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Chapter 5

When communicating disappointment helps and hurts

Chapter 5

Bargaining is often a heated, emotional process (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Research has now established that emotions in bargaining are not always detrimental or disruptive forces that interfere with decision-making. Instead, they are considered to be social tools that facilitate social decision-making. Social-functional perspectives on emotions (e.g., Elfenbein, 2007; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010) converge on the notion that emotions do not only influence those who experience them, but also those who observe them. Emotions contain valuable information about the feelings and intentions of the sender of the emotion, which can have consequences for the behavior of the receiver. However, in some cases the social-functional approach gives rise to competing predictions regarding the effects of emotional expressions in negotiations. In this respect disappointment is an interesting case. Disappointment arises when progress towards a goal is below expectations (Carver & Scheier, 1990) and/or when a desired outcome is not achieved (Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Van Dijk & Van der Pligt, 1997). Previous research on the social functions of disappointment has found that negotiators with disappointed opponents tend to infer that the other has received too little (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and was hoping for more (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995).

Disappointment thus serves a “supplication” function (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a). A key characteristic of supplication emotions is that they serve as a call for help (Van Kleef et al., 2006a). According to one perspective, this call for help communicates dependency (Eisenberg, 2000), which may signal weakness. In line with this perspective, research has shown that disappointment is often accompanied by passive behavior and a loss of control (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998a), and even feelings of weakness (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b), which may in turn be communicated to others. If expressions of disappointment indeed signal weakness, this may be exploited by others (Markowski, Willer, & Patton, 1988; Molm, 1985), especially in competitive situations such as negotiations (Kravitz & Gunto, 1992).

Interestingly, however, expressions of disappointment do not always elicit a tendency amongst targets to act in self-interested ways. According to another perspective, the weakness that supplication emotions communicate may elicit prosocial responses from
targets (Van Kleef et al., 2006a). There is now considerable evidence that emotional calls for help may actually be granted (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998), even though such calls may communicate a weak bargaining position. Targets of expressions of disappointment may help the expresser in an attempt to relieve his/her pain, for instance by making concessions (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). According to this perspective, communicating weakness does not elicit a tendency to act in a self-interested way, but it actually elicits a prosocial tendency.

The weakness that disappointment signals may thus have two effects on others in bargaining: It may elicit either selfish or prosocial tendencies in others. Research on power in negotiations has shown evidence for both possibilities. One line of negotiation studies has documented that in general power holders have the tendency to exploit the weak person by making more self-serving offers (De Dreu, 1995; Güth & Huck, 1997; Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996; Lawler, 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Suleiman, 1996). In contrast, a different line of studies has shown that power holders may also act in a socially responsible way by cooperating or acting altruistically (Fisher & Nadler, 1974; Frieze & Boneva, 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Greenberg, 1978; Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). Handgraaf and colleagues (2008) showed that whether bargainers behave in a self-interested or more prosocial manner towards low-power opponents depends on the extent to which strategic versus social responsibility considerations are triggered.

Thus, various perspectives within the social-functional approach to emotions suggest opposite hypotheses regarding the interpersonal effects of disappointment in negotiations. Currently, these perspectives exist separately from each other in the literature. In this paper we aim to reconcile these different perspectives on the interpersonal effects of disappointment, by exploring contingencies of the interpersonal effects of disappointment.

The critical role of guilt

We propose that a crucial determinant of whether disappointment elicits a tendency to act prosocially or a tendency to act in a self-interested way is whether or not it evokes guilt in others. Previous research has already established the association between disappointment and guilt. Ferguson, Olthof, and Stegge (1997) presented participants with
gilt-eliciting scenarios and demonstrated that the victim's anticipated disappointment was highly (positively) correlated with the participants' feelings of guilt. Guilt improves relationship quality, reduces competition, and motivates people to make amends (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Moreover, in negotiation settings guilt stimulates concessions (Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Van Kleef, 2012). This suggests that disappointment elicits generous offers in negotiations by evoking guilt in others.

A caveat in this prior research is that it only assessed situations in which disappointment evokes guilt. In such situations, expressions of disappointment may indeed elicit a tendency amongst targets to act prosocially (Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2006a). We extend this research by noting that expressions of disappointment may not always induce guilt. We propose that if disappointment does not evoke guilt, the communicated weakness may evoke a tendency amongst targets to act selfishly, which is reflected by lower offers. Evoked guilt may thus be a key determinant of whether the weakness that is communicated by expressions of disappointment pays off or backfires.

**With whom and on behalf of whom**

Guilt is considered to be a social phenomenon and arises from interpersonal transactions (Baumeister et al., 1994). Individuals experience higher levels of guilt in close relationships and lower levels of guilt when dealing with others they identify less or have less in common with (Baumeister et al., 1994; Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995). Whether disappointment evokes guilt in negotiations or not may thus depend on how much one identifies with one's opponent. In this respect, it is important to investigate the effects of an opponent's group membership.

Prior research on social identity has shown that group membership is an important determinant of interpersonal behavior. Members from the in-group are seen as more similar in attitudes and values in comparison to members from the out-group and this has been shown to influence responses towards others (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). When dealing with out-group members, people tend to be concerned more with their own interests instead of the collective interest (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), which implies that in negotiations, bargainers may use more distributive bargaining tactics. Also, research has shown that bargainers adopt a
more competitive negotiation strategy when they deal with out-group members (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Keenan & Carnevale, 1992; Kramer, 1991; Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988). Although a potential role of guilt was not considered in these studies, they do suggest that when individuals bargain with out-group members, they may feel less concerned with their opponent’s outcomes and experience lower levels of guilt. An opponent’s group membership may thus be a crucial determinant of whether disappointment evokes guilt or not.

Besides investigating the effects of an opponent’s group membership, it is also important to take the type of negotiation into account. Two important types of negotiations can be distinguished: individual negotiations and negotiations where a representative negotiates for a constituency (i.e., representative bargaining; e.g., Druckman, 1994). In representative negotiations, a bargainer’s constituency can have a significant impact on his/her bargaining behavior. Negotiators who negotiate on behalf of (a group of) others have a desire to make a positive impression on their constituents (Adelberg & Batson, 1978; Gruder & Rosen, 1971; Wall, 1975, 1991). Research has found that representatives typically adopt a more competitive bargaining strategy and make fewer concessions than individual negotiators do (Benton, 1972; Druckman, Solomon, & Zechmeister, 1972, Van Kleef, Steinel, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007), suggesting that representatives are more concerned with their own outcomes and those of their group, and less so with the outcomes of their opponent. Since guilt rests on a concern for other’s outcomes (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith and Baumeister, 1998; Lelieveld et al., 2012; Mallett & Swim, 2007), bargainers may experience lower levels of guilt when they negotiate as representatives. Whether disappointment evokes guilt or not, may thus be determined by the type of negotiation (i.e., whether it is a representative negotiation or an individual negotiation).

**Current studies**

We thus suggest that communicating disappointment may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, when it evokes guilt, the communicated weakness may pay. On the other hand, communicating disappointment may backfire when it does not evoke guilt. We investigate the relevance of this for negotiation behavior, by taking into account with whom one negotiates, but also on behalf of whom one negotiates. We argue and demonstrate that disappointment evokes higher levels of guilt when the opponent
expressing disappointment is an in-group member, or when the negotiation is an individual negotiation. In these cases, the weakness that disappointment signals elicits prosocial behavior in the counterpart, which is reflected in generous offers (see also Lelieveld et al., 2012). When bargainers negotiate with an out-group opponent or as representatives, they are typically less concerned with the outcomes of their opponent. In these situations, disappointment evokes lower levels of guilt, and as a result the communicated weakness elicits a tendency to act in a self-interested way, which is reflected in lower offers (see also Thompson et al., 1995).

Although our theoretical analysis is specific to the emotion of disappointment, we deemed it important to demonstrate that the effects of disappointment can indeed be distinguished from those of another negative emotion. To establish this, we pitted the effects of disappointment against another negative emotion that does not communicate weakness: anger. Although anger and disappointment are both common reactions to undesirable outcomes and have been shown to possess similar levels of intensity and appropriateness in bargaining settings similar to ours (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012; see also Wubben, De Cremer, & Van Dijk, 2009), research has shown that in contrast to our predictions about disappointment, anger does not communicate weakness. This makes anger a highly relevant emotion to compare the effects of disappointment with. Anger is an emotion that elicits approach tendencies (Harmon-Jones, 2004) and feelings of control (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). Angry individuals are perceived to be powerful (Tiedens, 2001) and in negotiations they are perceived as tough (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Research on the communication of anger in negotiations has shown that angry bargainers are perceived to have high limits (e.g., Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, b). When a bargainer has high limits, this means he/she is not expected to give in. Anger may therefore alert others to negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation), which may lead them to concede to avoid impasse.

In contrast to the communication of disappointment, we suggest that anger may not elicit lower offers when it is communicated by an out-group member or in representative negotiations. Being associated with toughness and power, communicated anger may not suffer from the disadvantages of communicating weakness. Regardless of whether it is communicated by an in-group or out-group member, the toughness and high limits that anger communicates may lead targets to give in to avoid impasse. Similarly, to avoid ending the negotiation in impasse, targets of anger may offer more when negotiating
for their own outcomes, but also when negotiating as representatives. We thus predict that when communicated by an in-group member and in an individual negotiation, anger and disappointment may both elicit generous offers. When communicated by an out-group member or in a representative negotiation, we predict that anger elicits generous offers, but disappointment does not.

To examine the effects of group membership (in-group vs. out-group, see Experiment 5.1) and the type of negotiation (individual vs. representative negotiation, see Experiment 5.2 and 5.3), we used the ultimatum bargaining game, a commonly used task to study motivated bargaining behavior (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In this game, two players have to decide on how to distribute a certain amount of chips. One of the players (the allocator) makes a “take it or leave it” offer to the other player (the recipient) by offering a proportion of the chips. If the recipient accepts, the money will be distributed accordingly. If the recipient rejects, both receive nothing. Because of its simple structure, in which many dynamics of making offers and counteroffers are not present, the ultimatum bargaining game is very suited and also often used to examine the effects of emotional reactions in bargaining (see also Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008).

**Experiment 5.1**

In Experiment 5.1 we investigated the influence of group membership on the effects of communicated disappointment and anger. We manipulated the group membership of the opponent communicating the emotion, by either informing the participants that their opponent was a student from another or from the same university. We expected that communicating disappointment would elicit high offers from participants when it is communicated by an in-group member, but low offers when communicated by an out-group member. Regardless of the opponent’s group membership, disappointment may communicate weakness. When communicated by an out-group member, disappointment may evoke lower levels of guilt and the communicated weakness may lead bargainers in this situation to make lower offers. When communicated by an in-group member, disappointment may evoke higher levels of guilt and the communicated weakness may lead bargainers to offer more. Being an emotion that does not communicate weakness, but actually signals high limits (Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b) and toughness
(Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006), anger does not come with the disadvantages that disappointment has when it is communicated by an out-group member. The high limits that anger communicates may lead participants to make higher offers to avoid impasse, regardless of the expresser's group membership.

**Method**

**Design and participants**

The study used a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. anger) × 2 (opponent’s group membership: in-group vs. out-group) between-participants design. Participants were 81 students from Leiden University (61 females, 20 males, $M_{\text{age}} = 20.11$, $SD = 1.98$).

**Procedure**

Upon arrival, participants learned that they would participate in a large collaborative study, initiated by researchers at Leiden University and the University of Amsterdam, and that they would be paired with another participant. This participant would either be a student from their own university (an in-group member), or a student from the other university (an out-group member). Subsequently, participants learned that the computer randomly determined which of the other participants they were paired with. Half of the participants learned they were paired with an in-group member and half learned they were paired with an out-group member. Members of each dyad were referred to as person X and person Y and participants were assigned the letter X.

Before they received information about the bargaining situation, participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with six general statements about bargaining behavior. The answers to these questions were used as the cause of the emotional reaction (cf. Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2008). Example statements were "During negotiations strategy plays an important role" and "During negotiations my own outcomes are important". After giving their opinion on the bargaining statements, participants learned that their ratings were sent to Y. This was explained by pointing out that in reality people often have information about their opponent in a negotiation.
Subsequently, participants received information about the ultimatum bargaining situation. All participants learned that they, X, would bargain with Y over the distribution of 100 chips. Participants learned that they were assigned the role of allocator and that the chips had different values for the allocator and the recipient. One chip was worth 10 eurocents to them (person X), but only 5 cents to the recipient (person Y). Introducing this asymmetry (see also Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000) creates some ambiguity about what should be considered a fair allocation, which reduces bargainers' tendency to just propose a 50-50 split of the money (which often happens in ultimatum bargaining; see Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Participants learned that they would make an offer to Y by indicating how they wanted to allocate the chips. If Y agreed, the chips were distributed accordingly. However, if Y turned down the division, both X and Y would not receive any money.

After explaining the bargaining situation, the manipulation of the recipient's emotion was induced. Participants were led to believe that while they received the instructions about the bargaining game, Y had typed a reaction after reading the participant's answers to the bargaining statements. To ensure that participants believed that the emotional reaction was not altered for strategic reasons, participants learned that Y did not know that the reaction would be sent back to them (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In the angry opponent condition, participants read: “Now that I’ve read what X typed, it makes me quite angry. This is unpleasant. I am really annoyed”. In the disappointment conditions participants read “Now that I’ve read what X typed, I feel quite disappointed. This is unpleasant. I am really disappointed”. The angry and disappointed emotional statements were adapted from previous research on the effects of emotional communication in negotiations (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b, 2006a).

Finally, participants made their ultimatum offer. Subsequently, participants completed a questionnaire with manipulation checks and items designed to measure the perception of the opponent's weakness, the opponent's limits, and participants' guilt. All items were answered on 7-point scales.

To ensure that our manipulations of the communicated emotions were successful, participants were asked to indicate how angry and disappointed they thought Y was. To check whether participants realized that their opponent was from a different university or from the same university, we asked participants which university their opponent attended.
To check whether participants identified more with their in-group (students from their own university) than with their out-group (students from the other university), we asked participants to indicate to what extent they agreed with five statements concerning students from their own university (e.g., “I feel a strong connection to other students from my university”, “I identify strongly with other students from my university”, and “I feel a large resemblance to the values and opinions of other students from my university”). These were combined into a single index of identification with the in-group (α = .78). The same five statements were used to assess the identification with students from the other university (i.e., the out-group). These items were combined into a single index of identification with the out-group (α = .81).

To measure the perceived weakness of the opponent, we asked participants to what extent they perceived their opponent to have a weak bargaining position. As a second indication of whether the opponent was perceived to be weak, we also measured the perception of the opponent’s limits, by asking what they thought the opponent’s lowest acceptable number of chips would be. If the lowest acceptable number of chips of the opponent is perceived to be high, this means that opponents are not expected to give in much and that their limits are perceived to be high. A bargainer’s limits are an indication of his/her weakness, such that a weak bargainer is considered to have low limits, whereas a tough bargainer is considered to have high limits (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). Furthermore, in line with previous research (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012), we assessed participants’ guilt by asking how guilty they felt during the negotiation.

It is also relevant to check whether anger and disappointment might differ in intensity. To rule out that a difference in intensity is driving our effects, we asked participants how negative they thought their opponent was. Also, although previous research has shown that in negotiations it is not more or less appropriate to communicate disappointment than to communicate anger (Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012), we also measured the perceived appropriateness of the communicated emotions to ensure that this did not influence our results. We asked participants to what extent they thought the emotional reaction was appropriate in the current situation. At the end participants were debriefed and received 3 euros.
Results

Manipulation checks

**Opponent’s emotion.** A 2 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (opponent’s group membership) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 77) = 225.82, p < .001, \eta^2 = .75$, indicating that participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more angry ($M = 6.20, SD = .98$) than did participants in the disappointed opponent condition ($M = 3.30, SD = .72$). The 2 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings also only revealed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 77) = 66.41, p < .001, \eta^2 = .46$, indicating that participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent to be more disappointed ($M = 5.92, SD = 1.46$) than did participants in the angry opponent condition ($M = 3.73, SD = .90$).

**Opponent’s group membership.** All participants correctly answered the question about which university their opponent attended. Also, the identification ratings were submitted to a 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA, with opponent’s group membership and opponent’s emotion as between-participants variables and group (identification to students from the same university vs. identification to students from the other university) as a repeated-measures variable. First of all, the analysis yielded a main effect of group, $F(1, 77) = 610.37, p < .001, \eta^2 = .89$, indicating that participants identified more with students from the same university ($M = 4.69, SD = .64$) than with students from the other university ($M = 2.30, SD = .48$). Secondly, the analysis showed no significant main or interaction effects of opponent’s emotion or group membership ($p$s > .37).

These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership were successful.

Offer

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants’ offers yielded main effects of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 77) = 6.22, p < .05, \eta^2 = .08$, and opponent’s group membership, $F(1, 77) = 11.70, p < .001, \eta^2 = .13$. More importantly, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, $F(1, 77) = 4.35, p < .05, \eta^2 = .05$ (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership (Experiment 5.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual negotiation</td>
<td>59.65 a</td>
<td>7.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative negotiation</td>
<td>57.52 a</td>
<td>7.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means with different superscripts differ significantly (p < .05, analyzed with simple-effect analyses).

As expected, participants offered fewer chips to out-group members communicating disappointment (M = 50.24, SD = 7.66) than to in-group members communicating disappointment (M = 59.00, SD = 5.61), F(1, 77) = 14.96, p < .001, η² = .16. Participants’ offers to out-group opponents communicating anger (M = 57.52, SD = 7.18) as well as in-group opponents communicating anger (M = 59.65, SD = 7.85) were high and did not differ significantly (p = .35).

Moreover, as Table 5.1 shows, offers to disappointed out-group members were significantly lower (M = 50.24, SD = 7.66) than offers to angry in-group members (M = 59.65, SD = 7.85) or angry out-group members (M = 57.52, SD = 7.18, ps < .005). Finally, offers to disappointed in-group members did not differ significantly from offers to angry in-group members or angry out-group members, ps > .52.

Perceived weakness

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived weakness ratings only revealed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 77) = 85.59, p < .001, η² = .53, indicating that disappointed opponents were perceived to be weaker (M = 4.75, SD = .81) than angry opponents (M = 2.61, SD = 1.20).

In agreement with the perceived weakness ratings, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived limits ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(1, 77) = 11.69, p < .001, η² = .13, indicating that the limits of disappointed opponents were judged to be lower (M = 50.00, SD = 9.82) than the limits of angry opponents (M = 57.68, SD = 10.48).
Guilt

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings revealed main effects of emotion, $F(1, 77) = 7.70, p < .01, \eta^2 = .09$, and group membership, $F(1, 77) = 9.89, p < .005, \eta^2 = .11$. More importantly, these main effects were qualified by an interaction effect, $F(1, 77) = 10.68, p < .005, \eta^2 = .12$. Simple main effects showed that disappointment evoked higher levels of guilt in participants when communicated by an in-group opponent ($M = 5.00, SD = 1.05$) than when disappointment was communicated by an out-group opponent ($M = 3.14, SD = 1.32$), $F(1, 77) = 20.28, p < .001, \eta^2 = .21$. Moreover, disappointment from an in-group opponent also evoked more guilt than anger communicated by an in-group ($M = 3.25, SD = 1.33$) or out-group opponent ($M = 3.29, SD = 1.45$, both $p < .001$). Levels of guilt did not differ across the anger conditions ($p = 1.00$).

Mediated moderation analysis

We expected that the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership on participant’s offers would be mediated by participant’s guilt. This means that we anticipated mediated moderation (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). We first performed a series of regression analyses with the opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group membership interaction as the independent variable, offers as the dependent variable, and guilt as the mediator (while controlling for the opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership). These regression analyses showed a significant opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group membership interaction effect on offers ($\beta = -.21, p < .05$) and a significant interaction effect on the mediator ($\beta = -.32, p < .005$), consistent with the ANOVA results reported above. Furthermore, the mediator significantly predicted participant’s offers ($\beta = .49, p < .001$). Finally, when the mediator (participant’s guilt) was included in the regression analyses, the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership on offers became non-significant ($\beta = .08, p = .46$).
To test whether this mediated moderation was significant, we used a bootstrap method (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). A bootstrapped mediation analysis uses resampling of raw data to estimate the confidence intervals (CI) of the indirect effects, of which the mediation model consists. We used bootstrapping to estimate the indirect effect of the opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group membership interaction on offers with guilt as mediator, while controlling for the opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership terms. Using 10,000 bootstrap re-samples and bias corrected and accelerated intervals (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008), we obtained confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -2.47; upper CI = -1.19), indicating significant mediation. Thus, participant’s guilt mediated the interaction between opponent’s emotion and opponent’s group membership on the offer.

**Additional measures**

To ensure that our results were not caused by a difference in the intensity or appropriateness of the emotions, we measured both the intensity and appropriateness of the communicated anger and disappointment. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the intensity ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion (\(p = .50\)) or group membership (\(p = .47\)) and no interaction effect (\(p = .11\); overall \(M = 5.42, SD = 1.13\)), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to the perceived intensity of the emotion.

Accordingly, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the appropriateness ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion (\(p = .59\)) or group membership (\(p = .91\)) and no interaction effect (\(p = .13\); overall \(M = 5.32, SD = 1.30\)), indicating that the conditions also did not differ with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion.

Finally, entering the intensity and appropriateness ratings as covariates in our mediation analyses did not change the pattern of findings.

**Discussion**

In line with our expectations, the results from Experiment 5.1 show that in negotiations, the interpersonal effects of disappointment and not the effects of anger

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1 We used bootstrapping because this method offers a good test of mediation effects with relatively low sample sizes (cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). Testing for mediation with the procedure described by Baron and Kenny (1986) yielded similar findings: When controlling for the mediator guilt, all mediated moderation analyses showed a significant reduction of the interaction effect (the opponent’s emotion × opponent’s group membership interaction for Experiment 5.1 and the opponent’s emotion × type of negotiation interaction for Experiment 5.2 and 5.3), as confirmed by Sobel tests (all \(ps < .05\)).
depend highly on the expresser's group membership. We showed that disappointment communicates weakness, which can have two effects: It can evoke a tendency to act self-interested which is reflected in lower offers to disappointed opponents, or a sense of social responsibility which is reflected in higher offers. Our findings showed that whether participants felt guilty determined whether participants made higher offers to disappointed opponents or not. When disappointment was communicated by an in-group member it evoked guilt, which elicited higher offers from participants. However, when disappointment was communicated by an out-group member, participants felt less guilty, which elicited lower offers from participants.

Anger, on the other hand, elicited higher offers from participants regardless of the expresser's group membership. Being an emotion that communicates less weakness, anger may not elicit lower offers when it is communicated by an out-group member. In line with previous research (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), angry bargainers were perceived to have high limits and participants offered more, regardless of whether the anger was expressed by an in- or out-group member.

This is the first experiment that has shown that, besides evoking guilt, disappointment also communicates weakness. When disappointment is communicated by someone you do not identify with (i.e., when your opponent is an out-group member), levels of guilt are low, and communicated weakness may elicit lower offers. When disappointment is communicated by an in-group person, the communicated weakness is accompanied by guilt, which results in more generous offers. In Experiment 5.2 we investigated the effect of the type of negotiation. We investigated whether the weakness that disappointment communicates would also elicit lower offers when the target of the emotion negotiates as a representative for a constituency.

**Experiment 5.2**

In Experiment 5.2 we investigated the influence of the type of negotiation, by comparing the effects of communicated disappointment and anger in individual versus representative bargaining. We manipulated the type of negotiation, by either informing the participants that they negotiated for the outcomes of a group of three other participants (the representative negotiation condition) or for their own outcomes (the individual negotiation condition). We expected that disappointment would communicate weakness,
regardless of the type of negotiation. This weakness may pay when disappointment evokes
guilt, but backfire when it does not. We expected that disappointment would evoke guilt in
participants who negotiated for their own outcomes (see Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012),
which would lead participants to offer more. However, in a representative negotiation, we
expected disappointment to evoke lower levels of guilt because representative negotiators
tend to exhibit less concern for their negotiation counterparts. In this case, the
communicated weakness would evoke a tendency to act in a self-interested way by making
lower offers. Since anger does not communicate weakness, we expected that it would not
elicit low offers from participants in a representative negotiation.

Method

Design and participants

The study used a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. anger) × 2 (type of
negotiation: individual vs. representative negotiation) between-participants design.
Participants were 78 students from a university in the Netherlands (55 females, 23 males,
$M_{age} = 20.81, SD = 2.13$).

Procedure

The procedure resembled the procedure of Experiment 5.1. However, in the
current experiment half of the participants learned that they were negotiating for a group
consisting of three other participants and that these participants were dependent on them
for their outcomes. Participants themselves did not receive any of the chips, only their
constituency (the three other participants) received the chips participants bargained for. If
the participant would end up with 50 chips, for instance, each of the three other
participants would earn 50 chips. Note that the constituency would only receive the chips
if the (simulated) opponent would accept the participant’s ultimatum offer and that the
participants could not communicate with the constituency during the course of the
negociation. The other half of the participants did not have a constituency and received the
same instruction as participants in Experiment 5.1.

After explaining the bargaining situation, participants received the emotional
reactions (angry and disappointed reactions) as in Experiment 5.1 and subsequently made
their offer. Also, participants completed a similar post-negotiation questionnaire as in Experiment 5.1. The negotiation type manipulation was checked by asking participants who would receive the chips they negotiated for: the participants themselves, three other participants, or nobody. Note that participants in the representative negotiation condition did not receive any of the outcomes of the negotiation. One may wonder whether participants in this condition would then be less motivated to get a good outcome. Although this would not explain any differences between disappointment and anger, we asked participants to indicate how motivated they were to get a good outcome, to rule out that a difference in motivation was driving the effects.

Results

Manipulation checks

Opponent's emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (type of negotiation) ANOVA on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 74) = 79.41, p < .001, \eta^2 = .52$. Participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more angry ($M = 6.24, SD = 1.32$) than did participants in the disappointed opponent condition ($M = 3.67, SD = 1.19$). The 2 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings also only revealed a main effect of opponent's emotion, $F(1, 74) = 81.88, p < .001, \eta^2 = .53$, indicating that participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent to be more disappointed ($M = 6.15, SD = .95$) than did participants in the angry opponent condition ($M = 3.79, SD = 1.34$).

Type of negotiation. All participants answered the question about who would receive the negotiated chips once the opponent accepted the offer correctly.

These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent's emotion and type of negotiation were successful.

Offer

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on offers yielded a main effect of type of negotiation, $F(1, 74) = 9.77, p < .005, \eta^2 = .12$. This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction, $F(1, 74) = 4.60, p < .05, \eta^2 = .06$ (see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation (Experiment 5.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual negotiation</td>
<td>56.42 $^a$</td>
<td>9.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative negotiation</td>
<td>54.42 $^a$</td>
<td>8.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means with different superscripts differ significantly ($ps < .05$, analyzed with simple-effect analyses).

As expected, participants offered fewer chips to disappointed opponents when they negotiated as representatives ($M = 48.65, SD = 8.74$) than when they negotiated for themselves ($M = 59.40, SD = 8.53$), $F(1, 74) = 14.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16$. Offers in the anger conditions did not differ significantly ($M = 54.42, SD = 8.98; M = 56.42, SD = 9.76, p = .50$).

Moreover, as Table 5.2 also shows, offers from participants in a representative negotiation setting who had a disappointed opponent were significantly lower ($M = 48.65, SD = 8.74$) than offers to angry opponents in a representative negotiation ($M = 54.42, SD = 8.98$) or an individual negotiation ($M = 56.42, SD = 9.76$), both $ps < .05$. Offers from participants who negotiated individually and had a disappointed opponent did not differ significantly from offers to angry opponents in representative and individual negotiations, both $ps > .32$.

Perceived weakness

A $2 \times 2$ ANOVA on the perceived weakness ratings only revealed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 74) = 47.30, p < .001, \eta^2 = .39$, indicating that participants perceived disappointed opponents to be weaker ($M = 4.85, SD = 1.19$) than anger opponents ($M = 2.92, SD = 1.26$).

In agreement with these results, a $2 \times 2$ ANOVA on the perceived limits ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 74) = 7.94, p < .01, \eta^2 = .10$, indicating that participants judged the limits of disappointed opponents to be lower ($M = 49.33, SD = 11.80$) than the limits of angry opponents ($M = 55.92, SD = 8.19$).
Guilt

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings revealed main effects of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 74) = 10.15, p < .005, \eta^2 = .12$, and type of negotiation, $F(1, 74) = 7.58, p < .01, \eta^2 = .09$. More importantly, these were qualified by an interaction effect, $F(1, 74) = 11.22, p < .005, \eta^2 = .13$. Simple main effects showed that participants felt guiltier towards disappointed opponents when they negotiated for themselves ($M = 5.25, SD = 1.07$) than when they negotiated as representatives ($M = 3.10, SD = 1.41$), $F(1, 74) = 19.11, p < .001, \eta^2 = .21$. Moreover, participants with disappointed opponents who were negotiating for their own outcomes also felt guiltier than participants with angry opponents who negotiated as representatives ($M = 3.16, SD = 1.98$) or individually ($M = 2.95, SD = 1.65$, both $p < .001$). Levels of guilt did not differ significantly across the anger conditions ($p = .98$).

Mediated moderation analysis

We expected that the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on participant’s offers would be mediated by participant’s guilt. As in Experiment 5.1, we performed regression analyses, which showed a significant opponent’s emotion × type of negotiation interaction effect on offers ($\beta = -.23, p < .05$) and a significant interaction effect on the mediator ($\beta = -.33, p < .005$), in line with the ANOVA results. The mediator (participant’s guilt) significantly predicted participant’s offers ($\beta = .48, p < .001$). Finally, when the mediator was included in the regression analyses, the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on offers became non-significant ($\beta = .05, p = .69$). Our bootstrap analysis using 10,000 re-samples showed confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -3.26; upper CI = -.14), indicating significant mediation. Thus, participant’s guilt mediated the interaction between opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on the offer.

Additional measures

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the intensity ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .22$) or type of negotiation ($p = .64$) and no interaction effect ($p = .25$; overall $M = 5.47, SD = 1.28$). The conditions thus did not differ with regard to the perceived intensity of the emotion.

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the appropriateness ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .93$) or type of negotiation ($p = .62$) and no interaction effect ($p$
0.34; overall $M = 4.46, SD = 1.41$), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion.

A $2 \times 2$ ANOVA on the motivation ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .82$) or type of negotiation ($p = .86$) and no interaction effect ($p = .86$; overall $M = 6.14, SD = .62$), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to participant’s motivation to get a good outcome.

Entering the intensity, appropriateness, and motivation ratings as covariates in our mediation analyses did not change the pattern of findings.

**Discussion**

The findings of Experiment 5.2 showed that in negotiations, the interpersonal effects of disappointment, but not the effects of anger, depend highly on the type of negotiation. We found that when participants negotiated as representatives, they felt less guilty toward disappointed opponents than when they negotiated for their own outcomes. In line with the results of Experiment 5.1, we found that when the communication of disappointment did not evoke guilt, participants made lower offers. When disappointment did evoke guilt (when they negotiated for their own outcomes) participants made higher offers. Participants were still careful when they negotiated with an angry opponent. These opponents were perceived as less weak, to have high limits, and participants offered more chips to angry opponents.

Experiment 5.1 and 5.2 thus showed that whether communicating disappointment pays or backfires, depends on whether disappointment evokes guilt or not. When an opponent communicated disappointment and it did not evoke guilt in bargainers (i.e., when it was communicated by an out-group member or when the bargainer negotiated as a representative), the communicated weakness evoked self-interested behavior (i.e., lower offers). When disappointment did evoke guilt (i.e., when it was communicated by an in-group member or when the bargainer negotiated for his/her own outcomes), the communicated weakness evoked prosocial behavior. In both experiments our emotion manipulation consisted of written messages. To rule out that our effects are restricted to verbal emotional reactions, in Experiment 5.3 we used a video of a trained actor who expressed either disappointment or anger. This emotion manipulation included facial, postural and vocal expressions of both emotions.
Experiment 5.3

Method

Design and participants

The study used a 2 (opponent’s emotion: disappointment vs. anger) × 2 (type of negotiation: individual vs. representative negotiation) between-participants design. Participants were 84 students from a university in the Netherlands (60 females, 24 males, \(M_{\text{age}} = 21.57, SD = 3.65\)).

Procedure

The procedure was identical to the procedure of Experiment 5.2, except for the emotion manipulation. In the current experiment a trained actor spoke exactly the same text as in Experiment 5.1 and 5.2 for the angry and disappointed emotional reaction. In the angry display condition, he frowned a lot, spoke with an angry and irritable tone of voice, and looked stern. In the disappointed display condition, he raised the insides of his eyebrows, spoke with a disapproving tone of voice, and shook his head (for similar procedures, see Barsade [2002], Bono and Ilies [2006], Lewis [2000], Van Kleef et al. [2009]). The two clips were of equal length.

Results

Manipulation checks

Opponent’s emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (type of negotiation) ANOVA on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, \(F(1, 80) = 102.54, p < .001, \eta^2 = .56\). Participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more angry \((M = 6.00, SD = .83)\) than did participants in the disappointed opponent condition \((M = 3.12, SD = 1.66)\). The 2 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings also only revealed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, \(F(1, 80) = 61.42, p < .001, \eta^2 = .43\), indicating that participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent to be more
disappointed \((M = 6.14, SD = 1.28)\) than did participants in the angry opponent condition \((M = 3.98, SD = 1.22)\).

**Type of negotiation.** All participants answered the question about who would receive the negotiated chips once the opponent accepted the offer correctly.

These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent's emotion and type of negotiation were successful.

**Offer**

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on offers yielded a main effect of type of negotiation, \(F(1, 80) = 9.06, p < .005, \eta^2 = .10\). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction, \(F(1, 80) = 6.28, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07\) (see Table 5.3).

**Table 5.3.** Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent's emotion and type of negotiation (Experiment 5.3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Negotiation</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>57.65 (^a)</td>
<td>59.86 (^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>56.73 (^a)</td>
<td>49.75 (^b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(Note.\) Means with different superscripts differ significantly \((ps < .05, \text{analyzed with simple-effect analyses})\).

As expected, participants made lower offers to disappointed opponents when they negotiated as representatives \((M = 49.75, SD = 11.06)\) than when they negotiated for themselves \((M = 59.86, SD = 5.18)\), \(F(1, 80) = 15.21, p < .001, \eta^2 = .16\). Offers in the anger conditions did not differ significantly \((M = 57.65, SD = 8.51; M = 56.73, SD = 8.09, p = .72)\).

Moreover, as Table 5.3 also shows, offers from participants who negotiated as representatives and had a disappointed opponent were significantly lower \((M = 49.75, SD = 11.06)\) than offers to angry opponents, who negotiated as representatives or individually \((M = 56.73, SD = 8.09; M = 57.65, SD = 8.51, ps < .01)\). Offers from participants who
When communicating disappointment helps and hurts

negotiated individually and had a disappointed opponent did not differ significantly from offers to angry opponents who negotiated as representatives or individually, both ps > .60.

Perceived weakness

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived weakness ratings only revealed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 80) = 32.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .29$, indicating that participants perceived disappointed opponents to be weaker ($M = 4.60, SD = 1.33$) than angry opponents ($M = 2.88, SD = 1.47$).

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the perceived limits ratings also yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(1, 80) = 5.89, p < .05, \eta^2 = .07$, indicating that participants judged the limits of disappointed opponents to be lower ($M = 50.90, SD = 16.52$) than the limits of angry participants ($M = 58.62, SD = 11.71$).

Guilt

A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt ratings revealed main effects of emotion, $F(1, 80) = 4.67, p < .05, \eta^2 = .06$, and type of negotiation, $F(1, 80) = 7.64, p < .01, \eta^2 = .09$. More importantly, these were qualified by an interaction effect, $F(1, 80) = 6.97, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08$. Simple main effects showed that participants felt guiltier towards disappointed opponents when they negotiated individually ($M = 5.05, SD = 1.25$) than when they negotiated as a representative ($M = 3.25, SD = 1.41$), $F(1, 80) = 14.61, p < .001, \eta^2 = .15$. Moreover, participants who negotiated individually and had a disappointed opponent felt guiltier than participants with angry opponents who negotiated individually ($M = 3.45, SD = 1.61$) or as representatives ($M = 3.41, SD = 1.76$, both ps < .001). Levels of guilt did not differ across the anger conditions ($p = 1.00$).

Mediated moderation analysis

Like in Experiment 5.2, we performed regression analyses to investigate whether the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on participant’s offers would be mediated by participant’s guilt. These analyses showed a significant opponent’s emotion × type of negotiation interaction effect on offers ($\beta = -.26, p < .05$) and a significant interaction effect on the mediator ($\beta = -.26, p < .01$). The mediator (participant’s guilt) significantly predicted participant’s offers ($\beta = .48, p < .001$). Finally, when the mediator was included in the regression analyses, the interaction effect of opponent’s emotion and
type of negotiation on offers became non-significant ($\beta = -.04, p = .73$). Our bootstrap analysis using 10,000 re-samples showed confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -2.54; upper CI = -.06), indicating significant mediation. Thus, participant’s guilt mediated the interaction between opponent’s emotion and type of negotiation on the offer.

**Additional measures**

A $2 \times 2$ ANOVA on the intensity ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .21$) or type of negotiation ($p = .67$) and no interaction effect ($p = .97$; overall $M = 5.35$, $SD = 1.09$). The conditions thus did not differ with regard to the perceived intensity of the emotion.

A $2 \times 2$ ANOVA on the appropriateness ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .80$) or type of negotiation ($p = .22$) and no interaction effect ($p = .51$; overall $M = 4.36$, $SD = 1.07$), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion.

A $2 \times 2$ ANOVA on the motivation ratings showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .25$) or type of negotiation ($p = .37$) and no interaction effect ($p = .97$; overall $M = 6.07$, $SD = .77$), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to participant’s motivation to get a good outcome.

Again, entering the intensity, appropriateness, and motivation ratings as covariates in our mediation analyses did not change the pattern of findings.

**General Discussion**

Social-functional approaches to emotion suggest that expressing disappointment in negotiations may be a double-edged sword. Disappointment communicates weakness, which on the one hand can evoke a tendency to act in a self-interested way (De Dreu, 1995; Güth & Huck, 1997; Kagel et al., 1996; Lawler, 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Suleiman, 1996), but on the other hand also a tendency to act in a prosocial way (Fisher & Nadler, 1974; Frieze & Boneva, 2001; Gardner & Seeley, 2001; Greenberg, 1978; Handgraaf et al., 2008; Lee & Tiedens, 2001; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1991). In negotiations, the first tendency may lead others to maximize their own outcomes and make lower offers. The second may lead others to help the weak opponent and cooperate more. Our goal was to resolve this
apparent inconsistency. In three experiments using both written emotion manipulations (Experiment 5.1 and 5.2) and filmclips involving facial, postural, and vocal expressions (Experiment 5.3) we demonstrated that whether guilt is evoked or not determines whether disappointment elicits high or low offers. Communicating disappointment pays when it elicits guilt in the target, but backfires when it does not elicit guilt. We pitted the interpersonal effects of disappointment (an emotion that communicates weakness) against the effects of anger (an emotion that communicates strength) and showed that an opponent's group membership and the type of negotiation (two important moderators of motivated bargaining behavior) determine whether communicating disappointment results in high outcomes or not. As anticipated, the interpersonal effects of anger were not affected.

We also showed why these factors moderate expressions of disappointment and not of anger. In our first experiment we showed that when an in-group member communicates disappointment it evokes guilt, but when an out-group member communicates disappointment it does not. People generally allocate more rewards to in-group members and regard in-group members more positively than out-group members (Tajfel, 1978). Also, research has shown that people tend to help members of their in-group more than members of their out-group (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1997; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Omoto & Snyder, 2002). People tend to care less about out-group members, and empathic responses towards out-group members are generally dampened or even absent (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011).

Whether people feel guilty or not depends highly on a concern for the other (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith and Baumeister, 1998; Lelieveld et al., 2012; Mallett & Swim, 2007). Indeed, our results showed that when out-group members communicated disappointment it did not evoke guilt, which led participants to offer less. When in-group members communicated disappointment it did evoke guilt, and this led participants to offer more. Guilt thus determined whether the weakness that disappointment communicated evoked a tendency to act in a self-interested way (which was reflected in low offers from participants), or a tendency to act prosocially (which was reflected in high offers from participants). The effects of expressions of anger, on the other hand, were not dependent on the expresser’s group membership. Anger communicated high limits regardless of whether it was expressed by an in- or out-group member. In line with
previous research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), we showed that participants made generous offers to these angry opponents.

In our second and third experiment we showed that not only group membership, but also the type of negotiation may influence the effects of disappointment. We showed that only when participants negotiated for their own outcomes, disappointment evoked guilt. In representative negotiations, however, disappointment evoked less guilt in participants. This is in line with research that has indicated that representatives adopt a more competitive bargaining strategy and make fewer concessions compared to individual negotiators (Benton, 1972; Druckman et al., 1972, Van Kleef et al., 2007). Expressions of anger were again not dependent on whether participants negotiated as representatives or not. Anger signaled high limits in both cases. Moreover, in line with previous research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), we showed that participants made generous offers to angry opponents, regardless of the type of negotiation.

Our results contribute to the existing line of research that suggests that emotions that communicate power are often more advantageous to express than emotions that communicate weakness. Emotions that communicate power, such as anger, signal competence (Tiedens, 2001), but also toughness and dominance (Clark et al., 1996; Karasawa, 2001; Knutson, 1996; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). This research suggests that, in general, people concede more to tough and powerful people than to bargainers who are perceived as soft or submissive (e.g., Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Komorita & Brenner, 1968; Pruitt, 1981; Yukl, 1974). Our findings accord with this reasoning to the extent that anger (which communicates power) elicited higher offers than disappointment (which communicates weakness) when communicated by an out-group member (Experiment 5.1) or in a representative negotiation (Experiment 5.2 and 5.3). However, when the communicated weakness evokes a social responsibility in others (when people feel guilty), weak emotions such as disappointment may actually induce cooperativeness in others. In the latter situation, expressing emotions that communicate weakness may benefit bargainers.

In some situations it has even been shown that expressing emotions that communicate weakness in negotiations is superior to expressing emotions that communicate power. In a recent study, the interpersonal effects of anger and
disappointment were examined in a similar ultimatum setting (see Lelieveld et al., 2012). In this study, the power of the bargainers expressing the emotions was manipulated. When anger and disappointment were communicated by a high power bargainer both emotions elicited high offers, but when they were communicated by a low power bargainer, anger elicited low offers but disappointment did not. The current research shows that bargainers who communicate disappointment do not always obtain higher outcomes than bargainers who communicate anger. The effects of disappointment depend highly on whether it evokes guilt in others or not.

In addition to the documented findings that disappointment may elicit a loss of control (Zeelenberg et al., 1998) and feelings of weakness (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b) in the self, the current findings indicate that it also communicates this weakness to others. This suggests that there is a clear link between the intrapersonal effects of disappointment (which refer to the effects of emotions on people's own thoughts, behavior and feelings) and the interpersonal effects of disappointment (which refer to the effects of emotions on others' thoughts, behavior and feelings). Research on other emotions has also shown that feelings and intentions that are evoked by certain emotions are also communicated to others. For instance, people who experience anger not only feel powerful (Roseman et al., 1996), they are also perceived as powerful and tough (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens, 2001; Van Dijk et al., 2008, Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b). Similarly, people who experience guilt not only feel that they violated an expectation or norm (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002), their guilt also signals this to others (Van Kleef et al., 2006a; Wubben et al., 2009). And previous research on disappointment showed that people experiencing disappointment not only feel in need of help (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b), their expressions of disappointment also convey this dependence to others (Van Kleef et al., 2006a). We add to this literature by showing that disappointment not only elicits feelings of weakness in oneself, but also communicates weakness to others. This communicated weakness can pay when guilt is evoked, but backfire when it does not evoke guilt.

Directions for future research

In the current experiments we used the ultimatum bargaining game to investigate the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment. This enabled us to study the effects of communicated emotions in a one-shot bargaining setting with a clear outcome. Thanks
to this controlled setting, we were able to provide clear findings and conclusions regarding the interpersonal effects of emotions and their underlying processes. For future research, it may also be interesting to investigate how our findings generalize to other types of negotiations. Prior findings regarding the interpersonal effects of emotions obtained in ultimatum bargaining settings (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2012; Van Dijk et al., 2008) have been similar to findings obtained in multi-trial negotiations (e.g., Lelieveld et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b) and even face-to-face negotiations (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). It would be interesting to see whether the current findings will also generalize to such settings.

In our studies we focused on anger and disappointment as steady-state emotions. However, during negotiations feelings and emotions of bargainers may change profoundly. Previous research has shown that these emotional transitions (i.e., the movement between emotions states) may lead to different outcomes than corresponding steady-state emotions (Filipowicz, Barsade, & Melwani, 2011). These studies compared the communication of anger and happiness to displays of becoming angry (i.e., emotional expressions moved from happiness to anger) and becoming happy (i.e., emotional expressions moved from anger to happiness). Results showed that displays of becoming angry elicited higher offers from others than did steady-state anger. Negotiation outcomes for displays of becoming happy were not significantly different from displays of steady-state happiness. However, opponents did give bargainers who showed displays of becoming happy lower relational impression ratings. With regard to the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment, it may also be interesting to investigate the effects of emotional transitions. Communicating disappointment backfires when it is communicated by an out-group member or in representative negotiations. Starting off with displaying an emotion that communicates power (i.e., anger), and moving to an emotion that communicates less power (i.e., disappointment), may be a wise alternative to expressing the steady-state emotion disappointment. It could be that expressers are then perceived to be less weak (because they start off with an emotion that signals strength), but the transition to disappointment may still evoke guilt. Future research could investigate how emotional transitions between anger and disappointment differ from the steady-state emotions that we investigated and which transition would elicit positive negotiation outcomes.

In future research, it may also be interesting to include other determinants of whether bargainers feel guilty or not towards their opponent. We now investigated the
effects of group membership and of the type of negotiation and showed that bargainers feel less guilty when their opponent is an out-group member or when they negotiate as representatives. Guilt, however, has also been shown to be linked to perspective taking and empathy, such that people feel guiltier towards another person when they want or are able to take the perspective of the other and when they empathize more with the other (Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). It would be interesting to investigate if manipulating these concepts (e.g., by instructing participants to take the perspective of the other person) would produce similar results.

In Experiment 5.2 and 5.3, we showed that the type of negotiation is a crucial determinant of whether disappointment evokes guilt or not. Our findings show that when bargainers negotiate as representatives, disappointment evokes less guilt. Participants in Experiment 5.2 and 5.3 may have been more concerned with the outcomes of their constituency and less with the outcomes of the disappointed opponent, which led participants to experience lower levels of guilt. There are several alternative explanations for why these participants experienced lower levels of guilt. First, it could be that participants assumed that their opponent was negotiating as a representative as well. We did not inform participants about whether their opponent was negotiating as a representative as well or for own outcomes. Participants may have felt less guilty in the representative negotiation, because they believed that they did not directly harm the outcomes of their opponent, but only the outcomes of the opponent’s constituency (whom they were not directly dealing with). Secondly, participants who negotiated as representatives may have perceived their constituency more as in-group members and their opponent more as an out-group member. In line with Experiment 5.1, one may then conclude that disappointment evoked lower levels of guilt, because it was communicated by an out-group member. Finally, participants may have felt less responsible for the outcomes of the opponent. Participants in our studies negotiated on the authority of a constituency, which may have led participants to feel less responsible for lower outcomes of their opponent. As a result, participants may have felt less guilty. Although we feel that these explanations may very well be related (e.g., in representative bargaining one may feel less responsible for the outcomes of the opponent, because one tends to see him/her as an out-group member), it may be interesting for future research to further explore these explanations.
In our studies, guilt was a crucial determinant of the interpersonal effects of disappointment. Anger, on the other hand, did not evoke guilt in our participants. At this point, it may be noted that some studies have shown that expressions of anger can also elicit sympathy or support (Clark & Brissette, 2003) and even feelings of guilt (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). However, these findings were obtained in situations in which the two parties were engaged in a close affiliative relationship (Yoo, Clark, Lemay, Salovey, & Monin, 2011) and in non-competitive situations (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). In our studies, the interpersonal effects of disappointment were examined within competitive bargaining settings, where the communication of anger may not evoke guilt in others, but instead triggers strategic considerations (Van Kleeft et al., 2010). Future research could investigate the effects of anger and disappointment in close relationships to see whether in negotiations, anger can also evoke guilt in others.

Whether communicating disappointment yields high outcomes seems to depend on whether it evokes guilt or not. We do not suggest, however, that guilt is the only factor that determines whether communicating weakness pays or not. Factors such as empathy, or the closeness of the relationship of the negotiation parties may also determine whether communicated weakness evokes a tendency to act prosocially. In this regard, it may also be interesting to broaden the scope and investigate other emotions that elicit a need for help. Other supplication emotions such as sadness, fear and worry (see Van Kleeft et al., 2006a) may also communicate weakness. So far, previous literature has not linked guilt to any of these other supplication emotions. Future research could investigate when and how these emotions evoke a tendency to act prosocially and when and how they evoke a tendency to act in a self-interested manner.

**Conclusion**

The current studies underscore the idea that specific emotions evoke specific affective reactions in others (e.g., Van Kleeft et al., 2006a, 2010). One should therefore treat each emotion as a distinct predictor of behavior in negotiations. We showed that, unlike anger, disappointment communicates weakness and thus exerts influence via different processes than anger does. In contrast to the common belief that weakness is a liability in negotiations, expressing disappointment can be effective under particular circumstances. We showed that the positive effects of disappointment depend highly on whether or not it evokes guilt. The weakness that disappointment communicates may elicit a sense of social
responsibility in others when disappointment evokes guilt, but a tendency to act in a self-
interested manner when it does not evoke guilt. These findings help to resolve the
apparent inconsistency regarding the interpersonal effects of disappointment and extend
the literature on communicated power/weakness.

**Acknowledgements**

We thank Marlon Mooijman for his help with our emotion manipulation in the
third experiment.