The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/20466 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

**Author:** Lelieveld, Gert-Jan  
**Title:** Emotions in negotiations: the role of communicated anger and disappointment  
**Issue Date:** 2013-01-29
Chapter 2

Affective reactions to anger
and disappointment

Chapter 2

When making decisions we are often dependent on others. Conflicts that arise in such situations are often resolved by negotiation, “a discussion between two or more parties with the apparent aim of resolving a divergence of interests” (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993, p.2). This definition, however, does not capture the fact that negotiations are often highly emotional. In this article, we examine how negotiators respond to their opponent's emotions. We focus on the effects of two common emotions in negotiation, anger and disappointment (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b), and examine how angry versus disappointed reactions shape a target's negotiation behavior by eliciting reciprocal and/or complementary emotions.

The social functions of emotions

Emotions have long been regarded as disruptive forces that interfere with rational decision-making. Increasingly, researchers have come to acknowledge the functional aspects of emotions (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010). According to social-functional perspectives (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2010), emotions contain crucial information about feelings and intentions of the expresser, which can have behavioral consequences for observers. Moreover, emotion displays can evoke complementary or reciprocal emotions in others that help to respond to social events (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). Emotions may thus affect others via two processes: by providing information that others may use as input to their decisions and by eliciting affective reactions (Van Kleef et al., 2010).

Previous research on negotiations has focused mainly on how bargainers make informational inferences following opponents’ emotions. Although anger and disappointment are both reactions to undesirable outcomes, they communicate different information (Bell, 1985; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). Earlier findings showed that because angry bargainers are seen as tough negotiators who do not want to give in (e.g., Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1996; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006, Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b), their limits (i.e., their minimal acceptable offer) are perceived to be high. Anger may therefore alert opponents to
negative consequences (e.g., conflict escalation), which may lead them to concede to avoid impasse.

Disappointment, on the other hand, is thought to have a “supplication” function (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006a). Supplication emotions serve as a call for help (Clark et al., 1996; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998). Previous research found that negotiators with disappointed opponents inferred that the other had received too little (Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008) and was hoping for more (Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995). Consequently, disappointment led opponents to make concessions to satisfy the other’s needs.

**Affective reactions towards anger and disappointment**

In addition to the informational value of anger and disappointment, emotional expressions can also wield interpersonal influence by eliciting affective reactions in observers (Barsade, 2002; Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Friedman et al., 2004; Van Kleef et al., 2010). The anger or disappointment communicated by opponents may elicit emotions in negotiators that subsequently influence their negotiation behavior. In the current article, we set out to investigate this affective link. We argue that emotional reactions may influence negotiators’ emotions and subsequent behavior in two ways: via emotional reciprocity and/or via emotional complementarity.

*Emotional reciprocity* refers to the process by which one individual comes to feel the emotions of another (e.g., via emotional convergence or emotional contagion; see Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Hess & Blairy, 2001). In the current context emotional reciprocity means that if one negotiator is angry, the other negotiator comes to experience anger as well. Likewise, if one negotiator is disappointed, the other also feels disappointed.

A second way by which one person’s emotions influence others’ emotions has been termed *emotional complementarity*. Emotional complementarity refers to “the situation where one person’s emotions evoke different but corresponding emotions in others” (Van Kleef et al., 2008, p.1315). One of the presumed social functions of complementary emotional responses is to reduce the intensity of others’ emotions and to promote well-adjusted personal relationships (Keltn er & Haidt, 1999). For instance, displays of contempt evoke shame in others (Gilbert & Andrews, 1998), which in turn may reduce the intensity of the contempt and thereby improve the interpersonal relation. By reducing the intensity of other’s emotions, complementary emotions thus regulate social
interaction and create social stability (Morris & Keltner, 2000; see also Tiedens & Fragale, 2003).

The complementary emotion that is most consistently associated with anger is fear (Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), which makes sense considering that anger is typically associated with aggression (Averill, 1982) and thus poses a threat to observers (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Indeed, empirical work has demonstrated that both verbal and nonverbal expressions of anger can evoke fear in observers (e.g., Dimberg & Öhman, 1996; Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Unlike anger, disappointment does not evoke fear in others. Instead, we argue that disappointment evokes the complementary emotion of guilt. Previous work has associated disappointment with feelings of weakness (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). It therefore does not communicate a potential threat, which makes it unlikely to evoke fear in others. Previous research showed that disappointment communicates that one has received too little and was hoping for more (Thompson et al., 1995; Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). This may evoke a sense of social responsibility in others, which is a key antecedent of guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Mallett & Swim, 2007). Guilt arises when individuals feel they have violated some expectation or norm (Leith & Baumeister, 1998). Expressions of guilt can help repair relationships because they signal that the “victim” is important to the “transgressor”. Guilt may thus hold a promise of better treatment in the future (Baumeister et al., 1994; Van Kleef et al., 2006a). In accordance with this reasoning, Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel and Van Kleef (2011) showed that expressions of disappointment may evoke guilt in others, which elicits a concern for the other.

In short, in this article, we study how affective reactions to other’s emotions subsequently affect behavior. This complements prior approaches that concentrated on the informational inferences (e.g., the inference that anger may communicate high limits). By doing so, we do not claim that affective reactions are not based on inferences. Our analysis acknowledges that other’s emotions may instigate a direct emotional reaction, but may also partly be based on inferential processes (e.g., when we infer from other’s disappointment that he/she had expected more from us, and consequently feel guilty). Based on prior theorizing and research, anger and disappointment can be expected to have differential effects on observers’ reciprocal and complementary emotional reactions. Whereas anger may evoke the reciprocal emotion anger and the complementary emotion
fear, disappointment may evoke the reciprocal emotion disappointment and the complementary emotion guilt.

**Behavioral consequences and the role of power**

So what determines whether people reciprocate or complement opponents’ emotions? We propose that one key determinant is the relative power of the bargainers. Social power reflects the relative capacity to modify and/or influence other’s outcomes (Fiske, 1993; Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). We argue that the relative power of the bargainers is more essential for the interpersonal effects of anger and less for disappointment.

When anger is expressed by a person in a relatively high-power position, it entails a threat (Van Dijk et al., 2008). The potential consequences of expressed anger for low-power individuals are severe, because they have limited control over their outcomes. As a result, angry reactions by powerful opponents lead negotiators to fear that their outcomes will be reduced (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006b). Fear has been shown to render bargainers risk averse (Lerner & Keltner, 2001) and to make them more likely to avoid conflict (Bell & Song, 2005), which leads them to make higher offers.

When a negotiator receives an angry reaction from an opponent in a low-power position, the potential consequences are less likely to be severe. When the opponent has little control over the outcomes, anger poses less of a threat. As a result, bargainers who are confronted with angry reactions of a low-power opponent experience less fear compared to those confronted with the anger of a high-power opponent. In such situations, anger is more likely to evoke reciprocal anger (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Angry reactions by low-power negotiators are thus more likely to backfire. The experience of (reciprocal) anger has been shown to elicit competitiveness (Forgas, 1998; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) and a desire for retaliation (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), which is typically reflected in lower offers. Power may therefore be a key factor that determines whether anger is complemented or reciprocated and thus successful or not. If the consequences for own outcomes are severe (i.e., when anger is reported by a high-power person), anger may pay, and when consequences are mild (i.e., when anger is reported by a low-power person), anger may backfire (see also Van Dijk et al., 2008).
We reasoned that these effects of anger do not generalize to disappointment. Previous research has shown that disappointment evokes a concern for others by evoking guilt, even in competitive settings (Lelieveld et al., 2011). Reactions to disappointment are thus less based on the immediate consequences for own outcomes, and more on a concern for the outcomes of the disappointed other. When the concern about own outcomes is reduced and social responsibility increases, the relative power position of the other person may become less important. Indeed, bargainers can feel a concern for high-power opponents, but research has shown that bargainers also feel social responsibility for low-power opponents (Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & De Dreu, 2008). Therefore, we hypothesize that disappointed reactions evoke the complementary emotion guilt in others, in high- as well as low-power positions. Guilt triggers a tendency to improve relationship quality and reduce competition (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998). In addition, guilt has been shown to motivate people to make amends (Baumeister et al., 1994) and stimulate concessions (Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Disappointed reactions should therefore elicit generous offers from targets, regardless of the disappointed bargainer’s power position.

We investigated our hypotheses in two experiments in which we manipulated the relative power position of the bargainers. To examine the effects of power distributions, we used a bargaining context that is commonly used to investigate motivated bargaining behavior; the ultimatum bargaining context. The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG, developed by Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) models the final phase of bargaining, where bargainers make a “take it or leave it” offer. With its simple structure, the UBG is very suited to studying motivated bargaining behavior and the structural effects of power as well as effects of emotional reactions (see Van Dijk et al., 2008).

**Experiment 2.1**

In Experiment 2.1 we manipulated the relative power position of the opponent. Half of the participants negotiated with high-power opponents and half with low-power opponents. Both groups received an angry reaction, a disappointed reaction or no reaction (which was the control condition). We propose that anger reported by a high-power opponent elicits higher offers than anger reported by a low-power opponent (see also Van Dijk et al., 2008). We expect this moderating effect of power in the anger conditions to be
mediated by fear. When anger does not pose a threat (in the low-power condition), anger may thus likely backfire because it may not evoke fear. We propose that reporting anger in a low-power position elicits lower offers, in comparison to reporting no emotion. We expect this effect of opponent’s emotion in the low-power anger and control conditions to be mediated by reciprocal anger.

We predict that the effects of disappointment are not moderated by power. Regardless of power, we expect participants to report more guilt in the disappointment condition than in the anger and control conditions (see also Lelieveld et al., 2011). Consequently, we do not expect a difference in offers between the high- and low-power disappointment conditions. Feelings of guilt lead participants to offer more to disappointed opponents than to angry or neutral opponents. First, we will focus on the participants with high-power disappointed opponents and test whether they make higher offers because they feel guilty. To do so, we will compare the high-power disappointment condition to the high-power control condition and expect the effect of opponent’s emotion to be mediated by guilt. Second, we will investigate whether disappointment reported by a low-power opponent also elicits high offers. We will compare the low-power disappointment condition to the low-power angry and control conditions, to see whether the effect of opponent’s emotion in these conditions is mediated by guilt.

In addition, we measured the perceived limits to see whether, in addition to the emotional effects of anger and disappointment, informational inferences also play a role in participant’s behavioral reactions. Previous research has shown that anger influences opponents via perceived limits (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b), but such effects have not been demonstrated for disappointment. In particular, one might wonder whether people offer more to high-power opponents (reporting anger or disappointment) than to low-power opponents, because they believe that high-power opponents are unlikely to settle for less.

**Method**

**Design and participants**

We used a 3 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. disappointment vs. control) × 2 (opponent’s power: high vs. low) between-participants design. Participants were 114 students from Leiden University (72 females, 42 males, \(M_{\text{age}} = 21.15, SD = 2.93\)).
Procedure

Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would participate in a study on bargaining, and that they would be paired with another participant. They learned that members of each dyad were referred to as person X and person Y and that they were assigned the letter X. The rest of the procedure can be divided into four phases.

In phase one, before they received information about the bargaining situation (see phase two), participants produced behavior which supposedly caused the opponent’s emotional reaction. Participants read six general statements about bargaining behavior. Participants indicated to what extent they agreed with these statements (cf. Van Dijk et al., 2008). Example statements were “During negotiations strategy plays an important role” and “During negotiations my own outcomes are important.” Subsequently, participants learned that their ratings on the statements were sent to Y, so that Y could form an opinion about the person they were dealing with. This was explained by pointing out that in reality people often have some information about the other party.

In phase two, participants received information about the bargaining situation. All participants learned that they, X, would bargain with Y over the distribution of 100 chips. Participants learned that they were assigned the role of allocator and that the chips had different values for the allocator and the recipient. One chip was worth 10 eurocents to them, but only 5 cents to the recipient. Introducing this asymmetry (see also Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000) creates some ambiguity about what should be considered a fair allocation, which reduces bargainers’ tendency to just propose a 50-50 split of the money (which often happens in ultimatum bargaining; see Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Participants learned that they would make an offer to Y by indicating how they wanted to allocate the chips. If Y agreed, the chips were distributed accordingly.

Next, we manipulated power. In the high-power opponent conditions, participants learned that if the recipient turned down the division, both X and Y would not receive anything. In the low-power opponent conditions, participants learned that if the recipient rejected the division, it would be reduced by 10%. For example, if the allocator proposes an 80-20 distribution and the recipient rejects the offer, both still receive 90% of the chips they would have received (in this case the allocator would receive 72 chips and the recipient 18). It is apparent that in the latter situation, the consequences of rejection are less severe and thus that the relative power of the recipient is weakened (see also Suleiman, 1996; Van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000).
In phase three the manipulation of the recipient’s emotion was induced. Participants were led to believe that meanwhile (during the time they received instructions about the bargaining game) the recipient had typed a reaction after reading the participant’s answers to the bargaining statements. Participants read that the recipient did not know that the reaction would be sent back to the participant. This was done to ensure that participants believed that the emotional reactions reflected the emotions as experienced by the opponent, and not emotions that were altered for self-presentational or strategic reasons (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). In the angry opponent condition, participants read: “Now that I’ve read what X typed, it makes me quite angry. This is unpleasant. I am really annoyed”. In the disappointment conditions participants read “Now that I’ve read what X typed, I feel quite disappointed. This is unpleasant. I am really disappointed”. The angry and disappointed emotional statements were adapted from previous research on the effects of emotional communication in negotiations (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, b, 2006a). In the control condition participants were not told anything about Y’s opportunity to give a reaction and also did not receive one (although in phase one, they did learn that their opponent was forming an opinion).

In phase four, participants made their ultimatum offer. Subsequently, they completed a post-negotiation questionnaire with manipulation checks and items designed to measure participants’ emotions and the perception of the opponent’s limits. All items were answered on 7-point scales.

To check the emotion manipulation, participants were asked to indicate how angry/disappointed they thought their opponent was. The manipulation of recipient’s relative power was checked by asking participants about the relative power of X and Y (1 = X had more power; 7 = Y had more power).

We assessed participant’s emotions by asking them how angry/disappointed/guilty/fearful they felt during the negotiation. We measured the perception of the opponent’s limits by asking what they thought the opponent’s lowest acceptable number of chips would be. In addition, to rule out that a difference in intensity or appropriateness was driving the effects, we asked participants how negative they thought their opponent was and to what extent they thought the emotional reaction was appropriate in the current situation (1 = not at all negative/appropriate; 7 = very
negative/appropriate). Perceived appropriateness was not assessed in the control condition. Finally, participants were debriefed and received 3 euros.

**Results**

**Manipulation checks**

*Recipient’s emotion.* A 3 (opponent’s emotion) × 2 (opponent’s power) ANOVA on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 108) = 63.33$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .54$. Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants in the angry opponent condition rated their opponent as more angry ($M = 6.16$, $SD = 1.26$) than did participants in the disappointed opponent condition ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.93$), who in turn rated their opponent as more angry than did participants in the control condition ($M = 2.08$, $SD = 1.46$).

The 3 × 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings only revealed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 108) = 61.92$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .53$. Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants in the disappointed opponent condition judged the opponent as more disappointed ($M = 6.16$, $SD = 1.35$) than did participants in the angry opponent condition ($M = 4.63$, $SD = 1.57$), who in turn judged the opponent as more disappointed than participants in the control condition ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.50$).

*Recipient’s power.* A 3 × 2 ANOVA revealed only a main effect of opponent’s power, $F(1, 108) = 42.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .28$, indicating that high-power opponents were perceived to be more powerful ($M = 4.20$, $SD = 1.93$) than low-power opponents ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.66$).

These findings suggest that the manipulations of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s power were successful.

**Offer**

A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded main effects of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 108) = 7.47$, $p < .005$, $\eta^2 = .12$, and opponent’s power, $F(1, 108) = 13.58$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$. More importantly, these main effects were qualified by an interaction, $F(2, 108) = 4.76$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .08$ (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1. Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s power (Experiment 2.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-power opponent</td>
<td>58.05&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>65.11&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-power opponent</td>
<td>36.26&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>22.43</td>
<td>55.68&lt;sup&gt;ab&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Means with different superscripts differ significantly (ps < .05, analyzed with simple-effect analyses).

As expected, in the anger condition offers to high-power opponents were higher (M = 58.05, SD = 6.64) than offers to low-power opponents (M = 36.26, SD = 22.43), F(1, 108) = 19.48, p < .001, η² = .15. This difference between offers to high- and low-power opponents was not significant in the disappointment (p = .06) and control conditions (p = .95).

Moreover, in the low-power opponent conditions, participants offered fewer chips to angry opponents (M = 36.26, SD = 22.43) than to disappointed opponents (M = 55.68, SD = 15.55, p < .001) or opponents from the control condition (M = 50.80, SD = 20.01, p < .005). In the high-power opponent conditions participants offered more chips to disappointed opponents (M = 65.11, SD = 6.09) than to opponents from the control condition (M = 51.11, SD = 12.19, p < .01), and they offered somewhat more chips to angry opponents (M = 58.05, SD = 6.64) than to opponents from the control condition, although this difference was not significant (p = .17).

Participants’ emotions

Anger. A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, F(2, 108) = 16.66, p < .001, η² = .24 (see Table 2.2). As predicted, Tukey’s tests (ps < .05) showed that participants in the anger conditions were angrier than participants in the disappointment conditions, who in turn were angrier than the participants in the control condition.
**Disappointment.** A $3 \times 2$ ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 108) = 31.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .37$ (see Table 2.2). Tukey’s tests showed that participants in the anger and disappointment conditions were more disappointed than participants in the control condition. The disappointment ratings from participants in the anger and disappointment conditions did not differ significantly ($p = .73$).

**Fear.** A $3 \times 2$ ANOVA revealed a main effect of opponent’s power, $F(1, 108) = 4.81$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .04$ (see Table 2.2). More importantly, this main effect was qualified by an interaction effect, $F(2, 108) = 4.28$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .07$. Simple main effects showed that participants were more fearful when they dealt with high-power angry opponents than when they dealt with low-power angry opponents, $F(1, 108) = 13.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .11$). This difference between fear ratings in high- and low-power conditions was not found in the disappointment and control conditions ($p = .91$).

**Guilt.** A $3 \times 2$ ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 108) = 52.17$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .49$ (see Table 2.2). As predicted, Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants in the disappointment conditions felt more guilty ($M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.59$) than participants in the anger ($M = 1.47$, $SD = .73$) and control condition ($M = 1.84$, $SD = 1.24$).

*Table 2.2. Participant’s emotions as a function of opponent’s emotion and opponent’s power (Experiment 2.1)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>High Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$ $SD$</td>
<td>$M$ $SD$</td>
<td>$M$ $SD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3.26 2.02</td>
<td>4.00 1.60</td>
<td>2.53 2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointment</td>
<td>3.89 1.94</td>
<td>4.11 1.85</td>
<td>4.32 1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>4.53 2.09</td>
<td>2.37 1.54</td>
<td>3.53 1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>1.37 .76</td>
<td>1.58 .69</td>
<td>4.42 1.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Perceived limits

A 3 × 2 ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent's emotion, $F(2, 108) = 4.89$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Tukey’s tests showed that participants in the anger conditions judged the limits of opponents to be higher ($M = 58.37$, $SD = 9.17$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 51.18$, $SD = 12.63$). Perceived limits in the disappointment condition ($M = 54.11$, $SD = 7.47$) fell in-between and did not differ from the perceived limits in the anger or control conditions ($ps > .16$).

Mediation analyses

We performed four mediation analyses to investigate how the emotions evoked by anger and disappointment mediated their effects on participants’ offers using bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). A bootstrapped mediation analysis uses re-sampling of raw data to estimate the confidence intervals (CI) of the indirect effects, of which the mediation model consists.¹

In our first mediation analysis we tested whether the effect of opponent’s power on offers in the anger conditions would be mediated by participant’s fear, while controlling for the other emotions (we included anger, guilt, and disappointment as covariates). Using 10000 bootstrap re-samples and bias corrected and accelerated intervals (see Preacher & Hayes, 2008), we obtained confidence intervals that did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -25.21; upper CI = -1.62), indicating significant mediation.

In our second mediation analysis, we tested whether the effect of opponent’s emotion on offers in the low-power anger and control conditions was mediated by participant’s anger. While controlling for fear, guilt, disappointment, and also for the appraisal of the opponent’s limits, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 95% level (i.e., lower CI = .80; upper CI = 13.53).

Our third mediation analysis was aimed to investigate whether the effect of opponent’s emotion on offers in the high-power disappointment and control conditions was mediated by guilt. While controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the

¹ We used bootstrapping because our sample size is relatively small. Under such circumstances, bootstrapping offers a good test of mediation effects (cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). Testing for mediation with the procedure described by Baron and Kenny (1986) yielded similar findings: When controlling for the mediators, all eight mediation analyses in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 showed a significant reduction of the direct effect, as confirmed by Sobel tests (all $ps < .05$).
confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -15.31; upper CI = -.68).

Participant’s offers to disappointed and neutral low-power opponents did not differ significantly. Therefore, in our fourth mediation analysis we could only test whether the effect of opponent’s emotion on offers in the low-power disappointed and anger conditions was mediated by guilt. While controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = 2.27; upper CI = 41.18).

Additional measures

Intensity of the emotion. A 3 × 2 ANOVA showed a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 108) = 50.06, p < .001, \eta^2 = .48$. Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants perceived disappointed ($M = 5.37$, $SD = 1.67$) and angry opponents ($M = 5.53$, $SD = 1.37$) to be more negative than opponents from the control condition ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.48$). More importantly, we did not detect any differences in intensity between anger and disappointment ($p = .89$).

Appropriateness of the emotion. A 2 (opponent’s emotion: anger vs. disappointment) × 2 (opponent’s power) ANOVA showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .20$) or power ($p = .80$) and no interaction effect ($p = .52$; overall $M = 5.03$, $SD = 1.77$), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the emotion.

Discussion

These results indicate that power moderated the effects of anger, but not the effects of disappointment. Anger elicited high offers when it was reported by a high-power bargainer, but low offers when it was reported by a low-power bargainer. Our mediation analyses showed that this difference can be explained by evoked fear. Participants offered more to high-power than to low-power angry opponents, because they were more fearful. Disappointment, on the other hand, resulted in higher offers, regardless of power. In fact, when reported by low-power bargainers, disappointment resulted in higher offers than anger. When reported by high-power bargainers, disappointment evoked higher offers than no emotion. As our mediation analyses showed, evoked guilt can explain these advantageous effects of disappointment.
Based on our findings concerning the perceived intensity and appropriateness of the emotions, we can rule out the possibility that the intensity or appropriateness of the emotion produced our effects. Participants did not perceive the angry reaction to be more intense than the disappointed reaction. Reported anger was also not perceived to be more or less appropriate than reported disappointment (which is in line with research on the appraisal patterns of both emotions; Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002b). Finally, the appraisal of the opponent’s limits also cannot explain the differences between the effects of anger and disappointment. Limits of bargainers in high- as well as low-power positions were not judged differently. Controlling for these inferential effects in our second mediation analysis also did not change our results. Because we only found a difference between the perceived limits of participants in the anger and control conditions, we decided to only control for perceived limits in the second mediation analysis, which focused on these specific conditions.

**Experiment 2.2**

In Experiment 2.2, participants played the same bargaining game as in Experiment 2.1. The main difference was that we changed the cause of the emotion. In bargaining people predominantly get emotional because of concrete (bargaining) behavior during the negotiation, and not so much because of their opponent’s general view on bargaining (as was the case in Experiment 2.1, following Van Dijk et al., 2008). For this reason, we performed a second experiment, where the emotional reaction was based on concrete bargaining behavior. Participants played a repeated offer UBG and the reported emotion was based on the initial offer. We also ran the same four mediation analyses as we did in Experiment 2.1 to investigate the role of the reciprocal and complementary emotions.

**Method**

**Design and participants**

The study used a similar design as in Experiment 2.1. Participants were 143 students from Leiden University (96 females, 47 males, $M_{age} = 21.51$, $SD = 2.93$).
Procedure

All instructions and tasks were similar to the ones used in Experiment 2.1, except for the task performed in phase one. Participants in Experiment 2.2 made an initial offer in the UBG. Participants were asked how they would distribute 100 chips between themselves and person Y. Participants had the choice between two distributions of 100 chips. The first option represented a 70-30 distribution in favor of the participant and the second a 30-70 distribution in favor of the other person. We expected most of the participants to choose the option that was in their favor. The altruistic participants that did not \( (N = 18) \), were excluded from further analyses, to ensure the credibility of the angry/disappointed reaction (However, retaining these participants yielded a similar pattern of results).

Note that whereas participants in Experiment 2.1 played a single offer UBG, participants in Experiment 2.2 played a repeated offer UBG. In phase one they played the first game where they made a decision between two offers, and in phase four they were free to propose any distribution ranging from 0 to 100 chips. Both parties were made aware of the fact that it was a repeated offer UBG.

After participants made their offer participants completed a similar post-negotiation questionnaire as in Experiment 2.1.\(^2\) Participant’s guilt was now measured with four items (e.g., “While making the offer, to what extent did you feel guilty for treating Y unfairly”), which were combined into an index of guilt (\( \alpha = .92 \)). Participant’s fear was measured with three items (e.g., “While making the offer, to what extent were you afraid”), which were also averaged into a reliable scale (\( \alpha = .77 \)).

Results

Manipulation checks

**Recipient’s emotion.** A 3 × 2 ANOVA on the anger ratings yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, \( F(2, 119) = 62.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .51 \). Tukey’s tests \( (p < .001) \) showed that participants in the anger condition rated their opponent as more angry \( (M = 5.81, SD = 1.67) \) than did participants in the disappointment condition \( (M = 4.42, SD = \)

\(^2\) Participant’s perceived limits ratings were similar to the ratings of Experiment 2.1. Because they also did not have any effects on our mediation analyses, we did not include these results in Experiment 2.2.
1.50), who in turn rated their opponent as more angry than did participants in the control condition \((M = 2.23, SD = 1.31)\).

The 3 \times 2 ANOVA on the disappointment ratings only revealed a main effect of opponent's emotion, \(F(2, 119) = 62.88, p < .001, \eta^2 = .51\). Tukey's tests (\(ps < .001\)) showed that participants in the disappointment condition judged their opponents to be more disappointed \((M = 6.35, SD = 1.12)\) than did participants in the anger condition \((M = 4.88, SD = 1.67)\). They, in turn, judged their opponents as more disappointed than did participants in the control condition \((M = 2.70, SD = 1.64)\).

**Recipient's power.** A 3 \times 2 ANOVA only revealed a main effect of opponent's power, \(F(1, 119) = 91.69, p < .001, \eta^2 = .44\), indicating that participants in the high-power opponent condition perceived their opponents to be more powerful \((M = 4.43, SD = 1.60)\) than did participants in the low-power opponent condition \((M = 1.91, SD = 1.34)\).

**Offer**

A 3 \times 2 ANOVA yielded main effects of opponent's emotion, \(F(2, 119) = 5.07, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08\), and opponent's power, \(F(1, 119) = 12.43, p < .005, \eta^2 = .10\). More importantly, these main effects were qualified by an interaction, \(F(2, 119) = 4.82, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08\) (see Table 2.3).

**Table 2.3.** Number of chips offered to the opponent as a function of opponent's emotion and opponent's power (Experiment 2.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th></th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>58.85(^{ab})</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>62.67(^b)</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>50.50(^a)</td>
<td>9.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-power opponent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-power opponent</td>
<td>39.05(^c)</td>
<td>22.90</td>
<td>54.58(^{ab})</td>
<td>18.47</td>
<td>50.48(^a)</td>
<td>15.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Means with different superscripts differ significantly \((ps < .05, analyzed with simple-effect analyses)\).
In the anger condition offers to high-power opponents were higher ($M = 58.85, SD = 10.02$) than offers to low-power opponents ($M = 39.05, SD = 20.90$). There were no significant differences in the disappointment ($p = .10$) and control conditions ($p = 1.00$).³

In the low-power opponent conditions, participants in the anger condition offered fewer chips ($M = 39.05, SD = 20.90$) than participants in the disappointment ($M = 54.58, SD = 18.47, p < .01$) or control condition ($M = 50.48, SD = 15.85, p < .05$). In line with the results from Experiment 2.1, in the high-power opponent conditions participants offered more chips to disappointed opponents ($M = 62.67, SD = 8.24$) than to opponents in the control condition ($M = 50.50, SD = 9.45, p < .05$). Also, participants offered more chips to high-power angry opponents ($M = 58.85, SD = 10.02$) than to high-power opponents in the control condition, although the latter difference was only marginally significant ($p = .08$).

**Participants’ emotions**

**Anger.** A $3 \times 2$ ANOVA yielded only a main effect for opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 119) = 60.16, p < .001, \eta^2 = .50$ (see Table 2.4). Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) revealed that participants in the anger condition were angrier than participants in the disappointment condition, who in turn were angrier than the participants in the control condition.

**Disappointment.** A $3 \times 2$ ANOVA yielded only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 119) = 33.53, p < .001, \eta^2 = .36$ (see Table 2.4). Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants in the anger and disappointment conditions were more disappointed than participants in the control condition. Participants in the anger and disappointment condition did not differ significantly ($p = .99$).

**Fear.** The $3 \times 2$ ANOVA showed main effects for opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 119) = 4.95, p < .01, \eta^2 = .08$, and opponent’s power, $F(1, 119) = 17.93, p < .001, \eta^2 = .13$. More importantly, these main effects were qualified by an interaction effect, $F(2, 119) = 8.80, p < .001, \eta^2 = .13$ (see Table 2.4). Simple main effects showed that participants were more fearful when they dealt with high-power angry opponents than when they dealt with low-

³ Suleiman (1996) found that allocators offer less to recipients who have low power. We did not find such a difference in our control condition. In our experiment we emphasized that when offers were sent to the opponent, opponents were forming an opinion of participants. In accordance with research on impression management (Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 1995), participants may have tried to establish and maintain positive impressions, because they were aware that they were being evaluated by others. We ran two extra control conditions, where we did not emphasize that the opponent was forming an opinion. As expected, these results showed a significant difference between the offers in the high- and low-power conditions, such that participants offered significantly more chips to high-power opponents ($M = 51.50, SD = 13.29$) than to low-power opponents ($M = 41.59, SD = 14.42, p < .05$).
power angry opponents, $F(1, 119) = 34.01, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$). This difference between fear ratings in high- and low-power conditions was not found in the disappointment and control conditions ($p = .78$).

**Guilt.** We found a significant main effect for opponent's emotion on participant's guilt, $F(2, 119) = 31.25, p < .001, \eta^2 = .34$ (see Table 2.4). Tukey's tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants who were confronted with a disappointed opponent felt guiltier than participants who were confronted with an angry opponent or an opponent from the control condition.

*Table 2.4. Participant's emotions as a function of opponent's emotion and opponent's power (Experiment 2.2)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant's emotions</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Disappointment</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disappointment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>3.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Power</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Power</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mediation analyses**

First, as in Experiment 2.1, we tested whether the effect of opponent's power on offers in the anger conditions was mediated by participant's fear. While controlling for anger, guilt and disappointment, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -30.68; upper CI = -4.50), indicating significant mediation.

In the second mediation analysis we investigated whether the effect of opponent's emotion on offers in the low-power anger and control conditions was mediated by
participant’s anger. While controlling for fear, guilt and disappointment, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 95% level (i.e., lower CI = .02; upper CI = 8.75).

In the third mediation analysis we investigated whether the effect of opponent’s emotion on offers in the high-power disappointment and control conditions was mediated by guilt. While, controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = -10.66; upper CI = -.08).

In the final mediation analysis we investigated whether the effect of opponent’s emotion on offers in the low-power disappointment and anger conditions was mediated by guilt. While controlling for fear, anger and disappointment, the confidence interval did not contain zero at the 99% level (i.e., lower CI = 1.49; upper CI = 20.68).

**Additional measures**

*Intensity of the emotion.* A 3 × 2 ANOVA showed only a main effect of opponent’s emotion, $F(2, 119) = 105.72, p < .001, \eta^2 = .64$. Tukey’s tests ($ps < .001$) showed that participants perceived disappointed ($M = 5.35, SD = .86$) and angry opponents ($M = 5.38, SD = 1.13$) to be more negative than opponents from the control condition ($M = 2.14, SD = 1.42$). Again, there were no differences in intensity between anger and disappointment ($p = .99$).

*Appropriateness of the emotion.* A 2 × 2 ANOVA showed no significant main effects of opponent’s emotion ($p = .29$) or opponent’s power ($p = .54$) and no interaction effect ($p = .64$; overall $M = 3.68, SD = 1.53$), indicating that the conditions did not differ with regard to the perceived appropriateness of the opponent’s reaction.

**Discussion**

Although we changed the procedure of the study, in terms of the apparent cause of the emotion, Experiment 2.2 replicated the results obtained in Experiment 2.1. Power moderated the effects of anger, but not the effects of disappointment. As expected, disappointed reactions evoked guilt in participants. These feelings of guilt led participants with low-power opponents to offer more chips to disappointed than to angry opponents, and participants with high-power opponents to offer more to disappointed opponents than to opponents from the control condition. Moreover, anger elicited higher offers when it was reported by high-power bargainers than when it was reported by low-power
bargainers, because it evoked fear. Because angry reactions on the part of low-power opponents evoked anger, participant's offered fewer chips.

**General Discussion**

In line with social-functional analyses of emotions (e.g., Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef et al., 2010) our findings show that emotional reactions shape both affective and behavioral aspects of the bargaining process. Whereas previous studies primarily focused on the inferences people make when they process opponents' emotions in bargaining, we emphasize the importance of affective reactions to others’ emotions and their consequences for behavior. As expected, although they are both negative emotions, our findings demonstrate that anger and disappointment affect counterparts differently. We investigated the moderating influence of power and found that reporting disappointment might be a better alternative than reporting anger.

As our findings indicated, anger and disappointment not only share a negative valence, they also were rated as possessing similar levels of intensity and appropriateness. With these similarities in mind, one might wonder whether both emotions are truly independent, i.e., whether reporting anger may to some extent also communicate that you are disappointed, and vice versa. Our manipulation checks indeed suggest that this may partly be the case. Some overlap may occur, because anger and disappointment are both reactions to undesirable outcomes (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989). It should be noted, however, that in all studies, the most extreme judgments were obtained for the emotions we intended to manipulate. In the anger conditions judgments of anger were higher than judgments of disappointment. Correspondingly, ratings of perceived disappointment exceeded those of perceived anger in the disappointment conditions. More importantly, our results showed that the effects of both reported emotions did not simply differ in terms of extremity. In agreement with previous insights linking anger and disappointment to different appraisals and behaviors (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989), both emotions elicited distinct behaviors, under different circumstances and for different reasons. We showed that reporting anger in high-power positions pays, because the anger is complemented (i.e., it evokes fear). Fear leads bargainers to be more risk averse and focus more on preventing impasse (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), and the only way to avoid impasse is to give in. Indeed, since anger evoked the complementary emotion fear, people offered more chips
in the high-power conditions. Reporting anger in a low-power position, however, backfired because it was reciprocated. Because participants did not feel fearful, their own anger led them to offer fewer chips.

Disappointment affected participants in our studies differently. We showed that high-power opponents received higher offers when they reported disappointment than when they did not report an emotion, and that low-power opponents received higher offers when they reported disappointment than when they reported anger. Participants offered more to disappointed opponents, because disappointment was emotionally complemented. Disappointment evoked guilt, which led opponents to offer more in the high-power conditions, but also in the low-power conditions. Little research so far (see Lelieveld et al., 2011) has acknowledged the causal relation between disappointment and guilt. The current work contributes to the understanding of why reporting disappointment may pay in negotiations.

In the current article, we focused on emotional reactions. As we mentioned in our Introduction, we do not wish to claim that affective reactions are not based on inferential reasoning. Participants’ emotional reactions may have been direct reactions to the reported emotions, but also reactions to inferences they made. For instance, in the case of reported anger by a high-power opponent, participants may have felt fearful because they inferred that the angry opponent (with high limits) would reject their offer. Also, in the case of reported disappointment, participants may have felt guilty because they inferred high needs for the disappointed person (see also Van Kleef & Van Lange, 2008). In addition, it should be acknowledged that participants reported their emotions while making their offer. This may have increased the possibility that their reports also reflected their informational inferences. Future research could further try to disentangle the inferential and direct emotional effects to anger and disappointment.

Our results thus suggest that it may be better to report disappointment than to report anger. Whereas anger only elicits high offers when it is reported by high-power bargainers, disappointment elicits high offers when reported by high-, as well as low-power bargainers. Moreover, although both emotions can elicit generous offers, they do so via different processes. Anger elicits higher offers when it evokes fear, whereas disappointment elicits higher offers by evoking guilt. We found similar results across different types of bargaining settings. In Experiment 2, emotions were reactions to participants’ offers. In Experiment 1, emotions might have been attributed more to the
person instead of their offer. Our findings indicate that the consequences of the emotions are identical. Future research could investigate whether this is always the case.

Anger thus influenced participant's offers by evoking fear or anger. However, there is also evidence that expressions of anger can elicit sympathy or support (Clark & Brissette, 2003) and even feelings of guilt (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). These results, however, have mainly been found when the two parties are engaged in a close affiliative relationship (Yoo, Clark, Lemay, Salovey, & Monin, 2011) or in non-competitive situations (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). In these situations, anger may not evoke fear and/or anger in others and the effects may not differ from the effects of disappointment.

Our findings can be seen as an extension of the previous research by Van Kleef and Van Lange (2008). They have also compared the interpersonal effects of anger and disappointment and identified social value orientation (SVO) as a moderator of the interpersonal effects of disappointment. This study focused on the informational value of reporting anger and disappointment. By contrast, our two experiments focus on the affective reactions to anger and disappointment, their consequences for behavior, and the moderating role of power. Nonetheless, future research could investigate whether SVO also moderates the affective reactions to anger and disappointment. Our findings corroborate the notion that it is essential to distinguish between different types of emotions and to not only consider the valence of emotions. It is important to acknowledge that specific emotions have differential effects on others (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Van Kleef et al., 2006a, 2010). One should therefore treat each emotion as a distinct predictor of behavior in negotiations.

**Broader implications and contributions**

The conclusions that stem from our findings resonate with the *Emotion as Social Information* (EASI) model (Van Kleef et al., 2010). This model posits that emotions affect others by providing relevant information about the intentions and/or feelings of the sender (the inferential path of the model), but also by affecting the emotions of others (the affective path of the model). Our study provides some of the first evidence of the role of such affective reactions in bargaining.

According to the EASI model it depends on the cooperative versus competitive nature of the situation whether emotions affect others via the inferential or affective path. The EASI model posits that affective reactions become more predictive of social decisions
to the extent that the situation is perceived as cooperative, whereas strategic inferences take precedence when the situation is perceived as competitive. Our findings show that even in competitive situations (such as the ultimatum settings in our experiments) emotions may affect others’ behavior via the affective path. Therefore, our findings can be seen as an important contribution to, but also as an extension of the EASI model. Note, however, that although the negotiation setting was competitive, participants showed increased cooperation (i.e., they offered a high number of chips) when dealing with disappointed opponents. Disappointment may have reduced the perceived competitiveness of the situation and may have “transformed” the predominantly competitive bargaining context into a perceived cooperative situation. Future research may investigate how this transforming power of disappointment works and when it predicts opponent’s behavior.

In future research, it may also be interesting to broaden the scope by including other determinants of the power-dependency relation between bargainers. In our experiments, we manipulated power by varying the consequences of rejection. Our results showed that retaliatory offers were only made when participants felt their offer could not be fully rejected. Although it is apparent that the power of the recipient is weakened when he/she has less control over the outcomes, it is important to investigate whether our effects hold up under different power manipulations where there is still an opportunity to reject the offer. One could for example manipulate the number or attractiveness of the alternatives that bargainers have at their disposal (see Van Kleef et al., 2006b). The more attractive alternatives are, and the more alternatives bargainers have, the less dependent bargainers are on their opponent (see also Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pinkley, 1995). When people have more (attractive) alternatives, it seems likely that reported anger backfires (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Beest, Van Kleef, & Van Dijk, 2008; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), but disappointment may not.

That said, power may not be the only factor that determines whether people reciprocate or complement other’s emotions. We expect that in situations where emotions, such as anger and disappointment, are reported unjustly or inappropriately, targets may retaliate and reciprocate the emotion (see also Van Kleef and Côté, 2007). Also, when serious conflicts arise between the parties in a negotiation and opponents do not care if the negotiation ends in impasse, opponents may reciprocate irrespective of their power position. Moreover, as stated above, complementary emotions are likely to be evoked
when people are engaged in a close relationship, with the aim of repairing the relationship. Future research could investigate (these) other antecedents of the elicitation of reciprocal and/or complementary emotions.