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Universiteit Leiden



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Author: Krijtenburg, Margriet

Title: Schuman's Europe : his frame of reference

Issue Date: 2012-09-11

CHAPTER THREE

Robert Schuman: The Plan

This chapter will start off by addressing the common assumption that Monnet was the principal architect of the Schuman Declaration. This will be followed by an overview of Schuman's political career, the circumstances of which contributed to the launch of the Schuman Declaration. The next section will be on the way the Schuman Declaration was launched, its content and on how it was received, as well as explain why the Declaration was a revolutionary move.

The final section covers Schuman's thinking on the key concepts of European unification. Some of these have already been mentioned in the two previous chapters but due to their importance in the creation of the Schuman Declaration they deserve to be looked at in greater detail.

3.1 Schuman Declaration: Schuman's or Monnet's?

Monnet²⁸⁴ is commonly presented as the inventor of the European unification project²⁸⁵ (that is, the Schuman Plan). Theodore White diminished Schuman's role in his *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in mid-century* (1953) saying:

284. Many think Monnet is, together with his team, the protagonist of the Schuman Declaration based on the detailed description of Monnet's *Mémoires* about this period and on Monnet's noticeable presence in European affairs. This last decade, however, there is increasing evidence that Schuman and his staff were the brains behind the Schuman Declaration. This 'discovery' is based on archives that opened and facilitated the study of Schuman's speeches, writings and actions of the years before, during and after the Declaration.

285. Alan S. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951*, (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd, 1984), 395. "The Schuman Plan was invented to safeguard the Monnet Plan" (See also Introduction); Tony Judt, *Postwar, a history of Europe since 1945*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 156. "Monnet proposed to France's Foreign Minister what became known to history as the Schuman Plan" (See also Introduction).

Schuman was looking for some token to offer to Germany as an earnest of good will. Schuman liked Monnet's project, accepted it, offered to give it his name and bring it before the Cabinet.²⁸⁶

Jos Kapteyn and Pieter Verloren van Themaat limited Schuman's role to the actual launch of the Declaration in their *The Law of the European Union and the European Communities* (2008) when they wrote "Schuman and Monnet (the intellectual father of the plan)".²⁸⁷ So did Dick Leonard when he wrote in his *Guide to the European Union* (1994) "Monnet's proposal, which was put forward by the French government as the Schuman Plan".²⁸⁸ The idea of Monnet as the principal initiator of the European unification also found its expression in the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (2011).²⁸⁹ Alan Milward, while also regarding Monnet as the inventor of the Declaration, did give some credit to Schuman in this regard, when he wrote:

That the substance of the proposals came from Monnet and the Planning Commissariat [and that this] need not be doubted and the timing of their submission reflects Monnet's shrewd sense of stage at which French policy had arrived. [...] But the

286. Theodor White, *Fire in the Ashes: Europe in mid-century*, (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953), 262.

287. P.J.G. (Jos) Kapteyn, Pieter Verloren van Themaat, *The Law of the European Union and the European Communities*, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International BV, 4th revised edition, 2008), 4.

288. Dick Leonard, *Guide to the European Union*, (London: The Economist in Association with Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1994), 4. "Monnet's proposal, which was put forward by the French government as the Schuman Plan". Leonard's comment on the Schuman Plan echoes Milward's comments on the rebuilding of Europe *The reconstruction of Western Europe* which is generally taken as a book of reference by those who study European affairs after the Second World War.

289. Mike Walker, *Beyond Borders (play)*, (London: BBC Radio 4, 16 December 2011); John Tusa, *The European Dream (documentary)*, (London: BBC Radio 4, 17 December 2011). A critical comment on this broadcasting from David Heilbron Price was: "Monnet seems to have persistently claimed the parentage of earlier ideas that were first circulated by others. The BBC should have been aware of this, especially when it could easily be checked where it dealt with British politics" in *Monnet9: The BBC becomes a propaganda voice for the Monnet Myth (article)*, <http://www.eurdemocracy.blogspot.com>, 29 December 2011.

ultimate credit for the Schuman Plan must go to Schuman himself. He had the courage to act quickly.²⁹⁰

The Schuman Declaration was based on more than Schuman's courage. Recently opened Schuman Archives and other sources of information²⁹¹ make clear that Schuman was not only the one "who had the courage to act quickly", but also the one who patiently and steadily prepared the ground for the reconciliation policy and the supranational structure of a European community. He did so in order to come to a European unification that would solve the 'German question' and that would make war impossible between the members of that European community. These sources explain that Schuman focused on the Franco-German common interests in coal and steel as a means for integration and practical interdependence to eradicate the possibility of another war.²⁹² As a French Deputy representing the most strategic region in France, Lorraine, for more than thirty years, Schuman, as these sources explain, had a great expertise on coal, steel and their cause for war unlike the other politicians and unlike Monnet.²⁹³

290. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951*, 396.

291. The Archives of the *Maison de Robert Schuman* opened in 2007. Other sources of information such as biographies on Robert Schuman and *Pour l' Europe*. See bibliography.

292. Schuman did not envision a federal union like the United States, nor a trading block of nations, but a community of peoples with a new political system which was the supranational system.

293. The district of Thionville, a city of steel in Lorraine, was itself of the most crucial importance in three wars: the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the two world wars. See: Heilbron Price, *Robert Schuman and the making of Europe*, 13. Heilbron Price also quotes the words written at the beginning of the First World War by M. Weiss, Director of Mines at the French Ministry of Public Works, to the army underling about the prime strategic importance of the iron production near Thionville and the need to bomb the area. The document submitted to the French General Staff concluded: "The occupation of the region of Thionville would immediately put an end to the war, because it would deprive Germany of almost the whole of metal that it needs for its armaments." His advice, however, was never taken up. The reason why it was never taken up is according to one of Schuman's fellow deputies "the most murky of all mysteries, the tightest of secrets, the web of the most closely-conjured obscurities."

Documents found in Schuman's Archives show that the project Monnet presented to Schuman was primarily the output of Schuman's thoughts, which came to Monnet through Schuman's close collaborators Reuter and Clappier who joined Monnet's team for the matter. Reuter, Schuman's right-hand man in the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry, wrote the first draft of the Schuman proposal, not Monnet as David Heilbron Price makes clear in his book *Schuman or Monnet?*. Heilbron Price comments the following:

The very first pencilled drafts of the Schuman Declaration and key parts of the treaty were hand-written by Paul Reuter. He could not be described as 'a close colleague' of Monnet. He was Schuman's legal adviser at the Foreign Ministry. Bernard Clappier, Schuman's head of private staff, and Paul Reuter were instrumental in stimulating Jean Monnet and his team of economics and engineers to involve themselves in the Declaration. Its initiation by two key staff members of the Foreign Minister should have alerted historians, some of who implied the Declaration was Monnet's idea and his contribution alone.²⁹⁴

The fact that Monnet had no intentions to strive towards European unification as visualized in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 is made clear when in April 1950, he still considered creating a buffer-state Lotharingia which would be composed of part of Belgium, Luxembourg, Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar and Ruhr territory. This newly created state would separate the main industries of coal and steel from Germany and therewith dismantle its strength based on heavy industry. Heilbron Price says regarding this episode:

It turned out that in April 1950 Monnet still had the idea of creating a buffer state called Lotharingia between eastern France and Germany. It would separate the rest of Germany from its heavy industries and supposedly pacify it. Professor Reuter, a Lorrainer, dissuaded him; separating people such as

294. Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, (Brussels: Bron Communications, 2003) 8, 9. The first draft was typed in the office and not at Monnet's home as is suggested in Monnet's *Mémoires*.

German Rhinelanders, Alsace-Lorrainers, Belgians and Luxembourgers from their home countries was 'against Nature'. It was for this reason that Monnet then asked Reuter - who was familiar with Schuman's thoughts, to prepare the first draft of the Declaration.²⁹⁵

Monnet affirmed that Reuter was at the origin of the High Authority, the word and the substance.²⁹⁶ And that he himself had no concrete ideas at that stage.²⁹⁷

After accepting this draft version on European unification Monnet's input regarding the Declaration would concern mainly technicalities. He would know best how to achieve economic integration. His contribution would be the fruit of his experiences in the League of Nations, the The Hague Congress and of the knowledge, which he shared with Schuman, of the contemporary problems France and Germany faced regarding the Saar and Rhur regions. In fact he himself had caused part of those problems with the project he had proposed as Head of the French Planning Commission to De Gaulle after the Second World War.²⁹⁸ The Germans protested against this project because it channelled all the financial and economic benefits to France and left them with only their political independence. This project, which Monnet had suggested at the time, was in line with De Gaulle's policy of dismantling the German coal and steel industry. It had, however, become clear, also to Monnet, that this was not the way to solve the 'German question'. He therefore supported Reuter's, read Schuman's, idea of a reconciliation policy with the integration of economic interests as this would be able to solve the problem.

295. Paul Reuter, *La naissance de l'Europe communautaire*, (Lausanne Jean Monnet Foundation, 1980). See also: *Mélanges Fernand Dehousse*, vol 2. 1980, 65-69.

296. Monnet, *Mémoires*, 352-353.

297. Monnet, *Mémoires*, 342.

298. See also: Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951*, 129.

The fact that Monnet is regarded by many as the main architect of Europe, has as a consequence that the idea of Europe is often regarded as purely economic, while the economy was in reality meant to be no more, and no less, than an instrument for European unification. Schuman's range of thought was far greater as we saw in the previous chapters and will see in the following pages. His vision was primarily focused on achieving a European community, a gathering of European nations, whose peace be guaranteed with the help of a supranational structure. Economic interdependence would be a means to make war impossible and contribute to the sense of community in which the human person played a pivotal role and in which Christianity was at the base of the moral order. The latter was understood, but not made explicit in the Schuman Declaration.

Because of Schuman's self-effacing personality, which was commented on in the first chapter, this never came to light. He did not mind and even seemed to prefer to obliterate himself and avoid the recognition of being the main father of this unique form of governmental policy that had never existed before. It is even acknowledged by historians and contemporaries that Schuman went out of his way to hide his own contribution.²⁹⁹

His personality seems to have prevented his close collaborators for a long time from protesting against the underestimation of Schuman as the principal architect of Declaration. Thirty years after the Schuman Declaration Reuter confirmed Schuman's main role in the process. Reuter stated at a conference of Europe's most eminent historians that they had neglected Schuman's subtle, self-effacing

299. See also: Heilbron Price, *Robert Schuman and the making of Europe* (manuscript), 1.

style of politics, his pre-occupations and methods. They should have concentrated more on substance not on Monnet's personality.³⁰⁰

Another consequence of Schuman's personality is that it is hard to find any information written by Schuman himself on the gradual development of his ideas across the years on European unification. The only booklet he wrote, which was only published posthumously, as mentioned in the Introduction, was his *Pour l'Europe* in which he had put down his main remarks and comments made during speeches that concerned the principal issues of the European unification history and the process and guidelines Europe should not part from.

Monnet writes in his *Memoires* that he handed the draft-project to Schuman on the Friday evening and that Schuman gave his consent on the Monday right after the weekend. It would not have been consistent with Schuman's personality to make such a revolutionary move without having carefully considered it. Thus, this relatively swift consent would suggest that Schuman was already familiar with its content. He was renowned for his political skills and accuracy. He had prepared the ground for a reconciliation policy in France³⁰¹ and already discussed and spoken about the possibility of European unification with his main colleagues Adenauer from Germany and De Gasperi from Italy before Monnet handed over the project that would become the Schuman Declaration. Monnet himself acknowledged

300. Paul Reuter, *International Conference of Professors of Contemporary History*, Luxemburg 1982, 16 (CEC 1982).

301. Schuman's reconciliation policy is already clearly evidenced in Marcel Bérain's observation made in the winter of 1939. Marcel Bérain was a young student teacher at the time he met Schuman in 1939 when the German attack on France could happen any moment. He recalled how Schuman reacted immediately to his belligerent talk towards Germany. Schuman had said that they should try to win the war as the war was imposed on France, but that once the war was over and there would be peace, he, Schuman, counted on him and his colleagues to teach the young people above all about brotherhood, not only confined to national borders, but extended to all peoples, beginning with their neighbours. See: Marcel Bérain, *Entretiens avec Schuman*, typescript. See also: Heilbron Price, *Robert Schuman*, 16.

Schuman's rare qualities as a politician and mentioned Schuman's 'lucid vision' of a working synergy integrating France, Germany and other countries in a 'united Europe' when he said:

It is a matter of great fortune for Europe that a man possessing such rare qualities was in place to open the route for a peaceful revolution.

[Schuman had a] lucid vision for the future of the countries of Europe.

[Schuman] had long reflected on the means to reconcile definitively France and Germany in combining their energies with the aim of integrating them in a united Europe in the service of peace and mankind.³⁰²

The opening up of the Schuman Archives, of which the Archives of *Maison de Robert Schuman* opened in 2007, and the insight in Schuman's background disclose Schuman's preparation work for and main role in the European unification process and unravel to a large extent the 'mysterious' element which according to Milward accompanied the extraordinary and lasting prosperity of the Schuman Declaration in Western Europe.

No one knew when or why it [this extraordinary prosperity] had started, and I soon discovered that neither did I. It was in fact not only one of the most unexpected events in Western Europe's history, but remains one of the most unexplained.³⁰³

The material from the archives also supports the assumption that Schuman's personal background predisposed him to European

302. *Revue générale* 1973, n. 6, 11. Quoted in: Heilbron Price, *Robert Schuman and the making of Europe* (manuscript), 9. In an interview I had with David Heilbron Price, he comments on the fact that in Monnet's *Mémoires* hardly any reference is made to Schuman's vision. Heilbron Price explains the latter saying that the *Mémoires* were not written by Monnet himself, and that the references to Schuman must have been either consciously ignored by the biographer or simply not have been noted down in writing by Monnet himself so as to be used as a source of information.

303. Milward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951*, Preface, XV.

integration and that Schuman, not Monnet, was the main architect of European unification.

3.1.1 Monnet's Mémoires and Schuman

He reflected for a long time, but he knew how to act quickly when he found the response to the grave problems that he settled on his conscience. To reconcile France and Germany was his deep preoccupation at that time. The surprise was total when this man who was so reserved proposed what no two nations had ever done before: place in common their vital resources, precisely those which were the source of their conflicts. This revolutionary gesture was accomplished without vain ostentation, with a sincerity that convinced at once all those to whom it was addressed. There was no ulterior motive in the French proposal. It was simple and frank; that is why it carried greater conviction in people's minds and had more consequences on events than the most carefully crafted schemes.

Jean Monnet on Schuman

Of course Schuman's *Pour l'Europe* and materials from the Archives provide a precious source of information on Schuman's thoughts about European unification. But Monnet's *Mémoires* must be mentioned as well as it is referred to frequently and used as a book of reference by scholars, students, and professionals in the field of the EU. The book reflects Monnet's version of what happened the days in which Monnet himself, Schuman and several specialists from different fields worked closely together in order to design what would become known as the Schuman Declaration. The entire sequence of events that accompanied the launch and reception of the Schuman Declaration is described from Monnet's point of view. The *Mémoires* also give an insight into the tense atmosphere within the country and the need to act in order to avoid a division amongst the people. People were devastated because of the ruins of war, and the lack of work, money and housing. And they were gripped by the fear of the outbreak of

another world war, and by the threat of Communism. Monnet argued that not the states but the people needed to be united in the first place.

³⁰⁴ This statement reflects the central importance of the citizen and of solidarity in the unification process.

He stated in his *Mémoires* the main challenges Schuman would experience as Minister of Foreign Affairs during his governmental period, that is, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the undesirable separation of Germany into an East and West Germany in 1949 and the urgent need for the recovery and rearmament of Western Germany. Monnet recalled that it was thought better to leave Europe out of this continental conflict between the two super-powers: “Let’s leave Europe out of these clashes.” But this was precisely the wrong attitude to take, according to him. Europe should take an active part in solving the problems it was itself complicit in creating.³⁰⁵

Monnet observed the impact the Cold War had on the minds of people, who had become locked up in their thoughts and fears. They needed to be given hope and he, like Schuman, was convinced that in order to do so the mentality had to change. Thorough action was needed to inspire this change of mentality.³⁰⁶ But at the same time, political prudence was called for, as there was a fierce opposition. On 9 May 1950 and the days before Schuman had to move cautiously within the government, so as not to give his opponents the opportunity

304. Monnet, *Mémoires*. The motto of *Mémoires* is: “Nous ne coalisons pas des États, nous unissons des hommes.”

305. Monnet mentioned the following to Beuve-Méry, director of *Le Monde* and a good friend: “L’absence des pays de l’Ouest européen dans les grandes décisions du monde, est précisément la cause du déséquilibre contre lequel vous pensez nous prémunir. Il faut au contraire que nous reprenions activement notre place dans le règlement des problèmes où l’Occident est tout entier engagé.” (in response to : “Laissons l’Europe en dehors de ces affrontements.”)

306. Monnet, *Mémoires*, 344. “Il faut une action profonde, réelle, immédiate et dramatique qui change les choses et fasse entrer dans la réalité les espoirs auxquels les peuples sont sur le point de ne plus croire.”

to block the Plan that was meant to bring about the integration of Germany into a European unification process. Only certain crucial individuals were informed of the project. From the government itself, these were the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Justice, who both favoured a policy of reconciliation and were highly respected within the government. Schuman also sent an envoy, Robert Mischlich, to Bonn to inform Adenauer of the proposed Declaration and to ask for his consent, as Schuman did not want to launch the Declaration before being absolutely certain of German consent.³⁰⁷ It was only after receiving Adenauer's consent that Schuman made the Declaration public at the Council of Ministers as the very last point on the agenda.³⁰⁸ The two Ministers that were informed beforehand supported the Plan and therefore no protests followed and the Declaration was accepted. Schuman thus somehow managed to mislead Prime Minister Bidault and pushed through the Declaration that not only unified France and Germany, but that was open to any democratic country interested in establishing a community without any form of discrimination or restriction. Monnet's *Memoires* also illustrate that the Schuman Declaration meant a historic break with former policies of enmity. The *Memoires*, however, lack accuracy on occasion in that they incorrectly give the main credit to Monnet and do not mention that the content of the Declaration was basically given and written by Schuman's close collaborators Reuter and Clappier and prepared by Schuman (see 3.1). The latter had prepared the

307. Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen: 1945–1953*, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), 328. "Ich teilte unverzüglich Robert Schuman mit, dass Ich seinem Vorschlag aus ganzem Herzen zustimme." Ibid., 335. "Die Bundesregierung erblicke in dem Schuman-Plan die Bildung eines wirklich dauerhaften Fundamentes für eine europäische Föderation, und die Bundesregierung werde sich diesem Plan mit ganzer Kraft widmen."

308. See: Robert Schuman, "Rede van de heer Schuman," in: *De verwezenlijking van een groot denkbeeld: Europa*, Publicity services of the European Community 2489.4.60.1, 9 May 1960.

Declaration through his policy of reconciliation, speeches in international contexts such as at the start of the Council of Europe (May 1949) and through talks with Adenauer and De Gasperi on a community of nations governed by supranational institutions to guide and control the Franco-German common industry of coal and steel to start with.

3.2 Schuman: his crucial impact on European unification

A closer look at Schuman's life from his first appointment as a Minister in 1940 onwards will provide further explanatory details regarding his vision on how Europe should overcome the dangerous and weakened situation it was experiencing immediately after the Second World War. It might thus shed more light on why Schuman can be considered to some extent a man of his circumstances, next to being a person of exceptional qualities, as he was able to initiate and launch the kind of project of European unification he did.

3.2.1 Schuman: 1940 – 1945

In March 1940, when the Second World War had been raging for several months, Schuman received a ministerial post for the first time. He was appointed the Under-Secretary of State for Refugees³⁰⁹ in Paul Reynaud's government also because he was from the Lorraine region and because he was familiar with German culture. After Reynaud's government fell on 16 June he automatically continued in Pétain's government until July 1940 when the new government would be

309. See also: Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 133. Roth, 593. Reynaud's government went to Bordeaux in the spring of 1940. The people from Alsace-Lorraine had to evacuate their region in 1939 even before the German troops entered France, because the Maginot-line for defence was situated at some distance between the Eastern French frontier and the West. Eastern France thus faced a refugee crisis. Most of them went to Poitiers in the central-western part of France.

formed. Pétain wanted an armistice between France and Germany. Schuman too preferred not to go to war, which was proposed by De Gaulle³¹⁰. The latter was furious about the armistice that came about. De Gaulle would accuse Schuman years later of collaborating with the Germans³¹¹ because Schuman had initially been in favour of an armistice. De Gaulle, however, later also acknowledged that this was an unjust reproach.³¹² Schuman strongly opposed Nazism, as is made

310. Charles De Gaulle (1890–1970), French general and statesman, led the French Free Forces during the Second World War. He opposed Pétain’s wish for armistice vehemently at the beginning of the war and was angry with Schuman for being in favour of the armistice. Years later, when Schuman became first Prime Minister and then Minister of Foreign Affairs, De Gaulle strongly opposed Schuman’s post-war policies of reconciliation between France and Germany. He did not support the idea of European integration at that time and was opposed to the Schuman Declaration and the subsequent creation of the European Community for Coal and Steel. However, from 1958 onwards his attitude changed. In that year De Gaulle founded the French Fifth Republic and became its first President. He showed himself to be in favour of European integration and valued a close collaboration with Germany. The United States and Great Britain were to be kept aside according to De Gaulle. De Gaulle resigned from the presidency in 1969. He passed away the following year.

311. See also: Roth, 412. (De Gaulle said: (mt)“Schuman, is a Jerry ; he is a good Jerry, but he is nevertheless a Jerry!” “Schuman, c’est un Boche; c’est un bon Boche, mais c’est un Boche tout de même!”).

312. See: Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 10. Despite De Gaulle’s inimical attitude towards Schuman, it was the same De Gaulle who right after the Second World War cleared Schuman of the accusation that he had been a collaborator of the Germans. This clearance made possible that Schuman was accepted as the representative of the Lorraine region in parliament.

Schuman has never been persued by the Gaullists and Communists because of his involvement in the ‘Munich Treason’ of 1938 when he, as the representative of Alsace-Lorraine, was in favour of having Hitler incorporating part of Czechoslovakia in order to avoid war (the Munich Treason). The reason why Schuman pleaded in favour was that he represented the people of Alsace-Lorraine of which the great majority wanted to safeguard peace in France at any cost. They were afraid a new war would start when they opposed themselves to Hitler’s project. Schuman encouraged actively safeguarding peace at any cost. It was only a year later, when Hitler invaded Poland that he and the others became aware of their own naïveté. See Poidevin, *homme d’État*, 121-124 and Baudet, Thierry, “Juist Europese eenwording leidt tot oorlog”, in: de *NRC*, 23 juni 2012, 4.

Schuman’s attitude resembles his initial wish to safeguard peace at all costs when the Germans had started to invade France for which he supported in the (very) beginning Pétain’s suggestion of armistice.

With reference to Schuman’s forebears can be mentioned that he had no German ancestors. Several generations of Schuman’s family had come from the general area around Lorraine-Luxembourg and the neighbouring southern part of

clear in the first chapter and will be made evident later on. When Pétain's new government had to be formed in July 1940, Schuman's post of Under-Secretary of State was discontinued. The post of Director of the Secretary of Refugees was offered instead, but Schuman rejected the offer and resigned from the Pétain government.³¹³ Schuman only continued in politics as a Member of Parliament. Even though Schuman rejected Pétain's offer, he was caught in a trap on 10 July 1940 when he, still being a Member of the National Assembly, was required to come to Vichy like the rest of the National Assembly (Pétain's government had moved to Vichy because the Germans now occupied Paris). When he arrived at Vichy, he and other deputies of Alsace Lorraine were forced by Pierre Laval of the Vichy government to give full powers to Pétain so as not have the Germans think that the people of Alsace Lorraine did not want to remain French citizens. Schuman therefore signed. It turned out to be no more than a trick of Laval so as to acquire enough signatures needed to support Pétain's government, that he, Pierre Laval, had to give shape. After signing the papers Schuman decided to go to Poitiers where most of the refugees from Alsace-Lorraine were stationed, so as to uplift their situation and see if they could go back to Alsace-Lorraine now that the armistice was a fact and their situation supposedly safe. But when he arrived back in Metz a few weeks later to arrange some matters for the refugees and burn papers that should not fall into German hands, the situation turned out not to be safe at all. Schuman got arrested by the Gestapo as the first Member of

Belgium. De Gaulle did have family in Germany. (from interview with David Heilbron Price, May 2011)

313. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 42.

Parliament.³¹⁴ This happened on 14 September 1940, most probably because of him having left Pétain's government.³¹⁵

Schuman's biographer Robert Rochefort mentions that the Germans wanted Schuman to cooperate with and endorse the re-incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine into the German Reich. Rochefort explains how Schuman refused unhesitatingly, also when offered the position of *Gauleiter* (Governor) of Alsace-Lorraine.³¹⁶ As a consequence he was sent to prison for the next seven months and placed under house arrest in Neustadt (Pfalz).³¹⁷ He escaped, however, in August 1942 and hid in an abbey of Benedictine monks close to Poitiers. From there he went to Lyon and other cities to speak to war refugees and others about hope for victory and the defeat that awaited the Nazis, convictions based on his experiences in Neustadt.

The Neustadt episode and the following years are also described in detail by Schuman's other biographer François Roth. He explains that Schuman was forced to live clandestinely after having escaped from German house arrest, also because of his dealings with the resistance. At his places of hiding, mostly monasteries, he read the

314. *Ibid.*, 42, 43.

315. See: "Der Kopf der Woche", in: *Die Weltwoche*, Zürich 21 November 1952. "Pétain suchte seine Mitarbeit im Juli 1940; doch Schuman lehnte ab und wird deshalb von den Deutschen verhaftet, die ihn sieben Monate lang in Metz in einer Zelle behielten. Dann wurde er von der Gestapo nach Neustadt deportiert." (Pétain asked for his collaboration in July 1940; but Schuman refused and was because of this arrested by the Germans, who put him for seven months in jail in Metz. After that he was deported to Neustadt by the Gestapo).

316. Rochefort, 97. When Schuman was in Neustadt he managed to meet with George Ditsch, his legal colleague in Kaiserlautern in April 1942. Schuman was in constant danger, but nevertheless explained how he saw this new Europe he had in mind arising. "This war, terrible though it is, will finish one day and will finish by the victory of the free world. [...] There are strong chances that there will appear more than ever, an exacerbated conflict between the free world whose roots lie in Christian civilization and the Soviet empire with its atheistic materialism. That is the reason why there is no question of perpetuating the hatred and the resentment towards Germans."

317. Lejeune, *Robert Schuman*, 107.

works of St. Thomas Aquinas³¹⁸, St. John of the Cross, as well as Shakespeare to perfect his English. Rochefort mentions that Schuman not only spoke out clearly against Nazism, but that he already began to speak to his friends at that time of the need to reconstruct post-war Europe on the basis of an institutional fusion of France and Germany:³¹⁹ “Even as far back as 1942 when he was on the run from the Gestapo, Schuman had been reflecting on the need for a victorious France to create a new Europe in cooperation with Germany.”³²⁰ In April 1942 he wrote down his thoughts, projects and vision of the future of Europe in a letter to his friend and fellow lawyer in Thionville, George Ditch, saying:

This war, horrible as it may seem, will one day end well with the victory of the free world. Force has never been able to triumph over justice for a long time [...] It should not lead to a perpetual hate and resentment towards the Germans. On the contrary, without forgetting about the past, we and our allies should look for the cause of the wars and come to structures that make the return of such cataclysms impossible. The solutions can only be found within a unified European framework. A similar thing has been tried in the past, but by brutal force.

Only a democratic enterprise will be able to count with the approval of the nations. This time we should finish off completely all the territorial ambitions that generate new

318. Roth, 262.

319. Rochefort, 128–132. See also: Schuman project, Brussels, 2004. During his house arrest in Neustadt (1941–42) Schuman succeeded in collecting intelligence information secretly from German sources and a top-secret economic Nazi report. His conclusion after statistical analysis was that German defeat was certain even though Nazi power was at that time attaining its greatest expansion and appeared to others as invincible: its armies attacked Leningrad and Moscow. He already told visiting friends then about the need for post-war European structure. Once he had escaped he chose to stay and work underground in occupied France. This meant three years of living clandestinely with a 100,000 Reichmark reward on his head. He spoke to Resistance friends (much to their consternation) on need for postwar reconciliation with Germany. He rejected De Gaulle’s invitation to come to London. Schuman preferred to stay with compatriots in Nazi-occupied France, changing address continuously. He prepared work for solid supranational European institutions and a healthier democracy once Europe was liberated.

320. Rochefort, 128–132. See also: Fimister, 186 and Roth, 250.

conflicts and look for the unification of all through cooperation.³²¹

Those thoughts are also reflected in his words after the war when he says:

War and the destruction it caused, together with liberating victory, were undertaken collectively. If we want peace to last and supplant war, we must take joint steps towards this, by associating everyone, including those who fought against each other in the past and who might, once more, face each other in bloody rivalries.³²²

Those first words mentioned above, written down in 1942, show Schuman's eagerness to find a solution to the seemingly never-ending problem of war on the European continent. They already give an idea of the blueprint of European unification striven towards after the Second World War. At that time, Schuman already wanted Franco-German reconciliation, the creation of new basic structures that made another war impossible, a European unification in accordance with democracy, and cooperation as a means for this unification to come about.³²³

321. René Lejeune, *Une âme pour l'Europe*, (Paris-Fribourg: Ed. Saint Paul, 1986), 90. "Cette guerre, si terrible qu'elle soit, finira bien un jour, et elle finira par la victoire du monde libre. La force n'a jamais pu durablement triompher du droit [...]. Il ne saurait être question de perpétuer la haine et nos ressentiments à l'encontre des Allemands. Tout au contraire, sans oublier le passé, il faudra avec nos alliés, rechercher la cause des guerres et imaginer des structures rendant impossible le retour de tels cataclysmes. Les solutions ne pourront être trouvées que dans le cadre d'une Europe unifiée. Une telle chose a déjà été tentée dans le passé, mais par la force brutale. Seule une entreprise démocratique sera susceptible de recueillir le consentement des nations. Cette fois, il faut faire table rase de toutes les ambitions territoriales génératrices de nouveaux conflits et chercher l'union de tous dans la coopération." See also: Muñoz, 43.

322. Schuman, *For Europe*, 32. "La guerre et sa destruction, comme la victoire libératrice, ont été oeuvre collective. La paix, si nous voulons qu'elle devienne une victoire durable sur la guerre, devra d'édifier en commun, par tous les peuples, y compris ceux qui se sont combattus hier et qui risquent de s'affronter à nouveau dans des rivalités sanglantes." Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 41.

323. As mentioned in chapter one, even as far back as 1912 Schuman was already involved as vice-president of the *Görres-Gesellschaft* in an international European peace project trying to find a structure based on international law that

During this wartime period Schuman's speeches and discourses had a strong impact on audiences, as he was a Member of Parliament, although he could not practice his profession. Schuman was one of the first European politicians to warn of the systematic destruction of the Jews by the Nazis as German government policy.³²⁴ Because of being wanted by the Germans, he was forced to change address more than a dozen of times until the end of the war, so as not to be captured by the Germans.

The fact that he already spoke in favour of a Franco-German reconciliation policy during the war, is even more surprising considering he was wanted by the Nazis. This demonstrates his capacity to look beyond short-term personal and national interests and feelings as well as his Christian virtue of forgiving and reconciliation. Both would be reflected clearly in the Schuman Declaration of 1950.

3.2.2 Schuman: 1945 – 1948

The inventory of public finances he established when he became Minister of Finance in 1946 became for this methodical, economic man, without illusions, the basis for [France's] economic and financial revival.

*Alain Poher*³²⁵

As a Minister of Finance Schuman's emphasis on transparency and on combat of corruption improved the economy and financial sector in France. He fostered a policy of reconciliation and unification after the Second World War. It was therefore not surprising that Schuman himself explicitly worked towards European unification and that his

would make war among European countries impossible. The project got destroyed during the first world war.

324. David Heilbron Price, *Schuman's Warning of the Nazi Destruction of the Jews*, (Brussels: Bron Communications, 2004).

325. Alain Poher (1909–1996) was French centrist politician, twice interim President of France (1969, 1974) and Schuman's colleague (MRP).

ideas on reconciliation and unification found their echo in the Schuman Declaration.

Robert Schuman returned to Lorraine on 21 November 1944 after the war had ended in France. It was a period of governmental unrest and of a succession of Republics resulting from contrary interests among citizens and even among politicians. Gaullists, nationalists, communists and those who wanted cooperation with western democratic states and were in favour of cooperation with the United States fought to pursue their practically incompatible convictions. The average duration of the successive governments was six months and 25 days. During this period of unrest Schuman was elected Deputy of the Moselle region and Member of the Commission of Finance in 1945.³²⁶ He became the French Minister of Finance in 1946. After yet another government collapsed he became the new Prime Minister in 1947. This change of charge was based on his excellent qualities as a Minister.

Schuman asked Pope Pius XII for an Apostolic blessing when he accepted this task of Prime Minister.³²⁷ His task would be a tough one not only due to the contemporary circumstances in France and Europe but also because of the political climate amongst French politicians. This was already clear at the moment Schuman presented his newly formed government on 29 November 1947 to the Assembly.

326. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 10. The people of Alsace-Lorraine want to celebrate Schuman's return, but the authorities take him for an ex-Minister of Pétain who had given full powers to Pétain's regime. As mentioned before in the note on De Gaulle's rejection of Pétain's armistice and Schuman's consent, it is only through the intercession of De Gaulle that Schuman is relieved from those accusations and re-enters politics.

327. Archives départementales de la Moselle 1369W184. (mt) "The responsibilities of so heavy an office bring home to me each day the inadequacy of my own powers and my need for special graces. The blessing which I ask Your Holiness would be for me a precious pledge and encouragement." Pius XII replied: "We recommend to God with all our heart your person and your activities. In pledge of the graces for which we plead in abundance for you and for your dear country we bestow upon you with particular affection the Apostolic Blessing for which you have asked."

He then had to confront a severe attack by the Communists who accused him of having been a German officer in the army during the First World War and of having worked for the German prefecture in Metz. Schuman himself replied with clear statements. He categorically denied the accusations, not because it hurt him personally to be falsely accused but for the sake of his position as a government official. To clear any doubts he said the following, directing himself to the leader of the communist party, Georges Marrane:

I protest against the methods used by your friends in politics not because of me personally, but because of the fact that my function, the dignity and the authority of the government are at stake. Statements regarding my past have been made that are absolutely false and slanderous, especially regarding my supposed time in the German army. They pretended that I had been a German officer. I tell you here solemnly: I have never worn a German uniform. There was a second false statement that said that I had worked for the German prefecture in Metz. I have not even known the prefect and I have never spoken to him. I am obliged to defend myself against this kind of methods, not because my person is at stake - in that case I would have kept quiet - but because of the fact that the government itself is at stake and the authority it needs. The public opinion of France and outside France needs to know what the methods are that one uses in certain environments. You, M. Marrane should be able to associate with what I say.³²⁸

328. Roth, 314. “Je tiens à élever une protestation - non pas parce que ma personne est en cause, mais du fait que ma fonction, la dignité et l'autorité du gouvernement sont en jeu – contre des méthodes utilisées par vos amis politiques. On a produit des affirmations absolument mensongères et calomnieuses au sujet de mon passé, en particulier sur mon prétendu passage dans l'armée allemande. On a prétendu que j'avais été officier allemande. Je le dis ici solennellement: je n'ai jamais porté l'uniforme allemande. Il y a une deuxième affirmation mensongère d'après laquelle j'aurais accompli des services à la préfecture allemande de Metz. Je n'ai même pas connu le préfet et ne lui ai jamais adressé la parole. Je suis obligé de me dresser contre des méthodes pareilles, non parce que ma personne est en cause – s'il n'y avait que cela, je me serais tu -, mais parce que le gouvernement lui-même est en cause et l'autorité dont il a besoin. L'opinion publique en France et en dehors de France doit savoir quelles sont les méthodes auxquelles on a recours dans certains milieux. Vous devriez, monsieur Marrane, vous associer à ce que je dis.” It is a known fact that Schuman was not called to the army, but required by the Germans to register conquered items in Boulay during the First World War. See chapter one (a Man of Faith).

Schuman did not let himself be intimidated. His accusers did not succeed in humiliating Schuman and did not have the last word.³²⁹

However, social and economic unrest, due to strikes and a huge inflation, made his position as Prime Minister a serious challenge. He wrote history with the way he handled the economic crisis and ended the Communist Trade Unions strike.³³⁰ As a practicing Catholic Schuman wanted to heed the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. In practice this meant primarily the effort to put into effect a reconciliation policy with Germany and to achieve an integration of Germany into Europe, which in turn led Schuman to the challenge of beginning the European integration process so as to safeguard peace and security in Western Europe.

It was the announcement of the Marshall Plan from the United States with its offer of financial support for the reconstruction of the European democratic countries that brought some hope and relief to the Schuman government. The Marshall Plan came about during Truman's Presidency.³³¹

Molotov, representing the USSR, did not accept the idea of a joint European project. He believed that it would harm the sovereignty of nations. He therefore declined and made all Soviet satellite states refuse American support as well. The consequence of Molotov's rejection was a deep fracture through the heart of Europe. The Eastern and Central European countries fell under Moscow's leadership and

329. See Roth, 315.

330. Franz Knipping, "Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman und der Durchbruch zur europäischen Einigung", in: *Europäer des 20Jahrhunderts. Wegbereiter und Gründer des "modernen" Europa*, ed. Heinz Duchhardt (Mainz: P. von Zabern, 2002), 75.

331. The Marshall Plan was part of the Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947) that wanted to provide economic and financial support in order to assure a stable European economy and political order and to prevent Europe from falling into communist hands.

therefore under the communist system. The break between East and West became a reality. This was the beginning of the Cold War.

The Marshall Plan was put into effect on 2 April 1948. In the meantime Rumania and Czechoslovakia had chosen sides with the USSR and Stalin's regime. Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary followed soon after being pressured by Stalin to do so. The situation in France was difficult, especially because of the Gaullists, the communists and the nationalists who opposed Schuman's policies and fiercely resisted a policy of reconciliation with Germany. Every step towards the integration of Germany into Europe meant that Schuman was called names such as *Le Boche*, the 'Jerry' or the *Kraut*.³³² Gaullists, nationalists and communists continued accusing Schuman of being a traitor who collaborated with the Germans, because of his policy of reconciliation.³³³ Moreover, they rejected any policy that would imply more focus on Europe and less focus on France. They could not agree with Schuman's strong support of the Congress of The Hague of May 1948 which was organised by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity and which would discuss several

332. As Schuman turned out to be able to beat the communists the latter started (again) to accuse him of having been a Prussian officer even though Schuman had already clearly rejected this false accusation as is mentioned before. The French Chamber needed to make known officially that Schuman had never been an officer in the army and that it concerned a false accusation. See also: *Die Weltwoche*, Zürich 14 July 1950. Archives *Maison de Robert Schuman*, Scy-Chazelles. "Die Behauptung Schuman sei Preussischer Offizier gewesen, wurde seinerzeit von der französischen Kommunistischen Partei verbreitet, um diesen Politiker in Misskredit zu bringen. Als Robert Schuman Ministerpräsident wurde und mit energischer Hand die kommunistischen Agitatoren niederkämpfte, warfen diese ihm vor, man könne von einem preussischen Offizier nichts anderes erwarten. In Tat und Wahrheit ist Schuman aber weder preussischer noch deutscher Offizier gewesen und die kommunistische Diffamierung wurde seinerzeit von der französischen Kämmer auch offiziell widerlegt."

333. They also accused him falsely of collaborating with the Nazis, on the basis of him having been part of the Vichy-regime headed by Marshal Pétain. Schuman did sign as a Member of the General Assembly due to Laval's trick as is explained before, but had already resigned from the government as he did not accept the post of Director of the Secretary of Refugees that was offered to him. See also: Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 42; Roth, 287.

important European issues.³³⁴ When Schuman's government fell two months after the Congress and he became Minister of Foreign Affairs, he quickly ensured that the Congress of The Hague gave birth to the Council of Europe.³³⁵

Schuman himself would describe the attitude of those opposing reconciliation and the initiative of the Congress of The Hague during a European conference in Vienna in 1956 as an attitude characterized by "patriotic fetishism of all kind, intangibility of the sovereignty especially regarding the army, liberalism and economic protectionism."³³⁶ Although the tension between those in favour and those against a conciliatory attitude towards Germany made it difficult to govern the country, it was on another issue that Schuman's government fell on 10 July 1948. After eight months, his government fell on a point of principle regarding a national matter. Schuman introduced legislation to remove the ban on public financial support for confessional schools. This was one of the key issues on which he had been elected to parliament back in 1919, and he could not in good conscience fail to make the attempt to legislate the removal of the ban on funding for confessional schools now that he was Prime Minister. The move was unacceptable to the Socialists who did not want to fund religious education and Schuman was unable to hold his coalition

334. The Congress, which was presided over by Winston Churchill, brought together state and other representatives from all over Europe and observers from the United States and Canada. It meant an important step towards European unification as it led to the establishment of the Council of Europe, the creation of the European Movement and the foundation of the College of Europe in Bruges.

335. (French) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Europe généralités 1944-49* Z547 5sd b10.

See also: David Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet? The real architect of Europe*, (Brussels: Bron Communications, 2003), 17.

336. Robert Schuman, "La Relance Européenne", Conférence Parlementaire Européenne, Vienna, 5 September 1956. Archives *Maison de Robert Schuman*, Scy-Chazelles. "fétichisme nationaliste de toute inspiration; intangibilité de la souveraineté, notamment dans le domaine militaire, libéralisme et protectionnisme économique."

together.³³⁷The latter shows that Schuman did not compromise his (religious) convictions despite the risk of losing his job of Prime-Minister. The fact that this would work out in his favour in that he would become the next Minister of Foreign Affairs meant that he became the one whose task it was to give shape to foreign policies and to solve the ‘German question’.

3.2.3 Schuman: 1948 – 1953

Profoundly democratic as Robert Schuman was, he faced up as the head of government with a cool head and strength to seditious attacks from all sides that at the time aimed their cross-fire at our republican democracy. This Christian, whose faith was so pure and simple that it could only gain respect, was nothing of sectarian and he extended this ‘tolerance’ at all opinions different from his own. This led him to defend the legitimacy and necessity of political parties against the demagogy that already exploded with furor [...] Courage, calmness and tenacity didn't fail Robert Schuman any less during the historic moments when a crucial impetus had to be given to Coal and Steel Community, or rather the Grand Design for a united Europe of which it was the first practical manifestation.

*Guy Mollet*³³⁸

This section on Schuman’s political achievements as Minister of Foreign Affairs will show that he followed a conciliatory course, with the United States as well, and that he constantly worked towards European unification. Schuman’s speech in London, where he signed the Statutes of the Council of Europe in May 1949, forms the backbone of the Schuman Declaration that would come about one year later. His meetings with Adenauer, De Gasperi and Acheson further prepared the unification. In the same year Schuman stepped down as

337. Fimister, 172.

338. Guy Mollet (1905–1975), French Socialist politician, French Prime-Minister from 1956–1957.

Prime Minister he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he was highly appreciated for his outstanding governmental talents and insight into international politics. He would remain Foreign Minister in the seven subsequent governments.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs he could move more freely, follow his vision and make good use of his parliamentary and governmental experience. He knew the situation of those days in Europe and had become familiar with the different moods that dominated the post-war period and thus also with the growing opposition between the Soviet Union and the West. At the time of commencing his new post, the period of confrontation between the democratic countries and the Soviet Union had just started. Schuman had to face as well the 'German question' which was another issue of great concern that needed to be tackled soon. There was, however, no one better equipped to deal with this matter amongst French politicians right after the Second World War than Schuman. Thanks to his origins he knew Germany and its people as no other French politician.³³⁹ He was also keenly aware of the complexity resulting from Germany and France's shared interests in the Saar³⁴⁰ and Ruhr regions rich in coal and steel that were under French control after the war.

Schuman had a clear vision of the integration of Germany into Europe and of the way in which this could be achieved through cooperation in precisely the controversial area of coal and steel. He

339. Peter Kindler, "Robert Schuman - ein wirklicher Staatsmann", *Sie Er*, n. 24 (17 June 1949). Archives *Maison de Robert Schuman*, Scy-Chazelles. Schuman sees the Germans as they are and not as the nationalistic hate or the pacifistic dream sees them. "Er sieht die Deutschen, wie sie sind – nicht wie sie der nationalistische Hass oder der pazifistische Traum sehen möchte."

340. See also: Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 216–228. Adenauer and Schuman had different opinions regarding the Saar. France still needed the produce delivered by the Saar region for economic and security reasons and did not (yet) want to give up on them.

also had the basic architecture for the institutions in mind, but still searched for the exact formula and plan to implement this vision.

A change in the way of thinking was needed. There was a need to face reality and act towards attaining unity.³⁴¹ A policy of revenge did not work as was evident enough from history in general and made very clear by the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles after the First World War. The way in which to escape this state of affairs, however, was at that moment still unclear. Time passed and there were other issues requiring Schuman's attention.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs Schuman signed the North Atlantic Treaty for France on 4 April 1949. This caused anger from the Soviet Union which accused Schuman of infringement of the agreement signed by De Gaulle and Stalin on 10 December 1944. That agreement implied the avoidance of participation in any coalition that would be formed against each other for a period of five years. Those five years had not yet passed. The communists in France turned against Schuman for this reason as well.

While Schuman had to combat this opposition in France and tried to prepare the ground for reconciliation with Germany, he went off to London to sign the Statutes for the Council of Europe. There too, he expressed his strong belief in the need for a supranational unification of Europe and the concept of unity in diversity:

Today, we cast the foundations of a spiritual and political cooperation, from which the European spirit will be born, the founding principle of a vast and enduring supranational union.

This union will have neither as a goal nor as its outcome the weakening of our link to the nation. On the contrary, the diversity and originality of the contributions that the member countries bring to their Community will supply the vital nutrient for the works conceived by the European association.

341. See also: Monnet, *Mémoires*, 334.

We can thus reconcile vigorous, dynamic expansion with those matters requiring prudence and realism.

We do not intend to deny our own past history, or weaken the vitality of our personal aspirations; our only limit is how to coordinate them in our immense collective work.³⁴²

Back in France Schuman remained convinced that he was an instrument of reconciliation between France and Germany despite severe opposition within France. Schuman found strong support from the United States. His American fellow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dean Acheson (1893–1971) put pressure on France to find a way to integrate Germany into the sphere of European democracies as soon as possible. These democracies were under threat from the Soviet Empire and therefore needed to gain strength. The American concern about the spreading of communism combined with Schuman's eagerness to come to a reconciliation with Germany as a first step towards European unification made the collaboration between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and therefore between France and the United States, still closer. The close friendship that arose between Acheson and Schuman also facilitated this process.

The German Saar territory with its major industries of coal and steel was the main region of concern in the reconciliation policy. It was a problematic region because its economy and finance were put under French command after the Second World War as we saw in the section at the beginning of this chapter. For the people of the Saar this was difficult to accept as they had their own constitution, their own government and their own parliamentary assembly. They also wanted to decide on their own economic and financial matters. A similar observation could be made about the heavily industrialized region of the Ruhr. This obstacle for reconciliation had to be removed at any

342. Robert Schuman, Speech at signature of Statutes of Council of Europe, St. James's Palace, London, 5 May 1949.

cost. For this reason Schuman arranged his first meeting with Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer was at that time president of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and of the Temporary Parliamentary Council of the three zones occupied by the allies. He was also one of the candidates for Chancellorship and would become the appointed Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany³⁴³ within a month after their first meeting in August 1949. Adenauer had been fiercely opposed to Nazism, and had been dismissed as the mayor of Cologne for this reason in 1933 when Hitler came to power. He had suffered imprisonment twice during the war. Adenauer too was in favour of reconciliation.

The United States strongly supported not only the economic and political recovery of West Germany but also its re-armament. This was an urgent necessity due to the threat of communism from the Soviet side and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 for which American troops had to be present in Asia and could not be fully present in Europe.

Schuman knew that the initiative for reconciliation should come from France and that any proposal from the German side would be rejected outright by the French government and public due to the anti-German feeling that still reigned in France. Nevertheless, France needed to foster German recovery in order to be able to count on its main ally, the United States, which had recently launched its Marshall Plan. If France continued to withdraw itself from any attempt at integrating Germany into Europe and show no sympathy towards the

343. The notion of theistically grounded civic responsibility and of European integration was integral to West Germany from the moment of its foundation. The Preamble of the German Constitution, promulgated on 23 May 1949 began with the words: "Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law. See Fimister, 181.

German recovery effort, it would risk damaging its relationship with the new government in Bonn.

A meeting was scheduled on 10 May 1950 between France, the United States and the United Kingdom. At this meeting Schuman had to present a proposal for the re-integration of Germany into Europe as an equal partner.

Adenauer from his side also searched assiduously for a solution. He believed “in the Europe and in the Germany that once raised cathedrals to the sky and in humble faith in divine omnipotence served the spirit of pure humanity”.³⁴⁴ In short, he believed in a Europe and Germany older than the concept and the reality of sovereignty. Adenauer even came to suggest putting all German and French interests together under a common institution. His ideal consisted of a German unity within a unified Europe, as only a European Community would be able to pave the way for the ‘German question’ to be resolved and to weaken the threat of the Soviet Union.³⁴⁵ His ideas, however, were never framed in a serious proposal, partially because the initiative for a solution should come from France if it were to have any result. But his ideas were heard and worked with later on, although restricted to the common interests of coal and steel.

The two, Schuman and Adenauer, understood each other perfectly. Both men had been fierce opponents of Nazism and were in favour of a policy of reconciliation. They wanted Germany to integrate into a democratic Europe. They both knew that something had to be done regarding the Saar region, and discussed for months how the tension in that territory could best be resolved. A providential

344. Konrad Adenauer, *World Indivisible*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956), 21. See also: Fimister, 181–182.

345. Hans-Gert Pöttering, “Konrad Adenauer’s policy on Europe,” EPP-ED Group in the EP (European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats in the European Parliament), 2001.

coincidence was that Schuman and Adenauer had several main characteristics in common. Both men grew up close to the borders of France and Germany and felt affection for both countries. Both were educated and nourished by the Catholic faith, a source that characterized their political thinking. Both were sober, preferred simplicity, were interested in culture and literature to name but a few similarities. The fact that they could converse face to face without requiring an interpreter aided their mutual understanding, friendship and communication even more. Both men were known for their integrity.

Schuman met Alcide de Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister, for the first time in Paris on 23 November 1948. De Gasperi commented on this encounter with the words:

I feel confident, because Schuman and I have things in common. We are both irredentists, he from Lorraine and I from Trentino. We have lived for a long time at the frontiers of our national thoughts; we are on the same wavelength and we understand the current problems as well in the same way.³⁴⁶

De Gasperi also shared several characteristics with Schuman and Adenauer. He was, like Schuman, brought up in a German-speaking border region, in this case Trentino, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Trentino later became part of another nation state, Italy, causing De Gasperi, too, to change his nationality. Like Schuman and Adenauer, he was a convinced and practicing Catholic and was known for his integrity. Next to that, De Gasperi had a natural bond with Schuman and Adenauer because of the German language and

346. (mt) Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 200. “Je me sens en confiance parce qu’en analogie avec M. Schuman. Nous sommes deux irrédents, lui de Lorraine, moi du Trentin. Nous avons vécu longtemps à la frontière de nos pensées nationales; nous avons réfléchi de la même manière et nous comprenons les problèmes actuels aussi de la même manière.”

education all three shared.³⁴⁷ Furthermore, the three of them had in common that they were all protagonists of Christian Democratic movements³⁴⁸ in those days: Schuman of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP),³⁴⁹ Adenauer of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and De Gasperi of the Italian *Democrazia Christiana* (DC). De Gasperi also supported a policy of reconciliation and wanted European democratic countries to unite and integrate their interests, as he too believed that no European state was able to stand on its own and face the problems of rebuilding Europe by itself.³⁵⁰

De Gasperi fostered a close friendship with Robert Schuman and got along very well with Konrad Adenauer:

These three statesmen, meeting each other, could take for granted knowledge, experiences, values that each of them had interiorized and about which it wasn't even necessary to exchange ideas, because each of them knew perfectly what the ideas of the others were.³⁵¹

347. See also: Tony Judt, *Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 157.

348. See also: Micheal Burgess, "Politischer Katholizismus, europäische Einigung und der Aufstieg der Christdemokratie," in: *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, ed. Martin Greschat and Wilfried Loth (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), 130. The Christian Democrats saw it as their task to fill out the political vacuum of the post-war period with Christian principles. They wanted a federal Europe that would be and remain rooted in an "organic community". Their ideal was consistent with the message of the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).

349. Schuman became a member of the MRP in 1945, one year after it was founded.

350. See Paolo Mattei, "De Gasperi and Europe," an interview with Sergio Romano, 2004. Sergio Romano was Ambassador in 2004 and author of *Europe, history of an idea*, Longanesi & C. Milano 2004. "No European state on its own was any longer able to deal with the problems of reconstruction and the future of the Old Continent. This perspective became particularly efficacious when he met Schuman and Adenauer who with him "become the real European directorate" after the end of the Second World War. His experience of the past as a parliamentarian of the Habsburg Empire came in handy as he knew from within the attempt to make a multi-ethnic Empire, a mosaic of nations, function".

351. Ibid.

Nearly a decade later Schuman commented on their acquaintance during his inauguration speech as *Doctor Honoris Causa* of the Catholic University of Leuven in 1958:

[W]e were led, I would say all of a sudden, to put in place [the unification], to get started without preparation, without having it properly discussed in other circumstances, and we have done it each with our temperament, with our contingent national characteristics, but we all had the same inspiration, the Christian inspiration; we had confidence and this conviction was for all three of us in the Faith that inspires us, in the Hope that encourages us, in the Charity that unites us.³⁵²

The fact that Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi had several main characteristics in common and all aspired to a similar European unification facilitated the possibility to work towards the realisation of the unification as Schuman envisioned it.

This triumvirate of Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi would become the pre-eminent Fathers of the European Union. Yet they needed Jean Monnet, then the Director of the French Planning Commission, and his pragmatic way of thinking to give shape to their vision of a united Europe on a Christian democratic basis. Although Monnet put Schuman's basic architecture for the institutions in place the main credit regarding the principal concepts of the Schuman Declaration, the foundation stone of the European Union, was Schuman's, as David Price points out:

The speeches prove that Schuman was the real architect of today's European Union - and that he considered the creation

352. Schuman, Robert, DVD, inauguration speech *doctor honoris causa*, l'Université Catholique de Louvain 1958. See also: Geneviève Duchenne and Gaëlle Coutois, *Pardon du passé, Europe Unie et défense de l'Occident*, (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), 162. "nous étions amenés, je dirais à l'improviste, à mettre sur place, à mettre en œuvre sans préparation, sans nous être concertés dans d'autres circonstances, et nous l'avons fait chacun avec son tempérament, avec les contingences spéciales de son pays, et nous avons eu la même inspiration, l'inspiration chrétienne; nous avons eu confiance et cette persuasion nous l'avons, tous trois, puisée dans la Foi qui nous inspire, dans l'Espérance qui nous anime, dans la Charité qui nous unit."

of the first European Community to be of global importance. The supranational system was a means to ‘save our Continent and preserve the world from suicide’.³⁵³

Monnet soon became a close friend of Schuman’s, and later on of Adenauer and De Gasperi’s as well. He too had been in favour of a policy of reconciliation for a long time and thought along the same lines as Schuman. After the First World War he had been Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations and had learned about step-by-step integration as a possible way to come to a Federation of States.³⁵⁴ It was through working together in the specific fields of coal and steel that this step-by-step integration was created. The spillover effect that made states cooperate in areas related to those specific fields fostered the increase of co-operation and increasingly broadened its scope of cooperation.

Next to being the Director of the French Planning Commission, Monnet also headed the Coal Authority of the Ruhr territory after the Second World War, and was therefore keenly aware of the complicated state of affairs for both Germany and France. His

353. Strasbourg 16 May 1949 Palais des Fêtes. See also: Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, 52.

354. One could argue therefore that the theory of functionalism, which suggests a step-by-step integration in certain fields of common interests, found its birth in the League of Nations. The denomination of “functionalism” was defined as “neo-functionalism” after the Schuman Declaration. Will Banyan, “functionalism and neo-functionalism,” www.research-assistant.com. “Under functionalism, the role of governments is to be progressively reduced by indirect methods, and integration is to be actively encouraged by a variety of functionally based, cross-national ties. Neo-functionalism, in essence, takes the functionalist perspective on integration even farther; it calls for the development of official supranational organizations such as the European Union (EU) that acquire the sovereignty and the status, in many different arenas, normally reserved to the exercise of the nation-state.” David Mitrany (1888–1975) is considered the creator of functionalism. He was a Romanian born, naturalized British scholar, historian and political theorist who worked on international relations and on issues of the Danube region. The founder of neo-functionalism was Ernst B. Haas (1924–2003), a German-American political scientist and leading authority on international relations theory. He explains his theory on neo-functionalism in his book *The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

Monnet Plan of Modernisation, which, as mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, was implemented right after the Second World War during De Gaulle's government and which was in line with De Gaulle's thoughts, had given the economic benefits of the Saar to France and the governmental independence of the region to Germany. It was scheduled to last until 1952. The Plan caused a strenuous situation for both France and Germany and both countries demanded clarity about what had to happen after 1952.

Monnet acknowledged the unsuitability of the situation created and that France should try to solve this mutual problem together with Germany. He also recognized that the initiatives up to then to come to a unified Europe did not work, as they all were based on an intergovernmental approach which involved the protection of national interests. He was therefore, just like Schuman, searching for a way to resolve this dilemma. The idea of unifying Europe led for example to the Congress of The Hague in 1948. The Congress was presided over by Winston Churchill and was attended by many political leaders such as Eden, Macmillan, Reynaud, Mitterand, who was sent by Schuman, Adenauer and Hallstein. Monnet, who was present as well, observed that several valuable ideas were announced, but that there was also a large amount of wishful thinking. Nevertheless, the congress would lead to the creation of the Council of Europe a year later. Monnet believed that another approach was needed, as the current approach would only lead to a deadlock. This was because it was not an expression of tangible European unity and the Council did not have the authority to enforce rules or laws.

The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that came about in 1948 provided each country the freedom to decide whether or not it wanted to participate in cooperative efforts. Monnet saw how these initiatives did not provide the desired result of

unification, as the countries involved were led by their own national interests. He acknowledged the necessity to be more ambitious and to confront the national sovereignties with more daring on more specific points.

In short, a great deal was said and written on the need for a united Europe, but nothing was effectively done. Churchill's address in the presence of Schuman in Metz on 14 July 1946 demonstrated his support for European unity, albeit without Great Britain.³⁵⁵ His speech about the United States of Europe in Zürich later that same year became far more famous.³⁵⁶

Monnet learned from the Congress of The Hague that institutions and rules were needed to safeguard the process of gradual integration. He made use of Schuman's advocated architecture for the institutions in his concept of a European supranational organisation with membership open to all democratic European countries. This organisation would have institutions among which a High Authority, a supranational entity as Schuman proposed, which would attend to and

355. Roy Jenkins, *Churchill: A Biography*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), 810–818. Churchill believed that Europe needed to do away with nationalisms, as only a united Europe would be able to avoid wars on the continent and resist the threat of Communism. He acknowledged three big centres of power after the Second World War: the United States, the Commonwealth of Nations and a united Europe. Although he did not state this explicitly, he mindfully excluded Great Britain from the European unification project. He did so not only because of the British Commonwealth, but also because of the strong Anglo-American connection.

356. Winston Churchill, "Zürich speech," Switzerland, 19 September 1946. Churchill underlined the need for Europe to become united and thus form the third world power. About the European identity Churchill says: "It is the fountain of Christian faith and Christian ethics. It is the origin of most of the culture, the arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern time. If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance, there would be no limit to the happiness, to the prosperity and the glory which its three or four million people would enjoy. Yet it is from Europe that have sprung that series of frightful nationalistic quarrels, originated by the Teutonic nations in their rise to power, which we have seen in this twentieth century and even in our own lifetime, wreck the peace and mar the prospects of all mankind."

decide on certain issues of common European interests predetermined by its members.³⁵⁷

The supranational aspect of the European Community to be was essential according to Schuman. Monnet agreed, but did not much favour the word ‘supranational’. David Heilbron Price comments on Schuman’s strong belief in the supranational approach based on sound moral principles and his rejection of former ways of unification attempted in the past, considering them utopian.³⁵⁸

Schuman already spoke about a supranational Europe in the immediate post-war years.³⁵⁹ For Schuman this supranational aspect was akin to a ‘scientific discovery’. It would be the first time in world history that such a supranational political structure would be established. He prepared the ground during the years preceding the Schuman Declaration.

As Schuman would later observe, this was precisely what Pius XII had proposed back in 1944 as the remedy for future wars and as the buttress of democracy: “the formation of an organization for the maintenance of peace, of an organization invested by common consent

357. The inauguration of the High Authority took place in Hôtel de Ville in Luxembourg. Monnet declared solemnly on behalf of all members of the High Authority that all would exercise their tasks in full independence, free from national bounds and in favour of the community and its supranational character. In his *Mémoires* he wrote: “Nous exercerons nos fonctions, en pleine indépendance, dans l’intérêt général de la Communauté. Dans l’accomplissement de nos devoirs, nous ne solliciterons ni n’accepterons d’instruction d’aucun gouvernement ni d’aucun organisme et nous nous abstiendrons de tout acte incompatible avec le caractère supranational de nos fonctions. Nous prenons acte de l’engagement des États membres de respecter ce caractère supranational et de ne pas chercher à nous influencer dans l’exécution de nos tâches.” Monnet, *Mémoires*, 439.

358. Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, 14. See also: Monnet, *Mémoires*, 352. A year before the Declaration, Schuman had listed as utopian all the previous plans from the Middle Ages on for uniting Europe based upon varying models of federalism and theocracy. The only chance, he said, was the supranational approach: an experiment based on sound moral principles. Monnet’s only objection to *supranational* was that he disliked the word. He did not discuss its meaning or significance.

359. Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, 14.

with supreme power.”³⁶⁰ Pius XII had already explored the question of the unity of human society in his inaugural encyclical *Summi Pontificatus*. He spoke of a natural sympathy between democracy and Christianity in his wartime radio addresses. He even mentioned the means to come to such a unity and strongly advocated:

[T]he creation of permanent institutions to embody supranational society through the use of treaties between sovereign powers establishing a “supreme authority” over themselves. He also advocated to Charles de Gaulle right after the Second World War the creation of a bloc of Western European Catholic powers to resist Communism.³⁶¹

De Gaulle, contrary to Schuman, had been against a policy of reconciliation and had therefore also not been supportive of the Pope’s ideas on striving towards a supranational society. But Schuman backed the Pope’s suggestions as they were fully in line with his train of thought and with that of his fellow founding fathers of European unification, Adenauer, De Gasperi and later also Monnet.

Schuman applauded Monnet’s proposal for being exactly the one he, Adenauer and De Gasperi had been searching for in order to make the policy of reconciliation work and attain the desired European unification.³⁶² The proposal was in line with their Catholic faith and applied the ideas suggested by Pope Pius XII. The ideas were elaborated and outlined in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.

It was Schuman who had prepared the ground to make the Declaration possible and who had taken responsibility for executing

360. Robert Schuman, “Démocratie et Christianisme,” Dijon 20 May 1957, Archives départementales de la Moselle, 34J35. See also: Fimister, 187.

361. Fimister, 255.

362. This statement contradicts therefore the observation “The Schuman Plan was invented to safeguard the Monnet Plan” made by Alan S. Milward in his book *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945- 1951* (London: Methuen & Co.Ltd, 1984) 395.

the project despite the still strong resistance in France towards the implementation of such a project of reconciliation:

The formation of a strong, new Europe applying the 'Community method' was based on years of conciliatory work. Immediately after the war, public opinion had been totally unready for European integration, even hostile. Repairing the ruins at home was absolute priority. With the destruction and nationalism of war, few people and governments with the notable exception of Schuman's 1947–1948 governments even mentioned European unity. In his writings, he praises men of trust who had succeeded in turning these two contrary tides: apathy for unity and hate for Germany.³⁶³

During his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Schuman became *Doctor Honoris Causa* in Economic Sciences of the Roman Catholic Polytechnic of Commerce of Tilburg, The Netherlands, in 1952.³⁶⁴ Schuman gratefully accepted and held his inauguration speech in December of that same year.

It was this same month of December 1952 that Schuman was forced to resign from his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs³⁶⁵ due to the strong opposition of the Gaullists against his foreign policy and attitude towards the former colonies. They considered his moral approach too soft. The problems in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Indo China had to be tackled firmly according to them. Schuman continued as a member of the Parliamentary Assembly. He worked towards and hoped for the formation of the proposed European Defence Community and the breakthrough it could provide.³⁶⁶ But there was no majority in favour of the EDC and the French government rejected the proposal.³⁶⁷

363. Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, 9.

364. See also: Regional Archives of Tilburg.

365. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 364.

366. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 376–383.

367. The decline of the MRP into political impotence was possibly partly the cause of the rejection of the EDC by the French parliament. See also: Fimister, 256.

The High Authority of the ECSC created a Robert Schuman Chair dedicated to the study of economics at the College of Europe in Bruges on 9 May 1953, which Schuman heartily applauded and opened with his inauguration speech in October of that same year.

3.2.4 Schuman: 1954 – 1963

In 1955 Schuman became the Minister of Justice, a position he would hold for ten months.³⁶⁸ It was to be his last post in the French government, as he would dedicate himself to European tasks within European institutions from 1956 onwards. He gave speeches all over the world on the Schuman Plan and so came to be called the Pilgrim of Europe. Schuman was honoured with the Charlemagne Award for his essential role in the unification of Europe in 1958.³⁶⁹ He became *Doctor Honoris Causa* of the Catholic University of Leuven in the same year.³⁷⁰ In 1959 he received, as mentioned in chapter two, the Erasmus Prize together with Karl Jaspers for his unifying efforts and contribution to peace and security in Europe.³⁷¹

From 1956 until 1961 Schuman was the President of the European Movement³⁷², and from 1958 until 1960 the first President

368. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 401, 406–409.

369. He was already nominated in 1951 for the Charlemagne Award, but Schuman had obligations he could not put aside. He therefore unfortunately could not accept his nomination. See: *Du Pater Europae aux Pères de l'Europe*, (Milan: Silvana Editoriale, 2010).

370. Adenauer received the title of *Doctor Honoris Causa* together with Robert Schuman at the Catholic University of Leuven in 1958.

371. Robert Schuman received the Erasmus Prize together with Karl Jaspers in 1959. The Erasmus Prize is awarded annually by the Praemium Erasmianum Foundation, a Dutch non-profit organization, to a person or institution that has made an exceptionally important contribution to culture, society or social science in Europe. Emphasizing the importance of tolerance, cultural pluralism and undogmatic critical thinking, the Foundation endeavours to express these values in the choice of the Erasmus laureates. The Praemium Erasmianum Foundation was founded on 23 June 1958 by Prince Bernhard. See also: www.praemium-erasmianum-foundation.nl.

372. See: www.europeanmovement.eu. The European Movement, with its headquarters in Brussels, was formally created after the Congress of The Hague on

of the European Parliament. As first President of the EP he was unanimously proclaimed the 'Father of Europe'. In 1962 Schuman retired from politics due to health reasons. He decided to note down and collect the most important ideas he had articulated in speeches and conferences. These assembled notes, which were finished with the help of others, would be published posthumously under the title *Pour l'Europe*.³⁷³ He passed away on 4 September 1963. His funeral Mass was held on 7 September in the Cathedral St. Etienne in Metz. Statesmen from all over the world came to pay a final tribute to Schuman, the Father of Europe. De Gaulle, President of France at that time, and never in favour of the supranational politics of Schuman, was absent, and so were all the principle members of his government.³⁷⁴ The French government had also dissuaded Adenauer to come to the funeral.³⁷⁵ Nonetheless, a large number of people attended the ceremony. Many friends and acquaintances from the Catholic circles and organisations Schuman attended were present. Schuman was buried in the tiny church opposite his home in Scy-Chazelles, where his grave is visited to this day.

In addition to what was mentioned in chapter one on Schuman's background, personality and personal and professional life, this chapter on Schuman's political circumstances has further explained and contextualized Schuman's intent to come to European unification. Furthermore it has shown how Schuman took advantage

25 October 1948. It is an international organisation open to all political, economic, social and cultural trends in civil society. It helped to bring about the Council of Europe in May 1949, the College of Europe, a postgraduate independent university in European Studies, in Bruges also in 1949 and the European Centre of Culture in Geneva in 1950. Since its beginning it has played an essential role in the process of European integration by exercising its influence on European and national institutions.

373. Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 388. *Pour l'Europe* would be published posthumously in 1963.

374. *Ibid.*, 423. "Nul n'est prophete en son pays."

375. Roth, *Robert Schuman*, 524; Poidevin, *Homme d'État*, 421.

of these circumstances which he felt were providential circumstances he was called on to make use of to strive towards the European unification he envisioned.

3.3 Schuman's 'Revolutionary Move': un saut dans l'inconnu

*Europe will be born of this, a Europe solidly united and constructed around a strong framework.*³⁷⁶

Robert Schuman

Although there have been many ideas of a united Europe, none is equivalent to the Declaration launched by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950. In *Pour l'Europe* Schuman wrote the following words about this episode:

Before dropping our bomb, we had to know what sort of reception it would get from the main targets. Our main target was the federal government, and therefore, we were assured, before May 9, of the federal chancellor's agreement in principle. Nothing would have been possible without that agreement. The other governments, the British, the Italian, the American, and the Benelux governments, were informed 24 hours before the official declaration.

Everybody was surprised. Nobody within or exterior to France, was expecting this kind of initiative, especially on the part of France. I could see this amazement (and this is an understatement) when on May 10 I travelled to London for a conference which had been planned for quite a while. I immediately felt that our plan had provoked coolness among our English friends. Jean Monnet was with me. We gave further explanation concerning our thoughts and our final intentions. That exchange of views, verbal at first, then via memoranda, lasted several weeks. It was quickly realised that

376. Schuman's own preliminary remarks before reading the Declaration on 9 May 1950. This statement was not drafted by the Monnet team. See: Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, 4.

it was not one of those diplomatic bombshells that make a lot of noise, but are devoid of effectiveness.³⁷⁷

Schuman saw the uniting of European states primarily as a requirement on its own, in that the unification would procure a strong and healthy Europe because of which war could be avoided. In this way Europe could also confront the threats of Communism and the East-West conflict. Schuman acknowledged that for this unification to succeed the main cause of the conflict between France and Germany had to be eliminated. This cause resided in the important regions of Alsace-Lorraine and of the Saar and Ruhr because of their richness in coal and steel. Cooperation between the former archenemies in the field of precisely these raw materials would dismantle the war-industry and consequently make a war between the states impossible. Schuman emphasized though that European unification should be more than just a sequence of integrated technical, economic and political events to take place. For unification to succeed the states and Europe as a whole needed to build and foster solidarity among nations and citizens based on the European heritage that formed its soul. Unification without this soul would be lifeless and therefore unsuccessful.

377. Schuman, *For Europe*, 120–121. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 124–125. “Nous devons avant de lancer cette bombe, savoir quel accueil elle recevrait de la part des principaux interlocuteurs. Le principal interlocuteur était pour nous le gouvernement fédéral et c’est ainsi que nous nous étions assurés, avant le 9 mai, de l’accord de principe du chancelier fédéral. Sans cet accord rien n’aurait été possible. Les autres gouvernements, britannique, italien, américain, ceux du Benelux, ont été mis au courant 24 heures avant la proclamation officielle. La surprise fut générale. Personne ne s’attendait à une initiative de ce genre, ni en France, ni hors de France, et surtout de la part de la France. J’ai pu mesurer cette stupeur (et le mot est encore faible), lorsque le 10 mai je me suis rendu à certain temps. J’ai senti tout de suite que notre projet avait provoqué un froid chez nos amis anglais. Jean Monnet m’accompagnait. Nous fournissions des précisions sur nos idées, non seulement sur celles qui étaient développées sommairement dans la déclaration de 9 mai, mais aussi sur nos pensées, nos intentions finales. Cet échange de vues, d’abord oral, puis par notes, dura plusieurs semaines. On s’est rapidement rendu compte qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’un de ces ‘pétard’ diplomatiques qui font de bruit, mais sont dépourvus d’efficacité”.

The Declaration was soon referred to as the ‘Schuman bomb’ as it took the world by surprise and because of its potential impact on the national sovereignties of European states and on the relationships among countries and continents. Schuman, before reading out the Declaration, stated:

It is no longer a time for vain words, but for a bold, constructive act. France has acted, and the consequences of her action might be immense. We hope they will. She has acted essentially in the cause of peace. For peace to have a chance, there must first be a Europe. Nearly five years to the day after the unconditional surrender of Germany, France is now taking the first decisive step towards the construction of Europe and is associating Germany in this venture. It is something which must completely change things in Europe and permit other joint actions which were hitherto impossible. Out of all this will come forth Europe, a solid and united Europe. A Europe in which the standard of living will rise thanks to the grouping of production and the expansion of markets, which will bring down prices.³⁷⁸

The Declaration put forward five main principles:

1. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through practical achievements which will first create real solidarity.
2. The age-old enmity between France and Germany must be eliminated; any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries, but it is open to any other European nation which shares the aims.

378. As translated by Alan Fimister, in: *Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe*, 192. Déclaration liminaire: “Messieurs, Il n’est plus question de vaines paroles, mais d’un acte, d’un acte hardi, d’un acte constructif. La France a agi et les conséquences de son action peuvent être immenses. Nous espérons qu’elles le seront. Elle a agi essentiellement pour la paix. Pour que la paix puisse vraiment courir sa chance, il faut, d’abord, qu’il y ait une Europe. Cinq ans, presque jour pour jour, après la capitulation sans conditions de l’Allemagne, la France accomplit le premier acte décisif de la construction européenne et y associe l’Allemagne. Les conditions européennes doivent s’en trouver entièrement transformées. Cette transformation rendra possibles d’autres actions communes impossibles jusqu’à ce jour. L’Europe naîtra de tout cela, une Europe solidement unie et fortement charpentée. Une Europe où le niveau de vie s’élèvera grâce au groupement des productions et à l’extension des marchés qui provoqueront l’abaissement des prix”.

3. Action must be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point: Franco-German production of coal and steel must be placed under a common High Authority.³⁷⁹
4. The fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and establish a European Community.
5. The decision of the High Authority will be binding on the member countries. The High Authority itself will be composed of independent persons and have equal representation. The Authority's decisions will be enforceable.³⁸⁰

The Declaration showed that France had taken the initiative to build a new Europe on the basis of equality with Germany. That was *un saut dans l'inconnu* (a leap in the dark), was one journalist's conclusion when trying to get more information from Schuman about the Declaration on European unification. He caught Schuman at the moment when the latter was about to catch the train, trying to avoid questions about the future of the project. Schuman, however, confirmed the journalist's observation. It was a leap in the dark because nothing similar had ever been done, and the plan still had to be defined and concretized. It would become the cornerstone of Europe's future, as it was through the effective solidarity that a tangible solution of the German-French problem regarding coal and steel came about.³⁸¹ Adenauer would confirm the statement and thank Schuman for his initiative.³⁸²

379. Kapteyn, Verloren van Themaat, *The Law of the European Union and the European Communities*, 7. "In accordance with the Schuman Plan the High Authority occupied a central place in the institutional structure of the Community. It was composed of independent persons jointly designated by the governments, had its own financial resources from a levy on coal and steel production, and was provided with powers for binding the Member States and companies coming under the Treaty regime. Thus it became a governmental authority operating in this new market instead of or alongside the six national governments."

380. Fimister, 192. See: Schuman Declaration 9 May 1950 in Appendix.

381. Robert Schuman quoted in Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, 78.

382. Adenauer's words translated to French in Poidevin, *Homme d'État*, 83: "l'homme qui, par son initiative de la C.E.C.A. a scellé la pierre angulaire de l'amitié qui unit désormais si étroitement nos deux peuples."

Schuman, Acheson and Bevin³⁸³ met in London on May 10, the day after the Schuman Declaration. Bevin, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, fully opposed the idea of handing over sovereignty and therefore also opposed the Schuman Declaration made the day before. He blamed Acheson and Schuman for setting up a plot against the UK. Attlee, the English Prime Minister at that time, welcomed the French-German reconciliation, but was not confident enough about its content and wanted a thorough examination of the economic and national consequences the project would have. His request would go unanswered, as these possible national consequences could not possibly be determined before the negotiations. From the United States, Italy, the countries of the Benelux and other states positive reactions followed. The Declaration made itself felt in the entire world in waves of impact like the circles of a stone fallen into the water.

The UK remained hesitant about entering the negotiations because of the plan to install a supranational institution, the High Authority, to decide on issues of common interests. The English saw such a High Authority as a threat. Their critical attitude contributed to a sharper definition of the parliamentary control over the High Authority, but in essence it remained the same. The governments surrendered their authority over a certain issue of common interest to a High Authority that was not accountable to governments but to the General Assembly. The Council of Ministers, with representatives of each of the member states, could have some influence on the High

383. Ernest Bevin (1881–1951) was appointed Minister of Labour (1940) by Churchill, who led the coalition government during the Second World War. From 1945 to 1951 Bevin became Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Labour Government led by Clement Attlee. He was very much against the communist regime and in favour of dealing with the United States. It is said that thanks to him the Marshall Plan and the NATO came about as quickly as they did. Bevin also dealt with the European unification idea, but the idea as proposed in the Schuman Declaration did not suit the UK and its Commonwealth of Nations because it was too much to ask a handing over of part of its sovereignty to a Higher Authority.

Authority, but only when it concerned veto-issues and when the majority votes system counted. Although their critical attitude had some effect on the plan, the English remained unconvinced. Schuman regretted the English attitude. Monnet wrote in his *Mémoires* that due to this attitude the UK would not decide its own destiny, but would be forced to change, adapt and shape its destiny according to the unification process that was taking place on the European continent.³⁸⁴

Schuman, Monnet and Adenauer spoke about the new partnership that had come into existence between France and Germany as two equal partners. They would work together and change especially the war industry into an industry that would be profitable to all of Europe. Europe would regain the eminent role it once played in the world and which its separations through the existence of nation states had caused it to lose. Its unity would not affect its diversity, but foster it. European civilization would benefit from its diversity and have influence on the development of super-powers as the United States.³⁸⁵

3.3.1 Moral order: key to ‘revolutionary move’

In his *Mémoires*, Monnet wrote the following words, describing one of the core points from which to depart since the Declaration of the Schuman Plan was made:

The French proposal is therefore essentially political. It has even a moral aspect. In its essence it envisions a very simple objective that our government tries to realize without, in the beginning, being bothered about technical difficulties.³⁸⁶

384. Monnet, *Mémoires*, 363. “Les Anglais ne trouveront pas seuls la ligne de leur destin. Le changement leur viendra de l’extérieur.”

385. *Ibid.*, 365.

386. (mt) *Ibid.*, 365–366. “La proposition française est donc, dans son inspiration essentiellement politique. Elle a même un aspect pour ainsi dire moral. Dans son essence, elle vise un objectif très simple que notre gouvernement

The focus should not be on the technical details, but on the political and moral ideal of unification. Monnet's conviction was that specific problems could easily be solved from the point of view of a great ideal.³⁸⁷ And in this case, the great ideal was European unification based on common interests.

Adenauer also considered the enterprise as belonging essentially to the higher order of morality, more so than that of politics and technical details. He wrote:

I am not, me neither, a technician, and not completely a politician. I look at this enterprise the same way you do which is under the highest regard, it belongs to the order of morality. It is the moral responsibility that we have towards our peoples, and not the technical responsibility that we need to put into the work so as to realize such a huge hope. It has been received enthusiastically by Germany, so let us not get stuck in details.³⁸⁸

Adenauer even highlighted that he had been waiting for such an initiative already for 25 years and that he was not longing for German hegemony whatsoever. After all, history had taught how vain those aspirations were. He added that Germany knew that its destiny was bound to that of Western Europe.³⁸⁹ Adenauer saw the realisation of

cherchera à réaliser sans se préoccuper, dans une première phase, des difficultés techniques.”

387. Ibid., 366. “Les problèmes concrets, je le sais par expérience, ne sont jamais insolubles à partir du moment où ils sont abordés du point de vue d’une grande idée.”

388. (mt) Adenauer's words translated to French in Monnet, *Mémoires*, 366. “Je ne suis pas, moi non plus, un technicien, et pas entièrement un politicien. J’envisage comme vous cette entreprise sous son aspect le plus élevé – elle appartient à l’ordre de la morale. C’est la responsabilité morale que nous avons à l’égard de nos peuples, et non la responsabilité technique que nous devons mettre en œuvre pour réaliser un si vaste espoir. L’accueil en Allemagne a été enthousiaste, aussi nous ne nous accrocherons pas à des détails.”

389. Adenauer's words translated into French in Monnet's *Mémoires*, 366. “Cette initiative, voici vingt-cinq ans que je l’attends. En nous y associant, mon gouvernement et mon pays n’ont aucune arrière-pensée hégémonique. Depuis 1933, l’histoire nous a appris combien pareilles préoccupations sont vaines. L’Allemagne sait que son sort est lié au sort de l’Europe occidentale.”

the proposal as the most important task that awaited him to fulfil and that would make him feel he had not lived in vain.³⁹⁰

3.3.2 ‘Revolutionary Move’: accepted, proposed, refused

On the 25 May 1950 the French government sent a memorandum to London proposing a project already accepted by Germany, and also submitted to Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. This memorandum stated that the governments had decided to pursue common action towards the realisation of the objectives such as peace, European solidarity, as well as economic and social progress. This would be done by combining the production of coal and steel and through the instalment of a High Authority whose decisions should be implemented by all member states. The negotiations would lead to a treaty that needed to be ratified by the parliaments.³⁹¹

Harold Macmillan (1894–1986), British Prime Minister and friend of Monnet, stated his response to this memorandum in a letter in which he made clear that neither the Labour Party nor the Conservative Party would accept the High Authority as a supranational institution. Monnet responded making clear that there was no way of joining Europe without the surrender of sovereignty in defined domains of common interests. “The Schuman propositions are

390. Adenauer’s words translated into French in Monnet’s *Mémoires*, 367. “la réalisation de la proposition française comme la tâche la plus important qui m’attende. Si je parviens à la mener à bien, j’estime que je n’aurai pas perdu ma vie.”

391. Monnet, *Mémoires*, 368. “Les gouvernements [...] sont décidés à poursuivre une action commune en vue des objectifs de paix, de solidarité européenne et de progrès économique et social par la mise en commun de leurs productions de charbon et d’acier, et l’institution d’une Haute Autorité nouvelle dont les décisions lieront les pays qui y adhéreront.” “Les négociations, sur la base des principes et des engagements essentiels figurant dans la proposition française du 9 mai dernier, s’ouvriront à une date qui sera proposée incessamment d’un traité qui sera soumis à la ratification des Parlements.”

revolutionary or they don't mean a thing,"³⁹² he stated, meaning that they had to break with previous propositions that did not go beyond the intergovernmental approach. The threats of Communism and of a third world war prepared the minds of the people for the Schuman Plan. As stated above, the English formed an exception in that they showed a contrary attitude, one of isolation from continental Europe. There were several reasons for this, but the most important ones were that they first of all had to confront their own problems regarding the British Common Wealth and secondly, they were not at all inclined to surrender part of their sovereignty to a Higher European Authority. Besides, they were confident that American aid would solve their possible problems.

To this can be added that the United Kingdom had not experienced the same level of destruction during the war as continental Europe had, and after the war its economy was still functioning. And although its Commonwealth suffered severe setbacks at that time, the United Kingdom still had a great deal of influence in these countries. In short, the United Kingdom was simply less in need of rebuilding than the rest of Europe and was reluctant to relinquish its power and hand over part of its sovereignty to a European High Authority.

392. Ibid., 371. "Les propositions Schuman sont révolutionnaires ou elles ne sont rien. Leur principe fondamental est la délégation de souveraineté dans un domaine limité, mais décisif. A mon avis, un plan qui ne part pas de ce principe ne peut apporter aucune contribution utile à la solution des grandes problèmes qui nous assaillent. La coopération entre les nations, si importante soit-elle, ne résout rien. Ce qu'il faut chercher, c'est une fusion des intérêts des peuples européens, et non pas simplement le maintien de l'équilibre de ces intérêts."

3.3.3 'revolutionary move' and ECSC

The Schuman Declaration was accepted by six countries: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. The signatories were Schuman for France, Adenauer for Germany, De Gasperi for Italy, Paul Van Zeeland for Belgium, Dirk Stikker for the Netherlands and Joseph Bech for Luxembourg. Their first conference was held in Paris in the Salon de l'Horloge on 20 June 1950. Next to Monnet, the first president of the High Authority, and Schuman, representatives of the governments of the six countries, experts, trade unionists and industrialists were present at this meeting. Walter Hallstein, who was sent by Adenauer, had a prominent position as a representative of Germany. Hallstein, politician and professor in law at several German and American universities, would become the first president of what later became the European Commission of the European Economic Community in 1958. He stressed the political over the economic importance of the Schuman Plan when the BENELUX countries started to express their concern that their economic interests could suffer. As a response to Dick Spiereburg, the Dutch representative who wanted the High Authority to have a more intergovernmental character, Monnet observed that the supranational aspect of the European community was precisely the cement needed to build the community.³⁹³

During this conference, the High Authority, the Common Assembly, the Court of Justice and, because of a Dutch proposal, the Council of National Ministers had been created. In two months time the essential structure of the plan was conceived. Most surprisingly of all was the change in attitude amongst the participants. The

393. Ibid., 384. "L'autorité supranationale n'est pas seulement l'organisme le mieux en mesure de régler les problèmes économiques, elle est l'amorce d'une fédération."

apprehensive and defensive attitude of Spierenburg and the others had changed into a cooperative attitude and they joined the others in the deliberations on how to achieve the aim of the Schuman Plan.³⁹⁴

It was evident at the conference that there had been a change in mentality. The entire arms industry of Germany was dismantled. The products of coal and steel had become instruments for the construction of peace.

3.3.4 Schuman Plan within European context

*A new political structure, Europe, transforming Europe as a mere geographical entity, appeared on the world scene. The crux of the decision (to propose a European Community) clearly went far beyond its original sinews of coal and steel. It was the embryo of an unprecedented political system unknown in history.*³⁹⁵

The Schuman Plan was generally received with great interest by Western Europe and the United States, as it gave new hope to the West for several reasons. Politically, it was a source of hope for lasting peace. The Plan would not only contribute to the unity of European states and reconciliation of former enemies, but also to lasting peace for making re-armament materially impossible:

The solidarity between the two countries established by joint production will show that a war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable, but materially impossible.³⁹⁶

394. Ibid., 391. “Je pouvais voir jour après jour la puissance de cohésion de l’idée communautaire qui avant d’exister dans la réalité agissait sur les esprits. Si les caractères nationaux demeuraient bien affirmés en chacun d’eux, les représentants des six pays étaient associés maintenant dans une même recherche et il leur arrivait de déléguer à certains d’entre eux le soin de parler pour l’ensemble, tant leurs points de vue s’étaient confondus en quelques semaines.”

395. Heilbron Price, *Schuman or Monnet?*, 4.

396. Schuman in Schuman Declaration. “La solidarité de production qui sera ainsi nouée manifesterà que toute guerre entre la France et L’Allemagne devient non seulement impensable, mais matériellement impossible.”

Economically the Schuman Plan took Europe out of a state of impasse. Before the First World War there had been in many ways a cross-border market between the 'Schuman countries'. After that war, however, and especially during the crisis of 1929, this market disappeared completely due to a hostile attitude and because of the global financial crisis. It was already during and even before the Second World War that countries realised their national economies were no longer self-contained and limiting their market to their own country had had a suffocating effect.

After the Second World War, Europe was left in a state of total destruction and it was therefore already very difficult to revitalise national economies. The Marshall Plan of 1947 meant enormous financial support for Europe to reconstruct its economies. It was thanks to this aid that Europe had the chance to rebuild itself. The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation was created in response to the Marshall Plan. This organisation would be the entity to administer and coordinate the Marshall Aid. The communists had voted against and the Gaullists had abstained from voting, but they did not have enough votes to reject the project. The OEEC was intergovernmental in nature, because the United Kingdom, one of its most important members, strongly opposed a supranational structure. Schuman, Monnet and the other founding fathers, however, spoke of this need for a project that provided long-lasting and increasing effects when launching the unique model for European integration based on common interests.

The Schuman Plan implied the first step towards a common market with free negotiations in coal and steel among the 'Schuman countries'. All custom duties and other obstacles would disappear between those countries during a period of transition. In this way, the Declaration was to contribute to the economic development, and to

increase the level of employment and the standard of living. The High Authority had to carefully control the process and the prices for coal and steel so as to avoid exploitation and other improper conduct, such as the formation of cartels,³⁹⁷ also towards non-member states. The ECSC Treaty translated the concept of effective solidarity among the states into articles that specified the content of this effective solidarity, such as Article 4 that prohibited:

1. duties on importation or exportation or charges having equivalent effect and quantitative restrictions;
2. measures and practices discriminating between producers, purchasers or consumers or interfering with the purchaser's free choice of supplier;
3. subsidies or aids granted by states, or special charges;
4. restrictive practices tending towards the sharing or exploiting of markets.³⁹⁸

Effective solidarity, solidarity expressed in specific deeds, was the leitmotiv of the Declaration and found its first expression in the ECSC Treaty. Another matter of importance was that the High Authority should be transparent and act publicly.

Socio-economically the maxim 'carry each other's loads' counted for the institutions and companies that did not function well enough and needed financial help to solve their problem. This might lead to the closure of the company and economic support for those who worked in that enterprise. This would also be taken care of by the Schuman Plan.

The Treaty of Paris, that established the ECSC, introduced a market-sector economy. The property rights of the companies were conserved, but the practice of these rights implied that the community

397. Article 81 of the EC Treaty. See: Kapteyn, Verloren van Themaat, *The Law of the European Union and the European Communities*, 795.

398. Kapteyn, Verloren van Themaat, *Ibid*, 4.
The effective solidarity was thus judicially laid down for the years to come. This article 4 is still unchanged present in the Treaty of the functioning of the European Union today.

interests had to be taken into account. Competition was allowed unless it provoked bad practices such as the formation of cartels. The effects of the treaty were far-reaching but needed to be supported by European institutions if they were to last.

Monnet recalled in his *Mémoires* that he and Schuman had made a far-reaching impact on the future of European countries in a short period of time through the launch of the Declaration, but that the Declaration needed to be supported by institutions if it were to work:

It all happened within a few hours and two men had had the courage and taken the responsibility to decide on the future of their countries establishing this agreement. A big step was taken, but the most important part still had to follow, such as the installation of institutions to make the agreement work. Nothing is possible without men, but nothing is lasting without institutions.³⁹⁹

The Schuman Plan was thus eagerly received in the western world and the launch of the ECSC applauded. In Scandinavia and Great Britain the ECSC was, however, looked at with skepticism for its ‘authoritarian incense’ and for the fact that it originated from mainly Catholic countries as Tage Erlander, the Swedish Social Democratic Prime Minister (1948–1968) commented.⁴⁰⁰ Scandinavia also did not

399. (mt). Monnet, *Mémoires*, 360. “Tout venait d’être conclu en quelques heures, au grand jour, entre deux hommes qui avaient osé, seuls, engager le destin de leur pays. Mais dès ce moment, si satisfait que je fusse, je savais que l’essentiel restait à faire et je n’avais qu’une hâte: que des institutions vinsent consacrer cet accord fondé sur une rencontre de bonnes volontés. Rien n’est possible sans les hommes, rien n’est durable sans les institutions.”

400. Judt, *Postwar*, 158. Willem Drees, Prime-Minister of The Netherlands in those days applauded the integration project of the ECSC, but was evenso skeptical about the fact that the Schuman Plan was originated by Catholic statesmen of Catholic countries and feared a ‘Vatican Europe’. For this reason he wanted a non-Catholic, Jan Willem Beyen, to be the Dutch Minister of European Foreign Affairs, and the Catholic Joseph Luns to be the Dutch Minister of not European Foreign Affairs. See: Paul Dekker, Albert van der Horst et.al. (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau/Centraal Planbureau, The Hague, 2007), 12, 13. Johan Willem Beyen became a Roman Catholic after his Ministership. See thesis: Wim Weenink, *Bankier van de wereld. Bouwer van Europa. Johan Willem Beyen 1897-1976* (Amsterdam/Rotterdam, Prometheus, 2005).

want to join as Great Britain, its economic partner, did not (yet) want to be part of the European Community.⁴⁰¹

3.4 Schuman's key concepts of European unification

*This Europe which is still split up and torn, continues to be ever more aware of its calling to form the heart of a pacific cooperation of all peoples and of all races at the service of a humanity that embraces all continents.*⁴⁰²

Robert Schuman

As mentioned in chapter two, next to reconciliation, the three elements that were essential to European unification were: effective solidarity, moral order and European spiritual and cultural heritage. Europe could no longer continue along the path it walked for centuries before the Second World War, but needed to change its attitude and outlook according to Schuman:

We shall have to replace all the tendencies inherited from the past with the notion of solidarity, that is to say the conviction that the real interest of all lies in acknowledging and accepting the interdependency of all. Egoism does not pay any more.⁴⁰³

Schuman referred to the extreme attachment to nationalism that had been the cause of several wars, among which the two World Wars. As

401. Kapteyn, Verloren van Themaat *The Law of the European Union and the European Communities*, 7. About Great Britain: "The fear of being impeded in the development of its own welfare state and in the maintenance of the bonds with the Commonwealth, as well as an insufficient realization of the importance of the French proposal and the vistas it opened, caused the British Government to cling to its standpoint that only a cooperation based on coordination of national policies within the framework of an intergovernmental organization like the OEEC was acceptable."

402. Robert Schuman, "Pour l'unité de l'Europe" in *Du Pater Europae aux Pères de l'Europe*, Milan: Silvana Editoriale, 2010), 30. "L'Europe qui est encore aujourd'hui divisée et déchirée, continue de prendre toujours plus conscience de sa vocation à former le cœur d'une coopération pacifique de tous les peuples et de toutes les races au service d'une humanité embrassant tous les continents."

403. Schuman, *For Europe*, 35. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 44: "A toutes ces tendances qui nous sont léguées par le passé il faudra substituer la notion de la solidarité, c'est-à-dire la conviction que le véritable intérêt de chacun consiste à reconnaître et à accepter, dans la pratique l'interdépendance de tous. L'égoïsme ne paye plus".

we saw in chapter two he regarded nationalism itself as a positive feature, but not at the cost of the common good shared with other states. It would then harm the solidarity and interdependence that was needed primarily with those that shared the same European culture so as to safeguard peace, contribute to development and prosperity of both the individual and the state. He believed that Europe had to build on its cultural and spiritual heritage by living and practicing through deeds a spirit of solidarity in keeping with this heritage. Schuman wanted to foster solidarity not only because of threats from outside or inside Europe but because solidarity was necessary in and of itself. As we saw in chapter two, his observations greatly resembled ideas of contemporary intellectuals such as Maritain, Dawson, Guardini, De Rougemont, Brugmans and Pius XII.

This subchapter will examine Schuman's key concepts of unification, which are: Man, European citizenship, Foundation of European unification, Democracy and Europe as master of its own destiny. The three essential elements for successful European unification - effective solidarity, moral order and European heritage - will be present as the red thread in each of those concepts.

There was great interest in the implications and scope of the Schuman Plan that would bring about European unification, as it was unique in the realm of international politics. Schuman's travels from country to country to convey the message of the project named after him even earned him the epithet 'Pilgrim of Europe'. He gave many speeches explaining the structure of the project, its nature and its implications. The quotes that will be used are taken from those speeches that took place after the Schuman Declaration had been launched on 9 May 1950. The ideas he expressed, however, were not new but originated far before the Declaration as has been shown in the previous chapters.

Schuman made clear that the Schuman Plan and the treaties that would follow as a consequence were of a totally different nature and method than those of the past. Effective solidarity would become a practical output of the treaties. New structures and new independent political and economic entities were created to make this different kind of politics possible. He stressed that the powers of these institutions were neatly defined by the member states themselves. He explained the supranational element of the High Authority and conveyed that this supranational element meant a breakthrough in international politics, as it implied that member states transfer part of their national sovereignty to an institution to make common sovereignty in certain areas possible. The need for a legal framework and of the creation of supranational jurisdiction to solve conflicts that might occur is a logical consequence.

3.4.1 Concept of man and consequence of solidarity

Europeans will be saved if they are aware of their solidarity in the face of danger. [...] the present feeling of insecurity will be the direct cause of European unification, but it will not be its 'raison d'être.' Europe will be more or less complete according to the contingent circumstances that contribute to its elaboration. Yet will it ever be complete? No one can tell. But that is no excuse for postponing work on unification to a later date. Action is better than resignation and hoping for perfection is a lame excuse for inactivity.

*In our minds, European policy is in no way at odds with the patriotic ideal we all share [...] the nation has a role to play vis-à-vis its own citizens, but also, and just as much, vis-à-vis other nations. It cannot therefore retreat into the first of those roles.*⁴⁰⁴

404. Schuman, *For Europe*, 133–134, 34. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 136–137, 43: “Les Européens seront sauvés dans la mesure où ils seront conscients de leur solidarité devant un même danger. [...] L’angoisse actuelle sera la cause immédiate d’une unification européenne, mais non sa raison d’être. Selon les circonstances contingentes dans lesquelles elle se fera, l’Europe sera plus ou moins

The following part focuses on Schuman's concept of man, which is at the base of effective solidarity, and illustrates this concept and some of its consequences with Schuman's own words. This elaboration on the concept of man will build Schuman's frame of reference for European unification.

Out of the studies concerning Schuman's background regarding origin, faith and personality can be concluded first of all that his concept of man was possibly strengthened by his strong attachment to Lorraine. Lorraine was the contested Franco-German border region, always faithful to Rome, that was fought over between France and the Habsburgs and later German Empire since a few years after the Treaty of Verdun in 843 until the Schuman Declaration in 1950. Schuman was a man from Lorraine in heart and soul, and - like a Lorrainer - Catholic, straightforward and familiar with German and French mentalities and cultures.

Schuman's faith played a fundamental role in his concept of man. Schuman was a practicing Catholic whose aim was to live up to his vocation to sanctity in the middle of the world whatever the circumstances were. His loyalty to the Church, the Popes and the teachings of the Church infuses his entire being.

Schuman's personality embodied his concept of man, as he was a man of modesty, honesty, perseverance, humility and straightforwardness all imbued by Catholic faith and combined with a sharp intelligence.

Out of what has been stated can be concluded that his concept of man corresponded to his conviction that each man is called to give heed to his vocation by God and should as such be respected and

complète. Le sera-t-elle jamais? nul ne saurait le dire. Ce n'est pas une raison pour remettre à plus tard l'effort d'unification. Entreprendre vaut mieux que se résigner, et l'attente de la perfection est une piètre excuse pour l'inaction [...].”

encouraged to live up to it wherever he lives and in whichever circumstances he is. This implies an upright and reconciliatory solidarity towards others accompanied by deeds and thus providing effective solidarity.

Referring this concept of man and solidarity to the Schuman Plan, this means the Plan will lead to a unity in diversity in which the human person with his transcendence plays a pivotal role and is at the base of the effective solidarity among the Europeans. The European states would be carrying out this solidarity between and among states by the member state representatives of the European citizens assembled in the supranational institution of the High Authority and the European Court of Justice and in the intergovernmental European Assembly and Council of Ministers.

Schuman's concept of man in general and of the politician in particular on which the idea of effective solidarity among states is based can be illustrated in many ways, but we will refer to the definition Schuman himself gives of the politician in a text that he pronounced on Dutch soil on 13 December 1952, during his inauguration speech as *doctor honoris causa* in Tilburg. Describing the role of the politician, his own task, Schuman stresses the moral aspect and says the following:

[The politician] is, certainly, governed by the moral principles that dominate each human activity, he is expected to act consistently with those principles. But, outside the moral imperatives, there is no other absolute truth for him. The lessons of history, like the psychology of peoples and masses, of regimes and institutions, are dependent on time and place; they belong to the domain of the relative.⁴⁰⁵

405. Robert Schuman, inauguration speech *doctor honoris causa*, 13 December 1952. Archives Départementales de la Moselle, 34J26. "Il est, certes, régi par les principes de la morale qui dominent toute activité humaine, et il est tenu de s'y conformer. Mais, en-dehors des impératifs moraux, il n'y a pour lui aucune valeur absolue. Les leçons de l'histoire comme la psychologie des peuples et des

Speaking about nationalism he focuses on the need of solidarity and says:

But the use we make of [nationalism], the spirit in which we value it, is no longer forged by the egoism that isolates and opposes itself to other egoisms.

The demonstration of facts has convinced us that the nations, far from being self-sufficient, show solidarity towards one another; that the best way to serve one's country is to be assured of the help of others through reciprocal efforts and joining resources.⁴⁰⁶

When speaking about reconciliation as a Christian attitude, he stresses the need to go beyond pardoning and to join hands for working together. He comments:

And as a paradox that would surprise us if we were no Christians - unconsciously Christians perhaps - we stretch out our hand to those who still were our enemies yesterday, not just to pardon them, but to build together the Europe of tomorrow.

[...] we join our interests, the decisions and the destiny of this new community of States that once were rivals. This new form of politics is on the base of solidarity and political confidence.⁴⁰⁷

Schuman concludes his speech wishing that the insight obtained and right conditions for Europe may from now on provide the lead and foster the practice of Christian fraternity among countries.

masses, les régimes comme les institutions, sont fonction du temps et du lieu; elle appartiennent au domaine du relatif.”

406. Ibid. “Mais l’usage que nous en faisons, l’esprit dans lequel nous la mettons en valeur, n’est plus faussé par l’égoïsme qui s’isole et qui s’oppose à d’autres égoïsmes. Nous avons acquis la conviction, par la démonstration des faits, que les nations, loin de pouvoir se suffire à elles-mêmes, sont solidaires les unes des autres; que la meilleure manière de servir son propre pays est de lui assurer le concours des autres par la réciprocité des efforts et par la mise en commun des ressources.”

407. Ibid. “Et par un paradoxe qui nous surprendrait, si nous n’étions pas des chrétiens, - inconsciemment chrétiens peut-être -, nous tendons la main à nos ennemis d’hier non simplement pour pardonner, mais pour construire ensemble l’Europe de demain. [...] nous lions les intérêts, les décisions et le destin de cette nouvelle communauté d’États précédemment rivaux.”

That this idea of a reconciled Europe, unified and strong, may be from now on the word of order for the young generations that are wanting to serve a humanity finally free from hate and fear, and that after too long periods of pain and hurt, learns again what Christian fraternity means.⁴⁰⁸

The four points mentioned in these quotes (morality, solidarity, reconciliation followed by joining hands, and Christian fraternity), are the key elements of Schuman's vision of European unification and can be considered Schuman's frame of reference for Europe. The fact that morality, solidarity, reconciliation and Christian fraternity do not stop at European borders, but go beyond and require consideration of the universal common good when taking decisions regarding Europe, is made clear in a statement by Schuman previously quoted in the introduction of this thesis. Schuman said: "it is impossible to remain indifferent to the fortunate or unfortunate lot of a people. For a European with the capacity to think it is no longer possible to rejoice spitefully over his neighbour's misfortune; everyone is united for better or for worse in a common destiny."

3.4.2. European citizenship

To obtain a deeper understanding of what effective solidarity means regarding citizenship, Schuman's thought on European citizenship are illustrative.

Europe needs a living faith, enthusiasm, abnegation and magnanimity. She will be created and her viability will need to be maintained by the young people and because of them, that is, with the active help of those that tomorrow will carry the heavy burden of assuring a future that is more or less

408. Ibid. "Que cette idée d'une Europe réconciliée, unie et forte soit désormais le mot d'ordre pour les jeunes générations désireuses de servir une humanité enfin affranchie de la haine et de la peur, et qui réapprend, après de trop longs déchirements, la fraternité chrétienne."

threatened. We should not forget in this regard that it are the errors of the past generations that created this situation.

*This call directed towards the young people should not be interpreted as a plea in favour of a revolutionary rupture between the generations. On the contrary: it is absolutely necessary that the continuity and the cooperation of the best people of all sorts of ages and categories be assured.*⁴⁰⁹

In his speeches, Schuman often referred to European citizenship as a result of the unification process that had started with the launch of the Schuman Declaration. He referred to the need for the new European institutions to bring about the integration of states and citizens, and explained that these new institutions would be totally at the service of the supranational community. They would therefore have different interests from those of each separate member state. National interests then need to be combined with common European interests, in the same way as the private interests of citizens mingle with national interests. Nevertheless, there will always be a common interest for all citizens of integrated Europe for which the public opinion must also be prepared, as it might be less favourable for national interests in the short run. This common interest should be made explicit over and over again, especially in the beginning. This implies a long process of education by those who are called to foster European citizenship next to their own national citizenship, as it implies the recognition of common principles and values. The recognition of this new citizenship will, according to Schuman, be a product of the creation of the new

409. Schuman, "Pour l'unité de l'Europe," 58. "L'Europe a besoin d'un foi vivante, d'enthousiasme, d'abnégation et de magnanimité. Elle sera créée et sa viabilité devra être maintenue par et pour la jeunesse, c'est-à-dire avec l'aide active de ceux à qui reviendra demain la lourde charge d'assurer un avenir plus ou moins menacé. Nous ne devons à ce sujet pas oublier que ce sont les erreurs des générations passées qui ont créé cette situation." "Pareil appel à la jeunesse ne doit pas être compris comme un plaidoyer en faveur d'une rupture révolutionnaire entre les générations. Au contraire : il est indispensable que reste assurée la continuité et la coopération des meilleurs éléments de toutes les classes d'âge et catégories de population."

institutions in favour of common interests. Schuman stresses above all the need to focus on the European common good. But this does not mean that one should deny one's duties towards the mother country.

We are not, and we shall never be, given to deny our mother country; we shall never forget our duties towards it. But beyond each country, we increasingly and clearly acknowledge the existence of a common good, superior to national interest. A common good into which our countries' individual interests are merged.⁴¹⁰

Of course there will always be the internal affairs and interests a member state itself should attend to and for which it cannot or should not count on the support of the European institutions:

Some problems, ladies and gentlemen, cannot be solved but by the proper responsibility of each State. We, French people, know that it is up to us alone that we take charge of the problems that belong to the internal affairs and that cannot be attributed to common activities. I take advantage of the present situation to stress this aspect.⁴¹¹

There will thus always be the national affairs that each state has to attend to itself. At the same time the member state has to take common European interests into account in its governmental tasks and procedures and have its citizens thus live their European citizenship. Similarly it needs to take care of the rules and procedures that are exclusively national and have its citizens live their national citizenship. The national citizenship should however always be in line

410. Schuman, *For Europe*, 30. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 40. "Nous ne sommes, nous ne serons jamais des négateurs de la patrie, oublieux des devoirs que nous avons envers elle. Mais au-dessus de chaque patrie nous reconnaissons de plus en plus distinctement l'existence d'un bien commun, supérieur à l'intérêt national, ce bien commun dans lequel se fondent et se confondent les intérêts individuels de nos pays".

411. Schuman, "Pour l'unité de l'Europe," 54. "Certains problèmes, Mesdames et Messieurs, ne peuvent être résolus que sous la propre responsabilité de chaque État. Nous, Français, savons que c'est à nous seuls qu'incombe la tâche de régler les problèmes de notre politique intérieure qui ne sont pas imputables à des activités communes, et je profite de la présente occasion pour le souligner."

with the European citizenship in order to be qualified a proper right of citizenship. For the citizen this might imply a process of adaptation.⁴¹²

3.4.3 Foundation of European unification

We are still at the start of things. We would do well to bridle our impatience. If not, we are likely to make the doubters more distrustful and what is more serious, endanger not only the experiment but also the whole idea of a united Europe.

At the signature of the Statutes of the Council of Europe, I recalled to everyone's mind that we do not yet have a definition of Europe as recognized by everybody. I believed that I was then able to claim that in thus laying the first bricks of an organization, Europe is now beginning to define herself, without the aid of scholars and academics, who I fear, will never be able to agree amongst themselves. ... I do not have any intention of drawing a geographical line of demarcation between Europe and 'non-Europe'. There is another valid way of setting limits: that which distinguishes those who have the European spirit and those who do not.

412. To indicate the topicality of the issue raised by Schuman, the following authors and titles of their books or articles, next to those briefly commented on in 2.1, are mentioned: Chistopher Caldwell, *Revolution in Europe*, (London: Allan Lane, 2009). Caldwell (1962) is a well-known American writer and journalist, who writes mainly on politics and Islam in Europe. Parallel to Schuman's stress on the need to integrate European common interests into national interests, Caldwell wonders if the integration of national and European norms and values proper to the European cultural heritage can be successful regarding minorities such as the Islamic people in Western countries if the natives of those same western countries do not live these same norms and values.

Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan, How Britain is creating a terror state within*, (London: Gibson Square, 2006). Phillips (1951) is a British journalist and author, whose studies refer mainly to Britain's educational and moral crisis. She focuses on the lack of knowledge of the British natives of their national and European cultural heritage. Phillips rejects the excessive positive attitude of the government towards the Islam and all kinds of sects.

Theodore Dalrymple, "What the new atheists don't see", (New York, *City Journal*, The Manhattan Institute, 2007). Theodore Dalrymple, pen-name for Anthony Daniels, is a British writer, physician and psychiatrist. He himself is an atheist, but not an anti-theist. He says: "to regret religion is to regret Western civilization".

See also: Paul B. Cliteur, *Tegen decadentie. De democratische rechtsstaat in verval* (Amsterdam, De Arbeiders Pers, 2004); Fokko T. Oldenhuis, *Een neutrale staat: kreet of credo?* (Heerenveen, Protestantse pers, 2009); Labuschagne and Sonnenschmidt, *Religion, Politics and Law, Philosophical Reflections on the Sources of Normative Order in Society* (leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 2009).

*The European spirit signifies being conscious of belonging to a cultural family and to have a willingness to serve that community in the spirit of total mutuality, without any hidden motives of hegemony or the selfish exploitation of others.*⁴¹³

Schuman's words spoken at the Council of Europe in 1949 show a considerable similarity to those of Pope Pius XII when the latter insisted on the common European values that needed to be at the base of European integration.⁴¹⁴ Schuman stressed the importance of a proper European foundation on which integration needs to come about in order to acquire its desired shape. He mentioned already that the European Community will only have a chance to succeed in a world in which people are no longer imprisoned in their own national interests and their short-sighted egoisms. Schuman believed this to be a matter of will and vision like any other political undertaking. According to Schuman the goodwill that is needed to make the integration succeed will be helped a lot by the common cultural roots that have given birth to a magnificent flourishing of national and regional cultures. Schuman's interpretation of civilization and of its importance is reflected clearly in his vision on European unification. He stressed the fact that:

This 'whole' cannot and must not remain an economic and technical enterprise: it needs a soul, the conscience of its historical affinities and of its responsibilities, in the present and in the future, and a political will at the service of the same human ideal.⁴¹⁵

413. Schuman, Speech at the Council of Europe, 1949.

414. See chapter 2.2.7.1.

415. Schuman, *For Europe*, 58; Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 66. "Et cet ensemble ne pourra et ne devra pas rester une entreprise économique et technique: il lui faut une âme, la conscience de ses affinités historiques et de ses responsabilités présents et futures, une volonté politique au service d'un même idéal humain." The definition of 'soul' given by the Catholic Church in those days, and thus known to Schuman, was written in the Catechism of Pope St. Pius X, Rome 1908 (and shortened version in 1930), Article I, n. 29. "The soul is the noblest part of man, because it is a spiritual substance, endowed with intelligence and will, capable of knowing God and of possessing Him for all eternity."

This recalls the importance Schuman gave to the European cultural heritage as a necessary and binding factor of the European integration process:

The union of the peoples of a Europe that is free thanks to this actual Christian civilization that has fed and educated us.⁴¹⁶

Knowing the importance Schuman gave to the European cultural heritage it is not surprising to know that Christianity plays according to him an important role in the unification of Europe and therefore also in its future. Schuman's personal life and the region he came from gave evidence as well of the importance of Christianity. This conviction has intrinsic consequences regarding human dignity and solidarity. Christian faith considers man to be always in connection with his transcendence and thus with his call from God.⁴¹⁷ For this the virtues of charity, humility and strength next to faith, hope and love need to be constantly present. Fanaticism is therefore out of the question. According to Schuman, this also means that:

Christian civilization should not be the product of a violent and immediate revolution, but of a progressive transformation, of a patient education, led by the great principles of charity, of sacrifice and of humility that are at the basis of the new society. It is not but after centuries of inner struggle and of purification that such a civilization could evolve towards the great ideal that is proposed. [...] Today Christianity, enriched by the lived experience along its own history, should help the peoples that are less evolved to adopt the same track of human regeneration. The colonizing nations have not always fully understood their role. The colonizer and the missionary were not always led by the same noble and generous inspiration. The economic capitalism lent itself too easily to methods of

416. (mt) Robert Schuman, Inauguration speech. See: Duchenne and Coutois, *Pardon du passé*, 162. "L'union des peuples de l'Europe libre grâce à cette véritable civilisation chrétienne qui nous a nourris et éduqués."

417. When it concerns Catholicism, as in Schuman's case, it is added that it regards man as a person who is called to give heed to his personal and divine call by God to become a saint.

egoistic exploitation and neglected the meaning of human responsibility.⁴¹⁸

The consequences of solidarity that Schuman mentions with regard to the former colonizing nations are more than mere abandonment of those colonies. He stressed the need for effective solidarity from former colonizing nations towards those former colonies. Setting the people free to govern themselves and take care of their own affairs was not the same as effective solidarity. According to Schuman, the colonizing nations needed to transfer to the colonized people the means and knowledge needed to attain the individual formation of themselves, their families and community, and the capacity to carry out those political and social responsibilities once they were liberated. Schuman commented that:

The colonizers did not realise the importance of human formation as they were too much involved in the technical aspects of progress. They neglected the moral dimension of their presence with which the technical progress should be in balance.

The colonizers should have explained to the colonized people the dimension of democracy and its implications for others as well so as to avoid injustice and chaos:

Democracy is not something improvised, but counts on a long history in which Christianity played a main role. [...] For this reason one should not let the people on their own just like that without the knowledge of what democracy really means and what its implications are as they will be vulnerable to arbitrariness and injustice.⁴¹⁹

418. See Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 57. "Le capitalisme économique se prêtait trop facilement à des méthodes d'exploitation égoïste et négligeait le sens de la responsabilité humaine qui a fini par être formulée dans le préambule de notre Constitution de 1946: La France entend conduire les peuples dont elle a pris la charge à la liberté de s'administrer eux-mêmes et de gérer démocratiquement leurs propres affaires."

419. Ibid, 59. "La démocratie surtout ne s'improvise pas. [...] Ce qui est plus grave, on a abandonné le pouvoir à des hommes qui n'ont fait aucun

These Schuman-quotes reflect that effective solidarity regarding the colonizing nations implied, just as among European states, solidarity consistent with the moral order that was based on Christianity and that was the fruit of the European cultural and spiritual heritage. An initially guided democracy would be one of the outcomes of this effective solidarity.

3.4.4 Democracy

We shall first of all have to agree on the term “democracy”. The main characteristics of the democratic state are the objectives it sets for itself and the means to achieving them. It is at the service of the people and acts in agreement with it. I cannot find a simpler and less scientific definition. It is closely akin to President Lincoln’s definition: “A people’s government by the people and for the people”. You might note that this does not question the form of the government. Modern democracy, in that sense, can be a constitutional monarchy as well as a republic. It is often true that the term “democracy” is reserved for republican states, to the exclusion of monarchies. I believe this is wrong. Certain monarchies, such as United Kingdom, Belgium and Holland, just to mention our nearest neighbours, are more clearly and more traditionally attached to democratic principles than certain republics, where the people have but little influence on the country’s orientation and on its political decisions. This observation will exempt me from debating the choice a democracy might make between various forms of government. We shall content ourselves with dismissing the ones we consider to be antidemocratic.⁴²⁰

apprentissage et qui seront exposés sans défense à toutes les tentations de l’arbitraire et de l’injustice.”

420. Schuman, *For Europe*, 42–43; Schuman, *Pour l’Europe*, 51–52. “Il faudra d’abord nous entendre sur le terme ‘démocratie’. Ce qui caractérise l’état démocratique ce sont les objectifs qu’il propose et les moyens par lesquels il cherche à les atteindre. Il est au service du peuple et il agit en accord avec lui. Je ne trouve pas de définition plus simple et moins scientifique. Elle rejoint celle du président Lincoln: ‘gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple’. Vous remarquerez qu’elle ne met pas en cause la forme du gouvernement. La démocratie moderne, dans le sens que je viens de dire, peut aussi bien être une monarchie constitutionnelle qu’une république. Souvent, il est vrai, le terme ‘démocratie’ est réservé à l’état républicain, à l’exclusion des monarchies. J’estime que c’est à tort ; certaines monarchies, comme la Grande Bretagne, la Belgique et la Hollande, pour

Why did Europe distinguish itself among the entire human family? Schuman points to the fact that this free Europe is formed by parliamentary democracies in which each state maintains its own democratic rights and rules, and surrenders part of its sovereignty to the Higher Authority that protects the common interests of all member states together.

Schuman was familiar with and most probably influenced by Maritain's thoughts on democracy, as was made clear in section 2.3.9. Schuman argued that democracy as we know it owes its existence to Christianity and not to the Greek democracy as is often believed, although its system will have had some application in today's democratic society. Greek democracy denied the equality of all people without exception and it applied itself only to the elite by birth. On the other hand, democracy cannot be separated from the Greek-Christian heritage which precedes it as pre-political foundation, as was observed by Cardinal Ratzinger just before being elected Pope. According to him, democracy is based on a pre-given natural law that precedes any positive law and that human rights play an essential role in this.⁴²¹ The idea of democracy pertains as such already to man's moral intuitions because it is a suitable form for an upright society.

According to Schuman it was Christianity that cleared the marred conscience stuck in the habit of inequality. It enlightened man's moral intuitions on the suitability of democracy so as to do away with the internalized society customs of inequality of men.

ne parler que de celles qui sont nos voisins les plus proches, sont plus franchement et plus traditionnellement attachées aux principes démocratiques que certaines républiques, où le peuple n'a que peu d'influence directe sur l'orientation et sur les décisions politiques du pays. Cette constatation me dispensera de discuter le choix qu'une démocratie peut faire entre plusieurs formes de gouvernement. Nous nous bornerons à écarter celles qui sont antidémocratiques dans le sens que j'aurai à préciser."

421. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph A. Ratzinger, *Dialectiek van de secularisering, over rede en religie*, (Kampen: Klement, 2009), 22.

Schuman himself acknowledged the existence of Greek democracy, but did not regard this as authentic democracy precisely for denying the equality of all men. He comments the following on democracy:

Democracy owes its existence to Christianity. It was born the day man was required to set the best example, during his life on earth [i.e. by respecting human dignity, individual rights and freedom and by exercising brotherly love towards his neighbour]. Before Christ, ideas such as this had never been expressed.⁴²² Thus, democracy is chronologically linked to Christianity as a doctrine. It gradually took shape with it, after a good deal of trial and error; sometimes at the expense of mistakes and lapses into barbarity. [...] Christianity taught us that all men are equal by nature, children of the same God, redeemed by Christ, regardless of race, colour, social status or profession. Thanks to him the dignity of labour was acknowledged, together with the idea that it was the duty of all men to work. He acknowledged the primacy of inner values which ennoble man. The universal law of love and charity made every man our neighbour, and social relations in the Christian world have been based on this ever since. All of his teachings, and the practical consequences that ensued changed the world forever: This revolution found inspiration in the gospel, which gradually shaped successive generations, sometimes after arduous struggle. Indeed, the progress made by Christian civilisation proved to be neither automatic nor one-sided: the influence of the past and the evil leanings of some corrupt characters have severely affected developments and continue to do so. [...]

During this long and dramatic process of Christian civilization, the most decisive democratic progress was not and is still not always achieved by total believers. Christian ideas survived in the people's subconscious and influenced men who gave up practising a dogmatic religion, but who were nevertheless inspired by its main principles. These principles have become

422. This statement is contradicted by Joseph McCabe (1867 – 1955), who said that e.g. Buddhism and Confucianism regarded moral law already centuries before Christ simply as a human and social law of conduct. See: Joseph McCabe, *The human Origin of morals*, (Girard (Kansas): Haldeman-Julius Company, 1926), chapter I.

See also: Joseph McCabe, *Sources of the Morality of the Gospels*, (London: Watts and Co. Printers, 1914); Remi Brague on the contrary holds that it were mainly the Judeo-Christian roots that imbued Western civilization . See: Remi Brague, *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*,((South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press) 2002. See also note 197.

the features of our civilisation, owing to which the XVIII century rationalists proclaimed and made popular human and citizen's rights, which are essentially Christian.⁴²³

Schuman stressed that modern democracy recognizes equal rights for everyone without exception. He indicated the great importance of Christianity and its consequences, such as the equality of nature of all men, the dignity of work, the need and obligation to work and the primacy of inner values as values that ennoble man. Schuman further pointed out that the universal law of love and charity has turned each man into our neighbour and that on this law social relations in the Christian world are built. All this meant a revolution which is done under the inspiration 'in progress' of the

423. Schuman, *For Europe*, 43–45; Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 52–54. "La démocratie doit son existence au christianisme. Elle est née le jour où l'homme a été appelé à réaliser dans sa vie temporelle la dignité de la personne humaine, dans la liberté individuelle, dans le respect des droits de chacun et par la pratique de l'amour fraternel à l'égard de tous. Jamais avant le Christ pareilles idées n'avaient été formulées. La démocratie est ainsi liée au christianisme, doctrinalement et chronologiquement. Elle a pris corps avec lui, par étapes, à travers de longs tâtonnements, parfois au prix d'erreurs et de rechutes dans la barbarie.[...] Le christianisme a enseigné l'égalité de nature de tous les hommes, enfants d'un même Dieu, rachetés par le même Christ, sans distinction de race, de couleur, de classe et de profession. Il a fait reconnaître la dignité du travail et l'obligation pour tous de s'y soumettre. Il a reconnu la primauté des valeurs intérieures qui seules ennoblissent l'homme. La loi universelle de l'amour et de la charité a fait de tout homme notre prochain, et sur elle reposent depuis lors les relations sociales dans le monde chrétien. Tout cet enseignement et les conséquences pratiques qui en découlent ont bouleversé le monde. Cette révolution s'est opérée sous l'inspiration progressive de l'évangile qui a façonné les générations par un travail lent, parfois accompagné de luttes pénibles. En effet, les progrès de la civilisation chrétienne n'ont été ni automatiques ni à sens unique: les réminiscences du passé et les mauvais instincts d'une nature viciée ont pesé sur cette évolution et continuent à la contrarier. Si cela est vrai pour nous qui sommes des privilégiés, qui bénéficions d'un atavisme chrétien, combien est-ce plus sensible encore chez ceux qui viennent d'avoir les premiers contacts avec le christianisme. Dans ce long et dramatique processus de la civilisation chrétienne, ce n'étaient et ce ne sont d'ailleurs pas toujours les croyants intégraux qui ont fait faire à la démocratie les progrès les plus décisifs. Les notions chrétiennes ont survécu et agi dans le subconscient d'hommes qui avaient cessé de pratiquer une religion dogmatique, mais qui continuaient à s'inspirer de ses grands principes. Ceux-ci sont devenus et demeurés les caractéristiques de la civilisation contemporaine. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que les rationalistes du XVIII^{ème} siècle ont proclamé et popularisé les droits de l'homme et du citoyen qui sont d'essence chrétienne."

Gospel, which has prepared generations for a long and fatiguing labour, sometimes accompanied by terrible conflict and warfare. This progress of the civilization with Christian essence has never been automatic, nor has it always gone in the same direction. The remnants of the past and the bad instincts of a vicious nature have weighed heavily on that evolution and continue to work against it.

Schuman considered democracy as essentially Christian⁴²⁴ as it was based on the typically Christian element of equality of men, including equal rights before the law. He thought an anti-Christian democracy, which is a democracy that does not regard the equality of men, would be a caricature of democracy and would inevitably fall into tyranny or anarchy sooner or later.⁴²⁵ This echoes Bergson's statement, as we saw in the previous chapter when discussing Maritain's thoughts, which says that the moral authority and the high value of its doctrine are with the Church, which is also recognized by a very large number of people.⁴²⁶ Schuman added that Christianity is not only the practice of religious cults and of good deeds, but that it is above all a doctrine that needs to define the moral duty in all domains, at least in its general principles. The Church safeguards the individual's main interests: its freedom, its dignity, its development, and opposes all that goes against them.⁴²⁷

Schuman sees Europe as the place where democracy should find its total development precisely because it is the continent in

424. For De Tocqueville's thoughts on this topic and a discussion, see note 106.

425. See also: Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 60; Schuman, *For Europe*, 51-52.

426. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 60. "La démocratie est d'essence évangélique parce qu'elle a pour moteur l'amour. La démocratie sera chrétienne ou ne sera pas. Une démocratie antichrétienne sera une caricature qui sombrera dans la tyrannie ou dans l'anarchie.[...] Il s'agit de reconnaître l'immense autorité morale de l'Église qui est spontanément acceptée par un très grand nombre de citoyens, et la haute valeur de son enseignement qu'aucun autre système philosophique n'a pu atteindre jusqu'à présent."

427. See also: Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 63; Schuman, *For Europe*, 54.

which Christianity forms a pivotal part of cultural heritage. And as democracy is a logical consequence of universal moral intuitions enlightened by the Christian train of thought to remain true to its content, it is natural that it will be practiced especially in Europe and spread from there to other countries when and if those are ready for it.⁴²⁸

At the same time Schuman insists that Christianity is not and must not be integrated into a political system and therefore also not be identified with any form of government, however democratic it might be. He stresses the importance of separation of Church and State affairs in this regard, saying:

We must distinguish what belongs to Caesar and what belongs to God. Each of these powers has its own responsibilities. The Church has to make sure that natural laws and truths are respected: however, it should not become the judge of concrete choices which have to be made from a practical point of view in line with the opportunities of the moment or that arise due to psychological and historical developments. The responsible politician's task consists in reconciling these two ideas: the spiritual and the secular: Our lives often become confused because of the problems we face and the choices we have to make, especially in the passion of controversy. However, no conflict involving these two requirements is insolvable, since one is an immutable doctrine of principles and the other implies wise administration of changing situations that have to be considered in the lives of populations and individuals.⁴²⁹

428. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 66. "La mise en oeuvre de ce vaste programme d'une démocratie généralisée dans le sens chrétien du mot trouve son épanouissement dans la construction de l'Europe."

429. Schuman, *For Europe*, 46-47. Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 55-56. "Il faut distinguer le domaine de César et celui de Dieu. Ces deux pouvoirs ont chacun des responsabilités propres. L'Eglise doit veiller au respect de la loi naturelle et des vérités révélées; son rôle, par contre, n'est pas de se faire juge des choix concrets qui devront se faire selon des points de vue pratique d'opportunité et selon les possibilités de fait qui découlent de l'évolution psychologique et historique. La tâche de l'homme politique responsable consiste à concilier, dans une synthèse parfois délicate mais nécessaire, ces deux ordres de considération, le spirituel et le profane. Notre vie est souvent obscurcie dans le dédale des problèmes et des options à faire et dans la passion des controverses. Mais il n'y a aucun conflit insoluble entre les deux impératifs, celui d'une doctrine immuable en ce qui concerne les principes et celui

Schuman thus explains that the separation of Church and State consists of their different tasks and that the two should complement each other. The task of the Church is to hold a moral mirror to the state. The task of the state is to take that mirror into account and to subsequently make its decisions. The Church has as ‘moral guard’ an independent position and is therefore not influenced by majorities or minorities. This also implies that the Church can never take over the tasks of the state nor impose its influence. As mentioned before, the state is the one that makes the decisions.

The above also indicates that upright - not ‘integralist’⁴³⁰ - laicization or secularity can be perfectly in accordance with a democratic government characterized, or not, by this kind of separation of Church and State.

d’une sage application des contingences changeantes dont il faut tenir compte dans la vie des peuples comme dans celle des individus.”

430. ‘Integralist’ laicization is a secularity that informs all fields, takes their religious elements out and fosters an anti-religious society. See M. Rhonheimer, *Cristianismo y laicidad. Historia y actualidad de una relación compleja*, (Madrid: Rialp, 2009). See also: Lautsi judgement ECHR 03.11.09, n. 30814/06 in Carla Zoethout, “Kruisbeelden op openbare scholen in Italië” in: *Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid* (1) (The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2010) and “El crucifijo puede estar en la escuela pública” in *Aceprensa*, Madrid, 2011. The fact that a religious symbol, such as the Crucifix in an Italian public school can lead to a courtcase in the European Court of Human Rights because a mother did not want her children to be confronted with a Catholic religious symbol in their classroom, indicates already that religious symbols can be a sensitive issue for those that do not believe. The initial decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 was in favour of the mother’s objection; the final decision in 2011 however was similar to the one of the Italian Court of Justice that said that the Crucifix should be interpreted first and foremost as a symbol that belonged to the essence of Italian culture. The Italian court held that the Crucifix had more meanings than the religious meaning such as its humanistic message with its set of principles and values that belong to the foundation of our democracies. (“*Le message de la croix serait donc un message humaniste, pouvant être lu de manière indépendante de sa dimension religieuse, constitué d’un ensemble de principes et de valeurs formant la base de nos démocraties.*”)

3.4.5 Europe as master of its own destiny

*It is in Europe's interest to remain the master of its fate.
Splitting Europe up has become an absurd anachronism.*⁴³¹

Robert Schuman

Schuman referred to the uniqueness of this time in history in which Europe is able to shape its own future and encouraged Europe to take advantage of this unique opportunity.⁴³² According to Schuman, Europe needed to be the master of its own destiny. However, each member state has its own history and that should be maintained:

What Europe wants is to uplift the rigidity of its borders. They should become the lines of contact where the material and cultural exchanges take place. They define the particular tasks, responsibilities and innovations proper to each country taking into account as well the problems all countries together - and even the continents - face and thus foster solidarity.⁴³³

Schuman also commented on the Christian roots of European civilization. He saw the Christian civilization as Europe's soul that needs to be revived and inform European society. According to Schuman, all countries belonging to European civilization have the calling to join the European community whenever they want, unless they lack an authentic democratic regime, product of the European cultural heritage. Schuman was, like Brugmans, convinced that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which in those days were

431. Schuman, *For Europe*, 25; Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 33. "Il est de l'intérêt de l'Europe d'être maîtresse de sa destinée. Le morcellement de l'Europe est devenu un absurde anachronisme."

432. Schuman, *For Europe*, 143-144; Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 146. "L'Europe se cherche. Elle sait qu'elle a en ses mains son propre avenir. Jamais elle n'a été si près du but. Qu'elle ne laisse pas passer l'heure de son destin, l'unique chance de son salut."

433. Schuman, *For Europe*, 26-27 ; Schuman, *Pour l'Europe*, 34-35. "Au lieu d'être des barrières qui séparent, elles devront devenir des lignes de contacts où s'organisent et s'intensifient les échanges matériels et culturels; elles délimiteront les tâches particulières de chaque pays, les responsabilités et les innovations qui lui seront propres, dans cet ensemble de problèmes qui enjambent les frontières et même les continents, qui font que tous les pays sont solidaires les uns des autres."

deprived of freedom by a totalitarian system, would no doubt join the European Community as soon as they could.⁴³⁴

Europe is searching for an identity; it is aware that it has its own future in hand. It has never been so close to the goal. May God not let Europe miss the hour of its destiny, its final chance of salvation.⁴³⁵

Serving humanity is a duty equal to the one dictated by our loyalty to the nation.⁴³⁶

We have to, we want to give Europe its radiance back, its strength, its independence, in other words its secular mission of guide and arbitrator.⁴³⁷

3.5 Schuman and the Plan in short

*I often think of 9 May 1950 and of your essential role [...] Your name is forever attached to the construction of the future of Europe and of the free world.*⁴³⁸

Monnet to Schuman

434. Lejeune, *Robert Schuman*, 172. “Tous les pays européens ont été pétris par la civilisation chrétienne. C’est cela l’âme de l’Europe qu’il faut faire revivre. Tous ces pays ont vocation de rejoindre la Communauté européenne, a condition qu’ils vivent sous un régime authentiquement démocratique. Alors ils pourront la rejoindre quand ils voudront. Quant aux pays d’Europe central et orientale aujourd’hui privés de liberté par un régime totalitaire, ils rejoindront l’Europe communautaire, n’en doutons pas, dès qu’ils le pourront.[...] Que cette idée d’une Europe réconciliée, unie et forte soit désormais le mot d’ordre pour les jeunes générations désireuses de servir une humanité enfin affranchie de la haine et de la peur, et qui réapprend, après de trop longs déchirements, la fraternité chrétienne.”

435. Schuman, *For Europe*, 143–144; Schuman, *Pour l’Europe*, 146. “L’Europe se cherche; elle sait qu’elle a en ses mains son propre avenir. Jamais elle n’a été si près du but. Dieu fasse qu’elle ne laisse passer l’heure de son destin, l’ultime chance de son salut.”

436. Schuman, *Pour l’Europe*, 131.

437. Schuman quoted in: Muñoz, 47. “Nous devons, nous voulons rendre à l’Europe son rayonnement, sa force, son indépendance, en d’autres termes la rendre à sa mission séculaire de guide et d’arbitre.”

438. Quoted in Roth, *Robert Schuman*, 513. Jean Monnet’s telegram sent to Robert Schuman from Roquebrune-Cap-Martin. “Je pense souvent au 9 mai 1950 et à votre rôle essentiel [...]. Votre nom est définitivement attaché à la construction d’avenir de l’Europe et du monde libre.”

Schuman's political circumstances made him help bring about world changing agreements, such as the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He got to know and work with the Director of the French Planning Commission, Monnet, and fellow world leaders such as Acheson from the United States, Adenauer and De Gasperi. Schuman came to play a central role in world changing initiatives such as the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community.

Schuman, Minister of Foreign Affairs, launched the Schuman Declaration on 9 May 1950 as the means to solve the 'German question'. Effective solidarity was the leitmotiv of the Declaration. Schuman's ideas were to solve the German problem by focusing on the French and German regions rich in coal and steel and by eliminating the many economic hindrances such as customs, price-agreements, subsidies etc. In order to make this possible an organisation was needed with a broad range of tasks that could reach beyond national states. Schuman's and Monnet's greatness lies in their turning this essentially simple idea into a project that was to be the base for negotiations for six European governments.

The negotiations took nine months. The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was, as mentioned previously, signed by the six governments on 18 April 1951. The treaty opened up the boundaries of national states.

The Declaration made clear that a united Europe could not be established at once, but should come about through concrete realisations of cooperation, which created an effective solidarity. The first concrete realisation was the Treaty of Paris, which procured the cooperation in the domain of coal and steel put under a common High Authority. The industries of coal and steel could in this way no longer serve purely national interests such as the weapon industry, which

could eventually lead to another war. The treaty implied equal rights and duties for the member states in the field of coal and steel. It provided a legal structure for a united Europe. This treaty was fully in contrast to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. This time it was a Treaty among equal members and not a conqueror's dictate over the defeated. It was the birth of a new Europe, of the European Union in which there are no winners or losers, but only partners. National egoisms should belong to the past.⁴³⁹ Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg joined the project that followed and resulted in the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.

The Schuman Declaration had made clear that it concerned a political integration in which democratic member states surrendered part of their sovereignty to a supranational institution in order to protect and foster the development of common interests. They would become interdependent. It also meant the recognition and protection of national interests unless they interfered with the sound development of common interests agreed on. It provided peace and security and made war materially impossible.

For all this to happen in the right way Schuman stressed the importance of a 'European spirit' that needed to permeate this European enterprise and that was to be found in the European cultural heritage with its Christian roots in which the human person played a pivotal role. Regarding European integration he pointed towards the necessity of living and practicing an effective solidarity and to do so step-by-step and very prudently living in upright fraternity. The ECSC

439. Robert Schuman, Magazine *Conférences des Ambassadeurs*, no. 51, (March 1951). "Le morcellement de l'Europe est devenu un anachronisme, un nonsens, une hérésie. La renonciation à tout régime d'isolement autarcique et protectionniste ainsi que la coordination des activités des pays européens. Ceux-ci doivent se libérer des égoïsmes à courte vue." National egoism thus refers to politics governed by protectionist national policies that are in detriment of common European interests.

was the first step. National self-interests should belong to the past, but a healthy national pride maintained and fostered so as to create an authentic unity in diversity. A unity and diversity in which there is mutual respect for the uniqueness of each state and the common interests are well taken care of. The common good should always enter the field of vision of each of its member states. No superstate would be created, but a union in which each state lives up to its proper uniqueness and feeds and is fed by its common home, the European community. It was such integration that Schuman and the other founding fathers strove towards and entrusted to Europe that would, according to Schuman, thus become the master of its own destiny.

Schuman was the main architect of the Schuman Declaration and not Monnet. However, as this chapter has made clear, Schuman needed Monnet, Adenauer and De Gasperi to put his ideas into practice. This means that the outcome of Schuman's timeless frame of reference for successful European unification (effective solidarity consistent with moral order based on Christianity), can and should be considered a main guideline for European unification issues.

