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Chapter 4: Introducing new parties

“In the beautiful month of May each bird lays an egg and each Dutchman founds his own party.” – Doe Hans, journalist (cited in Vossen 2003, 17 translation SO)

4.1 Introduction

The Dutch political system is known for its openness. The liberal journalist Doe Hans wrote before the Second World War that in May every Dutchman founds his own political party, just like birds lay eggs. While not entirely true, the Netherlands has seen a large number of new parties running in elections: between 1918 and 1940, 125 parties participated in elections, and after 1946, 173 individual parties attempted to enter the Dutch parliament (Kiesraad 2012): from the conservative liberal VVD, one of the big five Dutch political parties, the CDA, which has been in government for more than two decades since its foundation in 1977, to the LPF of the maverick politician Fortuyn and the sectarian IKB (*Internationale Communistenbond*/International Communist League). Not all of these parties will be studied here; this study will focus on nineteen new parties that are selected because they form truly new parties (as defined in section 3.2). A full list of parties that ran in elections since 1946 can be found in appendix 6.

This chapter has three goals: it will introduce each of the new political parties, it will discuss the context of their developments, and it will classify each of the new political parties in terms of three categorisation schemes. These schemes categorise new parties in terms of by whom they are formed, what new parties are formed to accomplish, and on which issues new parties focus. Moreover, this chapter will briefly introduce the Dutch party system and those established parties that already existed in 1946.

Table 4.1: typology of new party formations

Type	Definition	Example
Transformation	A party formed by transformation is a party that has been founded by (nearly) all individuals who had leading, national political offices in one established party.	Groen!
Marriage	A party formed by marriage is a party that has been founded by the merger of at least two established parties.	CU
Divorce	A party formed by divorce is a party that has been founded in either one of two ways: first if it is founded by at least one individual who had a leading, national political office in one established party with parliamentary representation. Or second, if it is founded by an organised group, which took a major role in the internal debate in one established political party.	PVV
Birth	A party formed by birth is a party that does not fit any of the other categories.	LN

4.2 Three typologies

This section will introduce the three categorisation schemes in which new parties will be classified in this chapter.

4.2.1 Party formation

Section 2.3 already gave a definition of what a new political party is and when they would be included in this study. Following Mair (1999), this study distinguishes between parties formed by birth, by divorce, by transformation and by marriage. This study focuses on the effects of political parties in the first period they have MPs in parliament, but only when these new parties are neither a transformation of a party that was already in parliament, nor a merger of parties that were in parliament before. It may prove prudent to provide rigorous definitions of these categories. These definitions are listed in table 4.1. In order to be formed by divorce, transformation, or merger, there must be a link in the personnel of the established party and the new party. This study follows Barnea and Rahat (2011) in operationalising the link between the new and established parties in terms of their personnel. The definition of established party flows naturally from the definition of the new party: any party that has been in parliament for more than one session is an established party. This means that many of the new parties studied here become established parties in later parts of this study. The GPV (*Gereformeerde Politiek Verbond*/Reformed Political League) entered parliament in 1963 and merged into the CU (*ChristenUnie*/ChristianUnion) in 2000. This party is a new party in one part

Table 4.2: Rochon's typology of new party goals operationalised

Characteristic	Challenger	Mobiliser
Political Communication	Oriented at one established political party.	Oriented at no particular party.
Political Ideology	Similar to an ideology one established party has or used to have.	Not similar to an ideology of an established party.
Electoral Appeal	Same social group as one established party used target or targets.	Appeals to no social group or to a social group that is not appealed to by established parties.

of the study, but it becomes one of the established parties in the study of twelve other new parties. Previous studies selected particular established parties for their study (see paragraph 3.2).

4.2.2 Party goals

A second measure that has to be operationalised is the difference between challengers and mobilisers described in section 2.8.2, a distinction drawn from Rochon (1985). This study seeks to systematically integrate, elaborate and further develop this approach by classifying all new Dutch political parties into a single classification scheme. The study attempts to contribute by using more rigid definitions and classification conditions than previous studies. In order to categorise these new parties, table 4.2 offers a scheme with three conditions. The conditions are drawn from Rochon's description of challengers, which he defines as follows: a challenger is a new party that attacks an established party for abandoning the ideology that it used to have, or the interests that it used to represent. The distinction between challenger and mobiliser can be divided into three aspects. The first aspect is the political communication of the new party: is it oriented towards one party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? The second aspect is the ideology of the new party: is it similar to another party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? And the third aspect is the electoral appeal of the new party: is it oriented towards the same social group as another party (challenger) or not (mobiliser)? If a party meets two of the three requirements, it should be considered a challenger. Any other party would be a mobiliser party. It is important to note that there is an assumption that in addition to having a new ideology, mobilisers will make new proposals. As seen in paragraph 3.5.4 the extent to which these new parties really offered new proposals should not

be overestimated. In the case-by-case discussion, the classification for every party is discussed, and the scores of all parties on all these characteristics are shown in table 4.2 and discussed in section 4.5.

4.2.3 Party's issue

As this study seeks to determine the effects new parties have on the attention that established parties devote to their issue, it is necessary to assess which new parties have ownership of which issues. Most current research on issue ownership looks at which issues parties are active or competent on in the eyes of the voter (Van der Brug 2004; Walgrave & De Swert 2007). This method cannot be applied here, because such questions were not asked for all new parties included in this study. Even if there is an electoral study available for the year in which the new party entered parliament, these parties are often neglected by electoral researchers, because they only include relevant parties in their studies.

Four measures will be used to triangulate the issues that new parties 'own': the election manifesto of the new party, the motions that it proposed, its parliamentary speeches, and the historical background of the party. The most basic notion is that, if a new party owns an issue, this issue will feature prominently in its election manifesto. Research shows that there is a relationship between the issue a party owns and the main issues in their election manifestos (Walgrave & De Swert 2007). It may, however, be that for strategic reasons, parties talk about different issues in their election manifesto than they actually do in the campaign. So, in order to avoid misassignment, in some cases different issues were selected on basis of their parliamentary work, both in terms of motions and parliamentary speech, and historical descriptions of the party's focus. The precise measurement of these variables is discussed in sections 3.4.3, 3.4.8 and 3.5.2.

4.3 The parties and party system in 1946: the baseline

In the 1946 elections, one can see which parties existed before the entry of new parties into the system. The 1946 elections were the first parliamentary elections after the Second World War. Several parties had been re-founded or reorganised after the war, but the basic pre-war party system and their social organisation in terms of pillars remained. The parties that took part in the 1946

Table 4.3: established parties 1946

Name			Ideology	Seats (1946)
Dutch	English	Abb.		
<i>Anti-Revolutionaire Partij</i>	Anti-Revolutionary Party	ARP	Protestant conservatism	13
<i>Communistische Partij Nederland</i>	Communist Party Netherlands	CPN	Communism	10
<i>Christelijk-Historische Unie</i>	Christian Historical Union	CHU	Protestant conservatism	8
<i>Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij</i>	Reformed Political Party	SGP	Orthodox Protestantism	2
<i>Partij van de Vrijheid</i>	Freedom Party	PvdV	Conservative liberalism	6
<i>Katholieke Volkspartij</i>	Catholic People's Party	KVP	Catholic Christian-democracy	32
<i>Partij van de Arbeid</i>	Labour Party	PvdA	Social-democracy	29

elections are listed in table 4.3. This paragraph offers a brief description of the parties that were established parties in 1946

The ARP (*Anti-Revolutionaire Partij*/Anti-Revolutionary Party) was formed in 1879 (Koole 1995, 172). The ARP's ideology can be described as conservative Protestantism, which combines conservative positions such as support for the monarchy and opposition to decolonisation with a Protestant interpretation of moral issues. It was the first mass party in the Netherlands with a membership base, a manifesto, parliamentary discipline and an extra-parliamentary organisation (Koole 1995, 17). The ARP was also the first party to be part of a network of societal organisations. In the post-war period, all Dutch parties had this kind of societal network, known as "zuilen" or pillars (Koole 1995, 34-35). The ARP-pillar included the *Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland* (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands). The party drew its support from this base (Lijphart 1968, 36). Although the party never received more than 20% of the votes, it had a major influence on Dutch politics, both in pioneering models of societal organisations, such as pillarisation and the mass party model, and in playing a major role in Dutch governments before the Second World War.

The CHU (*Christelijk-Historische Unie*/Christian Historical Union) was formed in 1908 as a merger of several parties which had split away from the ARP or which had formed independently as local support bases of conservative Protestant MPs (Koole 1995, 114; Van Spanning 2001, 115-119). These parties had split from the ARP because of ideological, personal, religious and organisational reasons (Koole 1995, 100, 113). The CHU drew its voters from *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* (Dutch Reformed Church), the main Protestant Church (Lijphart 1968, 36).

Like the ARP, the CHU was a medium-sized party, which participated in most coalition cabinets between 1908 and 1977.

Individuals who were aligned with the *Gereformeerde Gemeenten* (Reformed Congregations), a conservative split from the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* formed the SGP (*Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij*/Reformed Political Party) in 1918. The party was open to orthodox Christians from different churches. The SGP adhered to an orthodox Protestant ideology:⁶³ the right to govern was granted to the Dutch King by God, policy should be based on Biblical commandments, and women and men have different social roles, which should also be reflected in their political rights (Koole 1995, 128-129). The SGP has a small but consistent social base of around 2% of the Dutch population (Koole 1995, 129).

The KVP (*Katholieke Volkspartij*/Catholic People's Party) was formed in 1946. Its founders had been member of the RKSP (*Rooms Katholieke Staatspartij*/Roman Catholic Political Party) before the Second World War (Koole 1995, 165). Catholics form a large religious minority in the Netherlands that had faced formal and social discrimination (Koole 1995, 152). During the late 1800s and the early 1900s, the Catholics began to organise politically. When the Catholic party was re-launched after the Second World War, the founders sought to renew its ideological profile (Koole 1995, 164-166). Still, the party remained a party for Catholic voters (Lijphart 1968, 36; Jong, Van der Kolk & Voerman 2011). In terms of the classification employed above, the move from RKSP to KVP can be understood as a transformation (Lipschits 1982, 44). The ideological profile of the KVP was Christian-democratic, based on Catholic social principles. It supported the formation of a welfare state and corporatist economic management. This was combined with an emphasis on moral and religious issues. After the 1946 elections, the KVP formed a coalition cabinet with the social democrats in order to implement these social-economic reforms.

The PvdV (*Partij van de Vrijheid*/Freedom Party) was formed in 1946. It had personal and organisational ties to the conservative liberal LSP (*Liberale Staatspartij*/Liberal Political Party) that existed before the Second World War (Lipschits 1982, 43). The PvdV had a conservative liberal ideology, emphasising individual liberty and limited government. The conservative liberals were part of a

⁶³ The term orthodox is used here to refer to a bibliocratic political ideology, which holds that government policy should be based on a strict interpretation of scripture.

looser network of neutral organisations. These did not truly constitute a pillar. The electoral support of the liberals fluctuated over time. Its voters belonged to the middle class voters and to latitudinarian currents within the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk*. In 1948, the PvdV had merged with a liberal split from the PvdA to form the VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*/People's Party for Freedom and Democracy). The new formation retained the same ideological orientation and social base (Koole 1995, 292).

The PvdA (*Partij van de Arbeid*/Labour Party) was formed in 1946 as a merger of three parties: the socialist SDAP (*Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij*/Social democratic Workers' Party), the progressive Christian CDU (*Christelijk-Democratische Unie*/Christian-Democratic Union) and the progressive liberal VDB (*Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond*/Freethinking Democratic League), as well as individuals from the Catholic resistance movement *Christofoor* and the CHU (Lipschits 1982, 44). The founders of the PvdA sought to break through the pillarised societal organisation (Koole 1995, 48). The party anticipated an electoral breakthrough in 1946, by uniting progressives from all pillars, but instead, the PvdA won less than its predecessors had done in 1937. The party itself maintained ties with the organisations of the social democratic pillar. It was supported by working class voters from latitudinarian currents within the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* (Koole 1995, 224). Ideologically, the party is social democratic, emphasising the welfare state and government control over economic development. After the 1946 elections, the PvdA became the junior partner in a coalition cabinet with the Christian-democratic KVP.

The CPN (*Communistische Partij Nederland*/Communist Party of the Netherlands) was formed in 1909 as a leftwing split from the main social democratic party SDAP (Koole 1995, 254). It was originally named Social Democratic Party. After the Russian Revolution, it aligned with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and adopted the name Communist Party. During the interwar period the party was small and isolated. During the German occupation, (after initial hesitation) it played a major role in the resistance movement (Koole 1995, 261-262), and after the War, the party was rewarded for this electorally, although it remained politically isolated (Koole 1995, 263; Verrips 1995).

At the level of the party system, three elements must be recognised: first, in terms of electoral competition, the Netherlands of 1946 was a typical case of closed

competition. Each party had its own social base: Catholics voted for the KVP, Protestant voters aligned themselves with the CHU, ARP and SGP, depending on their particular religious persuasion. The secular working class supported the PvdA or the CPN and the secular middle class supported the VVD.

Second, in terms of the patterns of cabinet formation, there had been alternating governments formed by either the religious parties (RKSP, CHU and ARP) or the liberals between 1900 and 1918. As suffrage was extended, the liberal parties needed the support of the social democrats to obtain parliamentary majorities.⁶⁴ After 1918, there was a permanent religious majority. Therefore RKSP, CHU and ARP formed the core of every governing coalition (Koole 1995, 40). During the economic crisis of the 1930s, the cabinet was extended with liberal parties (Koole 1995, 37), and in 1939 on the eve of the Second World War cabinet cooperation also included the social democrats. After the Second World War the pattern of cabinet formation changed: social democratic and Christian-democratic parties formed a coalition cabinet. Those two parties formed the main core of all cabinets between 1946 and 1959; combinations of the ARP, CHU or VVD joined them.

And third, in terms of the dimensionality of the political space, there were two major divisions in Dutch politics: between religious and secular parties, and between parties that favoured government planning and parties that favoured a free market. Both these dimensions concern the extent to which government should interfere with social life: the religious parties favoured a moral state, which intervened into people's personal lives, and the secular parties favoured a neutral state, which did not intervene into the private sphere. The economically leftwing parties supported government intervention in the economy and the economically rightwing parties oppose government intervention in the economy.⁶⁵ The constellation of parties in this space has been characterised as the Dutch triangle (De

⁶⁴ This was also reflected in voting patterns in the two-round electoral system for parliament. At that time the Netherlands had an electoral system akin to the current French system. In the second round, the main divide often was between secular and religious parties (Jong, Van der Kolk and Voerman 2011).

⁶⁵ Both these divisions were related to the terms left and right. In the early twentieth century the terms left and right were tied to the division between secular (left) and religious (right), but by the 1950s, these terms would change their meaning to those who favoured limited government (right) and an interventionist government (left) in economic matters (Koole 1995).

Beus, van Doorn & de Rooy 1993): the PvdA and the CPN were secular and leftwing on both issues. The PvdV was secular and rightwing. The SGP was religious and rightwing. The KVP was a religious party with centrist positions on the economic dimension. The CHU and the ARP were religious parties with traditionally more rightwing positions on economic issues.⁶⁶

4.4 Nineteen new parties

The following sections will sketch the history of several individual new parties and categorise them in the schemes proposed above.

4.4.1 KNP: dissenting Catholics

The KNP (*Katholieke Nationale Partij*/Catholic National Party) was the first new party that entered parliament after the Second World War. It is a classical example of a challenger and a party formed by divorce, in this case from the KVP.

The KNP was formed in 1948 as the list-Welter (Koole 1995, 185). The KNP was founded by Charles Welter, who had been minister of Colonial Affairs two times in 1925 and between 1937 and 1941 for the Catholic RKSP (Tomassen 2003, 51). Until 1946, he had been a senator for the KVP. The issue that split Welter from the KVP was the independence of Indonesia, one of the most important issues in Dutch politics after the Second World War (Tomassen 2003, 51). The KVP supported greater autonomy for Indonesia, under pressure of the PvdA. In the view of Welter, this could not be united with the Dutch constitutional order (Tomassen 2003, 53). In addition to Indonesian independence, Welter was also uneasy about the KVP's cooperation with the PvdA, specifically on economic matters (Koole 1995, 185; Tomassen 2003, 54). Welter led the internal opposition against Indonesian independence within the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 54). His participation in this opposition was a reason for the KVP's national executive committee to remove Welter from the list of candidates for the 1948 elections (Tomassen 2003, 55, 57).

⁶⁶ The CHU and the ARP tended to change over time in their exact ideological relationship to each other. The ARP oscillated between rightwing and leftwing over the course of its post-war existence. It was outside of the first broad coalition cabinets because of its opposition to Indonesian independence, and it moved to the left over the course of the late 1960s, embracing what was called evangelical radicalism. The CHU, characterised by a much less coherent position, tended to move in the opposite direction: from a pragmatic cooperative stance towards the social democrats in the 1950s, to a more conservative position in the 1970s.

Welter and the other members of the internal opposition formed a separate list for those elections. This move had been anticipated by the leadership of the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 58). In the 1948 elections, the KNP won a single seat. KVP leader Romme stated that he did not see the KNP as a major threat (Lipschits 1982, 47). The KNP drew support from the Catholic middle class but also from people with a Dutch-Indian background, including non-Catholics (Tomassen 2003, 64).

The KNP saw itself as a Catholic party and it explicitly agreed with the KVP on moral matters (Tomassen 2003, 62). On other issues, it combined a more conservative and economically liberal outlook (Van Bergen 1996, 45). It was opposed to autonomy or independence of Indonesia and sought to maintain the constitutional order, even after Indonesia had become an independent state (Tomassen 2003, 63). In the election manifesto of the KNP, colonial affairs are a main issue. The party was opposed to extending government intervention on social and economic matters (Tomassen 2003, 63). On matters of economic governance and colonial politics, the KNP saw the PvdA as its main opponent, and the KVP as a “sheep” that was led astray by a “red shepherd” (Tomassen 2003, 63 translation SO). In parliament the KNP pursued the KVP as a “rightwing botfly”, which reinforced the existing conflict between left and right within the KVP (Koole 1995, 186 translation SO). The KNP has also been characterised as “splinter in the flesh of the KVP” (Van Bergen 1996, translation SO). Over time, the KNP focused less on Indonesia (which had become independent) and more on the economic policy of the government (Tomassen 2003, 65). In 1955 the KNP returned to the KVP under pressure from the episcopate (Lipschits 1982, 48; Koole 1995, 186). Welter remained a KVP MP until 1963.

Rochon (1985, 429) considers the KNP a challenger. The KNP considered the KVP to have strayed from the right path because of a “red shepherd”; it adhered to the more rightwing brand of political Catholicism of the RKSP, which the KVP had abandoned after the war, and it appealed specifically to Catholic voters (the base of the KVP). The KNP can be seen as a direct split from the KVP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): its leader had been a minister and senator for the Catholic party and he was a candidate for their party list. Given that the colonial issue was the reason for the KNP to split, and that this is the main issue in their election manifesto, colonial affairs and development cooperation is assigned as the issue owned by the KNP.

Table 4.4: profile of the KNP

Party Profile		KNP
Full name		<i>Katholieke Nationale Partij</i>
English name		Catholic National Party
Founded		1948
First elected		1952
First succesful election result		1 (1.2%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Divorce (from KVP)
Party goal		Challenger (KVP)
Ideology		Rightwing Catholicism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Colonial Affairs (22.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Colonial Affairs (17.9%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to decolonization of Indonesia
	assigned	Colonial Affairs
Unique proposals		37.8% (14)
In parliament		1948-1955
Reason dissolution		Merged into KVP

Table 4.5: profile of the PSP

Party Profile		PSP
Full name		<i>Pacifistisch-Socialistische Partij</i>
English name		Pacifist-Socialist Party
Founded		1957
First elected		1959
First succesful election result		2 (1.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		2497
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Challenger (PvdA)
Ideology		Leftwing socialism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Defence (49.4%)
	in parliamentary speech	Defence (17.2%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to the Cold War
	assigned	Defence
Unique proposals		39.1% (9)
In parliament		1959-1989
Reason dissolution		Merged into GL

4.4.2 PSP: dissenting socialists

The PSP (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*/Pacifist Socialist Party) was the second new party to enter parliament after the Second World War. Like the KNP, it traces its background to events within the international realm, namely the Cold War and Dutch coalition politics.

Individuals from the peace movement formed the PSP in 1957. They were united in their opposition to the use of nuclear weapons and the Cold War mentality (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 33). Most of them had been involved in a peace movement called The Third Way, which sought a political course between the Soviet Union and the United States (Denekamp et al. 1982, 34-37). Between 1955 and 1957, people from The Third Way organised themselves in a movement of politically homeless individuals (*Daklozenberaad*), which sought to cooperate with the PvdA in order to see a pacifist elected to parliament, but the PvdA refused (Van der Land 1962, 16-18; Koole 1995, 247). After this refusal, they formed their own party. The founding members had different backgrounds: leftwing socialists, dissident communists and pacifist Christians (Van der Land 1962, 89; Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 33; Denekamp et al. 1987). A large number of founders had been a member of the social democratic PvdA and had left the party because of its support for the Dutch military presence in the Dutch Indies in the 1950s (Van der Land 1962, 93).⁶⁷ A sizeable minority of the party's founders had been a member of the pre-War progressive Christian and pacifist CDU, which had merged into the social democratic PvdA (Van der Land 1962, 89). Only a small percentage of the party's founders had a background in the Communist CPN (Van der Land 1962, 89).⁶⁸ Many founders had been active in the SU (*Socialistische Unie*/Socialist Union), a short-lived leftwing-socialist party that existed in the early 1950s (Van der Land 1962, 89; Lipschits 1982, 64). In 1958 the PSP won its first seats in the North Holland Provincial Council, and in 1959 it won two seats in the *Tweede Kamer*. The PSP entered parliament at the cost of the PvdA (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 306).

⁶⁷ The most prominent of them had been Slotemaker-De Bruïne who had been head of the WBS, the PvdA think tank, between 1945 and 1947 (Denekamp et al. 1987).

⁶⁸ In 1967, the PSP was joined by a group of dissident Communists called the "Bruggroep", led by former CPN-parliamentary party chair Gortzak.

The ideology of the PSP contained two elements: pacifism and socialism. Like the Third Way, the PSP sought a third way between the Eastern (communist) and the Western (capitalist) blocs. Within the Dutch left, the division between East and West was reflected politically: the pro-American PvdA and the pro-Russian CPN were divided politically. In its first election manifesto and in its parliamentary speeches the PSP focused on defence. Like the PvdA and the CPN, the PSP had a leftwing economic programme: it was committed to socialisation of the means of production.

After the formation of the PSP, the media wrote about them as a minor nuisance for the PvdA (Van der Land 1962, 53-54). One newspaper wrote: “[w]e do not believe that this split will cost the PvdA many votes” (*de Volkskrant* cited in Van der Land 1962, 54 translation SO). One social democratic author characterised the PSP as a “botfly on the leg of the horse that has to pull socialism forward” (Schurer cited in Van der Land 1962, 60 translation SO). In its early communication, the PSP agitated against both the CPN and the PvdA (Denekamp et al. 1982, 55). The party considered both the CPN and the PvdA militaristic. The success of the PSP in the provincial elections of 1958 took the PvdA by surprise (Denekamp et al. 1982, 57), and after these elections, the PvdA began to warn against the PSP: a vote for the PSP would benefit the VVD or the KVP because the PvdA would become relatively smaller (Denekamp et al. 1982, 61). The early reactions of the CPN appear to have been much more positive: they supported the commitment of PSP against (American) nuclear weapons and sought cooperation between the PSP and CPN in the peace movement, but after the PSP entered parliament, relations became more strained (Denekamp et al. 1982, 64-66).

The PSP would remain in parliament for 30 years. Over time, its pacifism moved to the background and its leftwing socialism took over. During its history, the PSP was characterised by internal instability, conflicts and splits (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997). Although the party had responded positively to cooperation between the PvdA and other progressive parties in the early stages, it stood isolated from these parties during the 1970s. Over the course of the 1980s, the PSP began to cooperate with the CPN, the EVP and the PPR. These four parties eventually merged to form the leftwing green party GL (*GroenLinks*/GreenLeft) in 1989.

Van der Land (1962, 119) argues that one cannot see the PSP as a divorce from the PvdA, because its members had been politically homeless before forming the PSP, and those who had been a member of the PvdA had been so only for a short time long before the PSP was formed. As the founders included no former MPs or ministers, and as no organised groups from within the PvdA split to join the PSP, it ought to be considered a party formed by birth (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). The question whether the PSP is a challenger or a mobiliser, is more difficult to answer. Rochon (1985, 430) considers it a mobiliser party, even though he claims that the party sought to “revitalise” socialism, the ideology of the PvdA. The PSP adhered to the anti-militarist and socialist ideology of the pre-War SDAP and CDU parties, which had merged to form the PvdA. In its communication, the PSP attacked both the CPN and the PvdA for their militarism. Its support base of leftwing intellectuals, however, was not the support base of these two parties. The PSP shares two of the three characteristics of a challenger (communication and ideology), and therefore, one has to classify the party as such. Because of the early orientation of the PSP-founders towards the PvdA, this party is identified as its challenged party. Given that the defence issue is characteristic of the party’s parliamentary speeches and its election manifestos, and that the party’s anti-Cold War positions distinguished it from the PvdA and the CPN, the party is linked to the defence issue.

4.4.3 BP: *farmers in protest*

The 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of rightwing protest movements, specifically the BP (*Boerenpartij*/Farmers’ Party). In the eyes of Vossen (2005), these movements were part of a process of depillarisation, secularisation and anti-paternalism, as the rise of new leftwing parties such as the PSP had also been: the party is the other face of the sixties.

The BP was formed in 1958 by Hendrik Koekoek (Vossen 2005, 252). He served as party chair and later as chair of the parliamentary party, top candidate in every election and editor of the *Vrije Boer* (Free Farmer), the party’s magazine (Vossen 2005, 250). Koekoek had been a member of the conservative Protestant CHU until 1956, but had not been a prominent member, nor had he ever held political office for the party other than secretary of a local CHU branch (Nooij 1969, 33; Vossen 2005, 251). Since the late 1940s, Koekoek had been organising

resistance against government intervention in the economy: first with his *Bond voor Bedrijfsvrijheid in de Landbouw* (League for Entrepreneurial Freedom in Agriculture), and later with the BP. The party resisted the formation of a corporatist organisation of agriculture that was favoured by the KVP and the PvdA. This corporatist organisation had the power to levy taxes and had limited legislative powers. The first public activity of the BP was participation in the 1958 elections in several municipalities in the province of Gelderland (Nooij 1969, 34).⁶⁹ In 1959, they participated in the national elections unsuccessfully (Nooij 1969, 34-35; Vossen 2005, 252). The party was able to win a seat in the provincial council of Gelderland in 1962 (Nooij 1969, 35). In 1963, several farmers in the hamlet Hollandscheveld refused to pay taxes to the corporatist organisation for agriculture; the resistance degenerated into violent clashes with the police (Nooij 1969, 36; Koole 1995, 337; Vossen 2005, 251-252). Koekoek supported the farmers. This generated considerable attention for Koekoek and the BP. In the 1963 elections, the BP won three seats. Their electoral support was not limited to farmers. They also won a considerable number of votes in Amsterdam for instance (Vossen 2005, 253).⁷⁰

The BP saw itself explicitly as a party of the (economic) right, a position, which had been left open by the parties committed to the free market such as the ARP, the CHU and the VVD (Nooij, 1969:41). It agitated against these parties for abandoning their positions: “[the VVD] has been compromised by years of cooperation with the guild of interventionist quacks, which see the economic straightjacket as the only means to correct the growing resistance of businesses” (Stam 1966, 21 translation SO). In the BP’s view, the Christian parties were controlled by their leftwing labour wings, and the VVD had “collaborated” with these parties in coalition cabinets (Stam cited in Nooij 1969, 41). In the eyes of the BP, the established parties had all become indistinguishable (Faas 1967, 149). The party also stood on the right on issues such as monarchy, the place of religion in politics and foreign affairs (Nooij, 1969:45). In its election manifestos and its parliamentary speeches, the party focused most on agriculture.

⁶⁹ The party ran under the name *Vrije Boeren* (Free Farmers).

⁷⁰ It is important to note that in the elections of 1966 and 1967, the support from urban areas is much greater than in 1963, especially in comparison to the relatively constant support in rural areas (Nooij 1969, 37).

The BP would be in parliament for the following eighteen years. In the late 1960s, the party had become the focal point for individuals and movements to the right of the VVD, the ARP and the CHU (Vossen 2005, 257). The party grew in following elections. This growth coincided with several conflicts. The most prominent concerned the earlier affiliation of a BP senator with a National-Socialist party (Vossen 2005, 261). Koekoek supported the senator, and in response one of the MPs left the parliamentary party in 1966. In the 1970s, support for the BP petered out and the party disappeared from parliament in the 1981 elections.

Given that the BP was not founded by a large section of the members or a prominent politician of an established party, it must be seen as a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Lucardie (1986, 78-83) considers the BP to be a single interest, anti-system party. Koole (1995, 337-338), however, considers the party to be a protest party rather than a single-issue party. He stresses the comparison with the French *Poujadist* party, which also mobilised protest voters from both the urban and the rural middle class (Koole 1995, 337-338). Mudde (2004, 548) also describes the BP as an early populist party. Rochon (1985, 430) considers the party to be a mobiliser, which appealed primarily to those who opposed “big government”. And indeed, the party did not adhere explicitly to an ideology any other party had before: its conservatism mixed a kind of non-denominational Christianity with economic liberalism. It also agitated against the established parties of the right for abandoning their commitment to the free market. The social group they sought to represent (farmers) were not the social base of these established parties, however. Given the party’s background, electoral orientation and activity, the party is linked to the issue of agriculture.

Table 4.6: profile of BP

Party Profile		BP
Full name		<i>Boerenpartij</i>
English name		Farmers' Party
Founded		1957
First elected		1963
First succesful election result		3 (2.1%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		75%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (protest party)
Ideology		Conservatism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Agriculture (43.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Agriculture (15.5%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to organisation of agriculture
	assigned	Agriculture
Unique proposals		54.5% (12)
In parliament		1963-1981
Reason dissolution		Transformed into <i>Rechtse Volkspartij</i>

Table 4.7: profile of the GPV

Party Profile		GPV
Full name		<i>Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond</i>
English name		Reformed Political League
Founded		1948
First elected		1963
First succesful election result		1 (0.7%)
Membership in year of first MPs		7039
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Split (ARP)
Party goal		Challenger (ARP)
Ideology		Orthodox Protestantism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Governance (13.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Moral issues (26.8%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Moral issues, combined with economic and foreign policy
	assigned	Moral issues
Unique proposals		50% (31)
In parliament		1959-2000
Reason dissolution		Merged into CU

4.4.4 GPV: dissenting Protestants

As discussed above, the Protestant segment of the Dutch political landscape is characterised by splits between different religious groups: the ARP had its support in the *Gereformeerde Kerk*, the CHU in the conservative parts of the *Nederlands Hervormde Kerk* and the SGP had its support in the smaller orthodox Protestant communities. The GPV (*Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond*/Reformed Political League) was the fourth Protestant party to enter parliament after the Second World War. It, too, had its roots in a specific religious community.

The GPV was an orthodox Protestant party. In 1948, members of the ARP formed the GPV (Koole 1995, 136). The reason for the split was theological (Klei 2010, 12). The GPV was formed by members of the *Gereformeerde Kerken (Vrijgemaakt)* (Liberated Reformed Church) that had split away from the ARP-aligned *Gereformeerde Kerken* in 1944 (Koole 1995, 136). 10% of the members of the *Gereformeerde Kerken* had joined the *Vrijgemaakten* (Harinck 2001, 224). In the following four years, it became clear to the *Vrijgemaakten* that they could not continue to cooperate politically with individuals with whom they had a fundamental religious conflict (Koole 1995, 136-137). On a local level, caucuses had been split on religious grounds (Harinck 2001, 225). In part, the formation of the GPV was the result of a conflict within the *Vrijgemaakte Church*: between those who wanted to continue within the ARP and those who wanted to form a separate party (Klei 2011, 53). The ARP consciously attempted to prevent division, for instance by putting *Vrijgemaakten* on eligible places on the party list (Harinck 2001, 232; Klei 2011, 88). Between 1948 and 1950, the group that split away from the ARP operated as a loose *Voorlopig Verband van Vrije Kiesverenigingen* (Temporary League of Free Electoral Associations) and in 1950 they formed a separate political party (Klei 2010, 13). Several branches of the ARP switched allegiances (Koole 1995, 137). GPV local parties did not allow anyone to become a member if they were not a member of the *Vrijgemaakte Church* (Koole 1995, 138). The GPV was closely tied to the *Vrijgemaakte Church* and the *Vrijgemaakte pillar* (Klei 2010, 22-23). The GPV participated in the elections of 1952, 1956 and 1959 without winning a seat.⁷¹ The party had provincial councillors in Groningen since 1950. In 1959, they missed out

⁷¹ Already in 1948 *Vrijgemaakte* former ARP-voters believed that they had cost the ARP a seat by abstaining from voting (Klei 2011, 51).

on a seat in the *Tweede Kamer* by only twenty votes (Klei 2010, 14). Before the GPV entered parliament, however, the ARP had attempted to consciously ignore the party (Klei 2011, 64). The ARP spoke negatively of what it considered to be “an irrelevant, sectarian, small party” (Koole 1995, 137 translation SO). The GPV legitimated its own existence by referring to what it perceived as the aberrant course of the ARP (Klei 2011, 93). In one of its first election manifestos, the party wrote “the GPV does not seek to navigate a new course, but rightfully pretends to continue the old line of the ARP.” (Enschede Program of the GPV cited in Klei 2011, 94 translation SO). In 1963, the GPV won a seat in parliament. From then on the party provided one or two MPs. In parliament the GPV MPs were highly respected for their contributions to parliamentary debates. They were considered the “conscience” of the *Tweede Kamer* (Klei 2011, 119).

The GPV was an orthodox Protestant party. It was based on a specific interpretation of the Bible and the doctrines of Dutch Calvinism. The party combined conservatism on moral issues with conservative stances on the role of the government in the economy. The party also took conservative positions on foreign affairs: it was anti-communist and it opposed European integration. The GPV was opposed to the quick dissolution of both colonial relations and the apartheid regime in South Africa (Klei 2010, 26-27). For this party, however, its religious convictions were more important than any other issue. This is evident if one looks at the party’s election manifesto: moral issues are dominant.

The GPV would remain in parliament for the following 39 years. During the 1960s, a group of ARP-members petitioned to join the party because they felt the ARP drifted from its conservative positions. The GPV was internally divided over their support; in the end the GPV rebuked them because they were not members of the *Vrijgemaakte* Church (Klei 2011). This group became one of the components of the RPF (see section 4.4.10). Over the course of the 1990s, the GPV modified its position on non-*Vrijgemaakten* joining the party. This allowed for closer cooperation with the other orthodox Christian parties, especially the RPF. The two parties merged in 2000 to form the CU (*ChristenUnie/ChristianUnion*).

It is clear that the GPV was formed by divorce, as the party was formed by an organised group of *Vrijgemaakte* members in the ARP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). In terms of its goals it is much more difficult to characterise the party. Rochon considers them to be a mobilising party (Rochon 1985, 430), because they

mobilised voters on a new religious cleavage. Although some prominent GPV-politicians had attempted to broaden the base of the party, the GPV oriented itself in electoral terms to *Vrijgemaakten*. The ARP, however, considered the *Vrijgemaakten* part of its social base. As Daalder (1965) and Lucardie (1986) recognise, the GPV did adhere to a perfected version of the ideology of the ARP. At the moment of the GPV's foundation or the GPV's entry into parliament, the ARP had not drifted that far from this position yet, as it would in the course of the 1960s. On the basis of these characteristics, one has to characterise the GPV as a challenger of the ARP. Given its religious background and prevalence of moral themes in its election manifesto, the party is linked to moral issues.

4.4.5 D66: democratic idealists

During the 1960s, the pillars, which had organised Dutch social life, began to weaken. The party system continued to reflect the pillarised society. A group of *homines novi* formed a new political party, D66 (*Democraten '66*/Democrats '66)⁷², to try and radically reform the Dutch political system. Soon however, they themselves became part of that very same party system.

D66 was formed in 1966. The initiative for the party lay with Hans Gruijters, who had been a municipal councillor for the VVD in Amsterdam (Van der Land 2003, 21; Koole 1995, 311). He had left the VVD over a conflict with the conservative wing of the party concerning the royal wedding of Princess Beatrix, the heir-apparent, and Claus von Amsberg, which Gruijters had refused to attend (Van der Land 2003, 21). After he left the party he was approached by different individuals about the formation of a new party (Van der Land 2003, 22-23). Gruijters organised a series of meetings with several of them. The group had a mixed background.⁷³ A major concern they shared was the functioning of democracy (Van der Land 2003, 23). The group explicitly sought to prevent becoming a Group-Gruijters, a local split from the VVD, and therefore Gruijters soon handed over leadership to Hans van Mierlo (Van der Land 2003, 24-26).

⁷² The party was founded with the acronym D'66. D66 will be used consistently, which is the formal spelling since the 1980s.

⁷³ Out of the 44 participants, 25 were member of a political party: sixteen were members of the VVD, seven had been members of the PvdA, one had been a member of the PSP and one had been a member of the CHU (Godschalk 1970). Nineteen did not have a background in an established political party.

In 1966, the group formed the initiative-committee D66 with the intention to form a political party (Van der Land 2003, 25). The reasoning behind this move was that the group had to become a threat for the established parties in order to realise its policy goals (Van der Land 2003, 25). The committee drafted an appeal to the Dutch people, and because the appeal got considerable response both from the population and the media (Van der Land 2003, 29), the committee formed a new party in 1966 in order to participate in the 1967 elections (Van der Land 2003, 30). In the electoral campaign of 1967, the party emphasised government reform, because that was – according to market researchers – the unique selling point of the party (Van der Land 2003, 27). In the 1967 elections, D66 won seven seats, which was unprecedented for a new party (Van der Land 2003, 37; Koole 1995, 313). Electorally, D66 drew its support from all over the political landscape (Van der Land 2003, 38-39).

The party combined two political perspectives: on the one hand, the party presented itself as a pragmatic party unburdened by traditional ideology, and on the other hand, it presented itself as an ardent proponent of government reform (Koole 1995, 309-310; Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 67). Its message of government reform was far-reaching: the party sought “to blow up the existing parties” (Van der Land 2003, 36 translation SO). It advocated institutional reforms including the direct election of the prime minister and reform of the electoral system (Van der Land 2003, 33; Koole 1995, 312). All these reforms were oriented at the creation of a two party system, which would eliminate the need for a formation process, which was not transparent enough in the eyes of the D66 founders. There is a discrepancy between the party’s profile (which focuses on government reform) and the text of the party’s appeal to the electorate and the first election manifesto (which focuses on foreign policy). This was in many ways a marketing ploy: when the first appeal was printed, the government reform issues were printed on the front, while the other policies were printed on the back “in very small print” (Van der Land 2003, 27 translation SO). Also, in its parliamentary motions, D66 did not focus on government reform; instead it was most active on economic issues. This can be explained by the fact that government reform is a question of long-term constitutional amendments instead of motions. Over time, D66 developed programmatically in a progressive liberal direction (Lucardie 1993).

After 1967, D66 began to set steps towards the formation of a two-bloc political system. Like D66, the PvdA sought the creation of a two-bloc system, and it

proposed reforms similar to those of D66 (Van der Land 2003, 47-48). In the 1971 elections, D66 and PvdA together with the KVP-Radicals (see 4.4.7) formed a Progressive Agreement (*Progressief Akkoord*) committed to the formation of a progressive party, which could win a majority in parliamentary elections (Van der Land 2003, 74-78). After the 1972 elections, the alliance won a plurality in parliament and formed a progressive cabinet with ministers from the KVP and the ARP. In the following years, D66 went through a series of dramatic electoral ups and downs, governed in five different cabinets and continues to exist until today.

The position of D66 as a party formed by birth is somewhat problematic (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303) as a larger number of founders had backgrounds in different parties. But because none of them played a role on the national stage, their backgrounds were mixed and they were joined by so many independents, D66 ought to be seen as a party formed by birth. The party saw itself as a pragmatic party without an ideology, but with a clear commitment to government reform. It did not attack a single party, but rather moved against all parties. It drew its support from all parties. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider D66 a mobiliser, and specifically a purifier: it advocates new politics, which it combines with a pragmatic attitude on other issues. This is in line with Rochon's (1985, 431) classification of D66. Given this classification and its parliamentary speech, D66 is linked to the issue of governance.

Table 4.8: profile of D66

Party Profile		D'66
Full name		<i>Democraten '66</i>
English name		Democrats '66
Founded		1966
First elected		1967
First succesful election result		7 (4.5%)
Membership in year of first MPs		3700
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (purifier)
Ideology		Radical democracy Pragmatism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Foreign Affairs (14.2%)
	in parliamentary speech	Governance (14.0%)
	in motions	Economic Affairs (16.7%)
	in literature	Government reform
	assigned	Governance
Unique proposals		33.7% (31)
In parliament		1967-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

Table 4.9: profile of DS'70

Party Profile		DS'70
Full name		<i>Democratisch Socialisten '70</i>
English name		Democratic Socialist '70
Founded		1970
First elected		1971
First succesful election result		8 (5.3%)
Membership in year of first MPs		3000
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Merger of divorced groups
Party goal		Challenger (PvdA)
Ideology		Social-democracy
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Governance (17.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Economic Affairs (16.9%)
	in motions	Economic Affairs (20.2%)
	in literature	Foreign policy, economic issues
	assigned	Governance
Unique proposals		24.4% (22)
In parliament		1970-1981
Reason dissolution		Party death

4.4.6 DS'70: democratic moderates

The question of political cooperation was a key question for many parties in the late 1960s. It led to a division in the PvdA in the form of DS'70 (*Democratisch Socialisten '70*/Democratic Socialists '70).

DS'70 was founded in 1970 by former members of the PvdA (Koole 1995, 242). The founders of DS'70 felt uneasy with the course the PvdA had pursued since 1966. In 1966 *Nieuw Links* (New Left), a new generation of social democrats manifested itself within the party. The group advocated reform of the PvdA's internal organisation, a new strategy of polarisation and a new political agenda consisting of social, political and economic reform, leftwing economic policies, an anti-NATO foreign policy (Boivin et al. 1977, 34). Between 1966 and 1969, they gradually took over the leadership of the PvdA (Bosscher 1994, 225).

DS'70 was formed by three groups: a group of PvdA municipal councillors, an organised centrist faction within the PvdA, and group-Goedhart, which consisted of three PvdA MPs (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 118-120; Koole 1995, 242). The group of municipal councillors split from the PvdA over the formation of a local Progressive Agreement. The first such conflict was in Eindhoven: the local party meeting favoured the formation of a local Progressive Agreement, while the councillors did not (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 112). Therefore, these councillors formed their own party in the local council. The break in Eindhoven was followed in several other municipal councils (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 114). This group of councillors was joined by members of the *Democratisch Appel* (Democratic Appeal), who had unsuccessfully attempted to steer the course of the PvdA towards the centre. Their main concern was the new foreign policy of the PvdA, which in their view failed to grasp the distinction between democracies and dictatorships (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 104-105). The third constituent group was the group-Goedhart, a split from the PvdA parliamentary party (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 115). They left the PvdA parliamentary party in 1970 over the PvdA's position on the war in Indochina (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 116).

Basically, DS'70 adhered to the ideology that the PvdA adhered to in the 1950s (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 74-75). The party was committed to a social order that was characterised by solidarity with the weak and an economic system in which production and distribution were controlled by the community (Voerman 1991, 95). DS'70's economic policies were centrist: it adhered to fiscal conservatism and

opposed nationalisation. Moreover, it was opposed to communism at home as well as abroad (Lipschits 1982, 70; Voerman 1991, 104-108; Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 128-129; Lucardie 1991, 117). These two orientations were reflected in the party: it had two tendencies, a centrist tendency focusing on responsible social economic policies and an anti-communist tendency focusing on foreign policy. These two tendencies did not agree programmatically, which is why the party has been characterised as “a case of political schizophrenia” (Voerman 1991, translation SO). This makes it difficult to relate the party to a single issue. The most dominant issue in its manifesto (governance) was not one of the issues owned by one of these two tendencies. In its parliamentary activity (both motions and speeches), the issue of one of the tendencies (economic affairs) is dominant. Both the centrist and the rightwing tendency of the party were united in their commitment to (parliamentary) democracy: according to the anti-communist tendency, foreign cooperation should be oriented towards democracies, even if these are free market countries, and not towards dictatorships, even if they are socialist (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 104-105). Likewise, the social democratic tendency favoured parliamentary democracy over a socialist economy at home (Lucardie 1991, 114; De Vos 1976, 227). Thus governance was selected as the core issue of DS'70.

In the 1971 election campaign, DS'70 oriented itself against the PvdA (Vingerling & Schouten 2003, 119). Drees junior, son of a former PvdA prime minister, was chosen as its leader. In the 1971 elections, DS'70 won eight seats. The leadership of DS'70 saw its electoral success as the vindication of their view that the PvdA had drifted too far from the views of its traditional electoral base (Koole 1995, 243).⁷⁴ In 1971, DS'70 joined a centre-right cabinet with the VVD, CHU, ARP and KVP. Within a year, however, the cabinet fell due to a difference of opinion between the DS'70 ministers and the rest of the cabinet about budget cuts (Koole 1995, 244). DS'70 continued to exist until 1981, but it declined with every election.

DS'70 is a split from the PvdA in organisational terms (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed by the organised internal opposition within the PvdA and by people within the PvdA parliamentary party. Rochon (1985, 429) considers the party to be a challenger of the PvdA: DS'70 believed the PvdA had drifted too far from its original positions and no longer represented the interests of its

⁷⁴ In reality, the electoral support of DS'70 was drawn from the VVD, D66 and PvdA (Koole 1995, 243).

traditional electorate. The party took the positions that the PvdA took in the 1950s. Moreover, they agitated against the PvdA in their first election campaign. DS'70 is linked to governance because this issue (the largest in its election manifesto) links both the social democratic and anti-communist tendency.

4.4.7 PPR: radicalising radicals

In the 1960s and 1970s, cooperation between political parties was a major issue. This can be seen in the formation of a Progressive Agreement around the PvdA, as seen in section 4.4.5 and 4.4.6, but also in the formation of the CDA (*Christen Democratisch Appel*/Christian Democratic Appeal), a merger of the three major religious parties: the KVP, the ARP and the CHU. Within the KVP, cooperation with other parties was a contested issue. It divided the party between those who preferred a progressive alliance and those who preferred Christian-democratic cooperation. Those who favoured progressive to Christian-democratic cooperation founded the PPR (*Politieke Partij Radicalen*/Political Party Radicals).

The PPR was formed in 1968 as a split from the KVP (Koole 1995, 178). They had operated within the KVP before the split as the KVP-Radicals (*KVP-Radicalen*). The key issue between the KVP-Radicals and the rest of the party concerned cooperation: the KVP-Radicals preferred progressive cooperation to Christian-democratic cooperation. The majority of the KVP preferred centrist Christian democratic cooperation. The KVP-Radicals favoured the formation of a progressive concentration, which would consist of a progressive Christian-democratic party, the PvdA, D66 and the PSP (Tomassen 2003, 97-103). These KVP-Radicals included members from the trade unionist wing of the party, former ministers and even a former prime minister (Koole 1995, 178; Tomassen 2003, 95; Van der Steen 2004, 434-440). The KVP-Radicals kept close contacts with like-minded members of the ARP, so-called ARP-Radicals (*ARP-Radicalen*): a working group of Christian Radicals (*Christen-Radicalen*) was formed by members of the KVP, the ARP and the CHU (Tomassen 2003, 94; Waltmans 1983, 14; Klaassen 2000, 23). After the 1967 elections, the KVP formed a cabinet with the centre-right VVD and CHU, without the PvdA. The KVP-Radicals attempted to change the course of their own party internally (Waltmans 1983, 18). When in 1968 the KVP leadership committed itself explicitly to centrist Christian-democratic cooperation in a televised interview, several of the KVP-Radicals left the party. This group included four MPs, three of

whom would form a separate parliamentary party (Koole 1995, 178-179; Tomassen 2003, 115). They were joined by several members of provincial councils and municipal councils (Waltmans 1983, 23; Klaassen 2000, 25; Tomassen 2003, 199). Many prominent KVP-Radicals (including former Prime Minister Cals) remained within the KVP (Lipschits 1982, 52). In 1968, the *KVP-Radicalen* who had split away from the KVP formed a new party, the PPR. 79% of the founders were Catholic and 40% had been a member of the KVP (Waltmans 1983, 30). Although many founders had been affiliated with political Catholicism before forming the PPR, the party was not explicitly religious and was open to non-Christians (Waltmans 1983, 27; Koole 1995, 179; Tomassen 2003, 120). The PPR explicitly sought to cooperate with the other progressive parties, PvdA, D66 and PSP. In 1971, they were joined by a group of ARP-Radicals (Waltmans 1983, 33). In its early campaigns, the PPR explicitly sought conflict with the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 120). The party oriented itself towards religious voters who doubted the radicalism of the Christian parties (Waltmans 1983, 35; Van Egdom 1991, 8). The PPR participated in the Progressive Agreement, an alliance of PvdA and D66 (Van Egdom 1991, 12). Under the leadership of Bas De Gaay-Fortman (a former ARP-Radical), the party did particularly well in the 1972 elections (Klaassen 2000, 84). Between 1973 and 1977, the PPR became part of the Den Uyl cabinet (Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 34). After 1977, electoral decline set in (De Gaay-Fortman & Van Egdom 1988, 14). The PPR began to cooperate with other small leftwing parties and merged to form the leftwing green party GL in 1989.

The KVP-Radicals had a progressive Christian vision, which interpreted Christianity as a commitment to “peace, justice, harmony, and happiness” (Tomassen 2003, 104). The PPR, however, did not have a Christian identity, as it was a secular leftwing progressive party. Over time, the PPR radicalised (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 72-73); it became more and more influenced by new politics ideas such as environmental protection, women’s rights, government reform and Third World development (Koole 1995, 180; Lucardie, Van Schuur & Voerman 1997, 34-35). The party’s diffuse focus is reflected in their behaviour: in their first election manifesto, labour was the most prominent issue, its parliamentary speech focused on governance and its motions on defence. These, however, do not form the unique appeal or the core issue of the party. The party's unique appeal was in its emphasis on new politics issues: development cooperation, the environment, government reform and women's

Table 4.10: profile of the PPR

Party Profile		PPR
Full name		<i>Politieke Partij Radicalen</i>
English name		Political Party Radicals
Founded		1968
First elected		1971
First succesful election result		2 (1.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		4284
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Divorce (KVP)
Party goal		Challenger (KVP/CDA)
Ideology		Progressive Christianity
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Labour (20.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Governance (12.2%)
	in motions	Defence (14.5%)
	in literature	New politics issues (e.g. environment)
	assigned	Environment
Unique proposals		15.4% (12)
In parliament		1968-1989
Reason dissolution		Merged into GL

liberation. Of these four issues, the environment is the most often linked to the PPR. So the PPR is linked to the issue of the environment, but it is with some hesitation, because the party became greener after its foundation.

The PPR was formed by a divorce from the KVP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed as a split within the KVP parliamentary party. Rochon (1985, 431) considers the PPR to be a mobilising party for this new combination of Christian politics with redistribution and environmentalism. If one looks more precisely, however, the PPR meets two out of three requirements to be a challenger party. It oriented itself primarily against the KVP in its early campaigns. In the early years it oriented itself primarily to (a segment of) the Christian electorate. It did not represent an ideology the KVP ever had, but an ideology that the KVP-Radicals wanted the KVP to pursue. The PPR does not appear to fit well into the mobiliser category: it did not advocate a particular interest or focus exclusively on government reform (as a purifier would). Only in later years did the PPR begin to advocate a prophetic, green ideology. Therefore, it is categorised as a challenger of the KVP. For the purpose of some analyses however it is necessary to see the PPR as a challenger of the CDA, which was formed in 1977.

Table 4.11: profile of the NMP

Party Profile		NMP
Full name		<i>Nederlandse Middenstandspartij</i>
English name		New Business Party
Founded		1970
First elected		1971
First succesful election result		2 (1.5%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		50%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (protest party)
Ideology		Anti-tax populism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Economic affairs (29.0%)
	in parliamentary speech	Enterprise (20.2%)
	in motions	Housing Enterprise Defence (33.3%)
	in literature	Economic issues (e.g. taxes)
	assigned	Economic affairs
Unique proposals		8.7% (2)
In parliament		1971-1972
Reason dissolution		Party death (?)

4.4.8 NMP: small business owners in protest⁷⁵

Relatively little is known about the NMP (*Nieuwe Middenstandspartij*/New Business Party). This small anti-tax, pro-business party was in parliament for less than two years and fell apart due to internal strife.

The NMP was founded in 1970. The formation of the new party was announced in an advertisement in several newspapers.⁷⁶ The advertisements of the NMP appealed explicitly to the “self-employed, businessmen and entrepreneurs” and their financial, economic and business interests.⁷⁷ The established political parties had

⁷⁵ As there are no historical accounts of the NMP, the account provided here is based on newspaper reports. Three newspapers were selected for the description of the NMP. *Het Nieuwsblad voor het Noorden*, the *Leeuwarder Courant* and the *Zierikzeesche Courant*. These were selected on the basis of digital availability and because in Zeeland and Friesland (where these newspapers were based), the NMP won considerably more votes than in the rest of the Netherlands: 2.1% in Friesland and 2.7% in Zeeland compared to 1.5% nationally.

⁷⁶ "Nederlandse Middenstandspartij opgericht". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 17/9/1970.

⁷⁷ "Ingezonden mededeling". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 13/10/1970. Translation SO.

in the eyes of the NMP founders, neglected the interests of this group.⁷⁸ These advertisements did not attack specific established parties, but they attacked the parties of the government and the opposition in general.⁷⁹ The founders of the NMP were businessmen.⁸⁰ Ab Te Pas (managing director of a wholesale trading company in paintings) led the party list.

The NMP was considered a marginal party.⁸¹ And yet, during their campaign, the NMP announced that based on the number of self-employed people in the Netherlands, the party should be able to obtain at least 16 seats in parliament, and that it could potentially win between 20 and 25.⁸² When the NMP won only two seats, the top candidate Te Pas said he was pleased, although he had expected a better result.⁸³ Journalists explained the support for the NMP by the popular discontentment with the policies of the centre-right cabinet.⁸⁴

After the elections, internal conflict began to develop. The first conflict focused on a group around Te Pas, the party's top candidate and Jacques De Jong, the party's third candidate on the list. Issues were the composition of the party's parliamentary party and the composition of the party's executive board.⁸⁵ Under pressure of the party's advisory council, the party's second candidate decided not to take his seat in parliament, but left the position to De Jong.⁸⁶ De Jong was also elected chair of the party's executive board.⁸⁷ The party executive then attempted to cut ties with their MP Te Pas⁸⁸ and demanded that he handed over the position of parliamentary party chair to De Jong,⁸⁹ which Te Pas refused.⁹⁰ By August 1971, the

⁷⁸ "'Middenstanders". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 6/8/1971.

⁷⁹ "Ingezonden mededeling". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 13/10/1970.

⁸⁰ "Weekbladen van week tot week". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 24/9/1970.

⁸¹ "Nederland viel van zijn geloof". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 29/4/1971.

⁸² "Middenstandspartij rekent op minstens zestien zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

⁸³ "Premier De Jong: "Verheugend dat zovelen zijn opgekomen"". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

⁸⁴ "Dus toch Willem II". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

⁸⁵ "Scheuring bedreigt Middenstandspartij". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 11/5/1971.

⁸⁶ "Spoeding Kamerdebat over monetaire situatie". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 12/5/1971.

⁸⁷ "A. te Pas treedt af als voorzitter van Middenstandspartij". *Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode*, 19/5/1971.

⁸⁸ "Middenstandspartij wil van Kamerlid Te Pas af". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 30/7/1971.

⁸⁹ "Daverende ruzie in Middenstandspartij". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 30/7/1971.

two-man NMP parliamentary party had formally been split into two one-man parties.⁹¹ In September 1971 the party organisation had formally split into two:⁹² the NMP (led by Te Pas) and the DMP (*Democratische Middenstandspartij*/Democratic Business Party, led by De Jong). The two organisations then became involved in a legal conflict.⁹³ Conflicts would continue within the NMP, led by Te Pas.⁹⁴ Both parties would participate in the Dutch General election of 1972 without winning parliamentary representation (Lucardie 2004, 203).

The NMP was opposed to government intervention in the economy (Lucardie 2004, 202). Its short programme focused on taxation (Koole 1995, 340): the party advocated a fair distribution of burdens, especially for small businessmen (Lucardie 2004, 202). The most characteristic issue of the NMP's manifesto is economic affairs. In the eyes of the NMP, the social democrats had oriented the government towards the interests of the working class, neglecting the interests of small business owners and shopkeepers.⁹⁵ Additionally, the NMP favoured more liberal policies in the media, specifically a legal status for radio pirate station Veronica,⁹⁶ while at the same time they were advocating judicial action against the counterculture movement.⁹⁷ In parliamentary debates, the party focused more on enterprise. The party proposed only three motions, one of which also concerned enterprise. The second issue in its parliamentary speeches is economic affairs.

⁹⁰ "Te Pas blijft fractievoorzitter Middenstandspartij". *Zierikzeesche Nieuwsbode* 3/8/1971.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² "Bom is gebarsten bij Middenstandspartij: bestuur in opstand". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 7/9/1971.

⁹³ "Kamerlid De Jong dient klacht wegens smaad in tegen NMP'ers". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 2/11/1971, "Tweede Kamerlid de Jong wint geding tegen Te Pas". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 30/11/1971.

⁹⁴ "Ruzie tussen voormannen Middenstandspartij". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 18/10/1972, "Middenstandspartij verliest 't geding". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 7 November, 1972.

⁹⁵ "Middenstandspartij rekest op minstens zestien zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971, "Middenstandspartij rekest op 28 April 20-25 zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 14/4/1971.

⁹⁶ "Nieuwe Mini-partijtjes staan vooral aan rechterzijde". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden* 22/3/1971.

⁹⁷ "Middenstandspartij rekest op 28 April 20-25 zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 14/4/1971.

Before the 1971 elections, the party held a meeting with the newly formed DS'70 party, which also advocated cutting government expenditures.⁹⁸ Later on, the NMP castigated DS'70 for its lack of fiscal conservatism.⁹⁹ The NMP was oriented towards cooperation with those parties that sought to revitalise the Dutch economy: these were centre-right parties including DS'70.¹⁰⁰ Koekoek of the BP saw considerable programmatic similarities between his own party and the NMP;¹⁰¹ the relationship between the NMP-leader Te Pas and BP-leader Koekoek were amiable.¹⁰²

Given the limited academic literature on the party, it is difficult to classify it in terms of the different classificatory schemes. According to the information available, the founders of the NMP did not have a position within any established party. Therefore, it can be considered a new party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Rochon (1985, 430) considers the NMP to be a challenger of the VVD, because of its programmatic similarity to that party. Tromp (1989, 86) considers the NMP a *Poujadist* party in line with the BP. The ideological similarities between the VVD and the NMP are the only reason to consider the NMP a challenger of the VVD. In the available information on the campaign, there is no sign that the NMP oriented itself towards the VVD in its rhetoric or towards VVD voters. Like the BP, the NMP agitated against the growing influence of the government on the economy. It also oriented itself explicitly towards defending the position of small business owners. Therefore, one can best consider the party a mobiliser of small business owners. The party's core issue is economic affairs.

⁹⁸ "DS'70 praatte met Middenstandspartij". *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, 16/3/1971.

⁹⁹ "Middenstandspartij rekent op minstens zestien zetels". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

¹⁰⁰ "Dus toch Willem II". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 29/4/1971.

¹⁰¹ "Drees: kabinet-De Jong maakte beleidsfouten". *Leeuwarder Courant*, 13/5/1971.

¹⁰² "Hans Wiegel, de PvdA en D'66 en het ondergeschoven kind". 1971. *Leeuwarder Courant*.

4.4.9 RKPN: orthodox Catholics

As described in section 4.4.7, in 1968 part of a leftwing faction of the KVP left the party to form the PPR. They believed that Christian-democratic cooperation pulled the party too far to the right. Within the Catholic community, there were also those who thought that this Christian-democratic cooperation would pull the KVP too far to the left. These people formed the RKPN (*Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland*/Roman Catholic Party Netherlands).

After 1968, the KVP developed in the direction of a non-denominational party with moderate positions on social and moral issues, especially abortion (Koole 1995, 186; Tomassen 2003, 124-126). The conservative wing of the Catholic community, including the episcopate, disagreed (Tomassen 2003, 128-129). One of these reactions took the form of a new political party, the NRP (*Nieuwe Roomse Partij*/New Roman Party), which was founded in 1971 by a former KVP-member (Tomassen 2003, 130-131). The NRP failed to obtain parliamentary representation in the 1971 elections (Tomassen 2003, 132). Consequently, several members of the NRP formed a separate party, the RKPN. Klaas Beuker, who had been a member of the KVP until 1969 and who had been second candidate on the NRP list, led the new party (Tomassen 2003, 134). The RKPN (and the NRP) participated in the 1972 elections, in which the RKPN won a single seat (Tomassen 2003, 135). The ideology of the RKPN was based on a strict interpretation of the Bible and Papal dogma (Tomassen 2003, 137). The party believed that Dutch society was undergoing moral decay, and tolerant policies towards abortion were seen as a prime example of this (Tomassen 2003, 137-138). In its election manifesto, abortion and other moral issues played a dominant role. These issues were also reflected in the party's activity in parliament: the RKPN proposed four motions, three of which concerned moral issues. In parliamentary debates, however, the party focused more on education.

The RKPN received little attention from the media or from the KVP (Tomassen 2003, 145), and in parliament the RKPN was not taken seriously by the major parties (Koole 1995, 186; Tomassen 2003, 139). In 1977 the RKPN did not win a single seat in parliament and it has not participated in new elections since then.

The RKPN was formed as a split, but not as a split from a parliamentary party. The party was formed as a split from an extra-parliamentary party (pace Lipschits 1982, 53; pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303); one of its founders

Table 4.12: profile of the RKPN

Party Profile		RKPN
Full name		<i>Rooms-Katholieke Partij Nederland</i>
English name		Roman Catholic Party Netherlands
Founded		1972
First elected		1972
First succesful election result		1 (0.9%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Challenger (KVP)
Ideology		Orthodox Catholicism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Moral issues (23.1%)
	in parliamentary speech	Education (25.7%)
	in motions	Moral issues (75.0%)
	in literature	Opposition to abortion
	assigned	Moral issues
Unique proposals		24.7% (18)
In parliament		1972-1977
Reason dissolution		Party Death

had been a prominent member of the extra-parliamentary NRP. The RKPN was formed as a challenger party of the KVP: it sought to represent the former Catholic ideology of the KVP and attacked the KVP for abandoning its positions (Tomassen 2003, 148). The party adhered to a perfectionist version of political Catholicism and appealed specifically to conservative Catholics (Lucardie 1986). Rochon (1985, 430) indeed considers the RKPN a challenger of the KVP. Because KVP, ARP and CHU proposed a combined CDA manifesto in 1977, one has to consider the party a challenger of the CDA at least when studying parties in the electoral arena. The RKPN is linked to the moral issues category.

Table 4.13: profile of the RPF

Party Profile		RPF
Full name		<i>Reformatorische Politieke Federatie</i>
English name		Political Reformed Federation
Founded		1975
First elected		1981
First succesful election result		2 (1.3%)
Membership in year of first MPs		7000
Stability of the parliamentary party		50%
Formation history		Merger of divorced groups
Party goal		Challenger (CDA)
Ideology		Orthodox Protestantism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Moral issues (24.1%)
	in parliamentary speech	Governance (11.8%)
	in motions	Foreign Affairs (30.0%)
	in literature	Moral issues, combined with economic and foreign policy
	assigned	Moral Issues
Unique proposals		33.2% (98)
In parliament		1981-2000
Reason dissolution		Merged into CU

4.4.10 RPF: orthodox Protestants

Like the RKPN, which challenged the KVP for being too moderate, the RPF (*Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie*/Reformed Political Federation) split away from the ARP because they found the ARP had become too moderate. As the ARP oriented itself towards cooperation with the KVP and inclined more towards the left, some of its rightwing elements no longer felt at home in the party.

Four different groups formed the RPF in 1975: the NEV (*Nationaal Evangelisch Verband*/National Evangelical League), the Conversation Group (*Gespreksgroep*), the ARJC (*Anti-Revolutionair Jongerencontact*/Anti-Revolutionary Youth Contact), and the RPC (*Reformatorisch Politiek Contact*/Reformed Political Contact). The NEV was formed in 1966 by members of the ARP, who were not aligned with the *Vrijgemaakte* churches, but still felt closer to the parliamentary actions of the GPV than to the ARP, which had moved to the left during the 1960s (Kooles 1995, 139; Van Mulligen 2010, 32). The NEV sought cooperation with the GPV, but it was rebuked because the NEV-members did not belong to the Church that the GPV was linked to (see section 4.4.4) (Van Mulligen

2010, 32-33).¹⁰³ The Conversation Group was founded in 1972 by prominent, conservative members of the ARP (Van Mulligen, 2010:33), and the ARJC was founded in 1975 by young ARP-members who did not feel at home in ARJOS (*Nationale Organisatie van Anti-Revolutionaire Jongerenstudieclubs*/National Organisation of Anti-Revolutionary Youth Study Clubs), the youth organisation of the ARP (Koole 1995, 142). The RPC was a loose organisation of independent conservative Protestant local parties in the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel (Van Mulligen 2010, 33). The four groups shared three ideas: the ARP had drifted too far to the left, the ARP should not merge with the KVP, and politics should be based on Biblical principles. In 1975, these groups formed the RPF (Lipschits 1982, 59). The RPF emphasised the importance of cooperation with the other orthodox Protestant parties GPV and SGP. These parties reacted in a reserved fashion (Koole 1995, 138). The RPF shared an orthodox Protestant outlook with these parties: an emphasis on moral issues combined with a commitment to limited government intervention in the economy and opposition to European integration (Van Mulligen 2010, 35-36). Like the GPV, the RPF focused on moral issues in its election manifesto, but in its parliamentary activity its issue-specific concerns about domestic and foreign policies shines through.

In the 1977 elections, the RPF appeared to seek GPV-voters, and in particular those who left the *Vrijgemaakte* Church due to a religious split. The RPF put a former GPV-municipal councillor at the top of their list (Van Mulligen 2010, 36). The RPF missed the *de facto* electoral threshold by a few thousand votes, but the GPV did lose one of its seats (Van Mulligen 2010, 36). The GPV saw the RPF as an electoral competitor and attempted to combat the RPF, before cooperating with it (Klei 2011, 189-191). In 1981, the RPF did enter parliament (Koole 1995, 143). In 1985 one of the two RPF MPs, Aad Wagenaar, split to form AR'85, which was electorally unsuccessful. The RPF remained in parliament for 19 years. In 2000, the RPF formed a new, broader orthodox Protestant party together with the GPV, the CU.

The RPF can be seen as a divorce from the ARP (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Although no prominent ARP politicians were involved, several organised internal oppositional groups such as the ARJC and the *Gespreksgroep*

¹⁰³ They were joined by a religious group that split from the *Vrijgemaakte* Church and the GPV (Van Mulligen 2010, 32).

were involved. Rochon (1985, 430) considers the early RPF to be a challenger of the GPV, which later developed into a mobiliser because of its commitment to unite the existing orthodox Protestant parties. If one looks more precisely, it appears that the RPF can better be seen as a challenger of the CDA: as the ARP leaned too far to the left and towards the Catholic KVP, a new group emerged seeking to revive the old ARP with its conservative Protestant orientation. This appealed to Protestant voters. There are, however, two complicating factors: first, the ARP ceased to exist in 1980 (Koole 1995, 187), and it is up for discussion whether the RPF can be seen as a challenger of the *newly* formed CDA, which had yet to define its position and electoral base. Second, the RPF also competed with the GPV: it offered the GPV electorate a party, which had the potential to become a bigger political player, because it was less limited in its electoral appeal, and it offered those who split from the *Vrijgemaakte* Church an orthodox Protestant party open to their ideals. One cannot see the RPF as a challenger of the GPV because they did not claim that the GPV had drifted from its original positions or appealed to its exclusively *Vrijgemaakte* electoral base. Therefore, taking these two factors into account, the RPF can best be considered a challenger of the CDA. Given the party's religious background and the focus in its election manifesto on moral issues, the party is linked to this category.

4.4.11 EVP: progressive Protestants

The EVP (*Evangelische Volkspartij*/Evangelical People's Party) shares many similarities with several of the parties in this chapter: like the RPF it was formed as a split from the ARP, and like the PPR it was formed by the leftwing tendency of a Christian-democratic party. The main difference between the two is that the founders of the EVP began to consider the formation of a new party *after* the ARP had merged with the CHU and the KVP to form the CDA in 1977.

The EVP was formed in 1981. Its roots lie within the leftwing tendency within the ARP, the *ARP-Radicalen* (ARP-Radicals) (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 150-151). Like the KVP-Radicals, this group read Scripture in a progressive way. Of all the religious parties, the ARP was most open to leftwing politics, and therefore, the ARP-Radicals had (mostly) remained within the ARP. Over the 1970s, however, the ARP oriented itself more and more towards Christian-democratic cooperation. After the CDA was formed, the ARP-Radicals became

increasingly uneasy with its centrist course. This led to the formation of two groups, which later merged to form the EVP. The first of the two groups was the EPV (*Evangelische Progressive Partij*/Evangelical Progressive Party) (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 152; De Bas 1999, 42). It had split from the CDA because of the formation of the Van Agt cabinet of liberals and Christian-democrats. The EPV consisted of former members of the ARP, which had favoured the leftwing course the party had pursued during the 1970s (Koole 1995, 150; De Bas 1999, 52-53). The second group was called *Niet Bij Brood Alleen* (Not By Bread Alone), which had operated within the CDA since 1978 (De Bas 1999, 68-69). This group was called after the first election manifesto of the CDA, which emphasised that material happiness was not enough. The group felt that the CDA did not live up to its manifesto (De Bas 1999, 74). They belonged to the left wing of the party and, again, most of them had their roots in the ARP (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 152). They had formed an unofficial opposition within the CDA, hoping to push the CDA into a leftwing direction. The group included CDA MPs and former ARP MPs, such as Bob Goudzwaard, who had authored the CDA election manifesto (De Bas 1999, 73). In 1981, a part of the *Niet Bij Brood Alleen*-group merged with the EPV to form the EVP (Koole 1995, 150; De Bas 1999, 96-97). At the foundation congress, several former CDA MPs were present (De Bas 1999, 97).

The party adhered to a radical, leftwing interpretation of Scripture. Its political programme is explicitly based on religious principles. Its most important issue was nuclear disarmament: the party was motivated by the Biblical message of peace. Its commitment to these foreign policy and defence issues is also reflected in its parliamentary activity and election manifesto: it spoke mostly about foreign affairs in parliament, and in its election manifesto, defence was the dominant issue.

In the 1981 parliamentary elections the party failed to obtain representation, and it also failed to win its own seats in the 1982 municipal and provincial elections.¹⁰⁴ In 1982, there were mass protests against the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands, an issue on which the CDA was divided. The EVP opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons. In 1982 the EVP managed to secure a single seat in the Dutch parliament (Koole 1995, 149; De Bas 1999, 117). Their motto in the election was “Christian, therefore progressive” (De Bas 1999, 116

¹⁰⁴ Electoral research shows that the party was able to decrease the vote share of the CDA (Nieboer and Lucardie 1992, 156).

translation SO). The party saw itself as the “conscience” of the CDA (Nieboer & Lucardie 1992, 155), but the CDA explicitly ignored the EVP (De Bas 1999, 281-285). Relationship with the orthodox Christian parties in the Dutch parliament were hostile (De Bas 1999, 297), and so instead, the party cooperated with the PvdA, D66, the PPR and the PSP (De Bas 1999, 295). After disappearing from parliament in 1986, the EVP merged with three small, secular leftwing parties to form the leftwing green party GL in 1989 (De Bas 1999, 149).

The EVP was a party formed by divorce (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): *Niet Bij Brood Alleen*, out of which the EVP was formed, played a major role in the internal discussions in the CDA. The EVP was a challenger party: it believed it acted as the conscience of the CDA; its founders believed that the CDA did not live up to its own, progressive, election manifesto and that the EVP did. Additionally, the EVP was oriented explicitly at (progressive) Christian voters. De Bas (1999, 103) and Rochon (1985, 430) also consider the party to be a challenger. But while De Bas sees it as a challenger of the CDA, Rochon considers the PPR to be the challenged party. The relationship with the PPR posited by Rochon is less plausible than the one proposed by De Bas, because the EVP never stated that the PPR abandoned its ideology. Given its pacifist policies and the focus in its manifesto on defence, the EVP is linked to the issue defence.

Table 4.14: profile of the EVP

Party Profile		EVP
Full name		<i>Evangelische Volkspartij</i>
English name		Evangelical People's Party
Founded		1981
First elected		1982
First succesful election result		1 (0.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		1790
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Merger of divorced groups
Party goal		Challenger (CDA)
Ideology		Progressive Christianity
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Defence (11.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Foreign Affairs (19.2%)
	in motions	<i>None</i>
	in literature	Opposition to nuclear weapons
	assigned	Defence
Unique proposals		23.0% (84)
In Parliament		1982-1986
Reason Dissolution		Merged into GL

Table 4.15: profile of the CP

Party Profile		CP
Full name		<i>Centrumpartij</i>
English name		Centre Party
Founded		1980
First elected		1982
First succesful election result		1 (0.7%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		0%
Formation history		Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Radical nationalism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Education (17.9%)
	in parliamentary speech	Migration (17.5%)
	in motions	Justice (100%)
	in literature	Opposition to immigration
	assigned	Migration
Unique proposals		25.0% (12)
In parliament		1982-1986
Reason dissolution		Transformed into CD

4.4.12 CP: the start of anti-immigration politics

The CP (*Centrumpartij*/Centre Party) was the first anti-immigrant party to enter the Dutch parliament. It became politically isolated because of its anti-immigration policies, and it drifted to the political extremes and fell victim to internal struggles.¹⁰⁵

The CP was formed in 1980. It was formed by Henry Brookman, who had previously been involved with the far right NVU (*Nederlandse Volksunie*/Dutch People's Union) (Koole 1995, 331). Brookman had founded another party just before forming the CP, the NCP (*Nationale Centrumpartij*/National Centre Party) but after some of that party's members had been involved in racist violence, he abandoned it to form the CP (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 35; Koole 1995, 331). After the formation, the leadership of the party was taken over by Hans Janmaat, who had been a member of the KVP and active for DS'70 before joining the CP (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 20-21; Lucardie 1998, 19). After unsuccessfully participating in the 1981 elections, the CP won a single seat in the elections of 1982 (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 43). The CP drew most of its support from traditional working class neighbourhoods and a plurality of CP-voters had voted for the PvdA before 1982 (Brants & Hogendoorn 1983, 40).

In the social and political responses to the CP, one can see political isolation, direct social action and judicial persecution.¹⁰⁶ Whenever Janmaat spoke in parliament, many MPs would leave the room (Van Holsteyn 1998, 51-52). In municipal councils, CP councillors also faced political isolation. Whether CP councillors should be greeted with a handshake was a serious political issue in other parliamentary parties (Witte 1998, 130; Schikhof 1998, 145). CP local councillors found it impossible to find sufficient co-sponsors for motions and amendments (Van Riel & Van Holsteyn 1998, 71). The media also consciously sought to ignore the CP (Brants & Hogendoorn 1983, 39). The party also faced direct action from anti-fascist protestors. Direct action took many forms, but it was most extreme in 1986: violent anti-racism protestors interrupted a reconciliation meeting of former CP members.

¹⁰⁵ One of the problematic elements in the relationship between the CP, the press and established politics (and academic research), were its alleged ties to pre-War fascism, a characterisation that was difficult to substantiate (Brants & Hogendoorn 1988, 131-132).

¹⁰⁶ Most of the research has oriented itself towards the CD, and to a lesser extent to the CP. The following section assumes that these patterns also occur for the CP.

Their actions caused the hotel where the meeting was held to catch fire and one CP member lost a leg (Lucardie 1998, 24).

The CP was considered a far right party (Koole 1995, 332). In its 1982 election manifesto, one can see some anti-immigration and nationalist policies, but not the anti-system, racist and far right rhetoric that characterised its campaigns (Van Donselaar & Van Praag 1983, 35-36; Lucardie 1998, 26). The issue that got most attention in the election manifesto is education and culture. The party's parliamentary speech, however, focused on immigration. The only motion that the CP proposed was on justice. In written texts, the CP would use more moderate language and focus on other issues than they did in their direct electoral appeal to voters (Mudde 1995). The CP had good reason to be cautious: Janmaat has been persecuted for making racist statements (Schikhof 1998, 147). In parliament, Janmaat had less reason to worry, because he could not be prosecuted for what he said there.

In 1984, Janmaat came into conflict with the extra-parliamentary party organisation (Lucardie 1998, 21): an ideological dispute between Janmaat and the party cadre escalated into a conflict between the parliamentary party and the extra-parliamentary party organisation about who should decide the party's course. Janmaat left the party, but held on to his seat in parliament (Koole 1995, 332). In 1984, Janmaat founded the CD (*Centrumdemocraten/Centre Democrats*). In the 1986 elections, both the CP and the CD entered: the CP won three times as many votes as the CD, but neither party won a seat. Later that year, the CP was declared bankrupt and it was re-launched under the name CP'86 (Koole 1995, 332). The CD would go on to win seats in the 1989 and 1994 parliamentary elections.

Like the RKPN, the CP is a split but not from a parliamentary party: its founder Brookman had founded the NCP, but abandoned that party to form the CP. The CP sought to mobilise voters on a new far right ideology: the party did not attack a particular party for abandoning its ideology. It did, however, appeal particularly to working class voters, the traditional base of the PvdA. Combining these three arguments, one can consider the party as a mobiliser and specifically as a prophet. This categorisation is in line with Rochon (1985, 431). Given that the party's opposition to immigration was the party's unique appeal, the party has been linked to immigration. The CD can be considered both a split from the CP (Janmaat left the

CP) and a transformation of the CP (the sole MP and face of the party left the CP). Therefore, the CD is not included in this study as a separate new party.¹⁰⁷

4.4.13 AOV and U55+: two elderly sisters

The AOV (*Algemeen Ouderen Verbond*/General Pensioners' League) and U55+ (*Politieke Unie 55+*/Political Union 55+) are similar parties: with similar programmes they entered in the same election and they both won seats. After the elections, they started to cooperate, and in 1998 they entered as a common list. Therefore they can best be discussed side-by-side.

From 1971 onwards, one or more pensioners' parties entered in the elections occasionally, albeit unsuccessfully. In 1989, two parties did: PvO (*Partij voor Ouderen*/Pensioners' Party) and BC (*Bejaarden Centraal*/Seniors Central). In 1992, members of these parties were brought together in order to form a new pensioners' party, U55+. After testing their appeal in the 1994 municipal election, the party decided to compete in the 1994 parliamentary elections (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 69).¹⁰⁸ At the same time, another party was formed: the AOV was founded in December 1993 (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996, 132), six months before the 1994 election. The founder had sought the support of several prominent wealthy industrialists in order to finance the new party. Anton Philips, former managing director of the electronic company Philips, was the first to support the party financially. The party selected the Eindhoven municipal elections as the testing ground for the party.¹⁰⁹ It won 14% of the vote and became part of the municipal governing coalition. After this success, two provincial councillors left the Christian-democratic CDA and joined the AOV (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 27). The party decided to go national and to compete in the 1994 parliamentary elections (Kreulen 1995, 15).

The differences between the two pensioners' parties were marginal. According to the secretary of the U55+, the U55+ was mainly supported by pensioners who depended on a state pension, while the pensioners of the AOV also had a private pension (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 12). The election

¹⁰⁷ This goes against the classification of Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) who characterise the CD as a party formed by divorce.

¹⁰⁸ The U55+ won seats in Waddinxveen (in South Holland) and Hengelo (in Overijssel).

¹⁰⁹ Eindhoven (in North Brabant) is the fifth city of the Netherlands.

manifestos of both parties have similar emphases: healthcare played a major role in both their manifestos. The same is true for the parliamentary speech of both parties. In addition to healthcare, both parties also emphasised issues such as immigration and crime. The major difference in their manifestos is that the AOV wanted to finance the financial demands caused by the aging of the population by increasing labour market participation, while the U55+ wanted to solve this problem by reducing excessive government spending.

In the 1994 elections, pensioners' issues played a major role. Due to economic circumstances the governing coalition of CDA and PvdA had to consider cuts on healthcare and social security. The social democratic minister of healthcare sought to reduce the budget for nursing homes, pensioners' associations and healthcare coverage for pensioners. She was forced to back down after major resistance from pensioners' organisations, which organised mass protests against the cuts (Van Stipdonk & Van Holsteyn 1996, 133-134). In 1994 the CDA, the senior partner in the coalition government, proposed to freeze all government income grants, including government pensions. The proposal also faced public resistance. The party soon retracted this proposal. The welfare state was one of the two major issues in newspaper reporting of the election campaign (Flight & Felix 1995, 103).

The 1994 elections saw a large number of seats changing owners: the CDA lost 36% of its votes and the PvdA lost 24%. The AOV and U55+ both won seats in parliament: the AOV six and the U55+ one. After the elections the AOV was riddled by internal problems. At the same time the U55+ sought to cooperate with the AOV. Between 1994 and 1998, the conflicts in the AOV spiralled out of control. By 1998 there were five different parliamentary groups in parliament, which had split from the AOV.¹¹⁰ Polling indicated that the AOV was unable to win any seats on its own after 1995 (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 1996, 27). Therefore, first the AOV and later one of its successor groups entered into talks with the U55+ about cooperation between and possibly a merger of the two pensioners' parties. The conflicts within the AOV stalled this process for a while, but the AOV and U55+ formed a common list for the

¹¹⁰ The MP Hendriks, which was expelled in 1994 (see Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1995, 28); a group of three MPs, which had been expelled from the AOV, led by former top candidate Nijpels (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 1996, 27); the MP Van Wingerden was still aligned with the national executive of the AOV; the MP Verkerk who had split from Van Wingerden in 1998; and the senator Batenburg, who had split from the AOV as well (De Boer et al. 1999, 26).

Table 4.16: profiles of the AOV and U55+

Party Profile		AOV	U55+
Full name		<i>Algemeen Ouderenverbond</i>	<i>Politieke Unie 55+</i>
English name		General Pensioners' League	Political Union 55+
Founded		1993	1992
First elected		1994	1994
First succesful election result		6 (3.6%)	1 (0.9%)
Membership in year of first MPs		<i>unknown</i>	<i>unknown</i>
Stability of the parliamentary party		33.3%	100%
Formation history		Birth	Extraparliamentary merger
Party goal		Mobiliser (prolocutor)	Mobiliser (prolocutor)
Ideology		Pensioners' interest	Pensioners' interest
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Healthcare (13.7%)	Healthcare (58.0%)
	in parliamentary speech	Healthcare (21.8%)	Healthcare (27.6%)
	in motions	Economic Affairs (29.2%)	Healthcare Labour Transport (33.3%)
	in literature	Pensioners' issues	Pensioners' issues
	assigned	Healthcare	Healthcare
Unique proposals		35.5% (50)	12.0% (14)
In parliament		1994-1998	1994-1998
Reason dissolution		Merged into AOV/U55+	Merged into AOV/U55+

1998 parliamentary election (De Boer et al. 1999). In 1998 two other pensioners' parties, related to the AOV, entered the election. None of these parties won a seat.¹¹¹

U55+ was formed as a merger, but not of two parliamentary parties (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): it was formed by two small extra-parliamentary pensioners' parties. The AOV, in contrast, was a truly new initiative, a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). Both parties were mobilisers: they did not orient themselves towards any party specifically. They did not represent a group that was the traditional social base of a party. Nor did they adhere to an ideology of an established party. Rather, they emphasised traditional economic issues, with a particular mix of leftwing and rightwing positions, oriented at defending the interests of one particular group: pensioners. This categorization is in line with Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287). Both parties are linked to the category healthcare.

¹¹¹ The AOV/U55+, *Senioren 2000* (*Seniors 2000*, formed by the group Nijpels) and the NSOV (*Nieuw Solidair Ouderenverbond*/New Social Pensioners' League), formed by AOV founder Batenburg.

Table 4.17: profile of the SP

Party Profile		SP
Full name		<i>Socialistische Partij</i>
English name		Socialist Party
Founded		1971
First elected		1994
First succesful election result		2 (1.3%)
Membership in year of first MPs		15978
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Challenger (PvdA)
Ideology		Socialism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Foreign Affairs (11.6%)
	in parliamentary speech	Housing (11.3%)
	in motions	Healthcare (21.4%)
	in literature	Economic issues, Health, Education
	assigned	Labour
Unique proposals		24.5% (31)
In parliament		1994-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

4.4.14 SP: a leftwing challenger

The SP (*Socialistische Partij*/Socialist Party) was formed as part of the small Dutch Maoist movement, which had split away from the CPN. Over time it developed a different profile as a leftwing protest party. 23 years after its foundation the SP entered parliament.

The SP was formed in 1971 under the name KPN (*Kommunistische Partij Nederland-Marxistisch/Leninistisch*/Communist Party Netherlands-Marxist/Leninist), a Maoist splinter party (Koole 1995, 270). The KPN was split from the KEN (*Kommunistische Eenheidsbeweging Nederland-Marxistisch/Leninistisch*/Communist Unity Movement Netherlands-Marxist/Leninist), which in turn was a split from the CPN, the main communist party in the Netherlands (Beekers 2005, 22). The leader of the KPN, Daan Monjé, had also had a leading role in the KEN (Beekers 2005, 49). In 1972 the party renamed itself Socialist Party¹¹². In its early years, the SP followed a Maoist strategy: party members were expected to integrate into the masses and learn from them what it was that the people wanted (Voerman 1988, 133-134).

¹¹² Since 1972 the party called itself *Socialistische Partij*; since 1993 *Socialistische Partij*.

Since 1977, the SP participated in parliamentary elections. On the municipal level, it was particularly successful in North Brabant (one of the southern provinces of the Netherlands), especially in the city of Oss, where it has had seats in the municipal council since 1974 (Slager 2001, 138). On the national level, the party entered in all elections between 1977 and 1989 but without electoral success. The party adapted, abandoning its Maoist strategy and Marxist ideology (Voerman 1988; Van der Steen 1995). It took “populist” positions on issues like women’s emancipation and the integration of minorities. It voiced opposition to feminism and the multicultural positions of the small parties of the left and the social democrats (Koole 1995, 271). By 1994, the party had reinvented itself as a leftwing protest party: the party entered the election with the slogan “Vote Against, Vote SP” (Kagie 2004, 79 translation SO). The party focused on a broad range of issues including social-economic policy, healthcare, education and income distribution. In the analysis of the manifesto, foreign policy was identified as the dominant issue and labour issues are a close second. The 1994 elections were preceded by major conflicts about social affairs cuts: in addition to the conflicts with pensioners' organisations, the cabinet also came into conflict with the labour unions about disability pension, which in turn led to conflicts within the PvdA (Lucardie, Nieboer & Noomen 1992, 47; Van der Zwan 2008, 227-228). In these elections the SP won two seats. Koole (1995, 271) explains the rise of the SP with the conflicts within the PvdA.¹¹³ In parliament, the SP’s two MPs soon became an important voice of opposition. The party focused on housing in its parliamentary speech and on healthcare in its motions. They targeted their critique on the social democrats, which had adopted a third way-ideology; therefore Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the SP as a challenger of the PvdA. Social democratic Prime Minister Wim Kok characterised the party as a “jamming station”, which SP-leader Jan Marijnissen took as a compliment (De Boer et al. 1999, 78 translation SO). Over time, the SP would grow considerably, doubling its vote share in 1998 and 2002 and more than doubling it in 2006.

The SP was a split from the KEN, which was a split from the CPN. At the time, however, the KEN was not in parliament, which makes this yet another example of an

¹¹³ Koole also points to the disappearance of the CPN: a segment of working class voters was no longer represented. As the CPN disappeared from parliament in 1986 due to a lack of electoral support and the SP entered in 1994, this argument seems a bit strange.

extra-parliamentary split (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303). The SP clearly operated as a challenger party, adhering to a stricter interpretation of socialism than the PvdA and seeking to represent the traditional working class electorate of the PvdA. On the basis of its history, one may consider the SP to be a challenger of the CPN. However, given that the CPN had disappeared from parliament in 1986 and that the SP positioned itself as a competitor of the PvdA rather than of the CPN, one has to consider it a challenger of the PvdA. Labour is selected as the SP's issue, as this is characteristic of its economic focus.

4.4.15 LN and LPF: democratic populists & the return of anti-immigration politics

In 2002, two new political parties entered the Dutch political arena: LN (*Leefbaar Nederland/Liveable Netherlands*), a typical case of a purifier party, oriented at government reform but pragmatic on other issues, and the LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn/List Pim Fortuyn*), an anti-immigration party. The histories of the two parties are closely linked and they will therefore be discussed in one section.

LN was formed in 1999 as “the outgrowth of a motley collection of local protest parties” (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23). Its founders were Jan Nagel, a former senator for the PvdA, who led the local party *Leefbaar Hilversum* (Liveable Hilversum), and Henk Westbroek, who led the local party *Leefbaar Utrecht* (Liveable Utrecht) (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003, 21). These were two of a growing number of independent local political parties. Most of them voiced opposition against technocratic urban renewal projects (Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 75). LN favoured government reform, and combined this with a mix of rightwing and leftwing positions on other issues (Lucardie 2004, 21; Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 209): the party wanted to bring politics closer to the voters and rejected technocratic politics (Lucardie 2008b, 154). In its election manifesto, governance was the largest issue.

None of the founders of the party wanted to lead the party in the upcoming election, and therefore, they decided to hold an election for the leadership. The most prominent candidate was Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn was known as a columnist of the centre-right weekly *Elsevier* in which he criticised the cabinet of PvdA, VVD and D66 for the way it managed the public sector and for the way it dealt with the growing immigrant, Islamic, population (Lucardie, Noomen & Voerman 2003, 22; Lucardie 2004, 209). Fortuyn had undergone several ideological transformations as

well: from a Marxist beginning, via a neo-liberal phase to a communitarian period (Pels 2003). The other candidates for the party's list included many people who had been involved with other established parties (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 94).¹¹⁴ The party was not formed by *homines novi* who had no background in other parties, but instead, it united individuals from the entire political spectrum. Fortuyn was endorsed by the party board and was elected by a wide margin as top candidate on the party's list (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 23).

Since the 1990s, Fortuyn had strongly emphasised the importance of culture. He had denounced the lack of national consciousness of Dutch politicians (Pels 2003, 200), and he combined his communitarian and nationalist beliefs with a commitment to liberal values (Akkerman 2005). In Fortuyn's view, the fact that many immigrants did not accept these liberal values was a threat to these values. Fortuyn's outspoken positions on immigration led to a break between him and LN. The final issue was an interview in which Fortuyn proposed to eliminate the prohibition of discrimination from the Dutch constitution (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 97; Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23). A former VVD member and prominent public prosecutor, Fred Teeven, replaced Fortuyn on the LN list (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 98). In February 2002, Fortuyn formed his own party: the LPF. The party was founded with support of several businessmen (Lucardie 2004, 213). In a matter of months a new party was created. The list of candidates consisted of a large number of people without much political experience. The most experienced people were a CDA MP and a prominent parliamentary journalist who had been a passive VVD member (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 103). As a (first) election manifesto, the party used Fortuyn's book, which combined policy proposals with autobiographical elements (Fortuyn 2002). The book combined populism with liberal, nationalist and communitarian elements. The book was followed by a shorter election manifesto. In both the book and the election manifesto, immigration was the main issue. Fortuyn dominated the following general election campaign, especially after the strong performance of the Fortuyn-led *Leefbaar Rotterdam* (Liveable Rotterdam), in the municipal elections in Rotterdam. He criticised all parties for neglecting the growth of government bureaucracy and the integration of immigrants into Dutch society

¹¹⁴ Out of the 353 candidates, 62 had a VVD-background, 21 in the PvdA, 21 in the CDA, 18 in D66, 6 in the SP and 5 in the GL. The most experienced were a former KVP-minister and a senator representing provincial parties (Hippe, Lucardie and Voerman 2004).

(Lucardie & Ghillebaert 2008, 74-75). Nine days before the election, Fortuyn was shot by an animal rights activist (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 23).

Andeweg and Irwin (2005, 17) claimed that, “[g]iven the extraordinary circumstances, the (electoral, SO) results came as no surprise, although they were without precedent.” The governing parties PvdA, VVD and D66 lost heavily. The LPF made the most “impressive début” (Andeweg & Irwin 2009, 24) a new party had ever made in the Netherlands: from 0% to 17% of the vote. LN obtained less than 2% in parliament (Hippe, Lucardie & Voerman 2004, 99). A cabinet was formed by the CDA, the LPF and the VVD. The cabinet was short-lived, however: by the autumn of 2002, the cabinet had fallen due to internal struggles within the LPF, a party that was left without its leader (Lucardie 2008a, 163). In the short period in which it was in parliament, the LPF saw three MPs leave its ranks. In the following elections, the LPF lost eighteen of its 26 seats, and LN lost both its seats. In the following three years the LPF disintegrated: by 2006 the eight men parliamentary party had divided into three parliamentary parties and there had been four changes in the leadership of the LPF parliamentary party. In the 2006 elections, three parties participated that were led by (former) members of the LPF.¹¹⁵ None of them were able to win a seat in parliament. During the period 2002-2006, the LPF focused on justice in its parliamentary speeches, but it proposed most motions on agriculture.¹¹⁶

LN was as a party formed by birth (Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): contrary to other parties formed by birth many of its members were involved in other parties from the entire political spectrum. Therefore it cannot be considered a party formed as a split from any of the established parties. The LPF was a party formed by divorce, but again, not from a parliamentary party (pace Van Kessel & Krouwel 2011, 302-303): the top candidate of the LN left the party to form his own party. Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the LN as a mobiliser (and specifically a purifier): LN did not adhere to an ideology that another party abandoned, nor did it target a segment of the electorate a party no longer represented.

¹¹⁵ These were Fortuyn (*Lijst Vijf Fortuyn/List Five Fortuyn*), the legal successor of the LPF, PvdN (*Partij voor Nederland/Party for the Netherlands*), led by former LPF-minister Hilbrand Nawijn and the *EénNL* formed by former LPF-MP Joost Eerdmans and former Rotterdam alderman Marco Pastors for *Leefbaar Rotterdam*.

¹¹⁶ These differences between programme and parliamentary activity can be explained by individual MPs in these poorly organised parties: one of the most experienced LPF MPs was Van den Brink, a former farmers’ leader. The LN, under the leadership of former public prosecutor Teeven, focused on justice, in its parliamentary speeches and motions.

Table 4.18: profiles of the LN and LPF

Party Profile		LN	LPF
Full name		<i>Leefbaar Nederland</i>	<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i>
English name		Liveable Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn
Founded		1999	2002
First elected		2002	2002
First succesful election result		2 (1.6%)	26 (17.0%)
Membership in year of first MPs		1237	4100
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%	62.5%
Formation history		Birth	Extraparliamentary divorce
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)	Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Democratic Populism	Liberal Nationalism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Governance (17.6%)	Migration (19.2%)
	in parliamentary speech	Justice (32.5%)	Justice (12.7%)
	in motions	Justice (60%)	Agriculture (11.0%)
	in literature	Government reform	Opposition to immigration
	assigned	Governance	Migration
Unique proposals		10.9% (11)	23.7% (33)
In parliament		2002-2003	2002-2006
Reason dissolution		Party death	Party death

It sought to represent the entire population and advocate government reform, as a purifier. Given that LN was a purifier that focused on government reform, governance is the party's core issue. Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) consider the LPF a purifier (a subcategory of mobiliser), but acknowledge that in many ways the party is a personalist party, which also has elements of a prophet. Closer analysis however implies that the party can best be thought of as a prophet, another kind of mobiliser. The party introduced a new ideology of the LPF, which mixes elements of nationalism and liberalism. The categorisation of purifier also does not fit because the most important issue of the LPF was not government reform but rather immigration.

Table 4.19: profile of the PVV

Party Profile		PVV
Full name		<i>Partij voor de Vrijheid</i>
English name		Party for Freedom
Founded		2004
First elected		2006
First succesful election result		9 (5.9%)
Membership in year of first MPs		1
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Divorce
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Liberal nationalism
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Justice (22.1%)
	in parliamentary speech	Justice (14.1%)
	in motions	Justice (14.8%)
	in literature	Islamisation
	assigned	Migration
Unique proposals		27.1% (29)
In parliament		2004-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

4.4.16 PVV: the persistence of anti-immigration politics

As we saw in paragraph 4.4.16, over the course of the 2003-2006 parliamentary term, the LPF completely collapsed. At the same time, Geert Wilders broke away from the VVD parliamentary party and formed a new party, the PVV (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*/Freedom Party). In the 2006 elections, the PVV replaced the LPF as the most rightwing party in the Dutch parliament.

In 2004, Wilders left the VVD parliamentary party (Hippe et al. 2005, 101). Wilders had been an MP for the VVD since 1998. After the 2002 elections, he became an important voice in the debate about integration and immigration, and especially the place of Islam in the Netherlands and the European Union. Meanwhile, Wilders and the VVD grew apart. The final breaking point was the possible entry of Turkey into the European Union, which the VVD favoured but Wilders opposed. Wilders continued as an independent MP. He rebuked offers from the LPF to cooperate with them (Hippe et al. 2005, 102), and in 2006, he formally founded the PVV. The name explicitly referred to the name of the PvdV, one of the parties that merged into the VVD. In Wilders' view, the VVD had abandoned the classical liberal

course by espousing a social liberal course (Lucardie et al. 2008, 61). The PVV did not only scald the VVD for abandoning its course: the party also presents itself as the true heir of social democracy (Bosma 2010, 38-55). In the 2006 elections, the PVV won nine seats. The party's list consisted of individuals who did not have extensive political experience. One MP had been a member of the Rotterdam city council for *Leefbaar Rotterdam* and another had been a member of the North Holland provincial council for the LPF. The PVV has a limited party organisation: formally, there is only a *Vereniging Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Association Party for Freedom) of which Wilders and his *Stichting Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Foundation Party for Freedom) are the only members. In the 2010 general elections, the PVV nearly tripled its electoral support and it entered in an agreement with the CDA and VVD to support their cabinet without supplying ministers.

The PVV's manifesto advocated a more restrictive immigration policy, law and order policies, lower taxes, and more direct democracy, and it opposed further European integration (Lucardie et al. 2008, 62-63; Lucardie 2009, 177-178). The programme specifically advocated policies against the Islamisation of the Dutch culture, such as specific legislation against Islamic schools, headscarves and the building of mosques. Wilders agitated against the Dutch Left, which in his view was far too appealing towards the growing totalitarian threat of political Islam (Vossen 2010, 9-10). According to Vossen (2010), this combined critique of both the Dutch leftwing establishment and the growth of Islam has similarities to Fortuyn. There is considerably discussion about how to characterise the ideology of the PVV (Lucardie 2009, 176-177). Pels (2005, 90, 2011, 43-44) considers the party to be committed to a kind of liberal nationalism: it seeks to defend the liberal Dutch culture against external threats such as Islam. On similar grounds, Lucardie (2009, 181) describes the party's ideology as liberal nationalism as well. From the scholarly literature, it is clear that the dominant issue of the PVV is immigration, because of the party's opposition to the Islamisation of Dutch society. In its election manifesto, its parliamentary speeches and its motions, however, the PVV focuses on justice. In the eyes of the PVV there is a relationship between the two issues: its anti-crime measures are specifically oriented at fighting what they call "street terror" in which they link Islamic extremism to security (Partij voor de Vrijheid 2010, 9).

Krouwel and Lucardie (2008, 287) characterise the PVV as a challenger of the VVD and a party split from the VVD. While the latter is certainly the case, the former

is less certain. One has to consider three elements: the political communication of the PVV, its electoral strategy and its political programme. The electoral appeal of the PVV is much broader than the VVD-electorate, and their ideology is far more radical, especially in its opposition to the Islamisation of Dutch culture and the political establishment than the VVD ever was. In this sense, the PVV is more of a challenger of the LPF, which had collapsed, than of the VVD. Therefore, one cannot consider the PVV to be a challenger of the VVD, but rather a mobiliser in the tradition of the LPF. Thus, the PVV is linked to the issue of immigration.

4.4.17 PvdD: the hobbyhorse

The PvdD (*Partij voor de Dieren*/Party for the Animals) was the first animal rights party to win representation in a national parliament.¹¹⁷ The party defends the interest of a particular group. This group, however, is not a group that could vote for the party, like farmers, pensioners or small businessmen, but it is a group that cannot vote: animals.

The PvdD was formed by birth, founded by members of the animal welfare movement (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 287). It was founded on October 28, 2002. The founders were the chair, the director and a policy advisor of the animal rights NGO *Bont voor Dieren*.¹¹⁸ They were concerned about the policies of the first Balkenende cabinet concerning animal rights, environment and agriculture (Lucardie 2008b, 159). The founders were particularly worried about that cabinet's plans to delay and reverse legislation on animal rights. In the eyes of the activists, this legislation was an indirect consequence of their own efforts as lobbyists and activists (Thieme 2006, 29).¹¹⁹ They decided that, in that case, they should go into politics to ensure that animal rights received the attention it deserved (Schaafsma 2006, 21). The stigmatisation that animal rights activist felt after the murder of Fortuyn by an animal rights activist and their timid reactions to the plans of the centre-right cabinet were additional reasons to enter into politics (Meeuwissen 2011, 19). Niko Koffeman, an

¹¹⁷ Misérus, M. "Wereldprimeur in het Haagse parlement; dierenpartij in de landelijke politiek heeft geen voorbeelden elders". *Volkskrant* 24 November, 2006.

¹¹⁸ "Bont voor Dieren" literally means Fur for Animals, but it also sounds like League for Animals in Dutch. Jungmann, B. "Politieke dieren houden voeling met de wortels". *De Volkskrant*, 30/9/2006.

¹¹⁹ De Bruijn, E. "Zetels voor dieren: hoe zit dat nou?" *NRC Handelsblad*, 19/12/2002.

independent campaign advisor to the Socialist Party, had already developed the idea for an animal rights party back in 1992 (Meeuwissen 2011, 18).¹²⁰

The PvdD participated in the 2003 elections. In the parliamentary elections, the party obtained 0.5% of the votes. A year later, the party participated in the elections for the European Parliament. Eight Dutch authors, TV personalities and opinion makers endorsed the party by accepting a position on the party's list.¹²¹ The party won 3.2% of the vote, half a percent short for a seat. In 2006, the party again took part in the national elections, and again, several Dutch celebrities endorsed the party.¹²² The party won two seats in the *Tweede Kamer*. In the parliamentary elections of 2010, the party retained its two seats and in the provincial elections of 2011, it lost one of its eight seats in provincial councils.

The programme of the PvdD focuses on animal welfare. The party aims to be the voice of the weaker and voiceless sections of society, particularly animals (Lucardie 2004, 208; Meeuwissen 2011, 21). Most of the PvdD attention is given to the position of animals in industrial agriculture, but there is also attention to the position of wild animals and circus animals. The environment features prominently in the programme, besides animal rights. The party argues that it transcends the traditional division between left and right and instead aims for a society based on sustainability and compassion.¹²³ Therefore, "the Party for the Animals is not a single-issue party. We dare to believe in and work towards a sustainable society. A society that aims at a more comfortable life for current and future generations" (Thieme 2006, 11 translation SO).

Thieme and Koffeman give different reasons why specifically an animal rights party was established. Thieme, who was involved in the foundation of the party, demonstrates a great commitment to the welfare of animals. In her opinion, the other existing parties are actually single-interest parties because they focus solely on

¹²⁰ Banning, C. "Via Sla! en Nútopia in de Eerste Kamer; Niko Koffeman wordt de eerste senator voor de Partij voor de Dieren en neemt afscheid van de SP". *Ibid.*, 29/5/2007. Kruijt, M. "'Stem tegen, stem SP' kiest voor de dieren. Interview Niko Koffeman". *De Volkskrant*, 15/3/2007, Ter Horst, G. "Partij wil dieren terug op Haagse agenda". *Agrarisch Dagblad*, 3/12/2003.

¹²¹ "Rudy Kousbroek lijstduwer Partij voor de Dieren". *NRC Handelsblad*, 8/3/2004. "Onderste Dieren". *Het Financieele Dagblad*, 10/2/2004.

¹²² Jungmann, B. "Politieke dieren houden voeling met de wortels". *De Volkskrant*, 30/9/2006.

¹²³ De Waard, M. "Profiteren van onbehagen burgers". *NRC Handelsblad*, 9/6/2004.

the financial interests of humans and neglect many other interests, particularly the interests of animals (Thieme 2006, 30).¹²⁴ She tries to raise the profile of animal rights by acting as a pacer in the marathon, which forces the other runners (the other parties) to run faster for animal rights. In the eyes of Thieme, animal welfare is "a side dish on the political menu" of the established parties (Thieme 2006, 113). Even when there was an animal-friendly majority in the *Tweede Kamer* between 1998 and 2002, the parties did too little for animal welfare, according to Thieme (2006, 80). The "hot breath" of the PvdD should force the other parties to put animal rights higher on the political agenda (Thieme 2006, 83). Thieme wants to remind the existing parties of the "good intentions in their own programmes" (Thieme 2006, 74) and wants to be their animal-friendly conscience (Thieme 2006, 70).

Koffeman explains the strategy of the party in a different way. He fathered of the idea of an animal rights party, but he became involved with the party only after it was formed. In his view, journalists are not interested in yet another party with a broad programme oriented at welfare and sustainability. By zooming in on the specific issue of animal rights, the party draws journalists' attention. By doing so, the party can bring its message to the public: even the choice for the name 'Party for the Animals' was strategic in nature, according to Koffeman. The party could also have been called 'Party for the Environment' or 'Party for Animals and Children', but according to Koffeman that makes no lasting impression. By zooming in on the animal issue, the PvdD shows the true magnitude of the environmental problems and attracts media attention.¹²⁵

These arguments are partly contradictory: in the story of Koffeman, the PvdD has a broad green and leftwing programme and it *uses* animal rights to attract attention. In Thieme's story, the party focuses on animal rights in order to realise policy change, albeit indirectly. The question arises whether animals have intrinsic value for the party or whether they are an instrument. In the parliamentary work of

¹²⁴ Van Heese, R. & I. Weel. "'Wij zijn Partij voor de Duurzaamheid" PvdD-fractievoorzitter Thieme wil verder kijken dan de belangen van de Westerse mens". *Trouw*, 21/3/2009.

¹²⁵ Van Os, P. "Dierenmanieren; portret Partij voor de Dieren". *NRC Handelsblad* 17/4/2010, "'Wij worden gedomineerd" Partij voor de Dieren-senator Niko Koffeman gruwet van CDA "Beschaving zou los moeten staan van welvaart"'. *De Telegraaf*, 2/7/2007 "'Wij worden groter dan GroenLinks"'. *De Pers*, 31/3/2008. Translations SO

the party, the focus of the party on agriculture and animal rights remains. This is an indication of the MP's intrinsic motivation.

The relationship between the PvdD and the other existing parties, particularly the GL, influences how the goal of the PvdD must be understood: is this small green party a challenger of the larger green party GL or does the party seek to create a new line of conflict that transcends the existing dimensions? In the eyes of the PvdD, all existing parties focus too much on the interests of human beings and neglect the interests of animals, although some parties are more successful in transcending the interests of their own species than others (Thieme 2006, 56-57). The Christian parties, and particularly the CDA, emphasise environmental stewardship, but according to Thieme, they have continually bowed to agricultural interests. They are, according to Thieme, the main opponents of the PvdD.¹²⁶ GL, together with the SP, PvdA and D66 belong to the "animal-friendly majority" (Thieme 2006, 79-80), the parties that are better able to transcend their own species' interest. These parties did not devote enough attention to animal welfare in the eyes of Thieme (2006 113). The GL, PvdA and D66 are the parties that belong to the left in traditional socio-economic terms, but animal welfare, according to Thieme (2006), transcends the existing left-right pattern. On issues other than the environment and agriculture, the PvdD takes similar positions as the other leftwing parties.¹²⁷

The relationship between the animal-friendly parties and the PvdD is complex. Thieme claims that the main conflict is not between the PvdD and the animal friendly parties (Thieme 2006, 113). The proponents of animal welfare within, for instance the GL, are unable to make the issue a priority of the party (Thieme 2006, 84). The absence of vegetarians in the GL parliamentary party between 2006 and 2010 was symptomatic for the lack of attention to animal welfare in that party, according to Thieme and Koffeman.¹²⁸ During several campaigns, the PvdD focused on the GL: in 2005, Thieme wrote that GL's support for the "animal-unfriendly

¹²⁶ Eerst belachelijk dan crimineel en dan win je"; lijsttrekker Thieme ziet andere politici de 'grote leugen' van haar dierenpartij nu annexeren". NRC Handelsblad, 17/4/2010.

¹²⁷ Lucardie, P. "Links voor dieren én mensen". *Trouw*, 5/12/2006.

¹²⁸ Van Os, P. "'Eerst belachelijk dan crimineel en dan win je"; lijsttrekker Thieme ziet andere politici de 'grote leugen' van haar dierenpartij nu annexeren". NRC Handelsblad, 17/4/2010, "'Wij worden groter dan GroenLinks'". *De Pers*, 31/3/2008.

European Constitution" was bad for its credibility on the animal rights issue.¹²⁹ When several local GL councillors spoke out in favour of an industrial scale stable, Thieme, together with the author Kees Van Kooten, wrote: "how fast can a party that once called itself progressive forget its ideals when it begins to bear governmental responsibility."¹³⁰

In an electoral sense, the PvdD does not focus on the constituency of a particular party. When Thieme (2006, 33) speaks about the electoral potential of the PvdD, she refers to the number of vegetarians. Also, she appeals explicitly to voters by asking them to voice their dissatisfaction about the treatment of animals and express their sympathy for animals, independent of the question of who gets into power (Thieme 2006, 115). For what is known about the party's electoral support, the party performs well in constituencies with highly educated voters (which tend to vote GL and D66) and constituencies with lower educated voters (which tend to vote SP and PVV) (De Voogd 2011).

Authors have categorised the PvdD a prolocutor, a subcategory of the mobiliser party (Krouwel & Lucardie 2008, 287; Schaafsma 2006, 5). If one looks at the three aspects of a mobiliser party discussed above, a more complex picture emerges: in the campaign strategy, one can see that the party focused on both the CDA, as the representative of traditional farm interests, and on the GL and the other animal friendly parties that have neglected the issue. This makes the PvdD difficult to place. The programme of the PvdD shows the same ambiguity. This programme differs significantly from the programmes of the existing parties in its special focus on animal welfare. The PvdD, however, says that it is more than a single-issue party: it looks at all political issues from the perspective of sustainability and compassion. This is reflected in positions that are similar to the ones of GL and the SP. The central claim of challenging parties, namely that a particular party no longer represents the ideology that it once did, is not consistently and continually made by the PvdD. The PvdD also does not focus on the electorate of the GL: indeed, by insisting that the animal welfare issue transcends the traditional lines of conflict, it appeals to animal lovers in all social groups. All in all, the party's profile leans somewhat to the

¹²⁹ Thieme, M. "GroenLinks en het welzijn van dieren". *NRC Handelsblad*, 1/3/2005.

¹³⁰ Van Kooten, K. & M. Thieme. "Nieuw! Pluk van de Varkensflat". *Trouw*, 11 November, 2006. Translation SO

Table 4.20: profile of the PvdD

Party Profile		PvdD
Full name		<i>Partij voor de Dieren</i>
English name		Party for the Animals
Founded		2003
First elected		2006
First succesful election result		2 (1.8%)
Membership in year of first MPs		6370
Stability of the parliamentary party		100%
Formation history		Birth
Party goal		Mobiliser (prophet)
Ideology		Green Politics
Owned issue	in election manifesto	Agriculture (68.5%)
	in parliamentary speech	Agriculture (36.2%)
	in motions	Agriculture (68.0%)
	in literature	Animal Rights
	assigned	Agriculture
Unique proposals		47.1% (107)
In parliament		2006-now
Reason dissolution		Still in parliament

mobiliser. If one follows that profile, it can best be understood as a prophetic party trying to express a new ideology of animal welfare, sustainability and compassion, which transcends the traditional pattern between left and right. Because animals, the group that the PvdD wants to represent, do not have voting rights, the party cannot be characterised as a prolocutor. This categorisation follows Meeuwissen (2011, 65-66).

4.5 Patterns

Three categorisation schemes were employed here: one looked at the history of the new party; the second looked at its goal, and the third at its unique issue. The first scheme differentiated between parties formed by birth or divorce. The greatest drawback of this scheme is that it does not take into account whether the predecessors of a new party - the parties that merged, or the party from which it split - are parliamentary or extra-parliamentary. Here the point where a party moves from old to new is identified as the point where it enters parliament after competing in an election under its own banner for the first time. Therefore, it matters whether the predecessor parties had successfully participated in parliamentary elections before. The definition

Table 4.21: new parties classified as challenger or mobiliser

Party	According to Literature	Campaign	Ideology	Electorate	Sum	Verdict
KNP	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
PSP	Mobiliser	+	+	-	2	Challenger
BP	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
GPV	Mobiliser	-	+	+	2	Challenger
D66	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
PPR	Mobiliser	+	-	+	2	Challenger
DS'70	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
NMP	Challenger	-	+	-	1	Mobiliser
RKPN	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
RPF	Challenger	-	+	+	2	Challenger
EVP	Challenger	+	+	+	3	Challenger
CP	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
AOV	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
U55+	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
SP	Challenger	-	+	+	2	Challenger
LN	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
LPF	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
PvdD	Mobiliser	-	-	-	0	Mobiliser
PVV	Challenger	+	-	-	1	Mobiliser

employed here assumes that the new party split from a party with parliamentary representation. Four parties were formed as splits from extra-parliamentary parties (the SP, the CP, the RKPN and the LPF), however, and one was formed as a merger of two extra-parliamentary parties (U55+). While these parties are formally formed by divorce or marriage, this is a kind of embryonic divorce or marriage (if one continues with Mair's typology). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, these parties ought to be considered as parties formed by birth.

The second classification divided challengers from mobilisers. This typology was operationalised into a classificatory scheme with three criteria. It is clear that some parties fit better into this scheme than others. In table 4.21 one can see whether the particular characteristics of challenger parties were or were not present in each case. Twelve of the nineteen cases fit perfectly into this categorisation. Four of these are challengers and eight of these are mobilisers. Seven cases fit less well into this categorisation: five of these, PSP, GPV, PPR, RPF and SP, are imperfect challengers, which miss one characteristics of a challenger party. Two of these, the PVV and the NMP, meet one characteristic of a challenger but are still considered mobiliser.

Overall, this study agrees with the studies of Rochon (1985) and Krouwel and Lucardie (2008) in almost three quarters of the cases.¹³¹

Finally, each party was linked to an issue: from agriculture to defence. Some issues are used by more than one party: only nine issue categories are used for nineteen parties. The most prominent issues are governance, immigration, and moral issues. Three new parties prioritise each of these three issues. Three issues are prioritised by two parties (defence, agriculture, healthcare). Two issues are prioritised by one party (the economic issues economic affairs and labour). Most issues lie outside of the socio-economic line of conflict and are more cultural (immigration, moral issues) or political (defence, governance) in nature. The classification fits poorly in six cases, because there is a discrepancy between the most emphasised issue in the manifesto and the distinctive issue according to the literature. Post-materialist parties D66 and PPR emphasised economic issues more than their distinctive post-materialist concerns for the environment and governance. While in absolute terms D66 and the PPR focused more on economic issues, compared to the established parties these two parties were distinctive for their focus on post-materialist issues. For the CP one can see a clear difference between the formal documents (such as election manifestos) and their activity in parliament. The SP has a diffuse economic issue focus instead of a focus on one economic issue; therefore, foreign policy (a relatively large issue category) is slightly larger than economic issues such as labour. The PVV, however, is a different case: as could be seen for the PVV, but also for LN and LPF, these populist parties tend to be active on justice instead of on governance or immigration.¹³² DS'70 is the most difficult case. This party focused most on governance in its election manifesto. This is not, however, an issue that was,

¹³¹ Two cases offer an additional complication: the NMP and the BP. These parties are clearly not challengers, because they do not focus on a particular party, but they are not really mobilisers either: they do not seek to introduce a new issue or a new division into politics. Rather, they operate on economic issues and on the classical left-right dimension. Therefore one could identify a fourth category of the mobilisers, namely the protest parties. These parties seek to mobilise protest votes *along* the existing dimensions, challenging not just one party on the right or the left, but all parties on one of these dimensions.

¹³² Note, however, that when analysing the patterns in attention and position, the patterns found for immigration and governance for these periods could better be explained by the presence of these new parties than the patterns on the issue of justice.

Table 4.22: new parties classified

Category	Divorce	Birth	Sum
Challenger	6	3	9
Mobiliser	1	9	10
Sum	7	12	19

according to the literature, a defining issue of either of DS'70's tendencies (the foreign policy-oriented anti-communists, or the economically oriented social democrats). It is still selected as the distinctive issue of the DS'70 because it was the issue that united its two tendencies.

Over time, several trends can be seen in the categorisation: a major change is that new parties before 1982 were mainly challengers of established parties, whereas after 1982 the new parties tended to be mobilisers. There is a significant correlation between the year in which a party entered parliament and whether it was a challenger or not (Pearson's r is -0.52 – significant at the 0.05-level). This may be a result of depillarisation: the established parties did not just lose control over the voters, but they also became less important for the foundation of new parties. The major established parties lost their dominant role in politics. A similar development can be seen in the electoral support of new parties: there is a weak correlation between the support of a new party on its first entry and the year of its foundation (Pearson's r is 0.34). This is a sign of the same development: over time, the established parties lost control over their voters and elections became more volatile, providing better opportunities for new parties. There is a weak negative relationship between the year of entry and whether a party was formed by divorce or not (Pearson's r is -0.25). Over time, new parties were formed more independently from the established parties. Another pattern, which is shown in table 4.22, is that challenger parties tend to be formed by divorce: all parties formed by divorce were challengers, and only three parties formed by birth were challengers. It seems obvious that new parties, which break away from established parties claim that the established party no longer represents the ideology a party stood for, instead of advocating new issues or representing underrepresented interests. Of the nine parties formed in order to challenge an established party, three challenged the PvdA, which followed the oscillation between the left and the centre that the PvdA made over time. Six challenger parties were oriented explicitly towards one of the Christian-democratic parties. Four of these were formed in the wake of the formation of the Christian-

democratic Appeal (CDA), in which the ideologically homogenous Christian parties merged into one non-denominational centrist party.

This is also reflected in their issue orientation: out of the nine challenger parties, three focus on moral issues; these are all challengers of a Christian-democratic party. As one would expect, mobilisers have tended to focus on issues outside of traditional social-economic competition: out of the ten mobiliser parties, three focus on immigration, two on government reform and two on pensioners' issues. Three parties focus on economic issues: agriculture (BP and PvdD) and economic affairs (NMP). Of these three, the PvdD brings their distinctive animal rights approach to agriculture.