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1. Introduction

In the spring of 2007, I was attending a course entitled “Islam and Transnationalism” at Utrecht University, as a supplement to my MPhil study at the Department of Turkish Studies at Leiden University, which was in progress at the time. Being the only Turkish citizen in this course, on April 26 many of my classmates congratulated me on the presidency of Abdullah Gül, whom they considered president although the first round of the election had yet to take place. On the one hand, I politely reminded my friends that the elections were yet to come and their congratulations were kind, but a bit premature. On the other hand, they did remind me that the deadline for the candidacy had nearly passed, and Gül was the only candidate at the end with his party’s parliamentary majority support. In the end I truly wished my worries to be put to rest, and I hoped that the presidential election process in Turkey would run smoothly and without incident. However, the Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) once again confirmed my anxiety and continued its tradition of intervening in politics.

Such incidents have unfortunately occurred once every decade, with the only exception being a military intervention in the beginning of 1990’s, in which the TSK later revisited with the extensive February 28 Process in 1997. By the e-memorandum published from its official website, the TSK declared that “reactionary danger”\(^1\) arose in the presidency election process similar to the 31 March, Sheik Said and Menemen incidents and other military interventions in the Republican era. Also, according to the Kemalist discourse the same anti-republican, anti-secularist and backward stream of reaction was active in all of these cases. However, a critical historical and sociological analysis can raise some question marks about the underlying socio-political and economical power conflicts.

For example, consider the 31 March Incident in which the main demand of counter revolutionists who opposed the Second Constitutional Period in 1908 was the restoration of Shariah. Rebels organized around Dervis Vahdeti’s Volkan newspaper started an armed insurrection in Istanbul for the restoration of Shariah. The rebels also demanded the dismissal of many statesman and officers that had supported the constitution and secular reforms. The movement of the counter-revolutionaries was successful and their demands were more or less fulfilled initially until the Action Army, Harekat Ordusu, which was organized by the Committee of Union and Progress, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, from the empire’s Balkan

\(^1\)From now on naming practices of Kemalist discourse will not be expressed in brackets and this will not mean the writer’s acceptance of the discursive weight of the concepts.
territories, occupied Istanbul and suppressed the rebellion. After the occupation of the city, martial law was introduced and two martial courts were established, executing a large number of rebels. A deeper analysis, which goes beyond the discourse of the official history, will mention that the main reason behind the acts of the counter-revolutionists, considerable number of whom were the ranker, alaylı officers of the military, ulema and other civil servants, was not the abolition of the Shariah, but rather the government’s policy of diminishing the number of civil servants in order to stop overstaffing in the bureaucracy.\(^2\) This presented a real conflict for the alaylı officers whose primary source of income was from the government. Akşin also mentions that the discourse of the restoration of the Shariah was utilized during the revolt in spite of the fact that the general circumstances during the revolt were far away from a return to Islamic Rule.\(^3\) However, the discourse on reaction, irtica, inherited from the 31 March Incident, was so deep and intense that even Akşin changed the title of his book in later editions to suggest fundamentalism as the true culprit even though his writing supported the opposite view.\(^4\)

The Sheikh Said Rebellion also demonstrated the manipulation of the so-called anti-secularist actions to maintain the status quo and power relations. The rebellion that broke out in February 1925 was a result of growing Kurdish discontent in the southeastern regions of Turkey. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Kurds were far from getting the autonomy they had been promised during the independence struggle. Furthermore, with the abolition of the caliphate in the course of the secularization of the state by the Kemalists, the ties that bound Kurds and Turks together were also dissolved. At the same time, the nationalist polices of the republic, aimed at creating a national identity, were increasing. Under such circumstances, the outbreak of a rebellion in the Kurdish regions was not surprising. Although it was a rebellion motivated mostly by the Kurdish nationalist ideals more than any other, it was introduced as a reactionary movement and used for the repression of an emerging political opposition group, namely the Progressive Republican Party. The Progressive Republican Party was founded in 1924 by a group of parliamentarians who split from the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). The new party was also secular and nationalist, but it adopted a more liberal opposition against the centralist, statist and authoritarian policies of the CHP. The Kemalist regime used the rebellion as an excuse to oppress political opposition and to introduce the antidemocratic Law of Maintenance of Order, Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu, although the Progressive Republicans fully supported the government in the suppression of


the revolt,⁵ and the revolt was more or less suppressed before the introduction of the law.⁶ As a result, The Ankara Independence Tribunal, Ankara İstiklal Mahkemesi, which was martial court founded by the Law of Maintenance of Order, closed the Progressive Republican Party because of the accusation that the term “being respectful to religious ideas and faiths”, “efkar ve itikadi diniyeye hürmetkar,” in the party program was very suitable for the political exploitation of religion.⁷ The story of the Progressive Republicans ended very dramatically, but the motto of, “political exploitation of religion” was inherited as one of the most frequently used slogans of the Kemalist establishment.

Five years later, the rising danger of reaction was seen elsewhere in Menemen, a town close to Izmir. According to the official history, on December 23, 1930, reactionary members of the outlawed Nakşibendi Sufi order⁸, one of Turkey’s most influential and widespread Sufi orders, arrived in Menemen from Manisa. Dervishes, members of the sufi order, led by Mehmet, started an uprising against the secular state with demands for the restoration of Shariah and the caliphate. After this outbreak, a group of gendarmes led by Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, a young teacher and reserve officer in the army, attempted to force the rebels to surrender. However, Kubilay was unsuccessful and he was beheaded by the rebels. In short time, the additional gendarmerie units repressed the uprising. The incident would have been considered an ordinary criminal case if crowds in Menemen had done anything more than just watched the incident. The silence and non-protesting attitude of the inhabitants of Menemen was a real shock for the Kemalist leadership due to the fact that the silence of the inhabitants of Menemen was considered to be a silent and implicit support for the incident.⁹ As a result, the government took harsh measures in the aftermath of this incident, arresting many people and declaring martial law. Although several years passed since this incident, the memory of Menemen is still alive in Turkey, as a demonstration of the Kemalist establishment’s usage of the incident as a theme of the rising reactionary danger. Azak mentioned that despite the Kemalist determination of keeping Kubilay’s memory alive, the incident and Kubilay were more or less forgotten in the late 1930’s and 1940’s.¹⁰ However, the memory and image of Kubilay was revived in the 1950’s as a result of the Kemalists losing power due to the transition into a multi-party system.¹¹ From the second popularity wave of Kubilay in the

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⁶ Zürcher, E. J. Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic, p. 85.
⁸ For an analyses of perception of Nakşibendis in the official ideology see; Şeker, F. M. (2007). Cumhuriyet İdeolojisinin Nakşibendilik Tasavvuru: Şerif Mardin Örneği. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.
¹¹ Azak, U. Kubilay Icon of Secularism, p. 38.
1950’s onwards, the image of Kubilay served as the major medium for the Kemalists in secularism discussions.

Religious reaction, and the political exploitation of religious feelings, became the rationale behind a series of military interventions by the TSK that began with a military coup d’êtat in 1960 and continued with the recent April 27 Process. Although these rationales became the bedrock of the TSK’s agenda, the tactics that the TSK used to address and justify their interventions to society evolved. In May of 1960, it was the creaking voice of colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who later founded and lead the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) told Turkish citizens that the TSK took over power in the country in order to liberate it from the grips of ambitious politicians who would most certainly lead the country into disaster. Furthermore, the military junta claimed that they took over power in order to re-establish democratic rule and also to cease the rising reactionary danger. The military junta began legislating itself with the introduction of the National Unity Council, Milli Birlik Komitesi, as the administrative body of the country. Meanwhile, the task of preparing a new constitution that would prevent ambitious politicians from leading the country into disaster again was entrusted to university professors. The military junta sought to transform the army, universities and the country’s cultural life in accordance with the ethos of the military intervention; that is, limiting the effectiveness and power of civilian politics. The interventionist aims of the military junta were embodied in the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi, MGK), which was established as an advisory council to the government in internal and external affairs. In practice, the council worked as the basis for legitimizing the TSK’s future interventions in civil politics, as in the cases of the February 28 and April 27 military interventions. Finally, the executions of overthrown Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, were the other legacies of the intervention that have always been remembered in the context of civilian-military relations in Turkey.

On the 12th of March, 1971, the TSK “was forced” to make an intervention by issuing a memorandum to the government. TSK announced, again by radio, the necessity of their intervention in order to stop fraternal fighting, a chaotic environment, but with the ultimate aim of fixing the so-called required conditions for a democratic rule. During the days prior to the TSK’s memorandum, violence on streets and campuses had increased. The TSK asked the prime minister to establish a strong government that would be able to end the anarchy in the country. Upon receiving the memorandum, Prime Minister Demirel resigned and Nihat Erim, a CHP deputy, was appointed as the new prime minister in conformity with the TSK’s will. Under the rule of Erim’s technocrat government, the MGK increased its power both legally
and practically and started a war against terrorism by declaring martial law. During the witch-hunt that was operated by the MGK, the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) of conservative politician Necmettin Erbakan and many leftist organizations were closed and many intellectuals and politicians were arrested and tortured.

Later, the TSK counterbalanced the low scale memorandum of 1971 and formed a coup d’ètait on the 12th of September, 1980. In the beginning of three year junta rule, which was marked with numerous instances of torture and murder, General Kenan Evren explained the justification behind the intervention, but this time from official state television channel; the TSK “was forced” once again to intervene in order to stop fraternal fighting, a chaotic environment, but once again with the ultimate aim to fix democracy in the country. Furthermore, the theme of rising reactionary danger also featured as a legitimizing element, as in the case of the Jerusalem Meeting organized by Erbakan’s National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) in Konya a few months before the military intervention. The basic aim of the military junta was to save country from politicians, who junta leaders regarded as wicked by nature. To achieve this aim, all parties were closed, the parliament was dissolved and all mayors were replaced with military personnel. The MGK increased its power under martial law and many intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, trade unionists, politicians and academicians were arrested and tortured. The “excuse” behind the mass arrests and torture was the fight against terrorism, in which the junta became successful to a certain extent. After three years of junta rule, the new constitution was put to a referendum at the end of which the constitution was accepted with 91.4 percent of the vote. The constitution increased the power of the MGK, limited basic liberties, granted legal immunity for the acts and members of the junta and appointed junta leader Evren as the new president with a temporary clause.

When it came to the 1990’s, although ten years had passed since the last intervention, Turkey was far from the possibility of a repeated military intervention. It was widely believed that because of Turkey’s established entrance to the global economic system, military interventions would completely cease. It was even claimed that with the advancement of communication and media technology, means to form a coup d’ètait by controlling strategic communication and media facilities such as television, radio stations, and post offices would not be possible. Indeed, such arguments at the time made sense to some extent. However, what was not foreseeable was the TSK’s ability to rebuild its interventionist policy due to the

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general transformations the country was experiencing. The post-modern military intervention of the February 28 Process became the key indicator of the TSK’s capacity and ability of transforming its avenues into intervention, also demonstrating the possibility of military intervention without the use of guns, but by simply using the influence of its civilian allies. The military intervention was dubbed “post-modern” by the deputy chief of general staff with reference to the TSK’s capacity and ability to transform its means and methods of intervention. The military’s familiar way of making military interventions -- with the use of guns -- was regarded as the modern way of making military intervention. Thus, due to a superficial understanding of postmodernism -- regarding postmodernism as simply the next stage after modernism -- military intervention without guns was deemed post-modern. Announced as the peak point of the tension between TSK and government about rising reactionary danger several months before by newspapers and televisions, during an ordinary February 28th meeting of The National Security Council the TSK and its allies broadcasted an intervention live for the Turkish people to watch. The results of this type of intervention exercised through the civil domain was much more destructive in terms of civilian psyche than a typical one in the political domain.

The same optimistic point of view of my classmates was again shared on the eve of the presidential elections in 2007. “Never Again,” was the instant answer in response to questions about the possibility of a military intervention against the election of a Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) member as the president, which was regarded as a potential sign of rising reactionary danger. However on the night of April 27 during the first round of the presidential election, the TSK issued an e-memorandum from its official web site. Giving the various examples of reactionary acts from some corners of Turkey, the TSK again warned against rising reactionary danger. What made the April 27 Process unique was not only TSK’s usage of the internet technology, but also another memorandum that warned the TSK about its duties and responsibilities against government; the government’s counter memorandum to the TSK.

What was this reaction and who were these reactionaries who insistently worked for the restoration of shariah rule from 1908 onwards in spite of the changing political regimes, social, cultural and economical conditions in the course of the transition from Empire to Republic and transition in the course of Republic as well? Roughly speaking, these people were the religiously conservatives13 of Turkey including masses, politicians, poets, sufi

13 From now one “conservative” will be used instead of “religiously conservative.” Conservatism in Turkey has more religious tones rather than political. For a more detailed discussion about conservatism in see; Frey, F. (1956). *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, p.329-330, 378, 411.
circles, writers, artisans, and craftsman masses. They were intellectuals and politicians who opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress, claiming that its rule was more authoritarian than Abdulhamid II; they were Kurdish conservatives, who were unsatisfied with the nationalist and secular modernization policies of the Kemalists in the Sheik Said rebellion; they were villagers that were economically exhausted as a result of endless demands of the Kemalist regime; he was the local imam who organized the National Struggle in his town but later was expelled to the margins of society because of his traditional conservative ideas and lifestyle; they were the conservative youngsters and their families who wanted their children to be educated in official, mass education institutions of state – and therefore took its share from the modernization of the country – and receive religious education as well and as a result preferred İmam-Hatip Schools; they were Sufi Sheiks who occupied the posts of deputy presidents of First Grand National Assembly; he was Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the writer of the national anthem of Republic but later self exiled himself in Egypt; they were the whole population of Anatolia – but not urban dwellers and bureaucrats of the new regime – that were culturally, politically and economically marginalized by Kemalists and saw the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) as a medium of opposition against Kemalists; they were socially and economically handicapped new inhabitants of large cities and conservative rural people that voted for the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP); and of course they were some marginal radical groups who demanded a so called Islamic State; but in total they were the mass majority of Turkey that expressed its politico-economical demands with a conservative religious tone, and used every opportunity to resist against the Kemalist hegemony.

This dissertation aims to examine the story of these conservatives and their demands in 1990’s and 2000’s to some extent and also the hegemonic Kemalist groups’ ways of suppressing these demands, of taking back the positions conservatives gained, and of carrying back the achievements conservatives gained as a result of their struggle against the Kemalist hegemony. For facilitating such a research project, the current academic literature has some specific strengths and weaknesses. To begin with strengths, one should count the plenty of resources from many different theoretical schools that are devoted to understanding the “secularism discussion”14, the “rise of political Islam”15, and “Islam”16 in Turkey. Aside from this general literature, there also some examples of academic work that are specifically

focused on the February 28 and April 27 Processes. However, the literature has so far not addressed the hegemonic perspective of the conflict between Kemalists and conservatives. As will be explained in the coming chapters, although the conflict between Kemalists and conservatives has ideological, cultural, and economic dimensions, none of these domains is explanatory on its own. To cover the conflict comprehensively, a combined hegemonic (using Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony) and historical (using Mardin’s center-periphery conceptualization) approach is required. At this point, the works of Cihan Tuğal and Necmi Erdoğan should be mentioned as samples of a hegemonic perspective. Tuğal tries to understand the conservatives and their transformation within a hegemonic perspective; his is a thought-provoking and path-breaking approach, but one that differs from what this dissertation tries to do. On the other hand, Erdoğan examines the Kemalist NGOs’ contribution to the reproduction of Kemalist hegemony and such a perspective has made a significant contribution to this research.

Another gap in the existing literature on the February 28 and April 27 Processes is in the media and discursive perspective. Although there are a limited number of works on the political-economy of the Turkish media and its discourses, a joint perspective that focuses both on the political economy of the media and media discourse, while also taking into account the ideological and hegemonic position of the media, is missing. This is a gap the present research project aims to fill.

After this introductory chapter, the second chapter will be about the theoretical background. I will make use of two theoretical bodies; Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Şerif Mardin’s application of center-periphery analyses to the Turkish case. I do not consider the cleavage between the Kemalist elites and the conservative masses as a unidirectional one that only originated religiously or economically. Instead, the weight of religious, cultural, economical and social differentiations between the Kemalist elites and conservative masses are equal, and every single element constitutes a motivating factor for the other elements.

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Due to this aspect, the Gramscian conceptualization of hegemony offers tremendous theoretical opportunities for these analyses. As will be explained in the coming chapter, the conceptual subsets of hegemony give the opportunity of bringing non-economical factors to the discussion; (1) the “consent” and “coercion” subset is explanatory for the role and function of the different actors’ of Kemalist hegemonic group and urban middle class’ mobilization against conservatives; (2) “civil society” and “political society” explain the different realms through which hegemonic power was exercised over conservatives in the February 28 and April 27 Processes; and finally (3) the differentiation between “organic and traditional intellectuals” and the “intellectual and moral leadership” function of the traditional intellectuals offer an explanatory theoretical base for locating the role of media. Also, “Historic Bloc” is a good theoretical tool for the analyses of the alliance of different elements of Kemalist elites despite their conflicting interests.

Mardin’s center-periphery account will be the second theoretical framework I will use for the analyses of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. The main function of Mardin’s theory will be localizing the meta-analyses of center-periphery relations for Turkey. As the Gramscian explanation of hegemony is derived from Gramsci’s general reading of Italian history and the establishment of the fascist regime in Italy, Mardin further helps in adopting the Italian case to the Turkish one. Mardin also emphases the continuity between the Ottoman and Republican period and that will be helpful in building the next steps of continuity; the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Another strength of Mardin’s center-periphery analyses is how it encompasses both cultural and economical aspects of the cleavage between the center and periphery, and that will be essential in displaying both the cultural and economical aspects of the February 28 and April 27 Processes. Finally, the contemporary character of the center-periphery analyses will be one of the basic pillars behind the theoretical analyses of my cases.

At the end of the theoretical framework chapter, I will make a conceptualization for the analyses of the February 28 and April 27 Processes: the “Historic Hegemonic Center”. The combination of these two concepts helps both to eliminate their weaknesses and combine their strengths. As a result of merging these two concepts, both Mardin’s historical depth and Gramsci’s analytic functionality are preserved. The static character, theoretical limitations, and geographical dependency of Mardin’s center-periphery analysis are overcome by Gramscian hegemony’s analytical and theoretical depth and functionality, as in the concept sets of consent and coercion, and civil society and political society. On the other hand, the class-dependent analysis and the significance of economic factors in Gramscian hegemonic
analysis are overcome by the historicity and inclusion of non-economic factors in Mardin’s center-periphery analysis.

After theoretical explanations, the historical account will take the floor. In this context, I will firstly focus on the February 28 Process. The account of the February 28 Process will start with the explanation of the rise of the RP, and the dynamics that made the RP the electorate’s first choice. By focusing on the rise of the RP and seeking out the factors that made the RP the winner of the 1995 elections, the interrelatedness of ideological, social, political and economic factors of the conflict between the conservative masses and historic hegemonic center will be elaborated. In so doing, the RP will be situated in its place in the history of Turkish politics. After that the chapter will continue with the RP’s story and its coalition government with the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) will be the focus. The RP’s eagerness to participate in a coalition government, its search for legitimacy through ruling the country, and its ideological compromises with the TSK will explain the RP’s will to fill the political gap in the center of Turkish politics. As the discussion on the rising danger of reaction started after the RP’s coalition, it will also take its share in the analyses. In this part, major reactionary incidents will be analyzed. The primary focus will not be on the nature of the events, but on how such incidents were manipulated for the sake of military intervention. Then, the focus will shift to the historic hegemonic center’s reaction to the rising danger of reaction, and the MGK and its briefings. The key role played by the MGK and how it was effective in the formation of the front against the RP will be the main subject of this section. As a result of the MGK’s activities, the mobilization of the urban middle class masses will be told under the title of “Civil Society at Work.” The functions of Gramscian civil society and how it made a military intervention possible without the use of guns will be elaborated. The media’s manipulation of the Susurluk case and attempt to build support against the RP through Susurluk will be explained as crucial tasks of civil society in the February 28 Process. As a last word about the February 28 Process, the hegemonic character, and the aims of the intervention will be analyzed in the frame of “The Process Lasts, Ad Infinutum”. The way in which the ‘ad infinitum’ character of the February 28 Process aimed to destroy the social, political, and economic bases of conservative politics in Turkey is the major question that will be answered.

The story of the April 27 Process will be the following chapter after the chapter about the February 28 Process. The chapter on the AKP will start with an account of social and political atmosphere on the eve of the 2002 general elections. The account of the social and political atmosphere on the eve of the 2002 general elections will be explanatory about the rise of the
AKP in 2002 elections. Like the rise of RP in the previous chapter, the rise of the AKP will also be analyzed through the conjunction of both economic and non-economic factors. After the explanation of rise of the AKP, the focus will shift to the conflict between the AKP and the historic hegemonic center and how this conflict peaked with the presidential election process and further materialized with the e-memorandum. In this section the importance of the election of a president from the ranks of the AKP and its danger for the existing historic hegemonic center will be the main focus. It will be shown that the election of a president from the AKP’s ranks was not only about losing one more front to the AKP, but that it also had a symbolic and effective role in hegemonic relations. Contrary to the handling of the RP, the reading of the rise of the AKP will continue with a literature review. From a Gramscian perspective, this thesis argues that although all existing orientalist, modernist, political-economic, social movements, and modernity and civil society explanations have points in explaining the rise of the AKP after 2002 to some extent, they offer very limited information about the period between 1997 and 2002, a time in which the true reasons of the rise of the AKP should further researched. Therefore, a search for an alternative account will take place after the review of existing literature about AKP. An alternative account that attempts to explain all aspects of the case that are not covered by the existing explanations should be based on the political and social atmosphere following the February 28 Process: that is, the developments of the period between 1997 and 2001. By doing so the relationship between the February 28 Process and the April 27 Process and the ways in which these processes reflected the hegemonic crisis of the existing historic hegemonic bloc will be analyzed.

The fifth chapter will be the scene of research results and a focus on the analyses of newspaper discourse during the February 28 and April 27 Processes. The chapter will start with a brief introduction to the discourse analyses model chosen for the study. Among many different approaches, Norman Fairclough’s attention to text as well as discourse, his methodological inquiries, and the scope he provides for society-power relations seem to make his model the most appropriate. Fairclough’s three-dimensional model for critical discourse analysis -- focusing on text, discursive practice and social practice -- will be the methodological tool of this study. After that, the justification of sample newspapers at that time period will appear in addition to criteria of inclusion and exclusion. In this discourse analysis, Milliyet will be examined for its representation of the modern industrial bourgeoisie, Cumhuriyet for its hardcore Kemalist, statist, and elitist discourse, Sabah for its liberal attitude targeting the urban middle classes and white-collar workers, and, finally, Akşam, for its insights into the mobilization of the urban poor, artisans and craftsmen. After some brief information on the fundamentals of selected methodology, a chapter will evolve with two structurally identical subtopics, respectively reserved for the February 28 and April 27
Process. Each of these subtopics will start with a textual analysis. In this part, textual characteristics of newspapers’ discourse on basic incidents in these Processes will be displayed through their coverage. The February 28 Process is rich in controversial incidents, such as the establishment of the Refahyol government, the Susurluk scandal, the Fadime Şahin incident and various military briefings, that enable the observation of different textual practices. The newspapers’ coverage of the TSK’s memorandum will be the major object of analysis with regard to textual practices in the April 27 Process. Also, a discursive practices section that contains three subcategories will follow the textual analyses. The discursive practice is one of the mediums through which different social practices become possible and, therefore, each subcategory will cover a dominant discursive practice, a grand narrative, in the newspapers’ coverage during the Processes; Good vs. Bad Muslims, Moderate and Creeping Islamization, and Islamic Revolution. Each subcategory, each grand narrative, also aims to create a social practice. For example, in the case of the Good vs. Bad Muslim discursive practice, the very aim of defining the true version of Islam is to label, define, and then repress a false or bad version of Islam. In this section grand narratives, i.e. explanations and ideas that are generated for explaining history and for generating generalizations, will also be included in the discourse analysis, as they gave some idea of how conservatives are made to be associated with international and historical examples of religious reaction. In the light of these textual analyses and discursive practices, the social aspect of discourse will be explained in the social practices section. In this part, the contribution of different civil society actors to these processes and their discourses will be analyzed through each newspaper’s coverage. The results derived from these textual and discursive practices will be identified in the hegemonic analysis of the two military intervention processes, with a special focus on the activities of other members of the historic hegemonic bloc.

In the closing chapter, I will compare the results of the February 28 and April 27 Process. This final comparison will lead me to analyze the retreat of the historic hegemonic center, and to the argument that at this point the conservative *national popular* begins to replace the regressing historic hegemonic center. Finally, under the light of this argument, I will propose further research questions that will focus on the emerging conservative *national popular*.

Finally, I should state that some parts of this dissertation were submitted as a part of fulfillment of the degree of Master of Philosophy of Turkish Studies department at Leiden University.