Diplomatic Involvement with Labor Migration:
The role of Dutch embassies and consulates in Turkey and Morocco regarding the guest worker migration to the Netherlands 1960-1975

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1. Introduction - The Reasons for Investigating the Role of Embassies and Consulates

1.1 Central Focus

In this thesis I examine and discuss the role embassies and consulates played during the guest worker migration to the Netherlands from the early 1960s until the mid-1970s. During this period, Dutch firms recruited thousands of foreign workers. The large-scale reconstruction following the Second World War progressed more quickly than expected and Dutch industry was rapidly expanding. As a consequence, the Netherlands was confronted with an increasing shortage of (in particular) low-skilled workers as the 1960s approached. Because there were not enough Dutch workers, Dutch companies started to recruit workers from other countries.\(^1\) The guest worker migration affected the Netherlands as well as the worker's home countries. Because embassies and consulates function as intermediaries between their government and the government of the country in which they are stationed, they inevitably played a role in the migration process of guest workers to the Netherlands. The exact way in which they were involved with the recruitment of guest workers and if and how their role during the guest worker migration changed has not previously been investigated. Therefore, aim as well as relevance of this research is to investigate the role of these diplomatic institutions in order to provide new insight into the way in which the worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s unfolded. The recruitment of foreign workers to the Netherlands came to a close towards the mid-1970s.\(^2\) The sources used for this research cover the period until the 1980s, however, they contain little information about the period after 1975. For this reason, the period 1960-1975 is the time frame for this research.

This research will be limited to the Dutch embassies and consulates in Turkey and Morocco; the two countries from which the largest group of guest workers in the Netherlands originate.\(^3\) Prior to the 1960s, the Netherlands had already established diplomatic relationships

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2 After this period, the migration of people from the recruitment countries certainly did not stop but consisted primarily of wives and children of guest workers who joined their husbands and fathers in the Netherlands. See: Saskia Bonjour, Beleidsvorming inzake gezinsmigratie in Nederland, 1955-1970 (Amsterdam 2012) 109.
3 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en gaan, 284. The term ‘guest worker’ (in Dutch: ‘gastarbeider’) refers to foreign workers, i.e. temporary labor migrants. Because they were expected to migrate solely on a temporary basis for work after which they would return to their home countries they were not perceived as immigrants. The term guest worker is a translation of the German word Gastarbeiter and is not used by many Swiss and
with Turkey and Morocco (which included political, economic, and cultural partnerships). The guest worker migration added an additional ‘exchange’ between the Netherlands and the recruitment countries, in which the Dutch diplomats connected the different parties that were involved in the recruitment of workers. This research aims to answer the following central question: **What role did the Dutch embassies and consulates play in the Turkish and Moroccan guest worker migration to the Netherlands from 1960 to 1975, and how, when and why did this role change?**

1.2 Theory

**The Role of Embassies and Consulates in Labor Migration**

Embassies and consulates are part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As an ‘extension’ of the Dutch government abroad, their role is important in matters concerning the relationship between the sending and receiving nation. This section provides a brief description on the functions of embassies and consulates and how this relates to labor migration.

The functions of embassies and consulates are interrelated. Together, they represent the sending nation by providing services to people and companies of their own nationality who reside in the receiving state, as well as by providing services to immigrants and maintaining a network with local businesses and government agencies. This means that the responsibilities of these diplomatic posts comprise a number of different functions. An embassy can be described as a diplomatic mission that coordinates the communication, negotiations and (cultural) exchange between the sending and the receiving nations. A Dutch embassy is the main point of representation of the Netherlands in another nation. A consulate is a lower diplomatic representation than an embassy, and is primarily concerned with providing services directly to the citizens in the receiving state. The Oxford Dictionary defines an ambassador as: ‘an accredited diplomat sent by a state as its permanent representative in a foreign country.’ and a consul as: ‘an official appointed by a state to live in a foreign city and protect the state’s

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Frenchmen for example, due to its negative connotation as it stems from the time of Nazi Germany. See: Philip Martin and Mark Miller, ‘Guest workers: lessons from Western Europe’ *Industrial & Labor Relations Review* 33:3 (1980) 315-330, 315.


5 The receiving state is the state where the embassy and consulate of (the nationality of) the sending state are settled.

citizens and interests there.\textsuperscript{17} An ambassador is the first point of contact and is involved in formal negotiations and agreements between the two countries.\textsuperscript{8} He also sends reports on events and provides early signs of developments in the nation in which he is stationed.\textsuperscript{9} In this sense, the role of a diplomatic post is two-fold: Representing the sending nation in the ‘receiving’ nation, and connecting the receiving nation to the sending nation.

Embassies and consulates are decisive in determining whether a person is eligible to migrate to the Netherlands as a ‘labor migrant’.\textsuperscript{10} Their decisions are based on bilateral agreements on labor migration between the sending and receiving nation and the Dutch immigration policies which determine and alter the rules of admission and other requirements and rights for labor migrants.\textsuperscript{11} The embassy is a means to negotiate between and to connect countries with each other on a governmental level.\textsuperscript{12} The consulate, on a more ‘operational level’, deals with the provision of services regarding visas and other travel documents for different categories of migrants and immigrants.\textsuperscript{13} For a state that attracts foreign laborers and

\textsuperscript{7} Oxford Dictionary Online: Consul (accessed June 7, 2013); available from http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/consul.

\textsuperscript{8} Humphrey Trevelyan, a British diplomat, remarks: ‘Apart from negotiating, the ambassador’s basic task is to report on the political, social and economic conditions in the country in which he (she) is living, on the policy of its government and on his conversations with political leaders, officials and anyone else who has illuminated the local scene for him.’ See: R.P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy (Harlow 2006) 3.


\textsuperscript{11} Andrew Cooper, Jorge Heine and Ramesh Thakuhr, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford 2013) 131.

\textsuperscript{12} See for example: G. R. Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present: a study in the evolution of the resident embassy (Leiden 2009) 227-229.

\textsuperscript{13} The diplomatic institutions in the receiving country are generally not in a position to make decisions, as this is usually the (‘home-based’) Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the sending state. Though sometimes, when the affair had a ‘high political need’ or content, the diplomatic posts led he negotiations such as the American embassy in Russia during the Cold War. See: Cooper et al, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, 389.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 254.
whose consulates deal with a large number of migrants, the procedures at the consulate in the receiving state are usually lengthy and the consular staff is often large.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{Areas of Involvement}

The duties and tasks of Dutch embassies and consulates are described in a study by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was written in 2000.\textsuperscript{15} These duties incorporate the areas of foreign policy and development cooperation of the MFA since 1945.\textsuperscript{16} The functions of embassies and consulates are divided into four areas: political affairs, economic affairs, consular affairs, and press and cultural affairs. To a greater or lesser extent, these four areas all relate to the role of diplomacy regarding labor migration. This is important to bear in mind because it means that embassies and consulates are often required to use a ‘mediating approach’ as they are dealing with different people and parties who have divergent interests regarding the migration of workers.

The area of \textbf{political affairs} primarily includes the national and foreign political developments in the receiving state. The embassies and consulates report on developments that are relevant to the Netherlands and carry out the Dutch political policy. This is particularly important when a bilateral agreement is concluded (such as a recruitment agreement) between the sending and the receiving nations.\textsuperscript{17} A recruitment agreement is preceded by negotiations about the terms and conditions of the agreement in which diplomats are involved. Visits by representatives of the sending state are seldom needed as negotiations and briefing of information often occurs via the embassy.\textsuperscript{18}

The area of \textbf{economic affairs} concerns matters that deal with the entire country, a certain branch of industry or individual companies.\textsuperscript{19} Diplomatic representation is economically

\textsuperscript{14} Cooper et al, \textit{The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy} (Oxford 2013) 130.
\textsuperscript{16} Before 1945, the Dutch Foreign Service was divided into three areas; the diplomatic service, the consular service and the interpreters service. Because the aggregation of the services brought more (practical) benefits, the services were incorporated into one Foreign Service ‘De Directie Buitenlandse Dienst’ (DBD) in January 1946. See: NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{17} The political affairs also include looking after the interests of other nations which do not have a national representation in the state where the Dutch embassy or consul is situated (for example Luxembourg). Also, between confederates in the NAVO and between members of European Community who are situated in capital cities in which more than one NAVO- or EU-nations are represented, regular meetings are held.
\textsuperscript{18} Barston, \textit{Modern Diplomacy}, 3,55.
\textsuperscript{19} Since 1950, two economic services were authorized to give the diplomatic posts instructions on the field of trade policy. These services are the ‘Directoraat-Generaal voor de Buitenlandse Economische Betrekkingen’ (Directorate-General for Foreign Economic Relations), and the ‘Exportbevordering- en Voorlichtingsdienst’
beneficial for both the sending and the receiving nation (state). The recruitment of foreign laborers seems most beneficial for the economy of the nation that receives the foreign workers. However, the migration of workers can also be beneficial for the economy of the country of origin of the workers as there are less ‘mouths to feed’ and because wages earned by workers abroad would often be sent home to families. This was especially the case for Turkey and Morocco because they were dealing with a high unemployment rate during the 1960s and 1970s.

The area of **consular affairs** consist of services provided to Dutch nationals (residing in or visiting) the country, and services provided to nationals of the country in which the diplomats are stationed. On behalf of Dutch citizens, the most common consular services are providing, extending or modifying travel documents such as visas and passports or notarized certificates and civil status certificates. The service provided to non-Dutch individuals is the part of the consular service that is most central to this research. This service includes the tasks of the ambassadors and consuls regarding immigrants from the nation in which the embassy is stationed who wish to migrate to the Netherlands namely: 1) granting of visas for visits to the Netherlands for less than three months or providing a temporary residence authorization for stays longer than three months, 2) transmission of applications, 3) forwarding complaints about the actions of Dutch public figures, and 4) informing immigrants and foreign authorities about the Dutch legislation (immigration policies). The consulate thus also takes part in the arrangement for remittances and the migration of family members of immigrants.

The area of **press and cultural affairs** is the function of embassies and consulates that is concerned with advancing and extending the relationship of a foreign nation and the Netherlands. The way in which the Netherlands is portrayed and discussed in the sending nation or vice versa, is a point of attention for the diplomatic institutions because they are occupied with the task to ‘rectify’ or diminish these issues in and from the media. Certain matters can become a point of discussion in the public opinion in either the sending or the receiving nation. Due to these issues, the relationship with the nation where the embassy and consulates are

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stationed can be damaged, especially when it concerns matters that are ‘politically sensitive’. With respect to this research, the way in which the Dutch treatment of guest workers or the behavior of guest workers in the Netherlands appears in the news (in either the Dutch or foreign media), is therefore an important point of attention.

Factors of Influence

Several aspects played a role in the development of the worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s. On the basis of the theory on the functions of embassies and consulates, a number of aspects can be derived that could have affected the role of embassies and consulates within the worker migration. In a recent study on the nature of diplomacy, a number of significant aspects were mentioned regarding post-war diplomacy. These include: the ‘wide range’ of ministries involved in diplomacy, the decline of the power of the ambassador, the increase in governmental involvement from the native state, and the heightened importance and influence of the news media. Taking these aspects into account, together with the theory as described above, 6 key factors are formulated to analyze the role of embassies and consulates regarding the worker migration.

1) Nature and scope of the migration - The procedures that embassies and consulates applied and followed for the migration of people depended on the number of migrants (scope of the migration) and the ‘type’ of migrants in terms of gender ratio, schooling, individuals or families (nature of the migration). Changes in the nature worker migration as well as increasing or decreasing number of migrants likely affected the role of embassies and consulates.

2) Regulations of guest worker recruitment – The extent to which the migration of workers was regulated by governments altered the rules of admission for guest workers. For this reason, the procedures and tasks the embassies and consulates received changed when agreements were made or adjusted. These agreements between the sending and receiving countries (or the absence thereof) presumably affected what role the embassies and consulates would have played in the migration of workers.

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23 Ibid., 194.
24 Ibid., 5.
3) Leeway – As an ‘extension’ of a government, embassies and consulates acted on behalf of the interests of their government but also for the interests of the country in which they were stationed. Their insights in certain developments in the country in which they were stationed could lead to a judgment and decisions their governments could not make from a distance. Therefore, the leeway the ambassador and consuls had (or took) in implementing their own initiatives including any deviations from rules and regulations supposedly affected their role within the guest worker migration.26

4) Intermediaries – In addition to authorities, embassies and consulates also dealt with other (non-governmental) organizations and individuals who contacted and requested services or advice from them. The extent to which ambassadors and consuls were influenced by these intermediaries in their duties within the worker migration and vice versa is thus also an important point of analyses.27

5) Restrictions and incidents – Embassies and consulates were required to comply with the rules as well as restrictions set by the Dutch government on rules of admission and residence for migrants. In case these restrictions led to incidents if they were not understood or ignored by the guest workers involved could have influenced the role the embassies and consulates had to play in handling or resolving these matters.

6) Effects of the media – Embassies and consulates were involved in resolving issues which put the relationship between the countries at risk.28 This was particularly important when issues arose in the media and became part of discussion in the public opinion (at home or abroad).29 One would expect that the media items regarding Turkish and Moroccan labor migrants influenced the role of Dutch embassies and consulates.

26 See for example: G. R. Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the present: a study in the evolution of the resident embassy (Leiden 2009), 227-229.
27 These include for instance employment agencies and immigrant organizations, as well as employers and job-applicants in both the sending and the receiving states. See: Marlou Schrover and Floris Vermeulen, ‘Immigrant Organizations’ Journal of ethnic and Migration Studies 31:5 (2005) 823-832; Rinus Penninx and Marlou Schrover, Bastion of bindmiddel? Organisaties van immigranten in historisch perspectief (Amsterdam 2001).
28 Cooper et al, The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, 131. Especially towards the 1970s, when the influx of guest workers in Western European countries increased, a growing awareness of the scope and associated problems of the labor migration arose. In Germany for instance, attacks by German youth against Turkish labor migrants took place in several towns in East Germany. These incidents were reflected throughout the German media. See: Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe: from Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen (New York and Oxford 2011) 16.
29 Between 1960 and 1980 for instance, several issues regarding Spanish guest workers appeared in the Dutch, Spanish end foreign media. The Spanish embassy and consulate in the Netherlands, as well as the Dutch embassy and consulate in Spain reacted to these issues and tried to resolve the matters. The Spanish embassy...
The main objective of this research is to see if, how and when the role of embassies and consulates changed in the period under investigation. On the basis of the above mentioned theory and factors of influence, the changing role of embassies and consulates regarding labor migration of Turks and Moroccans will be analyzed.

1.3 Historiography

Within the current historiography on the guest worker migration, there are few studies that refer to the role of embassies and consulates. The literature on the changing role of embassies has been discussed above. This section discusses the literature on guest worker migration.

The guest worker migration to and functioning of guest workers in the Netherlands has received substantial attention among scholars and writers. This is mainly due to the fact that many guest workers did not return to their native countries after their recruitment contract ended but settled permanently in the Netherlands. The latter has led to a range of political and social changes and debates relating to the functioning of guest workers and later their descendants (called allochtonen in Dutch) in Dutch society. The studies that were selected as particular relevance to this research are those that discuss the relations with the Netherlands and Turkey and Morocco and studies that focus on the way in which the Dutch policy-making regarding immigrants in the 1960s and 1970s developed. In addition, the studies that provide insight into the nature and scope of the worker migration from Turkey and Morocco in this period are used, as they provide a context as well as insights that relate to the way in which the embassies and consulates were involved with the worker migration.

A direct connection to the function of Dutch embassies and consulates regarding the worker migration are Dutch family migration policies, as these relate to the way in which rules provided information, help and advice to Spanish workers in the Netherlands, and the Dutch embassy provided information to the Dutch government on the impact of the issues in Spain. See: Sjoerd Klaas Olfers, Arbeidsmigrant of vluchteling? Achtergronden van de Spaanse migratie naar Nederland, 1960-1980 (Amsterdam 2004) 25-29.

of admission were established and needed to be executed by the embassies and consulates. In order to make this connection, a recent study by Saskia Bonjour was used, that examined how Dutch politicians and civil servants set the rules for family migration policy in the Netherlands in the period from 1955-2005. Bonjour focuses on the situation in the Netherlands and examines how policies were realized and influenced by different ministries, as well as Dutch industry. Because the embassies and consulates were in contact with the different ministries it is interesting to see if and to what extent they played a role in the formation and execution of the Dutch immigration and family migration policies.

A study by Corrie van Eijl is also important in this context. She investigated the process, scale and policies regarding illegal immigrants in the Netherlands in the period from 1945-2000. Van Eijl demonstrates that the rules that were issued with regard to the admission and employment of labor migrants changed over time. With these changes, the determination about whether a person was a legal or an illegal guest worker also changed or became more difficult to determine. Embassies and consulates were in charge of the ‘legal migration’ of workers from their country of origin to the Netherlands. Because they acted according to the rules and regulations of admission of the Dutch government, the way in which policies and rules changed during the guest worker regime is an important link to this research. Van Eijl mentions that the regularization of 1975, which established stricter immigration policies, was in fact an acknowledgement of a failure of former immigration policies which had not prevented the illegal immigration of foreign workers. The way in which dominant ideas on migration and the regularizations of the Dutch government in the 1960s and 1970s affected the function of embassies and consulates regarding labor migration is therefore important to this research.

The study of Will Tinnemans illustrates the social and political issues that occurred during and after guest workers had settled in Dutch society (highlighting the perspective of the guest workers by inserting personal stories). This work is used for its insight into the context in which these issues (about for instance housing, cultural differences, criminality and cases of illegality) took place, in particular those examples and stories that referred to the procedures guest workers went through at the Dutch embassies or consulate in their country of origin. For the same reason, the studies of Nadia Bouras were used because these provide a comprehensive analysis on the nature of the Moroccan worker migration to the Netherlands. Her analysis serves

31 Bonjour, Grens en gezin.
32 Van Eijl, Tussenland.
33 Ibid., 27-35.
34 Tinnemans, Een gouden armband.
as a background to better understand the Moroccan recruitment process and the perspective of
the Moroccan authorities and guest workers.\textsuperscript{35} The latter is especially important when
examining incidents regarding (illegal) Moroccan guest workers that occurred in the
Netherlands. Bouras provides a context for the way in which these incidents were dealt with in
both the Netherlands and Morocco. Within this framework, it is possible to examine the various
situations and factors the Dutch embassies and consulates in Morocco encountered during this
period.

Many studies on the field of labor migration to the Netherlands focus on the functioning
of guest workers and their descendants guest workers in Dutch society (in terms of integration,
issues regarding social and religious differences, education, etc.).\textsuperscript{36} These studies are thus
mainly concerned with the consequences of the worker migration to Dutch society. Relatively
less is known about which individuals and what other (internal or external) factors were
involved in the recruitment of Turkish and Moroccan workers and in what way the migration
process developed during the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{37} By adding the role of embassies and
consulates, the intention of this thesis is to alter the current understanding of and thoughts about
the progression of the worker migration that took place during this time period.

\subsection{1.4 Material and Method}
To discover what the Dutch diplomats were dealing with in the 1960s and 1970s, I examined
the official documents and correspondence between the ambassadors, consuls and (several
ministries of) the Dutch government. In total, 300 documents from three different archives have

\textsuperscript{35} Bouras, \textit{Het land van herkomst}; Annemarie Cottaar, Nadia Bouras, and Fatïha Laouikili, \textit{Marokkanen in Nederland: de pioniers vertellen} (Amsterdam 2009).


\textsuperscript{37} In the Explanatory Memorandum of the Dutch government regarding the topic of foreign workers for instance, there is no explicit explanation provided to the question of why the Netherlands actually had decided to attract foreign workers. See: Dick van Eijk, ‘De werving van gastarbeiders als resultante: een sociaal probleem in arenaperspectief’ \textit{Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift} 21:2 (1994) 86-112, 106.
been analyzed.38 The archives of the Dutch embassies and consulates in Turkey and Morocco make up the bulk of material that has been used for this research. The third archive is that of the Ministry of Justice, department Foreign Affairs and Border Protection.39 In this archive, some pieces have been included that relate to matters in which the Dutch ambassadors and consuls were involved regarding the migration of Turkish and Moroccan guest workers. Nearly all documents of the archives contain correspondence between the consuls and ambassadors and the Dutch government. These include published, official decisions regarding the regulation of the recruitment procedure for guest workers.40 In addition to the official papers and letters, the archives also contain letters written by Turkish and Moroccan workers who asked for work or some type of personal arrangement.41 The files have been selected on the basis of the extent to which the content relates to the guest worker migration (requests, arrangements, changes in policies, etcetera) and topics related to migrant workers (such as letters discussing news items, law suits or special requests from or related to migrant workers in the Netherlands from Turkey or Morocco).42 The Turkish archive consists of the documents from the Dutch embassy in Ankara from 1955-1974, and the Consulate-General in Istanbul from 1955-1984. In this period, 6 ambassadors (in succession) were appointed at the embassy in Ankara.43 The archive of the embassy in Morocco includes the archives of the documents of the embassy in Rabat and the consulates in Casablanca and Tanger from 1940 to 1979. In this period, 5 ambassadors (in


40 Citations that have been incorporated in this paper are translated from Dutch to English. The original text is shown in the footnotes.

41 Throughout this paper, the names of the ambassador, consul, minister or other recipient are mentioned whenever this was mentioned in the letters. Otherwise, the sender or recipient is mentioned by function or organization.

42 The archives in the National Archive are composed on the basis of a list of selection procedures. This is a result of the multi-year covenant of 1994 as it was concluded between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Central Archive Selection Service (CAS). The selection is based on five ‘selection lists’ (these include inter alia: government budget and organization, housing and personnel budget policy), which can be viewed on the website of the Dutch government (accessed June 4, 2013); available from http://wetten.overheid.nl/zoeken_op/regeling_type_wetten.

43 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259.
succession) were appointed to the embassy in Rabat. In addition to the correspondences, the archives also contain a number of newspaper articles relating to guest workers in the Netherlands. These articles appeared in the Dutch as well as Turkish or Moroccan media (and some in ‘foreign’ media such as Belgian, German, French and English newspapers). These articles (33 in total) have been selected on the basis of whether the issue of the articles was discussed in correspondence that were found in the archives and thus relates to the function of embassies and consulates.

The next chapter serves as a theoretical framework in which the background and the context of the worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s, in particular regarding the above mentioned ‘factors of influence’ is discussed. It will also detail a number of important issues that took place regarding Turkish and Moroccan guest workers during this period. This is followed by the analyses of the sources of the embassies and consulates in Turkey and Morocco in respectively chapter 3 and 4. In these chapters, the period from approximately 1960-1969 will be central. Because issues regarding guest workers increased in particular towards and during the 1970s, chapter 5 specifically focusses on the (unexpected) issues and incidents that occurred within the last part of the guest worker migration (1970-1975). This is followed by the conclusions in chapter 6.

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44 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211.
2 - Context of the Worker Migration of the 1960s and 1970s

This chapter builds on the theory presented above, and discusses important characteristics of the guest worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s. The literature on guest workers migration is extensive, as have been observed above. In this chapter the focus lies only on those subjects that are important for the (changing) role of embassies. This chapter serves as a framework for understanding what ambassadors and consuls were dealing with regarding labor migration in the 1960s and 1970s.

2.1 Nature and Scope

The arrival of labor migrants was not a new phenomenon to the Netherlands in the 1960s.45 There are a number of ways, however, in which the guest worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s was different than labor migration in the preceding era.46 First, people came from further away than earlier groups, who primarily came from neighboring countries such as Germany and Belgium.47 Second, the worker migrants were nearly all lower educated men, who came for unskilled work in the Dutch industrial sector. The third difference is the large scale of the migration as well as the significant number of guest workers who would eventually not return to their home countries but settle in the Netherlands.48 In addition, contrary to earlier labor migration the Dutch government was involved to a much greater extent with the recruitment of foreign workers. Foreign labor migration was inter alia regulated by concluding recruitment agreements with countries. These agreements included a number of requirements the workers had to meet as well as rights they received once they were recruited to the Netherlands.49

The recruitment of low-skilled migrant workers took place in several post-war Western European countries.50 Germany was one of the first countries that started recruiting foreign workers, beginning in the mid-1950s. Shortly after, other countries such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands (and Sweden to a lesser extent) followed by recruiting workers from Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, and Portugal).51 A shortage of available workers from the Mediterranean

45 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en Gaan, 30.
46 Hoving et al, Cultuur en migratie in Nederland, vii; Van Eijl, Tussenland, 48.
47 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en gaan, 162-176.
48 Van Eijl, Tussenland, 48.
49 Bonjour, Grens en gezin, 50-51.
50 Roosblad, Vakbonden en Immigranten in Nederland, 20.
51 The Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s in this regard was no different than for instance, Germany or Belgium, even though every ‘guest land’ handled the influx of workers in a somewhat different manner. See: Stephen Castles, ‘The Guest-Worker in Western Europe – An Obituary’ International Migration Review 20:4
countries quickly arose because low-skilled workers were increasingly needed in the ‘booming economies’ of the Western European countries. Therefore, they began looking for laborers in countries further away such as North Africa and Turkey and signed recruitment agreements with these countries. The Netherlands did so as well. Over the course of the 1960s, the Dutch government signed recruitment agreements with eight countries. The recruitment agreements were first signed with Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Greece (1962) and Portugal (1963). Turkey (1964) and Morocco (1969) followed later. An overview of the number of Turkish and Moroccan migrants to the Netherlands from 1960-1976 is shown in the figure below.

**Graph 1. Migration of Turks and Moroccans to the Netherlands 1960-1976**


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56 The graph displays the data at every two years in the period 1960-1976. The number of new migrants is the total number of migrants that migrated to the Netherlands in that particular year. The total number of residents is the number of migrants on January 1 of that year.
Labor migrants constituted the largest group of post-war immigrants to the Netherlands and made up approximately half of the foreigners that entered the Netherlands until 1975. This migration of Turkish and Moroccan workers started after 1960, as demonstrated by the fact that in 1960 only 22 Turks and 3 Moroccans were registered in the Netherlands. This number progressively increased in the first half of the 1960s. As shown in the graph above, by 1966, the group of both Turkish and Moroccan immigrants exceeded 5 thousand. In 1970, there were 22 thousand Turks, and 18 thousand Moroccans in the Netherlands. These numbers would continue to grow towards the twenty-first century, mainly due to family migration and family formation. Together, they formed the largest group of guest workers in the Netherlands.

2.2 Recruitment Procedures

The Dutch government aimed to regulate the process of foreign recruitment by concluding recruitment agreements. These agreements included a number of requirements the workers had to meet as well as rights and benefits they received once they were recruited to the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs (MOPHSA) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) were involved with the recruitment procedure of foreign workers. The MOJ determined the admission status of guest workers and arranged their residence permits. The MOPHSA was responsible for the recruitment of labor migrants and for providing work permits. The Dutch consulate in the home country of the labor migrants had to approve the application for the work permit and issue a visa to the recruited workers. The employment office of MOPSHA in the Netherlands provided the workers with a work permit once the worker arrived in the Netherlands. Prior to 1968, a worker could only be recruited if a Dutch employer had requested the recruitment of a foreign worker from the MOPSHA. Later, documents were also filed for the wives and children of the guest workers.

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58 Tinnemans, *Een gouden armband*, 64.
63 Van Eijl, *Tussenland*, 50.
64 Ibid., 87.
After the recruitment agreement was signed, Dutch firms organized ‘selection teams’ who travelled to the recruitment countries to select the workers. This process took place at recruitment and selection agencies in the recruitment countries where workers could present themselves. Over the course of the 1960s, several Dutch recruitment and selection agencies sprung up in both Turkey and Morocco that handled the recruitment process of the workers.65 Workers were selected on basis of age, health and competence for the type of work for which employees were needed. The selection process incorporated a physical exam and a test on technical knowledge (applicable to the jobs available) and several interviews.

For the government and for employers, the recruitment procedure was a time-consuming and costly endeavor. For migrant workers, however, the official recruitment procedure included a number of benefits. Dutch employers were required to arrange housing and food for the first year of employment.66 Furthermore, the employers paid for the travel expenses and provided assistance with transferring the earnings of guest workers to their families in their home countries.67 Recruited guest workers also had rights such as unemployment benefits, social health insurance and family (children’s) allowance.68

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66 Tinnemans, Een gouden armband, 31.
67 Van den Berg-Eldering, Van gastarbeider tot immigrant, 8.
68 Tinnemans, Een gouden armband, 84.
2.3 Spontaneous Migrants

Prior to 1967, foreigners with a passport and ‘sufficient means of support’ could travel to and reside in the Netherlands.\(^{69}\) This basically meant that every migrant with a tourist visa could travel to the Netherlands and stay there longer if one found work and received a work permit. These workers were called ‘spontaneous migrants’.\(^{70}\) It is evident that most guest workers had travelled to and found a job in the Netherlands on their own initiative.\(^{71}\) Until 1968, regional employment agencies in the Netherlands were allowed to issue work permits for spontaneous migrants (in accordance with the MOPSHA).\(^{72}\) The spontaneous migrants generally did not have trouble finding work in the Netherlands as well as obtaining a work and residence permits.\(^{73}\) In fact, in the first half of the 1960s, the MOPSHA had given many more work permits to workers than the number of workers that were officially recruited by employment agencies. The number of spontaneous migrants grew extensively during the 1960s.\(^{74}\) Between 1964 and 1966, 15,000 guest workers were officially recruited, while the MOPSHA had given 65,000 work permits in this period.\(^{75}\) This indicates that over three quarters of the guest workers in this period were not officially recruited by the Dutch government, but directly through companies and ‘intermediaries’ who requested or arranged these work permits for them. Foreigners, who came to the Netherlands to work, were required to report to the regional Alien Police for a residence permit. At that point they were asked to remit a deposit of 500 guilders which would be used for their journey back to their home country if they were unable find work or if they became unemployed in the Netherlands.\(^{76}\) These migrants then had 14 days to find work, after which time they could receive a work permit.\(^{77}\)

2.4 Visa Requirements

In the second half of the 1960s, the MOPSHA became stricter about providing work permits to guest workers.\(^{78}\) The year 1968 marked the change in the proportion between the number of

\(^{69}\) Van Eijl, *Tussenland*, 50.
\(^{72}\) Van Eijl, *Tussenland*, 57-60. The total share of worker migrants that came to the Netherlands outside the official recruitment, increased from 30% in the early 1960s to almost 90% in 1966 and 1967.
\(^{74}\) Akgündüz, ‘Een analytische studie naar de arbeidsmigratie van Turkije naar West-Europa’, 356.
\(^{75}\) Tinnemans, *Een gouden armband*, 64.
\(^{76}\) Tinnemans, *Een gouden armband*, 65.
\(^{77}\) Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan*, 286; Bouras, *Het land van herkomst*, 43.
\(^{78}\) Ibid., 51. In Belgium for instance, the government tried to decrease the (growing) number of ‘spontaneous’ migrants who came as ‘tourists’ to Belgium as this became viewed as a problem during the 1960s. See: Kathlijn
officially recruited and spontaneous workers. This was mainly due to the so-called ‘Roolvinkstop’. The state secretary of MOPSHA, Roolvink, took a number of measures to stop the ‘disorderly arrival’ of foreign workers in the Netherlands. In 1966, a visa requirement had already been determined for foreigners who intended to stay in the Netherlands for more than three months. This visa was called a Temporary Residence Permit, and was provided by the Dutch embassy or consulate, in concurrence with the MOJ. However, nationals of countries that the Netherlands had signed a visa agreement with (including Turkey and Morocco), were exempt from the visa obligation. In 1968, the visa obligation which required a temporary residence permit also became a requirement for migrants from recruitment countries. This also meant that after 1968, the requests for a work permit were not filed by Dutch employers but by the migrant workers themselves. A request for a work permit could be refused based on the employment rate in the Dutch industrial sector at the time of the request. As a consequence of this measure, the number of spontaneous migrants dropped significantly. At the same time however, the number of illegal working and residing foreigners in the Netherlands increased.

Because the selection procedure via the official recruitment channel was costly and time consuming, many employers recruited workers outside the official recruitment procedure. These workers (if not in the possession of a visa and residence permit) were considered illegal workers after 1968. In the early 1970s, there were about 20,000 illegal worker migrants in the Netherlands. When discovered, the illegal migrants were deported to their country of origin and in many cases to neighboring countries of the Netherlands. Specifically with Moroccan guest workers, the deportation of illegal residents and workers had been attributed to a number of issues. In 1972, more than half of all migrants from recruitment countries were deported (of which three-quarters were either Turkish or Moroccan). Due to the high costs of deportation, the sum of money a worker needed to pay to assure their return trip in case of employment was consistently required from 1969 forward. This requirement disappeared in 1975.
2.5 Family Migration Policies

From the 1950s until today, the settlement of large groups of foreigners in the Netherlands has been seen as an unwanted development. It was the intention of both guest workers as well as the Dutch government that the recruitment period was temporary. Therefore, migrant workers were recruited on a temporary contract basis for a fixed number of years. Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, however, several political parties as well as Dutch employers were in favor of extending the visa terms for guest workers. For Dutch companies, the recruitment and training of the workers cost time and effort, and an employer would rather retain this worker after he was trained and settled in his company. To ensure that the Netherlands was an attractive country for foreign workers, the Dutch government was also in favor of extending the stay for guest workers. Family migration of guest workers outside the EEG became an option in 1961 (if the worker had suitable housing space for his family). Because the MOJ thought that the Netherlands should only allow family migration if they had accepted the long-term stay of a guest worker, the waiting period for wives and children of guest workers from outside the European Union to join their husbands and fathers in the Netherlands was set at three years. However, because Roolvink was of the opinion that recruitment of foreign workers would not be effective if the Netherlands used such a long waiting period for non-EEG workers, he pleaded for a one-year waiting period. Eventually in 1964, the compromise was made that the waiting period for guest workers from non-EEG countries was set at two years. In 1970, the waiting period for the reunification of families (family migration) of guest workers was reduced to one year under the condition that they had lived and worked in the Netherlands for one year, possessed a one-year contract and suitable housing. As late as 1974, the Dutch government still presumed that guest workers would soon return to their country of origin. Mostly due to

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84 Bonjour, *Grens en gezin*, 16.
87 Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan*, 287.
88 Bonjour, *Grens en gezin*, 68-70. Around 1960, the Dutch started to recruit workers from Spain as the Dutch industry still demanded more laborers. To meet the wish of the Spanish government, the Dutch government decided in 1961 that the arrival of families of Spanish guest workers in the Netherlands was allowed. With this, the arrival of families of guest workers from other non-EEG-countries was also made possible.
89 Ibid., 71-73.
family migration, however, many guest workers settled in the Netherlands. As Bonjour notes: ‘Family migration is almost always settlement migration’. 91

2.6 Issues and Incidents

During the 1960s and 1970s, several incidents and issues regarding Turkish and Moroccan guest workers occurred in the Netherlands. One of these issues was the (fear of) forgery of documents, especially with those that determined Family Allowance for guest workers. In 1963, the Dutch Law for Family Allowance determined that every person who worked or lived in the Netherlands had a right to an allowance for their children. This rule also applied for guest workers in the Netherlands who had either children living in the Netherlands or in their country of origin. 92 For Moroccan workers, the payment of family allowance was organized differently than for other groups of guest workers. This was confirmed in a renewed family allowance arrangement in 1971. The direct cause for this, were the issues and the fear that arose concerning large-scale fraud with the family allowance among Moroccans. The family allowance for Moroccan workers was not paid to them directly, but transferred to a Moroccan governmental institution, the Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale in Morocco. Moroccans who were entitled to receive family allowance in the Netherlands, were obliged to open a bank account at the General Bank of Morocco in Casablanca. These guest workers, or their family in Morocco, could only withdraw the allowance money from the bank in Morocco. 93

Another aspect that increasingly started to account for issues as the guest worker migration progressed was the housing for guest workers. Guest workers could only have their families come over if they had suitable housing which meant they had to hire a so-called ‘single family home’, large enough for their wife and children. 94 Due to long waiting lists, a lack of large houses as well as unfamiliarity with the system of housing benefits in the Netherlands, they were unable to find houses for rent, and therefore often bought houses in poor neighborhoods. In the low-priced segment of the private housing sector, they became competition to the native Dutch people (who belonged to the group of the lowest paid citizens of the Netherlands). In these neighborhoods, concentrations of guest workers emerged. 95

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91 Bonjour, *Grens en gezin*, 16. (‘Gezinsmigratie is bijna altijd vestigingsmigratie’).
92 Until 1995, the amount of children allowance per child was larger in proportion to the number of children. See: Official website of SVB (Social Insurance Bank of the Netherlands): oude sociale regelingen – kinderbijslag (accessed October 2, 2013); available from www.svb.nl.
93 Bouras, *Het land van herkomst*, 68.
led to heightened tensions and riots directed at the guest workers in the early 1970s. This was especially the case in Rotterdam where many guest workers resided. In August of 1972, several riots in Rotterdam took place that were directed at the Turkish guest workers living in the district called ‘Afrikaanderwijk’. These incidents stand out because of the degree to which the government(s) and several institutions were involved in the matter, as well as the media attention it received at the time. The race riots, as they were called in the newspapers, were broadly (fuelled) and discussed in the Dutch, the Turkish and even in British, French and American press.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter several aspects have been listed of the guest worker migration that affected the role of embassies and consulates. Whereas the scope of the guest worker migration increased towards the mid-1970s, the nature of the migration changed as the number of families of guest workers who migrated to the Netherlands increased. The arrival of guest workers and later their family members led to issues, especially regarding the arrangement of housing. The visa requirement in 1968 led to the illegalization of the former ‘spontaneous’ migrants which resulted in issues related to restrictions for migrants. For this reason, 1968 is an important turning point for the role of embassies and consulates regarding the migration of Turks and Moroccans to the Netherlands. In the next chapters, the above mentioned aspects will be analyzed and discussed in relation to the findings in the sources.

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97 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 122.
Before the recruitment agreement was signed with Turkey in 1964, several Dutch companies already had employed Turkish guest workers in their factory, harbor, workplace or mines.\(^98\) This means that these workers had either travelled from Turkey to the Netherlands (on a tourist visa) or via another country.\(^99\) A study from 1985 shows that almost half of the Turkish guest workers had already worked in another country before coming to the Netherlands.\(^100\) Another possibility was that Turkish men had been directly hired by a Dutch firm.\(^101\) This chapter discusses the role of the Dutch embassy and consulate in Turkey regarding the migration and recruitment of Turkish workers from the early 1960s until 1969. The recruitment agreement that was signed with Turkey in 1964 and the visa requirement that was implemented in 1968 mark important changes in the development of the worker migration.\(^102\)

### 3.1 The Onset: First Turkish Applicants

Turkish applicants who wanted to be recruited to the Netherlands had to request a visa and approval of a work permit at the Dutch embassy in Ankara or the consulate in Istanbul. The first individual applications for recruitment of Turkish workers were sent to and handled by the embassy in cooperation with the consulate. The latter is illustrated in a letter from the ambassador J.M. Devers in Ankara to the consul L.B. van Straten in Istanbul in October 1962. The letter contains a question from a father who was looking for information about his son who, supposedly, worked and resided in the Netherlands. Devers asked Van Straten whether he knows if, and where, the Turkish young man named Mustafa Topcuoglu was employed in the Netherlands. Van Straten responded that he did not know who or where this man was and noted that he would have known this if Mustafa had been officially recruited: ‘If he had indeed departed for the Netherlands with a work contract, he would have had to register with me to legalize this contract.’\(^103\)

\(^98\) Van Eijk, ‘De werving van gastarbeiders als resulante’, 100.
\(^100\) Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan*, 267.
\(^101\) Akgündüz, ‘Een analytische studie naar de arbeidsmigratie van Turkije naar West-Europa’, 105.
\(^102\) Castles, ‘The Guest-Worker in Western Europe – An Obituary’, 763.
\(^103\) NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 119. (‘Indien hij op een arbeidscontract naar Nederland vertrokken zou zijn, dan had hij zich voor de legalisering van dit contract bij mij gemeld moeten hebben.’)
To employ a foreign worker, a Dutch employer needed to request a work permit at the employment organization of MOPSHA in the Netherlands which is the institution that provided the work permits. The same rule applied for workers who had come on their own initiative to the Netherlands. When they had found a job, their employer requested their work permit from the employment organization of the MOPSHA. In addition to requests from Dutch employers who wanted to hire Turkish workers, the MOPSHA in the Netherlands also received requests from Turkish workers who had not been recruited by a Dutch firm yet. The workers asked for a work permit for a job at a Dutch company so they could issue their approval at the embassy and travel to the Netherlands as a labor migrant. From a letter to the MFA by the Minister of MOPHSA W.G. Roolvink, it can be derived that the requests from Turkish workers increased from 1962 onwards. Roolvink wrote in October of 1962 that he had seen an increasing number of requests from Turkish laborers for placements at a company in the Netherlands. Roolvink mentioned that there were also private employment agents in Turkey who were recruiting an increasing number of Turkish applicants who wished to work in the Netherlands. Despite the latter, Roolvink stressed that he deemed a recruitment agreement between the Netherlands and Turkey not necessary. In 1962, the demand for Turkish guest workers was apparently still not significant enough for Roolvink to determine that it should be regulated through a recruitment agreement. However, Roolvink progressively asked the Dutch embassies and consulates for assistance and advice with the increasing influx of Turkish workers to the Netherlands.

These requests for assistance and advice were mainly due to the fact that Dutch employers did not always request the MOPSHA to arrange the recruitment of Turkish workers. Instead, to avoid the often lengthy as well as costly procedure, many employers sent private or individual recruiters (so-called ‘ronselaars’) to travel to Turkey to recruit workers for them. In his letter, Roolvink named three major companies in the Netherlands (the Kellogg Company, Grasso and Koninklijke Maatschappij voor Havenwerken) that recruited Turkish workers. These companies had already established relations in Turkey, and they took on the responsibility of recruiting these Turkish workers. Roolvink reassured the MFA in his letter that these ‘incidental applications’ fell under his duties and that they would be arranged in a

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104 NL-HaNA, Justitie / Vreemdelingenzaken AJZ, 2.09.52, inv. nr.: 376.
105 Ibid. For the recruitment of foreign workers, the Dutch companies first had to seek the permission from the MOPHSA. With this rule, the Dutch government sought to control the recruitment of guest workers. See: Roosblad, Vakbonden en immigranten in Nederland, 40-43.
106 These recruiters were active in Turkey as well as in the European countries and often operated without the (official) knowledge and approval of the Dutch government. See: Tinnemans, Een gouden armband, 65, 83.
good manner.\textsuperscript{107} However, many Dutch firms that did request workers via the MOPSHA, Roolvink notes, were not comfortable without knowing the background and suitability of the foreign workers for the job. Roolvink gave four examples of individual applications he had received earlier, to show the MFA that complementary information such as marriage certificates, medical health certificates and police records of these men were desired before they would be recruited to the Netherlands. For this reason, Roolvink asked the minister of MFA to send an inquiry to the ambassador in Ankara to see if he could provide information on all individual Turkish applicants who requested work placement in the Netherlands, or, if the ambassador could advise and direct him about where to obtain these data.\textsuperscript{108} Herewith, Roolvink in fact asked for a greater involvement of the embassy in the recruitment of Turkish workers to the Netherlands. Roolvink did not deem a recruitment agreement with Turkey necessary with which these procedures could be arranged, but asked if the embassies and consulates could handle these matters. That the embassies and consulates took on these tasks is proven by the fact that many letters from the MOPSHA hereafter, contained similar requests as well as letters from the embassy in which these requests were granted. Whereas initially their role was limited to arranging visas and approvals of work permits for Turkish guest workers, the embassies and consulates increasingly received requests related to the recruitment of guest workers.

3.2 Expanding Duties and Increasing Requests for the Ambassador and Consul

The majority of Turkish guest workers were not recruited via the ‘official channels’. Between 1964 and 1968 approximately 66 percent of Turkish workers migrated without any arrangement by Dutch companies or the government.\textsuperscript{109} Because the approval of work permits was the prime task of the consulate, one would expect that embassies and consulates would not have to deal with spontaneous migrants. From the letters it appears, however, that embassies and consulates were not only busy with the admission of workers migrants to the Netherlands, but also with several checks on individuals who were already working in the Netherlands (this included information on spontaneous migrants). The ‘extra’ procedures the embassies and consulates were required to undertake, had mainly to do with the fact that several tests and documents of

\textsuperscript{107} NL-HaNA, Justitie / Vreemdelingenzaken AJZ, 2.09.52, inv. nr.: 376.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Van Eijl, Tussenland, 57.
individual applicants needed to be verified (such as medical health checks and marriage certificates) before a worker could be recruited to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{110} In principal, the employment agencies in Turkey could have provided this information but this was only arranged after the recruitment agreement with Turkey was signed. Prior to 1964 therefore, the verification of documents had become the task of embassies and consulates. The background of Turkish workers could only be checked by the consulate if this was needed, because the consulate had access to citizen’s records in Turkey. Drafting these documents or checking whether present documents were legal was a costly and time-consuming duty for the consul. On top of this, from several letters in the archives, it appears that the procedures in Turkey (as well as Morocco) generally took longer because the data in the system was often incomplete and not well organized.

As Roolvink at the end of 1962 spoke of ‘incidental requests’ for work permits from Turkish workers, this changed tremendously a year later when the number of requests from Turkish applicants had grown to thousands. The ambassador and consuls increasingly received more requests to arrange various types of documents for Turkish migrant workers to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{111} It appears, that the exact role the embassies and consulate were asked to fulfill became less clear as the influx of Turkish guest workers to the Netherlands grew. As the number of Turkish guest workers increased towards the mid-1960s, various issues arose regarding the recruitment and incorporation of the workers into Dutch society. These problems were primarily the shortage of housing, public health issues and the ‘social adjustments’ that guest workers experienced. This was specifically applicable to spontaneous migrants who generally did not have arranged housing by Dutch employers. In addition, spontaneous migrants failed to undergo medical testing and some of these workers appeared to be infected with tuberculosis.\textsuperscript{112}

In a letter from the MOPHSA to the MFA in 1963 for instance, the director of MOPSHA referred to a director of a company who noted the incidence of Turkish workers who were infected with the disease of tuberculosis at the oil refinery in the Botlek area in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{113} A copy of this letter was sent to the Dutch embassy and consulate in Turkey. In the letter, the director of MOPSHA emphasized the importance of the health of migrant workers, especially regarding potentially contagious diseases. The director asked the MFA to

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\textsuperscript{110} Tinnemans, \textit{Een gouden armband}, 64.
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\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, 63; Bouras, \textit{Het land van herkomst}, 64-66.
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\textsuperscript{112} Tinnemans, \textit{Een gouden armband}, 69.
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\textsuperscript{113} The Botlek is the largest harbor- and industry area situated in Rotterdam. It is the region with the most oil refineries and chemical plants of the Netherlands since 1954, and one of the areas in which large groups of guest workers were employed.
\end{flushleft}
ensure that the Consulate-General in Istanbul could require all Turkish men who were recruited to the Netherlands to receive the proper medical testing prior to their arrival in the Netherlands. The director explained to the MFA that, before issuing an acknowledgment of employment, he wanted the consulate in Istanbul to first contact the service of MOPHSA in order to assure that a permit should indeed be granted to the person in question.\footnote{NL-HaNA, Justitie / Vreemdelingenzaken AJZ, 2.09.52, inv.nr. 376.} He emphasized thereafter the importance of a health inspection for the workers before they would leave for the Netherlands. As the director stressed: ‘If possible, I would like to see that these issues are controlled by the Dutch representatives in Turkey.’\footnote{Ibid. (‘Indien zulks mogelijk is, zou ik gaarne zien, dat het toezicht op een en ander ook door de Nederlandse vertegenwoordiging in Turkije zou plaatsvinden.’).} This letter indicates that when issues concerning guest workers arose, the Dutch employers were to report this to the MOPSHA, who would in turn pass this on to the ambassador and consul in Turkey. The director of MOPSHA expected the consul to be willing and able to play a role as supervisor concerning the medical health checks for Turkish guest workers. The role of the consul thus changed again as he was charged with yet another task namely making sure that medical health checks for guest workers were executed as well as checked before their arrival in the Netherlands.

### 3.3 Inquiries for a Better Regulation of the Worker Migration

Requests received by the ambassador and consul for documents and personal information about Turkish workers continued to increase. By 1963, as evidenced by the growing number of documents in the archives concerning these requests, the ambassador and consul were apparently occupied with these matters to such a degree that they proposed and asked the Dutch government to turn the responsibility for such requests to other institutions. In September 1963, Consul Van Straten wrote to ambassador J.M. Devêrs about issuing the approval of work permits for Turkish workers.\footnote{Ibid.} Van Straten referred to an earlier letter he had received from MOPSHA in which he was asked to first contact the Dutch Employment Organization in The Hague before issuing the approval of work permits for workers in Turkey. He explained to Devêrs that the company *Vedeka Schoenfabrieken N.V.* (a shoe factory) had approached him about the fact that the Dutch Alien Police had confirmed that the Employment organization had given approval for a work permit for the Turkish worker Günaydin Yar. To expedite the procedure, the shoe factory requested a work permit for Günaydin Yar who was still in Turkey even though the MOPSHA as a rule, only gave a work permit once the person had arrived in

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\footnote{Ibid.}
the Netherlands. Van Straten mentioned that he had received several similar requests from Dutch employers. He therefore asked if Devèrs would approach the management of the employment organization of MOPSHA in The Hague to see if they could fulfill this request. As he states: ‘To request the regional employment agencies to provide work permits for Turkish workers whose presence in the Netherlands is no objection, even if this worker has not yet arrived in the Netherlands.’\textsuperscript{117} The consul thus in fact requested (via the ambassador) for Dutch employment organizations and regional employment agencies in the Netherlands to liberalize their policy regarding the work permits. In the response to Van Straten, Devèrs mentioned that he had indeed requested the matter, but he had yet to receive an answer. He emphasized that, before any changes would be made, Van Straten should still only issue statements on the basis of work permits. Van Straten and Devèrs apparently initiated a change but were forced to wait for an official approval of the Dutch government. This indicates that, despite the growing number of tasks regarding worker migrants, the ambassador and consul did not have the leeway to change the procedure regarding the guest worker recruitment. The continual requests by the ambassador and consul did, however, seem to instigate a change in the recruitment procedures for Turkish workers.

If a foreign worker in the Netherlands was not in possession of a work permit and medical health certificate, he was considered ‘illegal’ and was deported from the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{118} The fact that the Dutch government actually took these measures proves (as was extensively discussed in the Dutch and Turkish press) the event in which 62 Turks were sent from Amsterdam back to Turkey due to a lack of valid work permits and medical health certificates.\textsuperscript{119} The deportation of these Turkish workers was one of the examples cited by the ambassador in a letter to the MFA in which he asked the Dutch government to create a more organized and manageable system to regulate the influx of migrant workers.\textsuperscript{120} In fact, in 1963, a rather extensive correspondence between Dutch authorities in the Netherlands and Dutch representatives in Turkey was related to the quest for improvements in the system for recruiting workers from Turkey. Apparently, the number of requests the embassies and consulates received and matters they had to resolve had grown to such an extent that they no longer wished (or were able) to handle these matters.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. (‘De gewestelijke arbeidsbureaus te verzoeken ten behoeve van de Turkse arbeiders, tegen wier toelating in Nederland geen bezwaar bestaat, een werkvergunning aan de werkgever af te geven, ook al is de werknemer nog niet in Nederland gearriveerd.’).
\textsuperscript{118} Timemans, \textit{Een gouden armband}, 87, 159.
\textsuperscript{119} NL-HaNA, Justitie / Vreemdelingenzaken AJZ, 2.09.52, inv.nr. 376.
\textsuperscript{120} NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 119.
In August of 1963, ambassador Devèrs in Ankara sent a letter to the MFA in which he mentioned that he had received several requests from Turkish workers for a work permit for the Netherlands, and that the number of these requests had risen considerably. He explained that the applicants referred to circulating rumors among the ‘Turkish work force’ that the Netherlands was looking for large numbers of Turkish workers. These workers also mentioned that similar reports had appeared in the Turkish press (Devèrs notes that he unfortunately did not have this confirmed). Conjointly, several applicants had shown letters from Dutch employers, who declared that they would like to hire the workers for their companies and who had advised (and attempted to persuade) them to come to the Netherlands. Some Turks even had letters from private employment agencies in Germany, who directed them (by name and address) to Dutch companies who were looking for Turkish workers.\(^{121}\) Devèrs continued his report by noting that there was a regular flow of workers from Turkey who headed for Germany and Belgium. He stated that, for Turkish laborers seeking work abroad, there would likely be no significant difference between these countries and the Netherlands.\(^{122}\) The ambassador indicated herewith, that he feared the number of Turkish workers coming to the Netherlands would further increase. At the end of the letter he explicitly asked the MFA, also on behalf of consul Van Straten, to send him a response to his letter as soon as possible; ‘to make a decision regarding the establishment of an administrative procedure to handle the stated influx of workers’.\(^{123}\) The ambassador did not only request an answer from the MFA but also from the Director-General of the Employment agency of the MOPSHA. Devèrs concluded that if an official arrangement were to be made regarding the migrant worker flow from Turkey to the Netherlands, he and the consul could redirect part of the recruitment procedure to the Dutch and Turkish Employment organizations.\(^{124}\) This would mean that the ambassador and consul would only be responsible for approving the work permits (which remained the official rule until 1968) and not be occupied with the application of and requests from Turkish workers.\(^{125}\)

In another letter dated September 9\(^{\text{th}}\) 1963, the ambassador and consul jointly wrote to the MOPSHA in The Hague. In this letter, they again made a request for a decision about implementing and regulating the increasing administrative procedures. They stressed that they no longer wished to be involved with arranging work permits, but would rather only issue

\(^{121}\) Ibid.

\(^{122}\) NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 20.

\(^{123}\) Ibid. (‘om een dicisie te verkrijgen omtrent het vastleggen van een procedure inzake het administratief behandelen van de onderhavige arbeidersstroom’).

\(^{124}\) Ibid.

\(^{125}\) Bouras, Het land van herkomst, 43.
documents when the workers already had a work permit at their disposal, provided by the Dutch employment organization in The Hague. They added that if the Turkish workers did not have this permit, they should ask their future Dutch employers to send them these documents. They ended the letter with: ‘Let us hope that a quick and simple, official procedure between the Netherlands and Turkey can be set forth, which would save your consulate-general and the office of the ambassador a great deal of unnecessary work.’\textsuperscript{126} Herewith, it is clear that the ambassador and consul were strongly demanding a change in the procedure regarding the increasing applications and the recruitment of Turkish migrant workers.

The ambassador and consul were not the only ones who requested a different procedure regarding the work permits for Turkish workers. A Turkish employment organization also asked the Dutch government to no longer have the work permits arranged by the consulates. Devèrs explained the Turkish Employment Organization (İŞKUR) had made several objections against the approval of work permits by the Dutch consulate. This organization, the ambassador subtly noted in the letter, probably wishes to control the selection of applicants (to avoid the best Turkish workers from leaving for the Netherlands). In 1963, the requests of the ambassador and consul and the employment agencies in Turkey for a better regulation of the procedure amounted in the decision of the Dutch government that the approval of work permits should no longer by handled by the Dutch consulate but be executed by the employment agencies. In a letter dated the 26th of November 1963, addressed to the consul in Istanbul J. Van’t Hooft, ambassador Devèrs in Ankara informs the consul about this decision. Devèrs explains to Van’t Hooft that he no longer had to issue documents to Turkish workers who requested a work permit for the Netherlands. The ambassador noted that henceforth, the migration of Turkish workers shall be arranged between ISKUR and its ‘Dutch counterpart; the Employment organization in The Hague.’\textsuperscript{127}

The ambassador had not made this decision independently but had asked the MOPSHA and MFA for an approval on the proposed procedure for work permits. Prior to the letter from Devèrs to Van Straten, there was correspondence between the Dutch ministries on the topic, which is also included in the archive. An archived copy of a letter from the Management of Employment of MOPSHA to the MFA shows the correspondence between the different

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid. (‘Laten we hopen dat binnenkort een eenvoudige officiële procedure tussen Nederland en Turkije kan worden vastgelegd, waardoor aan Uw Consulaat-Generaal en de kanselarij deze Ambassade veel nutteloos werk zal worden bespaard.’).

\textsuperscript{127} NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 119.
ministries and Devèrs. The representative from MOPSHA wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that he agreed with the proposed procedure from ‘his Majesty’s ambassador in Ankara’ to have the requests from Turkish workers handled by employment organizations in Turkey and the Netherlands. He asked if the ambassador could inform and ask IŞKUR to cooperate with the Dutch employment organization. As he stated: ‘If the mentioned organization is in principle willing to this, I will gladly get in direct correspondence with them regarding the procedure to be followed with the placement of Turkish workers in our country.’ The aspect of worker migration that dealt with applications from Turkish workers thus shifted from the diplomatic institutions to employment organizations.

The events mentioned above indicate that a clear procedure with regard to the recruitment of workers from Turkey prior to 1964 had not been established yet and that the significance of labor migration from Turkey was not (yet) been fully anticipated or controlled by the Dutch government. The letters discussed, show that the scope of the worker migration from Turkey changed as the influx of workers grew extensively towards 1965. The ambassador and consul received many ‘additional’ tasks and were thus involved in an increasing number of issues that fell outside of their normal duties. In this sense, the role of embassies and consulates regarding the migration of Turkish workers to the Netherlands expanded and became more important as 1964 neared. For this reason, they repeatedly asked the Dutch government for a more efficiently organized system. In this way, ambassadors and consulates seemed to have played a role in the realization of the recruitment agreement with Turkey, as this was drafted and signed in 1964. It also shows that the embassies and consulates were not content with handling the extra tasks in relation to migrant workers and wanted to hand this over to other organizations. After the recruitment agreement was signed, the procedure of Turkish labor recruitment to the Netherlands was (officially) regulated. The recruitment, provision and approval of work permits were thereafter handled by the employment agencies in Turkey (which had been established by the Netherlands in the recruitment countries).

128 Ibid.
129 Ibid. (‘Indien genoemde instantie hiertoe in principe bereid is, treed ik gaarne rechtstreeks met haar in correspondentie omtrent de te volgen werkwijze bij de plaatsingen van Turkse arbeiders in ons land.’).
131 Tinnemans, Een gouden armband, 159.
3.4 Preference for Unmarried Guest Workers

In addition to the applications from guest workers, family migration also became a progressively larger part of the duties the embassies and consulates were required to fulfill regarding the worker migration. An important practical objection to family migration was that there was a considerable shortage of housing in the urban areas in the Netherlands.\(^\text{132}\) Policymakers and employers in the Netherlands therefore had a preference for unmarried guest workers who could be ‘placed’ in boarding houses and barracks.\(^\text{133}\) Soon, however, this requirement was withdrawn because it appeared difficult for the Netherlands to attract workers as opposed to countries who did not implement this requirement.\(^\text{134}\) In 1961, the waiting period for guest workers outside the EEG to have their families join them was set at two years.\(^\text{135}\) For this reason, a growing function of the consulate was to check and approve the temporary residence permits for wives and children of guest workers who migrated to the Netherlands. A letter from 1962 from the company *Altraco N.V.* in Vlaardingen near Rotterdam (a meat-industry company) to the consulate in Istanbul contained a request for an entry visa for (the undetermined temporary stay) for the wife of one of his employees, Osman Eyyilmaz. It seems clear from the letter that it was a standard request, because the writer mentioned (on behalf) of *Altraco* that mister Eryilmaz had been working for two continuous years in the Netherlands. The consul in Istanbul was requested to provide ‘permission for residence’ for the relatives (wives and children) of the Turkish workers who had lived and worked for at least 2 years in the Netherlands.\(^\text{136}\) The consul indeed approved the request.\(^\text{137}\) In addition to these tasks, the ambassador and consul were also approached with requests from Dutch ministries and employers, as well as individual applicants.

The companies that hired the Turkish workers also asked the ambassador or consul for advice or information on the Turkish people working for them. An example is a letter that was written by the assistant director H.F.W. Bantje from the Dutch *Van Nelle* Factory (a large coffee, tea and tobacco manufacturing plant in Rotterdam) to the ambassador in Ankara. The letter is dated February 16\(^\text{th}\) 1965. Bantje wrote that at the *Van Nelle* factory, 70 Turkish

\(^{\text{132}}\) Ibid., 71-72.
\(^{\text{133}}\) Obdeijn and Schrover, *Komen en gaan*, 270.
\(^{\text{134}}\) Ibid., 271.
\(^{\text{136}}\) NL-HaN\(\text{A}, \text{Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 314.}
\(^{\text{137}}\) Requests for family migration did not always run this smooth, however. A newspaper article of 1968 for instance, reports the case of two Turkish women who were sent back to Turkey when appeared that a stamp (that the Dutch consul in Istanbul supposed to have provided) was missing on their official documents. See: ‘Turkse vrouwen mochten toch niet naar ons land’ *De Waarheid*, September 5 (1968).
workmen were hired through the Job Placement Office at The Hague (MOPSHA). The letter concerned 4 of these men, who claimed they were married and requested family allowances for their wives and children in Turkey. Initially, the Turkish men had signed a contract in which they had stated they were unmarried. However, when they arrived in the Netherlands they had declared that they were actually married. He asked the ambassador if he could check to see if these men were registered in the civil register as married or unmarried.

About a week later, on the 24th of June, the ambassador replied with a letter stating that he had requested the information from the director Mr. Chultz, from the Dutch employment agency based in Ankara. Several Dutch employment agencies that had settled in Ankara from 1964 onwards should have indeed been able to provide such information as the applicants had registered at these offices. The ambassador noted that Chultz informed him that the Turkish workmen had most likely been afraid they would not be hired if they disclosed beforehand that they were married and had therefore stated that they were unmarried. The ambassador further mentioned that it is a very difficult job to ascertain the marital status of these men because Turkey has no central civil register. This data is registered by neighborhood, and, the ambassador adds, experience had taught him that correspondence with the neighborhood registration generally leads nowhere. He explained to Bantje that every Turk that is legally married owns a marriage certificate. Thus, he advised Bantje to ask the 4 Turkish men to show these certificates or to have them sent from Turkey. The ambassador concluded his letter by stating that in the meantime, the will attempt to obtain the necessary information from the neighborhoods of the 4 men.

What this correspondence shows is that the role of the embassy was still important, in particular with regard to the Turkish guest workers in the Netherlands. Even though the consulates and embassies were no longer in charge of the administrative process of the recruitment of Turkish workers to the Netherlands, they were apparently still the first contact between employers and workers. In addition, even though in principal Turkish workers could not be refused after 1961, it seems that the employment agencies still selected workers based on criteria such as marital status as evidenced by the fact that the 4 men mentioned above had lied during the registration process.

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138 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 119.
139 Ibid.
140 Timmenmans, Een gouden armband, 83.
141 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 314.
3.5 Social Insurance Treaty

As the representative of the Dutch government, the ambassador was the first point of contact with the Government and authorities of the receiving country. A remarkably lengthy correspondence between the embassy in Ankara and various Dutch institutions revolved around the topic of drafting and signing the Social Insurance Treaty between the Netherlands and Turkey.\textsuperscript{142} This process started in December of 1965 with a Dutch concept of the Treaty. The realization of this Treaty, and henceforth the correspondence to and from the ambassador in Ankara, appeared to be a lengthy process. This was partly due to the ‘inert responses’ from the Turkish government (as the ambassador expressed in the letters). In a letter from the embassy in Ankara (signed by C.G. Verdonck Huffnagel, Counsellor) to the MFA in December of 1966, Verdonck Huffnagel explained: ‘The Turkish draft was offered without any note or explanation and was sent to me after I had to insist on this many times.’\textsuperscript{143} The role of Verdonck Huffnagel within this process was primarily as ‘the middleman’ who would officially announce (and urge) the Turkish government to accept the decisions and ratifications of the Treaty as the Dutch government drafted them, and vice versa. In addition to ‘briefing’ the official decisions from one government to the other, Verdonck Huffnagel also sent photo copies of the documents and was the person who passed information from either the Dutch or the Turkish government to the other when they wanted to append or amend the Treaty.

Furthermore, a number of aspects were understood differently by the Turkish government as to the way in which the Dutch government typically handled matters such as formulating a treaty. For instance, in one letter from a Dutch minister to the embassy in February, 1966 it appears that the ambassador was the (only) person who was entitled to sign a Treaty even though it was ratified by both governments. The Turkish ambassador was apparently not abreast of the Dutch rule that every treaty in a foreign nation must be signed by the ambassador, and not by a minister. The Turkish ambassador had already made travel plans for the Dutch minister Veldkamp of the MOPHSA to travel to Turkey because he expected the Dutch minister to sign the treaty in Ankara. As Veldkamp writes: ‘You understand that during the verbal introduction of the document that was to be presented, I appeared extremely questionable because we principally adhere to the rule that the signing of agreements in foreign

\textsuperscript{142} NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 120.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. (‘Het Turkse ontwerp werd mij zonder nota of nadere toelichting aangeboden en werd mij toegezonden nadat ik vele malen daarop heb moeten aandringen’.)
countries be done by our highest diplomatic representative.’ He further explained that the Turkish ambassador was somewhat disturbed by this message and had explained he had not known this was the Dutch rule. The Ambassador in Ankara signed the Treaty in April 1966 (accompanied by minister Veldkamp who still took his trip to Turkey). The ambassador sent a report of this event to the MFA that listed which Dutch and Turkish officials were present and he explained that the day was closed with a diner at his house. This all occurred in 1966 and it would take until February of 1968 for the Social Insurance Treaty to be officially ratified by both governments. The position held by Verdonck Huffnagel, as well as his role as mediator between both governments shows that the embassy also played a (crucial) role in the handling of official agreements between the Netherlands and Turkey regarding guest workers in the Netherlands.

One of the topics the Social Insurance treaty incorporated was Social Health Insurance. Often, immigrant organizations helped the guest workers and their families to understand and receive rights such as these. During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of Turkish immigrant organizations arose in the Netherlands. Initially, these organizations were strongly focused on the country of origin because their stay in the Netherlands was thought to be temporary. Already in 1935, a Dutch-Turkish association (the Nederlandsch-Turksche Vereeniging) had been founded, under the auspices of Queen Wilhelmina and President Atatürk. In 1968, the Nederlandsch-Turksche Vereeniging wrote a letter to ‘the gentlemen of the embassy in Ankara’ with a question regarding the health insurance for the wives and children of Turkish guest workers in the Netherlands. As an example of the repeated requests from companies and Turkish guest workers to clarify the issue (and to stress the importance of the situation), the writer enclosed a letter from a Turkish worker who requested health insurance for his wife and children in Turkey. It appears, as was explained in the letter, that when a guest worker in the Netherlands requested health insurance for his wife or children in Turkey, this request first went to the SSK (the Turkish public Social Health Insurance). However, he mentioned that the Turkish national health insurance department apparently had problems with arranging this verification and asked the ambassador if he could verify with the SSK what the difficulties were.

144 Ibid. (‘U begrijpt dat ik na de mondelinge inleiding van de te overhandigen nota uitermate bedenkelijk heb gekeken en de ambassadeur heb uiteengezet dat wij in beginsel vasthouden aan de regel dat ondertekening van overeenkomsten in het buitenland geschiedt door onze hoogste diplomatieke vertegenwoordiger.’)
145 Ibid.
146 Penninx and Schrover, Bastion of bindmiddel?, 12.
exactly and why there was a delay in their response. The way in which the ambassador was asked to help, reveals the degree to which the spokesperson of the *Nederlandsch-Turksche Vereeniging* trusted the ambassador to be able and willing to get this sorted for Turkish guest workers who requested the verification of insurance for their wives and children. As he remarked: ‘It appears that the further developments in Ankara have been delayed which for us is reason to contact you by telephone and also in writing to ask you to use your influence to speed up the process regarding the developing issues that affect our Turkish employees.’

Even though the administrative handling of the procedure for recruitment had been ‘transferred’ to the Employment agencies, the ambassador continued to play an important part in the recruitment of Turkish guest workers.

### 3.6 After 1968 – Visa Requirement

Frequently, applicants had to wait a number of years after submitting their employment application for permission and recruitment to work abroad. Therefore, despite the good conditions of employment and benefits that workers received when they were officially recruited, many Turkish guest workers came to the Netherlands without an official recruitment procedure. As has been previously demonstrated, over the course of the 1960s the Dutch government had taken measures (the recruitment procedures and agreements) to control and regulate the entrance and residence of guest workers in the Netherlands. Despite these regulations, however, many foreign worker still travelled to the Netherlands as spontaneous migrants. As Will Tinnemans noted: ‘The government had everything arranged so well in the recruitment agreements, but in reality, the influx of spontaneous migrants brought down this whole policy’. Until 1968, the Dutch government allowed spontaneous migrants to reside in the Netherlands on a tourist visa. Actually, the Dutch government motivated companies to hire foreign workers for their companies because in this way, a number of lengthy and often complicated (as well as costly) recruitment procedures were then avoided. However, the official recruitment procedure via the government was meant for the poorest laborers, for whom working in Western Europe was their only hope and way to escape from the misery they

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148 Ibid. (‘Het schijnt, dat de verdere afwikkeling in Ankara wordt opgehouden, voor ons een reden om u heden telefonisch en nu schriftelijk te verzoeken, uw invloed aan te wenden om t.b.v. onze Turkse werknemers de afwikkeling van deze kwestie te bespoedigen.’)

149 Tinnemans, *Een gouden armband*, 64.

150 Ibid., 82. (‘De overheid had het allemaal zo mooi geregeld in de wervingsakkoorden, maar de praktijk van de spontane toestroom haalde dat hele beleid onderuit.’).

suffered in their homeland. In Turkey for instance, there were long waiting lists for worker migrants (with millions of applicants) in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{152} A study from 1965 showed that large discrepancies arose between the registrations of applications at the employments agencies and the number of residence permits as issued by the Dutch Alien Police. The new ‘vreemdelingenarbeiderswet’ (Law for Foreign Labor) brought change to the latter. In 1964, the ‘Wet Arbeidsvergunning Vreemdelingen’ (Law Work Permits for Foreigners) replaced the Law for Foreign Labor. With this new law, the migration of workers from outside the European Union was regulated by a system of residence permits and work permits.\textsuperscript{153} This law was less restrictive than the preceding one, and brought about a number of changes for foreign workers. The new law determined different residence ‘titles’; temporary (for foreigners that stayed less than 6 months) and there were several residence permits for ‘onbepaalde duur’ (indefinite duration) which was related to the duration of the contract the workers were offered by Dutch employers. All foreigners with a residence ‘title’ and a valid passport could to be admitted to the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter showed that as the worker migration progressed, the embassies and consulates were increasingly involved with the migration of Turkish workers to the Netherlands. Initially, seemingly without question, the embassy and consulate in Turkey played a role in the worker migration by providing information and assistance with the recruitment of Turkish workers. The MOPSHA, Dutch employers, organizations and also individual Turkish applicants requested (and expected) the help of the embassies and consulates in various matters. As these requests grew extensively, so did the requests from the ambassador and consul towards the Dutch government who repeatedly asked for a better regulated system in which they were less burdened with matters concerning Turkish applicants. It can be concluded that these requests contributed to two important changes: 1) that the recruitment of workers and approval of work permits was redirected and assigned to employment agencies in 1963, and, 2) that the official recruitment agreement with Turkey was signed in 1964. Remarkably, the recruitment agreement did not significantly seem to ‘decrease’ the involvement of the embassy and

\textsuperscript{152} Tinnemans, \textit{Een gouden armband}, 65.
\textsuperscript{153} Obdeijn and Schrover, \textit{Komen en gaan}, 269. This law replaced the ‘Foreigners law’ of 1934, which was aimed at limiting the access of foreign workers.
\textsuperscript{154} Remarkably, nowhere in the law is it stated that foreigners without a residence title had to be deported. Also, foreigners who received an ‘unfavorable decision’ could ask the minister for a revision. When waiting for the decision, the foreigner could not be deported. Van Eijl, \textit{Tussenland}, 51.
consulate regarding the worker migration. Their occupations regarding Turkish migrant workers in fact expanded and further increased as the number of Turkish workers in the Netherlands continued to increase. This can be accredited to the fact that they were more and more busy with checking various kinds of information on Turkish guest works who were already working in the Netherlands, of which at least half these workers were spontaneous migrants. Interestingly, the role of the ambassador and consul seemed to be equally occupied with spontaneous migrants as they were with officially recruited migrants, and their tasks increasingly shifted from the migration of workers in Turkey to the functioning of Turkish guest workers in the Netherlands. This is important to note because, as a result, embassies and consulates were occupied with provision and verification of documents for two different groups of labor migrants: those who migrated to the Netherlands and for those as who already resided in the Netherlands. In the last chapter the change in the role of embassies and consulates are discussed in relation to changes that took place regarding the regulation and restrictions for migrant workers from 1970-1975. First we turn to the analyses of the Dutch embassies and consulates in Morocco in the period from 1963, when the first Moroccan workers were recruited, until 1969.
4 - Recruitment and Migration of Moroccan Workers (1963-1969)

Morocco was one of the last countries (of eight in total) with whom the Netherlands signed a recruitment agreement in 1969 (only followed by Yugoslavia and Tunisia in 1970). In the archives, information about the period from 1960 to 1963 is scarce. The Dutch embassy in Rabat and the Consulate-General in Casablanca were apparently not dealing with notable numbers of Moroccan workers to the Netherlands in the early years of the 1960s. However, as seen in the table in chapter 3, in the period from 1960-1965 the number of immigrants from Morocco increased by almost exactly the same number as Turkish immigrants (by 1965 there were over 5 thousand Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands). The number of Moroccan immigrants was thus nearly equal to that of the Turkish immigrants by 1965, even though the majority of Moroccans were admitted later, after the recruitment agreement with the Netherlands was signed in 1969. This also indicates that many Moroccan labor migrants came ‘spontaneously’ prior to 1969, especially from countries where they had already been working, such as France, Belgium and Algeria. This chapter will discuss the role of the ambassador and consul before the recruitment agreement was signed with Morocco in 1969. Important topics in the correspondence between the embassy and the Dutch government are the realization of a recruitment agreement and the forgery of documents.

4.1 Attempts to Realize the Recruitment Agreement

From April 1963 forward, the Moroccan authorities frequently approached the Dutch government with the request to regulate the recruitments of Moroccan workers to the Netherlands. The Moroccan MFA and authorities in Morocco, as well as the Moroccan ambassador in The Hague asked several times for a ‘test’ to send a group of Moroccans to the Dutch mines. The Dutch ambassador participated in these discussions of a recruitment agreement with Morocco mainly as mediator between the Moroccan and the Dutch authorities. One such instance was brought forward in a correspondence between the ambassador H. Goemans in Rabat to the Dutch MFA in April 1963. In this letter, Goemans asked if the Dutch government had made an official decision regarding the recruitment of Moroccan (mine) workers to the Netherlands. Apparently, the issue had already been discussed within the Dutch government. The MFA replied to Goemans, that he had asked the MOPHSA for advice on the

155 Bonjour, Grens en gezin, 50.
156 Bouras, Het land van herkomst, 44.
157 Ibid., 64.
matter. The MOPSHA responded in turn that they ‘deemed the recruitment of Moroccan workers to the Netherlands not yet appropriate’.\(^{158}\) The MOPHSA further mentioned that they would notify the ambassador in Rabat if the Dutch industrial sector (specifically the mining-industry in the south of the Netherlands) indicated an interest in hiring Moroccan workers.\(^{159}\)

From an earlier letter (also dated April, 1963) from Goemans to the MFA, it appears that the Moroccan MFA had approached the Dutch ambassador asking to mediate with their attempts to realize the recruitment Moroccan workers to the Netherlands. This idea emerged after the Moroccan authorities had heard about the difficulties that had arisen in the Dutch mines with Spanish guest workers. The Moroccan authorities promoted their workers by emphasizing the good reputation of Moroccan workers that were already working in neighboring countries of the Netherlands. They mentioned for instance, that Moroccans are known to be good and hard-workers in the Belgian mines and were generally higher-performing than Algerian guest workers in France.\(^{160}\) These arguments were considered by Ambassador Goemans, who reported these facts to the Dutch government. In the following year, Goemans sent several letters to the MFA in which he asked if a decision had been made regarding the recruitment and employment of Moroccans to the Netherlands. This seems remarkable, since the MOPHSA had announced earlier that there were not many Dutch companies that were interested in Moroccan workers at that time. The Moroccan authorities indeed evidently aimed to solidify the recruitment agreement with the Netherlands and pushed their wishes to and via the embassy. From the letters it is difficult to derive whether the Dutch ambassador deliberately chose to pass on the requests on to the Dutch government and to act on behalf of their interests or if he felt he was obliged or pressured to do so. In any case, the ambassador appeared to be actively involved in complying and meeting the requests of the Moroccan government by communicating and discussing their wishes with the Dutch government. The MFA answered ambassador Goemans in June of 1964 that a meeting within the Dutch government had been arranged concerning a possible recruitment agreement between the Netherlands and Morocco. From this meeting, it had again appeared that the interest of Dutch employers in hiring Moroccans was still small. Therefore, the Dutch government had decided not to enter into an official recruitment agreement with Morocco at that time. The MFA asked Goemans to notify

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\(^{158}\) NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 205.  
\(^{159}\) Ibid.  
\(^{160}\) Ibid.
the Moroccan authorities on the decision, which also showed that the discussions and negotiating of a recruitment agreement occurred via the embassy.\textsuperscript{161}

As long as there was no official recruitment agreement signed between the countries, the embassy had no official role regarding the recruitment of Moroccan workers to the Netherlands (or in handling the requests of these workers). The latter is clear in a letter from the commissioner of the embassy in Rabat to the company \textit{Wolf & Wolf N.V.} in Amsterdam. The letter discussed the case of a Moroccan worker, Zizi Nacer, who had reported to the embassy in Rabat with a letter from \textit{Wolf & Wolf N.V.} in which the director of this company had directed him to the embassy to obtain a work permit. On behalf of the ambassador, the commissioner told the director that this stemmed from a misunderstanding. He stressed that he was unable to provide any service to this man, because there was no recruitment agreement between the Netherlands and Morocco. As he explained: ‘The recruitment of workers from Morocco should therefore be provided by the future employer.’\textsuperscript{162} The commissioner informed the director of the Dutch company that he should turn to the Employment organization in the Netherlands. He further mentioned that the only mediation he could offer was to see if the necessary papers were correct (and if needed, to translate these papers) when Mr. Nacer went to the Moroccan authorities to obtain a passport to travel to the Netherlands. As indicated in the previous chapter, the Dutch ambassador and consuls in Turkey had implemented the policy changes that directed the applications of workers to no longer be processed via the embassy but via employment agencies. It seems that this was also applied to the Dutch embassy and consulates in Morocco around the same time. In addition, as was the case in Turkey, the extra duties of the Dutch ambassador regarding the provision and verification of information about Moroccans who applied for work in the Netherlands grew towards 1969.\textsuperscript{163} Several correspondences between the ambassador, consul and the MFA that were found in the archives, contain requests to the ambassador to provide information for or about individual Moroccans who worked in the Netherlands. In most cases, the topic concerned requests from Moroccan workers, either in the Netherlands or at the embassy in Rabat, to have papers signed as proof of the authenticity of these documents. The ambassador and consul, as well as the ministry of Justice and the MFA were in interaction in deciding and checking whether the papers of the person in question were indeed genuine or not.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{162} NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207. (‘De werving van arbeiders uit Marokko dient derhalve door de toekomstige werkgever zelf te worden verzorgd.’).
\textsuperscript{163} Bouras, \textit{Het land van herkomst}, 64.
In the second half of the 1960s, the ambassador and consul also frequently sent letters to the MFA inquiring about the ‘current state’ of the decision made on the recruitment agreement with Morocco. These letters also indicate that the Dutch political representatives did not always agree with each other on the matter. Attempts had been made to pass the recruitment agreement with Morocco, though until 1969 a definitive decision was never made. In October of 1966, State Secretary De Meyer had promised that the agreement would be concluded. Nevertheless, when the decision was presented to the council of ministers, a decision was in fact never made. In a letter (sender not mentioned) to the ambassador in Rabat, dated February 1967, the writer mentioned that a recruitment agreement with Morocco had not proceeded ‘for the umpteenth time’. The most important reason stated for the refusal to approve the agreement was that de Dutch industry (for the time being) still did not show much interest in Moroccan workers. Another reason mentioned was that the promise made by the State Secretary was made at the onset of the new elections in the Netherlands and politicians therefore had other priorities. The writer further noted that the recruitment agreement would probably be discussed in a meeting with the Ministry of social Affairs and Public housing, though as he adds, it would most likely only be discussed shortly and vaguely.¹⁶⁴

It can be derived from this correspondence, as well as from the letters discussed previously, that the Dutch government felt no immediate need to solidify a recruitment agreement with Morocco. The most mentioned reason for the reserved attitude of the Dutch government in concluding a recruitment agreement with Morocco was that there were not many Moroccans in the Netherlands and the Dutch industry had little interest in another group of guest workers. This changed in 1964, when the number of Moroccans doubled towards 1965. However, in almost every case this was due to Dutch employers who, on their own account, travelled to Morocco to recruit Moroccans for their companies. This process continued into the second half of the 1960s. Because of the latter, the Ministry of Social affairs could no longer ‘maintain the objection’ that the Dutch industry had little interest in Moroccan workers. However, the first serious preparations for a recruitment agreement would take place as late as 1968, when a delegation of government Officials travelled to Morocco to prepare the official negotiations on a recruitment agreement with Morocco.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207.
¹⁶⁵ Bouras, Het land van herkomst, 64-65.
4.2 Spontaneous Migrants from Morocco

Most Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands originated from the Rif (area in the north of Morocco). Most immigrants from this area came on their own initiative to the Netherlands (partly via Algeria, France and Belgium), whereas the Dutch companies mostly recruited Moroccan workers from the larger cities in Morocco. During the official recruitment period (which was from 1969 to 1973) very few Moroccans from the Rif area were recruited to the Netherlands. The official recruitment procedure via the recruitment agreement of Moroccans therefore played a limited role in the migration of Moroccan workers to the Netherlands.166 Moroccans were thus recruited relatively late, to work in the Netherlands compared to other countries. For this reason, they often ended up in sectors where they functioned as ‘rear guards’. This meant that they would often arrive in sectors in which from the date of their arrival, it was already clear that a large number of jobs would disappear.167 The Moroccans were recruited for short-term jobs and would leave when the factories closed.168

The employment agencies made lists with suitable candidates in different regions of Morocco on the basis of the number of applications, the demand of European employers, and the economic situation. Countries that recruited foreign laborers could make a choice of workers from these lists after which the workers received a medical examination. Despite these agreements, recruiters (ronselaars) actually travelled to the recruitment countries to recruit the workers themselves.169 However, as was the case with ‘spontaneous migrants’ from Turkey, until 1968 the Moroccans who came to the Netherlands on their own initiative could basically apply for a work permit once they found a job at a Dutch company. These migrants had to report to the Alien Police in the Netherlands and pay 500 guilders as a deposit for their journey back home when their contract ended or if they lost their job due to the closing of a factory or mine they worked for.170 Not every Moroccan could find a (legal) job however and secure their stay in the Netherlands. According to the MOJ, in 1966 approximately 200 guest workers per month were deported, and these were primarily Moroccans who had come to the Netherlands spontaneously. The spontaneous migrants had to save money for the trip to the Netherlands and

166 Cottaar et al, *Marokkanen in Nederland*, 47.
167 Ibid., 42.
168 Ibid. The idea of the recruitment of ‘rearguards’, was that the Dutch personnel had the opportunity to gradually search for a job elsewhere. In this way, the closing of the factories would ‘run smoothly’. This was the case for the example with the mines in Limburg (province in the south of the Netherlands). From 1963 to 1965 between 3 and 4 thousand Moroccans worked in these mines. When the decision was made to close the mines, the number of Moroccans decreased to 1600 in 1965.
for the 500 guilders as a deposit if they lost their job. In addition, they often needed money for ‘ronselaars’ who would provide the migrant with a job in the Netherlands for a sum of 100 to 200 guilders.  

171 Ambassador Karnebeek mentioned in February of 1966: ‘It is officiously known to me that many of the unemployed, who are to obtain an employment contract abroad turn to dubious intermediaries, who receive substantial sums of money to be cajoled, which are often much more than the (500 guilders deposit).’  

172 In addition to the number of increasing spontaneous (and illegal) guest workers, the number of cases of falsified contracts from employers that enabled a guest worker to receive a work permit also seemed to increase towards the 1970s. The issues related to illegal documents, in particular concerning those of Moroccan workers, have appeared several times in the media in the 1960s and 1970s.  

173 The illegal trade in contracts that were falsified therefore became a matter of concern for the MOPSHA that involved the embassy in Rabat in the matter.

4.3 False Contracts

In the second half of the 1960s, the MOPSHA became stricter in providing work permits to foreign workers.  

174 Apparently, a circulation of false contracts began to appear and this occurred according to a certain ‘pattern’. Contracts that were meant for employment seekers were intercepted on their way from the Department of International Employment Affairs of MOPSHA to the recruitment agencies abroad. These contracts were sold for 800 to 3000 guilders to (illegal) workers who resided in the Netherlands. According to sources, a trader of fixed contracts was in contact with the Employment Office in Morocco and also with other employment agencies.  

175 In the archives, several examples are found in the correspondence between the Dutch embassy and consulate(s) and Dutch ministries in which the authenticity of these contracts, as well as other admission documents was discussed.

Moroccan workers who were in possession of a contract from a Dutch firm and wanted to migrate to the Netherlands as labor migrant first needed to visit the embassy in Rabat to receive and approve a work permit. The Dutch Embassy in Rabat received numerous requests

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171 Ibid., 85.
172 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207 (‘Het is mij officious bekend dat de vele werkelozen, die zich tot twijfelachtige tussenpersonen tot het verkrijgen van een arbeidscontract in het buitenland wenden, hiervoor aanzienlijke sommen gelds worden afgetroggeld, welke de genoemde cautie (500 gulden waarborgsom) dikwijls vele malen te boven gaan.’).
173 Bouras, Het land van herkomst, 61.
174 Ibid., 43
175 Ibid., 61-64.
to approve these contracts from Moroccan workers.\textsuperscript{176} However, Karnebeek mentioned in one of his letters to the MFA in September of 1966 that it was certainly not always clear if these contracts were legal. Karnebeek noted that the General Director of MOPSHA had warned him that: ‘Dutch and foreign recruiters issue fraudulent contracts, often drafted in broken Dutch, to possibly Italian, Turkish and other workers.’\textsuperscript{177} The latter is further clarified in a correspondence entitled ‘Employment of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands’ that took place between the Ministry of Justice, the MFA and the embassies and consulates in Morocco in 1965.\textsuperscript{178} The first letter was sent from the head of the department of Immigration Service and Border Protection of the MOJ to the MFA, who wrote: ‘As you know, the number of Moroccan workers that have found employment in the Dutch industry, has greatly increased during the last months.’\textsuperscript{179} He continued to explain that these men needed to be able to show an excerpt from the Moroccan police record, as well as a medical health certificate and pay a deposit in an amount of 500 guilders.\textsuperscript{180} He stressed that this was due to several issues that occurred regarding the probable falsification of police records by a number of Moroccan workers of whom the Ministry of Justice had expressed its concern.\textsuperscript{181}

The concerns expressed by the minister of Justice were based on the rumor he had heard about a semi-illegal office in the city of Casablanca in Morocco. This office would (most likely for a high fee) grant job placements by providing contracts to Moroccans who sought to work in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{182} The minister of Justice asked the MFA if the ‘Dutch representation in Morocco’ could check to determine whether this is indeed the case. The consul in Casablanca, J.H. Kersten, replied by assuring that the Minister of Justice should not worry about whether the abstracts from the Moroccan police record were indeed authentic, for no person is permitted to work in the Netherlands without providing a proven ‘clear’ police record to the Alien Police. He urged and advised the minister of Justice that if there was any doubt of the authenticity of

\textsuperscript{176} NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 116.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid. (‘Nederlandsche en buitenlandse ronselaars frauduleuze contracten, vaak gesteld in gebrekkig Nederlands, aan mogelijke Italiaanse, Turkse and andere arbeiders uitreiken.’)
\textsuperscript{178} NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207. (‘Tewerkstelling Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland’).
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid. (‘Zoals u bekend zal zijn is het aantal Marokkaanse arbeidskrachten dat emplooi in de Nederlandse industrie heeft gevonden, gedurende de laatste maanden sterk toegenomen.’).
\textsuperscript{180} Bouras’ research confirms that Moroccan workers indeed needed to show these papers, later followed by marriage certificates with regard to family allowance. See: Bouras, \textit{Het land van herkomst}, 66.
\textsuperscript{181} The second half of this letter from the archive was almost unreadable. However, because the answer to the letter was clear, this example is included here because from the response to the letter, it can be derived what the content of the first letter included.
\textsuperscript{182} Bouras, \textit{Het land van herkomst}, 61-62.
these papers, to send these to the Dutch embassy or consulates in Morocco, who, he assured him, would verify them and provide of a ‘stamp of approval’. Kersten further mentioned that he had tracked the address of the office in Casablanca that supposedly provided help in job placement for Moroccans to the Netherlands, though mentions that he had not found anything suspicious.\(^{183}\) He offered the minister of Justice the opportunity to have the case(s) be investigated by the Moroccan police if needed. The consul and ambassador seemed more than willing to help to sort out the matter. Kersten’s response indicates that he deemed the possibility of document forgery to be quite significant.

The suspicion of forgery is clarified further in another letter which Kersten wrote to the embassy in Rabat. In the letter, Kersten described the issue with regard to the requests from Moroccan workers who apparently sent him the most diverse Dutch letters, work proposals or contracts that they wanted him to sign ‘as seen and approved by him’.\(^{184}\) Apparently, these workers needed these approvals before they could receive a passport, which the Moroccan authorities could provide to them. Kersten continued by stating: ‘Insofar as there is no doubt about the authenticity of the documents shown, I will meet these kinds of requests, but in many cases, I refuse them when I think that the papers were not drafted by the employers themselves.’\(^{185}\) Kersten included an example of one of these contracts with his letter.\(^{186}\) He stated that regarding several aspects, such as an almost blank contract that carried a stamp without a date, made him question the authenticity of the document. He noted that he questioned whether there was fraud in play and asked if it was possible to verify how these ‘nearly empty contracts’ were put into circulation.\(^{187}\) Interestingly, Kersten emphasised at the end of the letter: ‘However, I think that at the moment, we had better not give any rumor about this affair at an official level, when Germany and Belgium are busy with deporting their ‘surplus’ of Moroccan workers.’\(^{188}\) He mentioned thereafter that he did not want people to start thinking that the same problems were occurring in the Netherlands, for he explains that if this was indeed the case, everyone would know this soon enough. Kersten did not explain what could happen if the ‘affair

\(^{183}\) NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207.

\(^{184}\) Ibid.

\(^{185}\) Ibid. (‘Voor zover er geen twijfel bestaat over de echtheid van de getoonde documenten voldoe ik wel aan dit soort verzoeken doch in vele gevallen weiger ik wanneer ik meen dat de papieren niet door de werkgever zelf zijn opgemaakt.’)

\(^{186}\) The example Kersten refers to is unfortunately missing in the archives, although the description the ambassador gives in the letter does clarify what the issue is about.

\(^{187}\) NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207.

\(^{188}\) Ibid. (‘Ik meen echter dat wij op het ogenblik beter geen geruchtmakende daad naar deze affaire moeten geven op officieel niveau, op het moment dat Duitsland en België bezig zijn hun overschot aan Marokkaanse arbeiders uit te wijzen.’)
of the false contracts’ would indeed be made known to the other government(s). What we can derive from his response, however, is that he proactively informed and advised the Dutch MFA on the matter. The letter herewith shows that Kersten had a certain leeway in his actions and decisions by playing a role as advisor as well as providing or refusing contracts on the basis of his own judgment. The above examples further show that the consuls and ambassador were important in fulfilling a role as a ‘controlling agency’ regarding Moroccan laborers in the Netherlands, even though no recruitment agreement with the Netherlands was yet signed.

4.4 Family Allowance

The ambassador (Karnebeek) wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in August of 1967 about the issue of fraud with family allowances for Moroccan guest workers. In an outspoken (and clearly irritated) manner, Karnebeek explained he had been called to the MFA as a result of foreign press messages which had appeared in several Dutch newspapers. These newspapers reported that the Dutch workers’ council had decided to ‘suspend’ the payment of family allowance to the working Moroccans in the Netherlands. This council, the ‘Raad van Arbeid’ in The Hague, had indeed advised that (temporarily) no family allowances should be paid to the Moroccan workers. This decision was made because an unknown number of blank ‘trouwboekjes’ (marriage certificates, in which in addition to the wife of the worker, presumably also the number and names of children were inscribed), were in circulation in the Netherlands. The French Police had intercepted 5 Moroccans who carried 95 empty certificates with them (apparently stolen from the Moroccan Government Printing Office). According to the Dutch Alien Police, these documents were sold to Moroccan workers in the Netherlands for 50 to 100 guilders. Ambassador Karnebeek was clearly not pleased that he was asked (again) to check and provide information on the matter because he considered this the responsibility of the Moroccan embassy and the consulate-general in the Netherlands. As Karnebeek expressed: ‘Again, it appears for the umpteenth time, that their [Moroccan] diplomatic representation in Brussels and the Consulate General in Rotterdam are too feeble to obtain the adequate information from the competent Dutch authorities themselves.’

189 Ibid.
190 Bouras, *Het land van herkomst*, 68.
191 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207. (‘Wederom blijkt voor de zoveelste maal dat hun [Marrokaanse] diplomatieke vertegenwoordiging te Brussel en het consulaat-generaal in Rotterdam te sullig zijn om de nodige inlichtingen zelf te verkrijgen bij de bevoegde Nederlandse autoriteiten.’)
Karnebeek received an answer from the department of ‘General Affairs’ of the MFA in a letter entitled ‘Social Security for Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands’. The minister explained to Karnebeek that the family allowances of 8000 (of the 13,000) Moroccans who were considered for this allowance, had indeed been deferred. The latter, the minister explained, was due to press messages that had appeared about the interception of Moroccans with several empty marriage certificates, who had presumably travelled back and forth a couple of times to provide these to Moroccan guest workers in the Netherlands. This issue had indeed appeared in the _Rotterdamsch Nieuwsblad_ which reported that the Moroccan consulate in France (Lyon) had forged documents so that the number of children that were considered for allowance would be higher. However, this would not be in the benefit of the families of Moroccan guest workers but to the benefit of the Moroccan ‘deviezenpot’ (foreign currency savings). Because family allowance for Moroccan workers could only be directly sent to a Moroccan bank account, some Moroccans were afraid that (part of) this money would be claimed by the Moroccan government. An article in the newspaper _De Waarheid_ mentioned on May 30, 1969 that the Moroccan consul in Rotterdam had warned the Moroccan guest workers that if they tried to bring their money in cash to Morocco (as they did not trust that the full amount would arrive at the Moroccan bank account) would run the risk of having all their money confiscated at the Moroccan border. As a response to the news messages, a member of the Dutch House of Commons asked the Dutch secretary of MOPSHA Roolvink to explain the situation. Roolvink denied that the Moroccan workers were disadvantaged and explained that the ‘Dutch Councils of Employment’ were dealing with a lack of information on the costs of sustenance of Moroccan children which made it difficult to determine who and how much family allowance the Moroccans were entitled to.

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192 Ibid.
193 Bouras, _Het land van herkomst_, 68.
The issues that had arisen in the late 1960s with family allowance among Moroccan guest workers indicated that the arrangement of the worker migration brought more unanticipated consequences than had been expected. In Morocco, problems with the administration of population registration and necessary documents of the guest workers was often ‘thwarted’ due to a poorly organized and maintained system. The earlier discussed correspondence between ambassador Karnebeek and the Minister of Foreign Affairs indicates that the ambassador was approached (and expected) to be responsible for controlling that only Moroccans with legal papers could work in the Netherlands. It appears, however, that Karnebeek was not of the opinion that it was his responsibility when it came to the verification of documents for Moroccan workers and their families. In addition, Karnebeek expressed his discontent with the Moroccan representation in the Netherlands which, according to him, was not effective in controlling the illegal practices concerning the documents for Moroccan Guest workers in the Netherlands. As in Turkey, the ambassador seemed increasingly occupied with the administration of documents and the provision of information on Moroccan guest workers. Even as this was indeed the task of the ambassador and consul, the scale to which they were involved in the administrative procedure of the worker migration increased tremendously.

4.5 1969 - Recruitment Agreement Signed after 6 Years of Migration of Moroccans to the Netherlands

By 1967, approximately 13,000 Moroccans were working in the Netherlands. This is a large number, considering this was actually two years before the recruitment agreement was signed. Compared to Turkey, the negotiations that led to a recruitment agreement took much longer. Since the first Moroccans started working in the Netherlands around 1963 until the recruitment agreement in 1969, the number of workers increased considerably. Towards the 1970s, the impression arose that the Netherlands had no sufficient control over the worker migration. This was aggravated by the fact that the identity of spontaneous migrants was difficult to determine by the documentation. This was partly due to the fact that the date of birth of (especially) many Turks and Moroccans were sometimes incorrect. Also, the names of Moroccans in passports were often written in the Arabic language. Because the Dutch organizations copied these names phonetically, differences in the spelling of their names existed in the documentation at the Alien Police, the employment agencies and at the national civil register. This resulted in not only

chaotic but also lengthy procedures to verify different types of documents. As a consequence, it made it more difficult to prevent the forgery of documents.\textsuperscript{195}

The recruitment agreement was a way to regulate the flow of guest workers in terms of avoiding illegal immigrants and people who defrauded documents.\textsuperscript{196} However, because there had been Moroccans working in the Netherlands for almost a decade, most of the (administrative) procedures regarding the recruitment of workers (as was the case in Turkey) were increasingly executed through the Moroccan and Dutch Employment organizations.\textsuperscript{197} The function that embassies and consulates had regarding guest workers from Morocco therefore did not seem to change much after the recruitment agreement was signed. However, as the influx of workers increased, the function of ambassador and consuls as ‘controlling agents’ regarding individuals or groups of Moroccans working in the Netherlands intensified as well. The checks the ambassador and consul were asked or supposed to carry out varied greatly. As part of the MFA, most of the requests to the ambassador and consul came from the minister of Foreign Affairs. Increasingly, however, others such as directors of companies (employers) sent their requests to the ambassador in Rabat, who in turn consulted and worked in conjunction with the consulate general in Casablanca.

With Morocco, the Dutch government was more reluctant to draft the agreement, even though requests from the Moroccan government had been made regularly since 1963. A difference with Turkey was that the requests made to the Dutch ambassador seemed to have been more strongly ‘reiterated’ by the Moroccan government, that, via the ambassador, repeatedly pushed for a recruitment agreement with the Netherlands. The reluctance of the Dutch government in closing the agreement was mainly due to the fact that the Moroccans were part of the last groups that were recruited for work in the Netherlands (because the demand for labor declined towards the 1970s and many Moroccans were placed in mines or factories that were on the verge of closing). For Morocco, the period before the recruitment agreement was signed, was actually longer than the official recruitment of workers after this period (roughly from 1969 to 1973). The influx of workers, whether they were recruited by companies or came on their own initiative, was initially ‘regulated’ in Morocco by the employment organizations. Because many Moroccan workers were recruited in the Netherlands before the recruitment

\textsuperscript{195} Tinnemans, \textit{Een gouden armband}, 82-83.


\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 64-67.
agreement was signed, the role of the ambassador and consul did not seem to change much after the agreement.

**Conclusion**

As in Turkey, embassies and consulates in Morocco were charged with the administrative task of verifying and approving the work permit for guest workers, which increased as the worker migration progressed. In the previous chapter is demonstrated that the ambassador and consul in Turkey were no longer charged with this duty after 1963, as they requested that this was handled by employment agencies. It appears that this ‘rule’ was also applied to the embassy and consulates in Morocco. From the start of the migration of worker from Morocco, the Moroccan authorities frequently requested the Dutch ambassador to convey their wish for a regulated process of recruitment of Moroccan workers to the Netherlands. The latter has been an important occupation of the Dutch embassies and consulates, especially because it took 6 years until the recruitment agreement with Morocco was concluded. The forgery of documents (or the fear thereof) has been a frequently discussed matter in the correspondence with the Dutch embassy and consulates in Morocco and the Dutch government. We can further conclude that, as in Turkey, the role of embassies and consulates in Morocco also increasingly expanded to an involvement with Moroccan guest workers in Netherlands. The next chapter will discuss the way in which the ambassador and consuls in both Turkey and Morocco were involved with further issues and developments of the worker migration that occurred after 1969.
5 – Incidents and Issues regarding Turkish and Moroccan Guest Workers and the Role of the Media (1970-1975)

In the 1960s and 1970s, increases and decreases in immigration numbers were almost completely determined by guest workers. Consequently, guest workers also increasingly determined the image of migrants and migration policy in this period. For policy makers and the public, the perception of the immigrants and guest workers was nearly the same at that time.\textsuperscript{198} From the end of the 1960s, Turkish and Moroccan guest workers became more visible in Dutch society.\textsuperscript{199} The latter was due to the continuous shortage of housing and increasing family migration of Turks and Moroccans, as well as the increasing media attention that was paid to issues related to the functioning of guest workers in the Netherlands. In the early 1970s, a number of incidents took place regarding Turkish and Moroccan guest workers.\textsuperscript{200} These incidents not only surfaced in the media in the Netherlands but also in Turkey and Morocco, and in some cases even in foreign media. This chapter will look at a number of incidents which were broadly discussed at the time and in which the embassies and consulates were involved.

5.1 Rotterdam - Riots against Turkish Guest Workers

The shortage of housing appeared to be an important cause for conflicts between native Dutch people and guest workers, who became seen as ‘intruders’. The Afrikaanderwijk in Rotterdam was one of the neighborhoods in which the population of Turks had increased the most (by 1972, about 8 to 9 out of 100 residents were native Dutch citizens).\textsuperscript{201} Due to the housing shortage, house after house in the neighborhood had been turned into boarding houses, owned by both Dutch and Turkish people. This overpopulation, in combination with the language and culture barriers, led to harassment and tensions between the Turks and the native citizens.\textsuperscript{202} According to the newspapers, the riots had started with a dispute between a Turk who had bought a house and wanted the Dutch woman with three children who rented it to leave. Dutch

\textsuperscript{198} Van Eijl, \textit{Tussenland}, 48.
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{200} Marlou Schrover, \textit{Om de meisjes, voor de meisjes: een historisch perspectief op problematisering en bagatelliseren van onderwerpen die te maken hebben met migratie en integratie} (Leiden 2011); Van Eijl, \textit{Tussenland}, 68-92.
\textsuperscript{201} Frank J. Buijs, \textit{Een moskee in de wijk: de vestiging van de Kocatepe moskee in Rotterdam-Zuid} (Amsterdam 1998) 7-8.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid. By May 1972, there were 49 registered boarding houses in the Afrikaanderwijk (next to a considerable number of illegal boarding houses).
residents of the Afrikaanderwijk (accompanied by so-called ‘hooligans’) responded angrily; they started throwing Turkish the resident's furniture on the street; 500 Dutch inhabitants of the neighborhood threatened to lynch Turkish people and a number of Turkish (as well as Moroccan and Spanish) families fled from the neighborhood while being jeered at by the Dutch residents.\

In the archives, a separate part has been dedicated to the riots that took place in Rotterdam, including newspaper articles in the Dutch and Turkish media, as well as articles from the British and French newspapers. Because the riots were directed at Turkish nationals residing in the Netherlands, both the Turkish and Dutch diplomats and authorities were involved with the matter. Turkish women sought help from the Turkish consul in Rotterdam, and the Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs intervened in the issue. In a letter to the Dutch MFA, the Dutch ambassador at the time, Dingemans, explained and showed how the incidents had appeared in the Turkish press and radio (these newspaper articles were included with the letter). An independent, conservative Turkish daily newspaper in Istanbul named Terellaan had posted on August 17th (English translation): ‘The hooligans who used stones and sticks to attack defenseless guest workers in Rotterdam are far from representing the European civilization. We do not approve of the wild attacks by these beasts and we are going to insist that every attempt be made to make up for the moral and material losses of our brethren.’ In the largest Turkish newspaper, the Hürriyet, a large article appeared on the topic of ‘The Riot in Holland’ on the front page of the paper that same day. The Hürriyet noted (in English

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204 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 122.

205 Ibid.
translation): ‘The events in Holland are not the first of their kind. If you remember, another riot was directed against Turkish workers by the residents of Rotterdam’.206

Dingemans sent a number of newspaper articles to the MFA to show the importance of the matter in Turkey. He also referred to English and French newspaper that also had reported on the events. In England for instance, the riots were primarily discussed as race riots. As the writer of the article in the London Times noted: ‘The Dutch are a colonist country. (…) the Indonesians have from time to time been the cause of various riots. And now the people in the street, especially the youth sees the Turks as a kind of Indonesians.’207 The riots were also discussed for quite a while in the Dutch press. On August 12th, the social-democratic daily newspaper Het Vrije Volk printed an article with the title: ‘Dutch people are no longer friends with the Turks’.208 The reporter noted that the hooligans, who called themselves ‘de knok- en opruimploeg’ (a term which could be translated as the fight and clean-up team) would have announced the following: ‘Our intent; to occupy the premises of foreigners, to move the Turks out and the Dutchmen in, has succeeded.’209 The reporter further mentioned that the riots had caused great anxiety among Turkish and other foreign workers in Rotterdam, and that a fear that similar groups of hooligans will do the same other neighborhoods in Rotterdam was very present. These newspaper messages show that the riots had caused great upheaval at home and abroad.

A wide range of correspondences between the ambassador(s) and authorities followed, in which the Dutch ambassador mainly seemed to function as the ‘mediator’ between different parties. Dingemans set up an investigation into what had happened and contacted and supported the Turkish consul in Rotterdam. At some point, the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Dingemans in Ankara on this subject. He reported to the ambassador that there would be a council meeting in which the damage restitution for the affected Turks would be discussed. In fact, the consul-general in Istanbul had already asked the minister of Foreign Affairs to request damage restitution on behalf of the Turkish guest workers. The mayor of Rotterdam had answered the Consul-General, and it appears from the letter that he had to wait until the decision had been made after the council meeting before any restitution could be arranged for the Turkish workers in the Netherlands. The consul had thus responded quickly to the incident and acted on behalf of the Turkish people in the Netherlands. The latter was crucial for

206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
209 Ibid. (‘Onze opzet, panden van buitenlanders bezetten, Turken eruit, Hollanders erin, is geslaagd.’)
maintaining a positive relationship between the Netherlands and Turkey, especially because the riots had appeared in both the Dutch as well as the Turkish press quite extensively. The latter seemed not only the objective of the Dutch diplomats and ministers, but also the Turkish minister of employment, Ali Rize Uzener who had sent a radio message to the 650,000 thousand Turkish guest workers in Europe. In this message, which was sent to national and foreign press agencies, the minister had asked the Turkish workers to respect the traditions, rules and laws of the country in which they were residing and ‘to act like gentlemen’. Dingemans explained to the Dutch MFA that Uzener had warned the workers that what he called ‘anarchists’ were trying to blow the Rotterdam incidents out of proportion. Dingemans further mentioned that Uzener had warned that; ‘the smallest negative behavior might foul the good relations between Turkey and the country in which the workers were employed.’ The Turkish minister and Dutch ambassador and consuls thus acted chiefly in favor of the interests of the relation between the two countries. As the ambassador expressed at the end of the letter: ‘I may add that I would strongly appreciate it, if, for the good relations between Turkey and the Netherlands, this somewhat painful affair could be resolved as soon as possible.’ Despite the seriousness of the case, Dingemans seemed to ‘settle’ the case as not notably significant and emphasized that the issues should be resolved as soon as possible.

The issue was indeed relatively quickly resolved (in conjunction with both the Dutch as well as the Turkish authorities). In a letter from August of 1972 from the Turkish embassy in The Hague, it was mentioned that only Turkish property was attacked and that no Turks were killed or wounded during the incidents. It seems that the authorities mainly accredited the importance of the incidents to accounts by various (foreign) media that had paid so much attention to the issue. This forced the Dutch ambassador to act in a resolute way to resolve the matter to maintain the positive relationship with Turkey, and also because the reputation of the Netherlands in the rest of Europe was at stake.

5.2 Moroccan Guest Workers – ‘Amsterdam Raids’

As in Turkey, after the recruitment agreement was signed with Morocco, the role of the embassy and consulates shifted from matters concerning the recruitment and employment of Moroccan

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210 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 122.
211 Ibid. (‘Ik moge hieraan toevoegen, dat ik het uiteraard ten zeerste op prijs zal stellen, indien deze voor de goede betrekkingen tussen Turkije en Nederland enigszins pijnlijke aangelegenhed, zo spoedig mogelijk uit de wereld kan worden geholpen.’)
212 Ibid.
workers, to the functioning of Moroccan guest workers in the Netherlands. When the recruitment of workers drew to a close after 1973, there were almost daily newspaper articles about Moroccans who were deported. In addition, there were a considerable number of correspondences devoted to the treatment of Moroccan guest workers in the Netherlands, a topic which apparently distressed the Moroccan government.

The MOPSHA became stricter in providing work permits for guest workers during the second half of the 1960s. When the demand for foreign workers temporarily decreased in 1967, the regional employment agencies no longer issued work permits to foreign laborers and many spontaneous migrants were deported from the Netherlands when they were no longer employed. In April of 1972, a number of invasions by the Dutch police had taken place to arrest and deport Moroccans who were residing illegally in Amsterdam. In May of 1972, the Dutch ambassador in Rabat, C. Vreede, sent a message to the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs. The topic of the code-message was about the ‘razzia’s’ (raids) which since January that year were occurring with Moroccans. These ‘raids’ as they were called in the media, had appeared in both the Dutch and the Turkish press. Not only the Dutch Lower Chamber but also the embassy in Rabat reacted to the incidents. The Dutch consulate in Morocco had made known (apparently via the embassy in Rabat) that the messages of the raids of Moroccans in the Netherlands had caused great turmoil in Morocco. It concerned Moroccans who ‘klandestien’ (illegally) resided in the Netherlands and were with a ‘laissez-passer’ (document by which a foreign national receives permission of his authorities to enter his country in lieu of

213 Bouras, Het land van herkomst, 61.
214 Van Eijl, Tussenland, 54-55.
215 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 204.
216 Van Eijl, Tussenland, 68-69. The term ‘razzia’ was used in the early 1970’s; a term which many politicians disapproved of, due to its connotation with the invasions the Germans executed during the Second World War. The term nevertheless was used for the invasions the police did to arrest larger groups of foreigners (who they could not inspect on the streets and therefore had to take them to the Police office) to do the check, and in case of illegally residing immigrants, deport them to their countries of origin.
a passport) repatriated to Morocco. The ambassador mentioned that he had received reports from the Consulate-General in Rotterdam that since January that year approximately 5 laissez passers’ per working day had been issued to Moroccans, which signified the importance of the matter. According to the Moroccan ‘Chef Consulaire’ of the department of Foreign Affairs, the treatment by the Dutch police was quite harsh. In addition, the fact that the raids were conducted at night were seen by the Moroccans as ‘unnecessarily belittling’.\textsuperscript{217} The Chef Consulaire further referred to the distress in the public opposition press in Morocco in which this issue had been brought up for discussion. Ambassador Vreede closed the letter by asking the MFA what answer he should provide to the Moroccan authorities about the matter. The minister of Foreign Affairs wrote back to the ambassador stating that an investigation would be set up concerning the ‘deportation of Moroccans’. He confirmed that a number of Moroccans were repatriated because they were not in possession of a passport. He added however, that Moroccans should not be afraid of the ‘confiscation’ of passports, for this is highly unlikely and would serve no purpose at all.\textsuperscript{218} In July of 1972, a similar message from the ambassador, then J. Strenger, reported to the Ministry of General Affairs about a visit from the new Moroccan ambassador. Strenger noted that many things had been discussed during the visit and that they had a positive, mutual understanding. However, there was one topic he needed to mention in more detail because the Moroccan ambassador had expressed his concern of the matter of the treatment of Moroccan guest workers in the Netherlands, (about which the Moroccan ambassador had also even spoken about with the Queen of the Netherlands). Strenger mentioned that a number of issues were discussed regarding the treatment of Moroccan guest workers. The most important aspects mentioned by the ambassador were first the housing of the workers (especially in the larger cities, as the Moroccan ambassador mentions, in which sometimes 3 or 4 men had to share 1 room). The second issue the Moroccan ambassador mentioned was the issue of documents of guest workers when entering the Netherlands. As Strenger reported: ‘The Ambassador said it is most regrettable that we would proceed again with the (mutual) setting of visas. To the Moroccan ambassador, it seemed more sufficient for the Netherlands to concentrate on work permits only. Many Moroccans were indeed not in possession of passports or other identification documents.’\textsuperscript{219} The Dutch minister of General Affairs wrote a letter back

\textsuperscript{217} NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 204.

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid. (‘De Ambassadeur zei het zeer te betreuren wanneer wij weer tot de (wederzijdse) instelling van visa zouden overgaan. Het leek hem voldoende wanneer wij ons zouden concentreren op werkvergunningen. Veel Marokkanen zouden immers niet in het bezit zijn van paspoorten of andere identiteitspapieren.’)
to Strenger in which he clearly formulated a response to the requests from the Moroccan ambassador. The minister of General Affairs explained that housing for legally recruited Moroccans is well taken care of in the Netherlands and if Moroccans live in smaller houses together it is their own choice because they choose to pay a lower rent in this way. He also noted that in principle, no Moroccan person without a passport or ID is permitted to work in the Netherlands and that the visa requirements make it possible to have better control of this matter; if one has no visa he is subject to ‘expulsion’ from the Netherlands.

Until the 1990s, the Dutch government was supportive of ‘preserving’ the cultural and religious identity of guest workers.220 One of the programs organized by the Dutch government was education (especially for guest workers’ children) in their own language and culture.221 These children received, in addition to their regular Dutch classes, lessons from a teacher from their home country. These teachers received a residence permit for the Netherlands and were hired by the Dutch Ministry of Education and Science.222 The nature of the worker migration changed, in particular from the 1970s onwards as family migration became the main type of migration. The idea of promoting the guest workers’ culture changed when many workers stayed and their ‘ties with the home country’ came seen as a problem for integration into Dutch society.223 In the same letter in which the Amsterdam raids were discussed, Strenger mentions ‘As a positive point, the [Moroccan] ambassador mentioned Morocco’s readiness too soon sent some teachers to teach in the Arabic language to the children of migrant workers in the Netherlands.’224 He added finally that if Moroccan teachers want to come to the Netherlands they should realize that they need to be in possession of a (preliminary) residence permit as well as a work permit.225 This straightforward reply to Strenger’s letter did not ‘close the case’ however, because the ambassador sent an encoded-message later that year in October of 1972 to the MFA as a result of the (apparently continuous) requests of the Moroccan authorities on the subject. Strenger reported that the Moroccan minister of Foreign Affairs had asked him to bring a number of matters concerning Moroccan guest workers to the attention of the Dutch government. The Moroccan minister had done so due to ‘some concern among the Moroccan

220 Bouras, Land van herkomst, 84-105; Tinnemans, Een gouden armband, 47.
221 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en gaan, 297-304.
222 Bouras, Land van herkomst, 88.
223 Ibid., 106.
224 Ibid. (‘Als een positief punt noemde de [Morrokaanse] Ambassadeur de bereidheid van Marokko om binnenkort enkele leerkrachten naar Nederland te zenden om de kinderen van de gastarbeiders onderricht te geven in de Arabische taal.’)
225 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 204.
government regarding the treatment of guest workers by the Dutch government.\textsuperscript{226} He mentioned that the Moroccan minister inter alia asked if the ambassador would urge the Dutch government to offer resistance in European meetings when the visa requirements were under discussion (as was mentioned as ‘reciprocal visa requirements’ in the earlier letter from the Dutch ambassador). In addition, the Moroccan minister asked Strenger if he could ask the Dutch government to regulate the status of Moroccan guest workers who had been working in the Netherlands for a quite some time. Strenger stressed that the Moroccan minister of Social Affairs was, in his visit to the Netherlands ‘strongly affected by the anguish of many brave Moroccans who feared their removal [deportation from] the Netherlands.’\textsuperscript{227} This correspondence, which was mainly focused on the treatment of Moroccan guest workers in the Netherlands, indicates a number of insights into the role of the Dutch ambassador in Morocco. It also reveals a number of other facts concerning the way in which the situation of guest workers and corresponding ideas from both the Dutch and the Moroccan governments developed. The Moroccan minister clearly expected the ambassador to be able to get the mentioned issues reported to the Dutch government, as well as to make sure that the importance and interests of the Moroccan government (on behalf of their ‘nationals’ in the Netherlands) was transmitted to the Dutch government.

\textbf{5.3 Willingness and Possibilities of the Ambassador and Consul}

It appears that the ambassador was often willing to cooperate, though sometimes was unable to help. In 1972 for instance, the issue of fraud with family allowance among Moroccans resurfaced as a point of discussion. Then again, Roolvink referred to the difficulties of assessment and processing of the (often incompletely filled out) applications and poor maintenance of the Moroccan civil registration which delayed the verification and payment of allowances to Moroccan workers.\textsuperscript{228} The Dutch ambassador in Rabat, then J.C. Lanjouw, wrote a letter in November of 1973 in response to the MFA that had reported a complaint from Moroccan workers in the Netherlands about the family allowance of which a part (a charge of 10 percent) was made for the transaction. Lanjouw mentioned that this complaint was unjust and he assured that the payments were made to the correct individuals without any reduction.

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid. (‘enige ongerustheid bij Marokkaanse regering over behandeling gastarbeiders zijdens Nederlandse overheid’)

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid. (‘sterk getroffen door het zielennood van vele brave Marokkanen, die verwijdering uit Nederland vrezen.’).

\textsuperscript{228} Bouras, \textit{Het land van herkomst}, 69.
because this was established in the Social Security Treaty with Morocco. He added nonetheless, that he deemed it possible that ‘incidentally’ (especially when an illiterate person was concerned) an unfair mail functionary or counter clerk could illegally abridge the amounts of family allowances.\(^{229}\) The response from Lanjouw illustrates that the Dutch embassy and consulates in Morocco were aware of the fact that the system of payment of family allowance in Morocco was not efficient. Lanjouw referred to the Treaty of Social Security which stated that the payments were guaranteed, and indicated that he seemed not overly willing (or able) to check this effectively, or that he perceived this as a duty that went beyond his responsibility. That said, although the letters did not always indicate that the ambassador or consul was not willing to verify certain information, it seems clear that the insufficient system of the civil registration in Morocco made the process difficult.

From the letters, it also appears that in the mid-1970s, approximately 12,000 Moroccans were residing in the Netherlands, of which a notable number had no passport or ID documents. The housing conditions of the Moroccan guest workers at this time were a matter of concern which the Moroccan ambassador expected to be solved by the Dutch government. The Moroccan ambassador even asked (via the Dutch ambassador in Rabat) to influence the stance that the Dutch government took in European discussions regarding the visa requirements for foreigners entering and residing in the Netherlands. From the tone which was used in the letters, as well as extent to which the Dutch ambassador was involved in these matters and was expected to affect the course of events or decisions made by the Dutch government, the involvement of the Dutch ambassador was genuinely great in the matter. The Moroccan ambassador directly contacted the Dutch government with these issues, although he supposedly also expected and requested the Dutch ambassador in Rabat to play a decisive role. Thus, the role of the Moroccan ambassador (to protect the rights and safety of Moroccan nationals in the Netherlands) was in a sense partly met by the Dutch ambassador in Rabat. The Dutch ambassador decidedly tried to meet the requests of the Moroccan authorities, as is demonstrated by the letters he kept sending to the Netherlands raising these issues.

5.4 Turkish Babies

Another incident that also appeared extensively in various (international) newspapers is the case of the often poor health condition (and even a few deaths) among Turkish babies in the Netherlands. The incidents appeared in the news because the babies supposedly suffered from

\(^{229}\) NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 216.
malnutrition and, according to the many newspaper articles, in many cases were not washed for weeks and had no proper clothing. As in the case of the Rotterdam riots, the Dutch ambassador and consul were busy with correspondence with both the Turkish and Dutch authorities to set up a study to investigate if this indeed was the case in the Netherlands and to discuss possible solutions. In this situation, the MFA sent all of the information surrounding the actions that had been taken (also in cooperation with the Turkish Consul-General in Rotterdam) to the ambassador in Ankara to make this known to the Turkish authorities and media. The Ambassador was asked to make this known: ‘to reiterate the explanations given regarding the state of affairs once again on the Turkish television, to take away the misunderstanding and heightened uneasiness in Turkey.’

The extent of the poor conditions of Turkish babies in the Netherlands appeared in a couple of cases, that, although taken very seriously, appeared by far not to be the norm of how the situation was for the majority of children of guest worker families in the Netherlands. This issue also indicates that the media increasingly determined the way in which the embassies and consulates (were required to) act on behalf of the Netherlands.

5.5 1973 – Recruitment Stop

The number of documents in the archives from the Dutch embassies and consulates in Turkey and the Morocco in the 1970s is considerably smaller than those in the 1960s. One plausible explanation for this is the recruitment stop. In 1973, approximately 10 years after the recruitment of workers from Turkey and Morocco began, the recruitment of guest workers came to an end. The oil crises of 1973 and the subsequent recession that followed was the main reason for the recruitment stop. Employers ‘fought’ for workers for their factories or workplace in the mid-1960s and conversely a deficit of work arose in the mid-1970s. However, the influx of Turkish and Moroccan people still grew after 1973, primarily because of family migration and

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230 NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 122.
231 Ibid. (‘om de gegeven uitleg over de stand van zaken nog eens te willen herhalen voor de Turkse televisie, teneinde het onbegrip en gerezen onbehagen weg te nemen in Turkije.’)
232 In 1973, the recruitment of Guest workers needed to be diminished or even stopped (the so-called ‘wervingsstop’). See for example: Jan Willen ten Doesschate, Asielbeleid en Belangen: Het Nederlands toelatingsbeleid ten aanzien van vluchtelingen in de jaren 1968-1982 (Hilversum: 1993) 167.
also due to illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{234} (With the standardization of illegal migrants, 15,000 more guest workers actually received a residence permit in 1975.)\textsuperscript{235}

What effect had the recruitment stop on the role of the embassies and consulates? As apparent from the archives, the accession to the recruitment stop seemed to be a gradual process without a direct effect in 1973. The Dutch ambassador in Ankara did play a role in the process as he sent an encoded-message on behalf of the Turkish government to the MFA in December of 1973 expressing the concern of the Turkish authorities regarding rumors of ‘a possible decrease of the recruitment of Turkish guest workers’.\textsuperscript{236} In March of 1974, Ambassador Van Baarda sent a message to the MFA as a result of a news message in the Turkish media about the declaration of the Dutch minister Boersma regarding a recruitment stop in the Netherlands. Apparently, only then did the ambassador hear the news item that a recruitment stop had been implemented because Van Baarda asked the MFA for the exact document in which minister Boersma had announced the recruitment stop.\textsuperscript{237}

5.6 Plans for the Return of Moroccan Migrants

From the 1970s onwards, critique of the Dutch policies regarding guest workers (or the lack thereof) grew. From different sides it was urged that measures should be taken against ‘lousy’ employers but also to create a kind of legalization of foreign workers. The ministry of Justice and the ministry of Social affairs both made clear that the legalization of foreigners was no option. The ‘nota’ (policy document) that appeared in January 1970 was based on the idea that: ‘Nederland is beslist geen immigratieland’ (‘The Netherlands is absolutely no immigration country’). This stance was in fact not different than in it had been during the 1960s, although the population of foreign workers still increased and a clear-cut immigration policy had not been formulated and implemented.\textsuperscript{238} This policy note received critique on the basis of the inadequate analysis of the background of the economic effects of labor migration to the Netherlands. Thus, a new policy document had to be drafted, although (because of alternations within the Dutch parliament) it took a couple of years for a new policy document regarding


\textsuperscript{236} NL-HaNA, Ambassade Turkije 1955-1974, 2.05.259, inv.nr. 122.

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{238} Van Eijl, Tussenland, 70-71.
labor migrants to be drafted. The clearest solution the ministries proposed regarding the number of labor migrants without a residence permit was a stricter control at the Dutch borders as well as a stricter deportation policy of illegal migrants. When the demand for foreign laborers declined in the course of the 1970s, a long-term vision on the policy of worker migration was still not formulated although it became increasingly desirable that the guest workers would migrate back to their home countries. One measure that was taken by the Dutch government to promote re-migration was the formation and financing of ‘return-projects’.

An example of the ideas that arose in investigating how these projects could be formed can be read in a correspondence from the Dutch government to the Dutch ambassador in Rabat in 1974. In August of 1974, the minister of Development Cooperation sent the ambassador a number of requests, that (although written in rather ‘woolly language’) evidently concerned the return of Moroccan guest workers. He explained that labor migration had consequences for both the receiving as well as the sending nations. In reference to his own stance he explained: ‘With regard to the Netherlands, there is a basic contention that our country is not a country of immigration and that labor migration should therefore not become a permanent phenomenon, with all of the negative socio-economic and psychological consequences thereof.’ He asked the ambassador to assess the opinion of the Moroccan authorities (in his words as underlined in the letter: ‘the thoughts that are present there’) on the issue of the return of Moroccans and asked him to submit a number of concrete questions to the Moroccan authorities. These questions dealt with the level of demand for professional or technical training in Morocco for returning guest workers; which ‘organizational design’ do the Moroccans prefer in reference to the return of guest workers; if a public credit bank exists that could provide help to the returning

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239 Ibid., 72.
240 Bouras, Het land van herkomst, 71. This is also confirmed in a study by an article that specifically discusses the situation labor migrants from Morocco. The authors of this article mention the oil crises of 1973 which caused the Western European governments to enact stricter immigration laws and designed plans for the Moroccans to re-integrate in their home countries. They stress nonetheless, that few Moroccans actually returned to Morocco in this period, and instead did everything they could to make use of the family migration arrangements, because the situation in Morocco was far worse than it was in Western Europe. See: Bilgili and Weyel, Migration in Morocco, 33.
241 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207. (‘Wat Nederland betreft wordt als uitgangspunt gehanteerd, dat ons land geen immigratieland is en dat arbeidsmigratie daarom geen blijvend verschijnsel mag zijn met alle negatieve socio-economische en psychologische gevolgen van dien.’) The notion that the Netherlands did not see itself, nor did it want to be seen, as an immigration country has been confirmed by various studies. See for example: Bonjour, Grens en gezin, 16; Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en gaan, 288; Tinnemans, Een gouden armband, 82.
242 NL-HaNA, Ambassade in Marokko (1940-1979), 2.05.211, inv.nr. 207. (‘de aldaar levende gedachten’)

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Moroccans; and if the return-projects were suitable for national and regional development plans. These questions were to be answered by the Moroccan authorities. The minister of Development Cooperation was in fact asking the ambassador to ‘gauge’ the thoughts and ideas of the Moroccan Authorities on the topics presented in the letters. This means that the ambassador at that point was still involved with the functioning of Moroccan guest works, though this time with those who would return and needed help with reintegration into the labor market in Morocco.

5.7 Settlement of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands

As demonstrated in the examples mentioned above, the presence and later settlement of guest workers resulted in a number of issues in Dutch society. The Dutch migration policies (especially the family migration policies) made possible the settlement of ‘temporary worker migrants’. After the mid-1970s it were basically only woman and children of Turkish and Moroccan decent that migrated to the Netherlands. Thus, despite the fact that the Netherlands never wanted to become an ‘immigration county’; thousands of Turkish and Moroccan people received the opportunity to settle (with their family) in the Netherlands. The settlement of especially Turkish and Moroccan guest workers could therefore be perceived as perhaps the largest unexpected consequence of the guest worker migration of the 1960s and 1970s. One explanation for the ‘unanticipated settlement’ of foreigners from recruitment countries is accredited to the relative lack of the importance with which the issue was handled by the Dutch government at the time. Until the 1970s, not a single policy appeared, and there was also no parliamentary debate on the desirability, meaning and scope of ‘guest labor’ in the

243 Schrover, Om de meisjes, voor de meisjes, 6. A similar development took place in Belgium, which is explained by John Lievens in his study of the formation of family migration in Belgium from Turkish and Moroccan migrants. Lievens shows that in the mid-1970s when Western European economies were stagnating’, they called for a stop of labour migration. It was thought that the family migration would drop, and that guest workers would return to their home countries. However, the influx of migrants from Turkey and Morocco actually continued (mainly due to the fact that children of ´original ´guest workers married people from their country of origin). See: John Lievens, ‘Family-Forming Migration from Turkey and Morocco to Belgium: The Demand for Marriage Partners from the Countries of Origin’ International Migration Review 33:3 (1999) 717-744, 718.

244 Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en gaan, 270-272.

245 Bonjour, Grens en gezin, 16.

246 This is indicated by a study by Dick Van Eijk, who poses that other social problems in the 1960s in the Netherlands (such as housing shortage, over-population, and the situation for the Dutch youth for example) were presumably higher on the agenda than the demand for labor. See: Van Eijk, ‘De werving van gastarbeiders als resultante’, 107.
Furthermore, none of the governmental sources from that time mention explicitly why the Dutch government made the decision to recruit foreign workers. In 1970, there were over 23,5 thousand Turkish people, and over 17 thousand Moroccan people in the Netherlands. The number of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants continued to grow towards the 1980s, when there were almost 72 thousand Turks, and nearly 120 thousand Moroccans in the Netherlands. These numbers would continue to increase after the 1980s, due to family migration as well as family formation of Turkish and Moroccan guest workers. Surprisingly, despite the fact that many Turkish and Moroccan relatives of guest workers migrated to the Netherlands between 1975 and 1980 (and thereafter), the archives of the Dutch embassies and consulates in Turkey and Morocco make little to no mention about these migrants after 1975. As the archives of diplomatic posts in both Turkey and Morocco contain documentation until respectively 1979 and 1984, this would seem to indicate that their role towards the migration of (family members of) guest workers diminished. It took until 1975 that the permanent settlement of migrants from Turkey and Morocco was officially recognized as well as regularized by the Dutch government. From that moment on, the role of embassies and consulates seemed to have reverted back to their ‘official’ functions regarding migrants. Also, the Dutch family migration policy became less strict towards and during the 1980s. These aspects indicate why there is little to no documentation in the archives of the embassies and consulates regarding the guest workers after 1975.

Conclusion
Towards and during the 1970s, the presence of guest workers became more visible and noticeable in Dutch society, which was also reflected (and intensified) through the media. The importance of incidents that took place regarding guest workers in the Netherlands to be solved became larger when these incidents appeared in the (foreign) media. The involvement of the embassies and consulates with the incidents seem to have been characterized in two ways. Firstly, the ambassadors provided news items that had appeared in the media in the country in which they were stationed. Thus, they showed and explained the magnitude and importance with which the incidents were received and discussed in the home countries of the guest

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248 Van Eijk, ‘De werving van gastarbeiders als resultante’, 106.
251 Ibid., 109.
workers. Secondly, and, at the same time, the ambassadors and consuls several times urged the matters to be solved as quick as possible and seemed to write them down as less significant than they actually were. Bearing in mind that the relationship between the receiving and sending nations was their first priority, these actions are understandable. However, for their role in the worker migration this means that embassies and consulates partly contributed to the fact that some incidents regarding guest workers did not get the attention they might deserved.
6 - Conclusions

The central question of this research was what role the Dutch embassies and consulates played in the Turkish and Moroccan guest worker migration to the Netherlands from 1960 to 1975, and how, when and why this role changed. To be able to answer this question 6 factors that were of influence to the (changing) role of embassies and consulates regarding labor migration have been analyzed. Overall, we can conclude that the embassies and consulates were a small, but important player in the development of the guest worker migration. The analyses has shown that the role of embassies and consulates regarding the guest worker migration advanced from a rather minor role in the early 1960s, to an increasingly more significant role towards the mid-1970s, to be reversed back abruptly to a minor role again in 1975. In regards to the factors of influence that were outlined in the first chapter, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions on how the role of embassies and consulates changed in the period investigated.

At the start of the worker migration form Turkey and Morocco, the role of Dutch embassies and consulates was confined to the official function of embassies and consulates regarding the migration and immigration of people. Their duties concerning labor migrants were clear and primarily related to the provision of visas and the provision of approval of work permits. The increasing scope of the migration during the worker migration naturally accounted for a greater involvement of embassies and consulates regarding the migration of laborers to the Netherlands. The changing nature of the migration also affected their role when more women and children migrated from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands. The nature and scope of the migration therewith mainly accounted for an increasing role of embassies and consulates. Very soon as the migration progressed, however, it appeared that embassies and consulates were increasingly charged with providing several other services and advice on matters concerning labor migrants. These matters related to medical health checks, verifications on marital statuses, police records and ID documents. Several organizations, ministries, employment agencies or individual Turkish or Moroccan applicants called for the assistance of the embassy and consulate on various matters. Dutch ministries and ‘intermediaries’ thus also contributed to an increasing role of embassies and consulates.

In many cases, the ‘extra duties’ that were asked from the ambassador and consul were not anticipated and it was often not clear who or how the requests had to be met. This indicates, or, confirms that the Dutch government had not fully anticipated the consequences and
‘magnitude’ of the recruitment process of workers from Turkey and Morocco. The tasks of the embassies and consulates increasingly shifted towards the provision of information and services for Turkish and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands. The latter was aggravated by the fact that the involvement also counted for the families of guest workers. Moreover, information and services regarding spontaneous and illegal Turkish and Moroccan migrants were also requested from the embassies and consulates because they had the best access to civil registrations and other agencies that could provide several kinds of information in the countries of origin of the workers. The fact that more than half of the total group of Turkish and Moroccan guest workers were spontaneous migrants (and a growing number of illegal migrants) the occupations of the ambassador and consul kept increasing. This meant that their involvement with guest workers not only increased due to the increasing number of labor migrants, but also that their role expanded. This is an important finding of this research, because it shows that the role of embassies and consulates stretched much further than the normal duties of controlling and providing travel documents for migrants.

Concretely, the fact that the involvement of the embassies and consulates did not stop once a worker had left for the Netherlands in fact meant that their role shifted to matters in the Netherlands instead of solely on the country in which the embassy and consulate were stationed. For this reason, besides an expansion of their tasks, their role also became less clear. If we look at the official role of embassies and consulates regarding migration as mentioned in the introduction, it is the provision of visa’s and services to nationals visiting or residing in the country in which the embassy and consulate is stationed, and for nationals of the country in which the embassy and consulates are stationed who want to migrate to the Netherlands. What this research shows, however, is that the embassies and consulates were increasingly involved with Turkish and Moroccan labor migrants and their families who were already residing in the Netherlands. This can be regarded as an abnormal situation, in which ambassadors and consuls fulfilled duties and gave advice on matters that fell outside of their normal duties regarding migrants. An important conclusion of this research is thus that, from the end of 1960 towards the mid-1970s, the role of embassies and consulates not only took part in the process of the recruitment to the Netherlands, but progressively also played a role regarding the functioning of guest workers in the Netherlands.

In relation to this, the involvement of the embassies and consulates grew extensively after a number of incidents regarding the guest workers took place in the Netherlands. The media issues that the Dutch ambassadors and consuls were dealing with also increasingly shifted from issues that appeared in the country in which they were stationed to issues that
occurred in the Netherlands itself. One of the functions of embassies and consulates as described in the introduction, is representing the Netherlands and preventing that the relationship between the two countries would be brought to risk. Their initial role was to protect the image of the Netherlands in the country in which they are stationed by helping to resolve the issues or trying to remove them from the media. The analyses show that this is indeed what the Dutch embassies and consulates did namely by reporting on issues regarding guest workers in the Netherlands and by contributing that the issues would be solved as quickly as possible. The ambassadors and consuls seem to primarily been acting according to this principle, even if this meant that certain incidents were depicted as less meaningful or important than they actually had been. However, this was officially the prime task of the Turkish and Moroccan embassies and consulates in the Netherlands as the issues regarding concerned the wellbeing of their nationals. The increasing media attention regarding Turkish and Moroccan guest workers in the Netherlands therefore also accounted for a shift towards a greater involvement of Dutch embassies and consulates with matters in the Netherlands.

The results have also shown that, despite the recruitment agreements that were signed with Turkey and Morocco, the role of embassies and consulates regarding Turkish and Moroccan migrants still increased, expanded and became less clear over time. Therefore, the expectation, that the regulation of the worker migration by Dutch government through recruitment agreements changed the role of embassies and consulates, cannot fully be confirmed. The Dutch embassies and consulates in both Turkey and Morocco pleaded for a better regulate system through a recruitment agreement because the recruitment of workers to the Netherlands increasingly required a considerable amount of their time and effort. With this, the Dutch embassies and consulates made possible that the approval of work permits was transferred to employment agencies. Also, they contributed to the concluding of the recruitment agreement that were signed with both Turkey and Morocco. This also means that ambassadors and consuls had a certain leeway in their actions to make such changes possible. Yet, even though they instigated a number of changes, in most cases they awaited the approval of the Dutch government before they took a decision in changing the procedures regarding migrant workers. The recruitment agreements did not appear to lower the involvement of embassies and consulates with the worker migration. The procedure at the embassy and consulates that handled the official recruitment of workers included only a small part of the ambassadors’ and consuls’ tasks. The official recruitment agreements the Netherlands had concluded with Turkey and Morocco were designed to regulate the influx of workers, though appeared to be only partly efficient, due to the large number of spontaneous migrants. Despite the complaints of the
ambassadors and consuls, their involvement with the worker migration kept increasing and expanding. This also seems to indicate that the ambassadors and consuls had a relative small leeway. Considering the fact that the Dutch government had not entirely been able to control the influx (and consequences) of guest workers to the Netherlands at the time, the embassies and consulates seemed not have much choice but to take on the responsibility of handling matters for guest workers until a decisive change was made by the Dutch government.

Lastly, when the number of Turkish and Moroccan migrants to the Netherlands kept growing after the mid-1970s due to family migration, the involvement of the embassies and consulates appeared to end rather abruptly in the second half of the 1970s. The sources hardly mention any kind of procedure or issue related to these migrations after 1975. The most plausible explanation for this decrease of the role of embassies and consulates regarding labor migrants could be accredited to the realization (and acceptance) by the Dutch government in 1974 that the recruitment of foreign workers was no longer considered temporary but had amounted in the settlement of thousands of foreign workers and their families in the Netherlands. The permanent residence of Turks and Moroccans and their families in the Netherlands was not only officially acknowledged but thereafter also regulated. This meant that from that moment, the migration and settlement of Turks and Moroccans seemed no longer the responsibility of embassies and consulates in Turkey and Morocco but of the government in the Netherlands.
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