign (357), and after having Kara Ibrahim Paşa dismissed as kapudan and kaymakam and demoted to fifth vizier (25 November 1678358), he seemed as implacable as ever:

Immediately after the said days of rejoicing [in honour of the victorious return of the sultan and grand vizier to Istanbul] all the Lords ambassadors and other ministers requested audiences with the grand vizier. Those of France and England had theirs the 7th, and your honours’ minister, yours truly, the 14th of the previous [month; June], in the same manner as during the previous audience: namely, the grand vizier sitting above, and the said ministers below the sofa. The aforementioned Lords ambassadors of France and England among other discourses spoke of the haraç or tribute, which had been instituted against their merchants (that had been married here) the previous year, but they were at once repudiated in the most severe terms, which persuaded the Lord Venetian ambassador and myself not to bring up the subject to avoid further embitterment. … Consequently, nothing out of the ordinary happened during my visit, except for the grand vizier during the giving of the presents inquiring of me, whether it was certain that France had evacuated all the places it had previously conquered in our country.359

The imposition of haraç on foreign merchants with local wives was to remain a contended issue until Kara Mustafa’s disgrace and execution in 1683. This is interesting in light of the constant exclamations by the European ambassadors and residents that Kara Mustafa had only issued the ferman

356 The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1060: Justinus Colyer, Jan van Breen, Gasparo Charelles, François de Brosses, Jan Croesen and Abraham de Vivier in the chancery of the Dutch embassy of Istanbul, 20 August 1678. The voyvoda was presented with the relatively moderate bribe of 5 vests of Dutch cloth, 5 vests of silk and 30 Lion Dollars.

357 Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 591b.

358 Parmaksızoğlu, “İbrâhîm Pasha, Kara”. By the time the Vienna campaign got underway in 1683, Kara Ibrahim had been promoted to third vizier and reappointed kaymakam again through the sultan’s protection. It was in this capacity that he successfully intrigued against Kara Mustafa when the siege of Vienna failed. After Kara Mustafa’s execution (25 December 1683) he succeeded him as grand vizier (December 1683; dismissed 17 December 1685; exiled March 1686; executed June 1687).

359 The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Justinus Colyer to States General, 29 June 1679. The audience is also described extensively in The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 46b-47a.
because he wanted the Europeans to buy him off in the first place. This is the pot calling the kettle black. However convinced they were that the grand vizier was always in desperate need of money with which he could finance his immense household, his campaigns or keep up his standing at court; the fact of this case remains that no matter how much they offered, he never accepted any money to abrogate the order.\textsuperscript{360} One has to wonder whether this was in fact a matter of principle or part of a larger policy? In any case, with no further arrests being made over it, it appears that this \textit{ferman} had served its original purpose and was now forgotten. But the issue which it had addressed was never definitively resolved; from time to time similar attempts to impose \textit{baraç} on dragomans, vice-consuls, and foreign merchants that had taken local wives, would continue to occur.\textsuperscript{361}

After the troubles with the \textit{baraç}, an increasing irritation with Kara Mustafa is discernible in Colyer's correspondence, even if he managed to stay on relatively good terms with him for the remaining duration of his embassy. Things that would have amused him some years before (such as the stool-incident), he now commented on with growing disgust, even if the Dutch ran no risk at all. This change in attitude is very clear in his correspondence on the problems the English ambassador, Finch, and the recently arrived new Venetian \textit{bailo}, Civrano, ran into with Kara Mustafa Paşa and Hüseyin Ağa in October-November 1679 – the former over a large amount of cloth he had imported free of duty under the pretense that it was for personal use, but was now suspected of selling; the latter over a number of slaves that had fled their Ottoman masters and were hiding aboard the two Venetian men-of-war that had carried the new \textit{bailo} to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{362}

\textsuperscript{360} The size and functioning of Kara Mustafa's household, which numbered in the hundreds and hundreds even when he was still \textit{kaymmakam}, is minutely described in a memoir appended to Galland, \textit{Journal}, ii: 186-207.

\textsuperscript{361} The Hague, NA 1.02.20 1088, for example, contains a number of Ottoman \textit{ferman}s issued specifically in response to attempts to impose the tax on the Dutch and their protégés: one stating that the Dutch are exempt from \textit{baraç} (1690); one stating that the dragomans, their sons and their servants are exempt from \textit{baraç} (1692); one stating that five servants of the consul of Izmir are exempt from \textit{baraç} (1701); one stating that the dragomans, their sons and their servants are exempt from \textit{baraç} and other taxes (1705); and another one stating again that the Dutch are exempt from \textit{baraç} (1709). Kew, NA SP 105 334, which is a register of Ottoman \textit{ferman}s concerning the English nation of Izmir during the consulship of William Raye (1677-1703) contains a similar \textit{ferman} “for freeing 5 of the consuls servants from haratch” (27).

\textsuperscript{362} The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 50a-b. The capitulations stipulated that ambassadors and consuls could import the furnishings, food and drink they needed for private use, free of customs. Although this meant that they were not permitted to sell the duty-free imports, this was of course very difficult for the Ottomans to monitor and transgressions abounded. In the case of the Venetian ships harbouring the runaway slaves, although there were witnesses to the contrary, the Venetians denied having them and refused to hand them over or to have their ships visited by the Ottoman authorities. When things came to a head and they were visited with force, all slaves were quickly rowed ashore or thrown overboard by their saviors.
Colyer’s new-found sympathy for the misadventures of his colleagues, was not reciprocated. His old colleagues were all replaced within the space of a few months, and lacking the support and perhaps advice of his old friend Venetian bailo Morosini, he fell victim to the jealousy of the newcomers. In December 1679 an alliance of Genoese ambassador Levanto, Venetian bailo Civrano, French ambassador Guilleragues and English ambassador Finch (who would be recalled in 1681), out of frustration with the preferential treatment Colyer received from Kara Mustafa while at the same time being the lowest-ranking European envoy in Istanbul, decided to make it clear to the grand vizier that he was not a full-fledged ambassador but a mere resident envoy. They were so successful that the next petition Colyer sent Kara Mustafa was returned with the reply that he should stop referring to himself as elçi (ambassador/envoy) and use kapı kethüdaşı (representative of a provincial governor) instead, paired with the imputation that the States General were showing the Porte disrespect by sending an envoy of such low rank to represent them. The upshot was that the States General decided to promote Colyer to full-fledged ambassador (the first since Cornelis Haga had attained that rank in 1612). With the time it took for correspondence to travel back and forth between Istanbul and Amsterdam (approximately 1½ months each way) it was 10 April 1680 before the States General promoted Colyer, and May before he actually received his promotion.

The last years of Colyer’s embassy (which ended with his death in Istanbul on 28 December 1682) and Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate (which ended with his execution in Belgrade on 25 December 1683) relations between the two became slightly more troublesome, although never to the extent of becoming as discordial or disrupted as had previously been the case with Colyer’s colleagues. We should briefly mention two cases that touched upon the basic principles underlying the capitulations; the physical punishment with lethal consequences of Colyer’s secretary François de Brosses in the divan-i hümâyûn, and the forced renewal of the Dutch capitulation. Despite the seriousness of these issues, they do not seem to have had a profound impact on the way in which Colyer regarded Kara Mustafa Paşa. And since both cases have received elaborate attention elsewhere, we will limit our discussion of them mainly to what they can tell us about Kara Mustafa Paşa and his interpretation of the capitulations.363

On 17 May 1680 secretary De Brosses was tried and convicted in the divan in connection with a sum of 1,000 Lion Dollars he had loaned a Greek inhabitant of Istanbul several years earlier. When this original debtor, a woman named Safira, defaulted in August 1679, the debt was taken over by the metropolitan of Chios. However, he denied having incurred it and took his case to the Ottoman authorities. The case was heard by Chief Justice of Rumelia (Rumeli kadi-‘askeri) Hamid Efendi, who ruled in De Brosses’ favour and provided him with a bücçet (written proof) to the effect that the loan would expire after a further six months (i.e. in February 1679) and would then be settled by the kadi of Galata. The agreed date having arrived, De Brosses dispatched a dragoman to the kadi of Galata with the kadi-‘asker’s and several other bücçets and obligations (temessükts) supporting his case, as well as with a ferman by Kara Mustafa ordering the kadi of Chios to collect the loan by force if necessary. The kadi decided the claim should be taken to Chios, but the person deputised by De Brosses’ to collect the debt was surprised by four disguised Turks in the stairwell of the metropolitan’s house, severely beaten and robbed of all the documents supporting the case. After this, the metropolitan again denied the debt in front of the kadi of Chios, forcing De Brosses to obtain copies of his lost documents from the records of the Rumeli kadi-‘askeri. On De Brosses’ request Colyer now successfully petitioned the grand vizier for a ferman ordering the kapudan pasa and the kadi of his fleet to examine the matter. But in the meantime the metropolitan had left Chios and committed himself to the protection of the patriarch of Istanbul, who now filed the case with the divan-ı hümayun. There, matters came to such a head that Kara Mustafa saw no other means of getting the truth out, than confronting De Brosses with an actual line-up of twenty possible debtors in the assembled divan. Between all the false beards – at least so he claimed in his defence – De Brosses failed to point out his debtor the metropolitan whom he had only met once eight months before, and was punished by being bastinadoed, receiving 200 blows under the feet, eventually resulting in his his death on 16 October 1682.

It was unusual – even during Kara Mustafa’s grand vizierate – for European subjects who lost a lawsuit to be sentenced to physical punishment, and particularly one so stark. Nevertheless, neither the hearing of the case in the divan, nor the sentence handed down, was contrary to the letter of the capitulations – although they might be regarded as going against its spirit, i.e. the extending of protection (aman) to subjects of friendly nations. So why did De Brosses receive a punishment normally reserved

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364 While lawsuits involving European and Ottoman Muslim subjects were outside their jurisdiction, the consular courts could hear cases (such as this one) between Europeans and zimmis. But if one or all of the parties involved decided to apply to the Ottoman kadi-courts, these could also hear them. So as to be better able to protect and represent their subjects in such cases, the European nations had obtained the capitulary privilege of having cases repre-
for Ottoman subjects? The description of the case Colyer’s son-in-law Daniel-Jan de Hocheipes has left us, provides us with a possible answer:

_About which [treatment] your honours’ said ambassador [Colyer] complained to the grand vizier, but never received satisfaction. But the grand vizier did send him answer that he had not known the said De Brosses to have been his Excellency’s secretary (although it is certain the vizier knew him full well), adding that he could not have imagined a secretary of an ambassador having a long beard and going about dressed a la turca [in the Turkish fashion], as the said De Brosses used to do, and even less that he could speak the Turkish language, in which he was proficient, and what’s more, that he would come and plea his own case in the full divan, that such was the responsibility of the dragomans, for it has to be noted that even though your honours’ ambassador’s chief dragoman Theyls had accompanied him, he insisted on defending his own cause against all practice customary there, which was rightly thought to have been the reason that this misfortune befell him, to which the haughty humour of the vizier then in power [Kara Mustafa Paşa], who had long before contemplated the means with which he could taunt and abuse the European nations, will have contributed to no small extent._

Apparently, Kara Mustafa had found De Brosses’ “Turkish manners” presumptuous and decided to teach him a lesson _a la turca_. We know from his correspondence on the matter, that Colyer for one agreed. Although it meant the end of his faithful right-hand man, he blamed the event entirely on him and took no further action.

The last significant run-in the Dutch had with Kara Mustafa Paşa, concerned their capitulation. Although the first Dutch capitulation (of 1612) had been confirmed in 1634, it had never been expanded, because the States General and the Board of Directors of Levant Trade baulked at the prohibitive costs involved in such a project. Instead of regularly seeking to have additional privileges inserted in new capitulations at huge costs and with relatively little effect, as the other capitulary powers were in the habit of doing, the Dutch practice had always been to depend on _fermans_ confirming and specifying the articles of theirs. This policy of constantly renegotiating the application of the capitulation on the basis of individual cases and in response to specific needs, had proven to be relatively inexpensive and effective, but had left them with an outdated document and a large number of _fermans_ to safeguard its validity and relevance.

_365_ The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 80a-b.

_366_ François, or Francesco, de Brosses had been secretary to the Dutch embassy since 1664, vice-chancellor since 1665, provisional resident from 1665 to 1668, and secretary again since 1669, and simultaneously treasurer since 1675: Schutte, _Repertorium_, 307.
Then, on 16 August 1680, while hearing a dispute between the Dutch nation of Istanbul and chief customs collector Hüseyin Ağa (I), grand vizier Kara Mustafa Paşa decided he would have no more of this ancient bundle of paper with its “scraped out letters” and confiscated the Dutch capitulation. With the capitulation held hostage by the grand vizier, who showed no intention whatsoever of returning it, Colyer was left no other choice then to apply for renewal. He dreaded the States General’s reaction and minutely described all his dealings with the grand vizier to convince them he had acquitted himself of his duties and had opposed as long as possible the forced renewal; in this, he naturally made much of Kara Mustafa’s intransigence. The States General decided in favour of renewal on the condition that the new capitulation should contain various clarifications with regard to articles (of the capitulation of 1612) which had given rise to disputes over the years. After extensive negotiations between Colyer and Kara Mustafa, it was decided that the Dutch were to receive their new capitulation upon payment of the enormous sum of 33,072 Lion Dollars. The new Dutch capitulation was eventually handed over 7 November 1680; it contained some minor additions to the articles concerning ambassadorial and consular duties, the shipping of goods for Muslim merchants, and the conversion of Dutch subjects to Islam.

Anyone investigating the European presence in Izmir during the grand vizierates of Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa and Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, cannot but be puzzled by the seemingly contradicting references to the latter. Kara Mustafa Paşa has gone down in history as a blinded and ruthless xenophobe; yet, his dislike of foreigners did not keep him from having a large residence constructed for himself right next to the English consulate on the main street of Izmir’s bustling European quarter during the first years of his grand vizierate. He is credited with little understanding of the empire’s

367 The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 81a: “… replied that our capitulation was very antiquated and that it contained several scraped out letters”.

368 On the taking hostage of the capitulation and the subsequent negotiations for renewal, see ibid., 80b-86a. On the handing over of the new capitulation and the apportionment of the costs of renewal, see The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 255b-256b: Justinus Colyer and Dutch Nation of Istanbul to Jacob van Dam and Dutch Nation of Izmir, 21 November 1680. The text of the articles of this new capitulation was almost identical to that of 1612; the above-mentioned additions were made to articles 13, 47, 48 and 49.

369 In the legend to his panorama of Izmir, Cornelis de Bruyn noted that the house he had drawn standing smack in the middle of Frank Street, between the Venetian and English consulates, was “the house of the vizier Cara Mustafa Pasha, which is the largest and most stately of Frank Street”: De Bruyn, Reizen, 24. This residence is not mentioned in the list of “les maisons du pacha” in the memoir appended to Galland, Journal (ii: 203), which does include those in Istanbul, Edime, Lárisa, Merzifon, and Galatasaray (Pera). Since this memoir was prepared between March 1675 and October 1676 (Heywood, “Karā Mustafa Pasha”, 589b), and since Kara Mustafa – as we have seen above – spent most of his time between 1670-1676
foreign trade and how to administer it; yet, he completed with his own funds his predecessors large-scale construction effort to facilitate that trade and was closely involved with its administration through his association with customs collector Hüseyin Ağa. His interest in the empire’s foreign trade is said to have gone no further than regarding it as supplier of ready cash for his own needs; yet, his administration’s handling of international mercantile and political affairs seems rather to betray efforts to impose a consistent and effective set of rules to come to grips with the elusive flow of European trade through Izmir and the assertiveness of its European partners.

The same kind of contradictions are prevalent in the correspondences of the European envoys in Istanbul and in the broader literature dealing with his politics in general or his person in particular – although one has to look for them very carefully between a mass of unanimous condemnations. As Colin Heywood cautiously suggests in his article on Kara Mustafa in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the history of his rule, and by extension perhaps also his personal character, are susceptible to divergent interpretations.\textsuperscript{370} The central question here is whether we should regard him as a grand vizier who managed to destroy in a mere seven years (1676-1683) a legacy it had taken Mehmed and Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü twenty years (1656-1676) to build, or as a faithful executor of Köprülü policy doing his utmost to conserve and consolidate that legacy of overextension and overdependence on unstable alliances against the odds.

If we discard for a moment the judgments of his contemporaries and look at the bare facts, they overwhelmingly point in that latter direction: as an adoptive son of Mehmed Köprülü, educated alongside Fazıl Ahmed Köprülü, rising to power through the protection of his adopted father as well as his adopted brother, and successfully serving under both of them, he should certainly be considered a Köprülü grand vizier by pedigree. As for his administration: its make-up shows considerable continuity with that of Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, to a large extent relying on the same men and political households (see Table 15). Related to this are his foreign policies: both his efforts to stabilise the empire’s northern frontier, and those to enhance the administration’s control over the international trade of the empire, were a direct consequence and continuation of Köprülü policy. Even his treatment of the European envoys to his government was not all that different from his predecessors, in fact only changing slightly in response to pressing issues and specific circumstances. In discussing someone as notorious as Kara Mustafa Paşa, we should mistrust the judgments and accounts of his

\textsuperscript{370} Ibid., 591a-b.
European contemporaries, particularly where his reputation as a destroyer of capitulatory rights is concerned.

Previously, we have discussed Mehmed Köprülü’s stabilization of the capital and the central lands, and its continuation as a policy of stabilization and incorporation of the periphery by his son Fazıl Ahmed. In the course of his education in the Köprülü-household, and as he climbed through the ranks of palace and government administration, Kara Mustafa must have been imbued with the Köprülü view of the world, of the Ottomans’ place in it, of their own place within the empire, and of the policies which ambition, experience and prudence suggested would best serve to reinvigorate and sustain that view. He also inherited and continued (see further below) the Köprülü political household and its wider network, as he did the policy implications with which it grappled and the manner in which it did so. Figuring prominently among these were the Köprülüs’ strategically placed clients in the hierarchies making up the various components of Izmir’s administration, and the policies and controls they were to exert over Izmir’s international trade and diplomatic relations. After decades of Ottoman laissez-faire the Köprülüs had proven very attentive to the fact that Izmir was a place that could both mirror and propell Istanbul’s relations with Europe on a daily basis and a practical level. They had in fact recognized that it was not only a place where a lot of money could be collected, but that what went on in Izmir formed an integral part of the looming balance of power with Europe.

Having inherited both the purpose and the apparatus that would allow the Ottomans (and the Köprülüs) to keep their footing in that balance, it fell to Kara Mustafa to put them to use and enforce and strengthen military, diplomatic and commercial boundaries and prerogatives with all the means at his disposal. Anything other than that would have meant carelessly doing away with the immense investments his predecessors had made to set up political, administrative and urban structures that would sustain their long-term goals.

How Kara Mustafa handled the first dimension of relations with Europe, the military one, is relatively straightforward: with great success, until the Vienna-debacle. His handling of the second, diplomatic, dimension has taken up most of this preceding section: we have seen how, in this arena, his reputation suffered heavily from a series of steps and measures that, taken collectively, may be viewed as a policy that reaffirmed the unilateral character of Ottoman relations with Europe and the pertinence of Ottoman laws and customs in this arena. Commandeering vessels, restoring disused tributes, and countering the creeping fiscal alienation of wealthy minority subjects; severely punishing smuggling, the illegal export of mixed inheritances, the harboring of fugitive slaves, and illegal selling by diplomats; guarding proper hierarchy and form when challenged by demanding strict adherence to diplomatic protocol (viz. the disputed audiences, Colyer’s diplomatic status,
De Brosses’ punishment, the sequestration of the 60-odd years old Dutch capitulations), and so on and on – these all meant to convey to the empire’s European relations that they were in no position to forestall the progression of Köprülü policy or even mitigate its consequences in any way. The diplomatic correspondence of the time makes it abundantly clear that the message was indeed received, which in turn greatly assisted Kara Mustafa in his efforts to bring Izmir back into the fold.

The question as to what shape Kara Mustafa’s (re)assertion of Ottoman controls in this third, commercial, dimension of Ottoman-European relations took through the purposefully endowed Köprülü vakf will be discussed throughout the remainder of this text. But first we should consider what the Köprülü’s succesful decades-long Ottoman reassertion vis-à-vis Europe and the making of an Ottoman-European balance of power mean for our various paradigms of Ottoman historical development, the world-systems paradigm in particular.

The Explanatory Value of the World-systems Approach

Most observers have sought an explanation for Izmir’s relatively benign atmosphere in administrative neglect. Overlooking arguments of political centrality, economic dependence, and socio-historical or political predisposition (such as suggested in the previous few pages), they have argued that the power (and, hence, freedom) foreigners enjoyed in Izmir was one wrested by them from a weakened Ottoman administration during a century of revolt and decentralization (1550-1650). It is argued that while Izmir’s highest official was a mere kadi, and not even a high-ranking one at that, Aleppo was the seat of a full-fledged governor-general (beylerbeyi) of high military rank (paşa) and a high-ranking kadi. Consequently, Izmir’s European merchants could simply circumvent or overpower local Ottoman administration, while their counterparts in Aleppo were kept in check by the full force of paşa and kadi. From this – the administration of Izmir by lower-ranking officials – it is concluded that Istanbul must have been unaware of the importance of the economic developments taking place in western Asia Minor – and that, even if and when it became aware, it proved incapable to do much about the irreversible European undermining of the Ottoman economic system taking place there.371

371 See Daniel Goffman’s highly influential work on Izmir in the bibliography. Esp. Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 141-42: “Whatever economic and social permutations Izmir and western Anatolia underwent in successive centuries, however great the rise in the volume of trade during the Age of Enlightenment, however profoundly Europeans influenced western-Anatolian society during the Age of Imperialism, the transformation that determined the region as their hub occurred when the settlement developed from a regional port into an international entrepôt at the beginning of the seventeenth century. More can be asserted. Although the ethnicity of its directors varied and its direction fluctuated in the eighteenth and
Frankly, the line of reasoning sketched above is typical of attempts to fill in the Western Anatolian, Ottoman, or Middle Eastern details for a much wider theory — a theory which has developed into the paradigm of developmental modernity *par excellence*; that of Immanuel Wallerstein’s “modern world-system”. Looking back from the 19th-century situation, it argues that an expanding Europe-centered economic world-system absorbed and internally reorganized for its own advantage a number of previously alternative world-systems (American, Chinese, Ottoman) at an increasing rate and intensity from the Middle Ages onwards, and thus defined as well as motivated the evolution to the single Western-based world economy of our modern globalized age. In the language of the paradigm, the process of absorption and reorganization of previously alternative world-systems is designated as their “semi-peripheralization” (that is, into assembly points for raw materials from their own peripheries, providers of menial labor, and consumers of the center’s manufactured goods), their own semi-peripheries being converted into peripheries of the new system.

The presence of increasing numbers of European merchants, combined with the growing volume of their — to a significant degree, contraband — trade and the uninhibited lifestyles they were able to cultivate, then, must signal that Europe’s 17th-century descent on that town was none other than the beginning of a relentless European drive towards economic (in the Arab provinces), political and cultural mastery over the Ottoman Empire, as fully realized in the second half of the 19th century. In a similar feat of history read backwards, the Ottomans’ ultimate failure to stop the peripheralization of their empire must signify that they were never up to the task in the first place: they were not able to formulate a commercial policy to successfully counter or mitigate the consequences of a European penetration that was not to manifest itself fully for a good two centuries: they merely managed conservative reflexes to the superficial manifestations of this deeper longer-term economic reality.

Obviously there are many objections to be raised against such a model-driven application of world-systems-theory, principally that it tends to misread or gloss over effective Ottoman responses as ultimately unsuccessful responses to the tide of history and therefore essentially repressive, which feeds into broader Orientalist prejudices. As a matter of fact, in our discussion of the status of Izmir’s European quarter, of its relations with its Ottoman context, and of the role of Ottoman society and administration in shaping them, the main problem seems to be this particular application’s indeb-
edness to another, cultural, paradigm; that of Orientalism (Edward Said’s version at least).372

Any elaboration or application of the proposition that the Ottoman Empire and its economy were completely overwhelmed by European mercantilism and forever failed to formulate an adequate response to its challenges should preferably be based on analysis of economic data (but always in conjunction with data from other fields!). However, if, as is the case for 16th and 17th-century Izmir, such data is sketchy at best, there should be no objection to relying more fully on other types of data (social, political, legal, or even archaeological, architectural, etc.) for indications of corresponding economic realities. (Incidentally, the relatively abundant evidence for the 18th century does already dispel any illusions about Ottoman merchants and their government not managing a solid response by at least that time.373) After all, history-writing is much like assembling an incomplete jigsaw puzzle – and is the historian’s filling in the missing pieces not vastly preferable to his forgoing the effort altogether? As Wallerstein himself has said:

World-systems analysts insist that rather than reduce complex situations to simpler variables, the effort should be to complexify and contextualize all so-called simpler variables in order to understand real social situations. World-systems analysts are not against quantification per se (they would quantify what can usefully be quantified), but (as the old joke about the drunk teaches us) they feel that one should not look for the lost key only under the street lamp just because the light is better (where there are more quantifiable data). One searches for the most appropriate data in function of the intellectual problem; one doesn’t choose the problem because hard, quantitative data are available.374

But how carefully we should tread! The more pieces are missing, the greater the danger that a preconceived idea of the findings gets the better of the scarce pieces at hand. One can easily imagine how 17th-century Izmir, with its lack of pertinent sources and its high potential relevance for world-systems-theory as the floodgate Europe supposedly pried open to gain full access to the Ottoman world-system, might be a bit too tempting.

The principal problem with world-systems-theory as it has been applied to study the variables of the complex equation it attempts to formulate is that the theory’s core evolutionary argument is considered established and unassailable. Research into specific centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries oftentimes seems often to want to rewrite the subjects’ history as part of the

373 See Kadı, “Natives and Interlopers”.
374 Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis, 19.
elegant grand model and to fine-tune it, rather than earnestly to falsify it.\textsuperscript{375} In Middle Eastern studies the world-systems approach has now been dominant for at least two decades. It has in effect become the single most dominant paradigm in the field, even strongly informing/determining the work of non-economic historians. This is why all modern studies on Izmir seem to start from the following inverse chain of assumptions:

Firstly, that by the 19\textsuperscript{th} century the Ottoman world-system had become semi-peripheralized through European mercantilist and capitalist penetration. Secondly, that shifts from Ottoman-controlled trade in luxury goods to European-controlled trade in bulky goods are sound indicators of this European economic penetration. Thirdly, that the boom occurring in 17\textsuperscript{th}-century Izmir is the earliest manifestation of this process. And fourthly, that the Ottomans woke up to this reality too late to be able to counter the trend through administrative and economic adjustments.

Although Wallerstein’s theory is neo-Marxian in origin, an indebtedness to Turner’s frontier thesis – in a way its ideological opposite – may be discerned. It relates of a less developed (or, “primitive”) landscape, society and economy opened up by energetic Westerners of enterprising spirit and cultivated for their own profit. In the process these Westerners not only transformed that “other” landscape, society and economy, but also Western society and economy itself with modernity as the end result. The Western Anatolian coastal area, and Izmir in particular, then, figure as an Ottoman version of the Wild West, and the role of the “native” Ottoman context is limited to being an passive and ineffectual object of Western penetration, at most responsible for the occasional burdensome delay to a linearly progressing modernity. This is overstating the case, but describing it in this vein does show how naturally Orientalist notions (as critiqued by Said in 1978) and the related paradigm of (uninterrupted) Ottoman decline could get a second lease on life through this more refined paradigm of economic modernization.\textsuperscript{376}

\textsuperscript{375} Cf. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, \textit{The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978; 2004), 24, where it is stressed that “The world-systems perspective also stresses the ‘historicity’ of regions prior to their confrontation with the European world economy. That is, it seeks to delineate their internal dynamic. In doing so, it differs from the Orientalist and modernizationist approaches in the choice of unit of analysis. Instead of the cultural unit of the Islamic civilization, İslamoğlu and Keyder and Wallerstein, DeceCDeli and Kasaba take as their object of study the social system of the ‘redistributive world empire’ defined in terms of its internal division of labour or its mode of integration. Hence, in contrast to ‘cellular’ conceptions of the Ottoman social structure in which discrete parts reproduce their own stagnation, the Ottoman world-empire describes an integrated whole.” (8-9).

\textsuperscript{376} See John M. Hobson, \textit{The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1-26 and throughout on the relation between Orientalism, Marxism, world systems theory, and their shared assumptions and fallacies. On world-systems analysis, he adds (in his conclusion): “This is not the place to rehearse all the arguments made against
We should hasten to add that this is not entirely to Wallerstein’s discredit. His *The Modern World-system* is extremely well-researched and very much concerned with varying modes, velocities and directions of development. Nonetheless, along the road from (experimental and falsifiable) theory to (received and indubitable) paradigm much of Wallerstein’s detailed variance and qualified uncertainty has been lost. Just as happened with Marxian theory, the result has been world-systems-theory light, heavy on form and light on substance.

The already noted scarcity of strictly economic data on 17th-century Izmir, the subject’s high relevance for world-systems analysis and the abrasive effect of that approach’s wide acceptance have resulted in much intuitive reasoning. Looking for early warning signs of the region’s peripheralization, research has started from the three available 16th-century *tahrirs* for Izmir (of 1522/23, 1528/29 and 1575/76), which indeed suggest a shift from regional to international production and commerce. This relative wealth of Ottoman economic data is followed by a long silence – not even broken by the 1693/94- *tahrir* (which is highly unreliable due to changes in taxation-units and the 1688-earthquake) or the partial *defters* from the Maliye’den müdevver (which are miscellaneous and offer totals instead of much-needed breakdowns). Only with the appearance of Ottoman yearbooks (*salnames*) from 1847/48 does the kind of Ottoman statistical data needed become available again. By that time the Ottoman economy was fast losing what remained of its independence: from 1850 foreign capital became widely available, by 1875 the empire reneged on its international debt-payments, and in 1881 a foreign (predominantly French-English-German) Ottoman Public Debt Administration took control of large sections of the economy to settle the debts.

The three-century-gap between *tahrirs* and *salnames* is commonly filled with economic data from European sources instead of with truly circumstantial evidence from local non-economic sectors. These sources – correspondences, shipping manifests, account books and the like – offer fine samples of Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory. The basic point to note here is that it is important to resist the functionalist logic of a global-structural approach.”

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378 “World-systems analysts began to be skeptical about the inevitability of progress. They saw progress as a possibility rather than a certainty. They wondered whether one could even describe the construction of a capitalist world-economy as progress”: Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 18.
early modern business practice, accounting and, not to forget, attitudes, but reveal little on the workings of the economy of the city of Izmir, its region, or the empire of which it was part. It matters little how much European trade narratives and figures are at our disposal; all they can really tell us is that at regular intervals a great many goods went into Izmir and a great many others came out again. Fluctuations in how many goods went in or out, in what goods went in or out and through whose agency they went in or out can of course reveal things about the economy in question, but does it lift the curtain pulled down over the inner workings of the city by the repeated loss of local Ottoman archives? The answer to this question must be "no".

Studying the Ottoman economy through European sources may reveal a declining Ottoman balance of trade and growing European influence within the Ottoman economy and the empire as a whole – but we should beware that it also completely obscures Ottoman agency.379 How convenient that three centuries of Ottoman economic and (conducive) administrative adjustment are not to be bothered with! Without taking it into account, a straight line can be drawn from 16th-century European penetration to late 19th-century European penetration as if these were manifestations of one and the same process – a perfect illustration of the West’s historical hegemony and a fine playground for world-systems enthusiasts trying to substantiate its inevitability. One could say that, here, shortage of Ottoman data has been relieved by Orientalism, cultural bias providing what evidence could not.

Following the logic of the Orientalist interpretation of world-systems analysis, the "fact" of the West’s uninterrupted and centuries-long rise to hegemony in the East feeds the assumption that Ottoman civilization was blind and/or powerless in face of the European onslaught: being reconstructed as the passive object of Western self-realization, such a civilization’s manifestations and exertions (be they cultural, military, legal, economic, administrative, etc.) are easily, if perhaps unwittingly, regarded first and foremost as impediments to the progression of Western history.380 This tendency towards historical polarization and partiality ("othering") goes a long way in explaining the seductiveness of the interpretation that European power pried open Izmir in the late sixteenth century and from there proceeded to overwhelm the entire Ottoman economy while the Ottomans stood by power-


380 Cf. İsmailoğlu-Inan, Ottoman Empire, 18: what remains of Ottoman agency in the world systems approach is a “resistance space” that the absence of direct colonization allowed the Ottoman central bureaucracy”. In this respect, incidentally, the very title of Goffman’s contribution to the oft-praised volume of world-systems analysis on Istanbul, Izmir, and Aleppo (Goffman, “Izmir: from Village to Colonial Port City”) illustrates what is so problematic about Goffman’s work on Izmir; namely that, starting in the early sixteenth century, it reasons towards a (non-existent) 19th-century colonial situation.
lessly. The problem with this theory is that it has ignored too many challenges.

Never has it been adequately explained why the peripheralization of the Ottoman world-system would have taken well over three centuries if the territory’s administration presumably was so weak and out of touch with early modern realities. And this goes for Izmir and its so-called “weak” administration even more. Should it not have given-in completely long before the 1870s, even with western prop-ups (because of the looming Eastern Question)? Nor has anyone ever successfully accounted for the favorable Ottoman balance of trade with Europe. The Ottomans’ making more from exports to Europe than the other way around (a situation that in all likelihood continued into the 19th century), does not exactly signal overwhelming European dominance. Surely, if Europe was that more powerful than the Ottoman Empire, it would have decisively penetrated Ottoman markets to dump its industrial output there? Moving on from the economic to the political and social spheres, how is it to be explained that the Ottomans managed to unilaterally dictate terms of trade to Europe through the capitulations during the 17th and 18th (and, to a lesser degree, even the 19th) centuries if it was simultaneously being overpowered by it? Finally, why was the social standing and power of European merchant communities resident in the Ottoman Empire so incongruous with their supposed economic power? Is this not a useful social reality to take note of in the absence of sound economic data? Furthermore, it is one thing for Armenians, Greeks and Jews (here cast as compradors381) to have low social standing, but to see the subjects of foreign states beg and grovel before Ottoman officials should make one wonder about the true weight and meaning of their power.

Clearly, any theory that starts from the grand narrative of European dominance – with Orientalism providing the negative and with Hobson’s “Euro-centric myths of the West” providing the positive, is not equipped to really deal with these problems – or, more generally, to deal with Ottoman history on its own terms.382 It can only ignore them as long as nobody bothers to confront them for fear of moving beyond accepted academic discourse. And

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381 On “fringe westernization” and compradors in general, see, e.g., Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 247-51. Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 1-17 provides a good overview of the comprador question in Ottoman historiography, and – through the remainder of this doctoral dissertation – demonstrates its uselessness in that field. Accordingly, in the previous pages we have suggested that the Ottoman intermediaries employed by the European nations in 17th-century Izmir in many respects operated rather as their patrons than as their clients.

382 Hobson, Eastern Origins, 283-93. These myths are those of “the centralized and rational Western state, 1500-1900”, “the liberal minimalistic Western state, 1500-1900”, and “the democratic Western state, 1500-1900”.
as it is, accepted Western academic discourse concerning the progression of Ottoman history to a large degree is world-systems-theory.

Nevertheless, I would venture to continue on the basic assumption that the balance of power between early modern Europe and the early modern Ottoman Empire was indeed very much a balance. That there existed a delicate equilibrium during most of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries within which two separate systems – with their own distinct histories, realities, attitudes and policies – continuously and meticulously wrestled each other for influence in all spheres. And that in the end, but only in the end (say from 1850), it became most probable that the West would beat the rest. Just as one would expect to see European economic dominance refracted, resisted and transformed in local social, political and administrative realities (with a truly dynamic interplay between world, center and peripheral developments as the result), the development of such an economic balance will have left traces in local society, politics and administration. Next, we will see what traces of Ottoman agency and policy may be found in late-17th-century Izmir.

Developments in the Status of an Alien Quarter

If we continue from the position that the Ottoman Empire was not only an économie-monde, but also a civilization, it follows naturally that that realm, economy and civilization operated according to an inner logic that was not strangely deviant from European modes, but rather alternative, and autonomous though overlapping, competitive though cooperating. This may sound abstract, but it is a proposition that has very real consequences for the study of such a civilization. For our infinitely smaller case, that of the significance of Izmir’s administrative status, it opens up the possibility that Izmir’s low administrative priority and Istanbul’s unwillingness to heighten it are not necessarily evidence for the Ottomans’ poor understanding of the systemic changes that were occurring in Western Asia Minor. Perhaps interpretations to that effect would have made sense for the Ottoman classical period (1300-1600, or 1453-1566), or for the modern period of recentralization (roughly from the 1839-proclamation of the Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane), but it is not very helpful for the early modern period.

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384 The first being the commonly used long classical age, from Ottoman beginnings shrouded in legend to the reign of Ahmed I and the Treaty of Zsitvatorok (1606); the second being the shorter (and in my view more apt), from the taking of Constantinople to the death of Süleyman I (the Great/the Lawgiver/the Magnificent).

385 Virgiana Aksan has succinctly made this argument concerning the telescopic danger of analyzing the early modern empire on the basis of paradigms, or even of an understanding of the Ottoman polity that rests on expertise in earlier or later periods: “Decline theorists argue that the Ottomans lost control over their internal resources, manpower as well as taxation systems, as early as 1600, and never recovered it. The empire struggled on for three
In the late classical period the internal unity of the Ottoman system was such that changes in a region’s or town’s economic importance would have generally predictable consequences for its political importance and its administrative status. Changes in economic importance and value would be gauged through recurring tax surveys (tahrirs), with swift consequences for the apportionment of fiefs (timars and ze’amets) and the calculated value of lands, services and commodities and, hence, for taxation. In general, rising economic value meant rising administrative status, military fiefs being upgraded and reserved for higher officers, judgeships and governorships being promoted and awarded to higher officials, and provincial budgets and fiscal targets being increased. Furthermore, through the tahrir and ihtisab-systems unwanted economic developments, such as changes in a region’s output to satisfy foreign demand, could be signaled and countered effectively. In the modern period the keeping of more or less uniform budgets and the publishing of salnames ensured administrative and political awareness of changes in regions’ economies.386

In the early modern 17th and 18th centuries, however, the classical Ottoman correlation between economic and political importance and military and administrative status had ceased to exist. By the end of the 16th century it had become undeniable that the semi-feudal timar-system through which most Ottoman lands were administered was breaking down under the pressures of the time. Most of these pressures on the timar-system were exerted by changes in military organization, of which the system had always been the cornerstone.

The most direct pressures on the classical system were ongoing revolts within the empire (particularly in the Anatolian heartland387) and unrelenting competition with the Habsburg, Safavid and Muscovian empires without. The standoff on three fronts, combined with the deflection of Ottoman forces away from them to combat internal unrest, limited opportunities for conquest and, hence, for the allotment of new cavalry fiefs (timars). This in turn caused new revolts and fed into ongoing ones. The conflicts at home and abroad also accelerated an increase in the use of irregulars (instead of semi-feudal cavalry, or sipahi), as well as the need to maintain a growing army

hundred more years, motionless and unchanging. Whatever the validity of these assertions, they generally lacked hard evidence, such as an elemental understanding of the budgets of the empire after 1650, or of the profound reordering of the agrarian tax systems that was underway, or of the relation between the military and society, and what the collapse of the military meant to the entire imperial project. … Ottomanist debates, prompted by those in Europe around the global crisis of the seventeenth century, inaugurated a discussion about the incorporation of the Ottomans into the world economy, which initially tended to focus on challenging the Asiatic mode of production.” (Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”, 113, my italics).

387 See W.J. Griswold, “Jalālī”, EI2, 0: 238b-40a.
of Janissaries and garrisons to secure Ottoman lands and fortify three active frontiers all year round.

This combination of military-strategic necessities decisively limited the relevance of the timar-system and the sipabis it provided for: the number of available fiefs could no longer support the numbers of new soldiers needed; firearm production and training increased at the cost of traditional cavalry weapons and tactics; more and more infantry was raised to take the place of cavalry that, after all, could not be kept from its semi-feudal administrative obligations at home all year each year. All this meant that the mainstay of the army could no longer be kept up through fiefs and the exaction of taxes and services from tenants. Instead of services, the new army that was evolving needed more and more cash for pay, training and firearms.\footnote{In his outstanding work \textit{Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700} (London: UCL Press, 1999) Rhoads Murphey meticulously identifies and weighs the practical limitations, opportunities and relative strengths of the Ottoman military machine as it confronted these challenges – implicitly critiquing many such blanket statements as are commonly made about this process of fiscal-military adaptation. In the process he arrives at some interesting conclusions concerning the social and fiscal background and impact of the Ottoman military complex, among others that it was relatively light, always kept significant reserves, moved about active troops prodigiously to save those reserves, and that recruitment targets for sipahi-cavalry, Janissary troops, garrison troops and irregulars were not set too far in advance as part of a policy to substitute one for the other, but frequently, as fiscal and military-strategic need required. Specifically see chapters one, two and three (“General political framework: the evolving context”, 1-11; “Material constraints on Ottoman warfare: the immutable context”, 13-34; “Military manpower and military spending: an attempt at realistic assessment”, 35-63), and chapter nine (“Conclusion – war and social transformation in the Ottoman empire”, 185-92).} Mainly because of this historical dynamic the Ottoman economy transformed from one primarily organized around the exaction of services (service economy) to one primarily organized around the exaction and payment of cash money (monetary economy).

For the Ottomanist’s practice, one of the most important consequences of this economic transformation is the diminishing importance and frequency of tax surveys (\textit{tabris}). The primary aim of the timar-system had been to support a hierarchically ordered military caste (the men of the sword, or seyfiye) that could be called upon in wartime to join campaigns with groups of retainers and to govern the land in peacetime. Thus, there had existed a firm link between the military, administrative, political and economic domains of the Ottoman polity. Now, the slow but certain demise of the timar-system was tearing heavily at this link. As Ottoman government sought new ways to root new military realities in wider Ottoman administration, the old link, though not severed completely, was transformed deeply.

With the direct tie between military service and administration of the lands increasingly ruptured through the reconfiguration from service to
monetary economy, the tasks of the military governors in the provinces were in large part reassigned to commissioners and private tax collectors. Local and provincial taxes originally levied for provincial treasuries (market dues, cattle dues, tolls, etc.) and taxes traditionally levied for the central treasury (cizye and various avereg-taxes) alike were more and more often collected by tax farmers (mukata’acs and mültezims389) who had acquired their right to collect at (annual or biannual) auctions. In this manner, amounts of collectable taxes, estimated through continuous monitoring by expressly appointed commissioners (emin(s) and local kadi(s), flowed straight into the coffers of the central administration, which could then decide more freely where it was to be spent – though most of it inevitably went towards military conscription, training, equipment and pay – instead of being automatically assigned to a caste of military governors (and their dependents) on which military success depended less and less.

The increasing use of tax farmers entailed the privatization of administrative tasks that had previously been the state’s exclusively. This had a profound impact on administrative practice. Not because it eroded the tax base, for taxes were remitted, be it in advance of collection. Nor because tax farmers could and would play the system to lower the apparent value of their farm ahead of the next auction (“to beat down a farm”, in contemporary European parlance). Rather, the impact lay in the implications tax farming had for hierarchy. Where previously there had been beys and kadi(s), sent out from the imperial center and each with their own taxes to administer and remit, there now also existed a host of contracted collectors, often with strong local ties, some of whom might still have been answerable in theory to the beys and kadi(s) (in security and legal issues respectively), but whose power could be so entrenched as to place them at considerable distance from these officials’ reach. The overriding importance placed on tax collection meant that the classical maxim of balancing a given town, city or region’s military-administrative and legal-administrative authority (again, the beys and kadi’s respectively) to limit opportunities for abuse, was subordinated to the acutely important rationale of fiscal maximization. If a locality’s circumstances permitted it or called for it, it became very conceivable that a kadi’s jurisdiction and power far outweighed a bey’s, or – if an area carried special fiscal importance – that both be eclipsed by those of its main tax farmer. Increasingly, whatever setup generated the most income without causing too much unrest seems to have been preferred to classical form, fiscal efficiency winning out from hierarchical authority.

Most of the changes and shifts in administration that later occurred throughout the empire originated in crown lands (havass-ı hümâyun). The

sultan could dispose of such lands with relative freedom from interference by classes and groups, who on other (miri/state, mülek/freehold or vakef/endowed) lands would have rightfully demanded specific regimes and claimed certain entitlements with regard to their uses and revenues. Thus, imperial ğass lands could function as a kind of testing ground for new administrative practices and governing strategies that bypassed existing state structures to experiment with tax farming and, more generally, with government through commissioners (emins). In this system, the role of feudal administrators like the sanâck beyi was limited to purely military tasks like the upkeep and manning of defenses. Although clearly advantageous to court, such government necessarily lacked some of the legitimacy of the classical system; it was, after all, despotic in essence.

Not only did the experimental attractiveness of the ğass result in the extension of its administrative practices to miri-lands, the system was also extended more directly by converting more and more lands to ğass proper. Whereas the classical Ottoman state had reserved ğass status primarily for royal hunting grounds, state monopolies and undercultivated stretches of farmlands suitable for cash cropping, the 17th century witnessed the conversion of more and more lands that had (potentially) high fiscal yields but that did not necessarily fit those earlier categories. This was advantageous for the specific reason that it gave the court more direct access to fiscal yields. But there was also the added general advantage that ğass administration bypassed the miri regime, giving the court much tighter administrative control over the lands involved than could ever be achieved otherwise.

390 See, e.g., the careful discussion on Ottoman land regimes in Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 12-24.

391 “The ğhawâṣ-i hâmâyân and the ğhâṣ lands of high officials and administrators formed an important part of the revenues of every province; ..., they formed 277,244,782 aṁces, 51% of the total revenue; the other ğhâṣ lands and timârs comprised 200,186,394 aṁces, 37% of the total revenue”; “The value and extent of ğhâṣ lands would vary according to the productivity of the provinces and sandjaks. Although the most productive lands were already included in the ğhâṣ estates at the beginning of the 10th/16th century, their boundaries and the revenue accruing from them tended to increase by a considerable amount”; “As a result of this decrease in agricultural income, the ğhâṣ lands of viziers, beşlerbeşs and sandjaks began to be transferred to the ğhâṣ-i hâmâyân”; “From the 10th/16th century onwards, the term ğhawâṣ-i hâmâyân started to be used as equivalent to that of miri nûkata’a. The officials supervising the ğhâṣ lands of sandjaks and beşlerbeşs could not therefore interfere with the revenues of miri nûkata’a or ğhawâṣ-i hâmâyân in any way ... ğhâṣ-i pâdishâhi or ğhawâṣ-i hâmâyân and ğhâṣ lands were managed by a voyvoda, who had under their command the sekhân soldiers in order to carry out their duties ... In some places the voyvoda, who were in charge of recording the shares of state and of individuals from ğhâṣ revenues ... were called ğhâṣ dâbil or “vêî officers” ... However, the taxes on the reâyâ living and working on the ğhâṣ lands were collected by emins, who had nothing to do with the voyvoda”; “In earlier times permission was not given for the ğhâṣa lands to be farmed out on iltizâm ... , but this was not adhered to in later applications”: Orhonlu, “Khâss”.
The foregoing already suggests that even if it is accepted that the modest rank of Izmir’s administrators in the classical system implied Istanbul’s indifference to what went on there (and its reliance on local mechanisms of control), it would nevertheless be a great mistake to assume it implied the same in the rapidly changing 17th-century context. As will be illustrated in more detail below, Izmir’s conversion from bass (of the kapudan and his kethûda) to bass-i hiymayun (c. 1678) not only transmitted its rapidly increasing revenues from the military establishment (in the person of the tersane-i amire kethûdası, the second Lord of the Admiralty, the grand admiral’s second-in-command) to court (in the person of the valide sultan, the sultan-mother) – it also meant that the court was now fully qualified to administer the bass directly (all the better if this could be done over the head of a lower-level kadi not in any position to challenge the will of the center).³⁹² Suraiya Faroqhi has asserted that “İzmir, the booming port town of this period [1590-1699], was intentionally left a simple district center and not promoted to the rank of a sancak capital, so that involvement of high-level officials was avoided as far as possible.”³⁹³ Although the assertion is certainly valid for the position of Izmir’s kadi, and for the city’s wider administration prior to the 1670s, the argument should not be extended beyond those limits: with its conversion to bass-i hiymayun, the city proper was taken out of the military-executive hierarchy of the sancak system altogether (excluding its external defenses) and brought under direct court rule. When observed through the prism of the fading classical system, its administrative status might seem to have remained peripheral; but within the context of the specifically early modern form of Ottoman administration that was congealing, this was a significant upgrade in status that implied an assertion of power and control by the center.³⁹⁴

Above the intact middle and lower tiers of Izmir’s administration consisting of the imported kadi and local officeholders, the top tier of district and provincial governors effectively disappeared, leaving a vacuum that was to be filled by various agents deeply indebted to the households enjoying ascendancy at court, committed to their politics and operating under their control. Special commissioners (emin) and tax farmers (who had subcontracted on empire-wide farms auctioned and based in Istanbul) were necessarily more dependent on the center than could ever have been the case with governors, who, though always tied to one or other court faction, might at least have retained some sense of their own legally defined claims to military-administrative responsibility, independence and authority.

³⁹² On clerical (ulema) hierarchy, and the lower-level rank (mahre) of Izmir’s kadi, see Halil İnalçık, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Phoenix, 1973; 1994), 170; F. Müge Göçek, “Mevlewiyyet or Mollalik”, EI2, vi: 1030a-b; Kreiser, Osmanische Staat, 221; and Madeline C. Zilfi, “The Ottoman ulema”, in: Cambridge History of Turkey 3, 216.
³⁹³ Faroqhi, Economic and Social History 2, 481.
³⁹⁴ Cf. note 385.
In Izmir, then, the realignment of offices so typical of the Ottoman 17th century came to mean that the jurisdiction of the bey (first of Sığla, then of Aydın) was limited to the inspection of coastal defenses while the jurisdiction of Izmir’s relatively low-ranking kadi far exceeded that usually associated with the office in localities of such importance.\(^\text{395}\) As the one in charge of day-to-day administration he was not only Izmir’s judge, notary, chief administrator and government agent, his duties also included overseeing and enforcing public safety and security in all its aspects, executive duties normally associated with the governorship. Formally within the kadi’s jurisdiction, but increasingly competing with him for the retreating competence of the bey were the officials operating Izmir’s tax collection system.

Those most relevant to our subject are the gümrükçü and the voyvoda. While gümrükçü simply means “customs inspector” (or, in the language of the time, “customer”), voyvoda translates much less readily. The title had its origin in the Ottoman Balkans, where it designated something like “vicereoy”. Voyvoda had originally been local Balkan rulers enlisted into Ottoman service and put in charge of the crown lands into which their previous dominions had been converted. Since crown lands had no regular military administration it became their task to ensure smooth and adequate collection of the taxes that accrued directly to governors (bawass) or the crown (bawass-ı hûmayun). As a corollary, they also assumed charge of the maintenance of public safety and security in the lands under their jurisdiction.\(^\text{396}\) This is why they are often called “bailiffs” by European observers. In the 17th century the Balkan-variant of the office was increasingly populated by non-Muslim court favorites, most often wealthy Phanariote Greek (and to a lesser extent Jewish) dragoman-doctor-financiers. With the increased incidence of bawass status in the Anatolian provinces the office became a regular fixture of Ottoman administration and – outside the Balkan lands – the preserve of Muslim occupants.

In 1678, Izmir’s voyvoda collected a stipend for the palace (paşmalık), taxes on fruits and wine, on imported market goods (baç-ı pazâr) and on intestate inheritances (beytülmal). The subaşı (police inspector) and gee naip (night judge) patrolled the streets day and night on his order to prevent, fine and arrest offenders of all sorts. This effectively made the voyvoda into a summary judge; the one who dispensed judgment and punishment as violations occurred – the kadi figuring almost as a judge of appeal in such non-administrative cases. Since the voyvoda was so deeply involved in so wide a variety of taxes and matters of public order, he was the first Ottoman official non-Muslims in general and Europeans in particular had to come to terms


with when wanting to make wine, to bring goods to market or to secure the inheritance of a fellow merchant – or, less innocuously, when making or drinking wine, roaming the streets at night without a lantern, engaging in prostitution, and like varieties of lewd or questionable behavior. This most often meant obtaining some dispensation from him, so Europeans were well-advised to stay on this officials right side.397

By 1678, the Izmir-Chios foreign customs farm (uç gümrük mukata’asıs or “outer” – foreign – customs farm, as distinct from that of the iç gümrük or inner – internal – customs) had been under tight control of the empire’s leading political family, the Köprülüs. Reflecting the hierarchy common in other areas of the empire’s administration, most regular customs posts in the empire’s core provinces were operated as subcontracts under one central contract served in Istanbul by the chief customer. Smaller posts were leased out as further subcontracts to those. Thus, the Chios customs was operated under the Izmir customs which was in turn operated under the Istanbul customs (not coincidentally this pattern was repeated in foreign representation: ambassador in Istanbul, consul in Izmir, vice-consul in Chios). Through careful household politics the three consecutive Köprülü grand viziers ruling from 1656 to 1683 managed to patronize and finance the four tax farmers (mukata’acs) that dominated the Istanbul and Izmir offices during this period (see Table 15 below).

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397 Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 165-68. One of the voyvoda’s several country houses and cottages was in fact a köşk (pavilion) at the far end of Frank Street, as shown under number 4 – “het Tjoske, of speelhuys van Hagmet Aga” – in De Bruyn’s 1678-panorama of Izmir (reproduced here as Appendix 1, Plate 1). This Ahmed Ağa – to whose person and functions we will return – held the office of voyvoda from at least 1665 to at least 1679. He competed with the kadi for the position of Izmir’s main power-broker and was also the single most accessible Ottoman in local administration to Europeans, even letting out his country house in the nearby village of Sey diköy to Dutch merchants. For the year 1665 and this voyvoda’s control over the kadi, see S.C. Lomas and Francis Lawrence Bickley, Report on the Manuscripts of Allan George Finch, Esq., of Burley-on-the-Hill, Rutland (London: H.M.S.O., 1913-57), ii: 375. For the year 1668 and his involvement with European merchants and their Ottoman protégés, see The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 64a-65a: Privileges obtained by Dutch ambassador Justinus Colyer during his audience with grand vizier Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa, 6 August 1668. For the year 1671, his charitable endowments, and his general pre-eminence, as well as for the information obtained from the muhtesib, see Evliya, *Seyahatname* 9, 89-99. For the year 1674 and his letting out his country house to the Dutch, see note 238 and Appendix 2, Document 4. For the years 1676-1677 and the gift presented to this voyvoda by the Dutch nation on the occasion of his son’s circumcision, see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacobus van der Merct to DLH, October 1677. For the years 1678-1679 and his köşk, see De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 23-25.
TABLE 15: THE KöPRÜLÜ HOLD ON CUSTOMS AND POLL-TAX COLLECTION (1668)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relevant Offices</th>
<th>Chief Household Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Köprülü Mehmed Paşa</td>
<td>former grand vizier</td>
<td>father of 2 and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa</td>
<td>former governor-general of Aleppo</td>
<td>son of 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>former deputy grand vizier</td>
<td>brother of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>grand vizier</td>
<td>father (in-law) of 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Merzifonlulu Kara Mustafa Paşa</td>
<td>former grand admiral</td>
<td>(adopted) son of 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>deputy grand vizier</td>
<td>brother of 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>future grand vizier</td>
<td>uncle (in-law) of 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kaplan Mustafa Paşa</td>
<td>grand admiral</td>
<td>son (in-law) of 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>future governor-general of Aleppo</td>
<td>nephew (in-law) of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mustafa Ağa</td>
<td>former customs farmer of Izmir/Chios</td>
<td>father of 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>former customs farmer of Istanbul</td>
<td>father (in-law) of 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>former steward of 1</td>
<td>client of sultana-mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mahmud Ağa</td>
<td>customs farmer of Istanbul</td>
<td>son of 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>steward of 1</td>
<td>brother (in-law) of 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hüseyin Ağa (I)</td>
<td>customs farmer of Izmir/Chios</td>
<td>son (in-law) of 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>poll-tax farmer of Izmir/Chios</td>
<td>brother (in-law) of 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>future poll-tax farmer of Istanbul</td>
<td>client of sultana-mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>future customs farmer of Istanbul</td>
<td>client of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hüseyin Ağa (II)</td>
<td>future customs collector of Izmir/Chios</td>
<td>client of 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>future poll-tax collector of Izmir/Chios</td>
<td>client of 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Galland, *Journal*, i: 87 and throughout; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 123, 170-71, and throughout; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Jacob van Dam and Justinus Colyer to DLH, 5 May 1688; and Kreutel, *Kara Mustafa vor Wien*, throughout.

The enduring grand vizieral grip on the empire’s foreign customs implied a high measure of control over its conditions, tariffs, collection and proceeds. It has already been noted that both the theoretical height of customs duties and the actual amount paid were decisive for the competitiveness of a nation’s trade. Since trade was the *raison d’être* of the nations assembled in Izmir’s European quarter, and since the Köprülü had a special interest in that trade, it would be no exaggeration to claim that for a period of some twenty-five years ending in 1683 that leading family possessed an unparalleled potential to dominate European life in Izmir. Yet the Köprülü managed to enhance this potential further still, since sometime before 1672 they extended their patronage to the poll-tax farm (*çizye iltizam*). During their remaining eleven years in power the chief customer was also the collector of the poll-tax in Galata, Pera and Üsküdar – the non-Muslim districts across Istanbul’s Golden Horne where most of the city’s non-Muslims and all its Europeans lived. Just as was the case with the customs farms, the poll-tax *iltizams* were organized hierarchically with Istanbul at the top, Izmir and other important centers of non-Muslim presence just below and smaller and more peripheral ones like Chios appended to those. Although this did
not necessarily mean that the offices of customs and poll-tax collector were always united in one person, this was the case in Izmir as in Istanbul.

In terms of power on the ground, patronizing the poll-tax farms in prime locations of international trade like Galata, Pera and Izmir was of major consequence. From their positions as grand vizier and substitute grand vizier the Köprülüls could already wield an impressive array of formal administrative and diplomatic instruments. Their control and reform of the customs farms added to this the means to gain precise information on, and interfere in, all commercial transactions involving foreigners – most often by invoking suspicions of illicit trading. This pervasiveness allowed them to pursue broader economic policy and to serve their private financial interests through day-to-day micro-management on the local level.398

Now, patronage and reform of the poll-tax added another instrument to the Köprülüls’ policy arsenal (399) and expanded opportunities for micro-managing Ottoman-European trade and relations, providing the means to intervene in the Ottoman side of business transactions as well. Shifting poll-tax burdens and manipulating relevant legal procedures in favor of some or other non-Muslim nation (Greek, Jewish, Armenian) or specific non-Muslim merchant (wholesaler, dragoman, warehouseman, etc.) at the cost of another

398 As is apparent in Kara Mustafa’s baraç order, in the Pentlow avania and the resulting precautions by the other nations, in the controversy with Venetian ambassador Civrano over diplomatic smuggling, in the forced renewal of the Dutch capitulations (upon complaints by the chief customer), as in the many arrests of European goods in the Izmir customs over the years 1675-1688: see, supra and, e.g., Appendix 2. The process began in earnest under Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, when the new Izmir customs was taken into operation and maintained by Kara Mustafa Paşa. Cf. The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Justinus Colyer to Jacob van Dam and the Dutch Nation of Izmir, 4 October 1675, where it is recounted how Colyer read Van Dam and the nation’s letter of 14 September 1675 on the troubles made by Izmir’s customer, who was refusing to expedite the cargo of Dutch national Schregels, upon which Colyer had sent his first dragoman to Hüseyin Ağá (I) to try to hold him to his earlier promise that the new customs regulation would not be enforced – to which the customer had replied that he could no longer guarantee this because the grand vizier had sent a general command to establish and maintain the new customs, and that all nations trading in Izmir now had to regulate themselves according to it. Upon taking his complaint higher up to substitute grand vizier Kara Mustafa, he was (of course!) again politely told that the order had come straight from the grand vizier and was ironclad. The subsequent memorandum to Fazıl Ahmed drafted by the French ambassador and cosigned by all European representatives was also to no avail, so the representatives advised their nations in Izmir to attempt to mitigate the effects of the new regulations through local arrangements with Hüseyin Ağá (II), giving up formal resistance for fear of commercial and diplomatic repercussions.

399 The əzər-reform of 1691, which officially replaced all maktu‘-arrangements and previous rates with three fixed rates of liability, was introduced by Köprülüzade Mustafa Paşa (1689-1691) but had in fact been prepared by Fazıl Ahmed and Kara Mustafa Paşas. They first tested various incarnations of the system in Crete, the Aegean, and Izmir after the conquest of Crete (see notes 110 and 112).
could after all impact these merchants’ competitive edge significantly. Potentially, the leverage created by control over the poll-tax could also be extended to directly or indirectly include European merchants who were felt to have retreated from consular protection, to have crossed communal lines, or to have simply resided in Ottoman lands for too many consecutive years not to be liable to taxation.

Beside the Köprülü’s hold on customs and the poll-tax through patronage of its farmers, another line of power led down to Izmir’s voyvoda. Because of the fluidity of the office, it has proved difficult to uniformly define the voyvodalık. Contemporary accounts invariably give many descriptions of his functions and modern scholars have followed in their footsteps styling him “prince”, “governor”, “bailiff”, “chief of police”, “tax collector”, “market inspector”, “head intendant”, and so on. The most learned dragomans’ dictionary of the time gives “wajwoda: (LA.) palatinus, princeps, praefectus, major pagi, quaestor, tribunus, maleficiorum judex, praetor, nomarcha; (FR.) palatin, prince, gouverneur, baillif, maire, prevost, receveur. Although voyvodas could certainly fulfill these and other tasks, we have already seen they can all be traced back to one central duty; that of collecting income from hasö estates, whether imperial (havass-i hümâyun, destined for the treasury) or otherwise (havass of sultans, royal consorts, viziers, governors-general, governors, etc.). This was the defining responsibility of the office, but to enable it to be carried out effectively some of the means and agents of force and control normally associated with the governorship had to be brought under the voyvoda’s competence. As a consequence, within the districts (kazaşs) he was appointed to the voyvoda could take on many tasks that were necessary to ensure the generation and collection of the revenue in his charge. Most important among these auxiliary duties were maintaining discipline and public order through the services of a number of lower tier officials like the police and market inspectors (resp. subaş and muhtesib) and with the assistance of local Janissary regiments or irregular units.

400 The best illustration of this capability and the Köprülü’s determination to use it to break European commercial power in their own and their subjects’ favor, is their deciding in the Portuguese Jews’ favor the controversy surrounding the balance between the formal status of Izmir’s Portuguese Jews as Ottoman subjects, Dutch protégés, and/or Dutch subjects, and the commercial privileges and courtesies that were to be accorded to them – a policy decision that was rapidly reversed after their fall. See pages 147-55, and Appendix 2, documents 8 and 9.

401 See my “Towards Classifying Avanias” on two Köprülü interventions (in the Dutch and the English nations) on poll-tax related questions of subject status and inheritance division. On the baraq controversy – Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa’s more concentrated effort to push the Europeans and their commerce back in their appointed legal-commercial space, see pages 206-16 and Appendix 2, document 12.

402 Meniński, Thesaurus, 5423.
Considering the extraordinary amount of commerce taking place in Izmir it is not surprising that Izmir’s voyvoda, Uzun Ahmed Ağâ (see note 397), cast a particularly large shadow – all the larger for the fact that he derived his salary as a percentage of the farmed and unfarmed taxes he collected. What’s more, the voyvoda’s local pedigree seems to have made him a power broker with close ties to the city’s elite and deep roots in local politics.403 As the strongman behind the customer/poll-tax collector and several more collectors of market taxes and other commercial duties, but also – more directly – behind the guards along Izmir’s quays, streets and markets, he was obviously of supreme importance to any Ottoman or European conducting business in the city. The Köprülüs’ ties to this personage of significant wealth and local power were twofold: firstly, they were officially charged with overseeing the affairs of the valide sultan (the beneficiary of the Izmir hâsim) and in that capacity were the voyvoda’s direct superiors; and, secondly, they had a more private stake in smooth and effective operation of the office because it was the second leg under their customs and poll-tax interests.

The situation outlined above once more draws our attention to the single most distinguishing feature of Ottoman elite social and political life in the early modern period; the political household (kapı), and the politics through which it was supported, expanded and utilized.404 The cultivation of large and influential households was not unique to the Ottoman case: it was common throughout the Middle East and Asia, as well as in Europe (though there on a more modest scale). The longevity, size and political relevance of the Ottoman institution were remarkable nonetheless. It was so pervasive because it developed as an integral part of the equally long-lived, large and politically relevant Ottoman Empire where the patrimonial household of the Ottoman dynasty was almost synonymous with the state and commanded emulation throughout elite society. As Ottoman vezir-paşa-households, with the Osmanlıs and the Köprülüs’ as shining examples, started to fill the vacuums left by the early modern multiform reorganization of the military, the land regimes, and provincial administrations, they acquired so much power and expertise that they ended up becoming indispensable to the operation of the Ottoman state and its territories. These miniature states would employ many hundreds of people with further client-patron relations branching out far and wide into Ottoman administration, institutions and society. Although their importance for early modern Ottoman history is established, their fluid-

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403 Cf. Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 89-99; and Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 165-68.

404 On the importance of political households for (the historiography of) the Ottoman early modern period, see Aksan, “Theoretical Ottomans”; Neumann, “Political and diplomatic developments”; Carter Vaughn Findley, “Political culture and the great households”, in: Cambridge History of Turkey 3, 65-80; and Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders: An analysis of the historiography”, in: ibid., 135-56.
ity and informality (though not perceived as such by the Ottomans themselves) have hindered consistent scholarly investigation.405

While being aware of the limitations of our current understanding of the phenomenon, it should be possible to appreciate its importance and illustrate its impacted on Ottoman affairs. We are fortunate to have relatively many references to the household connections of the three consecutive Köprülü viziers of the second half of the 17th century, and one remarkably detailed description of the household of the third.406 The general impression they provide of the Köprülü network is that it was tight yet wide, that it was carried over from generation to generation, and that it tended to mirror administrative hierarchy within its household and wider patron-client relationships. That last addition may seem like a complicated way of saying that this and other such networks purposely and necessarily followed administrative organization. After all, a client only gets appointed to an office precisely because his patron is in a position to procure appointment for him. In this fashion the patron not only dominates his subordinates professionally and formally as a superior within formal hierarchy, but also privately and informally as a patron through his network. But besides reminding us of the fact that there existed many other (e.g. more horizontal, less political) types of households and other networks, stressing this particular one’s stability, size, longevity and coincidence with formal hierarchy also serves another purpose: it signals a renewed Ottoman capability for policy-making.

Until now, we have primarily discussed the court’s direct involvement in the bass of Izmir (and, fleetingly, the hawass of Galata, Pera and Üsküdar) and Köprülü dominance in customs and poll-tax affairs in terms of the accumulation of raw power and financial control. We have argued that the light presence and even retreat of classical state structures from these places is not a sound indicator of their real or perceived importance to the Ottomans because from the end of the 16th century onwards the roles and functions of classical Ottoman administration were partly taken over by more effective, if more arbitrary, forms of management. The takeover happened first and foremost in lands reserved for the crown (hawass-i himayun) and members of

405 Although a number of biographic studies on Ottoman statesmen have gone some way towards mapping the unknown terrain opened up by Abou-el-Haj’s landmark study on the vezir-paşa-household (id., “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households”), his rudimentary study of the Köprülü-household, and those monographs, have yet to prompt a consistent effort to arrive at a (prosopographical) description of the empire’s most important households and their relations to each other and the state in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries.

406 See, e.g., supra under “The Köprülüs, Their Endowment and Its Impact” and “Kara Mustafa Paşa and the Reassertion of Ottoman Control”. Also see Dankoff, The Intimate Life; id., An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi; Galland, Journal, throughout (the description of Kara Mustafa’s household at ii: 186-207); and North, Life.
the royal household, court favorites and high officials (havass proper). The fact that such lands were either partly or fully administered for the benefit of private persons implied that their government was also to a certain degree privatized. Considering that most Ottomans invested whatever social and political capital they possessed in their households and that management of the extended family’s resources was the primary task of the public (birun; as opposed to enderun or privy) section of any household, it is to be expected that the administration of bass lands was dominated by members of their patriarchs’ households. If, then, a patron’s household was powerful enough to effectively and consistently develop linkages with the lands under consideration and keep out rival households, we would expect to see the pattern repeated lower down, displaying a hierarchical sequence of household loyalties instead of a tangle of competing ones.

This indeed was how the Izmir bass was administered; locally by members of the Köprülü household and centrally by its patrons, the Köprülü grand viziers, who in turn administered it for their own patron, the valide sultan. It seems the bonds of power connecting court, central government and local administration in Izmir were at once strong and deep because of the way “formal” and “informal” power coincided throughout hierarchy. The setup not only enhanced the Köprülü’s political and financial position by functioning as a power base, it also served as a political and financial insurance whose formal and informal legs kept each other up if either threatened to falter. Deliberate household policies thus served to unite political, financial and social power in the family’s hands and to make sure it stayed there beyond one patron’s term in office and for as long as possible. The measure of continuity thus achieved, apart from serving private interests, had great significance for general government. The longevity and depth of Köprülü power made possible a level of coordination in state affairs which the eroding classical state structures were no longer able to deliver. After decades of intense turmoil and rudderlessness it provided the means to engage in the development and implementation of unified and sustained government policies.

The Köprülü directed most of this renewed capability towards “foreign” affairs. It could hardly have been otherwise, seeing their empire’s uncomfortable position amidst the encroaching Muscovians, Safavids and Habsburgs and the rapidly increasing volume of Ottoman-European trade. But as our discussion of the capitulations has shown, the distinction between foreign and home affairs would have appeared artificial to the Ottomans to begin with. Short of special Ottoman embassies or outright war, all Ottoman-European relations took place in Ottoman lands and could be considered home affairs – a natural outcome of the absence of reciprocity. Throughout Ottoman history European representatives were confronted with the consequences of this position, namely that their hosts assumed sovereignty under Ottoman law over persons the Europeans considered to be protected and
immune under international law. Nevertheless, the resulting conflicts were rarely more than minor if recurring inconveniences to be smoothed over by diplomacy and money. That is, in the absence of major international crises and so long as the Ottomans did not embark upon any consistent effort to utilize the full potential of this controversy for larger purposes.

In extremis, though, consistent Ottoman utilization of the legal duplicity of capitulatory status for long-term political ends could result in the devaluation of the status of resident European diplomats and their merchant communities. Although it would never declare so unequivocally for the understandable reason that this would catastrophically harm the empire’s international relations, a sufficiently ruthless Ottoman logic could dictate that ambassadors, residents and consuls henceforth be treated – de facto – as heads (millet bası) of Ottoman minority communities (millets; taifes) that lived under their own legal and fiscal regimes just like the empire’s other non-Muslim communities. The previously described changes in Ottoman attitude towards foreign representatives, trade and merchants that occurred under the Köprülü could certainly be construed as shifts in that direction. The fundamental reaction to this apparent policy-based shift was an intensified European struggle to safeguard the additional privileges and exemptions that separated its merchant communities from the subjected Armenian, Jewish, and Greek ones. Most visibly, this involved suspending Ottoman imposition of the most eye-catching mark of the zimmî, the cizye poll-tax, on protected Europeans (müstemim).

The extension of Ottoman sovereignty achieved through Köprülü land, household and fiscal politics was crowned by their privately funded 1678 urban development project. In Izmir, its primary function was to bring European trade under Ottoman control, in the process cording it off more tightly from the Ottoman economy so as to limit its impact. As such, it was the physical equivalent of the Köprülü’s efforts to legally and administratively separate the Europeans more clearly from their Ottoman context in the social and economic arenas and force them back in their assigned legal, social and commercial space – a policy that simultaneously aimed to integrate these discrete communities’ more absolutely in the Ottoman system and to control their cultural impact. This it did through legal, commercial and other administrative measures, but now also physically through the creation of an Ottoman-controlled middle ground in Kasap Hazır.

Relocating entrance, storage and sale to Ottoman institutions in the Ottoman part of town served the practical purpose of drastically limiting possibilities for smuggling and other types of tax evasion (407), thereby raising the value of the hasç and the income and value derived from it. Politically, patronizing and facilitating Izmir’s administrative and mercantile elites

407 See pages 136-37 and note 195.
whether Ottoman or European – served to correct a main irritant in Ottoman foreign affairs, viz. the disproportionate amount of influence individual local Ottoman officials and European merchants could wield in the empire’s affairs against Istanbul’s (or for that matter; home governments’) explicit wishes. Indeed, if one takes a step back and surveys Ottoman-European affairs in Izmir from its beginnings up to 1688, a subtle change becomes visible: one notices how ripples and disruptions in local relations (let’s call them “avanias”) at first tend to be more frequent and modest, and to originate with demands made by local Ottoman officials in contravention of Istanbul’s will, and later on become scarcer, while appearing as expressions of Köprülü will to be countered only through petitioning other court factions and households in moments of Köprülü weakness or absence.

With the wide and deep foundation they were laying in the economic heart of Ottoman-European affairs, the Köprülüs gained enough power to have all concerned toe their line. To the Ottomans, politics and trade had always been two sides of the same coin, but the politicization of mercantile affairs that was the result of the Köprülüs’ interest in foreign affairs and their decades-long reassertion of central power was such that any and all chances of counterbalancing it through local alliances were lost from the outset. In a system that was increasingly adept and determined at manipulating their affairs through administrators, middlemen and competitors, Izmir’s European communities did well to recognize that they now operated as an integral part in an increasingly unified Ottoman power structure and to make the most of this given.

The affairs of the Dutch nation of the period afford an unusual degree of insight into this process. I have asserted above (and elsewhere; see note 408) that the manipulation of factions within Ottoman society and administration to secure optimal commercial conditions and mitigate avanias was regular European practice – a regular practice, however, that was to be concealed as much as possible from the home authorities. By not allowing their controllers and supervisors too good a view on how the sausage of commercial success was made, European merchants and representatives preserved deniability for when their dealings unraveled and invited Ottoman interference: they could play on European prejudices, blame Ottoman (or Jewish) untrustworthiness, intransigence and despotism, be bailed-out, and still come away with their reputations and prospects intact. Although the Dutch were no exception to this, and although the full extent of their illicit trades and relations will therefore also forever remain hidden, the intense and uninter-

rupted crisis of authority that plagued their nation from 1668 until 1687 (mainly over arrears in consular and ambassadorial duties\textsuperscript{409}) does afford us some added perspective on how the Dutch dealt with the realignment of Ottoman power in Izmir.

Together with the realignment of Ottoman power in Izmir, the rift in the Dutch nation that persisted throughout the first Köprülü-period (as specified in Appendix 3), ensured that the Dutch merchants and combined nation were no longer positioned to utilize national and factional divergences and oppositions within the city’s wider administration and society to locally counter or undermine the wishes of an Ottoman center that was in disarray.\textsuperscript{410} Instead, Dutch (and other European nations’) attempts to conduct factional politics in Izmir against the Ottoman center, although often initially appearing promising at the local level, invariably foundered later on because whatever national and factional divergences and oppositions existed within local society and administration were resolved higher up in the unified household and government hierarchy set up by the Köprülüs – its energies being redirected back down to Izmir to ensure compliance.

This change did not end factional politics in Izmir, but the fact that local factions could no longer be played to counterbalance Köprülü orders through local co-optation did limit its relevance for the city’s Europeans. Such European involvement in local politics as did occur, now served the purpose of winning temporary and incidental advantages over European competitors, or – as in the Dutch case – within the nation. In their struggle to gain the upper hand over one another, the factions within Izmir’s Dutch nation sought and obtained the support of competing institutions back home, and of competing European nations and Ottoman officials in Izmir. The prism of Dutch factional relations therefore affords us some interesting insights into concrete political alignments in Izmir during this time.

The rift in the Dutch nation of Izmir formed and persisted in resistance to attempts by the States General to reassert consular jurisdiction and controls. After decades of underrepresentation, liberty and anarchy (reminiscent of the Wild West) this was regarded by a substantial number of Dutch merchants as an unwarranted and costly infringement in their personal and professional affairs. Although it did not take the form of formal dissent with the States General, the Dutch correspondence to and from Izmir of this period does show that this tendency toward liberty was often viewed more sympathetically by the directors of the chambers of the Board of Levant Trade (DLH), themselves after all not officials but representatives and coordinators

\textsuperscript{409} The crisis figures prominently in all primary and secondary sources on the Dutch nation of Izmir in the 17th century, but see the contributions by Van Dam van Isselt in the bibliography in particular.

\textsuperscript{410} Cf., generally, Goffman, \textit{Izmir and the Levantine World}.
chosen from among merchant/burgher communities wary of centralized authority. Overall, the interests of the consul and the obedient faction coincided with those of the resident/ambassador and the States General, while those of the disobedient often found a more understanding audience in the DLH, the cities, and occasionally the provinces.411

The two Dutch factions also sought and obtained support among Izmir’s other Europeans. Although that support did not follow national lines completely, the consul’s faction often garnered the support of the English consul and nation, while the disobedient faction frequently managed to muster that of the French.412 Here, it is interesting to note that this alignment had almost nothing to do with world political developments (one will recall that an Anglo-French alliance attacked the United Provinces in 1672, for example), and everything with the organizational, mercantile and cultural style and makeup of these nations (as discussed a few pages further down): within the diverse European cultures of Izmir the French and disobedient Dutch faction represented an older more chaotic and diversified Levantinized mercantile culture than the one represented by the English nation and the obedient Dutch faction.

Completing the triangle of relations supporting European life and trade in Izmir was that of Ottoman administration. For any nation, faction or merchant to survive beyond one trade season, and certainly for as long as the Dutch disobedient faction did, it required not just the support of some home authorities and other European nations, but also that of one or more Otto-

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411 See all The Hague-archives listed in the bibliography. Also see Heeringa, Bronnen 2; and the articles by Van Dam van Isselt.

412 Cf., e.g., The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Adriano Groenincx, Frans de Hartigh, Nicolas Legouche and Philips van de Sande in Jacob van Dam’s chancery, 28 December 1671; *ibid.*: Nicolas Legouche to DLH, 2 July 1674; *ibid.*: “discrepant” Dutch merchants of Izmir to DLH, 14 August 1674; and *ibid.*: Nicolas Legouche in Louis Chambon’s chancery, 14 August 1674 – where we read that the complainants against consul Van Dam were vacationing in Seydiköy with members of the French nation, and that one of the consul’s supporters (Cornelis van Persijn, also a lodger of Van Dam’s) violently mistreated French merchant Auguste Rubin in that same village, leading his brother-in-law Joseph Clement Fauré to lodge a complaint with Jacob van Dam, who refused to do anything about it but did consequently had Fauré beaten up by Van Persijn and his domestics, occasioning a lawsuit resulting in depositions with French consul Louis Chambon and with a notary in Rotterdam. As for the advice and support the English lent the Dutch consul and his faction, that is in evidence throughout Dutch correspondence, esp. in The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6913: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 21 September 1671; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 6 December 1674; *ibid.*: Jacob van Dam to States General and DLH, 18 March 1675;

The Hague, NA 1.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Colyer, 13 February 1676; The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 2 March 1676; and *ibid.*: Jacobus van der Mercet to DLH, 24 November 1678. It is also apparent in the joint Anglo-Dutch excursion to Ephesus of 1678 (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23a-b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 28-34). Additional texts in Appendix 2, documents 1, 3, 4, and 5.
man power brokers. It appears that the consul and his faction managed to retain the support of Izmir’s kadi (and his subordinates), while the disobedient faction garnered that of the voyvoda (and his).

Surely, it is no coincidence that on this side of the triangle too, the consul and his party aligned with the Ottoman official that most represented the imported authority of the center and its formal procedures, while his opponents could apparently count on the support of a more embedded power broker with whom deals could be struck to mutual benefit. European expense accounts show that the kadi ranked above the voyvoda, also in the eyes of the European consuls. In their official correspondence, what’s more, the latter is non-existent. At the same time, Galland and other travelers tell us that he was a person of great power and importance to the Europeans. The resulting image is that of a local power broker who made good his formal position below the kadi by using the contacts and means of enforcement at his disposal to become the well-rewarded enabler of the shadier sides of European and inter-national life in Izmir, in a way balancing out the kadi’s and the consuls’ authority.

See note 397 and Appendix 2, document 4 on the disobedient faction’s leasing the voyvoda’s house in Seydiköy. Van Dam, on the other side, fully depended on the kadi for lodging complaints and enforcing his consular authority – cf., e.g., Appendix 2, document 1, which was used as a widely attested and very public demonstration of the disobedient faction’s disrespect for the kadi and all but the French consul’s authority. The kadi’s support was also of crucial importance in the controversy surrounding Van Dam’s appointment of Johan Calekoe as vice-consul, that is, against the express and rightful will of the disobedient faction: see The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Discrepant Thirteen of the Dutch Nation of Izmir to DLH, 13 December 1677; and ibid.: Jacob van Dam to DLH, 29 December 1677; and The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Jacob van Dam to Justinus Colyer, 23 December 1677.

See Appendix 2, documents 2, 4 and 11 and notes 238, 356, 397 and 413 (and surrounding text) on Dutch relations with voyvoda Ahmet Ağä (also in relation to the kadi). Accord. Ülker, Rise of Izmir, 224n48 on English presents to the kadi and voyvoda. And Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 284-93 on Ahmet Ağä’s accessibility, his formal relation to the kadi, and his actual power over him. Idem Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 162-68, where (166-67) it is also explained how the voyvoda issued permission slips enabling Europeans to visit prostitutes: “Il profite aussi des amendes auxquelles le cadi condamne les malfaiteurs et ceux qui font des désordres. Mais un des beaux droits qu’il ait est sur ceux qui se trouvent en débauche avec les femmes, parce que l’amende n’est pas limitée et qu’il peut exiger le plus qu’il peut suivant les richesses de ceux qu’il surprend. Mais il y en a plusieurs, et particulièrement des Francs, qui lui donnent qui 10, qui 20 écus par an pour avoir un billet de lui qui leur donne la liberté de fréquenter celles qu’ils veulent, et pour se mettre à couvert de l’affront d’être menés en prison ou de recevoir quelque autre mauvais traitement. Néanmoins, afin que le cadi ne trouve rien à redire à une telle permission qu’il pourrait trouver de mauvais exemple et contraire aux lois, il met simplement qu’il donne la permission à un tel Franc d’aller à la maison ou au jardin d’une telle pour faire blanchir son linge. Cela ne les met pas beaucoup plus en sûreté, parce que comme ils sont connus et que l’on sait les lieux qu’ils fréquentent, il ne manque pas de les importuner souvent et de leur en faire débourser davantage. Il y a des filles qui obtiennent aussi de ces billets afin d’être visitées par les Francs avec liberté, et l’on en a déjà vu qui par ce moyen sont arrivées à en épouser de bien riches, quoiqu’elles n’eussent aucun bien.” Accord. note 235; Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 315 and 334; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 127.
Rather than pointing towards a European overpowering of an incompetent and derelict Ottoman administrative structure ushering in an era of sustained Ottoman commercial incorporation into the European world system, the aforementioned changes in Ottoman administrative practice and the subtle ways in which the European communities adjusted to them, suggest movement in an opposite direction – that of an increasing European incorporation into a reconfiguring and reascending Ottoman system (at least until the Orlov revolt of 1769 and the Battle of Çeşme of 1770). This is not to say that no Ottoman (semi-)peripheralization took place, but it does challenge us to reconsider time and again that process’ relative timing and strength, and, therefore, also its inevitability. However hard it might be for the modern observer to recognize and appreciate policies and measures that were formulated through sovereign Ottoman knowledge, experience and practice (especially when they do not correspond to our perceptions of what was ideally, classically, Ottoman), it would be wise to imagine that they might have constituted a viable alternative to European commercial prowess instead of a rearguard action against it.

Size and Composition of the non-Ottoman Communities

After our necessarily somewhat philosophical examinations of the causes, perceptions, manifestations and ramifications of the European communities’ changing legal, administrative and social status, the following sections will address a number of more practical questions concerning their size, composition, organization and taxation.

Our first two questions, as to size and composition, do however require some further qualification before we can attempt to answer them. For what did a “nation” constitute? As is to be expected in a time when concepts such as nationality and citizenship were still very much in development, there existed precious little agreement on what constituted national membership. And even if some form of agreement existed, a far from egalitarian worldview would guarantee that insiders and observers often shared a sense that not all members really mattered or counted evenly. Comparison of contemporary accounts confirms this: some observers count only the principal merchants (trading for their own accounts or “factors”), others include clerks and other staff, still others shop- and tavern keepers and the like. And then there is the question of whether female family members and protégés were included in estimates of a given nation’s size. So, although tables of contemporary estimates have been produced and reproduced countless times, the question as to what sections of Izmir’s European population are included or omitted in the figures given for any nation still need to be grappled with. In the end, just as was the case with our figures for Izmir’s non-European population, it comes down to whom to trust most as a source.

Contemporary accounts speak of significant disparities between the various nations. Everywhere, the French nation is listed as the largest by far,
followed at some distance by the English, the Dutch, the Venetian and the Genoese. Though they are not to be taken at face value, the overall picture that emerges from them is confirmed by all contemporary accounts, both narrative and otherwise. It is that of three consecutive waves of foreign merchants washing one over the other, each virtually crushing its predecessors (with the French forming the exception). After centuries of competition among themselves, the merchants of Venice and Genoa were swamped by an inpour of French, particularly Provençals, who started arriving in full force in the second half of the 16th century. Around the turn of the century they were joined by the English, followed on their heels by the Dutch. Far from being haphazard, this sequence of arrivals perfectly illustrates the overriding themes of Braudel’s *La Méditerranée*, viz. the capturing of Mediterranean trade by the Atlantic Seaboard states (a theme which would go on to prompt and inform much of Wallerstein’s world-system theory) and the ruining of Mediterranean socioeconomic unity.415

Just like the arrival of Islam and the Turks had an enormous (though not disruptive) impact on the organization and substance of Mediterranean trade (and obviously also on participation in it), the Atlantic seaboard’s intrusion in the status quo under Ottoman rule again ushered in many new developments. Neither the arrival of Islam and the Turks, nor that of France, England and the Netherlands, were negative developments commercially speaking (a belief nevertheless still widely held in the case of Islam and, even more so, the Turks).416 Rather, each new arrival signaled yet another rise in the total volume and value of trade. But in the early modern period the distinctively tolerant Mediterranean way of life so closely intertwined with a highly pragmatic and crosscultural Mediterranean commercial practice developed over ages, was time and again besieged by clericalism, mercantilism, absolutism, nationalism, and a host of other “isms” that eventually altered it beyond recognition. Such medium-term changes in Mediterranean commerce and society were not only expressed through the sequence in which new trading nations arrived in commercial centers, but also of course through who traded what goods under what form of internal administration once they got there. A relatively open and commercially integrated city like Izmir – benignly administered and ideally positioned at the crossroads of the North-South and East-West axes of Mediterranean trade, offering access to the old luxury trade from the Far and Near East and to increasingly popular bulk goods (cotton, grain, soap, ore etc.) from Anatolia and Egypt – offers an excellent example of how systemic developments played out locally.

415 See notes 139 and 373-76.
Venice, Genoa and the Greek islands dominated by them had the oldest claims to trade in Ottoman lands. The city republics themselves obviously lay outside Ottoman borders and were therefore foreign to the Ottomans. Yet, the existence of Genoese and Venetian communities in Thrace, Asia Minor and the Archipelago predated the arrival of the Ottomans, implying they could be considered more domestic to those regions than their overlords. The integral parts of the pre-Ottoman configuration that these communities were, they were complete societies in the truest sense. In Izmir as in Istanbul they once consisted of significant numbers of families occupied in as full an array of trades as might be found in any town, guided by their own clergy-men, led and represented by chosen headmen, and under the ultimate jurisdiction of noble families tied to the home city.417

As the demand for luxury goods from the East was superseded by Europe’s increasing demand for Egyptian and Anatolian bulky foodstuffs and raw materials, however, the French managed to supplant them as leading merchants and by 1678 the number of their companies in Izmir had dwindled to insignificance. The city states’ networks, honed as they were to the long-distance far-eastern connections of the Silk Road and the Red Sea, and of diminishing political relevance in the Mediterranean arena, had managed only slight resistance against the Marseille merchants, who had an old presence in Mamluk and Ottoman Egypt and whose affairs were increasingly taken in hand by (and absorbed into) a steadily ascending Kingdom of France.

Just like the history of the Italian city states’ Levantine communities, that of the French goes back to the Crusades, the primary difference being that the Venetians and Genoese managed to hold on a bit longer to some of their territories in Anatolia and the Archipelago through the 1202-1204 crusade against Byzantium, while further to the South the French relinquished all territory from earlier crusades to the Seljuks and Mamluks. French presence in the Levant, then, was equally old but had ceased to be territorial at a much earlier date. These circumstances, accompanied by the uncoordinated nature of the multiple trade connections between the Provence and Izmir, created a French nation in Izmir that by 1678 was fairly large, but constituted much less of a complete society. It boasted a number of larger companies, or “rag-gions” of several merchants, and a mass of petty merchants, skippers and sailors; a rough and predominantly male society herded by its own priests and monks and supported by its own tavern- and innkeepers, carpenters, rope-makers, barbers, doctors, apothecaries and so on.418

417 See, generally, e.g., Lane, Venice; Slot, Archipelagus turbatus; and Fleet, European and Islamic Trade.
418 See note 234.
These nations were joined, at the close of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century respectively, by the English and the Dutch. We have already discussed the scramble for sovereignty and the uniformity of capitulatory practice that accompanied these nations’ arrival on the scene. There were corresponding developments with regard to national size, composition, organization and taxation. The feature that most distinguished the newly formed English and Dutch nations from the older and more firmly embedded Italian and French ones, was their leanness. These were small and tight-knit communities comprised almost exclusively of factors and clerks who ran a monopolized trade (fully so in the English case, and de facto so in the case of the 17th-century Dutch) between themselves and their principals and trade organizations back home. The result was an exclusively male purely professional business community with narrowly defined interests and minimal ties to the larger population of the city. But as is confirmed by many sources (Colbert and Winchelsea chief among them) these comparatively small communities did represent a trade of such value that it soon eclipsed that of a large nation like the French.419

In retrospect, there seems to have taken place in the trade of 17th-century Izmir (as in European trade at large) a shift in mercantile power from the large, open and loosely organized commercial communities of the Middle Ages to the smaller tighter professional merchant communities of our capitalist age. The French, part of the old Mediterranean system as much as of the up-and-coming Atlantic one, occupied a promising yet cumbersome middle position. Ideally, France could muster its old, wide and populous Mediterranean base to procure the materials needed to advance its industrial output at home and go on to use that to dominate the Atlantic arena. In implementing the centralized mercantilist state policy that would enable it to achieve this, however, it had to deal with much resistance from the city of Marseilles at home and from its merchant communities abroad. Nevertheless, by the end of the century France had regained its lost ground. It managed to keep up with England and (at least for some time still) the United Provinces, while these nations’ combined mercantile power briskly shoved the Italian city states out of the market.

Notwithstanding the insights to be gained through a relative, developmental, perspective, it cannot quite make up for the absence of uniform and reliable data on the composition, size and economic value of Izmir’s various European communities. Overall estimates should be attempted nevertheless, be-

419 Anderson, English Consul, 54-55: “… in 1661 Winchelsea had to report that for every English ship in Turkey there were four Dutch.” and “In that year Colbert valued the annual Levant trade of the Dutch at ten to twelve million livres, roughly equivalent to their East India trade.”
cause rough approximations can at least provide indications of the relative numerical strength (in size and commercial value) of the city’s European presence. However tentative the resulting ratio might be, it is instrumental if we want to consider Frank Street as part of a larger Ottoman complex (i.e. the city of Izmir and, beyond that, wider Ottoman society and administration) and in establishing its potential for and against the Ottoman context.

Apart from what it can reveal about the relative size of Frank Street, absolute size could also shed additional light on the question whether Izmir’s Europeans might indeed have constituted the isolated and self-sufficient community that emerges from European sources, or must have depended much more on their Ottoman context than they cared to admit openly. Other (social, economic and political) factors did influence Frank Street’s capacity to fend for itself, but the first condition for self-sufficiency is mass. Only a community large enough to fulfill all functions its members habitually depend upon can even attempt to fend for itself.\textsuperscript{420} It would be frivolous to construe our early modern community of merchants as pursuing absolute self-sufficiency as a policy, but the fact that the trade of its members depended heavily on their privileges as foreigners, as well as their repeated claims to such a status aparte does indicate that they perceived it to be in their best interest not only to be well-connected to Ottoman society as merchants, but also to maintain considerable distance from it as Europeans.

The questions before us therefore are the following: what would be a reasonable estimate of Izmir’s European population and commerce; of what order of magnitude is the ratio between its European and Ottoman populations and economies; and, can we draw any conclusions from this with regard to relative power and the measure of self-sufficiency?

To arrive at a reasonable estimate of Izmir’s European population we have to weigh the estimates of several reporters from various nations against each other. This can best be done by first obtaining an impression of the reporters’ reliability in other fields, followed by an assessment of the particular politics and idiosyncrasies underlying and coloring their narratives. If, by 1678, the Genoese and the Venetian nations increasingly functioned as consular extended families, the French as a town or miniature state complete with hierarchically ordered estates, and the Dutch and English as a number of competing yet coordinating companies of factors of solid burgher stock, it is to be expected that such differences were not only of consequence for the nations’ real size and functioning, but also for their perceived size and functioning.

\textsuperscript{420} The inherent contradiction of course being that the larger the scale, the more unattainable the ideal of autarky actually becomes – because of the increasing difficulty in maintaining a territory, providing enough consumable goods and enforcing the requisite strict conformity without outside assistance. This is why states that have pursued the ideal have invariably either become oppressive and totalitarian, or have quickly abandoned it altogether.

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That is to say, structural as much as political differences between the nations naturally also bore upon the way they perceived and represented themselves and upon the way they were perceived and represented by others. For instance, the account a staunch French observer might give of a sizeable and lively French nation will have differed significantly from the Englishman’s, who, proud of his own nation’s order, thriftiness and effectiveness, most likely considered this rival nation impractically bloated and overly arrogant while not all that savvy commercially. Furthermore, their accounts of the Dutch nation will again have differed – the French typically stressing its small size, humble origins and lack of social hierarchy; the English its anti-authoritarianism, its extreme frugality and the commercial prowess that enabled so small a nation to claim such a large share of the trade.

What, then, are our preferred sources for the year 1678 and the years immediately preceding and following it? Table 1 has shown that precious few travelers who commented on the size of Izmir’s Turkish, Greek, Jewish and Armenian population provided similar information for the European population. Although a good number of relatively open-minded and inquisitive men from all nations visited Izmir in the 1670s and left us fairly accurate narrative accounts of the city, its surroundings and – above all – its European life, few bothered to disentangle and breakdown the multitude of European nationals they encountered on and around Frank Street. Between Jean Chardin (present in 1672) and Antoine Galland (pr. 1672 and 1678) for the French; De Bruyn (pr. 1678) and De Hochepeid (pr. 1678) for the Dutch; Rycaut (pr. 1667-1678) and North (pr. 1667) for the English; and, lastly, the Anglo-French collaboration of Spon and Wheler (pr. 1675-1676), Galland, again the best informed and most informative, provides the most detailed breakdown (see Table 16). 421

Galland’s figures may seem rather low when juxtaposed with the many enthusiastic accounts of European life in 17th-century Izmir. Yet, they are consistent with the more fragmentary statements given by the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries. Compare his information, for instance, with the – clearly less thoroughly informed – information provided by Jean Chardin for 1672 (that is, before the English had captured most of the Dutch trade during the war of 1672-1678), or with that provided in 1678 by a young Daniël-Jan de Hochepeid, fresh off the boat from Holland and preparing for a long and successful career in Levantine diplomacy (see Table 17).

### TABLE 16: ESTIMATED EUROPEAN POPULATION OF IZMIR (GALLAND, 1678)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>1 consul, 30 merchants, 40-50 other families constituting more than 160 persons (inn-keepers, doctors, apothecaries, surgeons, barbers, tailors, shoemakers), 2 bachelor doctors, more than 20 further bachelors (doctors, shoemakers, tailors and cooks working mostly for the Dutch and English), 3 Capuchin friars, 1 lay friar</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>1 consul, 70 merchants, 15 clerks, 1 minister, 1 doctor, 1 apothecary, 1 surgeon, 3 tavern-keepers</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1 consul, 23 merchants (3 of whom are married to local women), 8 clerks, 2 ministers (one of whom is French)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venetian</td>
<td>1 consul, 4 merchants</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoese</td>
<td>1 consul, 4 merchants and 1 clerk</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1 merchant and 1 clerk from Florence, 1 merchant from Sienna (all under Dutch protection), 1 clerk from Leghorn (under English protection), 1 tavern-keeper from Sienna (under French protection)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EST. TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>360</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113-27.

### TABLE 17: IDEM (CHARDIN, 1672; DE HOCHEPIED, 1678)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Chardin’s description (1672)</th>
<th>Subtotal</th>
<th>De Hochepied’s description (1678)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>trade of approx. 400,000 <em>livres</em> a year, 1 consul, more than 100 merchants, most petty</td>
<td>≥101</td>
<td>small trade, largest number of merchants and artisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>trade of 6-700,000 <em>livres</em> a year, 1 consul, more than 20 houses [a trading house usually consisted of 2-3 partners plus 2-3 clerks]</td>
<td>±101</td>
<td>large trade, approx. 20 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>trade greater than that of the English, 1 consul, few houses (lacking connections in the Anatolian interior) [10 houses plus clerks?]</td>
<td>[±50?]</td>
<td>previously large trade (recently interrupted by war of 1672-1678, but back on a par with the East Indies trade of the VOC within months of the cessation of hostilities), 13-14 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venetian</td>
<td>1 merchant-consul [plus clerks]</td>
<td>±3</td>
<td>of little consequence, not many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoese</td>
<td>1 consul, 2/3 merchants [plus clerks]</td>
<td>±5</td>
<td>of little consequence, 1 vice-consul, 1 house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EST. TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>≥262</td>
<td>plus a couple of tens for French growth between 1672-1678 and subsequent Dutch recovery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Chardin, *Voyages*, 6-21; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b-38b.

Sonia Anderson, author of an exceptional biography of Paul Rycaut (the highly skilled English consul in Izmir from 1667-1678, better known as the foremost English writer on the Ottoman Empire of his day) largely corroboro-
rates these figures through her subject’s correspondence and numerous other primary and secondary sources. She also draws attention to two French censuses conducted in June and November 1670, and provides the totals given in the former as being “101 heads of household, 28 wives, 56 children, and 84 servants or slaves, in all 269 persons”.

The results of the French census would increase the grand total to about 425 persons. The same census, however, also raises the question whether this would not be too conservative an estimate still. It suggests that certain categories of “voiceless” subjects (wives, offspring, servants, slaves) may have been heavily underrepresented in contemporary accounts of other nations. It seems that on top of the more obvious underrepresentation of anyone who was not a private merchant or factor (i.e. clerks, clergy and craftsmen with little to no vote or voice in their nation), there was a second form of underrepresentation at work in the counting of higher-class, or burgher, heads of household only. In this respect, the problems we come up against resemble those we encountered in “The Ottoman City”.

Yet, although it is certain that merchants of all nations made good use of the services of craftsmen, servants and the like, these appear to have been either French or Ottoman non-Muslim and not fellow-nationals. Similarly, some English, Dutch, Venetian and Genoese merchants of Izmir indeed also kept families, but their number appears to have been modest and the national status of its members disputed. All considered, application of a multiplier such as the one introduced previously or an alternative comparable to the ratio between France’s 30 merchants or 101 heads of household and the total of 269 French nationals (multipliers of 9 and 2.66 respectively) is not warranted. Particularly because the exceptionalism of the French case is stressed repeatedly in all sources, their own included.

Rather, all available evidence on the 1670s indicates that only the French nation comprised significant numbers of imported French families and servants, forcing us to conclude that only in that nation the number of nationals differed so considerably from the number of merchants or heads of household. In view of the conspicuous undercounting (in all but the French case) of a nevertheless modest number of imported clerks, clergy, servants and family members, a rough estimate of up to 500 inhabitants fully belonging under European jurisdiction (henceforth “European nationals” will be used by way of historically inaccurate shorthand) seems reasonable – but it could have been a good 100 less. This brings the ratio between the estimated total number of European nationals and our previously estimated Ottoman popu-

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422 Anderson, *English Consul*, 49-76.
423 Ibid., 59.
424 See note 234 and appendix 2, documents 2, 3 and 12.
425 See *supra* for the discussion of Kara Mustafa Paşa’s haraç order, and see Appendix 2, documents 2, 12 and 14.
lation of Izmir in the year 1678 to a maximum of \( \frac{500}{70,000} = 0.0071 \), i.e. 0.7% or less.

The above calculations are useful for several purposes. First of all, they serve to provide an appraisal of the number of residents the European consular system was maintained to protect, regulate and govern. In the absence of clearly defined and uniform principles of nationality and citizenship this number should be construed as including only those whose nationality was generally undisputed, i.e. structurally agreed upon by the Ottoman state and their own, as well as by themselves. Secondly, our calculations invite comparison between the size of the overall community and its hard core. We have seen that contemporary accounts are usually – and unsurprisingly – strongly biased in favor of political, social and economic elites (noblemen and other officials, factors and wealthier private merchants). Their number appears to have been about 135, slightly above a quarter of the community’s total size. This we should take to be the size of Izmir’s European political community, for its members held exclusive right to active participation in community affairs and decision-making. Needless to say, this elite also formed the economic backbone of Frank Street and might therefore be considered the consular systems true raison d’être.

It would be a mistake to think of Frank Street as a community of 500, however. That number reflects an official reality rather than an actual one. Without challenging the accuracy of the estimation that some 400 to 500 European nationals occupied Frank Street, we should take the size of Frank Street as a socio-economic complex (and therefore its direct influence as well) to be much larger. Imagine, if you will, a pebble thrown into a pond, a number of concentric circles rippling out across its surface; if the pebble is consular authority and the first ripple marks the boundary of our core community of around 135, the next ripple would represent the entire community of 400 to 500 European “nationals”. Not strictly part of the community, yet part of its communal space just as much, is the next ripple, that of non-European residents of dubious legal status; Greek wives to European merchants, their offspring, slaves, concubines, and native servants. Visiting European travelers and the officers and crews of several hundred European ships calling port twice a year form yet another ripple, this one of visitors. Higher Ottoman personnel spending much of their time in Frank Street could be regarded as constituting the next ripple, this one heavily overlapping with similar circles rippling out from Izmir’s Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish pebbles. Within this last category fall the Janissary guards appointed to protect each consul and secure the consulates, the customer’s guards along Frank Street’s quays, and the Europeans’ dragomans, warehousemen (with their porters) and moneylenders.

Even when omitting the many servants employed in the dozens of European country residences in Izmir’s vicinity, or those called upon to provide
food and other essentials in recurring times of contagious fever or plague (426), it is obvious that our estimate of 400 to 500 European Frank Street residents to a large degree obscures that we are discussing a quarter teeming with additional Frankish, Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish residents, personnel and visitors alike.427 Putting a sensible number to that conclusion is both impossible and impractical. Impossible because these different groupings represent too many constantly fluctuating variables, impractical because they consist of temporary visitors as well as residents already represented in our previous estimate of the Ottoman population (of 70,000). Still, the discussion above suggests some preliminary conclusions with regard to the European quarter’s relative importance and its measure of self-sufficiency.

Izmir’s foreign commerce-driven demographic explosion, the size of its European quarter, the number and comparative wealth of its inhabitants, visitors and dependents, and the hundreds of European ships calling port (428), show it to have been one of the city’s major economic hubs. If we take into account the (previously discussed) outdated infrastructure of the older commercial quarters of Han Bey/Pazar and Limon (Liman) and the major 1678-effort to relocate the city’s European trade to the rebuilt and newly constituted neighboring Ottoman quarter of Kasap Hazırı (429), there can be little doubt that in 1678 Frenk Mahallesi had become the commercial center of the city insofar as volume and value were concerned. In the absence of precise statistical data on the relative size of Izmir’s outer (uc, “international”) and inner (iç, “national”) economies, Evliya offers some interesting figures to work with (see Table 18).

Official incomes will have represented half to a third the actual income of these officials (which is probably still a high estimate). Similarly, customs income for goods actually declared (i.e. the official value of the customs tax farm) will have had a comparable ratio to actual imports and exports.430 If we

426 See, e.g., De Bruyn, Reizyn, 23; and The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 22a-b. Galland, whom the French nation refused to lodge for his and their own safety, took refuge in the Greek han: Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 86.
427 See Map 13 and the surrounding paragraphs.
429 In 1677, De Hochieped could already report that many Europeans had warehouses in the newly constructed Vezirhan: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b.
430 We have previously mentioned that contemporary and modern estimates are that half to two-thirds of the foreign commerce of Izmir was smuggled (with and without knowledge of its officials). Consider, by way of corroboratio, the following calculations concerning Dutch consular and ambassadorial (C&A) duties (which were collected as percentages from the value of goods declared at Ottoman customs) between 1668 and 1671, i.e. in the peak
accept these ratios, we might go on to conclude that Izmir’s European economy must have represented about a quarter to a fifth of Izmir’s overall economy. It follows that Izmir’s European population (of less than 1%) enjoyed influence far beyond its number, although the political and social aspects of that power will have lagged significantly behind the economic aspect due to the lowly place generally reserved for non-Muslims in the Ottoman system, and (more to the point) because of the care the Köprülü̇s took to keep the Europeans in check.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly income</th>
<th>Given Value</th>
<th>In LD</th>
<th>Per office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paşalıklı</td>
<td>50 purses</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paşa's hass</td>
<td>100,000 kuruş</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>302,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mevleviyyet</td>
<td>(500*365=)182,500 akçe</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadi's hass</td>
<td>200 purses</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadiilik</td>
<td>200,000 kuruş</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(uc) Gümrük</td>
<td>200,000 kuruş</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voyvoda</td>
<td>[similar to kadi’s?]</td>
<td>[c.300,000?]</td>
<td>[c.300,000?]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Evliya, Seyahatname 9, 88-100.

With regard to the question of self-sufficiency, it is safe to conclude that though a community that size could have probably fended for itself, it did so less and less. This was due to a number of factors, both internal and external. Firstly, the development from a full-blown minority community fulfilling most functions required to sustain it, to a lean merchant community focused almost exclusively on long distance trade, brought with it an increasing reliance on structural labor and assistance from without. Secondly, the whole principle of competition, though here somewhat softened through the limits imposed by Ottoman controls and oversights, is not at all conducive to isolation. Contrary to, for instance, the monopolistic Dutch factory in Japanese

years of Dutch trade with Izmir: The Hague, NA 1.02.22 676, 204b-9b: DLH to States of Holland and West-Friesland, 1676 lists the duties collected by Dutch representatives from convoys and ships that arrived in Izmir under Dutch protection between 1668 and 1671. These amounted to LD 82,000. There were 32 Dutch ships in convoys in approx. 3 years, or 8 Dutch convoys of 4 ships on average p/a. C&A-duties stood at an average 1,5% at the time of Van Dam’s appointment, so the equivalent value of the declared trade imported on 8 Dutch convoys of an average 4 ships to and from Izmir from 1668-1671 was LD 5,466,667, or LD 1,822,222 p/a. The actual value (accounting for smuggling, miscellaneous Dutch shipping, and protected foreign shipping) must have been much higher – cf. Colbert’s contemporary estimate of 10-12 million livres (equiv. LD 5-6,000,000) p/a for overall Dutch Levant trade. If three quarters of that passed through Izmir (LD 4,125,000 p/a), this would mean that declared imports represented only about 44% of the actual value of the Dutch Izmir trade, the Dutch and Ottoman states and its representatives being defrauded of more than half their due proceeds from it.
Deshima, Europeans in Izmir could hardly limit outside contact to a couple of officials and wholesalers. To do so would have cost them their trade in the face of any competitor that proved more aggressive in his reconnaissance of the hinterland and actively courted and patronized less obvious local merchants and power brokers, especially in the context of the generally limited Ottoman enforcement of Ottoman-European social segregation.431

As to the external factors, these all go back to Köprülü policy. That policy was determinedly not aimed at separating the European quarter from the Ottoman city anymore than its Greek, Armenian or Jewish quarters. If anything, the opposite (controlled integration into the Ottoman context) seems to have been the agenda. Consequently, the quarter was managed as a secured but open one and, like all Ottoman city quarters, had its main (south-western) entrance chained off and guarded at night, although traffic within the quarter and across its closure was possible at night.432 Further proof of active Ottoman commitment to Frank Street as an Ottoman-European thoroughfare and trade center is the fact that up until the destruction of much of Izmir in the 1688-earthquake, all real estate along it was the property of Ottoman vakfs and notables, its European inhabitants occupying it on the merit of their lease alone.433

Organization and Taxation
Throughout the 1670s there were present in Izmir five officially recognized European communities, or nations: the French, the English, the Dutch, the Venetian and the Genoese. These differed significantly in size, composition, favored merchandise, commercial acumen and, consequently, success. As the mainstay of the Levant trade shifted from luxury items to bulky goods in the course of the 17th century and as the margins on the merchandise consequently decreased, it became organization and taxation that determined these nations’ competitiveness more than anything else. After all, a well-functioning community with lower shipping, handling and tax rates could

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431 It is no coincidence that those merchants that are often disapprovingly mentioned in consular correspondence because of having invited costly Ottoman interventions through over-familiarity with the non-European quarters and their inhabitants were also almost invariably the most successful. Cf. notes 236, 238, 244, 347, 348, and 397.

432 Cf. D’Arvieux, Mémoires, 125-27; The Hague, NA 1.01.02 6912: Jacob van Dam to States General, 11 July 1676; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 133-34 and 149; De Bruyn, Reizen, 138-39; Anderson, English Consul, 5, 10 and 13; Dumont, Nouveau voyage, 352-53; and other contemporary accounts listed in the bibliography.

433 See the Köprülü-vakfs merchants’ apartments and hans in Table 12, the leases cited in note 181, two similar leases (the second of which by Dutch factor Dionis Houset from the Ottoman officials Hasan Çavuş and Subaşı Mehmed Bey) in Alexander H. de Groot, “An Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Turkish-Dutch Letterbook and Some of its Implications”, in: The Netherlands and Turkey: Four hundred years of political, economical, social and cultural relations: selected essays (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2007), 64-65; and Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 149.
capture trade more swiftly, decisively and profitably when opportunities presented themselves. Furthermore, in a commercial setting where Ottoman controls limited opportunities for all-too assertive competition in buying and selling, success depended all the more on a smoothly run organization with the lowest possible overhead.

The key competitive areas of organization and taxation both have local and general components. Since they are also closely intertwined (in that lean and efficient organizations generally incur less costs than bloated and inefficient ones, leading to sharper rates) this complex of factors is perhaps most readily identified and understood by following an imaginary piece of merchandise from the principal merchant in, say, Amsterdam to the receiving and reselling merchant factor in Izmir (i.e. the “factor”; a merchant who buys or sells for another in exchange for a commission). The costs that needed to be recuperated through the sale of the original merchandise in Izmir and that of the return cargo in Amsterdam included the purchasing prize of the goods, local tariffs, the operational costs (incl. salaries) of the principal, export duties, insurance costs, the operational costs of ship and crew, import duties, presents and bribes to officials, and last but not least the operational costs of the factor(s), of diplomatic protection and representation, and of the Ottoman staff. On the return trip a similar chain of costs would be incurred.\[434\]

The chain of costs above aptly illustrates the importance to trade of trustworthy yet minimal and therefore cheap government, frugal mercantile management, secure yet affordable passage through sailing in large protected convoys, ships with large hulls and an abundance of guns, small and well-fed yet badly paid crews, optimal contacts with Ottoman officials, modest and hardworking factors and clerks, relatively cheap and low-rank missions, and well-cultivated and formally protected dragomans and warehousemen. It also suggests why “alternative” commercial practices like (legal) carrying for third parties and (illegal) smuggling and under-declaring were so endemic. The former meant additional trade and cargo without round trips and additional income from duties with minimal risk, the latter relatively cheap uninsured cargo and the evasion of customs and diplomatic duties. Since both were relatively easy means of minimizing costs, thereby enhancing merchants’ competitive edge, such practices proved ineradicable.

As we have seen, each of the five European nations of Izmir was predetermined historically, economically, politically and socially to deal with the chal-

\[434\] See also Kadi, “Natives and Interlopers”, 132-33, 157-59 and 193-205, a comparison of the chain of added (handling, insurance and other) costs incurred as merchandise travelled between 18th-ct. Holland and Ankara (through Izmir) in the hands of Ottoman and Dutch merchants.
lenges of the trade in its own way. Since a nation’s operational costs were central to its competitiveness, its willingness and ability to adjust its operation when circumstances required was instrumental to its survival and success. In this area the city states of Venice and Genoa were at a disadvantage. Their organizations, both at home and in the factories, proved unable to adjust to a number of structural changes governing the Levant trade: firstly, the loss of sovereignty along the western and northern Anatolian coasts and in the Greek archipelago (which definitively reconfigured the political basis of their relations with the Ottomans); secondly, the shift from luxury trade and fine fabrics to bulk trade and coarser fabrics (as epitomized by the sudden success of the English and the Dutch); and, thirdly, changes in Ottoman administration and foreign policy (chiefly felt as a drive for greater Ottoman administrative and commercial control in the trading ports, or scales).

As mentioned earlier, both Genoa’s and Venice’s history in the Levant predated that of the Ottoman Turks. Holding a number of sovereign territories across the Eastern Mediterranean put them in the difficult position of not just being commercial partners with the Ottoman Turks, but at the same time also territorial competitors. For Genoa, whose power had been waning since the mid-15th century, this was less of a problem than for Venice. Retreating before the advancing Ottomans, the Genoese managed to mostly keep on friendly terms with them, repeatedly gaining Ottoman privileges in return for their support against sworn rival Venice (yet, incidentally, joining Venice in the Holy Leagues against the Ottomans when it suited them). Still, the loss of its territorial bases in the East, and that of Chios (1566) in particular, exacerbated the Republic’s decline. Faced with fierce competition from the much stronger Venetians and French it opted for a subordinate role in Levantine politics and commerce, sending the occasional envoy and conducting business under French protection.

When fortuitous circumstances finally did conspire to furnish the Genoese with their own Ottoman capitulation, Istanbul embassy and Izmir consulate in 1666, it soon became apparent why they had not systematically pursued these previously. Even a favorable Ottoman customs rate of 3% (their previous French protectors would continue to pay 5% until 1673) could not make up for their lack of urgency, resources and merchandise. Genoese ships sailed without escorts or under Venetian ones, unnecessarily raising either insurance or hiring costs. The cargoes they returned for the luxury silks they exported from Izmir consisted mainly in debased and false coinage, which invited complaints, lawsuits and demands for compensation from the other nations and Ottoman officials alike, thereby increasing the nation’s overhead even further. When the Ottomans expressly prohibited the import of such moneys in 1669 it became apparent that Genoese cloth and shipping was too expensive to compete with the English and Dutch nations, forcing them to trade out of the Tuscan port of Leghorn/Livorno.
Worse still, neither the consul nor the one Genoese company (of Vincenzo and Francesco Spinola; close relatives of Augustino Spinola, Genoese resident in Istanbul from 1675 to 1679) could muster the force required to deal effectively with French refusals to recognize their independence, or with Ottoman officials’ taking advantage of their lack of leverage and power to exact substantial lump sum restitutions (avancias) for their import abuses. Unable to settle these matters locally themselves, they all-too often fled to English or Dutch protection, or referred disputes to their resident in Istanbul, both emergency measures further raising the costs of their resolution. Faced with a dwindling trade, heavy financial demands, and deprived of his income and security, the (by that time, third) Genoese resident (Francisco Maria Levanto) decided to slip out of Istanbul in 1683, disguised as a friar and without the necessary Ottoman discharge and permission. Thereupon, Genoese trade reverted to French protection.435

During the short time the position existed, the Genoese consuls in Izmir (Ottavio Doria, 1666-1671; Gian Luigi Gentile, 1671-1674; Langetti, 1675-…) reportedly received a fixed annual income of 600 rix-dollars; a mere pittance when compared to Izmir’s other consuls and far too little to advance regular expenses, let alone extraordinary ones.436 The organization of Genoese representation appears to have followed established Venetian practice (see below) in theory, but in reality was largely informal in Izmir, where the number of Genoese merchants and the value of Genoese trade after all remained so negligible as to forbid all too cumbersome and costly an arrangement.

Although Venice’s troubles were very similar to Genoa’s, it did manage to hold on to a sliver of the trade that it had formerly dominated. The defining difference between the rivals was one of scale. Culminating in the sack of Constantinople in 1204 and continuing with the installation of a series of Latin puppet emperors (ruling until 1261), Venice’s heavy involvement in Byzantine affairs provided it with every opportunity to entrench itself commercially. Its commercial communities and networks even successfully survived the resurrection of an independent Byzantine empire from Nicaea and the arrival of the Ottoman Turks.

Still, Venice proved particularly receptive to the temptation of continuing (and perhaps even increasing) territorial sovereignty in the Levant. When Ottoman advances forced it to choose between trade and sovereignty in the Levant, it almost consistently preferred the latter in the hope of eventually

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435 Cf. The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 18 June 1675; The Hague, NA 01.03.01 98: Justinus Colyer to DLH, 9 December 1677; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 126-27; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b, 49a, 51b-52a and 77a. Also, see Anderson, English Consul, 52-54.

436 See The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b.
gaining the former on its own terms. Although it did so with the necessary encouragement and assistance from others (the papal state and France primarily), repeated failures to halt the Turkish tide disrupted the trade of Venice in particular. Between 1453 (the fall of Constantinople) and 1699 (the Treaty of Carlowitz) Venetian representation in Ottoman lands was suspended due to war for a total 65 years (in 1463-1479, 1499-1503, 1537-1540, 1570-1573, 1645-1669, 1684-1699).\footnote{See De Groot, “Historical Development”, 587-95.}

Especially the 24-year-long Cretan war (1645-1669) proved very hard for Venetian commerce to make a comeback from. Naturally Venetian trade in Ottoman lands did not cease altogether during this period. It continued under Dutch protection, but this meant that Venetian factors, principals, producers and government had very limited control over the conditions of trade and could not shape them to sustain the political and commercial power of the Republic in a coordinated manner. It was no coincidence that when Venice reentered the trade on its own account, it found that its cloth manufactures could no longer compete against advances in English and particularly Dutch industry. Similarly, the shorter and safer distance from the Levant to Venice (although Venice’s merchants successfully resisted sailing under mandatory convoy, the route was constantly patrolled by the Venetian fleet and largely bypassed North Africa’s Barbary coast, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Atlantic coast), could not make up for its less effectual merchant fleet and its Ottoman customs rate of 5%. Ironically, Venice had not only supported Dutch Levant trade at its own (future) cost by taking itself out of the diplomatic equation, it had also done so by continuing the trade under the Dutch flag. Logically so, because Venetian-Dutch mutual assistance went all the way back to the arrival of Dutch trade in the Levant and since Dutch terms of trade (capitulatory privileges as well as shipping security and costs) were now the most advantageous in existence. But in this manner Venice did contribute to the undisputed Dutch primacy of the 1660s and early 70s, in the event hampering its own return to the trade in 1669.

Not only Venice’s trade in general suffered from the Cretan war. The Venetian community of Izmir sustained a particularly heavy loss of size and influence. As the main naval relay between the Dardanelles and Crete, Izmir was crucial for supplying the Ottoman besiegers. Consequently, the Ottomans seized every opportunity to minimize the liability of Venetian presence and influence in the city, diplomatically and commercially as well as culturally and numerically. By the end of the war, after 24 years without a Venetian consul, there was barely any trade or nation left (see above). Furthermore, the most marked representative of Venetian cultural influence in Izmir – the
Franciscan church under its protection – had been pillaged and sold to Izmir’s Greeks.\(^{438}\)

When a new Venetian consul was finally appointed, the position went to one of the very few in Venetian service that had stayed on in Izmir, Francesco Luppazzoli. The new consul, though not from the senatorial order (normally a strict requirement for admission into Venetian diplomatic service) received the appointment nonetheless – a reward for “recommendable diplomatic activity” (read; espionage) during the war, which also earned him a state pension. His appointment was not a particularly far-sighted move by the Republic, since the Cretan War and Luppazzoli’s contribution to it had earned Izmir’s resident Venetians the lasting hostility of the ruling Köprülü dynasty (and notably that of Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa). In hindsight it would almost seem as if the Venetians were allowed back into Köprülü-controlled Izmir for the sole purpose of being all the more easily picked clean by them as belated punishment. Still, it had been common knowledge in 1660s Frank Street that Luppazzoli – as chancellor of the Dutch consulate from 1654 until his promotion to consul in 1669 – had not pursued Dutch interests exclusively.\(^{439}\) Interestingly, among Izmir’s Europeans such apparent conflicts of interest formed precious little impediment to diplomatic functioning and Luppazzoli was allowed to continue as Venetian consul until 1702, though with an extended interruption due to renewed Ottoman-Venetian hostilities from 1684 to 1699.

In fact, behavior such as Luppazzoli’s was far more common than most official correspondences of the period would have us believe. However much at odds with the largely fictitious national unity and loyalty home governments wishfully expected from their “nations” in the Levant (and which future generations projected onto them), theirs was in fact a society replete with the tangle of identities and loyalties so apparent in the biography of Luppazzoli. Amidst our account of national differences in organization, the Venetian consul’s Mantuan youth, short-lived papal service, heavily Graecized scholarly and family life (first on Chios, then in Izmir), and lastly Dutch chancellorship cum Venetian secret and consular service are a useful reminder of this easily understated historical reality.\(^{440}\)

\(^{438}\) It was subsequently purchased by Catholic Dutch factor Eduard Blijdenbergh. He re endowed it to the Franciscans, who promptly became Dutch protégés, though they eventually returned to Venetian protection in 1671: Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 126; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 39a-b; and Johan van Droffelaar, ““Flemish Fathers” in the Levant: Dutch Protection of Three Franciscan Missions in the 17th and 18th Centuries”, in: *Eastward Bound: Dutch Ventures and Adventures in the Middle East*, eds. Geert Jan van Gelder and Ed de Moor (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 81-113.

\(^{439}\) Cf. Schutte, *Repertorium*, 341; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation of Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668.

What did initially become an impediment to the freshly minted consul’s functioning, however, was his insistence on being awarded precedence over Izmir’s other consuls. Questions of precedence were deemed far more consequential than strict national loyalty and the French in particular did not take his unrealistic claim kindly, the more so since Louis XIV repeatedly ordered his diplomats in the Ottoman Empire to pursue unequivocal French primacy as a matter of principle. Eventually Luppazzoli (much like Venice in general) was forced to acknowledge the new realities of the trade and, by 1672, the recognized order was French, English, Venetian, Dutch, Genoese – a diplomatic hierarchy reflecting, firstly, constitutional seniority (of the kingdoms of France and England over the Republics of Venice, Holland and Genoa); secondly, the consuls’ descent (noble as opposed to burgher); and, thirdly, the significance of their nation’s trade (where the upstart, burgher, Dutch, for the moment, ruled).441

As it was, appointing a representative of non-noble lineage and accepting lower diplomatic rank were not the only deviations from regular Venetian procedure and organization. According to Steensgaard’s comparative analysis of the organization of the European nations in the Levant (442), it dictated that consuls were to belong to the aristocracy, were appointed for three years, were to have no business ties with their station, were appointed by the senate in consultation with the Cinque Savii (the Board of Commerce), enjoyed a fixed salary, could only dispose of consular duties (the cottimo for ordinary expenses and the tanza for payoffs and avania) in cooperation with the nation’s representatives, enjoyed no legal sources of extra income, should have their consular expenditures approved by a Council of XII from the nation pending final approval by the home authorities (the Cinque Savii, nominally the Provveditori ai Cottimi (Commissioners of the cottimo) and finally the Council of XII), and enjoyed no formal right to regulate trade.

In a simplified diagram Venetian consular organization might be represented as shown in Figure 1.

Note especially the absence of a structural administrative relation in Venice itself between the principals and the institutions governing the consulates. This absence seems to have contributed greatly to Venice’s inability to regulate the trade and come up with viable alternative strategies to cope with mounting English and Dutch competition.

441 Cf. Anderson, English Consul, 50n4. On the importance of protocol, esp. to the French, see pages 199-203.
FIGURE 1: VENETIAN CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY)

Just as was the case with the Genoese consulate, the operation of the Venetian consulate of Izmir was far less formal than would have been the case in a more significant factory. Although the diagram still applies, the relative insignificance (and, hence, low income) of the consulate meant that many otherwise standard restrictions within it were relaxed. This accounts not only for the consul’s non-noble lineage and low diplomatic rank, but also for his exceptionally long tenure (instead of for three-year periods), his dependence on consular duties (instead of a fixed consular salary), and his enjoying a state pension and several other sources of income (instead of having no extra-consular income). All considered, it would be remarkable if he did not hold extraordinary sway over his tiny nation, in effect regulating what little remained of Venetian trade in Izmir, being very much at liberty to dispose of the consulate’s dwindling funds, and enthusiastically pursuing additional sources of income.

If Venice’s consul and nation in Izmir had considerable leeway, its measure pales in comparison to that of the French, though for entirely different reasons. In their case it was not small size that was conducive to relaxed organizational behavior, but a dysfunctional organization that made an already unwieldy French nation virtually ungovernable. Here was a large community of Frenchmen, only about half of whom were merchants and therefore could be counted on to let the trade’s and home city’s best interests – not to be confused with the Crown’s interests – prevail. The other half consisted of trades- and craftsmen and, it was suspected, of the dregs of French society (bankrupts, deserters, thieves and the like). Representing and governing them was a consul whose administrative authority derived from a more or less regular administrative hierarchy leading down from the Crown to the com-

444 See The Hague, NA 1.03.01 123: Dutch Nation Izmir to Jacob van Dam, 25 May 1668; Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 122-26; The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 38b; De Bruyn, *Reizen*, 25; and The Hague, NA 1.03.01 124: Jacob van Dam to States General, 18 June 1675.
mercials deputies of the Marseille government, but whose financial responsibility was first and foremost to a private person: the proprietor of the tax farm that was the consulship (see Figure 2).

**FIGURE 2: FRENCH CONSULAR ORGANIZATION (17TH CENTURY)**

A French consulate was first established in Izmir during the reign of Henry IV (1553-1610; r. as Henry III king of Navarra, 1572-1610; as king of France, 1589-1610). In 1623, the consulship was fiscalized, a result of the transfer of authority from the cities to the Crown. Predictably (because it was necessary for noblesse de robe to guard and secure their position at court by being physically present there), the result was increasing absenteeism. Sometimes those acting as consuls were the actual proprietors of the consulship, but more often these tax farmer-consuls had their positions filled by associates fulfilling its duties as their salaried employees or as the deputies of those salaried employees. After several failed attempts to curb this absenteeist practice, it was definitively abolished in 1675.445

The French consular system had a number of inherent problems, most importantly a less than clear-cut relation between the embassy and the consulate (since the competence of its two main occupiers belonged to such different spheres), overly slow communication on matters of urgency and importance (Izmir to Istanbul by way of Paris and vice-versa), contestable diplomatic precedence and accreditation, and, last but not least, extensive

445 See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 113n6.
borrowing, smuggling and overtaxation by deputies whose salaries (their own as well as the ones they paid to consular personnel) were insufficient since they were only a fraction of the actual consular duties accruing to the consul proper (the permitted 2% on French goods would have barely covered the consul’s and the ambassador’s expenses, yet 0.5% was regularly waived so as not to overburden an already fragile trade).446

During the personal rule of Louis XIV (from 1661), the problems of hierarchy, authority and finance typically caused by tax farming were exacerbated by pervasive royal meddling. The result of the Crown’s efforts to maximize its influence over civic institutions, its behavior of micromanaging the fiscal administration of the realm over the heads of competent lower institutions and officials made the Izmir nation all the more unmanageable. Consular authority became increasingly dependent on the Crown (it reserved the right to assess special duties for instance), yet at the same time it proved reluctant to truly administer the consulate. As a consequence, the consul’s hands were tied by the fiscal requirements of the tax farm, by the two consular auditors or “assessors” chosen from among the nation doing their most to represent its own wishes and needs, by underpaid dragomans and watchmen, by royal ambassadors who tried to recoup the excessive expenses of their unrealistic diplomacy from the Izmir nation, by the policies of Marseilles’ Chamber of Commerce, and by the Crown’s political interests.

It is hardly surprising that amidst this jumble of policies and jurisdictions no one knew exactly who did or did not belong to the French nation of Izmir or what their precise identities were, that conflict was rife between all parties involved, and that the French were hardly in a position to challenge Anglo-Dutch commercial primacy in a concerted fashion.447 To remedy this detrimental state of affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (minister of finance from 1665 to 1683) in 1670 launched a policy with the stated ambition to capture the entire Levant trade for France. Notwithstanding very grave and recent ruptures with the Ottomans over French military and logistical assistance to the defenders of Crete, a new ambassador (De Nointel, 1670-1679) was sent to the Porte with instructions to obtain from the sultan a capitulation giving the French a full monopoly over Levant trade. Despite spending vast amounts, the less than brilliant ambassador merely managed (through the capitulation of 1673) to have affirmed and slightly enhanced French protection of Roman Catholic clergy (in Izmir; a Capuchin church with three friars and one lay brother, and a Jesuit one with three friars) and pilgrims in Otto-

446 See Anderson, English Consul, 62.

man lands and to obtain the long-sought reduction of customs from 5% to 3% (already acquired by the English in 1601 and by the Dutch in 1612).448

The envisioned monopoly was to be operated by a newly created French Levant Company. Instead of being awarded a full monopoly on French trade comparable to that of its English namesake and example (or a de facto one like the much-admired Dutch variant discussed below), this company was set up to lure merchants into government-controlled joint stock by offering export bounties and free loans for exporters of Languedoc cloth and high tariffs and embargoes for foreign trade (a mercantilist import-substituting policy called “Colbertism”). Until French cloth industry and Levant trade really took off in the early eighteenth century most merchants continued to prefer the freedom of their old trade however, especially since French cloth and shipping was still so easily undercut by the English and the Dutch. French Levant merchants must have seen little purpose in giving up their lucrative Greek and Armenian carrying trade and attacking foreign supremacy with their own products for the common good of France (or, rather, of the Crown’s finances), but at the price of personal bankruptcy. Struggling since its inception and having proven itself unable even to profit from the reduction in Ottoman customs or from the Dutch War laying waste to Dutch trade (1672-1678), Colbert’s Levant Company was liquidated in 1678.

The master plan also included changes in the administration of Izmir’s French. To enhance the Crown’s jurisdiction over the nation, the national assemblies which had sprung up (in response to mismanagement or out of sheer independence) were suppressed in 1670. At the same time Colbert instructed biannual censuses (see note 423) of the nation to be conducted by the consul and forwarded to the ambassador in Istanbul and himself in Paris. But even had he wanted to, Colbert himself could not have the all-pervasive and lucrative Ancien Régime-practice of tax farming discontinued. (In fact, discontent about its injustices would go on to become one of the driving forces behind the French Revolution.) So instead of doing away with the problematic split administration, his efforts in this area were necessarily limited to imposing a forbidding 10,000-livre fine on absenteeism in 1675. Being more than three times the sum he paid to acting consul Chambon annually (his 3,000 livres equaled about 1,000 dollars), this duly prompted consul Henri Dupuy (whose family had held the post since 1624) to return to his post. He would stay on there until his death in 1683.449

448 See Vandal, Odyssée d’un ambassadeur; throughout; Duparc’s Recueil des instructions 29, i-50; Galland, Voyage à Smyrne, 114-16; and pages 199-203.

In the end, Colbert’s measures (though laying the groundwork for the 18th-century boom in French cloth production and trade) produced precious little initial effects. In Izmir they merely succeeded in replacing a perfectly good deputy consul, Louis Chambon, with a rather feeble tax farmer. Indeed, the French nation lost little of its unruliness, trade continued to be conducted in a haphazard manner, and France’s merchant fleet remained overly light, heavily overmanned and largely unescorted. More fundamentally, French Levant merchants continued to place little trust in French cloth (instead resorting to importing felt caps and currency of often doubtful quality), Armenian merchants continued to load French hulls with Armenian silks, and the trade consequently continued to be outmaneuvered by the Atlantic competitors. In diplomacy, the haughty manners and imperious demands of Louis XIV’s ambassadors continued to make them impossible in the eyes of Ottoman officials and French merchants alike. French commerce was far from done suffering for the magnificence of the most Christian king.

The English of course had their own eventful royal history to contend with. Between the commencement of permanent Anglo-Ottoman relations (sealed by the capitulation of 1580) and our year 1678 the English Levant merchant had to navigate a change of dynasty (Tudor to Stuart in 1603), a civil war (1642-1651), a republican period (1649-1660), and a restoration (1660). Although especially the civil war and the republican period had their repercussions in the Levant – rival ambassadors being dispatched to Istanbul, Englishmen attacking each other in Frank Street, insurance rates soaring – the English generally attempted to receive news of important events with protest or merriment (as with the Treaties of Nijmegen/Nimégue in 1678-1679) only to move on quickly to the more pressing business of making money. In fact, the English maintained the primacy of trade over politics whenever circumstances permitted it.

Instrumental in implementing and guarding this primacy was the English Levant Company. Founded as a chartered joint-stock company in 1581, it became a regulated monopoly in 1588 and continued as a regulated company from around 1595. The Company is regarded by both contemporary and modern observers to be the secret behind English success in the Levant. A glance at Figure 3 will easily reveal the most obvious advantage of organizing the trade through a single company.


451 See The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 23b; and De Bruyn, Reizen, 151.
Because government stepped back and left a sufficiently chartered company of professional merchants with private interest in the trade to its own devices, the Levant trade could be run in a comparatively rational and professional manner. The Company’s operation was fully funded through impositions on imports and exports in London, consular duties (“consulate”) in the scales, and fines (“brokes”) for violations of its statutes. Government interference was limited to the regulatory framework and general trade policy within which the Company was allowed to conduct its affairs. In the question of safe passage through the waters of the North Sea, the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean – infested with the navies and corsairs of the Dutch Republic, France, Italy and Barbary (Ottoman North Africa and Morocco) – national and private interests and responsibilities converged at their fullest.

The merchants of Genoa, Venice and France had successfully opposed the introduction of sailing in regular fleets because of the costs involved. Apart from the costs of organizing, maintaining and enforcing it, they foresaw significant commercial losses. Rightly so, for in their non-regulated trades it would have been impossible to control buying and selling to such a degree that their factors in Izmir would not try to outbid and underbid each other. The wholly foreseeable drop in prices that would result from factors outdoing each other in rushing an entire convoy’s cargo to the market and the buying frenzy they would unleash in their competitive quest for return cargo would have annihilated their already weak trades. In the English case, however, the Company monopoly ensured that the organizational costs of organizing, maintaining and enforcing a convoy system remained moderate, while its policy of encouraging cartel formation by the English nations in the Levant avoided uncoordinated flooding of its markets and explosive price rises due to undue competition in buying. English “Smyrna fleets” consisting of fully loaded, lightly manned, well-fitted and large-hulled merchant ships were dispatched under government-paid naval escort twice a year. Any additional costs were generally more than compensated by the resulting drop in English insurance rates and the consequent increase in English and third-party (strangers’) trade.

The English nations receiving and returning cargoes in the Levant meanwhile consisted entirely of Company members and candidate-members; factors trading on commission-basis and principals trading on their own account making up the first category, apprentices to either of the previous
making up the second. All had investments in stock or premiums consider-
able enough to guarantee their abiding by the Company’s laws and regula-
tions. And if they did not, the Company was fully authorized to impose
damaging fines or boycotts that would quickly return them to the fold.452

With regard to the appointment and instruction of ambassadors and con-
suls the English followed the practice established by other states; i.e. the
right to the former belonged to the highest political body of the central gov-
ernment (here; the Crown in conjunction with the Secretary of State), that to
the latter to the highest available body representing mercantile interests
(here; the Company). Nor was it unique to have the ambassador receive his
salary of 10,000 dollars a year from the Company whose interests he primari-
ly represented, instead of from the government that appointed and instruct-
ed him. Although paying for the appointment of an unfit ambassador could
cause unrest among Levant merchants, the system did have the advantage of
an embassy that was necessarily inclined to balance very carefully the inter-
est of the Crown against those of the mighty Company.453

But it was in the administration of the consulates that the advantages of
the Company monopoly were most apparent. The affairs of other nations
were often severely hampered by internal strife. For the most part, this was
due to their consuls’ dependence on consular duties (“consulage”). Consular
officials (usually the treasurers) estimated these duties on incoming and out-
going goods of the nation by inspecting the manifests and bills of lading after
they had passed customs (or, in case of suspected evasion, through physical
inspection of the goods loaded and unloaded), and collected them from their
nations. The merchants of the other nations generally proved reluctant to
give honest accounts of their transactions or downright refused to pay the
estimated duties, declaring with or without reason that consul and treasurer
had colluded to unjustly increase them. Precisely because of the temptations
for abuse that the consulship would otherwise offer, consuls were universally
withheld the near-dictatorial power that would be required to compel full
payment of duties.

The Levant Company solved this dilemma by disentangling the financial
interests of the consulates (of Aleppo-Alexandretta, Izmir and Alexandria)
firmly from the private interests of its occupants. English consuls as well as
their treasurers, secretaries and chaplains were all full Company employees.
As such, they were prohibited from enjoying any trade-related secondary
sources of income and were dissuaded from pursuing them anyway by
uniquely adequate salaries: the English consul in Izmir received 2,000 dollars

452 On the organization of the English Levant trade and diplomacy, see, generally, North,
Life; Abbott, Under the Turk; Wood, History of the Levant Company; and Anderson, English Consul.
The summary supra and infra is largely based on these sources.

453 See Abbott, Under the Turk, 7.
a year with a 1,000-dollar gratuity (roughly equaling the consulate’s total income from consulage), the treasurer 600 dollars with a 100-dollar gratuity, the chancellor 200 dollars plus a 5 dollar bonus at the New Year, and the chaplain 200 dollars with another 200-dollar as gratuity. Because English consular staff did not depend on consulage for its personal livelihood and was rewarded for duties properly fulfilled (that is, irrespective of private or professional conflicts with the consul), English consular administration could function with all internal checks and balances in working order and in relative harmony with the factors it administered.454

The professionalism of English consular organization in Izmir extended to the employment of its relatively well-paid native staff of translators and guards. Like other consuls, the English were accorded a two-man guard from the local Janissary regiment to protect the consulate and its officials when they ventured beyond Frank Street. Their basic salary of 136 dollars was augmented with 15 dollars at the New Year, 10 dollars (plus 8 dollars from each of the other consuls) at the Islamic Festival of Sacrifice (T. *Kurban Bayram*; A. ‘*Id ul’-*Adha), 2 dollars in port charges from every English ship, and a horse each maintained at the consul’s expense.

Notwithstanding being provided with an adequate guard, European diplomats were expected to minimize direct contact with Ottoman officials. To prevent any unnecessary devaluation of their office they left as much of the daily business of representation to their dragomans. These not only served as translators pure and simple but were interpreters in the fullest sense of the word, also acting as attachés and political advisors. The English employed three to five at regular salaries of 400, 300 and 200 dollars with New Years’ bonuses of 25 dollars (and 15 dollars from the other consuls), 12 dollars in port charges, and additional gratuities for various commercial services rendered.

Ottoman Greeks from the Homero family invariably served as chief dragomans of the English, with Ottoman Armenians from time to time filling junior dragomanships. The choice naturally fell on these minorities since Jews – banned wholesale from England until 1654 and overly implicated in Izmir’s Turkish affairs – were considered unlikely candidates for positions requiring such a degree of confidentiality and loyalty. As for non-Ottomans, the Levant Company expressly precluded Izmir’s Genoese and Venetians from entering English consular service, while experiments with bringing up young boys as interpreters failed due to lack of interest or funding.

454 According to De Hochepied: 3000 eight-reals and free rent for consul, plus a portion of strangers’ consulage; the treasurer collects consular duties towards the salary of the chaplain; the treasurer is appointed for two years and receives 600 rix-dollars annually, and a Janissary guard; the Company pays for dragomans and janissaries, and for ordinary expenses (The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 24b-25a).
Even if Ottoman subjects’ handling daily diplomatic affairs caused some apprehension, employing local Christians did have important advantages too. Although they might have been more amenable to pressure from Ottoman officials and would prudently water down their masters’ more abrasive communications or even give up sensitive information under threat, they were certainly less expensive than specially trained European counterparts could ever be and had a far more intimate knowledge of the local political, economic and social configuration. For these cheaper as well as better interpreters, the 3% customs rate from which they profited as English protégés commanded its own loyalty. Senior dragomans regularly became the wealthiest merchants of their communities and facilitated or handled consignments for many of their coreligionists on the vessels of the nation employing them.

In fact, in the years leading up to 1678 English shipping was so successful that it came to hold a near-monopoly on third-party carrying. Granted by the sultan as the privilege to protect the merchants and goods of nations that held no capitulations, in Dutch and English hands it came to apply equally to the goods of protégés and members of other capitulatory nations that wished to consign by their companies and/or carriers. As more and more merchants from the Ottoman minorities as well as from protected and unprotected European nations chose Dutch and English factors and ships for their low customs, freight and insurance rates, the consulage collected from these “strangers” became an increasingly important source of income. Strangers’ consulage also provided them with the means to regulate other nations’ Levant trades to their own advantage. Because of this double advantage it became the weapon of choice in the fiscal battle that was waged within the wider Anglo-Dutch war for commercial supremacy (of which the English Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660, 1663 and the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1652-1654, 1665-1667, 1672-1674 were the most conspicuous manifestations).

The fiscal policies the Company adopted in its quest to fully supplant the Dutch followed a typically monopolistic pattern. With the dispatching of Paul Rycaut on the heels of the English defeat in the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) to take up the position of English consul in Izmir, the Company embarked on a consistent if somewhat fitful adjustment of its fiscal regime to capture and incorporate as much shipping as possible. The Izmir consulate over which Rycaut was to preside until 1678 was central to the operation since that scale was the undisputed center of Dutch Levant trade. First, in 1668, Rycaut was instructed to lower strangers’ consulage on exports from Izmir from 4% to 2% at his discretion, in effect bringing it to the same level as regular “national” consulage. Then, in 1670, instructions followed to extend protection not only to English ships and any foreign goods they might carry, but to any ship that chose to sail into port flying English colors – but with the proviso that its actions or cargo would not provoke an Ottoman avania, which left foreign captains and merchants to choose between the indisputably low costs of English protection and the
theoretically fuller security of another consul’s. Next, in 1671, the Company did away with the penalizing double consulage for private shipping (i.e. English merchants consigning Company goods by private ships instead of by Company, or “general” ships), lowering that to 2% as well, thereby encouraging an overall growth in the volume of English shipping. In 1673, consulage on general ships was lowered even further, to 1% – a record low with which even the Dutch could not compete. And finally, in 1674, the lowering of strangers’ consulage from 4% to 2% was extended to include not only strangers’ exports from Izmir (since 1668), but also strangers’ imports.

In tandem with the very real Third Anglo-Dutch War the English waged against the Republic from 1672 to 1674 (as part of the larger Allied-Dutch War of 1672-1678), these commercial policies succeeded in hindering Dutch shipping to such a degree that Izmir’s Dutch factors were compelled to use English carriers to save their trade. By the time of the Treaty of Westminster (ending the Third Anglo-Dutch War, 1674) English trade in the Mediterranean had become larger than that of all other nations combined. At that point, having laid waste to the shipping of all other nations and consequently holding what amounted to a monopoly over the entire Levant trade, the Levant Company could no longer resist its monopolistic impulses and reversed its fiscal policy to extract maximum profit from its advantage in the face of the resurgent Dutch. In 1677 the Company determined that Izmir’s foreign merchants, still heavily dependent on English shipping and protection, would henceforth pay consulage at double the rate reserved for English merchants. An additional increase (to 4%) on cargoes shipped to destinations north of Cape Finisterre (on the far northwestern coast of Spain) other than London, also aimed at once to make more money from the carrying trade, to promote English trade and to reduce the commerce of other nations. Both measures appear to have contributed significantly to the strong comeback of Dutch trade from 1677/78 onwards.

The coping stone of a professional English management of consular affairs was the way in which sudden financial shortfalls were met. Even though a shortage of consular funds was dangerous because it hindered or suspended the meeting of Ottoman financial demands, empty consular coffers were never an excuse to levy additional taxes from English shipping, even if the addition concerned came in the form of an advance. Where other nations would all-too-often take recourse to such measures, or borrow the necessary funds from Ottoman (Jewish) financiers against Turkish rates of interest (of 18% and upwards), the Levant Company successfully prohibited both. Instead, it organized a fixed procedure for raising money that was both voluntary, inexpensive and relatively quick. The key was that both the debt and its fulfillment against interest were moved from the Ottoman Empire to England, where it would not unnecessarily impair diplomatic relations: extraordinary expenses were advanced by the factory members (i.e. factors) and notice thereof sent to general court of the Levant Company in London, whereupon
the London merchants (i.e. principals) subscribed to the accumulated debt at
a moderate 5-6% rate of interest which was fulfilled by the Company, in
effect making it a Company debt.

If there is one aspect to their trade where the Dutch failed miserably, it was
this. For all their disinterest in ideology, status or rank, Dutch merchants
were interested above all in the one form of competition that truly mattered
to them; that for commerce. In their uphill struggle to achieve it against the
more legitimate, powerful and centralized states of France and England,
loyalty to their nation and deference to their appointed superiors suffered
more systematically than in any other nation. Although its trade’s loose or-
ganization (and the abundant room for individual initiative it afforded) con-
tributed significantly to Dutch success, it also made it exceedingly difficult to
organize the trade and respond to challenges against it in a structurally sus-
tainable manner. Most of the time though, some balance between personal
and state interests was attained, be it at often great personal cost of the offi-
cials caught in-between. It was on them that both sides implicitly counted to
unite conflicting interests through mediation and the slight manipulation of
rules and laws.455

Particularly during the 17th-century heyday of Dutch trade, the pressure
put on Dutch consular officials was enormous. In contrast to that of the
Dutch East Indies trade or the English Levant trade, the organizational un-
derpinnings of Dutch Levant trade did not predate or coincide with the full
establishment of trade. Dutch Levant trade had started in the 1580s under
foreign (English and French) protection and had already become considera-
ble enough by the early years of the Twelve Years’ Truce with Spain (1609-
1621) to merit the States-General’s pursuing and acquiring its first Ottoman
capitulation in 1612 to the dismay of the English and French. Although the
capitulation formalized Ottoman-Dutch relations and called for a proper
hierarchy of representation to be established, having a representative in Is-
tanbul and consuls and deputies in the factories did not amount to organiz-
ing the trade.

For the duration of the truce Dutch Levant trade was predominantly left
to the merchants of Holland and Zeeland, with Dutch diplomatic officials
functioning in a supporting capacity rather than in a regulatory one. The
resumption of Spanish-Dutch hostilities made this relatively cheap and
loosely organized regime untenable, however. The passage along the French
and Spanish coasts, the Strait of Gibraltar and through the corsair-infested
Mediterranean had been wrought with difficulties even during the truce, but
to make it through Spanish waters now required a whole other level of pro-

455 Cf. supra on consul Van Dam’s impossible position as a collector of arrears who was
deliberately kept impotent.
tection. Simultaneously, even the States General’s practice of sending naval squadrons to patrol the Atlantic and the Mediterranean for corsairs and other enemy ships preying on Dutch merchantmen was no longer tenable, since the Dutch navy was pinned down defending Dutch waters.\(^{456}\)

A solution for the merchants’ increased need for protection and the navy’s decreased availability was sought in convoying. In 1623 the States General obliged shipping companies to equip their vessels according to fixed standards checked and maintained by the Admiralty.\(^{457}\) Though they had to do so at their own cost, the Admiralty consequently assigned contingents of sailors free of charge. It soon became apparent however that the convoying regulations could hardly be enforced through the Admiralty’s power alone. Because a sizeable percentage of companies and ship masters took their chances and evaded the costs of submitting to regulation, they could carry against unfairly reduced rates but at undue risk for consigning merchants and insurers. The dangers posed by rogue traders prompted the Dutch ambassador in Istanbul to request the States General to consider establishing a regulatory body of senior merchants to organize and represent Dutch Mediterranean trade.\(^{458}\) Within two months, the resident’s missive from April 1625 was followed up with a similar request from the principal merchants of Amsterdam. Though addressed to the States General, the government of Amsterdam’s underwriting it preemptively established a central Amsterdam leg, or “chamber”, for the projected organization:

_Burgomaster and governors of the city of Amsterdam authorize and commission Albert Schuyt, Hillebrand den Otter, Elias Trip, Gerrit Hudden, Marcus Vogelaer, Philippo Calandrini and Jan Bicker, to oversee the equipage of all ships bound for the Mediterranean and the Archipelago, to visitate and examine their patents and consignments, to correspond with the resident and consuls in the Levant and Barbaray, and to procure everything they consider necessary to maintain the basbas and principals of Algiers and Tunis. (Signed 25 June 1625.)\(^{459}\)_

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\(^{456}\) On the organization of the Dutch Levant trade and diplomacy, see, generally, Heeringa, _Bronnen_ 1 and 2. The summary _supra_ and _infra_ is largely based on these sources.

\(^{457}\) See Heeringa, _Bronnen_ 1, 838.

\(^{458}\) “… eenige van de ervaerenste ende prcinpaelste coopluydens tot Ambstelredam, op Italia ende Levant handelende, t’aucthoriseren, om behoorlijk regard te nemen op de uuytrustinge van alle schepen, die nae de Straet vaeren, sorge te draegen voor haere verseecheringhe met het visiteren ende examineren van de patenten ende cognossementen, correspondentie te houden met den orateur ende consuls van Levante ende Barbarije …”: Heeringa, _Bronnen_ 1, 963: Cornelis Haga to States General, 5 April 1625.

\(^{459}\) “Burgermeesters ende regeerders der stede Amsterdam authoriseren ende commiteren Albert Schuyt, Hillebrand den Otter, Elias Trip, Gerrit Hudden, Marcus Vogelaer, Philippo Calandrini ende Jan Bicker, om behoorlijk regard te nemen op de uuytrustinge van alle de schepen, die in de Middelandse see ende Archipellago varen, hare patenten ende cognossementen te visiteren ende examineren, mitten heere orateur ende consuls van Levanten ende Barbariijen correspondentiën te houden ende voorts alles anders te procureren, dat sijluyden
Set up as a municipal board, the “Directie van de Levantse Handel en de Navigatie op de Middellandse Zee” ("Board of Levant Trade and Navigation in the Mediterranean Sea”, commonly abbreviated to DLH in Dutch) in fact acquired national authority upon ratification by the States General. Reimbursed for their efforts and expenses through surcharges on vessels bound for and from the Mediterranean, its directors were to oversee their proper mustering, equipage, insurance and taxation. As its advisory and coordinating role in relations between the States General, the Admiralty, provinces, cities, and other municipal and port authorities on the one hand, and principals, factors and consuls in the Mediterranean on the other, developed in the course of the century, the DLH’s authority evolved into a political and semi-legislative one.

Originally set up primarily to coordinate Levant trade-related affairs in Holland, by the 1670s and 80s the DLH’s involvement with the factories had become so intensive that it was in regular correspondence with consular officials and actively designed, promoted and supervised the standardization of the factories’ commercial, fiscal and administrative practices, the States General increasingly merely signing off on decisions previously made by the directors in Amsterdam city hall. Far from being coincidental, this development (which we would nowadays call “mission creep”) was condoned by the States General. They now had at their disposal a commission that managed Ottoman-Dutch trade, free of charge, yet bound to take full account of The Hague’s diplomatic considerations and needs. At the same time the Levant merchants and their cities and provinces were not unduly provoked by perceived authoritarianism because – officially – the directors were not in the States General’s service and had no authority beyond that which they themselves accorded them.

The resulting organization of Dutch Levant trade is represented in the diagram below. Most conspicuous is the absence of a link between the directorate and the nations. This can be attributed to the fact that the DLH’s jurisdiction over them was indirect at best. The majority of Dutch factors in the scales were deputies of the principal merchants in the Republic and were primarily answerable to those. The DLH’s legal authority over them was limited to commercial practice and regulation (through the consul), and – as we have seen above – even that authority was often very much in dispute.

That the relatively low-powered DLH came to be the central authority in Dutch Levant trade, having to establish itself over, and coordinate form the midst of, a web of institutions and persons over which it could claim little seniority or authority had advantages as well as, obviously, disadvantages.

tot onderhoudinghe van bassas ende principaelen van Algiers ende Tunis nodigh achten sullen. … Actum den 25 Junij 1625”: Heeringa, Bronnen 1, 968-69.
On the positive side its establishment as a committee or board (and not a full-fledged government agency or independent company) made its operation far less expensive and cumbersome. At no cost to the States General and the provinces, at minimal cost to the cities housing DLH-chambers, and at fairly modest cost to the trade that provided the DLH with funds, Holland and Zeeland gained a well-organized, secured and insured operation with lobbying and policymaking capacity that was nevertheless still freely accessible to merchants and investors. Beyond the immediate advantages of heightened controls on mustering, equipage, insurance and taxation, these measures also had another (longer term) advantage: to reduce the costs of mandatory mustering and equipage per unit of cargo Levant merchants quickly switched to ships with bigger holds and more guns. These could barely outrun threats, but made up for this defect with relatively small crews that could nevertheless wield enormous firepower. This inadvertent advantage in the development of Dutch Mediterranean shipping would go on to make it so cost-effective and competitive as to form a severe threat to Italian, French and English shipping well into the 18th century.

All consequences on the negative side of the equation were a direct consequence of the almost organic evolution of the DLH as the central authority in Dutch Levant trade. As this fledgling organization tried to assert itself over a trade that predated and outstripped it, its ambassador and merchants can be forgiven for primarily regarding it as a vehicle for their specific wishes and demands, as in turn might the burgomasters of cities housing chambers, the States of Holland and Zeeland, and the States General. In any case, whatever the directors’ intentions or the institutional, political and diplomatic merits of their policies, their limited mandate would continue to haunt them for the duration of the 17th century.

But no one felt the very real consequences of the theoretical gap between authority and ambition, loyalty to the trade and subservience to the state quite as keenly as the consul of the largest Dutch Levantine factory; Izmir. He was initially appointed through an overly elaborate procedure: candidacy by the directors, approval by the burgomasters of Amsterdam, final selection
by the States of Holland, confirmation by the States General (460) – and all this in contravention of the capitulatory stipulation that the appointment of consuls was in fact the ambassador’s prerogative. Plagued with a structural lack of legal jurisdiction, of political authority, of means for enforcement and – most importantly – of personal as well as consular funds (for both of which he was entirely dependent on consulage, which was collectible only with explicit consent from the consulate’s three independently elected assessors) his position was the one where Dutch administrative decentralization came into full contact with the reality of a strong and independent community of expatriates. The nation seemed determined to systematically defraud its consul of his income through chronic under-declaring and endless bickering over consular and national expenses. At the same time the directors adamantly refused to take sole fiscal responsibility for consular affairs (for example, through awarding fixed salaries and reserving funds for extraordinary, emergency, expenses). Yet, he was counted on by both parties to act in their best interests, which made fulfillment of the office a high-wire act that required very loyal, skillful, diplomatic yet forceful occupants. As it was, the skills of those found were often insufficient.

After the establishment of the directorate in 1625, the growing importance of the Dutch Izmir trade, coupled with the increasing requirement for its consul to function as a governor abroad rather than as a purely local representative of his merchants’ interests, conspired to make hiring foreign locals (from 1618 to 1633 the Venetian Nicolo Orlando and from 1635 to 1657 the Greek Duca di Giovanni) less desirable. From 1656 onward, the consulship would no longer go to foreign incumbents who were highly versed in mercantile matters and well-connected to Ottoman officials, but to patricians, burghers and lawyers brought over from the Netherlands (while members of the Dutch nation from time to time observed it ad interim). With little to no connections to the trade or to the Izmir nation, and expected to be all the more faithful to the directors and resident to which they owed their office, Dutch consuls would now be better positioned to gradually establish the home authorities’ prerogatives and objectively implement stricter and more uniform rules and principles. Or so it was thought.

After two less successful consulships (that of Michiel du Mortier form 1657 to 1661 and of Gerard Smits from 1662 to 1668) the unlucky task would fall to Utrecht lawyer Jacob van Dam, consul from 1668 to 1687. As he set about attempting to impose consecutive layers of administrative controls on a community that baulked at seeing its former liberties diminished by the merchants and governments back home, his long-drawn consulship

461 Cf. Schutte, Repertorium, 331-34.
became entirely marred by the unceasing and oftentimes extreme enmity between his nation and himself. The way the organization of Dutch trade was made up along the way of its greatest successes had borne a peculiar mixture of mandatory participation and official organization on the one hand, and private initiative and informal organization on the other. It was this failure of the decentralized and heavily factionalized governing institutions of the Dutch Republic to clearly delimit and communicate the jurisdictions and administrative forms involved, to which Dutch commercial and community life in Izmir owed its peculiarly quarrelsome and anarchical character.

This organizational overview of Izmir’s European communities concludes our survey of what we have (somewhat misleadingly) called the ‘demography’ of European Izmir, that is to say; a survey of the various communities (and individuals) of which it was made up, of the specific ways in which these were confronted with, and reacted to, the increasing pressures brought to bear on them from the countries under which they resorted, from their Ottoman context, and from the specific segments of the mutual trade they sought to dominate. It should by now be very clear that this was actually a nationally, culturally, socially and economically diverse collective, whose shrinking yet professionalizing parts were feeling their way through systemic changes – with very different responses to their Ottoman surroundings as a result. Let us next see what we can say about their geographic distribution, along Frank Street, but also in relation to the adjacent Ottoman quarters.

**Geography**

Despite the abundance of European sources from and on Izmir it is equally challenging to attempt a rudimentary topography of the city’s 17th-century European quarter as it has been for the Ottoman quarter. As is to be expected of an Ottoman administration that had a decidedly *laissez-faire* attitude towards the inner workings of its non-Ottoman quarters, it left precious little relevant documents for us to peruse. Nevertheless, European sources do not yield significantly more detailed or accurate information. Delighting in general references to Frank Street’s landmarks and cosmopolitan character, it appears Europeans’ interest in their neighborhood’s Greek-Armenian urban hinterland was not significantly greater than that displayed by Ottoman contemporaries. In fact, European observers remain tantalizingly vague even on the more modest and common aspects of life in Frank Street itself.

Our discussion of the geography of European Izmir will therefore necessarily be very limited and highly inferred. Even so, it will yield a topography of the quarter’s main structures, as well as roughly delineate the distribution

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462 See Appendix 2, Documents 4 and 7 and *supra*. 281
of class, nationality and power among them. In the process, it will also suggest an answer to the double question as to what separated the European quarter from the Ottoman quarters behind it and why all contemporary sources avoid it altogether.

A Topography of Frank Street

Just like our discussion of the geography of 17th-century Ottoman Izmir, that of 17th-century European Izmir must take De Bruyn’s panorama as a starting point. The panorama is the only pre-19th century source that identifies with a measure of accuracy a number of buildings along the city’s northern coastline. On the large six-folio foldout illustration, De Bruyn enumerates a total of twenty-one landmark structures and locations which he further identifies in the text. (Since the original numerals are undistinguishable on our scaled down Plate 1 I have added Map 14 for clarification.)

MAP 14: PANORAMA WITH CLARIFIED LANDMARKS (DE BRUYN, 1678)

De Bruyn, Reizen, plate 2 and 23-25.

The corresponding descriptions (by De Bruyn) may be summarized thus:

1. Kadifekale (upper castle)
2. Chapel of Saint Polycarp
3. Ancient theatre
4. Köjk (pavilion) of Ahmed Ağa
5. Greek han (inn)
6. Genoese consulate
7. Dutch consulate
8. Venetian consulate
9. Residence of Kara Mustafa Paşa
10. English consulate
11. French consulate
12. Gümürkhan or uc gümürük (outer customs house)
13. Vezirhan (great warehouse)
14. Liman Kalesi (harbor castle/Castle of St. Peter)
15. İç or kadiרגa liman (inner, or galley, harbor)
16. İç gümürük (inner customs)
17. Church of Saint Veneranda
18. Greek and Armenian burial grounds
19. English, French and Dutch cemeteries
20. Jewish burial ground
When we insert De Bruyn’s numerals in our edited version of Graves’ map of Izmir to more readily understand the relative locations of the identified landmarks, the result is Map 15 below.

**MAP 15: MAP OF STRUCTURES AND LOCATIONS IDENTIFIED BY DE BRUYN (1678)**

Based on Maps 5, 11 and 12.

Galland, our other most instructive 17th-century visitor, has left us no such panorama. Still, the unusual detail of his description of the city, and of its seaside in particular, complements De Bruyn’s quite well by also moving beyond the immediate shore, as well as by giving some more general insights into the workings of the European quarter. From his description (465) we may add that:

- the vezirhan (no. 14) was reserved for Armenian merchants (106);
- the governor’s mansion was located on the shore of the inner harbor on a square right behind the lower castle, which also boasted a mod-

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465 Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne.*
est mosque, an elegant fountain and Izmir's wood market (wood being of particular importance to the fleet building governor, or derya bey) (110);
- the Capuchin French parochial church was just across the street from the French consulate (to which it was connected by a traverse) and had its own cemetery (114-116);
- there was also a French Jesuit “church” (housed in a large house) with garden somewhere along Frank Street’s quayside, with ground floor shop- and storerooms being leased out (116);
- on the landward side of Frank Street there was also a Franciscan Venetian church with cemetery (126);
- Frank Street counted three officially sanctioned ovens: one in the Greek khan, an older English one and a French one established only after the Candian war had ended (the Ottoman authorities had previously refused the French their own oven for fear of its products being employed to sustain the Venetian defenders of Candia) (145);
- there were a number of bars (“cabarets”) on Frank Street, the popularity of which among European as well as Barbary corsairs caused trouble with some regularity (133), and
- the houses along Frank Street were all on lease from Ottoman owners (since non-Muslim foreigners were not allowed to hold real estate in Ottoman lands) and thus constituted a major source of income for the well-to-do Turks of Izmir (144).466

The topographical detail provided by De Bruyn and Galland represent the limits of a feasible topography of Frank Street as it existed in 1678 (as well as adding some interesting details to that of adjoining quarters). A good many other sources provide further information on the street and its inhabitants, but theirs is invariably topographically or generally imprecise and is best employed for added context only.

Our rudimentary topography of Frank Street begs a number of questions; most importantly, what does the distribution of the fully identified structures on the seaward side of the street tell us and, secondly, what, then, was the situation on the landward side of the street?

Distribution
In all descriptions of European Izmir – be they practical or literary – the consulates along Frank Street invariably receive the most attention. This is for a number of rather straightforward reasons: because their size and flagging made them the most visible and recognizable European buildings when approaching the city from the sea; because arriving travelers were expected

466 Cf. notes 181 and 433.
and required to seek lodging, patronage and protection at their consulate (i.e. to matriculate); and because the consulates were (or were supposed to be) the main focus of their stay as well as of their national loyalty and pride. Together with the churches (second only in the attention bestowed on them) the consulates constituted the backbone of the respective European communities or nations and as a result are at the center of our understanding of Frank Street.

Being national symbols though, an awful lot of the consulates’ (and the churches’) more mundane goings on have remained hidden from sight. We have at our disposal many reports of consular and national meetings, a couple of anecdotal references to meals at the consular table, to festivities and to religious services and precious few hints (mostly in descriptions of the extraordinary measures taken to avoid plague infection) at what went on in the consulates’ storage and private rooms, in their gardens and on their jetties. One can only guess at the reasons for this, but most likely what went on there concerned the private lives of consular staff and was (alas!) deemed too prosaic to deserve mention, or was indelicate, illicit or plain illegal. What is revealed to us, then, is mostly the public outer shell of the consular institution.

Still, even that outer shell can serve an analytical purpose. Granted, we have no information on the exact lineup of buildings along (sections of) Frank Street. Yet our awareness of the relative prominence and location of the consulates, as well as of what Ottoman quarters with what functions and institutions bordered which section of Frank Street, may be combined to provide a degree of topographical context for otherwise tantalizingly vague references to the clustering of nationalities and professions and to the locations of minor chapels, merchants’ houses, shops and bars. The question of centrality is of key importance in attempting this.

Like any city Izmir had parts that were deemed to be more desirable to work or live in than others – i.e. that best suited the specific wishes and purposes of certain groups of inhabitants (and visitors). And like any neighborhood the European quarter had streets and stretches of streets more desirable than others. European sources are very clear on the fact that the most desirable (and, only?) street of the European quarter was Frank Street and that the seaside of the street was more desirable than the landward side. The mansions along the shore had direct, private, access to the outer harbor and their ground level warehouses, gardens and jetties were therefore ideally positioned to move goods from and to ships quickly, easily and – more interestingly – at any hour and under the cloak of darkness. At the same time, the seaward side of the street offered some distance from the stresses of ethnoreligious cohabitation and the real and imagined dangers of plague, fire and Ottoman “violence” (read; jurisdiction!) that roamed the indigenous city beyond Frank Street.
Undesirable as we might expect some to have found too close a proximity to the non-Frankish and particularly the non-Christian quarters, not being too far removed from them certainly had its advantages. This not only applied to vicinity to the Greek and Armenian quarters, but certainly also to the Jewish and the Turkish. As the Europeans depended on the former for personal services, industrial production and mercantile mediation, they did on the latter for luxury imports (through the caravan trade) and for financial, administrative, legal and diplomatic services. Their dependence only increased when, between 1675 and 1678 the Köprülü̈s decisively moved to gain administrative and even physical control over European trade by having it flow through the administrative and commercial institutions of its endowment (see above, and esp. De Bruyn’s nos. 12, 13 and 14).

Weighing the various advantages and disadvantages of certain locations along Frank Street against each other, consuls and well-to-do merchants generally preferred to set up house on the southernmost end of Frank Street’s seaside. The advantages were several: a private garden and quay, proximity to the Greek center (east and northeast of the Saint George and the Saint Photina), easy access to the rue des Arméniens (467), and thereby to the Armenian center east of the St. Stephen, as well as to the caravan bridge and the countryside beyond. More crucially, the southern end of Frank Street opened unto the newly renovated Ottoman commercial quarter of Kasap Hazı̈r and lay within carting distance of its customs house, warehouses and markets. How successful the Köprülü̈s’ regrafting of Izmir’s international economy, away from the European quarter and onto this Ottoman quarter, was, can be gleaned not just from the rapid establishment, enforcement and acceptance of the new customs house and its procedures in 1675, but also more convincingly from the fact that, in 1678, a freshly arrived De Hochepied could already innocently remark that...

near the customs house two large fireproof hans (being closed living and commercial quarters with many rooms) have been contracted for the convenience of the merchants; the first being called the bedestan and the second the vezirhan, the latter containing two floors, where many European merchants have their warehouses, the rest being inhabited by Armenians, Persians and other foreign nations, who use it to keep the goods they direct to Izmir by caravans from Persia and other places.468

Located at the far southern end of Frank Street’s seaside, the French and English consulates occupied superior if somewhat exposed positions. Both suffered repeatedly at the hands of drunken and rowdy bands of European and North-African sailors and corsairs, but apparently that was not felt to

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467 See Galland, *Voyage à Smyrne*, 88.
468 My italics. The Hague, NA 1.02.22 684, 42b.
outweigh the advantages offered by simultaneous proximity to the Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Turkish sections of town.

How then, did the French and English manage to occupy such prime locations? Was it because their presence went furthest back, or because they were the mightier or wealthier nations, or because of any combination of these possible reasons? Not necessarily, or even likely. An explanation should rather be sought in the importance they accorded to the projection of their wealth, status and power vis-à-vis their European competitors and their Ottoman hosts, i.e. in consuming conspicuously.\(^{469}\) It is no coincidence that precisely the monarchical states went for the most prestigious locations, while those of the merchant republics of Venice, Genoa and the United Provinces were content with real estate on the street’s less prestigious northern end. Although the republics were by no means insensitive to matters of precedence, the status it implied and the beneficial social, economic and political effects it could produce, they were equally apprehensive of diverting the best of their efforts away from their commercial raison d’être, and of the unwanted attention from corrupt officials and commercial swindlers that too much visibility and pomp could generate.\(^{470}\)

With the locations of the consulates accounted for it would be consistent to proceed with those of their nations. Unfortunately no contemporary document I know of more than hints at the distribution of communities (or even their senior merchants) along Frank Street – with the exception of the testimony of Christoffel Capoen (see Appendix 2, document 3), from which we learn that the Dutch company of Van Goor & Smout was located next to the French consulate (which, together with apparent French complicity in the hostage-taking, again suggests a certain affinity between the Dutch disobedient faction and the French). In any case, with the protective function of the consular institution in mind, we may accept those hints and assume that the majority of (loyal) nationals will indeed have settled in the vicinity of its consular seat. On the other hand, it is to be expected that a number of merchants did do its utmost to distance itself from consular authority and, especially, fiscal jurisdiction.\(^{471}\) But their number will have been too small to invalidate the proposition that most well-to-do merchants resided on the seaside in the close vicinity of their consulate, while the less well-off joined the tradesmen and shopkeepers on the other side of the street.


\(^{470}\) Cf. *supra* on Kara Mustafa Paşa’s stalled audiences, and the practicality with which the non-monarchical representatives (Venetian, Genoese and Dutch) efficiently dealt with Ottoman adjustments of protocol that the French and English found unacceptable and halted relations over.

\(^{471}\) See *supra*, esp. notes 230, 236, 238, 244 and 347.
Boundaries

With the relative lack of sound topographical data for even Frank Street’s seaside and its near complete absence for the street’s landward side, we are left very much in the dark about the Frank quarter beyond Frank Street proper. Was there such a thing to begin with? Or did all Europeans (except for a few peculiar cases nearly “turned Turk”) actually live on that one street? And, if not, did a significant number actually reside in the Greek quarter and under Greek communal organization and authority?

Although the extent to which the Frank quarter can truly be equated with Frank Street is beyond retrieval, the suspicion lingers that the separation between European and Ottoman that most contemporary accounts insist on, is disingenuous. For how are they to be reconciled with the candor displayed throughout Galland’s description, and many other contemporary descriptions of the generally pleasant European life in Izmir, as they dryly refer to the unhindered social intercourse between Europeans and Ottoman Christians (the stigmatized Greeks, Armenians and Jews) and even Muslims in European and Ottoman bars, theatres, churches, markets, shops, warehouses, courts of justice, lodgings and households? Though formally regarded as somewhat distasteful conduct, which many considered it imprudent to advertise to widely or openly, it could never be covered up entirely.

Particularly in conflict situations the self-preservationist instinct to point a finger would often override prudence, leaving us interesting snippets of the otherwise hidden information discussed in the preceding pages and footnotes. As a result we now have at our disposal the letters of stiff-headed and self-righteous men like Dutch minister Thomas Coenen and Dutch consul Jacob van Dam. In stressing their own good faith and exemplary conduct and pressing the resolution of conflicts over their remuneration and oft-flouted authority, both extensively lamented their flock’s wayward manners and in the process described them in informative detail.472 It is because of predicaments such as Coenen’s and Van Dam’s that we can now know about the less than exemplary ways of a number of well-to-do merchants that took up Oriental lifestyles complete with Turkish dress, concubines and slave girls, and with houses beyond Frank Street. Had it been up to more diplomatic men in less desperate circumstances such information would have remained hidden.

For all concerned it was generally more expedient to promote an image of wholesome, obedient and self-sufficient expatriate communities then to soil it with tales of cultural fluidity, opaque jurisdictions and messy interde-
dependence. And this strategy of silencing not only applied to the Ottoman other, those lower on the social ladder commonly received similar treatment. Apart from the fact that the crosscultural and transcultural messiness increased as one traversed the non-Muslim part of town from the shore to the quarters beyond, most early modern literates will also have found it distasteful to dwell on the lives and livelihoods of “rabble”, be they coreligionists, compatriots, or – worst of all – neither. For over-acknowledging such elements of lesser class, profession and/or religion would implicitly taint and thereby diminish the authority that diplomats and gentlemen-travelers were attempting to establish and project with their narratives.

The boundary between the European and Ottoman city, then, is not just obscured by differences of race and religion, but doubly so by their conflation with class. Consequently, as the “quality” of inhabitants decreased in all respects when one travelled from Frank Street’s seaside toward the city’s interior, the light of our sources also grows ever more faint and we stumble to feel our way forward there. Nonetheless, all of the above strongly suggests that there was no firm boundary between Frank Street and the Greek quarter beyond it, and that particularly Europeans of lesser station freely mingled with the latter’s population, a good number of them in all likelihood residing there as well.