The Politics of Representation: The Construction of the Tibetan National Identity in Exile

MA Thesis
Leiden University
Institute for History
28 August 2012

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people have supported me during the painful process of writing this thesis. Without their support, I would never be able to complete it. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Leo Lucassen, for his valuable comments and contributions. He carefully read every page of this thesis and made precious contributions. I am also indebted to my second supervisor, Nira Wickramasinghe, for her intellectual guidance during the year she taught me at Leiden University. She has been very instrumental in forcing me to clarify and reshape my arguments. Her informative and intelligent comments contributed most to the theoretical framework of this thesis. Moreover, I am indebted to her for giving me the opportunity to work for the South Asian Studies department. It has been an honor and a great pleasure to work with her.

Over the years, I have been lucky enough to meet notable scholars who changed the way of my thinking and provided me with a deeper understanding of academic inquiry and critical analysis. While naming all would be impossible, a few deserve to be mentioned. My biggest intellectual debt is to Yücel Terzibaşoğlu. During the years he taught me at Boğaziçi University, he introduced me to the seminal works of the outstanding historians and the social theorists. Our discussions over the readings he assigned me changed the way I saw history and social sciences. He also showed great interest in my works and encouraged me to pursue my “unconventional” academic interest in modern Tibetan studies. Without his support and encouragement, I would never dare to insist in Tibetan studies. I also would like to thank Ferhunde Özbay for teaching me migration studies and demography. Her classes enabled me to develop my sociological thinking and research skills. I am also grateful to Sunil Amrith for showing interest in my work and making valuable contributions to my intellectual worldview. It was a great pleasure to meet him whose works I had long admired.

Among my friends, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Laura Neumann, Helene Feest, Marjolein Schepers, Gleb Mytko, Simon Kemper, Mariana Restrepo, Canan Balkan, Cengiz Yolcu, Orçun Can Okan, Yaprak Aydın, Yusuf Gören, Ezgi Memiş, Naz Tuğtekin, Öykü İnci Yener and Gözde Sonal. They all read my chapters and made valuable contributions. But most importantly, they encouraged me with their support when I needed most.
During my stay in Leiden, I have met some great people whose friendships I value deeply. I would like to thank Katarina Kolar, Spela Prunk, Alexandra Pop, Eugenia Yakunina, Gaye Eksen, Francesco Nattino, Stefano Voltan, Pablo Castellanos Nash, Vicente Atal, Matteo Bonfanti, Alessandro Genova, Armando Nicolas Bastidas, Jose Eduardo Millan Rivero, Viviana Voulgari and Hayri Emrah Balcıoğlu for being with me during the hardest part of the writing process and listening to my long boring speeches about my thesis without complaining. Perhaps, I should also be grateful to them for forcing me to “go out for a beer” and showing me that “there is a life outside my room.” Despite their endless attempts to prevent me from writing, I was able to finish this thesis. I am especially grateful to Francesco, Stefano, Pablo and Vicente for hosting me in their apartments when I was homeless. I am also indebted to Adela Martaskova and Joao Rebelo not only for their irreplaceable friendship and unforgettable moments we shared together but also for making me part of their small family. Hesna Begüm Özel also deserves special thanks for her friendship, support and most importantly her intellectual contribution to this thesis. Our long and exhilarating discussions on historical theory, modernity and nationalism challenged me and made me question and reconsider my arguments.

In last couple of years, my life has intersected with the lives of Tibetan people whose companionship fundamentally changed the way I saw the Tibetan culture and society. Spending time with them, listening to the stories of their personal struggles and most importantly being part of their daily lives strengthened my academic engagement with Tibetan Studies and kept me motivated during the times I lost my self-confidence. Special thanks go to my Tibetan sister Yeshi Lhamo with whom I lived over two months in Kathmandu. I also extend my deepest appreciation to my colloquial Tibetan teachers: Cinthia Font, Sonam Dickey, Phuntsok Tenzin, Dawa Thulong, Tenzing Namkha and Tsering Wangchuck. They are not only enthusiastic teachers who helped me to develop my Tibetan language skills but also great friends who made every single moment of my Kathmandu experience unforgettable.

My greatest debt is to my mother, Şirin Erdem, for her unconditional love and devotion. She has always believed in me and supported my decisions no matter what. Her belief in me was what kept me going during the most difficult times. Without her support, I would never be able to find my way. There are no words adequate to express my gratitude to her. For this reason, it is to her I dedicate this thesis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTA</td>
<td>Central Tibetan Administration or Tibetan Government in exile</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOI</td>
<td>Government of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWA</td>
<td>Tibetan Welfare Association</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>CTPD</td>
<td>The Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies</td>
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<td>TYC</td>
<td>Tibetan Youth Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPO</td>
<td>Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization</td>
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<td>UCM</td>
<td>Universal Compassion Movement</td>
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

But history is neither watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an endeavor toward better understanding, and, consequently, a thing in movement.

March Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft*¹

In the last three decades, the long standing Sino-Tibetan political conflict which is frequently referred to as the “Tibet Question”² in the international political arena, has attracted the interests of different groups of people all over the world, including politicians, human rights activists, journalists, Buddhist communities, independent writers and scholars. Since the early 1960s, the worldwide Tibet Support Groups have organized numerous political demonstrations and discussions on Tibet-related topics such as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) human rights violations, ecological and economic disasters in the Tibetan regions and indigenous, religious and cultural identity of the Tibetans. In addition to the activities of these supra-national organizations, religious and political speeches of the 14ᵗʰ Dalai Lama³ have been broadcasted widely on the multiple TV channels and thousands of articles about the contemporary Tibetans who both live inside and outside of Tibet have been published and circulated all over the world. In the context of “Shangri-la” paradigm⁴, most of that publicity has contributed to the romanticized, exoticised and essentialized image of the Tibetan other. Simply put, in most of these Orientalist articulations of the Tibetan other, the multiple and complex identities of Tibetans have been simplified, thus, all Tibetans have been characterized as peaceful, non-violent, environmentally friendly, devout Buddhists. These simplistic -and often highly problematic- images of Tibetans have been both challenged and (re)produced to a certain extent by those Tibetan elites in exile. On the one hand, the mystic, spiritual image of Tibetanness has been appropriated because of its value as “symbolic capital” which has been transformed into political and economic capital. On the other hand, through modernization process and the

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² According to Goldstein; “the Tibet Question, the long-standing conflict over the political status of Tibet in relation to China, is a conflict about nationalism-an emotional-laden debate over whether political units should directly parallel ethnic units. This question pits the right of a “people” (Tibetans) to self-determination and independence against the right of a multiethnic state (the People’s Republic of China) to maintain what it sees as its historic territorial integrity.” Melvyn Goldstein, *The Snow Lion and the Dragon* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), ix.
³ From now on, I will refer to the 14ᵗʰ Dalai Lama as the Dalai Lama.
⁴ Shangri-la can be defined as mythical-Himalayan utopia introduced by the James Hilton in his novel, Shangri-la. Shangri-la paradigm can be summarized as mystification of Tibetan geography, Tibetan culture as well as Tibetan people.
development of Tibetan nationalism in exile, modern political and social concepts—which were primarily Western—such as democracy, human rights, and ecological awareness, have been integrated to the official rhetoric of Tibetan identity. Considering Tibetan national identity formation an important case study which can offer an alternative perspective to comprehend the complexity of the modern phenomenon of nationalism and nation-building process, the following question will be addressed in this thesis: how has the Tibetan national identity been constructed and negotiated by the Tibetan exile elites in order to obtain internal and global support to their political cause?\(^5\) Two analytical questions that will guide me to answer my leading question are: Why did Tibetan exile elites integrate some specific concepts and themes (not the others) such as democracy, non-violence, environmentalism and gender equality into Tibetan nationalist discourse at the very particular historical time periods and what kind of global and internal context enabled them to do so?

By tracing the historical development of Tibetan nationalism and national identity formation through reading written materials produced in exile, the broader aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to a larger debate on the characteristics of Tibetan nationalism. However, it is important to note that this thesis is not intended to capture Tibetan nationalism as whole; it is rather limited to one particular form of nationalism, the one created and promoted by the Dalai Lama and his entourage, the elite members of the Tibetan exile community. Simply put, the canonical form of Tibetan nationalism will be the scope of this thesis.

Challenging to the conventional idea that Tibetan nationalism can only be characterized as religious nationalism and proto-nationalism with regard to the role of Buddhism and the institution of the Dalai Lama on its development, this thesis will support and further George Dreyfus’s\(^6\) and Ashild Kolas’s arguments and that the process that gave rise to the Tibetan

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\(^5\) What I mean by Tibetan political cause is the political agenda articulated by the Dalai Lama and his Central Tibetan Administration. Like many other political movements, the Tibetan movement is also fractional; there are important groups that do not necessarily agree with the official position of the CTA. However, since the main concern of this thesis is to map the dominant nationalist discourse, I will not discuss them here. Considering the dominant discourse, it is important to note that although until the late 1980s the Dalai Lama and the CTA supported the idea of full independence, in 1988 with the statement the Dalai Lama issued in the European parliament in Strasbourg the decision to pursue “Middle Way Approach” which means “genuine autonomy” under the Chinese rule was taken.

nationalism involves a complex of interactions between Tibetan traditional religious culture, Western secular political norms and Western and Indian modernity experiences. These interactions were not one-sided but reciprocal since all three actors were influenced by each other through the course of these interactions. It is therefore my intention in this thesis to take this dialectical link between various actors who have been instrumental in the development of Tibetan nationalism into account to understand the process of Tibetan national identity formation.

Theories of Nationalism

The construction of Tibetan national identity should also be studied, discussed and analyzed within wider theoretical debates over nationalism. Such a study is indeed essential to locate the Tibetan case into the global one and to offer a comparative space for the further analysis. There is no doubt that “Nationalism” as a global political phenomenon has long been the subject of academic inquiry and many outstanding scholars from different disciplinary backgrounds have attempted to theorize “nationalism.” Most of these theories either supported one of the two main theoretical stances; “primordialist” versus “constructionist” approaches. On the one hand, primordialists claim that the nations have primordial origin and are deeply rooted in human evolutionary psychology and thereby “natural”. On the other hand, the constructionists claim that nations were constructed for political and economic requirements of the age of the modernity which enabled them to emerge.

Since to discuss all theories of nationalism would be impossible- and it is not the primary concern of this thesis- I will briefly focus on some prominent examples of the constructionist approach and its critiques to clarify the diverse understandings and conceptualization of the term.

One of the most important theories on nationalism was introduced by Eric Hobsbawm in his seminal book *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Building his theory upon Miroslav Hroch’s comparative studies of small European national movements and his division of history of national movements into three phases, Hobsbawm states that Phase A was “purely cultural, literary and folkloric and hand no particular political or even national implications whereas in the

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Phase B it is possible to find a “body of pioneers and militans of ‘the national idea’ and the beginning of political campaign for this idea.” In addition to these two phases, the Phase C refers to the period “when nationalist programmes acquire mass support or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they represent.” In the Phase B, what he calls popular proto-nationalism, “states and national movements could mobilize certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate on the macro political scale.” According to Hobsbawm, the four main criteria for the emergence of popular proto-nationalism are 1) language 2) ethnicity 3) religion and 4) the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity. In his analysis on the link between religion and proto-nationalism, Hobsbawm briefly comments on the Tibetan case by stating that “since there are comparatively few theocracies which have nation-making possibilities, it is difficult to judge how far purely divine authority is enough; the question must be left to the experts in the history of Mongols and Tibetans.” Although he did not discuss Tibetan case further on, Hobsbawm’s formulation on proto-nationalism provided insights into the contemporary characteristic of Tibetan nationalism which is often identified with “proto-nationalism” by several Tibet scholars who followed his theory- which I shall return to below.

The second theory I would like to examine is Benedict Anderson’s theory of nationalism since it is generally accepted as one of the most important works in the field. In his seminal book *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” and he further argues that:

[Nation] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.

According to Anderson, several historical conditions made imagined communities come into being. What he called “cultural roots” to nationalism are; (1) the rise of secularism and the decline of the religious faith in the age of Enlightenment (2) decline of the legitimacy of sacral

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11 Ibid., 46.  
12 Ibid., 46-80.  
13 Ibid., 72.  
15 Ibid., 6.
monarchy in the 17th century (3) the change in the apprehension of time and the development of the idea of “homogenous, empty time.” In addition to these historical changes, Anderson suggests that print-capitalism provided the new institutional space for the development of “modern” language which enhanced the idea of nationalism.16

Anderson’s theory of imagined communities can be seen as another example of the “constructionist” model since he clearly refers to the link between nationalism, secularism and modernity and conceptualizes nationalism within this framework. Despite the undeniable accuracy of his arguments and descriptions, his theory remains insufficient to answer an important question. If one of the most important historical conditions that made nationalism possible was “secular consciousness” how then will we explain the phenomenon of “religious nationalism”?

An important objection to Anderson’s theory comes from a Subaltern Studies scholar, Partha Chatterjee, who raises the question: Whose imagined community? Chatterjee criticizes Anderson’s argument that nationalisms in Asia and Africa-or postcolonial world- adopted a set of modular norms which were created by Western Europe, America and Russia in the first place.19 Instead, he claims that anti-colonial nationalism created its own domain of sovereignty by dividing the world of the social institutions and practices into two domains; the material and the spiritual.20 He then argued that although the material domain was primarily shaped by these western norms, the spiritual domain was the sphere “nationalism launches its most powerful, creative and historically significant project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western.”21 Chatterjee’s theory was indeed an important drive from the idea of “Western Universalism” and offered a critical perspective to comprehend “different paths to modernity.”

The last theory I would like to focus on is the least known theory of Dawa Norbu, an important Tibetan social scientist who wrote on “third-world” nationalism. In his book, Culture

16 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 44.
17 Subaltern Studies Group refers to a group of South Asian-dominantly Indian- scholars who are interested in post-colonialism with a particular focus on South Asian societies.
19 Ibid., 5.
20 Ibid., 6.
21 Ibid., 6.
and Politics of Third World Nationalism, concentrating on the nationalism experiences of China, India, Egypt, Iraq and Mexico and criticizing the existed theories of nationalism as being West oriented and thereby being inadequate in explaining non-western nationalism, Norbu sought an answer to the question of how and why nationalist ideologies did evolve in the non-western, post-colonial world. Dawa Norbu also claimed that nationalism has both a traditional and modern component; “traditional culture provides the emotional power that mystifies the rational mind, while egalitarian ideology provides a rational framework for the resolution of social problems.” Unlike most of his counterparts, Dawa Norbu did not contrast religion and nationalism; he rather asserts that the world religions have potential for mass politics. However, he distinguishes European and non-European nationalism by stating that religion played a fundamental role in the making of the former but not in the latter. This is indeed rather problematic argument which tends to homogenize Western experiences of nationalism and to simplify its complexities and to (re)produce the west-east dichotomy. However, it is still important to recognize the relevancy of his theory, especially in the Tibetan context.

**Literature on Tibetan Nationalism**

Surprisingly, there is a little scholarly literature on Tibetan nationalism even though it seems that the subject recently attracts more scholars who work on Tibet. Based on the review of existing literature, it can be argued that there is general consensus among Tibet scholars that Tibetan nationalism was the direct product of the exile existence which provided the initial stimulus for modern Tibetan identity construction. Accordingly, it is asserted that since prior to the Chinese takeover in 1951 Tibet had not been a unified land and the Dalai Lama’s traditional political control had been limited to the Central Tibet it would be impossible-and anachronistic- to talk about Tibetan nationalism, nation-building process or “national consciousness” with regard to this period. It should be noted that, however, most of these scholars also acknowledged that prior to the Chinese, Tibetans had in fact different types of sense of belonging-rather than the “national” one- e.g. religious, linguistic, and ethnic which made them a “community”. Although

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the accuracy of these arguments is undeniable, it would be an oversimplification to reach an immediate conclusion that only the political and social conditions of the exile could have made Tibetan nationalism possible. It is indeed true that prior to 1959, one can hardly talk about Tibetan unity in the sense of “national unity” or full-fledged Tibetan nationalism. But nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the nationalist ideology began to be articulated among Tibetan elites in the beginning of 20th century with the modernization attempts of the 13th Dalai Lama25—even though these attempts are generally considered a failure rather than a success. Therefore, without denying the fact that the current form of Tibetan nationalism was very much product of exile elites and thereby the experience of Chinese colonialism and the displacement, I will claim that Tibetan diasporic nationalism is a continuity of the process which was already in motion in the pre-Chinese Tibetan community.

Another point that Tibet scholars have a consensus is the central role of the institution of the Dalai Lama in the development of Tibetan nationalism.26 Almost without any exception, the theorists of Tibetan nationalism overemphasized the Dalai Lama’s role in Tibetan community as a charismatic authority in Weberian terms which is often referred to as a unifying symbol of religion and politics and, consequently, Tibetan “nationhood”.27 According to Anand, for instance, the Dalai was “not the most prominent advocate of Tibetan cause but also it is main theoretician.”28 Similarly, George Dreyfus, in his article, Are we prisoners of Shangri-la? Orientalism, Nationalism and the study of Tibet, also attributes a very central role to the Dalai Lama stating that the Dalai Lama’s own intellectual evolution was the essence that formed Tibetan nationalism.29 Although I do agree that it is very important to recognize the symbolic and the political power of the Dalai Lama—both as an institution and as a person, Tenzin Gyatso— as well as its instrumentality on the formation of Tibetan nationalism, I also think that one should not immediately reach to the conclusion that the Dalai Lama is “the architect” of Tibetan nationalism. What I am suggesting here is to adopt a more critical approach that might help to understand the complex dynamics in the formation of Tibetan nationalism much better than a

25 In the proclamation he issued in 1913, the 13th Dalai Lama condemned China by stating that “we (Tibetans) are a small, religious and independent nation.” See: Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press 1967), 248.
26 See: Kolas, Tibetan Nationalism and Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism.
28 Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism, 282.
29 Dreyfus, Are we Prisoners, 2-21.
deterministic approach which precludes alternative readings. Before to clarify what I mean by “a more critical approach” it is necessary to scrutinize these aforementioned theories.

In her article, Tibetan Nationalism: Politics of Religion, Ashild Kolas critically analyzed the current theories of nationalism and their inadequacy to explain the Tibetan case. According to her, because of their overemphasis on the relationship between the secular politics and nationalism, most of the prominent theories of nationalism tend to neglect the role of religion or to reduce it to the antiquated proto-nationalism. She suggests that Tibetan nationalism can neither be defined as purely religious nationalism nor a modern secular nationalism. She rather conceptualizes Tibetan nationalism as an interplay between religion and secular modernity:

Within the exile community, Tibetans contest the notion of “Tibetaness” in various ways. Religion comprises the main idiom of Tibetan identity; the source of unity within all Tibetans. Religion as a source of identity seems to be especially important to the uneducated, the elderly and recent arrivals from Tibet. On the other hand, the secular concept of Tibet is now being established as the primary idiom of identity, mainly as an elite project.30

On the other hand, Dibyesh Anand suggests at the beginning of his article, Reimagining Tibetan nationalism: identity and representation in the Tibetan Diaspora of South Asia, that regarding Tibetan case one should situate himself between primordialist and constructionist approaches of nationalism since “the centrality of the process of imagination in constituting a nation is noteworthy, the existence of an archive from which this process draws resources is also undeniable.”31 Referring to Benedict Anderson’s theory, he further argues that Tibet nation is “imagining community” rather than the imagined one since it is still being built. According to Anand, this ongoing process of “imagining” is more like “a neo(Orientalist) representation strategy”32 of exile elites who intend to increase international support for their plight. Although I find difficult to argue against his main argument—which is that “Tibetan national identity is the product of constant negotiation and renegotiation among several interrelated discursive and material factors”33 - I strongly believe that his overuse of the constructionist vocabulary and his striking claim that Tibetan national identity is constructed, multiple, fluid and changing leave us

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30 Kolas, Tibetan Nationalism, 64.
31 Anand, (Re)imagining nationalism, 274.
32 Ibid., 272.
33 Ibid., 284.
little room to understand it “as a category of practice” which directly influence the everyday social experiences of Tibetan exiles.\textsuperscript{34}

Among the others, George Dreyfus article, \textit{Are we prisoners of Shangri-la? Orientalism, Nationalism and the study of Tibet} offers the most convincing analysis on Tibetan nationalism. He begins with criticizing Donald S. Lopez’s argument that “Tibetan nationalism is mainly the internalization of Western fantasies of Tibet.”\textsuperscript{35} Similar to Dawa Norbu’s theory of non-western nationalism, Dreyfus also emphasizes that the Tibetan nationalism has both modern and traditional component which equally resulted in the very particular expression of new Tibetan national identity. He further argues that “when Tibetans borrowed Western ideas and turned the notions like democracy and human rights, they grounded their views in a mixture of traditional Tibetan Buddhist ideas.”\textsuperscript{36} He states that “Tibetan nationalism is not just an internalization of alien values but an artful synthesis produced out of a complex heterological dialogue in which all the elements involved in the process interact with each other, and in the process change.”\textsuperscript{37} Agreeing with Dreyfus’s and main point- my only objection to his arguments, as I mentioned above is the central role he attributed to the Dalai Lama, my current thesis is also written by the assumption that the contemporary Tibetan nationalism could only be grasped by acknowledging the dialectical link between the global forces and local conditions.

\textbf{Material and Method}

My research is primarily based on the content analysis of \textit{Tibetan Review}, a Tibetan-exile publication which has been published since 1968. \textit{Tibetan Review} is the first Tibetan-exile periodical in English and it was editorially “independent,” or in better words, semi-independent periodical. According to their official website, “Tibetan Review is independent because it is not funded by any government-including the Tibetan Government-in-exile- nor is it affiliated or related to any interest group.”\textsuperscript{38} However, these claims were not entirely accurate. It was indeed

\textsuperscript{34} I do build my argument here on Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker’s article, \textit{Beyond “Identity”}, within which they criticize the constructionist and essentialist understandings of the concept of “identity”. Instead, they suggest focusing on the term as an analytical category which might “serve well the demands of social analysis.” See: Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” \textit{Theory and Society} 29, no. 1, (February 2000): 1-47.

\textsuperscript{35} Dreyfus, \textit{Are We Prisoners} 6.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 14.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 14.

true that *Tibetan Review* was not initiated by the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) or any other political organizations of the Tibetan exile community but nevertheless from the beginning, the editors and the contributors of the magazine have been politically and socially influential figures in the Tibetan exile community. The first editor of the magazine\(^\text{39}\), for instance, Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari was one of the founding members of Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) which is one of the most important Tibetan exile political organizations. In addition, he is currently working as the Dalai Lama’s special envoy based on Washington DC. After him, the magazine was edited by other politically important names such as Tenzin Ngawang Takla, Prof. Dawa Norbu and Tsering Wangyal, all very influential intellectuals who played an important role in shaping both local and international public opinion about Tibet. Simply put, they all were well-educated elite members of the community who could communicate in English and had power and resources to further their own political agenda. For this reason, the analyses of the magazine provided important insights into the development of Tibetan nationalist ideology in exile. This, of course, does not mean that all the editors and the contributors of the magazine were Tibetan nationalists who sought to impose their ideology on the public. However, it was possible to trace when and why certain themes and notions which have been integrated into the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse started to be debated. It can also be suggested that the magazine has primarily targeted the international audience as well as the Tibetans who live in Europe and North America or the highly educated Tibetan readers of South Asia—at least for the initial years—who could read in English. I selected this magazine as my primary source since it was the only long-term Tibetan exile publication accessible from the Netherlands. Although there are many other important periodicals, magazines and newspapers published by the official institutions of the CTA and the Dalai Lama, neither the Dutch national archives nor the Leiden University library collection had the copies of them in their collection during the time of my research. To overcome this source limitation, I added several online sources including the websites of the worldwide Tibetan organizations—mostly the ones initiated by Tibetans themselves—, the other periodicals published by different Tibet-related organizations which were mainly available for the last two decades and finally, the autobiographies of the important Tibetan political figures such as the Dalai Lama and his elder sister Pema Jetsun into my analysis. This wide selection of

\(^{39}\) During that time (1967) the name of the magazine was *The Voice of Tibet.*
data enabled me to monitor the different viewpoints and perspectives on the same subjects and themes which provided the basis for the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse.

On this methodological basis, this thesis is divided into three research chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion chapters. I divided the chapters both in chronological and thematic manner. Each of the chapters follows a similar line of analysis; I begin with the demographics of the period of concern and then I move to the discursive and practical issues which characterized the periods. In this regard, the second chapter of the thesis focuses on the first decade of the exile years, the period from 1959 to 1972, which I call “foundational years.” In this chapter, I mainly scrutinize the initial themes and concepts which later provided a conceptual bedrock for the mainstream Tibetan discourse. Since it is very essential to grasp the political dynamics of the period, the second chapter begins with a descriptive part that outlines the historical background of the Tibetan case. After analyzing the nationalist discourses and practices, the second chapter ends with the year 1972 when the non-violence discourse officially and globally started to be promoted by the Dalai Lama and his entourage. The third chapter covers a broader period which starts from 1972 and ends with 1989, the year when the Dalai Lama was awarded Nobel Peace Prize. In this chapter, focusing on the articulations of non-violent, environment friendly Tibetan image, I argue that the Tibetan nationalist discourse has been strategically (re)religionized by the Tibetan elites in order to meet global expectations. For a better understanding of this turning point toward religionization, I examine how regional and sectarian identities were suppressed and Tibetan identity tried to be homogenized by newly-introduced identification policies. In the last chapter, I focus on the period from 1989 up to the present day which shows how the global actors and forces had been instrumental in the making of Tibetan national identity and some new globally popular subjects e.g. vegetarianism and gender equality were integrated into the mainstream nationalist discourse.

A Clarification of Terminology: “Exile” versus “Refugee”

It has been an important academic debate about the meaning of the terms “exile” and “refugee” and the semantic distinction between these two. The legal definition of the term “refugee” is based on the definition given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through the “UN Convention on Refugees” in Geneva in 1951, the international law on refugees. According to this convention, a political refugee is a person:
who is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country: or who, not having a nationality and being outside the county of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.\(^40\)

The ambiguity of the term “refugee” has been debated both legally and academically. These UN criteria have no universal application and even if the county has ratified the Geneva Convention, it still has the option either to recognize certain people as refugee or to withdraw this status.\(^41\) Therefore, most of the current political debates are framed around the question: who are “genuine refugees” and how they can be distinguished from those called “economic”, thereby unwanted migrants who claim on “refugee” status. The internationally accepted definition of the term “refugee” with its political connotation and the debates around it can be regarded as attempts to diagnose the factors that led to migration and they do not focus on the activities of those “refugees” in their “host country”. That is where the term “exile” comes into the discussion because these activities that are specially designed to end a people’s stay in “host country” refer to the term “exile”.\(^42\)

According to Yossi Shain, exiles are persons who are engaged “[...] in political activity directed against the policies of a home regime, against the home regime itself, or against the political system as a whole, so as to create circumstances favorable to their return.”\(^43\) This definition implies that exiles have clear and precise political agenda which is first to challenge the present ruler at home and eventually to replace or overthrow him. Exiles organize their activities according to the hope for the “future” and the ultimate aim of “returning back to home.”

With regard to the Tibetan case, it can be suggested that Tibetans correspond to the term “exile” much better than the term “refugee” because of their collective political activism. However, this emphasis on their collective political activism should not be seen as the simplification of the complex nature of Tibetan diaspora and the fractionality of their political

\(^42\) Ibid., 37.
\(^43\) Ibid., 37.
identities. Being aware of this complexity, in this dissertation, the term “exile” will be used to refer the Tibetan elites who hold the political power in exile since the aim of this work is to analyze their nationalist agenda.

**Writing about Tibet: Politics of History Writing**

I wrote this thesis in a time of Tibetan self-immolation protests culminated both inside and outside of Tibet. Most recently, on 27 May 2012, two Tibetans were to set themselves in fire in Lhasa, Tibet’s tightly-controlled administrative capital. Subsequently, in June 2012, the Chinese authorities declared that Tibet is closed to foreign tourists for an indefinite period of time. The latest string of Tibetan self-immolation, as many are arguing, led to the country’s shutdown to the outsiders. Written in such a critical moment and a delicate political context, this thesis does not intend to discuss the validity of the political arguments made by the PRC or the Tibetan exiles. However, as a study of exile politics and exile nationalism, it indeed intends to contribute the scholarly discussions on the Tibetan exile community. In the light of the political nature of the Tibetan history writing and heightened political tensions in this new phase of the Tibetan struggle, I want to clarify several points about this thesis and my own stand as a researcher. Since I strongly believe that the duty of the historian is “to understand” rather than “to judge”, in this thesis, I avoided making moral judgments on the Tibetan exile politics; I have rather tried to examine the Tibetan nationalist discourse articulated by exile elites and to analyze the themes and concepts embedded in this discourse “without being dragged into the trap of ‘sentimental scholarship’ which permeates in Tibetan studies.” Doing so, an important aim of this thesis is to search for a more fruitful approach to the Tibetan studies and to open up new discussions/questions on Tibetan nationalism. In this regard, the arguments and the interpretations presented in this thesis are also open to further criticism and discussions.

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CHAPTER II. THE FIRST DECADE OF EXILE: THE FOUNDATIONAL YEARS

The first decade of exile, more precisely the period from 1959 to 1972, can be regarded as the foundational years for the Tibetan exile community both at a practical and a theoretical level. To put it plainly, during this period, “a collective Tibetan national identity was fostered and the nation building process was initiated”\textsuperscript{46}. The themes and political concepts which had been introduced by exile elites in the first decade of exile provided the conceptual bedrock for the mainstream Tibetan political discourse and played an important role in the development of Tibetan nationalism in exile. Tibetan genocidal claims, the theme of “returning to the homeland”, the emphasis on the cultural affinity and the historical ties between India and Tibet, the establishment of modern educational institutions, and the introduction of democracy as an ideal political system are examples of these foundational concepts and practices. Discussing these foundational concepts and practices, this chapter intends to outline the first decade of exile. However, to be able to acknowledge the dynamics of the first decade of exile, it is essential to have general knowledge about the historical background of the Tibetan case. Therefore, this chapter will begin by summarizing the political and historical events that resulted in the 14\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama’s flight to India.

**Historical Background\textsuperscript{47}: What is the Tibetan case?**

The political status of Tibet prior to 1951 has been the subject of many scholarly discussions. Whether or not Tibet\textsuperscript{48} was an independent country before the PRC’s takeover, is not an easy question to answer. Throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, both China and the British colonial administration in India had exercised control over Tibetan territory. With the official collapse of Manchu Empire which overran Tibet since 18\textsuperscript{th} century, the nominal Manchu authority over


\textsuperscript{48} What the term ‘Tibet’ referred to prior to 1951 has been the subject of another academic discussion. Hugh Richardson, the British diplomat who served in Lhasa as an official for the colonial Indian government in 1930’s and 1940’s suggests two terms to explain what Tibet means; the political Tibet and ethnographic Tibet. According to Richardson, “the political Tibet refers to the Central Tibet under the direct control of the institution of Dalai Lama, which was ruled by the Tibetan government from the earliest times down to 1951.” The region beyond that to the north and east (Amdo and Kham) is its “ethnographic” extension which people of Tibetan race once inhabited exclusively. In that wider area, local lay or monastic chiefs were in control of districts of varying size.” See: Melvyn C. Goldstein, *The Snow Lion and The Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama* (California: University of California Press, 1997), xi.
Tibet had ended in 1911. According to Shakya, from 1913 onwards, the Tibetans regarded themselves as independent of China but the successive Chinese regimes never accepted this, nor was Tibet able to obtain de jure recognition for her independent status. In spite of the lack of any clear-cut consensus among Tibet scholars, both Goldstein and Shakya affirm that until the eve of the Chinese invasion in October 1950, the Tibetan Government exercised internal and external freedom, which clearly demonstrated the country’s independence. Therefore, the period between 1911 and 1950 is frequently referred as the span of Tibet’s de facto not de jure independence.

On October 1949, after a victory by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the Chinese civil war, Chairman Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on Tiananmen Square. Having come to power, the Communists stated that one of the tasks for People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was the liberation of Tibet. The first military skirmish between Tibetan troops and the PLA took place at the end of May 1950, when a group of fifty PLA attacked Dengo, a small town situated on the bank of the Drichu, ninety miles from Chamdo. Although they captured Dengo and confiscated all Dengo’s communication equipment, there were no further attacks until October. The new attacks came from three directions and the main aim was to capture Chamdo to prevent the Tibetan troops from retreating to Lhasa. On 19 October, Ngabo, the governor of Kham, sent two messengers to inform the Chinese that he would surrender. The military action clearly demonstrated the Chinese military strength to the Tibetan government. Instead of marching straight on to Lhasa, the Chinese first attempted to persuade the Tibetan government that a negotiation settlement could be reached.

51 In 1913 and 1914, with the intervention of Great Britain, the new Chinese Republican Government was pressured to participate in a conference with itself and Tibet in Simla, India. The Simla negotiations produced a draft convention in 1914. The final draft of the Simla Convention therefore declared that Tibet would be autonomous from China, but also acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Although China did not agree to the convention at the end, it set the background for the Tibet Question during the next four decades. See: Goldstein, *The Snow Lion*, 30-36.
52 The Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, Zhu De, in a speech to the Chinese Peoples’ Political Consultative Conference on 24 September 1949, said: ‘the Common Programme demanded the waging of the revolutionary war to the very end and the liberation of all the territory of China, including Formosa, the Pescadores, Hainan Island and Tibet’. Shakya, *The Dragon*, 3.
53 Ibid., 38-45.
The Tibetan government first attempted to seek international support and instructed Shakabpa\textsuperscript{54} to make an appeal to the United Nations. However neither India and Britain nor the U.S. were prepared to take the initiative in placing Tibet’s appeal on the UN agenda. Although El Salvadorian delegation requested “the invasion of Tibet by foreign forces” to be included in the agenda for the General Assembly, however, the Korean issue took over the UN’s agenda and the subsequent debate on Tibet was adjourned without a decision.\textsuperscript{55}

This lack of support in the international arena forced the Tibetan Government to proceed with the negotiations with the Chinese. The negotiations between the Tibetan and the Chinese delegation started on 29 April 1951 at an army headquarters in Beijing. On 23 May, the final copy of the agreement entitled “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures of the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” which is also known as “17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” was signed by the delegates.\textsuperscript{56} Signing the agreement was later considered invalid by Tibetan exile community, as having been unwillingly signed under duress. The 14\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama also stated that the Tibetan delegation was not authorized by Lhasa to sign it.\textsuperscript{57} It should be kept in mind that all these statements were made later on in exile. At the time, there was no immediate reaction by the Lhasa government to repudiate the agreement although they were alarmed by the terms of the agreement.\textsuperscript{58} Finally, after protracted discussions, on 20 October 1951, a year and thirteen days after the Chinese invasion of Chamdo, a letter of acceptance of the 17-Point Agreement was drafted by the Lhasa government.\textsuperscript{59} The \textit{de facto} independence that Tibet had enjoyed since 1911 had ended; Tibet officially became part of the PRC.

\textsuperscript{54} Shakabpa was a Tibetan nobleman who was appointed Minister of Finance in 1939. Because of his previous travel experiences to China, India, England, USA, Italy, France and Switzerland as head of a Tibetan Trade Mission, he was later appointed to serve as chief negotiators with the Chinese.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 52-61.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 65-69. For the entire document, see Appendix 1.
\textsuperscript{57} The 14\textsuperscript{th} Dalai Lama describes his initial reactions in his first autobiography: “Neither I nor my government were told that an agreement had been signed. We first came to know of it from a broadcast which Ngabo made on Peking Radio. It was a terrible shock when we heard the terms of it. We were appalled at the mixture of Communist clichés, vainglorious assertions which were completely false and bold statements which were only partly true and the terms were worse and more oppressive than anything we had imagined.” See: His Holiness the Dalai Lama, \textit{My Land and My People} (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), 81.
\textsuperscript{58} Shakya, \textit{The Dragon}, 71.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 89.
According to Shakya, when they first arrived in Tibet the Chinese officials followed the policy to win over the upper classes as ordered by Mao Zedong. By the end of 1951, with the arrival of thousands of PLA troops, the population of Lhasa and surrounding areas had doubled. The logistics of accommodating and supplying provisions was the biggest problem which caused an enormous burden on Tibet’s traditional subsistence economy. The rising price of food and the acquirement of land by the Chinese caused a great deal of resentment from the Tibetan peasantry who suffered most from the severe strain on Tibet’s fragile economy. While the Tibetan peasantry was carrying the economic burden of the influx of Chinese, aristocrats and traders were enjoying new business opportunities; they sold land, food, fuel and construction materials to Chinese at exorbitant prices.  

The Chinese first dismissed the two acting Prime Ministers of Tibet who were known as opponents to the Communist rule and 17-Point Agreement. Secondly, they successfully suppressed an anti-Chinese organization calling itself People’s Representatives. They also successfully manipulated the antagonistic relationship between the Lhasa government and the Panchen Lama. By the end of 1954, the Dalai Lama and the entire Tibetan hierarchy were invited to Beijing. This visit of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan officials to China provided the latter with the international recognition of the Chinese claims on Tibet. This earlier period of Chinese administration in Tibet, Shakya asserts, was the period when the relationship between the Chinese and Tibetans was at its best. However, this friendly atmosphere did not last long.

The situation in the Kham and Amdo region of Tibet (see map 2) which was inhabited by ethnic Tibetans was rather different than Lhasa. Since these areas traditionally were not under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa government, the Chinese immediately implemented communist reforms such as redistribution of land and the classification of people into different class groups.

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60 Shakya, Dragon, 93-95.
61 Ibid., 96-111.
62 Ibid., 113-118. Panchen Lama is the highest ranking Lama after the Dalai Lama and traditionally lived in Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. He was traditionally responsible for the administration of the region. However, due to the conflict occurring between the 13th Dalai Lama and 9th Panchen Lama, the 9th Panchen Lama fled to inner Mongolia, China and died in the Qinghai Province of China. After his death, his successor 10th Panchen Lama was also born in China and selected by 9th Panchen Lama’s officials. Since he is considered pro-Chinese by the Lhasa government, he was not allowed to enter Tibet prior to 28 April 1952. On 28 April, the 10th Panchen Rinpoche, escorted by over 1000 Chinese troops, entered Lhasa from exile.
63 The photos of Dalai Lama, Panchen Lama and Mao Zedong were distributed all over the world.
64 Shakya, Dragon, 113-118.
The first confrontation over Chinese reforms in Kham and Amdo took place towards the end of 1954. The subsequent fighting between Khampas and the Chinese ended with the destruction of two important monasteries where the rebels were deployed.65

This led to the flows of refugees from Kham to Lhasa. The news brought by refugees of the destruction of monasteries and the deaths of hundreds of monks created a panic atmosphere among the Central Tibetans.66 By the end of March 1956, the revolt in eastern Tibet was spreading into Central Tibet.67 The political situation had become more complicated with the Dalai Lama’s visit to India on November 1956. Since they were concerned that he might seek asylum in India, the Chinese reluctantly allowed him to go to India for the 2500th anniversary of Buddha’s birth.68 During his visit in India, the Dalai Lama contacted the Tibetan émigré community in India that requested him to stay in India and to repudiate the 17-point agreement.70 Despite the fact that the Dalai Lama intended to remain in India, Zhou Enlai who was sent by Mao Zedong to urge the Dalai Lama to return Tibet managed to persuade him by promising to slowdown the reforms.71 At the same time, when the Dalai Lama was in India, a growing number of refugees from Kham and Amdo arrived in central Tibet. By late 1958, with the establishment of the pan-Khampa resistance movement called “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” Khampa resistance turned to the nationwide rebellion.72 The clandestine support from America and the CIA involvement changed the course of the resistance. The CIA trained six Khampa guerillas and provided the rest of the guerillas with modern ammunition and automatic rifles.73 News of success of Khampa attacks on Chinese garrisons shifted people’s sympathies towards the Khampas and by the beginning of 1959, a sizeable number of people from Central Tibet had joined the Four Rivers, Six Ranges.74

65 Shakya, Dragon, 131-141.
66 Ibid., 141.
67 Ibid., 147.
68 Ibid., 149.
69 By that time, a considerable number of people already left Tibet for India to seek asylum. This émigré community which located in Kalimpong, was composed of many influential people including the 14th Dalai Lama’s family members, two ex-presidents who were dismissed by Tibetans and wealthy landlords.
70 Ibid., 148-153.
71 Ibid., 153-162.
72 Ibid., 166-167.
73 Ibid., 170-184.
74 Ibid., 179.
On 7 March 1959, as it had been planned earlier, the Dalai Lama agreed to attend the dance show in the PLA headquarters three days later. Many Tibetan officials who were surprised by this announcement suspected that the Chinese would abduct the Dalai Lama. With the quick spread of the rumor in Lhasa, on the morning of 10 March, a stream of people headed towards the summer palace of the Dalai Lama, Norbulingka, demanding to see him.\(^{75}\)

On 13 March, the crowd denounced the 17-Point Agreement, saying that the Chinese had betrayed the agreement by undermining the authority of the Dalai Lama. For nearly a week, the Chinese did not take any action to regain the control of the city and there was no sign that the uprising would fizzle out. On the morning of 17 March, two shells landed near the Norbulingka and that evening, the Dalai Lama (dressed in the traditional gown of a layman) and his entourage headed out of Lhasa. The Dalai Lama’s escape route was not accessible to vehicles and laid in an area under the control of Khampa resistance fighters, so it was fairly free of PLA incursions. The Dalai Lama’s party proceeded southward towards Lhuntse Dzong, sixty miles from the Indian border, where the Dalai Lama and the Lhasa government issued a proclamation setting up the new temporary Government of Tibet. When the rumors that the Chinese army was marching towards Lhuntse Dzong reached the area, the Dalai Lama had to admit that they could not remain in Tibetan territory. On 30 March 1959, the Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual leader of Tibet, crossed the border and went into exile in India.\(^{76}\)

**First Exiles and the Role of Newly Founded Central Tibetan Administration**

Tsering Shakya notes that following the news of the Dalai Lama’s escape to India which was broadcasted on All India Radio, between April and May 1959 more than 7,000 Tibetans entered India and sought asylum.\(^{77}\) Although there are no detailed demographic data about the first wave of exiles, it is possible to make some assumptions about the demographic characteristics of this first group based on the population census and the demographic survey conducted by the Central Tibetan Administration in 1998. (Table1) According to table 1, the sex ratio among those aged 55 to 74 heavily favored males, a strong indication that men far outnumbered women among the

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\(^{75}\) Shakya, *Dragon*, 188-195.  
\(^{76}\) Ibid., 197-207.  
\(^{77}\) Ibid., 207.
first wave of refugees. This data also reaffirms Shakya’s argument that after the Dalai Lama’s flight, many Tibetan soldiers and Khampa fighters were surrendering their weapons at the border and wanted to settle in India. It is also difficult to determine the socio-economic composition of the first exiles. On one hand, existing data indicates that most of the first exiles were the influential political and religious leaders who followed the Dalai Lama. On the other hand, the CTA even specified that approximately 60 per cent of the Tibetans at this time had been either farmers or pastoral peasants. The Indian Government’s (the GOI) rehabilitation and resettlement projects which demonstrate that many Tibetan peasants and nomads also arrived in India at the beginning of 1960s also affirms the CTA’s statement. In the first couple of years in exile, those peasants and nomads who were first recruited as road construction workers in Northern India were later settled in southern India by the GOI.

According to Roemer, during the time of Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) the numbers of newcomers in exile was constant but relatively small compared with the initial years because of the restrictive politics of the PRC. Therefore, based on these data, it can be asserted that the first exile group who arrived in India between 1959 and 1976 were dominantly composed of the members of the dismissed Lhasa Government and their families as well as Tibetan peasants. They were an ethnically and socio-economically diverse, male dominant group.

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83 In this case, ethnically diverse indicates the differences between eastern Tibetans, Khampas and Amdowas, and the Central Tibetans.
Table 1: Population of Tibetan Exiles by Age and Sex, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age</th>
<th>males</th>
<th>females</th>
<th>sex ratio (males/100 females)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>2,649</td>
<td>2,511</td>
<td>105.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>103.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>115.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>5,517</td>
<td>120.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>6,032</td>
<td>3,939</td>
<td>153.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>5,940</td>
<td>3,741</td>
<td>158.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>3,422</td>
<td>2,483</td>
<td>137.8</td>
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<td>35-39</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>107.9</td>
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<td>40-44</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>1,750</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>1,484</td>
<td>134.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>2,615</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>2,247</td>
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<tr>
<td>85+</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>151</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50,937</td>
<td>40,417</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1998 TDS8a

As mentioned earlier, before the Dalai Lama’s flight, there was a small émigré community in Kalimpong, Darjeeling. Most of the member of this community were aristocrats and dismissed political leaders including two ex-prime ministers who had left Tibet in the 1950s with their portable property. Once in exile, they organize themselves into the Tibetan Welfare Association (TWA) which carried out the first Tibetan political activities from an exile base between 1954

8a Childs, *Tibetan Transitions*, 155.
and 1959. Focusing the struggle against the Chinese invasion, The TWA’s organizations can be classified as: (1) lobbying with the international community with petitions based on the information obtained from inside Tibet. (2) organizing demonstrations in Northern India (3) having contact with the USA, who were clandestinely operating inside Tibet by supporting the eastern Tibetan guerilla forces. In spite of its remarkable political activities, some historians claim that conflicts between TWA members weakened the organizational structure and Tibetan aristocrats were accused of not being dedicated enough to the struggle for a free Tibet. With the effects of such criticism and the arrival of the Dalai Lama, the TWA disappeared from the political stage and it was replaced by the CTA in 1959. Approximately a month after his arrival in India, on 25 April 1959, the Dalai Lama called an emergency meeting of the few senior Tibetan officials who had accompanied him from Tibet, and those who had arrived earlier in India(aristocratic members of the dissolving TWA) to discuss the situation and plan for the reconstruction in exile. The meeting identified a few areas of concentration: rehabilitation of the Tibetan refugees, education of the Tibetan children, preservation of Tibetan culture and identity, gathering and disseminating information regarding Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet, pursuing the Tibetan question at the United Nations, and preserving and promoting unity among the Tibetan refugee community. Soon after the meeting, on 29 April 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama officially proclaimed the CTA and he (re)established the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, in Mussoorie, Uttarakhand, the hill station in the Northern India with the twin task of guiding the Tibetan struggle for national-self rule and rehabilitating Tibetan refugees. In 1960, the headquarters of the CTA was shifted on the initiative of the Government of India (GOI) from Mussoorie to Dharamsala, the former British hill station in Himachal Pradesh. The Dalai Lama first set up four main departments; (1) the Department of Education(established in 1960) (2) the Home Department(established in 1959) which is responsible for all the rehabilitation schemes for Tibetans in exile (3) the Department of Religion and Culture(established in 1959) which is responsible for supervising works aimed at reviving, preserving and promotion of Tibetan religious and cultural heritage (4) the Department of Security which is primarily responsible for

85 Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 63.
86 Ibid., 63.
87 Ibid., 63. See also Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1967).
89 Ibid.,134.
the Dalai Lama’s security and until the establishment of the Department of Finance in 1966 was also responsible for financial affairs. Since it came into existence, the CTA has played a very influential role in the establishment and the administration of the Tibetan settlements in India. These settlements had been established by the initiatives of the GOI with the cooperation of the CTA. The earlier policies of the GOI toward the CTA can be considered to express a *laissez faire* attitude; despite of the fact that the GOI never recognized the CTA as the Tibetan Government, it accepted the CTA’s collaboration and its *de facto* authority on the Tibetans who live in these settlements. Although the GOI adopted a very liberal attitude toward the administration of Tibetans, it should also be noted that the GOI refused to settle all Tibetans in one area in North India as the CTA had suggested. Whatever restrictions and limitations the CTA met at this earlier stage of the exile; it had successfully constructed a centralized administration and dominated over the Tibetans through its officials appointed by the center.

**The Foundational Concepts in the Making of Tibetan Political Discourse**

The three main themes which have been widely articulated and adopted into the exile Tibetan political discourse came into being during the first years of the exile;(1) the genocide threat, (2) the theme of “returning back to homeland” and (3) the cultural affinity and the historical ties between India and Tibet as a counter argument to the Chinese claims over Tibet. All three themes occurred simultaneously with regard to the contemporary political situation in Tibet and they all can be associated with the nation building process that was initiated in exile. The perception of Tibet as a ‘lost homeland’ under the Chinese occupation had an immense impact on Tibetan life in exile. Through the strong emphasis on the notion of a ‘future free Tibet’ as a main goal of exile life, the ruling elites had succeeded to instill the sense of responsibility in the exile population. Furthermore, as a part of the nation-building process, the Tibetan political elites needed to build a sense of national unity with common origins and a shared history. To achieve this, the historical and cultural ties between India and Tibet were stressed while the hostile Chinese other was often depicted as a perpetrator of Tibetan genocide. In the following section, these three foundational themes will be examined in detail.

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Since the very beginning of the exile years, the Dalai Lama and the CTA as well as other educated elites of the exile community have continually stated that the Tibetans were threatened by “genocide” in their homeland. Correspondingly, the Tibetan population in Tibet has often been portrayed as “the population in danger”. The discourse on genocide has been one of the strongest ideological weapons of the CTA not only to govern the exile population but also to influence the western public. The influence of the discourse of genocide on the western public was already proven by two reports of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) published in 1959 and 1960. This commission charged China with genocide in Tibet, based on Tibetan religious belief.\(^2\) When the contemporary global political situation was taken into consideration, the instrumentality of the discourse on Tibetan genocide can be better understood. In 1960s, the word ‘genocide’ was globally associated with the atrocities of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust which were still fresh in the memories of millions of people. There was no doubt that the genocidal claims would attract the attention of the western public, foreign NGO’s and the political activists to the Tibetan issue. Furthermore, in the cold war atmosphere, a bad image of Communist China would be a useful means of propaganda for the non-communist bloc. However, the discourse on genocide cannot be seen as merely strategic maneuver to recruit foreign supporters for Tibetan cause. Through the discourse on genocide, the CTA and the exile political cadre obtained the loyalty and the consent of the exile population. The emphasis on the urgency of the situation in the homeland had granted the CTA full governing authority despite the fact that it did not have any coercive power of territorially defined nation states such as military or judicial power.

One of the first articulations of this discourse on genocide can be seen in the Dalai Lama’s alarming Press Statement of June 20, 1959 which spoke about the “danger of near annihilation” and “terrible deportation and execution of innocent men”.\(^3\) He made a similar statement on the second anniversary of Tibetan National Uprising Day on 10 March 1961. Referring to the reports of the International Commission of Jurists, he said that:

During my research on *Tibetan Review*, I have come across several articles and reports which repeatedly mentioned the genocide threat. For instance, according to the article “Tibet Today: A Nation in chains” by Sonam Wangdi, situation in Tibet was depicted as such:

> The Chinese have been consistently engaged in the extinction of everything—culture, art, religion, education and even the physical basis of racial identity of the Tibetan people. [...] The refugees also say that almost all the monks and educated people have been killed or tortured to death. [...] No facet of Tibetan life has escaped the ruthless attacks by the Chinese in their campaign of “hanization” of the Tibetan people. [...] In short it can be said that no other people in the world have subjected to such a systematic extermination of a nation and its culture since the “New Order” of Hitler’s third Reich.

The strong and alarming tone of the article can be easily recognized. The words chosen to define the situation in Tibet; “extinction”, “systematic extermination” and the comparison of the Tibetan case with the Holocaust clearly implies the acts of “genocide” although the word “genocide” itself was not mentioned explicitly.

In his article, T.N. Nakla, one of the contributors of *Tibetan Review* uses the word “genocide” referring to the International Commission of Jurists’ reports documented in 1960. He writes, “Act of genocide has been committed in Tibet.” He also compares the Chinese aggression in Tibet with the “the policy of apartheid” and continues, “Tibetan people are subjected to even greater brutality and suppression than their suffering brethren in Africa.”

Another example can be given from the quote of the Dalai Lama’s speech in the opening ceremony of the Higher Tibetan Studies. This passage clearly shows how the sense of responsibility had been instilled in exile community referring to the discourse on genocide:

> His Holiness declared that today in Tibet, the Buddhist Culture of Tibet can “neither be seen nor heard” and that the Chinese were carrying on a ruthless drive to uproot all traces of the indigenous Tibetan civilization.

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97 Ibid., 3.
In the face of this critical situation, His Holiness remarked that it was the imperative duty of all Tibetans to preserve their ancient cultural heritage.\textsuperscript{98}

As was mentioned earlier, the discourse on genocide had been highly instrumental in controlling and regulating the exile population. Anthropologist Goldstein, who conducted fieldwork\textsuperscript{99} in one of the earlier settlements of Tibetan exiles in Mysore, South India during the late 1960’s, draws a clear picture of how the discourse on genocide functioned to promote ethnic endogamy and pronatalism. During his fieldwork, he observed that ‘endogamy was vigorously encouraged by the local Tibetan administration; it was portrayed as absolutely fundamental to the preservation of the Tibetan race, a race endangered by the actions of Communists in Tibet.’\textsuperscript{100} Similarly, he shows how pronatalism as a nationalistic call to counteract genocide had been promoted by the local administration that vigorously opposed to use of birth control.\textsuperscript{101} This research shows that the discourse on genocide enabled the CTA to advocate pronatalism and the ethnic endogamy as a form of social engineering.

The second most articulated theme which constitutes the mainstream Tibetan political discourse is the theme of “returning to the homeland.” From its earlier days, the exile community operated in the belief that they would be returning to Tibet. There is no doubt that the very definition of the exile politics, in general, includes the ultimate aim of regaining the homeland. Yossi Shain stresses that “exiles are engaged in political activity to create circumstances favorable to their return.”\textsuperscript{102} In this regard, the theme of “returning to the homeland” can be seen as a fundamental component of the exile existence. Correspondingly, the theme of “returning to the homeland” which had procured the necessary ground to produce and to maintain the legitimacy of the policies and the operations of the CTA became an ideological instrument of the exile elites. As steps on the road of return to the homeland, the Dalai Lama and the CTA reminded the imperatives duties of Tibetan exiles; (1) to preserve the Tibetan culture and identity and (2) to be equipped with modern civilization. The relationship between “future free Tibet” and “exile responsibilities” can be detected in the Dalai Lama’s statement on 1968 on the occasion of the 9\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Lhasa Uprisings:

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 414.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 418.
\textsuperscript{102} Roemer, \textit{The Tibetan Government}, 37.
[...] Tibetan children, whom I look upon as the future foundation of a free and independent Tibet, are being provided with the best possible opportunities of development deeply rooted in their own culture, belief and living habits, as well as acquainted with modern civilization, enriched by the greatest achievements of World culture, and thus becoming sound and creative Tibetan citizens, capable of serving our nation and the whole mankind.\textsuperscript{103}

In a similar manner, the governing policies introduced in the exile context had been promoted as the “modernization” of the traditional Tibetan Administration for the future administration of independent Tibet. Thus, modernization without losing Tibetan culture and identity was considered the only way of serving the Tibetan nation.

The third dominant element in the earlier Tibetan political discourse was the emphasis on the cultural affinity between India and Tibet. India has been one of the main determinants in the construction of homogenous Tibetan identity in exile. There is no doubt that the policies of the GOI toward the CTA and the Tibetan exiles had a tremendous effect on the development of Tibetan nationalism in exile. However, the role of India in the construction of Tibetan identity should not be solely reduced to the Indian politics toward Tibetan exiles. Culturally speaking, the historical ties between India and Tibet which were underlined extensively by the Dalai Lama and exile elites provided one of the foundational myths for Tibetan nationalism. The emphasis on the cultural affinity between Tibetans and Indians had become the major alternative narrative to the Chinese one which claimed that Tibet absorbed civilization mainly from China and thereby, that it had been historically part of China.

An article entitled “How Chinese was China’s Tibet Region?” and published in \textit{Tibetan Review} can be given as a very good example of this search for an alternative narrative. The writer of the article Nirmal C. Sinha\textsuperscript{104}, who was a Tibet scholar and also the editor of \textit{Tibetan Review}, intends to disprove the Chinese claims over Tibetan identity by analyzing ‘the constituent contents of civilization (which are)language, religion, polity, arts, literature, legends and history, food and dress, family life and occupational pattern’.\textsuperscript{105} In the language section of

\textsuperscript{103} Tibetan Review, “Statement of his holiness the Dalai Lama on the occasion of the 9\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Lhasa Uprisings on the 10\textsuperscript{th} March, 1959,” \textit{TR} 1, no.3 (March 1968): 9.

\textsuperscript{104} Although he was originally from India, he played an influential role in the development of Tibetan nationalism in exile. He was a founder member of the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology in Sikkim. He had written numerous articles in learned journals on Tibetan history and had contributed to ‘The Voice of Tibet’ which was the predecessor of \textit{Tibetan Review}.

\textsuperscript{105} Nirmal C. Sinha, “How Chinese was China’s Tibet Region,” \textit{Tibetan Review} 1, no.4 (April 1968): 9-10, 12-14.
his analysis, he underlines the fact that “Tibetan script derived from some Indic scripts prevalent in Kashmir”\textsuperscript{106}. He also recalls that Tibetan script is known as “Lhasa Sanskrit”\textsuperscript{107} in Nepal which, according to him, affirms the historical fact that the Tibetan script derived from Sanskrit. In the section on religion, challenging the Chinese version of the story that claims Buddhism came to Tibet from China, he argues that “Tibetan legends preserve vague memories of the first advent of Buddhism from India before the entry of Buddhism from the west [China] into Tibet”\textsuperscript{108}. Concerning the Tibetan art, he describes the relationship between Tibet and India as “mother-daughter relationship; the one [India] gave the life the other [Tibet]”, while he considers Chinese influences on Tibetan art “peripheral”\textsuperscript{109}. In the last section of his analysis, he focuses on the literature and history of Tibet. He asserts that “Asoka (the first Buddhist king of India) became a sort of national hero for Tibet”\textsuperscript{110}. He also stresses that “the Indian science of dialectics flourished in Tibetan Buddhism” and “in Tibetan cosmography, India and Tibet formed one zone.”\textsuperscript{111} What is so remarkable about this article, perhaps, is the selection of the concepts which were defined as “the constituent contents of civilization”. The word “civilization” here can be seen as an equivalent of the word ‘nation’ since all these themes are conventionally referred as the unifying elements of a nation; common language, culture, history and even religion. Is it then possible to argue that the search of the affinity between India and Tibet was a part of Tibetan nation building process? This question can be answered yes in a certain extent. It is clear that the emphasis on the Indic elements in Tibetan culture was highly important to challenge the Chinese argumentation. Nevertheless, it should also be kept in mind that an important component of Tibetan nation building process was the belief in national “superiority”. This feeling of superiority, the sense of pride in Tibetan language, custom, religious institutions, “modernized” government, and of course, in His Holiness, the Dalai Lama have been instilled through the modernized national education. It may indeed be useful at this point to analyze the development of Tibetan education.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 10. He emphasizes ‘Lhasa Sanskrit’, writing it with capital letters.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 14.
Creating a “Modern Tibetan Nation”: The Establishment of Modern Schools

One of the major institutional forms, and perhaps the most effective one, through which the “imagined community”\textsuperscript{112} came to acquire concrete-shape is the school education. The schools are the places where the national history, national language and national symbols are systematically taught. Thus, it is not surprising that from the earlier days of exile, both the Dalai Lama and the CTA have given special attention to the issue of education. Jetsun Pema, sister of the Dalai Lama, mentions in her autobiography that in the beginning of 1960s, the Dalai Lama was very preoccupied with the issue of the education of Tibetan Children:

His Holiness attached a great deal of importance to education and liked to remind his officials of a meeting with Nehru\textsuperscript{113} when the latter had said that the provision of education was Tibet’s hope for future.\textsuperscript{114}

The Dalai Lama also remarks in his memoirs:

We have to do something drastic to preserve their [Tibetan Children] health-and their education was also a matter of paramount importance.\textsuperscript{115}

With these motivations, the Dalai Lama and the CTA immediately took the lead in mobilizing national efforts to start schools in the settlements dispersed all over India. The first school in India was established Mussoorie on 3 March 1960 with a batch of 50 selected adolescent students and four Tibetan teachers.\textsuperscript{116} The following year the Department of education was established under the CTA and two more schools were opened in Simla and Darjeeling. By 1961, there were 800 students enrolled in these three Tibetan schools.\textsuperscript{117} In the same year, with the financial support of the GOI, ‘The Tibetan Schools Society’\textsuperscript{118} which took over the

\textsuperscript{112} See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London ; Verso, 2006).
\textsuperscript{113} In his article, George Dreyfus argues that Nehru and less famous figures in Indian politics were significant for the Dalai Lama’s formation (intellectual and political). This is because, through their versions of modernism, they showed him how one could be a religious person and yet be a full participant in the modern world. According to Dreyfus, it is in large part as a result of contact with these men that the Dalai Lama have developed his own Buddhist modernism as a position adapted to modernity and yet in agreement with his traditional background. See: George Dreyfus, “Are We Prisoners of Shangrila?: Orientalism, Nationalism and the Study of Tibet,” Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, no. 1 (October 2005), 7.
\textsuperscript{114} Jetsun Pema and Gilles van Grasdorff, Tibet: My Story (Shaftesbury: Element Books, 1997), 73.
\textsuperscript{115} His Holiness the Dalai Lama, My Land.
\textsuperscript{117} “The Tibetan Schools Society: The story of the Education of Tibetan Refugee Children in India,” Tibetan Review 1, no.9 (September 1968): 8.
\textsuperscript{118} The Tibetan Schools Society was established by the initiative of the CTA and the GOI. In 1961, Indian Ministry of Education set up an autonomous body to establish and administer schools for the children of Tibetan Refugees.
management of three former schools was set up. By 1967, the total enrolment for the seven Tibetan schools was almost 6,000 students.\textsuperscript{119}

According to Tsepak Rigzin, there were two main objectives of establishing Tibetan schools in exile: 1) to impart modern education to Tibetan children so that they are fully equipped to face the challenges of the modern world and to reconstruct Tibet’s future, and (2) to enable Tibetan children to preserve Tibet’s rich cultural heritage, religion and identity.\textsuperscript{120}

Another report published in \textit{Tibetan Review} on the development of the Tibetan Schools Society explains the general principle followed in framing the educational system:

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\ldots\text{Students should be given a modern education so that the foundations could be laid for the training of future engineers, doctors, nurses, lawyers and other professions. Even in the teaching of traditional subjects such as Tibetan language and literature, efforts were made to incorporate modern methods and special text books were written by a committee of Tibetan experts under the direction of the Council for Tibetan Education.}\textsuperscript{121}
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It is possible to recognize the familiar discursive theme- the notion of “future free Tibet” - both in previous quotations from the Dalai Lama and his sister, Jetsun Pema, as well as the following statements on the objectives of the Tibetan education. There is no need to discuss much about the formative power of this discourse of “future free Tibet” on Tibetan educational policies since this point was already clarified. What it is really interesting about these quotations and is the explicit articulation of the goal toward nationalist modernization. The perception of “the modern education as a requirement to face the challenges of the modern world” together with the emphasis on “the preservation Tibet’s culture, religion and identity” clearly show how modern education was seen as a main instrument by exile elites to modernize Tibetans and to create a modern Tibetan nation. One of the first outcomes of these nationalistic aspirations which came into existence through education was the standardization of the Tibetan language.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{120} Rigzin, \textit{The Tibetan Schools}, 269.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 8.
In his seminal book, *Seeing like a State*, anthropologist James C. Scott correctly argues that “the imposition of a single, official language may be the most powerful of all state simplifications.” According to him, the implicit logic of the move was to define a hierarchy of identities, relegating local languages and their regional cultures to, at best, a quaint provincialism. The imposition of “Lhasa Dialect” as an official language on the Tibetan exiles—who came to India from widely separate regions in Tibet where they spoke mutually unintelligible dialects, operated under different sociopolitical systems, and were traditionally hostile—was also such an attempt of standardization. The newly established Tibetan schools provided the space where the Tibetan language was officialized and standardized. The notable success of the Tibetan campaign of linguistic centralization was observed by Goldstein:

Lhasa Tibetan has come to be used as a *lingua franca* in the camp.[…] The school system does a truly excellent job of teaching literary Tibetan [Lhasa version] to the refugee youth on a high level of proficiency. For the older refugees there are night schools that teach enough so that a person can read a newspaper.

The Tibetan schools were (and are) also the places where the Tibetan children learned their national symbols such as the “Tibetan national anthem”. In this sense, as Goldstein notes, ‘a new national anthem which was sung daily in the schools played an important role in mobilizing national sentiments.’ The creation of a new Tibetan national anthem was a perfect example of an invented tradition, and it deserves to be mentioned here. The concept of “invented traditions” which was introduced by historian Eric Hobsbawm refers to “set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual and symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms, which automatically imply continuity with the past”. Written in exile and modeled after traditional religious prayers, the Tibetan national anthem is “emotionally and symbolically charged sign of Tibetan group membership.” Following

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123 Ibid., 73.
125 Ibid., 403.
126 Ibid., 411.
Hobsbawm’s thinking, it can be said that it inculcated “patriotism”, “loyalty” and “duty” in Tibetans.”

Tibetan National Anthem

Let the radiant light shine of Buddha’s wish-fulfilling gem teachings,  
the treasure chest of all hopes for happiness and benefit in both secular life and liberation.  
O Protectors who hold the jewel of the teachings and all beings,  
nourishing them greatly, may the sum of your karmas grow full.  
Firmly enduring in a diamond-hard state, guard all directions with Compassion and love.  
Above our heads may divinely appointed rule abide endowed with a hundred benefits and let the power increase of fourfold auspiciousness,  
May a new golden age of happiness and bliss spread throughout the three provinces of Tibet and the glory expand of religious-secular rule.  
By the spread of Buddha’s teachings in the ten directions,  
may everyone throughout the world enjoy the glories of happiness and peace.  
In the battle against negative forces may the auspicious sunshine of the teachings and beings of Tibet and the brilliance of a myriad radiant prosperities be ever triumphant.

Although the anthem has clear religious connotation and it is written in the form of a traditional Buddhist prayer, it is also possible to distinguish political motives embedded in it, as when the anthem refers to “battle against negative forces”. Another striking reference is “the religious-secular” rule which indeed sounds paradoxical. I believe that the idea of “religious-secular rule” which I think the best summary of modern Tibetan political views in that refers to the Tibetan democratization process. This is indeed right juncture to move to an analysis of the process of democratization in the Tibetan community.

The Process of Democratization

Even prior to my departure from Tibet in March 1959, I had come to the conclusion that in the changing circumstances of the modern world, the system of governance in Tibet must be modified and amended so as to allow the elected representatives of the people to play a more effective role in guiding and shaping the social and economic policies of the

State. I also firmly believed that this could only be done through democratic institutions based on social and economic justice.

The Dalai Lama of Tibet

The impetus for democratization in the Tibetan community in exile came from above on the initiative of the Dalai Lama. In February 1960, at Bodh Gaya (Bihar, India) the Dalai Lama outlined a detailed program designed to introduce the exile Tibetans to the practice of democracy. He advised them to set up an elected body with three exile representatives each from the three provinces (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) and one from each of the four religious schools of Tibetan Buddhism (Gelug, Sakya, Kagyu and Nyingma). Elections were held and the first elected representative body in Tibetan’s history “The Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies (CTPD)” took oath on 2 September 1960. Eventually, on 10 March 1963, the Dalai Lama promulgated the first Tibetan exile constitution consisting of 10 chapters and 77 articles. This provisional constitution included international human rights instruments, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Fundamental Principles of the Law of the Land.

In this earlier stage, the Tibetan concept of democracy, however, was radically different from that of the West. The crucial political role of the institution of the Dalai Lama played in the process of Tibetan democratization marks this fundamental difference. In Tibetan belief system, the divine authority of the Dalai Lama is inherited through reincarnation; he cannot be elected. His position in the government is therefore seen as the major challenge to the Tibetan democratization process. Being aware of this challenge, the Dalai Lama addresses the issue of his authority and expressed his future aspiration to move toward secular democracy:

His Holiness has remarked, the total commitment to democratic ideals as set forth in the future Constitution for Tibet stipulates that only the sovereign will of the people can decide the future political system, including the political powers and prerogatives of the Dalai Lama.

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131 His Holiness the Dalai Lama, *Constitution of Tibet* (Delhi: Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1963).
132 Ibid.
Why then was it one of the first exile political actions of the Dalai Lama to initiate the process of democratization? Two interrelated answers can be given to this question. Firstly, it can be suggested that the Dalai Lama considered democratization a necessary step be taken if his government is to be recognized as legitimate by the foreign powers. Secondly, it can be argued that the efforts of the Dalai Lama to democratize the Tibetan exile polity was directed at an international audience with an aim to emphasize the progressive nature of the contemporary polity compared with both old Tibet and modern China. Alternatively, the Tibetan democratization attempts can be seen as a part of the larger process of Tibetan modernization (in-exile). To a certain extent, all of these possible answers are convincing. There is no doubt that the process of democratization was an important tool for Tibetans to use against the Chinese government. As an ideal role model for the future administration of free Tibet, the process of democratization both challenged the contemporary authoritarian Chinese rule in Tibet and the feudal administration of ‘old Tibet’. It is also true that Tibetan claims to democratic governance attracted international sympathy for the Tibetan political cause. Without denying the international importance of the democratization process, I will instead focus on the relationship between Tibetan modernization process and the appropriation of democracy as an ideal political system. As George Dreyfus correctly asserts, “what is usually neglected is the degree to which the early years spent in India were formative to the Dalai Lama’s stance toward modernity and modern political culture.” In particular, the experience of the exile and the encounter with Indian democracy were important in developing the commitment to human rights and democratic values expressed in the democratic constitution promulgated by the Dalai Lama.

I will also claim that the internal use of the concept had played a remarkable role in the development of Tibetan nationalism. The discourse of democracy -and the practice of democracy- allowed the sophisticated articulation of national identity among Tibetan exiles. Through the democratization process the CTA sought to be the representative body of all Tibetans. The inclusion of the traditionally excluded regions (Kham and Amdo) to the exile parliament created a new sense of national identity. Hereby, the Tibetan democratization process

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136 Ardley, *Learning the art*, 357.
137 Georges Dreyfus, *Are We Prisoners*, 7.
138 Ibid., 14.
which ensures ‘unity-in-diversity’ should be seen as one of the constituent elements that shaped Tibetan nationalism.

**Conclusion**

It is therefore clear that in the first years of the exile, both the Dalai Lama and the political elites of the Tibetan exile community found themselves in the critical position of being compelled to take immediate actions to rebuild the Tibetan community-in-exile. Throughout this chapter, I have focused on the crucial elements of this earlier stage of the Tibetan nation building process.

In this regard, I have stressed that the themes and the concepts that shaped Tibetan political discourse in this earlier stage of exile, instilled “the sense of national responsibility” in the Tibetan exile community. Furthermore, I have discussed the two institutional changes which occurred in this period; the development of modern education and the democratization process. My analysis shows that the primary objective of these political practices was to modernize the Tibetan exiles. In this formative age, the Dalai Lama’s and the Tibetan elite’s encounters with the Indian politicians, their interactions with Indian democracy and modernity experiences were indeed very influential on Tibetan modernization. The next chapter which will focus on the period from 1972 to 1989 will analyze the changes that came about in the process of Tibetan modernization and nation-building.

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139 Ardley, *Learning the art*, 353.
CHAPTER III. A RELIGIOUS TURN? TIBETAN NATIONALIST DISCOURSE AND EXILE POLITICS FROM 1972 TO 1989

During the period from 1972 to 1989, several important structural and discursive changes occurred in the Tibetan exile politics. One of the most important of these changes which can also be considered as the first important shift in the Tibetan political discourse was the appropriation of Gandhian principles of “nonviolence” by the Dalai Lama. Since 1974, the Dalai Lama has waged a nonviolent political campaign which eventually brought him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. The decade of the 1970s also witnessed several political discussions on the Tibetan regional/sectarian differences and the issue of citizenship. Furthermore, during the mid-1980s, “environmentalism” was integrated in the mainstream Tibetan political discourse and the CTA began to promote Tibetan culture and religion as “Green”. These discursive shifts also influenced the political practices. The CTA reconfigured its initial departments, developed new governing policies such as an identification regime and a taxation system (Green Book/Chatrel) and put them into practice. I will claim that through these discursive changes, the Tibetan political discourse gained a more religious character in the mid-1970s as compared to the previous period. Considering this “religionization” as an important strategic maneuver of the exile elites, this chapter will mainly focus on the period from 1972 to 1989 in order to give a detailed analysis of the nature of this shift and its instrumentality for the Tibetan political cause. Before starting to analyze the discourses and practices, I will start by giving a brief outline of the demographic character of the period.

Demographic Character of the Period

As mentioned in the previous chapter, during the time of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the period from 1966 to 1976, only small numbers of Tibetans arrived in India and Nepal. According to Roemer, the restrictive policies of the PRC made the departure difficult for the people who wanted to escape concrete political oppression. My own research on the issues of Tibetan Review also affirms this argument. The newly arrived Tibetans frequently referred to the Chinese

140 Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 60.
restrictions by saying that: “The movements of Tibetans are strictly restricted and exit permits are almost impossible to obtain.”

From 1980 onwards, however, China began granting permission for Tibetans to visit India and Nepal. The opening of Sino-Nepali border in particular resulted in a steady flows of Tibetans who intended to stay temporarily in India and Nepal. Demographer Geoff Childs also argues that “many people took advantage of this opportunity to place their children in boarding schools run by exiles under the justified belief that they would get a better education than was available in Tibet.”

In the late 1980s, renewed political turmoil and demonstrations led to a new growth in Tibetan migrants. This movement of Tibetans during this period is frequently referred to as the second biggest wave of migration. At this time, however, mainly single people were leaving Tibet, rather than whole families. According to the CTA data, 18,667 Tibetans entered in the exile communities between 1986 and 1993, roughly 40 percent of whom were monks and the rest consisted of lay adults. The demographic data confirm that far more men than women have entered in exile communities since the 1980s.

The End of Khampa Resistance and the Shift towards Nonviolence

Finally I told him [Nehru] very firmly that my main concern was twofold: “I am determined to win independence for Tibet, but the immediate requirement is to put stop to the bloodshed.” “That is impossible” he said in a voice charged emotion. “You say you want independence and in the same breath you say you do not want bloodshed. Impossible!”

The Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile

Contrary to popular belief, nonviolence has not always been part of the mainstream Tibetan political discourse. Although the Dalai Lama had previously expressed his preference toward a nonviolent struggle, it was not until 1974- with the official end of armed resistance in Mustang- that the nonviolent political campaign was officially launched. Since then, nonviolence has

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142 Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 60.
143 Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 156.
144 Roemer, The Tibetan Government, 60.
146 Childs, Tibetan Transitions, 157.
become one of the most articulated themes of the Tibetan political discourse and it is often associated with the fundamental principles of Buddhism. Unsurprisingly, the discourse on nonviolence brought important political benefits and the international recognition to the Tibetan exile community. The Tibetan discourse on nonviolence became dominant in the late 1980s. Particularly in 1987, the Dalai Lama clearly-and globally- articulated nonviolence as the sole Tibetan strategy in his Five Point Peace Plan presented to the U.S. Congress.\textsuperscript{148} Two years later, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize which is considered the most important cultural success of the Tibetan political campaign. Regarding this shift towards nonviolence as an important turning point in the Tibetan political discourse, this sub-chapter will analyze the historical development of the nationalist narrative of nonviolence by seeking an answer to the question of why this shift occurred in the mid-1970s.

After China crushed the Lhasa Uprisings and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, Khampa guerrillas\textsuperscript{149} continued the armed resistance in Tibet. In the middle of 1960s the Khampas relocated in Mustang in north-west Nepal and Khampa operations persisted in upper Mustang region until 1974.\textsuperscript{150} According to Jane Ardley, there were various reasons for the failure of the armed resistance including geographical factors, external factors and internal conflict. One of the most important external factors, she asserts, was the withdrawal of the CIA support and supply to the guerillas.\textsuperscript{151} A second and further external pressure on the guerillas came from the Nepalese government. After Mao Zedong personally put pressure on King Birendra of Nepal, with threats of direct action if the guerilla bases were not destroyed, the Nepalese army attacked Mustang’s bases on 1974.\textsuperscript{152} Nepal started large scale military operations to disarm Khampa guerrillas. According to the news in \textit{Tibetan Review}, in 1974, the Dalai Lama also urged the Khampas to lay down their arms:

\textsuperscript{148} Carole McGranahan, \textit{Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA and the Memories of a forgotten war} (London: Duke University Press, 2010), 186.

\textsuperscript{149} As mentioned in the previous chapter, “Khampa” refers to the eastern Tibetans who played a crucial role in Tibetan resistance against China. For the detailed account of Khampa resistance, see: McGranahan, \textit{Arrested Histories} and Jane Ardley, \textit{Tibetan Independence Movement: Political, Religious and Gandhian Perspectives} (London: Routledge, 2002).

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., \textit{Tibetan Independence Movement}, 37-38.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 38.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 38-39.
The Nepalese government called upon the Khampas to surrender their ammunition and wireless sets with them before July 26[…] The Dalai Lama too advised these Khampas to give up their arms and comply with the Nepalese Government plans for their resettlement.153

The Dalai Lama’s call for disarmament was an important step on the path to ending the Mustang operations. Most of the Khampas were loyal to the Dalai Lama. After his message arrived, they decided to surrender.154

The Dalai Lama’s earlier stance toward Tibetan armed resistance and Khampa guerillas was rather contradictory. On one hand, he occasionally revealed his preference of nonviolence as a means of Tibetan struggle. On the other hand, he expressed his sympathy for Khampa guerillas. In his autobiography, *My Land My People*, he addressed his personal and political dilemmas regarding violence and resistance:

I am a steadfast follower of the doctrine of non-violence, a doctrine which was first advocated, among his critical teachings, a Lord Buddha, and was practiced in our own times, by the Indian saint and leader Mahatma Gandhi. So, from the very beginning I was strongly opposed to any resort to arms as a means of regaining our freedom. […]Part of me greatly admired the guerilla fighters. They were brave people, men and women, and they were putting their lives and their children’s lives at stake to try to save our religion and country in the only remaining way that they could see. When one heard of the terrible deeds of the Chinese in the east, it was a natural human reaction to seek revenge.155

In spite of the Dalai Lama’s contradictory position between violence and nonviolence, it is possible to argue that prior to 1974, both he and the CTA did support (most of the time, covertly) the Tibetan resistance in its armed defense of Tibet. This official support can be best seen in the CTA’s statement in the commemoration of the 13th anniversary of the Historic Lhasa Uprising in 1972:

[…] The flame of freedom burns bright in the hearts of our courageous compatriots who continue to demonstrate repeatedly the indomitable spirit of man and his desire to be free of the alien’s yoke. The Cabinet, on behalf of the Government and those in exile, salute our brave brothers and sisters, and reaffirm our pledge to continue the struggle of freedom.156

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The concomitant failure of the armed resistance, indeed, would be a strong argument to explain why the Dalai Lama officially launched a nonviolent political campaign in 1974. However, the “natural” end of armed resistance cannot be considered the sole reason of this shift. I will claim that the Dalai Lama’s visits to Western countries and his interactions with Western political and religious leaders also played an important role in this discursive shift towards nonviolence.

The Dalai Lama started to travel to Western countries\(^\text{157}\) at the end of 1973. During these visits, he did realize the symbolic importance of the popular Orientalist image of Tibet as a land of peace, Shangri-la. In his article, *Towards Universal Responsibility*, he clearly expressed how his European tour provided him with a better understanding of Tibet’s “spiritual superiority”:

> I have learnt a great deal from other peoples during my tour. Tibet was materially backward in the past. But spiritually Tibet was very rich. Apart from Buddhism which took deep roots in the country, many great ancient sciences, arts and ideas from her neighboring countries found their way into Tibet which gradually became a melting pot of great Asian civilizations.\(^\text{158}\)

Georges Dreyfus also argues that the idea of Tibet as a special place appeared in the Dalai Lama’s discourse in a sustained way during the mid-eighties.\(^\text{159}\) According to Dreyfus, the idea of Tibet as a special place seems to have been part of a choice made by the Dalai Lama and his entourage concerning the best ways to present Tibetan national struggle on the international scene.\(^\text{160}\) Drawing on Dreyfus’ argument, I assert that in having recourse to the language of Orientalism, the Dalai Lama strategically used the discourse on nonviolence to further his own political agenda. The following passage from his Five Point Peace Plan which was presented to U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus by the Dalai Lama in 1987 is an ample proof of this strategy:

> The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace, and I believe they are in a unique position to do so. Traditionally, Tibetans are a peace loving and nonviolent people. Since Buddhism was


\(^{159}\) Georges Dreyfus, *Are We Prisoners*, 18.

\(^{160}\) Ibid., 18.
introduced to Tibet over one thousand years ago, Tibetans have practiced nonviolence with respect to all forms of life.\textsuperscript{161}

It is therefore very clear that the essentialist and romanticized representation of Tibetans as “natural born peace lovers” has been perpetuated-and reconstructed- by the Dalai Lama and the CTA for more favorable international public relations.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Picture 1. The Dalai Lama being awarded Nobel Peace Prize (December 1989). Source: The Office of Tibet, New York, USA.}\textsuperscript{162}
\end{center}

The role that Buddhism played in this nonviolent image construction is particularly important and it should be discussed in order to comprehend the way in which Tibetan national identity was- what I will call-strategically “(re)religionized” during this period. Religion has never been totally removed from the mainstream Tibetan political discourse. However, as explained in the previous chapter of this thesis, during the first decade of exile, the Dalai Lama introduced


\textsuperscript{162} Tibet Office, “Biography of His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso,” \url{http://tibetoffice.org/h-h-the-dalai-lama/biography} [accessed May, 2012].
important political reforms toward secular modernization. Although this secular modernization also continued in this period -at least at the institutional level- it is very clear that starting from the mid 1970s and early 1980s; Buddhism began to be associated more frequently with Tibetan national identity. This “conservative” turn to Buddhism, as previously explained, was mainly strategic and intended to meet the expectations of the international Tibet supporters, or to recruit new supporters.

Similar to the nonviolent Buddhist image, another important theme which was strategically adopted by the exile elites and widely promoted as an “essential” component of Tibetan Buddhism and thereby “Tibetanness” was environmentalism. It therefore would be useful at this point to focus how the Green Tibetan Identity was constructed in relation to the Buddhist ethics.

The Construction of Green Tibetan Identity

During the mid-1980s, the image of the “Green Tibetan Buddhist Cultural Identity” began to be promoted by the exile elites in a range of publications issued by the CTA and the Tibetan intellectuals. In these publications Tibetan people, their culture and lifestyle were depicted as being in harmony with nature, non-exploitative of the natural world and its resources. The religious identity and Buddhist philosophy were frequently referred to as the source of “Green Tibetan Culture”. Tibetan people were anachronistically portrayed as ecologically aware and environmentally sensitive since time immemorial because of their Buddhist faith.

The Dalai Lama also played a prominent role in the construction and the promotion of this “Green Tibetan” image. Starting from 1985, he has published a significant number of articles about Buddhism and nature, the global environmental degradation, ecological responsibility and so on. It is therefore my intention to consider why and how the image of Green Tibetans suddenly came into being in mid-1980s.

164 My own research is based on the issues of Tibetan Review. However, Huber’s extensive research on the widely read Tibetan language newspapers Shes bya and Tibetan Bulletin, which was the official publication of the CTA shows that starting from 1986, reveal a significant number of articles that promoted “Green Tibetan identity” have been published.
165 Huber, Green Tibetans, 103.
The global context is particularly important to comprehend the strategic adoption of Green identity by Tibetans in mid-1980s. According to Huber, Green Tibet identity should be analyzed in relation to the “religious environmentalist paradigm.”\textsuperscript{166} The paradigm, introduced by Poul Pederson, refers to the 1960s environmentalist view that ecological crisis could be deduced from an idea that Christianity was a religion that allowed the exploitation of nature whereas Asian religions fostered a more ecological approach.\textsuperscript{167} Huber argues that “within this general framework some early environmentalist thinkers became specifically interested in connecting Buddhism with ecology.”\textsuperscript{168} However, until 1985 did neither CTA nor the Dalai Lama seem interested in starting an ecological campaign based on Buddhist ethics. Rather, the driving force for Tibetan “greening” came from those Western and Tibetan intellectuals who suggested to the CTA to become “green” to increase international sympathy for their cause, when the reports about environmental destruction in Tibet started to come in.\textsuperscript{169}

In October 1985, Tibetan and Thai Buddhists initiated a joint project called “Buddhist Perception of Nature: A New Perspective for Conservation.”\textsuperscript{170} The Project was endorsed and provided grants by the New York Zoological Society (NYZS) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) branches in the United States and Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{171} According to the news report in the \textit{Tibetan Review}, there were three mains goals of the project; (1) comprehensive study and assembly of traditional Buddhist literature regarding human independence with the responsibilities to the earth and living things; (2) design and production of efficient teaching tools; (3) use of the educational material in Buddhist influenced communities to achieve better conservation of the nature.\textsuperscript{172} The way in which this project came into being tends to prove that global actors and the “religious environmentalist paradigm” played an important role in the process of “greening” Tibetans. According to Huber, bringing the CTA within the orbit of the WWF, the project also enabled the Tibetan exile elites to join the newly formed global ecological network in 1986.\textsuperscript{173} In the same year, on June 5\textsuperscript{th}, on World Environment day, the Dalai Lama issued a statement

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\textsuperscript{166} Huber, \textit{Green Tibetans}, 107.
\textsuperscript{168} Huber, \textit{Green Tibetans}, 107.
\textsuperscript{169} Huber, \textit{Green Tibetans}, 108.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{173} Huber, \textit{Green Tibetans}, 110-111.
\end{flushright}
entitled “An Ethical Approach to Environmental Protection”.174 Unsurprisingly, the subsequent issue of *Tibetan Review* (July 1986) was dedicated to the ecology. Two articles published in this issue, *Ecology and Culture in Tibet Today*175 and *A Tibetan Tragedy*176 as well as the editorial piece, *A Sanctuary for the World*177 dramatically mentioned the environmental degradation in contemporary Tibet under Chinese rule by constructing “a negative ecologically destructive Chinese other.”178 This construction can be clearly seen in the following passage from the editorial article:

> The tragedy of Tibet is that barely thirty years ago it was a place where man and nature lived in harmony[…] Because of massive deforestation, unprecedented mining and indiscriminate slaughter of wildlife by the Chinese—not to mention the unchecked nuclear tests—soon it may be too late. Though there is no way of determining exactly eco-system, we can be sure that loss will be irrecoverable.179

A similar argument was made by the Dalai Lama in his Five Point Peace Plan. The point four of the plan was specifically dedicated to the environmental protection:

> Tibetans have a great respect for all forms of life. This inherent feeling is enhanced by the Buddhist faith, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment. Sadly, in the past decades the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost totally destroyed by the Chinese. The effects on Tibet’s delicate environment have been devastating. What little is left in Tibet must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state.180

Depicting the Chinese as “evil” and solely responsible of Tibet’s environmental degradation was indeed a historical distortion181 and highly politicized act. As Huber aptly puts, “the political

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176 Ibid., 13.

177 Ibid., 3 and 5.

178 Huber, *Green Tibetans*, 112.


181 It is important to note that my intention here is not to negate the Tibetan claims. The supporting evidence already proved that the PRC has tested nuclear weapons on the Tibetan plateau and caused important ecological damage. However, it is also true that prior to the Chinese dominance, Tibetans were far removed from being perfectly in “harmony with nature”. Several important historical accounts (see Huber, *Green Tibetans*) from the pre-Chinese
subtext here is that Tibetans should gain their independence because they would “obviously” do a better job maintaining the environment than the Chinese have in the past.\textsuperscript{182}

Therefore, as Huber suggests, it is important to recognize the Green Tibetan image as “the modern reflexive, politicized and globally valid identity.”\textsuperscript{183} In this regard, there is no doubt that the Green Tibetan image which was produced by the small circle of elite Tibetans primarily targeted an international audience. However, it would be an oversimplification to reduce the “Green Tibetan image” to an identity marketing strategy. Like all discourses of the Tibetan elites, “Green Tibetan image” should also be seen as the part of the Tibetan nation-building process. As Dawa Norbu correctly observed “it is this new generation that under the Dalai Lama’s influence is projecting democracy, human rights, and environmentalism as constitutive of the new Tibetan identity.”\textsuperscript{184} It perhaps should be added that this new Tibetan identity was homogenized by the exile elites at the expense of identities based on the regional and sectarian affiliations.

\textbf{Criticism of the Sectarian Divisions and the Dalai Lama’s sudden Interest in Tibetan Muslims}

As Carole McGranahan eloquently puts it, “the perceived need for internal cohesion, given the current political state of Tibet, resulted in devaluing of diversity in the exile community.”\textsuperscript{185} Referring to the political importance of “national unity”, the Tibetan political elites criticized the sectarian and regional identities which were seen as the major cause of disunity and condemned them being divisive and harmful to the Tibetan political cause.\textsuperscript{186} Unsurprisingly, most of those who sought to subsume fractious and regional identities under a homogenous national identity were the ones who traditionally held the political power: Lhasa elites and Gelukpa and Sakyapa abbots. In this regard, “favored were central Tibetan styles of language and dress, general senses

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\textsuperscript{182} Huber, \textit{Green Tibetans}, 112.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 115.
\textsuperscript{185} McGranahan, \textit{Arrested Histories}, 17.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 17.
\end{flushright}
of propriety and comportment, and ideas of class, hierarchy and prestige directly correlated to central Tibetan sociopolitical worlds.”\(^{187}\)

Although the political need of presenting a coherent national identity to the world was articulated as the primary objective of the homogenizing efforts of those elites-and to a certain extent this was the case-, it is also important to recognize that homogenizing efforts were also about controlling and governing the exile population by creating a new common identity of “Tibetanness.” Downgrading its differences, the Tibetan exile community has presented itself to the world- and to itself-as a harmonious, unified nation.

In *Tibetan Review*, the discussion on sectarianism first appeared in 1976. The whole September 1976 issue was specifically dedicated to the four traditional sects of Tibetan Buddhism as well as pre-Buddhist religion *Bon*. In his editorial article entitled “Towards Sectarian Harmony and National Unity”, Dawa Norbu acknowledges “the political necessity to eschew sectarian differences for the sake of national unity.”\(^{188}\) However, Norbu does not suggest the elimination of the sectarian identities, he instead favors for the Dalai Lama’s future vision of Tibet as a modern plural society; to have unity within diversity.\(^{189}\) What Norbu suggests as a solution to the sectarian divisions was to eliminate the political role of the sects-which he saw as harmful and dangerous to national unity- and to keep their cultural and religious role the same.\(^{190}\)

Another article published in the same issue, *The Diversity and Unity of Four Sects*, takes Norbu’s position one step further. Writing from a religious point of view, the writer, Jamyang Khentse Rinpoche, stresses the common tenets of Tibetan Buddhism and condemns the sectarianists for misunderstanding Buddhism:

Sectarian disputes completely agitate and disturb people’s mind, causing great confusion and misunderstanding about the Dharma. Holding sectarian views, we ruin both this and future lives by causing ourselves and others to have to suffer unfortunate consequences of the non-virtuous act of denying the Dharma. As there is no point whatsoever in holding sectarian views, we must all abandon such ideas completely and preserve the teachings of the Buddha.\(^{191}\)

\(^{187}\) Ibid., 17.
\(^{189}\) Ibid, 3.
\(^{190}\) Ibid, 4.
Another article published in May 1977, *Religion: a Major Cause of Tibetan Disunity*, approaches the issue from a political point of view and claims that the national disunity that resulted from sectarian clashes was the reason of the Chinese victory:

The weakest point of Tibet was always disunity. [...] Disunity was easily aggravated by an external enemy who could sow discord either among religious leaders of different sects or between two great ecclesiastic leaders within one sect, for example the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. [...] This article is to remind us Tibetans to open our eyes and take note of history. History repeats itself and it should be taken as a guide for the future.\(^\text{192}\)

Based on these aforementioned examples, it is therefore possible to argue that the ultimate objective of these critiques of the sectarian affiliations was to create a new sense of belonging, a pan-Tibetan national identity which would suppress the traditional-and mostly hostile-regional and sectarian identities. As a political project, pan-Tibetanism also sought to include other ethnically Tibetan groups, the ones who were usually neglected: Tibetan Muslims.

Tibetan Muslims were numerically small—a mere 2000 in all, but a group that played a significant role in the pre-1959 Tibet’s economy.\(^\text{193}\) They were predominantly merchants who had lived in the big cities of Tibet such as Lhasa, Shigatse and Tsethang.\(^\text{194}\) After the Chinese takeover of Tibet and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India, the Tibetan Muslims also went into exile in India. However, in spite of their Tibetan ethnicity, the Tibetan exile community neglected them for a long time. They could not benefit from the political and social opportunity structures that had been provided their Tibetan Buddhist counterparts. They were only allowed to enter India as Indian citizens.\(^\text{195}\) The Indian Government settled them in the Kashmir region where they had to organize themselves to rebuild their community. Interestingly, in the mid-1970s, the sudden interest in the Tibetan Muslims arose within the Tibetan exile community. The Dalai Lama began to visit their settlements in Kashmir and several articles which emphasized their similarities to the Tibetan Buddhists were published in the *Tibetan Review*.


\(^{194}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{195}\) The Indian Government’s attitude towards Muslim Tibetans was radically different from that towards Buddhist Tibetans. The former were not granted a “refugee-like” status, but instead were forced to take Indian citizenship as to be settled in India. See: Ibid., 15-17.
One of the first reports published about the Tibetan Muslims dated back to 1975 July when the Dalai Lama first visited their settlement at Kashmir. This report entitled *Dalai Lama visits Tibetan Muslim Refugee Camp*\(^{196}\) gave detailed information on the Dalai Lama’s trip to Kashmir and showed how he attempted to build a relationship with the Tibetan Muslim community. The report also mentioned that “the Dalai Lama donated Rs. 10,000 to the Tibetan Muslim camp at Idgah.”\(^{197}\)

In April 1976, a special article entitled *Tibetan Muslim Refugees in Kashmir* was published in the *Tibetan Review*. This article seems interesting in many ways. First of all, the title itself implies that Tibetan Muslims were also “refugees” just as Tibetan Buddhists were although they entered India as Indian citizens. This emphasis on their refugeehood was indeed a political attempt to engage them with Tibetan exile community. Secondly, the article strongly stressed that “Tibetan Muslims were thoroughly Tibetan in every other aspect except their religion.”\(^{198}\) Thirdly, and more interestingly, it emphasized that “the Dalai Lama has always been deeply concerned about the welfare of Tibetan Muslims and has been untiring in his efforts to help them.”\(^{199}\) The article concluded with the requests from relief agencies which had been supporting Tibetan refugees earlier “not to forget these very hardworking and honest Tibetan Muslims who formed an integral part of pre-1959 Tibetan society.”\(^{200}\)

After 1976, however, neither news reports nor articles have been published about the Tibetan Muslims until 1990s. The sudden interest in them which arose in the mid-1970s did only last a couple of years. This ephemeral interest in Tibetan Muslims can be best explained within the broader political climate of the period. It is obvious that during the mid-1970s the Tibetan exile elites were attempting to create a pan-Tibetan national identity which would prevail over the religious/sectarian and regional identities. However, the global actors who supported-or started to support- the Tibetan exile community were interested in the Buddhist Tibetans who were imagined as nonviolent, spiritually superior people. The Tibetan elites were very aware that the Buddhist identity had symbolic capital which would be transformed into political capital. As I argued earlier, this was the reason of the strategic religionization of Tibetan identity after mid-


\(^{197}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{198}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., 16.

\(^{200}\) Ibid., 17.
1970s. It is therefore possible to argue that the reason behind the Tibetan exile elites’ declining interest in Tibetan Muslims was the fact that Tibetan Muslim identity did not fit into the Shangri-la paradigm.

The construction of the Tibetan national identity was a highly dynamic process. The changes in local and global politics did directly affect this process. This was why some concepts and images were integrated to the Tibetan national discourse in specific historical time periods. The identification of Tibetan exiles as “citizens” was also the product of such a process.

**The Bhutanese Crisis and the Debate on Citizenship; the Identification Regime of the CTA**

During my research on the issues of the *Tibetan Review*, I have come across significant number of articles and reports written on the “Bhutanese allegations against Tibetan exiles” dating back to 1974. According to the news, twenty-eight Tibetan exiles who had lived in Bhutan were arrested and charged with an attempt to assassinate the contemporary Bhutanese king, Jigme Singye Wangchuk.201 Moreover, the Dalai Lama’s elder brother, Mr. Gyalpo Thondup was accused of being the mastermind behind the alleged plot.202 As expected, the charges against Tibetans especially the accusation of the Dalai Lama’s brother created a bomb effect203 in the exile community and caused heated public discussion. The immediate reaction of the CTA was to deny any Tibetan involvement in the alleged plot and to express their concerns about the arrested Tibetans by calling for a fair and open trial. According to the press statement issued by Mr. Phintso Thonden Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama:

> Under the circumstances we are forced to conclude that the Government of Bhutan has been misled into believing that our people took part in such nefarious activities. We, therefore categorically deny any Tibetan involvement in the alleged plots in any shape or form.[…] We are confident that in due course our people will be vindicated and the dark shadow over the Tibeto-Bhutanese relations will be dissipated by the light of truth.204

However, contrary to the Tibetan wishes to resolve the crisis without harming the relationship between Bhutan and the CTA, in the following months, the Bhutanese government had taken

203 The readers’ letters published in the following issue of the magazine show that the Tibetan people were very concerned about the latest developments in Bhutan. Most of these readers referred to the event as a Chinese plot. See: “Et Tu Brute (Bhutan),” *TR* 9, no. 6-7 (July-August 1974): 34-35.
aggressive decisions that triggered a new rise in tensions between two governments. One of these decisions was to restrict the Tibetan exiles movements. Accordingly, no Tibetan was allowed to go in or come out.\textsuperscript{205} Furthermore, the Bhutanese government came to the conclusion that the political loyalty would be resolved once and for all if the Tibetans in Bhutan were formally granted Bhutanese citizenship.\textsuperscript{206} The citizenship issue was raised by the King of Bhutan in his meeting with the deputy of the Dalai Lama, Mr. Wangdu Dorjee. During the meeting, he clearly stated that ‘Tibetan refugees in Bhutan should adopt Bhutanese citizenship’.\textsuperscript{207} The rejection of the CTA, said the Bhutanese officials, would make the Bhutanese government take other steps unilaterally-namely to disperse the Tibetans in Bhutan into different regions.\textsuperscript{208} These statements immediately sparked a big discussion on the question of whether Tibetans should adopt Bhutanese citizenship. The CTA declined the Bhutanese offer of naturalization on the ground that the acceptance of citizenship by Tibetan exiles in Bhutan would seriously weaken their struggle for the liberation of their motherland.\textsuperscript{209} Similarly, the editor of \textit{Tibetan Review} expressed his thoughts on the issue:

\begin{quote}
As exiled people in a free alien country, the Tibetans have a very heavy responsibility of struggling for the liberation of their own land and the question of adopting Bhutanese citizenship was totally inconsistent with their ultimate goal.\textsuperscript{210}
\end{quote}

The opposition of the CTA and the Dalai Lama against Tibetans taking host countries citizenship was not a new phenomenon. From the beginning of the exile years, both the CTA and the Tibetan exile elites followed a policy of discouraging the Tibetans from adopting Indian citizenship despite the fact that the stateless status of the Tibetans placed them under a variety of disadvantages with respect to such things as landownership, the acquisition of business licenses and the freedom of movement. During his research in 1960s, Goldstein explored that “taking Indian citizenship is considered as a renunciation of Tibetan cultural and national aspirations and

\textsuperscript{205} “Trades Badly Affected by Bhutan’s Ban on Tibetan Movement,” \textit{TR} 10, no. 2-3 (Feb-March 1975): 10.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., 7.
is actively opposed.” In her memoirs, Jetsun Pema, the sister of the Dalai Lama, clearly expressed this official position of the CTA:

Although it was possible for us to opt for Indian nationality, we considered it very important to retain our identity so that we should not be forgotten and to show the world our determination.

These examples clearly demonstrate that the exile elites actively encouraged Tibetans to remain stateless and therefore to affirm their patriotic commitment to Tibetan nationalism and Tibet’s future freedom. In this regard, adopting an “alien” citizenship was perceived as a threat to Tibetan national unity which was seen as the very reason of the exile existence. As Fiona McConnell correctly put it, ‘Tibetan population was perceived [by the Tibetan political elites] as having series of interlinked and distinct purposes: as a “resource” which needs to be preserved; as a population-in-waiting ready to return to govern a future Tibet; and as a cultural repository, preserving a unified Tibetan national identity outside the home territory.’ Under the given circumstances, the CTA needed to identify, label and document the Tibetan population as ‘Tibetan citizens’. It may indeed be useful in this point to focus on the CTA’s identification regime, materialized form of Tibetan citizenship; rangzen lagteb or “Green Book”.

Through its identification regime, the CTA sought to “monopolize legitimate symbolic force which includes the power to name, to identify, to categorize” what is Tibetanness and who is ‘Tibetan’. The CTA developed a formalized notion of Tibetan citizenship, the definitions, criteria, rights, and duties of which are enshrined in the Draft Constitution of 1963 and the Charter of Tibetans in Exile of 1991. According to the charter, Tibetan citizenship is granted to; “All Tibetans born within the territory of Tibet and those born in other countries shall be eligible to be citizens of Tibet. Any person whose biological mother or biological father is of Tibetan descent has the right to become a citizen of Tibet.” The rights of such Tibetan citizens include equality before the law; religious freedom; freedom to life, liberty, and property;

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211 Goldstein, Ethnogenesis and Resource, 414.
212 Pema, Tibet: My Story, 81.
216 Ibid., 9.
freedom of speech and expression; and freedom of movement and association. Under the article 13 of the Charter:

all Tibetans shall fulfill the following obligations:

(a) bear true allegiance to Tibet;

(b) faithfully comply and observe the Charter and the laws enshrined therein;

(c) endeavor to achieve the common goal of Tibet;

(d) pay taxes imposed in accordance with the laws;

(e) perform such obligations as may be imposed by law in the event of a threat to the interest of Tibet.

It is indeed possible to recognize one reiterated theme of the Tibetan political discourse in these statutes of Tibetan citizenship: “to endeavor to achieve the common goal of Tibet” which was defined as one of the primary obligations of a Tibetan citizen clearly refers to the theme of “returning back to homeland.” Once more, the CTA reminds Tibetans their duties for “the future free Tibet”. In a similar manner, “bearing true allegiance to Tibet” clearly implies that there is one ‘true’ way of being patriotically Tibetan, the way defined by the CTA.

Moreover, Tibetan citizenship was materialized in a pseudo-passport, the rangzen lagteb or “Green Book,” and the annual payment of voluntary contributions to Tibetan Government-in-exile. (chatrel system). The rangzen lagteb and chatrel system were initiated by a group of exile Tibetan in 1972 under the auspices of the Tibetan Freedom Movement with the rationale of encouraging Tibetans to make a financial contribution to the running of their government, thereby expressing their loyalty to the CTA.

Considering the fact that the CTA has not been recognized as a “state”, it is clear that its citizenship regime has mainly symbolic significance. However, it would be an oversimplification

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217 Ibid., 9.
219 McConnell, Citizens and Refugees, 9.
220 It is important to note that Jamyang Norbu, who is a well-known Tibetan nationalist, was one of the creators of the Green book. Jamyang Norbu was an influential but contradictory figure in the exile society. Although he played an important role in the development of the CTA, he later on took a different path because he did not agree with the Dalai Lama’s non-violent “Middle Way approach”. As an independent writer and activist, he is currently living in the United States.
221 Ibid., 10.
to reduce this practice to a mere political symbol. Rather, holding *rangzen lagteb* did (and does) bring important material benefits to the exile community. The material benefits of holding *rangzen lagteb* can be listed as being eligible for the jobs in the CTA, benefiting from Tibetan welfare stipends and voting in Tibetan elections.\(^ {222}\)

How then one should interpret the citizenship regime of the CTA with all its complications? A couple of interrelated answers can be given to this question. First of all, it is important to note that no universal identity document existed in pre-1959 Tibet, and Tibetan passports were only introduced in 1947 and issued by the Lhasa government to just four Tibetan diplomats.\(^ {223}\) It is therefore clear that as a unifying marker of Tibetan identity, Tibetan citizenship was part of broader exile nation-building process and Tibetan modernization. In a similar manner, the statutes of citizenship rights such as ‘equality before law’, ‘freedom of religion, speech and movement’ and voting in Tibetan elections can be related to the Dalai Lama’s efforts toward democratization. There is also no doubt that adopting such a modern Western model of citizenship would strengthen the CTA’s position in the international political arena. The introduction of Tibetan citizenship regime, however, should also be linked with the previous discussion on the CTA’s opposition to Tibetans taking host countries’ citizenship. As Goldstein argues, ‘a consequence of the CTA’s policy [its opposition against Tibetans adopting Indian citizenship] was the greater independence of the Tibetan exiles on the CTA’.\(^ {224}\) Following Goldstein’s argument, it is possible to claim that the Tibetan citizenship regime was also about to control the Tibetan exile population rendering them dependent on the institutions of the CTA.

**Conclusion**

Based on the analyses done in this chapter, it is therefore possible to argue that the period from 1972 to 1989 was a milestone in the development of Tibetan nationalism because an important shift toward non-violence campaign which brought unprecedented global support to Tibetan exiles occurred in this period. Focusing on this shift, the beginning of this chapter sought an answer to the question why non-violence campaign suddenly came into being in early 1970s and not before? It is suggested that the natural end of Khampa resistance could only partially answer this question. When the period was scrutinized in detail, it was clearly seen that the Dalai Lama

\(^ {222}\) Ibid., 10.
\(^ {223}\) Ibid., 10.
and the Tibetan exile elites’ close contacts with the Western world played a fundamental role not only in the initiation of non-violence campaign but also in the “invention” of “Green” Tibetan image. It is claimed that in this particular period, the Dalai Lama and other important figures of Tibetan exile community started to realize the importance of the symbolic power of *Shangri-la* image which, they might have thought, would have provided the global support to their political agenda which is what they needed most to be able to struggle against the PRC. Indeed, the integration of the theme of “non-violence” in early 1970s and “environmentalism” in 1980s to the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse were considered in this context. As mentioned throughout the chapter, the sudden increase of non-violent discourse and the subsequent “invention” of “Green” Tibetan identity were regarded as strategic moves which were mainly targeted at the global actors. Expectedly, Tibetan elites frequently-and systematically- associated both of these themes with the essence of Tibetan Buddhist teachings, thereby the “natural” character of Tibetan “nation”. However, when Tibetan Buddhism gained a new importance in the construction of the global image of Tibet with the (re)religionization of Tibetan identity at discursive level, at the same time, the Dalai Lama and the CTA sought to produce a modern Tibetan nation with the secular norms they introduced e.g. the citizenship regime and tax system. This tension- or as one may call “paradox”- between the discourse and the practice, religion and secular modernity revealed once more the idiosyncratic character of Tibetan nationalism.
CHAPTER IV. TIBETAN NATIONALIST DISCOURSE SINCE 1989

In the years following the Dalai Lama’s Nobel Peace Prize award in 1989, the Tibetan exile community garnered unprecedented global support and made the communities around the world aware of the plight of Tibetans in the Chinese controlled Tibet. The year 1991, specifically, was the watershed year for the global political campaign for Tibet. In this year, collaborating with the department of religion and culture of the CTA, the Tibet House US\(^{225}\) initiated the International Year of Tibet as a “worldwide celebration of Tibetan culture.” The international year of Tibet was a huge marketing campaign; several Tibet-related art exhibitions were made, Tibetan dance performances conducted, political and the religious speeches given, demonstrations held and the story of Tibet broadcast widely and loudly.\(^{226}\) Although this “Global Tibet movement” did not have any positive impact on the Chinese policies over Tibet—on the contrary, it led Chinese government to tighten control over Tibetan regions— it was highly instrumental in discrediting the Chinese government in the eyes of thousands of people all over the world. Furthermore, the year 1991 was also witnessed the establishment of Unrepresented Nations and People’s Organization (UNPO), an international organization of political groups and governments representing self-proclaimed “indigenous peoples, minorities and unrecognized or occupied territories.”\(^{227}\) Together with the “World Uyghur Congress”\(^{228}\) the CTA became one of the founding members of the organization at a ceremony held at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. As expected, the mainstream Tibetan political discourse was also directly influenced by this new wave of global support. While the previously introduced themes and concepts such as non-violence, democracy, human rights and environmentalism have remained dominant, couple of new themes such as “gender equality” and “vegetarianism” was also integrated to the mainstream discourse in order to adapt to the transnational requirements of the globalized world order. Locating Tibet [local] into the global, this chapter intends to scrutinize the period from

\(^{225}\) The Tibet House US was founded in 1987 in New York City by the actor Richard Gere and the Prof. Robert Thurman at the request of the Dalai Lama in order to present the “Tibetan civilization and its profound wisdom, beauty and, special art of freedom to the people of the world” and “to preserve Tibet’s unique culture at a time when it is confronted with extinction in his soil.” See Tibet House US, “Mission and History,” http://tibethouse.us/index.php?option=com_content&id=3 [accessed May, 2012].

\(^{226}\) See also McGranahan, Arrested Histories, 187.


\(^{228}\) The World Uyghur Congress is an international congress of exiled Uyghurs which claims to represent the Uyghur people both inside and outside of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of PRC.
1989 up to the present day and analyze how Tibetan nationalist discourse took its current form. Since the contemporary migration patterns and the creation of Tibetan diaspora in the West played a crucial role in the nationalist discourse of the period, this chapter will begin with the detailed analysis of the CTA’s population politics.

**Demographic Character of the Period: Population Censuses of 1998 and 2009 and the CTA’s population Politics**

Owing to the two extensive demographic surveys done by the CTA during the last two decades of the exile, the demographic data for the period from 1998 up to the present day provide a much more accurate picture of the Tibetan exile community than the previous periods. In 1998, the CTA conducted the first extensive population census and demographic survey of the Tibetan exile community. Adopting the standardized state census format, the CTA planned to repeat the surveys in every ten years. Accordingly, the second demographic survey was planned to take place in June 2008. However, due to the widespread political unrest occurred in Tibet in the spring 2008 as a reaction to coming Beijing Olympics the second census was postponed until 12 April 2009. These two population censuses were indeed important developments toward the modernization of the Tibetan exile “state”. It can be suggested that through these extensive demographic surveys, the CTA attempted to make its community “legible” and to arrange the population in ways that simplified the state functions- or in this case, “state-like” functions. This, of course, does not mean that the CTA did not seek to count and to “read” its exile population prior to this period. On the contrary, until 1998, “the CTA’s collected information about the Tibetan exile population through a range of ad hoc surveys and registration systems including the documentation of “newcomer” migrants by the CTA reception centers in Kathmandu, Delhi and Dharamsala, and the administration of the CTA issued Green Book identity documents.”

However, the first population census of the Tibetan exile community of South Asia conducted in 1998 under the auspices of the CTA was the first systematic attempt to count the entire exile

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229 Fiona McConnell, *Governmentality to*, 82.
230 It should be noted that the first population census in 1998 was conducted only for Tibetans who live in India and Nepal. It did not include the Tibetans who live in North America and Western Europe. It is also important to mention that unlike the “official” state surveys, the functionality of the CTA’s population survey depended on the voluntary compliance of the exile population. This is because there was no element of coercion in the Tibetan census: not cooperating in the enumeration was not illegal and there were no penalties.
population in India and Nepal in order to regulate the health, identity and mobility of Tibetan “citizens” in these countries.

According to the first census data (see table 1), there were approximately 100,000 Tibetans living in the thirty settlements dispersed in India and Nepal, with the majority living in India (85,147) and a relatively small number living in Nepal (13,720). The data also indicates that the Tibetan settlements were scattered across the Indian sub-continent and continued to be the primary places of residence for most of the exile population.\textsuperscript{231} Unsurprisingly, the Tibetan settlements in North, South and East India, the regions where Tibetans were resettled by the GOI at the beginning of the exile years were much more densely populated than the settlements in Central and Western India. Additionally, the data shows that in 1998, two urbanized areas in Nepal, Kathmandu and Pokhara, accommodated the majority\textsuperscript{232} of the Tibetan exile population of Nepal.

\textsuperscript{231} Geoff Childs, \textit{Tibetan Transitions}, 137.
\textsuperscript{232} It is important to note that a significant number of Tibetans live in the regions along the Tibet-Nepal border, particularly in the Mustang area. The exclusion of this region in the survey can be interpreted in different ways. First of all, it can be suggested that conducting demographic survey in this remote area was technically difficult and impractical for the CTA. Secondly, it is possible to argue that since Mustang region had previously been the base for Khampa guerilla operations, the CTA might consider the fact that conducting research on the Tibetans in Mustang would be “politically dangerous” and draw the attention of Nepali and Chinese governments to those Tibetans who live in the region. Lastly, it can also be suggested that since the Mustang district was traditionally dominated by ethnic Tibetans, it would be difficult for the CTA to distinguish exile Tibetans from the local ethnic Tibetan population.
Table 2: Tibetan Exile Population of South Asia by Region and Major Settlements, 1998\(^{233}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region (States within Region)</th>
<th>Major Settlements</th>
<th>Settlement Populations</th>
<th>Regional and Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North India</td>
<td>Dhramsala</td>
<td>8,694</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ladakh(2 settlements)</td>
<td>6,839</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Delhi, Haryana Himachal Pradesh,</td>
<td>Bir (4 settlements)</td>
<td>3,224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamnu and Kashmir, Rajasthan)</td>
<td>Kullu/Manali</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>28,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shimla</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dalhousie</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central India</td>
<td>Mussorie</td>
<td>2,654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>Dehradun</td>
<td>1,962</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mainpat</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>9,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rajpur</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clement Town</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western India</td>
<td>Bhandara</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gujarat, Maharashatra)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern India</td>
<td>Darjeeling</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Orissa, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam,</td>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>2,259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meghalaya, Nagaland, Sikkim, West Bengal)</td>
<td>Gangtok</td>
<td>2,217</td>
<td>18,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kalimpong</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bomdila</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South India</td>
<td>Bylakuppe(2 settlements)</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>18,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu)</td>
<td>Mungod</td>
<td>8,583</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kollegal</td>
<td>4,359</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hunsur</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Kathmandu</td>
<td>9,620</td>
<td>13,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pokhara</td>
<td>2,665</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>98,869</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{233}\) Source: Planning Council 2000a. This table was originally published by the CTA’s planning commission based on the results of the population census 1998. This version used here is taken from: Childs, *Tibetan Transitions*, 138.
Figure 1: Age Sex Composition of the Tibetan Exile Population in South Asia, 1998

Source: 1998 TDS. This table is originally published by the CTA based on the results of the Tibetan demographic survey. This version used here is taken from: Childs, *Tibetan Transitions*, 156.

With regard to the sex-age composition of the exile population in 1998 (see figure 1), among the younger age groups, particularly those 10-34, men heavily outnumbered the women. According to Childs, this imbalance can be explained by the recent migration patterns which show that Tibetans entered in exile communities from Tibet after the mid-1980s were mostly monks who escaped the Chinese crackdowns on religion in order to attend the monastic schools in exile.\footnote{Childs, *Tibetan Transitions*, 156-157.} Childs also argues that in 1998 about 22 percent (11,067) of the male population in exile was monks, while only three percent (1,230) of the female population was nuns.\footnote{Ibid., 165.} Although this data suggest that monasticism played an important population regulating role in exile with regard to the celibacy oath was taken by monks and nuns, the sex ratio data (table 2) show that after eliminating monks and nuns from the population, there were slightly more laywomen than laymen of marriageable age.\footnote{Ibid.,165.} Table 2 also suggests that in 1998 the younger age groups were mostly composed of those who were born in exile rather than the “newcomers.” Although the first population census and the demographic survey gave valuable information about the Tibetan exile population in South Asia including the family systems, the fertility and mortality rates and the marriage patterns, it was not as extensive as the second survey was taken in 2009.
Table 3: Sex Ratios by Age, Tibetan Exiles 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age</th>
<th>Sex Ratio (Males per 100 Females)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All exiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Excluding Monks and Nuns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Born in Exile, Excluding Monks and Nuns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Planning Council 1998. This table is originally published by the Planning Council of the CTA based on the results of the Tibetan Demographic Survey. This version used here is taken from: Childs, *Tibetan Transitions*, 163.

The initial results of the second demographic survey were published in December 2010. The survey found that the total population of Tibetans outside of Tibet –including not only the Tibetans who live in South Asia both also in North America, Europe and Australia- as on 12 April 2009, reached 127,938 composed of 70,556 men and 57,379 women. Of the total population recorded, 94,203 Tibetans were living in India, 13,514 in Nepal, 1,298 in Bhutan and 18,920 elsewhere around the world. According to the table published in the website of the CTA (see table 3), 53% of the Tibetan exile population of South Asia was unemployed. The data suggests that only 17% of the unemployed population was seeking job during the time of survey. This strongly indicates that most of the unemployed Tibetan exiles were either monks or nuns. The effective literacy rate of Tibetan exile population of South Asia (82.4%) was quite high, especially compared to the host countries: India (74.4%)239, Nepal (45.2%)240 and Bhutan (52.8%).241 This relatively high literacy provides clear evidence of the success of national education policy of the CTA.

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238 Ibid.
Table 4. Snapshots data of Tibetan Demographic Survey 1998 & 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>TDS 1998*</th>
<th>TDS 2009</th>
<th>Decadal Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>98,867**</td>
<td>109,015</td>
<td>15,929 (14.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51,059 (55.8%)</td>
<td>60,599 (55.5%)</td>
<td>9,540 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40,443 (44.1%)</td>
<td>48,416 (44.4%)</td>
<td>7,973 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex ratio (males/1000 females)</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-dependency ratio</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE GROUP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 – 14</td>
<td>23,122</td>
<td>20,302</td>
<td>-2,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 64</td>
<td>59,648</td>
<td>75,031</td>
<td>15,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 &amp; above</td>
<td>8,584</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>2,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age not clear/stated</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2,982</td>
<td>2,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEALTH INDICATORS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Birth Rate (CBR)</td>
<td>7.83</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Death Rate (CDR)</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>15.44</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fertility Rate (TFR)</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Marital Fertility Rate</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TMFR)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LITERACY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General literacy rate (%)</td>
<td>61.6%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective literacy rate (%)</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WORKFORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce population (15 – 64 years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main workers (%)</td>
<td>20,928 (35%)</td>
<td>27,540 (39%)</td>
<td>6,612 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal workers (%)</td>
<td>604 (1%)</td>
<td>5,525 (8%)</td>
<td>4,921 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-workers non-seeking jobs (%)</td>
<td>33,923 (57%)</td>
<td>30,651 (44%)</td>
<td>3,272 (-13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-workers seeking jobs (%)</td>
<td>4,193 (7%)</td>
<td>6,104 (9%)</td>
<td>1,911 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: TDS ’98 was conducted only for Tibetans in India and Nepal whereas TDS ’09 includes Bhutan (pop: 1,298)** Household population. Population as per individual questionnaire was: 91,502.
The second survey report also estimates that there was significant growth of Tibetan population in the countries outside South Asia and over 9,309 Tibetans who had previously lived in India and Nepal moved to the Western countries during 1998-2009. However, the demographic data about those who live outside of South Asia were rather inaccurate because of the low participation rate in the population census conducted in these countries. Dr. Kunchok Tsondue, the Chief Planning Officer of the CTA, pointed out this problem in the interview he gave to Phayul, the website created in 2001 by the Tibetan exiles in India:

In India, Nepal and Bhutan where the majority of Tibetan exiles live, not more than 5 percent of the population had missed the survey. However, a sizeable population elsewhere, especially in the west, either did not participate or have missed the survey owing to a number of factors such as adopting citizenship of a host country or being in the process of becoming neutralized citizen of a host country.

The CTA’s attempt of including the Tibetans who live outside of South Asia in the population census was indeed a politically motivated act and it needs to be discussed here. Regarding this policy, it is possible to argue that the CTA sought to strengthen its relationship with its own “diaspora” in the West which was seen as an important group that could bring political and economic benefits to the exile community in South Asia. Tibetan diaspora in the West formed in 1970s when the Tibetan exile population in South Asia started to migrate to Western countries including Switzerland, Belgium, U.S and Australia. Since the Tibetan migration to the West has been regulated by the CTA based on the bilateral agreements made between the CTA and the receiving countries, the CTA has been the main authority that selected the candidates for emigration. It is clear that the main purpose of the CTA to encourage and to regulate the migration to the West was to create a Tibetan community that would influence the global audience about the Tibetan plight. How the CTA instilled the sense of “national” responsibility and patriotism in those Tibetans who migrated to the West can be best seen in the following statement of the CTA in 1972:

We remind fellow Tibetans settled abroad that each of them is an ambassador and a spokesman for our people and country. [...] They are members of Tibetan society and not as individuals. [...] They have an equal responsibility and stake in the future of Tibet.

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242 Tinley, Planning Commission.
243 Ibid.
244 Tibetan Review, Kashag Statement, 10.
When the activities of the current Tibetan community in the West was taken into consideration, it is possible to argue that most of these small Tibetan communities in the West have remained loyal to the Tibetan cause and within them important pro-Tibetan activist movements occurred.

However, it should be noted that these pro-Tibetan political movements did not always agree with the Dalai Lama’s and CTA’s official position. One of the most important political divisions concerning the Tibetan political cause occurred at the beginning of 1990s after the Dalai Lama articulated his preference toward “a genuine Tibetan autonomy” which is also known as “Middle Way Approach” in his statement issued in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 15 June 1988. The first and perhaps the strongest reaction to this middle way approach came from the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), one of the largest and perhaps most influential organizations of Tibetan exiles, which demands “complete independence of Tibet even at the cost of one’s life.”
is important to note that despite their dissident position, the leaders of the TYC never openly criticized the Dalai Lama himself. However, they have been outspoken critics of the CTA’s parliament members, which brought them into conflict with governing elites. Interestingly, these contemporary political divisions in the Tibetan exile community did hardly affect the global image of “Tibetan unity.” On the contrary, Tibetan political elites kept portraying Tibetan exile community as a harmonious and unified group. In a similar manner, the new themes which were simultaneously integrated to the Tibetan nationalist discourse in this period were also propagated with a strong reference to the Tibetan “national unity.”

The Myth of Gender-equal Tibet: Women in the Tibetan Nationalist Discourse

Starting from the mid-1990s, Tibetan exile elites wrote extensively on women as a part of their nationalist discourse within which they (re)constructed the role and the image of the Tibetan women. Although these writings on women were very diverse and the authors expressed their thoughts on several gender-related topics, a few common themes stand out in all writings and they deserved special attention. Almost without exception, all the writings portrayed pre-1951 Tibetan society as “gender equal” society with a strong emphasis that “traditionally Tibetan women enjoyed a higher social status than their counterparts in many other societies.” Similar to the “Green Tibetan identity” construction, the image of gender-equal Tibetan society was also politicized by constructing a negative, misogynistic Chinese other. It is interesting to note that the gender equal Tibet image started to be widely articulated when the debate over whether or not Tibetan women organizations should attend to the UN women’s conference in Beijing broke out in 1995.

In Tibetan Review, the first article about the UN women’s conference appeared in May 1995. In his editorial piece, Food for Thought, Tsering Wangyal criticized Tibetan women organizations for insisting to attend the conference instead of boycotting it:

[…] The seemingly- abundant resources [Tibetan women organizations have] could have been better directed towards preventing Peking from hosting the conference at all or, if unsuccessful in this towards making at least the non -governmental organizations boycott it. […]Begging to be allowed in the forthcoming conference implies acceptance of Peking as a reasonable choice for venue. This in turn would
mean that Tibetans still standing in the queue think the Chinese are not guilty of any crime against women.  

Three months later, in September issue, Tsering Wangyal wrote another polemical article, Gender Bender, which again harshly criticized Tibetan women’s organizations that finally managed to get permission to attend to the UN conference condemning them “misportraying” Tibetan society:

I could never understand why the small but organization-ridden and bureaucracy-infested Tibetan society needs a separate organization for women. Now, before Tibetan women of various shapes and sizes decide to descend on me with an assortment of kitchen tools, let me explain further. I have full respect for women, some of whom are my friends. […] The interests of women are represented as much as of any other sections of the society by the Tibetan government and other organizations. […] The Tibetan cause is the cause of all Tibetans, not exclusively of Tibetan men or the Tibetan women. […] I am sure any foreigner unfamiliar with our story will automatically assume when hearing about something called Tibetan Women’s Association that Tibetan women must be a downtrodden lot in their own society, most probably kept chained indoors, barred from political and all other activities except cooking producing children. This being far from the case, an organization like TWA actually gives a wrong image of the Tibetan society.

From a feminist point of view, the article was obviously sexist. Although the writer claimed that he had “full respect” for women, he did not see any problem to confine them to the “kitchen.” Moreover, both of his statements, “there is no needs for a Tibetan women organization” and “Tibetan women degrade their own society in the eyes of foreigners because they organize themselves as a separate entity”, were very problematic and gender-biased. The clear implication behind these arguments was that by identifying themselves with their gender, Tibetan women did harm “national unity” and the Tibetan political cause.

Concurrently with this discussion about the UN conference, the Women’s issue desk at the CTA’s department of Information and International Relations prepared a national report on Tibetan Women “to document the conditions of Tibetan women inside occupied Tibet as well as in exile.” This report was interesting in many ways. First of all, it did not only contrast the status of the Tibetan women in Tibet with their counterparts in exile, but it also strongly

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emphasized that “unlike their Chinese counterparts Tibetan women were never subjected to the
gender discrimination or violent traditions such as foot binding, veiling, dowry or concubinage”:

Traditionally, Tibetan women enjoyed a higher social status than their counterparts in many other societies. They also played an active part in the affairs of family and society. Since the occupation of Tibet by Chinese military forces, Tibetan women have suffered oppression, exploitation, subjugation and discrimination […] Tibetan women in exile also suffered as a result of displacement and dislocation of normal life. However, in comparison with those in Tibet, women in exile enjoyed equal opportunity in education and job. They were given special consideration in political representation to encourage greater role in public affairs. […] The women in Tibet enjoy none of the human rights and freedom that are taken for granted in exile.248

Furthermore, the second article of the report, *The Status of women before the Chinese occupation*, was specifically dedicated to the history of Tibetan women- but not Tibetan women’s history- in order to prove the argument that “Tibetan society has always been gender-equal.” It would be noteworthy giving a couple of examples from this article:

In the annals of Suishu and T’ang shu-Sui and T’ang dynasty (around the second century AD), there is a reference to the existence of a "women's kingdom" in southeastern Tibet. In this kingdom, the society is described as being matriarchal and matrilineal where political power appeared to have been in the hands of women. Matriliney is also suggested in a Tibetan text of aphorisms from Tun-huang that may be connected to a female-dominated society of the fifth century Sum-pa people. In Tibetan history one also finds that there were times when certain individual women played prominent roles in determining the social development of the Tibetan nation. The mothers of the Tibetan emperors in the period between the seventh and the ninth centuries AD, for instance, are believed to have played active roles in the polity of the state.249

There is no doubt that this attempt of drawing historical line of “continuity” between Tibetan ancient-medieval past and today with regard to women’s status was a part of Tibetan nation building process. The emphasis on “the prominent roles women played in the development of Tibetan nation” was an ample proof of this nationalist aspiration. The report’s claim that Tibetan society had historically been matriarchal and “women dominated” went even further in the following paragraph of the same article which asserted that “by looking at the patterns of marriage and household organization, one can gain an insight into the traditional position of women in Tibetan society”:


249 Ibid.
Marriage arrangements included monogamous, polyandrous and polygamous alliances. Divorce and remarriage (including widow marriage) were acceptable. Polygamy was just as common as polyandry, though both were by no means widespread. They were accepted in some regions to sustain family and social networks and to keep estates undivided, without infringing the rights to which men and women were accustomed. Arranged marriages were the norm but only the daughter, upon marriage, would remain with her family. Her husband would enter her family. Then, upon the death of the household head, the daughter, and not her husband, would head the family estate.\textsuperscript{250}

The emphasis on polyandry and polygamy as signifiers of the women’s status in the past Tibetan society was indeed interesting and it should be elaborated further on. Tibetan polyandry has long been subject of academic inquiry and many prominent Tibet scholars discussed about the polyandric practices\textsuperscript{251} both in traditional and contemporary Tibetan societies. Although polyandry is frequently regarded as a rarely practiced phenomenon, many scholars agreed that it was a “characteristic marker”\textsuperscript{252} of Tibetan identity. But what does polyandric marriage pattern show about the traditional status of Tibetan women? Does it really mean that Tibetan society was traditionally matriarchal and “women dominated”? According to Goldstein and Nellie, the polyandric marriage pattern was little about the gender equality or women’s dominancy in the society; it was rather product of the material considerations; “a practice derived from rules of land tenure and semi-feudal politico-economic system.”\textsuperscript{253}

Moreover, the Tibetan women’s traditional status in society was inferior and subordinate to men. Women were often associated with “danger” and “pollution” because of the menstrual blood.\textsuperscript{254} As Carole McGranahan states, in Buddhist Tibet the women clearly signaled disorder and the female body was considered dangerous to cultural and spiritual order.\textsuperscript{255} In a similar manner, Tibetan monastic tradition was also highly patriarchal and with few exceptions, women hardly attained higher religious status. According to Kapstein, “women who excelled within the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[250] Ibid.
\item[253] Goldstein, \textit{Stratification, Polyandry}, 73.
\item[255] Ibid., 780.
\end{footnotes}
Tibetan religious world were often associated with the orders and lineages that emphasized practical mastery of ritual and meditation rather than the scholastic dimensions of Buddhist formal learning.”

In spite of this well-known discrimination against women in the monastic institutions, the report argued oppositely:

Buddhism played a significant role in the lives of Tibetan women. Although the number of monks is greater than that of nuns, becoming a nun provided an alternative and positive role for women in society. Becoming a nun was a matter of choice. Prior to 1959, there were 270 nunneries with over 15,600 nuns throughout Tibet. Besides, many nuns lived in small groups in retreat communities or hermitages.

In her autobiography, the Dalai Lama’s sister, Pema Jetsun affirmed “the frustrations encountered by Tibetan women desiring to teach Buddhism” but she also added that “religion is the only area where women are not considered equal to men.” In all other areas of social life, she claimed, Tibetan women enjoyed a much higher social position than their counterparts in China and India:

As a general rule, Tibetan women have always held a high social position. It was perhaps less high than that demanded by feminist movements in Western countries, but better than in many Asian countries. Thus, even though the traditional structure of Tibetan society was patriarchal, women’s feet were never bandaged as they were in China. In the same way, cases of female infanticide, such as those in India, were unknown. The position of Tibet women’ is on par with their exceptionally independent character- they are free economically, and have their own property which makes divorce easy.

It is therefore very clear that a gender-equal Tibet image was a product of small group of educated Tibetan elites who skillfully reinvented the traditional role of Tibetan women and manipulated it for their own nationalist political agenda. It is interesting to note that this essentialized image of “exceptionally independent Tibetan women” has also been appropriated by Tibetan women intellectuals and organizations without further questioning or criticizing. If it is obvious that Tibetan society has never been a gender-equal society as the Tibetan elites promoted, why then neither intellectual Tibetan women nor Tibetan women organizations did challenge this image? To answer this question, it would be useful to recall the way in which Tibetan regional and sectarian identities were subsumed under a homogenized Tibetan identity.

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257 Tibetan Studies WWW Virtual Library, *Tibetan women under*.
258 Pema, *Tibet: My Story*, 177
259 Ibid., 177.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, referring to the political need for “national unity”, Tibetan mainstream discourse did in fact suppress the dissident voices in exile community. In this regard, I venture to suggest that alternative articulations of gender were also suppressed by the mainstream discourse for the sake of national unity.

Non-violence, Ecology and Vegetarianism: Tibetan Vegetarian Movement in 21st Century

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Dalai Lama and the CTA launched a campaign for a “vegetarian Tibetan society” to encourage the Tibetan exile population to embrace a vegetarian life-style. As a part of the campaign, several prominent religious and secular leaders of the Tibetan exile community delivered speeches to promote vegetarian diet as healthier, ethical and environmental friendly option. Moreover, in a range publications issued by the exile authorities and religious leaders during this period, vegetarianism was represented as an essential and fundamental component of the Tibetan religious identity; something has always been there in the Buddhist teachings. Drawing parallel line between Tibetan Buddhist teachings and vegetarianism, the image of “vegetarian Tibetans” has been successfully disseminated around the world. Suggesting that Tibetan vegetarian movement was central to the discourse of nationalism, herein, I will briefly address two interrelated questions: (1) why and how Vegetarian movement was launched by Tibetan exile elites? And (2) what visions of Tibetan population did the discourse of vegetarianism generate?260

In Tibetan Review, the first articulations of the vegetarian campaign appeared at 1995. In July issue, a small news report, Moving towards Vegetarianism was published. According to the report, “the south zone office of the central Tibetan relief committee of India organized a workshop on food and nutrition in Bangalore to carry out the wishes of the Dalai Lama who asked Tibetans ‘to turn more towards vegetarianism’.” 261 Although the report did only briefly mention that the Dalai Lama expressed his wishes for a more vegetarian Tibetan society during his teachings in India, it is possible to locate 1995 as the year when the idea of vegetarianism started to be circulated in the Tibetan community. Two years later, vegetarianism turned into a

social campaign with the establishment of a charitable organization, “Universal Compassion Movement.” (UCM)

The UCM was founded by a Geshe Thupten Phelgye, an important Buddhist Lama of Gelukpa tradition and current member of Tibetan Parliament in exile, with the twin task of creating awareness about animal rights and promoting vegetarianism around the world. In his primary article about the mission of UCM, an appeal for Compassion, Phelgye stated that “Buddha taught about the benefits of following a vegetarian life-style and eating meat is contrary to one’s inherent Buddha nature which is, in essence, a love for all sentiment beings.” In 1999, Phelgye furthered his vegetarian mission by bringing up a resolution on vegetarianism for all Geluk monasteries and nunneries which was successfully passed and declared implementation of the conduct around his sect.

Tibetan vegetarian movement gained a new momentum in 2003 when “Geshe Phelgye brought up a bill in Parliament in exile to encourage vegetarianism in Tibetan communities for compassionate living and for the long life of the Dalai Lama which was successfully passed in the House.” In addition, Tibetan parliament in exile also decided to celebrate the year 2004 as “Tibetan Vegetarian Year.”

Concurrently, a civil organization called “Tibetans for Vegetarian society” was established by Tenzin Kunga Luding, with a mission “to bring about vegetarianism in the Tibetan society.” Embracing both the language of religion and science- particularly nutritional sciences- the organization introduced the importance of vegetarian food not only in preventing death of animals but also in enhancing a “healthy” life. In the interview he gave to Phayul, Luding stated that:

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262 Universal Compassion Movement, “Universal Compassion,” [accessed May 2012].
265 Ibid.
I realized that these foods (eggs, meat, and animal dairy products) were not only causing so much of unnecessary sufferings to animals but were harmful to our precious health and environment as well.[…] On the whole I think there is some awareness to remain healthy seeped in the minds of our people and we must continue to follow in the same direction.267

In 2005, in his speech to newly arrived Tibetans from Tibet to New Delhi, the Dalai Lama also addressed the importance of consuming more vegetarian food not only for ethical/religious reasons but also for a “longer and healthier life”:

Less meat consumption means good health. I knew a monk in America who often consumed meat, as well as lots of cream. All of a sudden he succumbed to death from a heart attack. This example is a profound lesson that we should take care of our diets. Despite its purported good taste, too much fat is harmful to our health. 268

The idea that “the vegetarian diet is much healthier than the non-vegetarian diet” was indeed distinctively modern and novel. This healthy lifestyle discourse should also be considered in relation to the global food politics, particularly to the contemporary popularity of organic/ecological food consumption. There is no doubt that these current global food movements were primarily based on two concepts: health and environmental ethics. In this regard, it would be argued that Tibetan elites felt obliged to govern Tibetan food consumption in order to further propagate the “environment friendly Tibetan image.”

While vegetarianism was promoted as a healthier, more ethical and more appropriate to the “Tibetan character,” the Chinese eating habits were often portrayed as “unethical.” In a similar manner, the Chinese was accused of animal brutality and abuse. In his aforementioned speech shows how the Dalai Lama dramatically narrate the Chinese brutality towards animals:

I am often told by Tibetans arriving from Tibet that the Potala Palace is now surrounded by meat shops and that blood stains of animals can be seen everywhere around the palace. Snakes and fish are being slaughtered for consumption. In the past such things were unheard of in Tibet. Hunting wildlife and fishing was not allowed then. Tibetans who went fishing were looked down upon, except for those near the areas of Yamdrok Lake. Since the Chinese invasion of Tibet, Tibetans have started eating all kinds of meat. I met a monk from Kham, who told me about how people sold fish in front of the Potala Palace. With tears

267 Ibid.
268 The Dalai Lama, “Be a Vegetarian,” in His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama on Environment: Collected Statements (Dhramsala: Environment and Development Desk, Department of Information and International Relations (CTA), 2007), 93.
rolling down his cheek, he narrated to me the following incident: “There was a man selling fish in front of the Potala Palace. He kept his fish, alive and kicking, in a tin box. As one Tibetan customer arrived, the man pulled a fish out of the tin box and pressed its eye to the nail affixed to the wooden board, just in front of him. The man then cut open the body of the fish with a razor-sharp knife to remove its waste, and then sold it.” He further told me that Tibetans have now learnt such evil practices and requested me to advise Tibetans to refrain from engaging in them.”

Once more, pre-1950 Tibet was idealized and romanticized as a land of human-animal harmony and spirituality and all the negative “evil” practices which threaten this harmonious image were associated with the Chinese.

Therefore, it seems clear that vegetarian Tibetan image was built on two important themes of Tibetan nationalist discourse: non-violence and environmentalism. It would be indeed difficult for Tibetan exile elites to accommodate the image of “meatarian Tibetan” while they simultaneously promote non-violent and green aspects of Tibetan identity. But if vegetarian Tibetan image is an essential component of non-violent, green Tibetan identity, why it was not mentioned until 2000s? As suggested above, contemporary global food politics and the rise of the vegan/vegetarian movement in the Western countries stimulated the Tibetan elites to introduce global vegetarian campaign with Buddhist ethics. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to reduce Tibetan vegetarian movement to a sole marketing campaign. Instead, it should also be considered a form of Tibetan governmentality and biopolitics; the way in which Tibetan state sought to govern the “body” of its citizens.

269 Ibid., 93.
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION

Covering a long historical period—the period from 1959 to the recent times—and a wide scope of events and ideas, this thesis has attempted to show how the Tibetan national identity has been constructed and negotiated by the Tibetan exile elites in order to obtain the internal loyalty/legitimization and the global support to their political cause—Tibetan political cause changed during the exile years; at the beginning, the Dalai Lama and the CTA was favoring for the total independence, then, starting from 1980s with the Dalai Lama’s declaration of the “Middle Way” approach, they started to demand for a “genuine autonomy”. Throughout the study, I traced how the themes such as non-violence, democracy, human rights, environmentalism, gender-equality which all have been integrated to the Tibetan nationalist discourse in the specific historical times turned out to globally well-known markers of “Tibetanness”. At the same time, I have scrutinized the political practices of the CTA in order to understand how the Tibetan nation as “an imagined community” has been produced and practiced. By doing this type of research and analysis, my main purpose in this thesis was to comprehend the dynamics and the factors that gave rise to the Tibetan nationalism and the formation of Tibetan national identity both at the level of theory/discourse and practice.

The main arguments of this thesis were supported by the written sources produced in the exile. The journal articles and the reports published in the websites of the CTA and the other Tibet-related organizations illuminated the specific historical time periods when the aforementioned themes were introduced by the exile elites, debated by the reactionaries and finally became part of the mainstream nationalist discourse. Based on the research on these materials, this thesis showed that the first decade of the exile years, mainly the period from 1959 to 1972, witnessed the formation of the ideological bedrock of the Tibetan nationalist discourse, and consequently the mainstream Tibetan nationalist ideology. Two of the themes, the discourse on genocide and the theme of “returning to homeland”, were born out in this period and provided the legitimacy for the practical policies of the newly founded CTA. The very same period also witnessed the establishment of the main political, administrative and educational institutions such as the CTA, local administration units in Tibetan exile settlements dispersed all over India and Nepal and the Tibetan schools which all have been highly instrumental to create a “Tibetan nation”. The second period I scrutinized in chapter three starts from 1972 and ends with 1989,
the year the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, was the period when some crucial themes such as non-violence and environmentalism became part of the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse. Throughout the period, the Dalai Lama’s consistent promotion on non-violent struggle brought him one of the world’s most important awards, the Nobel Peace Prize which is frequently considered one of the biggest cultural successes of the Tibetan campaign. The last research chapter focused on the period from 1989 up to the present day and discussed the recent trends in Tibetan nationalist discourse such as the discourse on gender equality and vegetarianism posing the question why such themes suddenly came into being.

The main theoretical argument of this thesis was based on two previously introduced theories of Tibetan nationalism, the theories of two prominent Tibet scholars, Ashild Kolas and George Dreyfus which I furthered on in my own research. Accordingly, I argued that through the complex of interactions between Tibetan traditional culture-mainly Buddhist culture -, modern secular political culture-mostly Western-, and the contemporary Indian policies, Tibetan nationalist discourse took a very idiosyncratic form which in fact offered us an interesting case study which both supported the grand theories of nationalism to a certain extent and questioned their simplified arguments in many ways. First and foremost, this study supported to the constructionist approaches that see nationalism as a modern phenomenon, which developed parallel to the capitalist modernity challenging to the primordialist approach which claim that national sense of belonging is primordial and natural. In this regard, the Tibetan case study clearly showed that Tibetan nationalist ideology was born out in the period when Tibetans experienced modernity, Chinese colonialism and displacement. Particularly, the last two, Chinese colonialism and the subsequent exile experience became the catalyst for the development of modern Tibetan nationalism. This study also agreed with the idea that mainstream Tibetan nationalism was primarily an elite project which was initiated by the political and intellectual elites of Tibetan exile community. The scope of this thesis did not allow for an extensive research on how and to what extent this elite project has been received by the “ordinary” Tibetan exiles and how did, in fact, affect their daily life. These are indeed important questions which should not be neglected and should be addressed in the further research on the subject. Finally, this study criticized the idea that non-Western or “third world” nationalism merely developed adopting “the modular norms of West”. Regarding Tibetan case, there is no doubt that Tibetans’ long and complicated relationship with the Western world in the context of
Shangri-la paradigm has been highly instrumental in the development of mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse. As the research chapters of this thesis showed clearly, both Western romantic images about Tibet and Tibetan society and Western secular norms such as democracy, human rights and environmentalism have been adopted to the mainstream Tibetan nationalist discourse. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Tibetan nationalism was the product of the Orientalist Western imagination-as having often thought- or Western Universalism. What is often neglected in the Eurocentric theories is the creative use and adaptation of the Western norms, values and imaginations by Tibetan exiles who modified them according to the traditional Tibetan values and consequently turned them into something neither entirely Western nor purely traditional.

With regard to the Tibetan exile nationalism and national building process, several other interrelated arguments have been made in this thesis. First of all, I claimed that many important themes and concepts that were integrated into Tibetan nationalist discourse by the Tibetan exile elites were strategically created-or(re)created- and promoted by the exile elites in order to influence the global political actors and the supra-national organizations and thereby, to recruit more international support to the Tibetan political campaign. As it can be seen in the example of the creation of “Green” Tibetan identity, whenever some ethical issues attract global interests, Tibetan exile elites appropriated them creating a new- and perhaps “better”- component to the image of “Tibetanness”. This thesis suggested that the main reason behind this strategic appropriation was Tibetans’ vulnerable situation as a stateless “nation” and their lack of economic and political power in the global political arena. At the very beginning of the exile experience, Tibetan exile elites realized that national imagination would only come true through the global consensus of the other nations of the world. It is then exactly for this reason, that Tibetan elites sought a way to manipulate global actors who, they thought, could have helped them to regain the “homeland” or to legitimize their political claims.

This research also showed that the construction of a Tibetan national identity was not only a strategy to influence the global audience but also a social engineering project of those Tibetan exile elites who dream(ed) to create a Tibetan nation which is capable of competing with its counterparts. As a part of this social engineering and nation building projects, the Dalai Lama and the CTA have attempted to homogenize the sectarian and religious differences of Tibetan
society, to standardize the Tibetan language through their educational and administrative institutions. As mentioned above, due to the limitations of my research, it was not possible to measure the success of these projects in the scope of this thesis. But nevertheless, it is still possible to argue that Tibetan exile elites have been successful to create an image of “national unity” at least in the eyes of the international public.

This thesis was an endeavor to read and to understand the history of mainstream Tibetan nationalism through a global perspective without neither falling into the trap of Eurocentric assumptions and thinking nor erasing out West of the historical inquiry-as some of Subaltern scholars suggested. In this regard, this thesis is above all a humble attempt to re-think the essentialized categories such as West, East, modernity, nationalism and identity which preclude the alternative readings of history. Although I tried to do such an alternative reading in the limited scope of this thesis, my work is far from being complete account of Tibetan nationalism. There are still important questions left to be asked and answered. Moreover, I firmly believed that further research on the different and varied sources, particularly the extensive research on the publications in Tibetan language as well as oral history projects, will be helpful to comprehend the character of Tibetan nationalism, especially grassroots nationalism much better. In this regard, I sincerely hope that my modest study may inspire more researchers and research projects to pursue the endeavor of understanding Tibetan nationalism.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE AGREEMENT OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TIBET ON MEASURES FOR THE PEACEFUL LIBERATION OF TIBET

23 MAY, 1951

The Tibetan nationality is one of the nationalities with a long history within the boundaries of China and, like many other nationalities, it has done its glorious duty in the course of the creation and development of the great motherland. But over the last hundred years and more, imperialist forces penetrated into China, and in consequence, also penetrated into the Tibetan region and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous reactionary Governments, the KMT [p.Kuomintang] reactionary government continued to carry out a policy of oppression and sowing dissension among the nationalities, causing division and disunity among the Tibetan people. The Local Government of Tibet did not oppose imperialist deception and provocations, but adopted an unpatriotic attitude towards the great motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering. In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nation-wide scale in the Chinese people's war of liberation; the common domestic enemy of all nationalities--the KMT reactionary government--was overthrown; and the common foreign enemy of all nationalities--the aggressive imperialist forces--was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the People's Republic of China and of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the People's Republic of China are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People's Republic of China may become one big family of fraternity and cooperation, composed of all its nationalities. Within this big family of nationalities of the People's Republic of China, national regional autonomy is to be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities are to have freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, and the Central People's Government will assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the direct leadership of the higher levels of People's Governments, all national minorities have fully enjoyed the right of national equality and have exercised, or are exercising, national regional autonomy. In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet may be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people may be freed and return to the big family of the People's Republic of China to enjoy

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the same rights of national equality as all other nationalities in the country and develop their political, economic, cultural, and educational work, the Central People's Government, when it ordered the People's Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local government of Tibet to send delegates to the Central Authorities to hold talks for the conclusion of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. At the latter part of April, 1951, the delegates with full powers from the Local Government of Tibet arrived in Peking. The Central People's Government appointed representatives with full powers to conduct talks on a friendly basis with the delegates of the Local Government of Tibet. The result of the talks is that both parties have agreed to establish this agreement and ensure that it be carried into effect.

1. The Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the motherland--the People's Republic of China.

2. The Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences.

3. In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government.

4. The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central Authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The established status, functions, and powers of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni is meant the status, functions and powers of the 13th Dalai Lama and of the 9th Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. The policy of freedom of religious belief laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference will be protected. The Central Authorities will not effect any change in the income of the monasteries.

8. The Tibetan troops will be reorganised step by step into the People's Liberation Army, and become a part of the national defence forces of the Central People's Government.

9. The spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality will be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry and commerce will be developed step by step, and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.
11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-KMT officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the KMT and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will abide by the above-mentioned policies and will also be fair in all buying and selling and will not arbitrarily take even a needle or a thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government will handle all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful co-existence with neighboring countries and the establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government will set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the Central People's Government it will absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the military and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the Local Government of Tibet, various district and various principal monasteries; the name list is to be prepared after consultation between the representatives designated by the Central People's Government and various quarters concerned, and is to be submitted to the Central People's Government for approval.

16. Funds needed by the military and administrative committee, the military area headquarters and the People's Liberation Army entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People's Government. The Local Government of Tibet should assist the People's Liberation Army in the purchases and transportation of food, fodder, and other daily necessities.

17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by delegates of the Central People's Government with full powers:

Chief Delegate: Li Wei-han (Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs);

Delegates: Chang Ching-wu, Chang Kuo-hua, Sun Chih-yuan

Delegates with full powers of the Local Government of Tibet:

Chief Delegate: Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme (Ngabo Shape) Delegates: Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, Khentrung Thuptan, Tenthar, Khenchung Thuptan Lekmuun Rimshi, Samposey Tenzin Thondup
APPENDIX B

Five Point Peace Plan (1987)\textsuperscript{271}

ADDRESS TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS FIVE POINT PLAN FOR TIBET

BY

HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA

WASHINGTON, D.C. SEPTEMBER 21, 1987

The world is increasingly interdependent, so that lasting peace - national, regional, and global - can only be achieved if we think in terms of broader interest rather than parochial needs. At this time, it is crucial that all of us, the strong and the weak, contribute in our own way. I speak to you today as the leader of the Tibetan people and as a Buddhist monk devoted to the principles of a religion based on love and compassion. Above all, I am here as a human being who is destined to share this planet with you and all others as brothers and sisters. As the world grows smaller, we need each other more than in the past. This is true in all parts of the world, including the continent I come from.

At present in Asia, as elsewhere, tensions are high. There are open conflicts in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and in my own country, Tibet. To a large extent, these problems are symptoms of the underlying tensions that exist among the area's great powers. In order to resolve regional conflicts, an approach is required that takes into account the interests of all relevant countries and peoples, large and small. Unless comprehensive solutions are formulated, that take into account the aspirations of the people most directly concerned, piecemeal or merely expedient measures will only create new problems.

The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace, and I believe they are in a unique position to do so. Traditionally, Tibetans are a peace loving and non-violent people. Since Buddhism was introduced to Tibet over one thousand years ago, Tibetans have practiced non-violence with respect to all forms of life. This attitude has also been extended to our country's international relations. Tibet's highly strategic position in the heart of Asia, separating the continent's great powers - India, China and the USSR - has throughout history endowed it with an essential role in the maintenance of peace and stability. This is precisely why, in the past, Asia's empires went to great lengths to keep one another out of Tibet. Tibet's value as an independent buffer state was integral to the region's stability.

When the newly formed People's Republic of China invaded Tibet in 1949/50, it created a new source of conflict. This was highlighted when, following the Tibetan national uprising against the Chinese and my flight to India in 1959, tensions between China and India escalated into the

border war in 1962. Today large numbers of troops are again massed on both sides of the Himalayan border and tension is once more dangerously high.

The real issue, of course, is not the Indo-Tibetan border demarcation. It is China's illegal occupation of Tibet, which has given it direct access to the Indian sub-continent. The Chinese authorities have attempted to confuse the issue by claiming that Tibet has always been a part of China. This is untrue. Tibet was a fully independent state when the People's Liberation Army invaded the country in 1949/50.

Since Tibetan emperors unified Tibet over a thousand years ago, our country was able to maintain its independence until the middle of this century. At times Tibet extended its influence over neighboring countries and peoples and, in other periods, came itself under the influence of powerful foreign rulers - the Mongol Khans, the Gorkhas of Nepal, the Manchu Emperors and the British in India.

It is, of course, not uncommon for states to be subjected to foreign influence or interference,. Although so-called satellite relationships are perhaps the clearest examples of this, most major powers exert influence over less powerful allies or neighbors. As the most authoritative legal studies have shown, in Tibet's case, the country's occasional subjection to foreign influence never entailed a loss of independence. And there can be no doubt that when Peking's communist armies entered Tibet, Tibet was in all respects an independent state.

China's aggression, condemned by virtually all nations of the free world, was a flagrant violation of international law. As China's military occupation of Tibet continues, the world should remember that though Tibetans have lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation.

It is not my purpose to enter a political/legal discussion here concerning Tibet's status. I just wish to emphasize the obvious and undisputed fact that we Tibetans are a distinct people with our own culture, language, religion and history. But for China's occupation, Tibet would still, today, fulfill its natural role as a buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in Asia.

It is my sincere desire, as well as that of the Tibetan people, to restore to Tibet her invaluable role, by converting the entire country - comprising the three provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo - once more into a place of stability, peace and harmony. In the best of Buddhist tradition, Tibet would extend its services and hospitality to all who further the cause of world peace and the well-being of mankind and the natural environment we share.

Despite the holocaust inflicted upon our people in the past decades of occupation, I have always strived to find a solution through direct and honest discussions with the Chinese. In 1982, following the change of leadership in China and the establishment of direct contacts with the government in Peking, I sent my representatives to Peking to open talks concerning the future of my country and people.

We entered the dialogue with a sincere and positive attitude and with a willingness to take into account the legitimate needs of the People's Republic of China. I hoped that this attitude would
be reciprocated and that a solution could eventually be found which would satisfy and safeguard the aspirations and interests of both parties. Unfortunately, China has consistently responded to our efforts in a defensive manner, as though our detailing of Tibet's very real difficulties was criticism for its own sake.

To our even greater dismay, the Chinese government misused the opportunity for a genuine dialogue. Instead of addressing the real issues facing the six million Tibetan people, China has attempted to reduce the question of Tibet to a discussion of my own personal status.

It is against this background and in response to the tremendous support and encouragement I have been given by you and other persons I have met during this trip, that I wish today to clarify the principal issues and to propose, in a spirit of openness and conciliation, a first step towards a lasting solution. I hope this may contribute to a future of friendship and cooperation with all of our neighbors, including the Chinese people.

This peace plan contains five basic components:

1. Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace;

2. Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;

3. Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;

4. Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;

5. Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Let me explain these five components.

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I propose that the whole of Tibet, including the eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo, be transformed into a zone of "Ahimsa", a Hindi term used to mean a state of peace and non-violence.

The establishment of such a peace zone would be in keeping with Tibet's historical role as a peaceful and neutral Buddhist nation and buffer state separating the continent's great powers. It would also be in keeping with Nepal's proposal to proclaim Nepal a peace zone and with China's declared support for such a proclamation. The peace zone proposed by Nepal would have a much greater impact if it were to include Tibet and neighboring areas.

The establishing of a peace zone in Tibet would require withdrawal of Chinese troops and military installations from the country, which would enable India also to withdraw troops and
military installations from the Himalayan regions bordering Tibet. This would be achieved under an international agreement which would satisfy China's legitimate security needs and build trust among the Tibetan, Indian, Chinese and other peoples of the region. This is in everyone's best interest, particularly that of China and India, as it would enhance their security, while reducing the economic burden of maintaining high troop concentrations on the disputed Himalayan border.

Historically, relations between China and India were never strained. It was only when Chinese armies marched into Tibet, creating for the first time a common border, that tensions arose between these two powers, ultimately leading to the 1962 war. Since then numerous dangerous incidents have continued to occur. A restoration of good relations between the world's two most populous countries would be greatly facilitated if they were separated - as they were throughout history - by a large and friendly buffer region.

To improve relations between the Tibetan people and the Chinese, the first requirement is the creation of trust. After the holocaust of the last decades in which over one million Tibetans - one sixth of the population - lost their lives and at least as many lingered in prison camps because of their religious beliefs and love of freedom, only a withdrawal of Chinese troops could start a genuine process of reconciliation. The vast occupation force in Tibet is a daily reminder to the Tibetans of the oppression and suffering they have all experienced. A troop withdrawal would be an essential signal that in the future a meaningful relationship might be established with the Chinese, based on friendship and trust.

The population transfer of Chinese into Tibet, which the government in Peking pursues in order to force a "final solution" to the Tibetan problem by reducing the Tibetan population to an insignificant and disenfranchised minority in Tibet itself, must be stopped.

The massive transfer of Chinese civilians into Tibet in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a distinct people. In the eastern parts of our country, the Chinese now greatly outnumber Tibetans. In the Amdo province, for example, where I was born, there are, according to Chinese statistics, 2.5 million Chinese and only 750,000 Tibetans. Even in so-called Tibet Autonomous Region (i.e., central and western Tibet), Chinese government sources now confirm that Chinese outnumber Tibetans.

The Chinese population transfer policy is not new. It has been systematically applied to other areas before. Earlier in this century, the Manchus were a distinct race with their own culture and traditions. Today only two to three million Manchurians are left in Manchuria, where 75 million Chinese have settled. In Eastern Turkestan, which the Chinese now call Sinkiang, the Chinese population has grown from 200,000 in 1949 to 7 million, more than half of the total population of 13 million. In the wake of the Chinese colonization of Inner Mongolia, Chinese number 8.5 million, Mongols 2.5 million.

Today, in the whole of Tibet 7.5 million Chinese settlers have already been sent, outnumbering the Tibetan population of 6 million. In central and western Tibet, now referred to by the Chinese...
as the "Tibet Autonomous Region", Chinese sources admit the 1.9 million Tibetans already constitute a minority of the region's population. These numbers do not take the estimated 300,000 - 500,000 troops in Tibet into account - 250,000 of them in the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region.

For the Tibetans to survive as a people, it is imperative that the population transfer is stopped and Chinese settlers return to China. Otherwise, Tibetans will soon be no more than a tourist attraction and relic of a noble past.

Fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms must be respected in Tibet. The Tibetan people must once again be free to develop culturally, intellectually, economically and spiritually and to exercise basic democratic freedoms.

Human rights violations in Tibet are among the most serious in the world. Discrimination is practiced in Tibet under a policy of "apartheid" which the Chinese call "segregation and assimilation". Tibetans are, at best, second class citizens in their own country. Deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms, they exist under a colonial administration in which all real power is wielded by Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the army.

Although the Chinese government allows Tibetan to rebuild some Buddhist monasteries and to worship in them, it still forbids serious study and teaching of religion. Only a small number of people, approved by the Communist Party, are permitted to join the monasteries.

While Tibetans in exile exercise their democratic rights under a constitution promulgated by me in 1963, thousands of our countrymen suffer in prisons and labor camps in Tibet for their religious or political convictions.

Serious efforts must be made to restore the natural environment in Tibet. Tibet should not be used for the production of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear waste.

Tibetans have a great respect for all forms of life. This inherent feeling is enhanced by the Buddhist faith, which prohibits the harming of all sentient beings, whether human or animal. Prior to the Chinese invasion, Tibet was an unspoiled wilderness sanctuary in a unique natural environment. Sadly, in the past decades the wildlife and the forests of Tibet have been almost totally destroyed by the Chinese. The effects on Tibet's delicate environment have been devastating. What little is left in Tibet must be protected and efforts must be made to restore the environment to its balanced state.

China uses Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and may also have started dumping nuclear waste in Tibet. Not only does China plan to dispose of its own nuclear waste but also that of other countries, who have already agreed to pay Peking to dispose of their toxic materials.
The dangers this presents are obvious. Not only living generations, but future generations are threatened by China's lack of concern for Tibet's unique and delicate environment.

Negotiations on the future status of Tibet and the relationship between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples should be started in earnest.

We wish to approach this subject in a reasonable and realistic way, in a spirit of frankness and conciliation and with a view to finding a solution that in the long term interest of all: the Tibetans, the Chinese, and all other peoples concerned. Tibetans and Chinese are distinct peoples, each with their own country, history, culture, language and way of life. Differences among peoples must be recognized and respected. They need not, however, form obstacles to genuine cooperation where this is in the mutual benefit of both peoples. It is my sincere belief that if the concerned parties were to meet and discuss their future with an open mind and a sincere desire to find a satisfactory and just solution, a breakthrough could be achieved. We must all exert ourselves to be reasonable and wise, and to meet in a spirit of frankness and understanding.

Let me end on a personal note. I wish to thank you for the concern and support which you and so many of your colleagues and fellow citizens have expressed for the plight of oppressed people everywhere. The fact that you have publicly shown your sympathy for us Tibetans, has already had a positive impact on the lives of our people inside Tibet. I ask for your continued support in this critical time in our country's history.

Thank you.


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