Sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N peacekeepers – why the problem continues to persist

Carlyn van der Mark

S1139835

Political Science International Relations Master Thesis

June 11 2012

Word Count: 20,374

Professor A.W Chalmers & Professor J.V Outshoorn
# Table of contents

**List of tables** .......................................................................................................................... 4  

**Introduction** ............................................................................................................................ 5  

**Literature Review** ....................................................................................................................... 7  

- *Militarized Masculinities* ......................................................................................................... 7  
- *“Boys will be Boys”* ................................................................................................................... 8  
- *Social masculinities* .................................................................................................................... 8  
- *Measures of impunity* .................................................................................................................. 9  
- *Failure of gender mainstreaming the 1325 resolution* .............................................................. 10  

**Research Design Framework** .................................................................................................. 11  

- *Liberal feminist theory* .............................................................................................................. 11  
- *Methodology in explaining the failure of the zero tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse* .................................................................................................................. 12  
- *The failure of the zero tolerance policy* .................................................................................... 12  
- *MONUC/MINUTASH peacekeeping operations* .......................................................................... 13  
- *Social masculinities and the peacekeeper* .................................................................................. 14  
- *Immunity, Impunity and accountability measures* ...................................................................... 16  
- *The domestic context of the peacekeeping mission* .................................................................. 18  

**Section 1: Social Masculinities and the Peacekeeper** ................................................................. 20  

1.1 *Combating sexual exploitation and abuse on the institutional level* ...................................... 20  

1.2 *Deconstructing the agency of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse - which peacekeepers are involved, who are the perpetrators?* ................................................................. 22  

1.3 *Data collection of number of personnel involved in sexual exploitation* ............................... 23  

1.4 *Failure of the Zero Tolerance in combating social masculinities and the military peacekeeper* .............................................................................................................................. 26  

1.5 *Analysis of social masculinities and failure of zero tolerance policy* ................................... 30  

1.6 *Conclusion* ............................................................................................................................. 32  

**Section 2: The Immunity and Impunity dilemma: the problem of accountability measures** ....... 34  

2.1 *The UN and legal provisions* ................................................................................................. 34
2.2 Legal status and jurisdiction per personnel .................................................................36
2.3 Implementation difficulties per national countries.........................................................37
2.4 The zero tolerance policy and accountability failures.....................................................41
2.5 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................41

Section Three: Looking at the social status of women and indicators of poverty as determining factors for sexual exploitation and abuse .................................................................42

3.1 Gender inequality and Poverty index..............................................................................42
3.2 Feminization of poverty....................................................................................................44
3.3 Measures of the Zero tolerance policy in contextualizing domestic social structures........45
3.4 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................47

Section 4: Conclusion ..........................................................................................................48

References............................................................................................................................52
List of tables

Table 1: No. of allegations per personnel in the MONUC mission
Table 2: The no. of allegations per personnel of MINUTASH
Table 3: Number of female personnel within the MONUC mission
Table 4: Number of female personnel within the MINUTASH mission
Table 3.a Percentage of women in MONUC
Table 4.a Percentage of women in MINUTASH
Table 5: indicating the age of consent for sex and legality of prostitution
Table 6: Gender inequality index and Multidimensional poverty index
Table 6.1 Violence against women indicator scores
Introduction

The United Nations peacekeeping missions have a compelling role in assisting states emerging from conflicts. Notorious for their missions, peacekeepers are paramount in bringing peace for societies to being the rebuilding process. United Nations (U.N) peacekeeping missions have throughout the years obtained a distinguished role within the international community. However mindful of the commendable work peacekeepers are involved with, there remains a dark stain behind the curtain of the prestigious peacekeeper. Sexual exploitation and abuse committed by U.N peacekeepers have been reported throughout peacekeeping missions. These include Cambodia and Bosnia Herzegovina in the 1990s, to West Africa in 2002, the Democratic Republic in 2004 and to the latest installment of allegations, 2012, Haiti. Allegations of sexual exploitation create a negative outlook on peacekeeping missions, and prevent a successful transformation of peace and stability to the host country. To discuss allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N peacekeepers remains a taboo topic. Yet, it is vital to explore if peacekeeping operations continue to help establish order and peace in prior conflict ridden areas.

In 2003, the U.N established a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse (A/59/862). Despite the establishment of a zero tolerance policy there continues to be allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2004 made international headlines when reports indicated numerous allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The media reports caused the U.N to readdress their zero tolerance policy and undertake their own investigations into peacekeeping missions. In 2005, the U.N released a comprehensive report by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, former UN peacekeeper, who investigated and provided recommendations towards the zero tolerance policy. This report was “A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations” (A/59/710). Nonetheless, after a revision of the zero tolerance policy, allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse persisted by U.N peacekeepers. Even 7 years after the revision of the zero tolerance policy, the year 2012 has been marked with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti.

This thesis is a study into the zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse. The thesis will address why almost 10 years after the original zero tolerance policy there continues to be cases of sexual exploitation and abuse during peacekeeping operations.
Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are directed towards the women and teenage girls during peacekeeping missions.¹ The continuation of sexual exploitation and abuse is harmful to the local population and is an abuse of the position of peacekeepers as role models who are there to serve and protect the domestic environment - not to exploit it. The reason it is important to study the zero tolerance policy is because it appears to be “zero tolerance - zero compliance” (Clayton, Bone, Dec 23 2004). This thesis shall explore which factors prevent the zero tolerance policy from being effective. It will do so by posing the research question “what factors explain for the failure of the UN’s zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation?”

In order to address the failure of the zero tolerance policy, this thesis shall investigate three dominant variables for the failure of the zero tolerance policy. Section 1 will explore the Social Masculinities and the peacekeeper, section 2 will discover the problem of immunity and accountability measures whilst section 3 looks at resource allocation by examining the domestic context of the peacekeeping mission. This thesis will explore why the zero tolerance policy fails by examining the flaws of the policy in relation to these three variables. By exploring these three variables I hope to discover the ineffectiveness of the zero tolerance policy. I predict the main flaw of the zero tolerance policy is the implementation of a zero tolerance policy within a peacekeeping culture; making the social masculinities a determining factor. It is apparent that there is a supply and demand cycle towards sexual exploitation. The three variables will highlight why this supply and demand cycle persists. This thesis shall begin with a literature review on explaining reasons for sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions which causes for a failure of the zero tolerance policy. The research design framework will then highlight how this thesis is structured in examining the failure of the zero tolerance policy, followed by section 1,2,3 and finally a conclusion.

¹ Women and teenage girls are not the only victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. There have been numerous cases of boys being exploited by peacekeepers. However, this thesis will focus only on women and teenage girls. It is important to note that children below 11 years old have also been involved in sexual exploitation. However, to include ‘women and children’ infantilizes women involved with sexual exploitation (Enloe, 2000). This thesis shall use women and teenage girls as points of reference for allegations of sexual exploitation. Teenage girls refer to girls who are in their adolescent years, from 12 years onwards. The reason for using the term “teenage girls” is because referring to girls above 12 as children infantilizes them. Furthermore, the society they live in hardly categorizes them with a child-like innocence. It is important to hear their stories as well.
The literature that explains why sexual exploitation and abuse occur during peacekeeping missions is explained through two approaches. The first approach focuses directly on the peacekeeper to explain why a peacekeeper is involved with sexual exploitation. The literature surrounding the peacekeeper is based on concepts such as Militarized Masculinities and Social Masculinities. Another explanation for sexual exploitation is from a “boys will be boys” perspective. This perspective is derived from essentialist argumentation. The second approach is an exploration of the failure of the U.N as an institution in preventing sexual exploitation. The literature surrounding this topic focuses on impunity measures and the failure of gender mainstreaming the 1325 resolution.

**Militarized Masculinities**

Authors have developed critiques on masculine behavior by suggesting that boys and men aspire to a form of masculinity. Masculinity is characterized by “stoicism, phallocentricity, and the domination of weaker individuals (Higate, Hopton, 2002, p.433). Men who have these attributes of masculinity are seen in awe by other men. The masculine traits are aspirational (Higate, Hopton, 2002, p.433). Military organizations exemplify the masculine behavior and reward this behavior, creating a hyper-masculinity culture. The hyper-masculine behavior is further amplified through the contrast of the feminine. Men are seen as strong and women as weak and emotional. The contrast between masculinity and femininity and the celebration of masculinity creates the feminine as the ‘other’ (Goldstein, 2009). The creation of manhood has become an ‘artificial status that must be won individually’ and is constructed through a culture needing disciplined and strong soldiers (Goldstein, 2009, p.283). Sandra Whitworth further examines the military institution in creating overtly masculine men. Whitworth’s argument stresses that the military “teaches manhood and only secondarily teaches soldiering” (Whitworth, 2004, p.160). This means that soldiers are trained in a certain way of thinking that relies heavily on hegemonic forms of masculinity. Whitworth argues that hegemonic masculinity indoctrinated by the military does not make military personnel good peacekeepers (Whitworth, 2004). Scholars such as Sandra Whitworth have explored these masculine institutions and demonstrated that soldiers are socialized into exaggerated ideals of masculinity and manhood (2004, Simic, 2010, Jennings, 2008, Hooper 2001).
Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse occur when soldiers who are trained for in-war fighting, indoctrinated with ideals of domineering strength, are then working in an environment that does not require immediate violence. The peacekeeping environment is about non-violence and ensuring a transition of peace that requires sensitivity to the local population. Meanwhile, the soldiers are still living in a highly militarized environment. The soldier has to switch mindset from a soldier to a peacekeeper. It is this switch in expectation and environment that some U.N peacekeepers are unable to manage, which leads to aggressive behavior and in some cases, sexual exploitation of the local population (Fetherston, 1995, p.21). The U.N military peacekeepers involvement in sexual exploitation is that troops cannot exercise their training with a propensity to manliness and violence. Instead, the men exercise their ‘manliness’ through sexual practices that can lead to sexual exploitation and abuse (Whitworth 2004, Higate 2007).

“Boys will be Boys”

Militarized masculinities can also be derived from essentialist feminist theory. The justification for the behavior of U.N peacekeepers is “boys will be boys” (Cockburn, Hubric, 2002). The behavior of men is a result of their biological attributes of needing and wanting sex. Men are depicted with a need for sexual release, hence having sexual relations with the local population. The “Boys will be Boys” argument further indicates that the hyper masculine culture encourages sexual exploitation and abuse and this is maintained within a ‘wall of silence’ (Refugee International, 2004 p.6). However, the essentialist argument has drawbacks for relying on simplified biological determinants. To argue only that men need sex ignores the social structures that provide a more thorough analysis on sexual exploitation. Social masculinities, derived from militarized masculinities, argues for the significance of social structures that create an environment and circumstances of sexual exploitation.

Social masculinities

Social masculinity stems from the argument of militarized masculinities, but focuses on the importance of social structures to explain for sexual exploitation. Social structures incorporate the importance of context in explaining behavior. The explanatory factor for the failure of the zero-tolerance towards sexual exploitation is a result of economic and social power relationships (Higate 2007, Clarke 2008). These relationships are based on a supply-demand cycle whereby food or money is exchanged for sex (Clarke, 2008). U.N
peacekeepers abuse their social power by providing extra basic necessities to those that are willing to pay through sexual favors (Higate, 2007). War-torn or disaster struck countries creates a social situation whereby there are limited accountability and responsibility measures (Meintjes, Pillay, Turshen, 2002). Some U.N peacekeepers take advantage of the situation for their personal gain. The economic and social position between the oppressor and oppressed creates a supply and demand cycle for sexual exploitation and abuse.

Measures of Impunity

To further understand the reasons for a demand and supply cycle, scholars have explored measures of impunity as explanations for U.N peacekeepers’ involvement in sexual exploitation and abuse (Murphy, 2006, Vandenburg, 2005). The U.N is not a legal entity and does have the legal authority to prosecute peacekeepers that are involved in sexual exploitation and abuse. The authority for prosecuting soldiers who have committed crimes is the responsibility of the soldier’s home country (Bedont, 2005). Bedont argues that the lack of a justice system during the peacekeeping operation results in sexual exploitation and abuse (2005). The problem for the failure of the policy is that peacekeepers have immunity (Vandenburg, 2005, Ladley, 2005).

Furthermore, different peacekeepers fall under different legal systems. For example, civilians can be prosecuted under domestic criminal law whereas the military has their own military court (Defies, 2008). The UN’s inability to prosecute creates a sense of immunity alongside impunity (Ladley, 2005).

One of the main problems of not adhering to the U.N code of conduct is the lack of accountability the U.N can implement on their peacekeepers (Allred 2006, Ladley 2005). Scholars have argued that there is no consistency between the different countries’ legal systems that prevents a universal understanding on determining a sexual offense (Simic, 2010). There are gaps between civilian and military personnel within the legal systems, as well as differences in jurisdiction and willingness of countries to hold their troops accountable (Ladley, 2005). Therefore, some peacekeepers partaking in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse have the perception that they are immune towards prosecution for their crimes. This is a result of the lack of surveillance and “privilege of temporality” which allows for peacekeepers to feel that their time in mission is finite, and that their involvement in sexual exploitation is unlikely to receive swift sanctions (Higate, 2007, p.112, Allred,
The lack of accountability can also result in the abuse of power. U.N peacekeepers are rarely held accountable for their actions because of technical difficulties in obtaining evidence or criminal allegations against the peacekeepers (Allred, 2006).

However, other scholars have argued that the UN does not want to be held accountable for allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (Raven-Roberts, 2005). There has been a continuation of reports of misconduct by U.N peacekeepers that the U.N prefers to acknowledge internally (SOURCEIT). The peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was celebrated by the U.N and preferred not to acknowledge the sexual exploitation and abuse that occurred simultaneously throughout the mission (vandenburg, 2005). The failure of the policy is a result of the U.N not wanting to address allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse because of the negative impact it has on the organization (vandenburg, 2005).

Failure of gender mainstreaming the 1325 resolution

The United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 in 2000 has been referred to as the ‘mantra’ in gender mainstreaming policies (Carey, 2007, p.2). SC 1325 was the first time the Security Council regarded the importance of women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations. The purpose of the resolution was to outline actions that were to be taken by the U.N and member states to incorporate a gender mainstreaming policy in peace and security policies (Cohn, Kinsella, Gibbings, 2010, p.2). The principles of gender mainstreaming apply to women’s rights and humanitarian needs with regard to the implementation of U.N peacekeeping missions (Carey, 2007, p.2). The incorporation of a gender perspective is important towards the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse because it reinforces a zero tolerance towards violence against women (Cary, 2007, p.4). The failure of the zero tolerance policy is attributed to the failure of implementing SC 1325 (Lytikainen, 2000, Cohn C, Kinsella H, Gibbings, 2004).

Vayrynen criticizes the mainstream of gender as being a confine of modernity (2004). Vayrynen and Hudson perceive the importance of recognizing contextual differences in implementing gender mainstreaming policies. Vayrynen argues that the U.N discourse on gender creates binary opposites in thinking about gender. Women are perceived through private and peaceful terms and men as public and war-like (Vayrynen, 2004, p.2). Hudson recognizes this same critical approach in mainstreaming gender issues by arguing that contextual analysis is significant when incorporating a gender perspective. Incorporating
gender mainstreaming policies is not only a product of implementing gender into policy making but understanding the traditional structures within a society. This implies a focused training-based approach in incorporating gender mainstreaming policies. The failure of the zero tolerance policy can be explained by not acknowledging the context gender aspects per peacekeeping mission.

Interpretations are simplified in addressing women but not the actions of men in gender mainstreaming policies. The critique addresses solving gender issues by incorporating a problem solving approach of implementing more women into the development and peace process. This would allow for the recognition of a gender perspective and recognize the important role of women in peace processes; instead of including more women as a direct solution to gender issues (Cary, 2007, Vayrynen, 2004, Simic, 2010).

**Research Design Framework**

The literature review explained why sexual exploitation occurs and why the policy has failed in tackling sexual exploitation. This thesis shall elaborate on the literature thus far by examining three variables. The first focuses on the present literature on social masculinities and will discover which measures are used by the U.N to tackle the problem of social masculinities. The second variable looks at accountability measures and the third focuses on resource allocation by the U.N’s zero tolerance policy. The variables will help identify why the zero tolerance policy fails and will be examined by using a liberal feminist approach. This section explains the research design in answering the question which factors cause for the failure of the zero tolerance policy.

**The Liberal Feminist Approach**

To investigate the failure of the U.N’s policy and strategy to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse by their peacekeepers; this thesis shall adopt a liberal feminist approach in explaining the failure of the zero tolerance policy.

Feminist theories emerged into the discipline of International Relations during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Tickner, Sjoberg, 2010, p.196). The significance of incorporating a feminist perspective in understanding global politics is to use a gender lens in examining the differential impact of the state system. Men and women are impacted differently by the state system. By incorporating a gender lens, these differences can be highlighted.
A liberal feminist approach highlights the causes in which women are subjected to a subordinate position in society within a positivist framework (Tickner, Sjoberg, 2010, p.199). By using a liberal feminist approach, certain problems that occur disproportionately towards women can be identified. These include income inequalities between women and men, human rights violations such as trafficking and rape in war (Tickner, Sjobery, 2010, p.199). The failure of the zero tolerance policy will be examined by using a liberal feminist approach. The theory will help examine the inequalities that are presented during a peacekeeping mission that attributes to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. For example, the liberal feminist approach will help identify the variable examining resource allocation. The liberal feminist approach explores the intricacies in indicating a supply and demand cycle between the oppressors and oppressed in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

*Methodology in explaining the failure of the zero tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse*

This section of the thesis outlines the dependent and independent variables that are used to explain factors that cause for the failure of the zero tolerance policy. The dependent variable is the failure of the zero tolerance policy. The three independent variables are the social masculinities and the peacekeeper, accountability measures and the domestic context of the peacekeeping mission. The following section will explain the variables along with data collection and hypotheses that will be used to relation to the failure of the zero tolerance policy.

*The failure of the zero tolerance policy*

The failure of the U.N’s zero tolerance policy is the dependent variable for this analysis. The U.N’s definition of sexual exploitation is “any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another” (A/59/710). The Secretary-General released a bulletin in 2003 outlining prohibitions of sexual exploitation and abuse. Section three of the bulletin provides 6 behavioral instances that are prohibited by the zero tolerance policy (ST/SGB/2003/13). These instances include the prohibition of sexual relations with children below 18, prohibition of exchange of goods for services of sex, no sexual relationships based on unequal power dynamics, the importance of reporting sexual abuses, disciplinary action if such conduct persists, and United Nations
staff are obliged to create and maintain an environment that prevents sexual exploitation (ST/SGB/2003/13).

Despite the prohibition of sexual exploitation and abuse set by the Secretary General’s bulletin, there continues to be allegations. The indicator that is chosen to highlight the continuation of allegations is the instances of sexual exploitation and abuse released by the U.N’s Code of Conduct website. The data will be presented in the form of the number of allegations against peacekeepers from the year 2006 till 2012.

The peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the mission in Haiti (MINUTASH) will be used to highlight the failure of the zero tolerance policy. The reason for using these two peacekeeping missions as indicators for the failure of the zero tolerance policy is because they represent two different time periods for the zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse.

**MONUC/MINUTASH peacekeeping operations**

This thesis will use the peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the peacekeeping mission in Haiti as examples to illustrate the failure of the zero tolerance policy. The reason for including the MONUC mission is because of the scandals that erupted against the U.N peacekeepers involvement with sexual exploitation. The UN conducted 111 investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse between December 2004 and October 2005 (Dahrendorf, 2006, p.4). The investigations led to dismissals, charges and repatriation (Dahrendorf, 2006, p.4). The peacekeeping mission MONUC is important to examine because despite the acceptance of the zero tolerance policy set forth by the Secretary General in 2003, which explicitly prohibited acts of sexual exploitation, allegations continued two years later and to an extent that caused a media frenzy. Investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse instigated further investigations into the situation of sexual exploitation and peacekeeping missions. This was released in a report in March 2005. The report is ‘The comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ (A/59/710). The report is otherwise known as the Zeid Report.²

The Zeid Report is a significant report to address with regards to the zero tolerance policy. This is because the report investigated four main concerns of peacekeeping operations with

---

² The report is referred to as the Zeid Report because the report was investigated by former peacekeeper and permanent representative of Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein. The report was further endorsed by Kofi Annan.
regards to sexual exploitation and abuse. These four concerns are: the current rules on standards of conduct, the investigatory process, organizational managerial and command responsibility, and individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability. The report was written as a response to the many allegations that had arisen out of the MONUC mission. The report was to provide new insight into the zero tolerance policy and address further strategies to prevent allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. This thesis shall use aspects of the Zeid Report’s strategies alongside the zero tolerance policy to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.

The reason for using the MINUTASH mission to indicate the failure of the zero tolerance policy is because the MINUTASH mission has the most recent allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. It is important to recognize that despite the reaffirmation of the zero tolerance policy in 2005, in 2012 reports of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by UN peacekeepers continue to be released. It is important to note that the MONUC and MINUTASH mission are cases that help illustrate the failure of the zero tolerance policy. This thesis will not explore in depth the organizational flaws of each mission but rather examine how the zero tolerance policy fails in preventing sexual exploitation in both missions.

This thesis will attempt to explain why seven years later, there continues to be allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The following section shall explain the three independent variables that facilitate the failure of the zero tolerance policy.

*Social masculinities and the peacekeeper*

Social masculinities highlight the importance of social structures that explain for the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse. Higate and Clarke have already established that sexual exploitation occurs within a peacekeeping mission because of the social and economic conditions (Higate, 2007, Clarke, 2008). The poor socio-economic conditions create relationships between the peacekeeper and the local citizen that are based on an unequal power balance. The Secretary General’s Bulletin on ‘Special measures for the protection from sexual exploitation and abuse’ specifically indicates that sexual relationships between U.N staff are “based on inherently unequal power dynamics” (ST/SGB/2003/13). The unequal relationship creates an environment whereby sex is exchanged for basic needs such as food. This creates a supply and demand chain and exacerbates instances of sexual
exploitation and abuse. This thesis will examine the social masculinities and how the zero tolerance policy attempts to combat this issue.

This thesis will not specifically explore the social dynamics between the peacekeeper and local citizens. In order to do so, one must conduct qualitative research to which this thesis is limited. Instead, to grasp why the zero tolerance policy fails, the independent variable social masculinities and the military peacekeeper will be explored by examining what the U.N proposes in an attempt to prevent an environment that creates a supply and demand cycle.

The variable social masculinities and the peacekeeper will first identify which peacekeepers have the most allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Identifying which peacekeeper is involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse will help pin point the strategies that the U.N adopts in preventing future allegations of sexual exploitation. The U.N adopts three main strategies that directly influence the peacekeeper and the social masculinities aspect. The strategies are, gender training, the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping missions and gender units. These strategies are implemented before and during peacekeeping missions to prevent peacekeepers from becoming involved in relationships based on unequal power structures. The purpose of these strategies is to educate the peacekeepers in gender issues and the local population.

The variable social masculinities and peacekeepers will examine the specific gender strategies that are implemented to prevent an environment whereby peacekeepers are involved with sexual exploitation and abuse. This variable will help indicate why these strategies fail with regard to the zero tolerance policy. Unfortunately not all gender strategies can be directly tested to indicate the failure of the zero tolerance policy. This would require research involving interviews with gender specialists in U.N peacekeeping missions and with the peacekeepers themselves. Instead desk research will be used to illuminate the effect of gender training and gender units within peacekeeping missions. Therefore the main indicator that will be used to analyze the U.N’s attempt in creating an environment less prone to exploitation by social masculinities, is the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping missions. This strategy was set forth by the Zeid Report. The reasoning for this argument is that more women within a peacekeeping mission will result in a better environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse (A/59/710). This thesis will examine if the gender strategy implemented by the U.N can explain for a failure of the zero tolerance policy. The reason this variable (tested by looking at the implementation of women in peacekeeping
missions) is important to consider is because it will help determine the strategies that the U.N implements to prevent future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The U.N Code of Conduct website will provide the necessary statistics to see if there is a relationship with the number of women and the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The MONUC and MINUTASH mission will be used as examples of the two data sets. Information on the number of women per personnel from the MINUTASH AND MONUC mission has also been extracted from the U.N’s Code of Conduct website. A simple comparison between the number of allegations and the number of women per mission will help indicate, if the implementation of more women in peacekeeping missions, will create an environment whereby there are fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The variable social masculinities and peacekeepers will indicate if hypothesis I can be tested as positive or false. Hypothesis I argues that “the greater the emphasis of gender strategies that are implemented within a peacekeeping mission, the greater the decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse.” To test this hypothesis, the gender strategy is measured by the number of women present in peacekeeping missions. It is important to note that the inclusion of women is not the only gender strategy that is implemented by the U.N. This is why this thesis will draw on gender training and gender units as explaining the implementation of gender strategies by the U.N. The indicators will be highlighted through qualitative data done by other scholars and gender awareness within peacekeeping missions. Ultimately the variable will indicate the success or failure of the implementation of the U.N’s gender strategies to combat sexual exploitation and abuse.

Immunity, Impunity and accountability measures

The second variable examines the failure of the zero tolerance by focusing on the implementation of prosecuting peacekeepers involved with sexual exploitation and abuse. To comprehend accountability measures two factors will be considered. The first is the measure of accountability set by the U.N, and the second is the response by domestic governments. Measures of accountability will explain which accountability measures within the U.N are in place towards allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The response by domestic governments will indicate how accountability measures are then implemented within a domestic context.
To measure how domestic governments respond to their peacekeepers’ involvement in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, a cultural factor needs to be considered. Not every domestic government has the same jurisdiction towards allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The difference between domestic governments is also dependent on which type of peacekeeper is involved in sexual exploitation and abuse. For example, a military peacekeeper is held accountable by military law whereas a civilian peacekeeper is held accountable to domestic criminal law. The different accountability procedures is further complicated as each government has their own legal system. It is because of these different legal systems and accountability measures that make it difficult to measure and test accountability towards sexual exploitation and abuse. However, it is still an important measure to recognize for the failure of the zero tolerance policy. Therefore this thesis will take one aspect of the zero tolerance policy and indicate how the implementation fails towards holding peacekeepers accountable for their actions. Hypothesis II will also be measured by using the accountability measure by indicating that the more accountability measures that are implemented then the greater the decrease in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The specific accountability measure that this thesis will investigate is that “sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age of majority or age of consent locally” and “exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favors or other forms of humiliating, degrading exploitative behavior, is prohibited” (St/SGB/2002/13). Despite these prohibitions set by the zero tolerance policy there remains to be allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. This thesis will attempt to explain why there continues to be allegations from this legal standpoint. In order to investigate why this continues, one needs to determine which aspects of the legal accountability issue conflicts with the zero tolerance policy. The indicators that are chosen to represent this is the age of consent and legality of prostitution. The reason for choosing age of consent and legality of prostitution is because they are the closet legal forms to understanding why culturally, some troop contributing countries have sex with persons below 18 or engage in sexual services.

Unfortunately, the U.N does not submit which troop contributing countries are involved with sexual exploitation and abuse. This makes it difficult to measure the countries that are involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. In order to obtain some data, this
thesis will rely on media reports that have reported instances of sexual exploitation and abuse. The countries with the most reports on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse during the MINUTASH and MONUC mission will be compared with their domestic laws of age of consent and legality of prostitution. The data that will show age of consent and legality of prostitution will be obtained from a general website that provides this information. It is important to note that the variable of accountability measures will be based on proxy measurements. One can only make assumptions for why the zero tolerance policy on prohibition is not implemented on a domestic level.

Despite the difficulties in measurement towards accountability, this thesis will highlight that some of the cultural attributes within a domestic legal system prevents an implementation of a zero tolerance policy. Therefore it is significant to employ more accountability measures from the U.N’s standpoint to prevent further difficulties in implementing a zero tolerance policy from a legal perspective.

The domestic context of the peacekeeping mission

The last independent variable that will explain for the failure of the zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse is the domestic context of the peacekeeping mission. This variable is a difficult variable to test. Nonetheless it shall help indicate the socio-economic status of women and teenage girls that may cause them to engage in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse. The reason for investigating the socio-economic conditions is because it brings agency to the women and teenage girls. Instead of only perceiving the women and teenage girls as victims, this variable will help understand why women and teenage girls are presented into a situation of sexual exploitation. This variable helps indicate the supply side of the demand and supply cycle of exploitation and abuse. The zero tolerance policy does not acknowledge the importance of understanding the domestic context. This is why the policy has failed thus far.

In order to investigate the domestic context as a failure of the zero tolerance policy, two indicators will be analyzed. The first is the gender inequality, and the second is the multidimensional poverty index. These indicators are taken from the Social institutions and Gender index. The reason for using the Social institutions and Gender index is because they provide specific data on access to bank loans, political participation and attitudes towards domestic violence. These indicators will provide an understanding of the socio-economic
situation of the women and teenage girls during peacekeeping missions. The relationship of the domestic context and the zero tolerance policy will be highlighted in how the U.N implements measures to prevent sexual exploitation. To investigate these measures, this thesis will use Kathleen Jenning’s minimalist and maximalist approach in preventing sexual exploitation (2008). The minimalist and maximalist approach indicates the amount of interaction peacekeepers have with the local population. Using Jenning’s framework one can determine how U.N resources are allocated in preventing sexual exploitation and abuse. This section of the thesis will also refer to the liberal feminist approach in identifying unequal power structures by identifying the feminization of poverty.

Hypothesis III shall be explored through the variable of the domestic context. **Hypothesis III indicates that more emphasis that is placed within the domestic community of the peacekeeping mission, then the greater the decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse.** In order to investigate hypothesis III the zero tolerance policy will be examined to illuminate how the domestic context is vital in preventing allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. If more emphasis is placed on the unequal social structures presented to women, then there will be fewer allegations. The reasoning behind this argument is that women and teenage girls will not be part of a supply chain for sexual services because they will feel empowered to obtain basic necessities without using sex.

To sum up, three independent variables are used to explain for the failure of the zero tolerance policy. The first is the social masculinities and the peacekeeper. This variable will help identify which peacekeepers are involved with sexual exploitation and the strategies that are presented by the U.N to prevent any more allegations. The second variable refers to the accountability measures and the third is resource allocation. Three hypothesizes shall be explored throughout the thesis.

Hypothesis I: the greater the emphasis of gender strategies that are implemented within a peacekeeping mission, the greater the decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse.

Hypothesis II: the more accountability measures that are implemented then the greater the decrease in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Hypothesis III: the more emphasis that is placed within the domestic community of the peacekeeping mission, then the greater the decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse.
This thesis predicts that the main failure of the zero tolerance policy is dependent on all three variables. However, the first variable, social masculinities and the peacekeeper, represents a challenge in ideology that the U.N can change to prevent future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The rest of the thesis is divided into three main sections. The first explores the social masculinities, the second accountability measures and the third is the resource allocation. To begin with, the social masculinities aspect will be investigated.

Section 1: Social Masculinities and the Peacekeeper

1.1 Combating sexual exploitation and abuse on the institutional level

The year 2005 marked a significant change for the U.N to combat sexual exploitation and abuse by their peacekeepers. It was the year that the ‘Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’ was put forth to the General Assembly to combat sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N peacekeepers. The report was written by former peacekeeper and permanent representative of Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein. Prince Zeid investigated the issue of sexual exploitation by the MONUC peacekeepers. The report is otherwise referred to as the Zeid report. The report signified the first time that there was a thorough investigation into the problem of sexual exploitation during a peacekeeping mission. The result of the report gave way to a stronger enforcement of a zero tolerance policy.

Prior to the release of the Zeid report, the U.N did attempt to engage with the problem of their peacekeepers sexually exploiting the local population. In February 2005 a special task force was set up for the protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. This was a joint effort by the Executive Committees on Humanitarian Affairs and Peace and Security (ECHA/ECPS) along with the U.N and Non-governmental organizing task force on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit). The task force involves 30 U.N and non U.N entities cooperating on four pillars to prevent further cases of sexual exploitation. These four pillars are; engagement with and support of local populations, prevention, response, and management and coordination (United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit). This section will examine preventative measures to enforce a zero tolerance policy.

One of the prevention strategies against sexual exploitation and abuse is the Secretary General’s bulletin on 9th October 2003 on “special measures for protection from sexual
exploitation and abuse.” This three page bulletin explores the scope of the problem, provides definitions and explicates the prohibition of sexual exploitation (ST/SGB/2002/13). The standards of prohibition of sexual exploitation is the prohibition of sexual activity with anyone younger than 18, the exchange of goods, employment for services of sex, the importance of managers roles, the importance of maintaining an environment free from sexual exploitation and abuse (ST/SGB/2002/13). The 2003 bulletin further outlines the responsibilities of heads of departments, offices and missions and referral to national authorities (ST/SGB/2002/13). The second prevention measure is the importance of training and raising awareness among personnel. This is done through the U.N issued-raising-awareness video; To Serve with Pride (United Nations Task Force from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, 2006). The training video is screened to peacekeepers before they are sent to missions abroad, and explains the U.N’s code of conduct prohibiting sexual relations with the local population. The video’s duration is 20 minutes. The last preventive measure prevents the future employment of peacekeepers who have been involved with past cases of sexual exploitation and abuse (United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit).

Sexual exploitation and abuse has always remained a taboo topic within the U.N. The peacekeeping mission in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1999 was riddled with U.N personnel associated with trafficking of teenage girls and sexual activity with the local population (Vandenburg, 2005). The reports were kept internally and those accused of sexual misconduct were sent home (Refugee International, 2005, p.15). Since then, the U.N has become more involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. In 2002 a report issued by the Office of Internal Oversight Services investigated cases on sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa (A/57/4650). The report was presented to the General Assembly and stressed the issue. The Office of Internal Oversight continued to investigate further allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was now a cause for concern with the rising number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Another report was issued in January 2005 to explore in depth allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in the DRC (A/59/661). The report is a detailed account of the number of allegations and testimonies of women and children that were involved with sexual acts with peacekeepers (A/59/661). However, it wasn’t until the release of the Zeid Report in March 2005 that the U.N acknowledged the need to implement a comprehensive strategy to combat future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (A/60/862).
The importance of the Zeid Report is that the report explores the difficulties the U.N faces in enforcing a zero tolerance policy, as well as provides different mechanisms in combating the problem. The Zeid report identifies four main areas of concern; the current rules on standards of conduct, the investigative process, organizational, managerial and command responsibility, and individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability (A/59/710). The Zeid Report prompted more attention towards the zero tolerance policy. The ‘Implementation of the recommendations of the special committee on peacekeeping operations’ was released a few months after the Zeid Report on December 29 2005 (A/60/640). This led to the publication of the ‘Comprehensive report prepared to General Assembly resolution 59/296 on sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, including policy development, implementation and full justification on proposed capacity on personnel conduct’ was released on May 24 2006 (A/60/862). The two reports adopted recommendations made by the Zeid Report in combatting sexual exploitation and abuse.

To understand the failure of the zero tolerance policy in preventing future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, the following sections will examine some of the recommendations that is proposed by the Zeid Report. The two aspects that are of interest for this thesis is the Zeid Report’s recommendations on the organizational, managerial and command responsibility and criminal accountability. This section will focus on recommendations towards the organizational aspect of peacekeeping missions by incorporating gender mainstreaming into peacekeeping missions. The inclusion of gender into peacekeeping missions from the U.N’s perspective will minimize an environment of militarized masculinities and social masculinities. However, to understand the recommendations set forth by the Zeid Report, one needs to understand which peacekeepers are involved in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

1.2 Deconstructing the agency of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse - which peacekeepers are involved, who are the perpetrators?

A U.N peacekeeping mission is made up of four different types of peacekeepers; Military troops, Civilians, Police, and Non U.N volunteer groups. To explore the allegations this section will look at which type of peacekeeper is associated with the most allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. In doing so, one can identify which peacekeeper is a cause for concern for the U.N’s implementation of a zero tolerance policy. This section will then further explore how the U.N aims to tackle the problem by their peacekeepers. This will be
done by examining the implementation of gender mainstreaming proposed by the Zeid Report and adopted in further U.N resolutions. The indicators chosen for this, is the inclusion of more women within peacekeeping missions and the U.N’s gender training. Hypothesis I shall be tested in this section. Hypothesis I illustrates that the more gender strategies that are incorporated in a peacekeeping mission then there will be less allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

1.3 Data collection of number of personnel involved in sexual exploitation

The United Nations developed a Conduct and Discipline Unit in 2007 following the establishment of a Conduct and Discipline team in 2005. The Conduct and Discipline team are designed to uphold accountability and strengthen conduct during peacekeeping missions (United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit). The Conduct and Discipline Unit provide reports on which type of personnel are involved in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The table below is the results of which peacekeepers are involved in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

It is important to recognize that these numbers are not definitive in terms of all allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. It is difficult to report every allegation of sexual exploitation and abuse as not every case is reported. Furthermore, the numbers below are only of the cases that have enough evidence to be investigated. The lack of information and reported data only allows for these results to be an estimate of the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

*Table 1: No. of allegations per personnel in the MONUC mission*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONUC</th>
<th>no. of allegations per personnel</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-UN</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit)
Reports from the Conduct and Discipline team provide a pattern of personnel that are involved in sexual exploitation and abuse. The peacekeeping mission MONUC indicates that there is a substantial difference between peacekeeping personnel and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. In 2007, MONUC had 31 allegations from the military. The next highest figure are 15 allegations against civilian personnel. In 2009, the results decreased for military men, with 29 allegations, and 10 allegations of civilians. An increase occurred in 2009 with 40 allegations and 25 in 2010 against military personnel. Whereas, the remaining categories of civilians, police, non-UN and unknown remain below 10 allegations (A/61/841). When looking at the percentage differences more than 50% of the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are from military peacekeepers. This is a significant difference from the police personnel which had, within the four years, only 5% of all the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. One can derive from these results that within the MONUC mission, the main perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse are the military men.

MINUTASH presents the same difference between personnel as the MONUC mission. In 2007, 8 allegations were against the military. Whereas allegations against civilian personnel remained at 5 allegations. In 2009, there was only 1 allegation against the military and 8 allegations between the police and civilian personnel. The numbers changed in 2010. The allegations against military personnel increased to 6 allegations and allegations against the
civilian and police personnel decreased to 2. In 2011 the number of allegations against the military personnel continued to increase.

The percentage figures of MINUTASH show less of difference between personnel than that of the MONUC mission. The MINUTASH mission had 43% of all allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against military personnel. The MONUC mission had a higher number of 64%. The difference between the two missions is that the MINUTASH mission had more allegations against the police personnel than the civilians. The MONUC mission had more civilian personnel that were involved with sexual exploitation and abuse.

Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the type of peacekeeper that is most involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are the military peacekeepers. It is important to recognize that the two peacekeeping missions are set at two different time periods and contexts. However, both missions have high numbers of the military men being involved with sexual exploitation and abuse.

The problem of the military peacekeeper has been attributed to explanations of militarized masculinities and social masculinities. Many scholars such as Whitworth and Goldstein claim that the reason for a high number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by military personnel is because of the militarized masculinity aspect. The argument here is that soldiers are trained to think in hegemonic forms of masculinity that celebrates aspects of ‘masculinity’ such as violence and strength whilst denounces more ‘feminine’ traits such as peace and compassion (Whitworth, 2004). However, one can argue that this approach doesn’t acknowledge the military troops that are not involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The militarized masculinity argument neglects to recognize the social and economic structures that create an environment for sexual exploitation. Paul Higate establishes this by highlighting the exchange for food for sex which creates a demand and supply cycle between the peacekeeper and the local population (Higate, 2007). This thesis recognizes social masculinities as a determining factor for the failure of a zero tolerance policy. The zero tolerance policy continues to fail and have high levels of military peacekeepers being involved with sexual exploitation and abuse because of how the U.N attempts to tackle the issue of social masculinities. The social masculinities aspect is one of the key failures for the zero tolerance policy because the zero tolerance policy does not fully acknowledge the implications of social masculinities. The reason for this is the way the zero tolerance policy attempts to prevent future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The
U.N adopts an organizational responsibility approach with, ‘just add gender and stir. The U.N’s measures and recommendations presented by the Zeid Report is to include more women into peacekeeping missions, and provide gender training before missions.

1.4 Failure of the Zero Tolerance in combating social masculinities and the military peacekeeper

One of the main strategies from the U.N to combat the social masculinities aspect is the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping operations. The inclusion of more women will result in a better environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse (A/59/710). Another reason for including more women in peacekeeping operations is due to the fact that victims and their spokespersons tend to be female (A/59/710). Women and teenage girls may feel more comfortable speaking with a woman than a man. This may also encourage more abuses to be reported (A/59/710).

The Zeid Report specifically argues that the “presence of more women in a mission, especially at senior levels, will help to promote an environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse”(A/59/710, p.19). Resolution A/60/640 further demonstrated that equal gender representation in selecting staff for senior positions, will help enforce better mission leadership and prevent future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse (A/60/640). It appears as if the inclusion of women in peacekeeping missions will influence the level of sexual exploitation and abuse. To test if the Zeid Report’s assumption of including more women will indeed create less of an environment for sexual exploitation, this thesis will investigate the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse alongside the number of women in the peacekeeping operation. If more women in a peacekeeping mission correlates with fewer allegations then hypothesis I could be tested positive; that the more gender strategies there are, then there will be a decrease in the levels of sexual exploitation and abuse.
### Table 3: Number of female personnel within the MONUC mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONUC</th>
<th>Feb-10</th>
<th>Feb-09</th>
<th>Feb-08</th>
<th>Feb-07</th>
<th>Dec-06</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual police</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formed police units</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contingent troops</td>
<td>18276</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>16343</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>16322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total no. allegations</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. of allegations against troops</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Number of female personnel within the MONUC mission
Table 4: Number of female personnel within the MINUTASH mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINUTASH</th>
<th>Feb-12</th>
<th>Feb-11</th>
<th>Feb-10</th>
<th>Feb-09</th>
<th>Feb-08</th>
<th>Feb-07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual police</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formed police units</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1824</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contingent troops</td>
<td>7420</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>8606</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>6893</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total no. allegations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no. allegations against troops</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics

Table 4a: Percentage of women in MINUTASH mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINUTASH</th>
<th>Feb-12</th>
<th>Feb-11</th>
<th>Feb-10</th>
<th>Feb-09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual police</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>formed police units</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contingent troops</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total % of W. in mission</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics
Table 3 shows the number of female personnel within the MONUC mission. Unfortunately, the number of female personnel per U.N personnel is limited to police and military units. Nonetheless, the data that is available from the UN website does include the number of female personnel within contingent troops. This is the data set that is important because as was discovered in the prior section, the type of personnel with the highest allegations are the military men.

Table 3 shows that since December 2006 there has been an increase in female military troops, with an exception in 2009. In 2007, the number of women in the MONUC mission was 287 in comparison to the 16,335 male troops. The number of allegations against the troops in 2007 was 31. In 2008 the number of women in the troops personnel increased to 298. This is only a slight increase of 10 women. The number of allegations against troops in the year 2008 was 29. The number of allegations only decreased by 2 allegations. One could argue that the number of women did not make a great effect on the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. In 2009 the number of allegations increased significantly to a total of 40 allegations against troop personnel. The number of women within the troops also remained at a low number of 246 in comparison to the 16,343. In 2010 the number of allegations did decrease to 25 against troops and 36 in total. The number of female troops increased in 369 but decreased to 19 from the individual police. The year 2009 indicated a high rise in the number of allegations against troops. The number of women was 246. The following year, 2010, showed a large decrease of 25 allegations against the troops. The number of women did increase by 123 more women within the mission. It appears as if this may have had an effect, yet with less than 71 women in mission the number of allegations remains at 29 (from the year 2008). This makes it hard to distinguish if the number of women had an effect on the number of allegations. When looking at the percentage of women in table 3.A involved throughout 2007-2010 the percentage of women within the MONUC mission remained within a 3% of the total number of women personnel within the peacekeeping missions. This is a low percentage of women and does not provide enough information if the number of women had a direct effect on the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The MINUTASH mission has a slightly higher percentage of women in the peacekeeping mission. Table 4.A shows a 2% increase of women involved in the mission from 2009 to 2012. Table 4 shows that in 2009 there were 109 women within the contingent troop
personnel. The number increased in 2010 when 30 more women joined the contingent troops. This made a total of 139 women in the military during the MINUTASH mission. If the Zeid Report was correct in suggesting that the more women in mission would create less of an environment for sexual exploitation, then the number of allegations should decrease. However, instead the number of allegations against military personnel increased, as did the overall number of missions by 5 more allegations. It appears as if the number of women did not directly affect the environment for fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. In 2011 this number increased to 8 allegations with only 2 less female contingent troop members. When looking at table 4.A the percentage of women within the MINUTASH mission remains low with no more than 10% of women in any category. Furthermore, although the percentage of women in the mission increased from 2% in 2009 to 4% in 2012 the number of allegations overall within the mission increased up to 15 allegations. This would disprove the assumption that women create less of an environment for sexual exploitation and abuse.

Tables 3 and 4 show that there still remains a low percentage of women within the two peacekeeping missions. The results also indicate that even with a slight increase of women within a peacekeeping mission, there is not much influence in the number of allegations per personnel. The total number of allegations per year appears to also remain unchallenged depending on the number of women within the mission. This is seen mostly in the MINUTASH mission where the number of women increased in 2009 to 2010, as did the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The results also show that most of the allegations are against the military personnel despite the number of women within the mission. Therefore, the assumption of including more women into a peacekeeping mission will decrease levels of sexual exploitation is false. The following section will elaborate as to why this assumption fails in creating a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse.

1.5 Analysis of social masculinities and failure of zero tolerance policy

The Zeid Report establishes basic measures that are needed to be implemented to minimize future levels of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Aside from the importance of training and raising awareness that the U.N had already emphasized in prior reports, the Zeid report establishes the importance of increasing the percentage of female peacekeeping personnel (A/59/710 p.18). The results from Tables 3 and 4 show that the increase of female
personnel in peacekeeping missions do not directly affect the levels of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The reason for the number of women not directly effecting the number of allegations is because the assumption is based on essentialist argumentation. Including more women into the peacekeeping process only reinforces a gendered justification of a feminine and masculine dichotomy. The conviction that females are more peaceful then men, and promotes an environment with fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, ignores the social structures that cause for sexual exploitation. The U.N argues that men behave differently in the presence of women from their own culture and are more able to observe social conventions and civilized behavior (Simic, 2010, p.3). However, as the results from table 3 and 4 indicate, the more female representatives from their own cultures does not necessarily create less allegations. In fact research shows that the inclusion of women within a military context does not change the hyper masculine culture of the military. Instead women fit into the culture opposed to change it (Simic, 2010, p.6). Hence, the argumentation of more women means less allegations is a void solution. The culture of the military needs to change in order for there to be less allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. To change the culture is to change the opportunities of a demand and supply chain and realize the importance of social masculinities in influencing the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The problem of the Zeid report arguing that the inclusion of more women will result in a better environment that discourages sexual exploitation and abuse is that in doing so, it is creating the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse as a woman’s issue. This marginalizes the issue as being the women’s responsibility to change a culture of sexual exploitation and abuse. Incorporating more women into peacekeeping missions is important and integrating gender aware strategies is significant as it does allow for gender sensitive issues to be raised during peacekeeping missions. However, incorporating women as a solution to the problem neglects to understand the source of the problem – the peacekeeper themselves in partaking in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Furthermore, the Zeid Report reiterates the importance of tackling sexual exploitation through the reinforcement of gender training (A/59/710). Gender training is significant in preventing future allegations of sexual exploitation as training brings awareness to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse. The U.N provides a training video, ‘To Serve with Pride,’
that emphasizes the problem with sexual exploitation and abuse. However, this video is limited to 20 minutes. Angela McKay, former Chief of Gender Affairs Office in the U.N mission in Kosovo, argues that the gender training has become sensitized as being part of a checklist (McKay, 2003). The danger of the military’s propensity towards checklists can create gender training as something to be “simply ticked off from a long list alongside landmines, HIV/AIDS, or driving skills” (McKay, 2003, p.5). Unfortunately this thesis is limited with regards to testing the effectiveness of gender training on military personnel. This means that this thesis cannot test if the gender training material provided for a zero tolerance policy is effective enough for eliminating allegations of sexual exploitation. However, from the results of Table 3 and 4 it appears as if gender training has not necessarily effected the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. This is because allegations continue to persist per year despite the reinforcement for gender training (A/60/640).

Raven-Roberts points out that the flaws with gender training is not the training itself but rather the implementation of gender training (2005). Departments seek to find gender experts to fulfill gender focal points instead of personnel with gender and political affairs peacekeeping expertise (Raven-Roberts, 2005, p.52). By not hiring someone with the expertise of both, then gender issues are not expected to influence the politics of interagency coordination or discourses within peacekeeping agendas (Raven-Roberts, 2005, p.52). Furthermore, gender manuals are not always implemented (Raven-Roberts, 2005). Gender is still treated as a woman’s issue and the responsibility of implementation is left to the women. However, to decrease levels of sexual exploitation and abuse, the issue has to be perceived as the responsibility of both a woman and a man. The gender training is not a failure of eliminating allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse but rather the implementation of gender training is flawed. This is not to say that hypothesis I fails specifically. The inclusion of more gender strategies should decrease levels of sexual exploitation and abuse as it would reinforce the importance of the issue. However, the failure is a result of implementation and reasoning for including gender strategies into peacekeeping missions. One cannot simply ‘add gender’ to the equation, one needs to directly understand why such allegations occur.

1.6 Conclusion

To conclude, this section has looked at measures implemented by the U.N to combat social masculinities in a zero tolerance policy. Section 1 found that the measures that are implemented are flawed. They are flawed because they are based on essentialist
argumentation. The more women that are included in peacekeeping operations will result in a decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse. Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the inclusion of women has not significantly altered the number of allegations. Hence, more women into peacekeeping missions will not directly affect the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Gender training packages are also inadequate to counter allegations of sexual exploitation. To just include gender does not mean that sexual exploitation will decrease. The issue of social masculinities needs to be understood further to recognize why the supply and demand cycle exists. To just present the importance of gender training as a zero tolerance policy will not change the culture unless training is enforced. Hence, to refer back to hypothesis I that the more gender aware strategies that are implemented in the mission means the lower the levels of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse appears to be falsifiable. The reason for hypothesis 1 appearing to be false, is that in theory it should decrease allegations. However, despite the inclusion of gender aware strategies there continues to be allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. The implementation of gender aware strategies is flawed. The argument for including more women is flawed, and the training for gender aware issues is dependent on the effectiveness of implementation measures. To measure the effectiveness of implementing gender training would require interviews with peacekeepers and a different form of analysis that this thesis is incapable of performing.

However, what one can gather from this information is that the failure of the zero tolerance policy is dependent on implementation procedures. The following section will begin to explore some of the implementation technicalities of the zero tolerance policy. This will be explored by examining the immunity and impunity issue.

**Section 2: The Immunity and Impunity dilemma: the problem of accountability measures**

The previous section identified that one of the main perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse are military peacekeepers. So far the failure of the zero tolerance policy is a result of implementation practicalities and ineffectiveness of gender policies to combat social masculinities. This section will expand on the social masculinities aspect by examining the problems associated with holding military men accountable for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.
One of the problems in determining the failure or success of a zero tolerance policy is the issue of accountability. To prevent future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse from occurring by U.N personnel, there must be a greater measure of accountability towards the U.N personnel’s actions. The situation of sexual exploitation and abuse appears to have become a “zero-compliance with zero tolerance” (Clayton, Bone, Dec 23 2004). Instances of sexual exploitation appear to have been engulfed in a “wall of silence” that is promoted through a militarized masculine culture (Defeis, 2008, p.8). However, it is not only this wall of silence that enables military personnel to escape punishment for their actions; the fact that military personnel have immunity creates an obstacle in addressing allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse.

This section will explore the legal provisions for addressing sexual exploitation and abuse and the limitations in addressing a zero tolerance policy. The variable accountability and domestic law will be explored in indicating a failure of the zero tolerance policy. This section will deepen into the implementation difficulties in holding troop contributing countries accountable with regards to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. One of the factors that indicate why implementation of legal provisions are hard to administer is the cultural differences in what constitutes sexual exploitation. The indicator that is chosen to measure a culture aspect is the age of consent for sex and legality of prostitution.

This section will test hypothesis II. Hypothesis II argues that with more accountability measures that are implemented, then the greater the decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse. What is expected to be measured is that if there are more measures of accountability directed at U.N personnel, then there will be fewer allegations. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse will not feel that they have impunity for the crimes they have committed.

2.1 The UN and legal provisions

To understand and to test the accountability measures, this section will first elaborate on the legal provisions that are set forth by the U.N with regards to sexual exploitation and abuse. Outlining the legal provisions will indicate the difficulties associated with implementing accountability.

Sexual exploitation and abuse violate universally recognized international legal norms and standards. Such behavior is seen as unacceptable and prohibited conduct for United Nations
staff (SGB/2003/13). The U.N has established legal provisions under the Code of Conduct for blue helmets that prohibit sexual exploitation and abuse. This is set out in the Code of Conduct under rule 4 of the code of personal conduct for Blue Helmets\(^3\) (G.A A/59/661). In May 2005, the president of the Security Council strongly condemned “in the strongest terms, all acts of sexual abuse and exploitation committed by United Nations peacekeeping personnel” (ST/PRST/2005/21). The Council reiterates that sexual exploitation and abuse is unacceptable and has a detrimental effect on the fulfillment of mission mandates” (ST/PRST/2005/21).

The difficulty of implementing a prohibition on sexual exploitation and abuse in the form of a zero tolerance policy is that the military personnel have their own legal provisions. Military personnel fall under the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. The convention enables all officials to be “immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity” (A/63/260). Experts on mission enjoy “immunity from legal process of every kind” and “senior officials at the rank of Assistant Secretary-General and above enjoy the same privileges and immunities as those accorded to diplomatic envoys” (A/63/260). The General Assembly does account for criminal accountability only “if and after proper investigation, there is evidence to support allegations of sexual exploitation or sexual abuse, these cases may, upon consultation with the Office of Legal Affairs, be referred to national authorities for criminal prosecution” (ST/SGB/2003/13). Already two problems arise in the difficulty of implementing a legal provisions for a zero tolerance policy. The first problem regards the ‘referral to national authorizes for criminal prosecution’ (ST/SGB/2003/13). The U.N cannot prosecute military members and can only “refer” to national authorities. The second problem refers to the ‘evidence to support allegations.’ Not all cases of sexual exploitation and abuse are recorded or documented. This means that some allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse cannot go through legal means because there is not enough evidence to support a claim. Furthermore, if this masculine culture of a ‘wall of silence’ occurs within a mission then finding evidence to support allegations becomes a problematic matter.

The Zeid Report attempts to tackle the issue of legality and accountability. The Zeid Report mentions a category that pertains towards managerial and command accountability. Section five indicates the importance of referring allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse to

\(^3\) Blue helmets is another term used for peacekeepers (Whitworth, 2004).
national authorities. This would allow for a continuation of investigating an allegation with the possibility of prosecution of such crimes (A/59/710). The report issued by the Security Council after the Zeid Report emphasizes that improved cooperation between the secretariat and troop contributing countries is needed for holding U.N personnel accountable (A/60/640). However, the difficulty of implementing a zero tolerance policy from a legal perspective is that U.N does not have the official legal authority to prosecute against U.N personnel. The U.N can only repatriate personnel who have committed crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse. The legal jurisdiction is left to the national authorities. This restricts the implementation of the zero tolerance policy on the behalf of the U.N. Another difficulty of implementing a zero tolerance policy from a legal perspective is the differences in legal jurisdiction per U.N personnel.

2.2 Legal status and jurisdiction per personnel

One of the difficulties facing the implementation of a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse is the legal provisions for different personnel in U.N peacekeeping missions. For example, a civilian U.N staff who has violated the zero tolerance policy can be fired and sent home (Jennings, 2008, p.20). The United Nations civilian staff are bound by the Charter of the United Nations (article 101) (DPKO/MD/03/00996). Civilian staff are civilians who work with intergovernmental organizations, NGOS, private voluntary organizations or private companies. Civilian U.N staff do not fall under the same jurisdiction as military personnel. This means that civilians personnel, unlike military personnel, do not have immunity for the crimes they may commit while on mission.

In comparison, military members of national contingents are held accountable by the criminal jurisdiction of their own national authorities. This gives them immunity from local criminal prosecution (DPKO/MD/03/00996). It is important to note that immunity does not justify impunity. Military personnel, if found to be guilty of neglecting to follow the zero tolerance policy, should still be prosecuted by their own national laws. National authorities are expected to take appropriate action (DPKO/MD/03/00996). Military members of national contingents are expected to abide to the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets and We are the United Nations Peacekeepers (DPKO/MD/03/00996). If a military personnel is convicted with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse then the military personnel is most likely to be repatriated back to their home country. Repatriation does not necessarily mean the peacekeeper will be fired or punished (Jennings, 2008, p.20).
Punishment is dependent on the national legal system. The U.N from a legal standpoint can only repatriate a peacekeeper, dismiss them from future missions, garnishing of wages and blacklist them from any U.N missions (Jennings, 2008, p.20). After repatriation the U.N can demand follow up on actions taken by the military towards a personnel that has committed crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse. However, this does not mean that the U.N always follows up on investigations (Jennings, 2008). Instead there appears to be a disconnection between U.N administrative standards and the legal regimes of the troop contributing countries (Jennings, 2008, p.20).

2.3 Implementation difficulties per national countries

Although there appears to be a disconnection between follow up investigations of sexual exploitation and abuse there is another disconnection between the U.N and troop contributing countries. It appears that some troop contributing countries undertake investigations into sexual exploitation more seriously than other troop contributing countries. This is shown in the different levels of punishment that troops are given by their national authorities. Unfortunately the U.N prefers to keep information regarding the involvement of troop contributing countries as private. Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse reported by the U.N are sent to the appropriate troop contributing country to deal with internally. The lack of knowledge on which country’s peacekeepers are involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse limits the amount of analysis one can do regarding implementation measures. However, there are two measures of the zero tolerance policy that can be analyzed in terms of complications regarding implementation difficulties. The first is the prohibition of having sexual relations with anyone under 18 and having sex with prostitution (A/59/710). These two provisions are key for a zero tolerance policy. However, not all troop contributing countries have the same minimal age of consent for sex or legality of prostitution. This section will explore the different cultural norms within a legal perspective towards sex with prostitutes and age of consent. It is important to recognize that the measurements of cultural norms, age of consent and legality of prostitution, can only be seen as proxies in understanding implementation difficulties towards the zero tolerance policy.

One of the proxy measures for trying to explain why the zero tolerance policy fails in implementing accountability for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse can be attributed to cultural interpretations within their legal system. It is difficult to analyze the specific cultural attributes and would require a different type of analysis which is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Therefore this analysis is limited to a particular section of the zero tolerance policy. This section refers to the U.N’s minimal age of consent for sex. Sex with minors, those below 18, is unacceptable behavior by the U.N. The U.N further states that sex with prostitutes is also prohibited by U.N personnel. However, not all troop contributing countries have the same standards of minimal age of consent for sex, or consider prostitution to be illegal. The table below shows some of the different perceptions of age of consent for sex and legality of prostitution from troop contributing countries. The countries that were chosen are either those with common allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse or have high levels of troops contributing towards peacekeeping missions.

**Table 5: indicating the age of consent for sex and legality of prostitution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is prostitution legal?</th>
<th>Age of consent for sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo DRC</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 indicates the different ages of consent for sex and legality of prostitution. The table shows that Pakistan along with Sri Lanka, South Africa, Nepal and the Netherlands have a lower age of consent for sex than the U.N’s minimal age of 18. Uruguay, Morocco, and

---

4 The countries that are chosen are based on the most media reports of sexual exploitation and abuse.
France have an even lower age of consent; 15. Italy has the lowest minimal age of consent; 14. The legality of prostitution also show varying results per country. For example Uruguay does find prostitution to be legal along with France, the Netherlands and Italy. The reason for drawing attention to the different legal systems regarding prostitution and age of consent is because it indicates one of the problems for implementing a zero tolerance policy. Not all legal systems are the same in implementing or agreeing with some conditions of the zero tolerance policy.

Examples of countries that have been accused of sexual exploitation during their peacekeeping mission in Congo include Morocco, Pakistan, Uruguay, Tunisia, South Africa, and Nepal (Lynch, Dec 16 2004). Reports include rape, prostitution, and pedophilia (Lynch, Dec 16, 2004). The MINUTASH mission has had countries such as Sri Lanka and Uruguay that are involved with sexual exploitation and abuse. One of the biggest scandals in MINUTASH was the deportation of 108 Sri Lankan peacekeepers that were sent home on disciplinary grounds (Reuters, Nov 2, 2007).

Allegations on sexual exploitation and abuse has been documented globally through news reports, none more so than peacekeepers from India. One of the allegations against three Indian peacekeepers was that they sexually exploited a woman while on holiday in South Africa during their MONUC mission (Bhatia, June 7th 2011). In 2008 more allegations of Indian peacekeepers from the 6th Sikh Battalion were affirmed during their mission in Congo (Bhatia, June 7th 2011). Allegations against Indian peacekeepers are not restricted to prostitution or to single nights with women. Peacekeepers from Indian have also been associated with child prostitution rings in Masisi (Brown, August 25th 2008). The ages of teenage girls that were involved in such prostitution rings were as young as 13 (BBC, August 17th 2006). It was after this allegation that troops were banned from sex with locals (BBC, August 17th 2006). After allegations of Indian peacekeeping troops were associated with sexual exploitation and child abuse, Ban Ki Moon, asked India for a “maximum degree” of punishment (Pubby, August 13th 2008). The allegations that arose against Indian peacekeepers caused for the indictment of several peacekeepers for having transactional sex with local Congolese women and teenage girls in North Kivu (Pubby, August 13th 2008). However, the status of such allegations is unknown. The history of the Indian army in prosecuting against cases of sexual exploitation and abuse has been limited to “censures” and lack of investigative capabilities (Pubby, August 13, 2008).
The common pattern from these allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is that although the troops are repatriated back to their national contexts there remains a flaw in the ability to further prosecute military troops. It is difficult to identify what is the cause for lack of thorough implementation. One can only speculate that domestic law does not align with the U.N’s standards of international norms. The difference in norms relating to prostitution and consent of age may be the cause for a failure in the zero tolerance policy. Troops may feel they can ‘get away with’ having sex with younger girls, prostitution or transactional sex because under their national laws. These crimes are not considered as grave crimes. Therefore irrespective of what the U.N states, troops are involved with acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.

One of the reasons for justifying the determination of a national legal system in prosecuting military troops for crimes of sexual exploitation and abuse, is the amount of conviction a legal system has on gender crimes. Bedont highlights that ignorance of gender issues creates inadequate attention of crimes that may be committed against women in national jurisdictions (2005, p.90). For example, the case against a U.N French civilian, Didier Bourguet, was sentenced to 9 years of imprisonment for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse during the MONUC mission (Africa news, September 10th 2008). The French legal system may take offences against women with more jurisprudence then in Pakistan where the position of women in society is lower than a man’s position. However, to make such ascertains one must be careful and undergo a more in-depth legal analysis of each national contingent.

Although these results are inconclusive in determining implementation measures and accountability on a national level they do indicate the difficulties in holding military personnel accountable. Section 2 has also indicated that there is a difference in legal norms between national legal systems and the U.N’s zero tolerance policy. The difference in what constitutes as a minimal consent of age or a culture of transactional sex may influence the further implementation of prosecuting peacekeepers. The zero tolerance policy against sexual exploitation and abuse does not recognize the differences in national legal systems. To create a more accountable system the zero tolerance policy should acknowledge this cultural difference in prosecuting peacekeepers. However, it is important to recognize that despite the need to create greater accountability measures and to recognize the cultural differences, the U.N is limited in the amount of enforcement they can do. The U.N is not a legal or state
entity and therefore cannot interfere into matters of a sovereign state. Nonetheless, the U.N does falter on other accountability and implementation measures.

2.4 The zero tolerance policy and accountability failures

The U.N is an international body that upholds humanitarian law (ST/SGB/1993/3). The U.N is left with the responsibility of the military personnel that is represented by the U.N to be fully acquainted with the rules of humanitarian law (Murphy, 2006, p.9). The U.N accepts co-responsibility with contributing states for recognition of humanitarian law. Co-recognition of humanitarian law means that the U.N should follow up on allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse after the offending peacekeeper is brought back to their national country. However, the Secretary-General has yet to obtain formal assurances from troop contributing countries on jurisdictions related to sexual exploitation and abuse (Defies, 2008, p.23). Another factor that makes prosecuting peacekeepers involved with sexual exploitation difficult is the continuous troop rotation (Murphy, 2006, p.8). When troops are rotated it makes investigating into allegations more difficult because victims cannot testify against their perpetrators. Troop rotation also makes it difficult for follow up statements (Murphy, 2006).

The U.N also struggles with the investigation into cases of sexual exploitation and abuse. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which is responsible for investigating allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, does not have sufficient resources and suffers from a backlog of misconduct cases (Defeis, 2008, p.12). Holding peacekeepers accountable for allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is also restricted in the difficulty of obtaining evidence. This is because it is difficult to catch the peacekeeper in an act of sexual exploitation and abuse. The misconduct has already occurred and finding reliable evidence that will hold up in a legal court is hard to obtain (Defeis, 2008).

2.5 Conclusion

In theory if the U.N had stronger accountability measures regarding the prosecution of peacekeepers involved with sexual exploitation and abuse then most likely there would be fewer allegations of sexual exploitation. Unfortunately one cannot test this theory because accountability measures is dependent on national legal systems. Since the U.N will not provide the information on which troop contributing countries are involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, one cannot test the differences in implementing the U.N’s zero tolerance policy within a national’s legal system. Therefore, the accountability measure
is dependent on proxy measurements. Despite not being able to find concrete measurements, it is still significant to consider accountability and implementation of legal provisions as a failure of the zero tolerance policy. The failure of the zero tolerance policy is dependent on troop contributing countries enforcing a zero tolerance in their legal system. This section has highlighted through table 5 that the U.N the domestic government do not always align with regards to standards of consent of sex and prostitution. The un-clarity of what is allowed and what isn’t can account for feelings of impunity by peacekeepers. Hence, the zero tolerance policy fails in creating a strong enforcement body against allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse as well as enforcement of age of consent and legality of prostitution.

Section Three: Looking at the social status of women and indicators of poverty as determining factors for sexual exploitation and abuse

In understanding which factors cause for the failure of the zero tolerance policy one needs to understand the domestic context within which acts of sexual exploitation and abuse occur. The previous sections have elaborated on the strategies to combat social masculinities and focused on the legal aspects in the failure of the zero tolerance policy. This section will now explore why transactional sex, otherwise known as survival sex, occurs by incorporating a women’s perspective. By using a liberal feminist approach, unequal social factors will be highlighted that cause for some women and young teenage girls to be involved with forms of transactional sex with U.N peacekeepers. The indicators that is used to highlight the unequal social factors are the Gender Inequality index and Multi-dimensional Poverty index. Hypothesis III shall be tested in this section. Hypothesis III indicates that the more emphasis that is placed within the domestic community of the peacekeeping mission, then the greater the decrease in sexual exploitation and abuse.

This section will be split into three parts. The first will indicate the social circumstances in the DRC and Haiti context. The second section will highlight the importance of recognizing the social and economic context in preventing future allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Lastly, the third section will see how the zero tolerance policy comprehends environmental factors that cause for circumstances of sexual exploitation and abuse.

3.1 Gender inequality and Poverty index

The table below uses data collected from the Gender Inequality Index along with the Multi-Dimensional Index. The data is used to highlight the social circumstances within the DRC
and Haiti. Table 6.1 shows the indicators that is used in relation to violence against women. Indicators that are used to measure violence against women refers to laws that are in place, attitudes towards domestic violence and lifetime prevalence of domestic violence.

Table 6: Gender inequality index and Multidimensional poverty index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRC and Haiti 2012 rankings</th>
<th>Gender Inequality/Multidimensional poverty index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes towards domestic violence</td>
<td>0.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of domestic violence</td>
<td>0.641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to bank loans and credit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political participation</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGI value 2012/102</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Family code value 2012</td>
<td>0.7043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of poor (national poverty line)</td>
<td>71.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the Gender Inequality index show that the attitudes towards domestic violence regarding DRC is 0.75. The figure represents legislation that is planned but not fully implemented yet. Haiti has a lower score of 0.2 which indicates that there is no specific legislation in place to combat domestic violence. Access for women to obtain bank loans and credit for both countries indicate that it is not as easy to obtain credit as a woman. Aspects that further show a lower social standing for women is the lower political participation of women. The highest/desired outcome is a score of 0.5. However, Haiti and DRC have scores
of 0.04. The lack of female representatives in politics may also attribute to levels of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Gender issues may be more recognized on a political level with more female representation. One of the most relevant indicators shown from the Gender Inequality and Multidimensional Poverty Index is the high percentage of poor people in each country. DRC has 71% and Haiti has 77% of the population on the national poverty line. One of the reasons for women and teenage girls to be involved with transactional sex is because they can exchange food for sex. These women and children may be suffering from poverty which causes them to supply their services for a demand by the peacekeepers. Poverty levels are important indicators in understanding what causes for a supply within a demand and supply cycle of sexual exploitation and abuse.

3.2 Feminization of poverty

When looking at the example of Haiti to determine what causes for the failure of the zero tolerance policy, it is significant to look at the historical context of Haiti and the role of women in society. Women have historically been most affected by levels of poverty (Merlet, 2001, p.167). Feminization of poverty refers to how poverty affects the genders differently. In the case of Haiti, poverty is a particular problem for the women. In some families they are the sole providers (Merlet, 2001, p.168). Merlet describes these women as the pillars, proto mitan, of families because they play a determining role in fulfilling family needs (2001, p.168). Feminization of poverty occurs because of two reasons. The first refers to the violence women experience in the market place through gang violence, and the violence in marketplaces where merchandise is distributed (Merlet, 2001, p.167). The second reason refers to the system of production whereby women’s work is unvalued (Merlet, 2001, p.168). Haiti already has a high poverty index score of 77%. This might be the cause for why women and teenage girls engage in sexual relations with peacekeepers, because of their poor economic standing. Peacekeepers exchange food, goods or money if the women and teenage girls have sexual relations with them. The reason for this, is because women are struck hard by poverty and because of the lack of financial support, they feel through sex they can gain some economic independence. Furthermore, households (46%) are headed by women, and in urban areas where women are head of the household poverty levels are more extreme (AI, 2008, p.10).

The DRC example highlights the problem of feminization of poverty as an indicator as to why women and teenage girls partake in sexual relations with peacekeepers. The
Multidimensional Poverty Index of is 71% which is as high a value as Haiti. The MONUC and MINUTASH mission both encounter difficulties of feminization of poverty. Although the two missions have two very different domestic contexts, the circumstances of seeking alternative resources in dire conditions are the same.

When the peacekeepers arrived in DRC, many women and teenage girls were gang raped by rebel groups. Some of these women and teenage girls became pregnant from the soldiers and were left to become single mothers. Furthermore, single mothers were considered as social outcasts and caused for many to leave their villages and families and go to the refugee camps (A/57/465). The refugee camps create an environment whereby acts of sexual exploitation are common. The Investigation team of the U.N issued, in the report of the investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa, that the camp environment “is a fertile ground for breeding exploitative behavior”(A/57/465).

The explanatory reasons for a fertile ground of sexual exploitation is that basic needs such as shelter and food are scarce. Peacekeeping missions were sent to Haiti and DRC because the political and social situation required international assistance. One of the resources that both contexts suffered from is food. Food is a large problem within these camps as there is limited supplies. This affects the woman differently than from the men, because the women within the families are not only responsible for themselves but also for their children. The lack of food, money and shelter can cause some of the women and teenage girls to seek alternatives to these necessities. The alternative is to be involved with transactional forms of sex which creates a demand and supply cycle for sexual exploitation and abuse.

3.3 Measures of the Zero tolerance policy in contextualizing domestic social structures

The zero tolerance policy does not specifically reflect the poor economic and social situation during peacekeeping operations. It is not to say it neglects the social situation, but there are no specific measures in acknowledging the extent of the problem. Reports issued by the Office of Internal Oversight services recognize problems relating to the social situation of the camps. The report on the Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa, issued in 2002, indicates certain basic needs that exacerbate conditions of the camps (A/57/465). These basic needs include shelters, sanitary offices, health security and food (A/57/465). However, these reports are not used with regards to the zero tolerance policy. The reports are issued for informational purposes opposed to policy regulation.
The U.N’s implementation of the zero tolerance policy brings to light as to how the U.N recognizes the importance of the domestic context. In order to investigate the implementation this thesis will draw on Jenning’s maximalist vs minimalist awareness approach (2008). Jennings highlights that there are two approaches of the implementation of the zero tolerance policy on a domestic level. The minimalist approach refers to the U.N’s protection of their image, and the maximalist approach focuses on the protection of the local population (Jennings, 2008). A maximalist approach focuses on the importance of spending greater resources on patrolling, investigations and victim protection (Jennings, 2008, p.46). Whereas a minimalist approach pertains to keeping personnel from partaking in activities that might provoke a scandal (Jennings, 2008, p.36). The zero tolerance policy specifically undertakes a more minimalist approach towards preventing sexual exploitation. That is not to say all peacekeeping missions do not raise awareness or engage with the local population. For example the Conduct and Discipline Unit includes specific raising awareness programs. An example is seen within the MONUC mission whereby the MONUC Conduct and Discipline Unit engage with the Congolese population through briefings about HIV/AIDS and prostitution (Conduct and Discipline Unit – raising awareness). However, resource allocation with regards to the peacekeeping personnel resembles a more minimalist approach.

The prevention strategy indicated by a zero tolerance policy prefers to refrain peacekeepers from interacting with the local population outside of their peacekeeping duties. Prevention includes training on sexual exploitation and abuse, curfews, out-of-bounds areas and more restrictions on movement (Jennings, 2008, p.37). The MONUC mission encompassed elements of a minimalist approach by prohibiting their military personnel from carrying food items or money during their patrols (Dahrendorf, 2006, p.19). The MONUC mission had supplementary restrictions such as curfews from 1800 till 0600, strict prohibition against fraternizing with members of the local population and off limits areas from which MONUC personnel are prohibited from frequenting (Dahrenhof, 2006, p.19). MINUTASH had similar prohibitions on their peacekeeping personnel. For example since 2007, there has been almost no public outreach in place to enable reporting of violations beyond the U.N system (Jennings, 2008, p.41). Communication of sexual exploitation and abuse remain limited within the community (Jennings, 2008, p.41). The zero tolerance policy prefers to handle the problem of peacekeepers internally by providing recreational activities to preoccupy peacekeepers while off duty. The Zeid Report as a strategy for the zero tolerance argues for recreational facilities such as “sports areas, free internet facilities and subsidized telephones
The strategy of providing recreational facilities for peacekeepers is to prevent peacekeepers from looking for recreational activities in the form of sexual relations with the local population.

The strategy of imposing more recreational facilities for peacekeepers does not highlight the issue at hand. If anything, preventing the peacekeepers from communicating with the local population prevents the ability to create a stronger zero tolerance policy on the supply side of the demand supply cycle of sexual exploitation and abuse. The education that peacekeepers are given on the domestic context is through gender training. However, section 1 indicated that not all gender training strategies are well implemented. Furthermore, the To Serve with Pride video is hardly able to focus on the domestic context. This is due to the video lasting only 20 minutes. Such a short video cannot grasp the extent of the domestic context within a peacekeeping mission. If there was more outreach within the domestic community about sexual exploitation, and less expenses set on recreational activities, then more attention can be drawn towards awareness campaigns and accessibility of resources towards the women and teenage girls. One can even argue that recreational activities serve only as a distraction from the issue at hand opposed to providing an actual prevention strategy.

3.4 Conclusion

It is important to note that it is difficult to measure the domestic context with regards to the failure of the zero tolerance policy. One of the main reasons that makes this variable challenging to measure is the fact that each peacekeeping mission is unique. Each mission has its own historical background and social situation that may or may not exacerbate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Therefore the analysis of this section is limited. Yet despite the limitations within this section, one needs to recognize the importance of a domestic context in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse. For a zero tolerance policy to be more successful these measures of poverty and social standing should be more efficiently targeted. This would create a stronger prevention strategy then providing recreational facilities for peacekeepers. Furthermore, the problem of having limited contact with the local population is that the supply side, the women’s perspective, in allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is ignored. The agency of the women and teenage girls involved with sexual exploitation is ignored.
Hypothesis III argues that if more emphasis is placed on resource allocation then there would be fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. However, due to the limits of this thesis, this hypothesis cannot be fully tested. This is because there is no case whereby resource allocation is highlighted. This section of the thesis indicates the problem of the zero tolerance in acknowledging this variable which is why it is used as a failure of the zero tolerance policy. The difficulty with peacekeeping missions is that they are limited in their involvement with domestic governance. If the zero tolerance policy were to effectively recognize the domestic context, then more collaboration with governmental forces are needed to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. Collaboration with governments could be taken in the form of more awareness raising campaigns. This would be a better solution as a prevention strategy then providing recreational facilities for peacekeepers.

Section 4: Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to discover which factors explain for the failure of the U.N’s zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation. Section 1 established that the main peacekeeper that is involved with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are the military troops. The reason for military troop’s involvement with sexual exploitation and abuse can be explained by using the masculinities argument. This thesis has focused on the social masculinities argument, indicating that the social environment exacerbates allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. A peacekeeping mission is set in a domestic context with no stable government. This makes the role of the peacekeeper even more important in providing support and peace to the local population, opposed to abusing their position, and helping to reinforce a demand and supply cycle of sex. The social masculinities argument is largely ignored by the U.N’s zero tolerance policy. The zero tolerance policy follows an essentialist perception in combating sexual exploitation. The U.N assumes that with the inclusion of more women in peacekeeping operations, there will be fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. This strategy is not only flawed and was shown in tables 3 and 4 to not have a large impact, but the strategy reinforces the essentialist argument that women are peaceful and men are violent. This argument is an overtly simplified explanation to include more women into peacekeeping missions that exclude the importance of social structures and norms that influence behavioral patterns. The zero tolerance policy of including more women into peacekeeping missions will not be the answer in preventing future allegations of sexual exploitation. It should be recognized that this thesis is not against the inclusion of more
women into peacekeeping operations. However, the inclusion of women as a strategy to prevent an environment of sexual exploitation needs to be revisited. The U.N’s zero tolerance policy is further flawed through the implementation of gender strategies. These include gender units and gender training. Unfortunately Hypothesis I which suggests that the more gender aware strategies that are implemented in the mission, means the lower the levels of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse has to an extent, been proven false. That is not to say that gender strategies are inadequate for peacekeeping missions but rather that the gender strategies are failing due to poor implementation. This prevents a successful analysis in indicating the importance of gender strategies because there has yet to be a peacekeeping mission with successful implementation of gender units and training.

Section 2 argued for stronger accountability measures towards the peacekeepers involvement with sexual exploitation and abuse. Section 2 indicated the same problem as section 1, the difficulty of implementation. The difference with accountability measures is that the failure of the zero tolerance policy is dependent on troop contributing countries enforcing a zero tolerance policy within their legal systems. A zero tolerance policy fails if the domestic country does not provide legal accountability towards allegations of sexual exploitation. A legal vacuum is created if there is no follow up procedure. Furthermore, the difference in age of consent and legality of prostitution between the U.N and the domestic government enhances this legal vacuum.

Unfortunately the U.N cannot change domestic laws to fit the U.N standards. A solution to the problem would be if the U.N became more exclusive with which troop contributing countries would partake in peacekeeping missions. The U.N has of this year been thinking of introducing a ban on certain troop contributing countries that are involved with sexual exploitation and abuse. However such a ban would also have political ramifications. Troop contributing countries may want to withdraw their troops earlier in fear of being named and shamed by the U.N. Furthermore, removing some military personnel will not challenge or change the culture of social masculinities. The military personnel is also exempt from domestic criminal laws which brings the accountability issue back to the forefront. Hence, a solution such as Sandra Whitworth’s indicating that maybe military troops may not make the best peacekeepers could serve as the answer to eradicating the legal vacuum of immunity and impunity.
Section 3 focused on bringing agency to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. This was done by discussing the domestic context as a factor that explained for the failure of the zero tolerance policy. Section 3 aimed to highlight the socio-economic reasons that caused women and teenage girls to engage in survival sex with U.N peacekeepers. The U.N refers to the women and teenage girls as victims which takes away their agency. One needs to understand why women are engaging in survival sex to create an environment whereby there is no sexual exploitation. Unfortunately it was difficult to test hypothesis III. Nonetheless, some interesting perceptions were made. The U.N focuses on prevention strategies from an internal perspective. That means to say there is little resource allocation towards the domestic context in preventing sexual exploitation. Instead section 3 indicated that resource allocation was directed in preoccupying the peacekeepers leisure time. This is not a strategy to enforce the zero tolerance policy because there is no understanding of why the zero tolerance policy is in place.

No thesis is without its limitations. One of the biggest limitations of researching allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse are that the cases are hidden stories. Sexual exploitation and abuse is a difficult subject to address. Some women and teenage girls may feel ashamed after such an act and prevent further discussions about the topic. The lack of evidence in cases of sexual exploitation and abuse makes it even more difficult to address from an institutional level. Another limitation to the thesis is the lack of information provided by the U.N. The U.N does not publicize which troop contributing country is associated with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. This limits the ability to understand which legal systems have problems with prosecuting troops involved with sexual exploitation and abuse. Further research could be done on one specific troop contributing country to investigate the legal difficulties in implementing a zero tolerance policy. Furthermore, the U.N is now considering to black-list certain troop contributing countries with allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Further research could be done on the implementation of such a ban on peacekeeping missions and the zero tolerance policy.

The difficulty of analyzing the zero tolerance policy from an all rounded perspective is that each peacekeeping mission is unique. This thesis focused on the DRC and Haiti as examples whereby the zero tolerance policy fails. However, each domestic context is unique with different historical backgrounds that explain for women’s position in society, environmental circumstances and economic position. This makes every domestic context unique with their
own validations for a demand and supply cycle. Nonetheless, the limitation does indicate that environmental factors on a domestic level are significant to address if the zero tolerance policy wants to effectively prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.

There is not one factor that can explain for the failure of the zero tolerance policy in all of its totalities. This thesis has shown that preventing sexual exploitation and abuse is not as black and white. Nonetheless one determining factor within all the factors of the zero tolerance policy failure is the difficulty of implementation. To fully address and prevent further allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse is not to consider only one context. The U.N, troop contributing countries and the domestic governments of the peacekeeping mission have to implement the same preventative strategies to really be able to prevent an environment that is ripe for sexual exploitation and abuse. It is a matter of all three institutions working together to tackle this issue and enforce a zero tolerance policy. It is the implementation of all three institutions on the factors of social masculinities and the peacekeeper, accountability measures and resource allocation that will effectively impose a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse. In order to wipe the stain on peacekeeping operations one needs to collaborate to fully enforce a zero tolerance policy towards sexual exploitation and abuse.
References:


Allred K (2006) Peacekeepers and Prostitutes, How deployed forces fuel the demand for trafficked women and new hope for stopping it, Armed Forces & Society, 33(1) 5-23


El Bushar, J (2007) Feminism, Gender, and Women’s peace Activism, Development and Change, 38(1) 131-147


ChartsBin, (n.d) Charts Bin, obtained 14th May 2012 from: http://chartsbin.com/graph

Clayton J, Bone, J (Dec 23rd 2004) “Sex Scandal in Congo threatens to engulf UN’s peacekeepers” The Times, http://www.thetimes.co.uk


Conduct and Discipline Unit (n.d) Outreach Awareness Raising, United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, obtained on June 7th 2012 from: http://cdu.unlb.org/

Deccan Herald, (July 15\textsuperscript{th} PTI) UN probes Indian Army Officer’s sexual misconduct in Congo, Deccan Herald, obtained on May 14\textsuperscript{th} 2012 from:
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/81522/ipl-2012.html

Defeis E (2008) U.N peacekeepers and sexual abuse and exploitation: an end to impunity, Washington University Global Studies Law review, 7 (2) 185-212


EnjoyFrance (September 10\textsuperscript{th} 2008) Frenchman Didier Bourguet charged with rape of African Girls, Enjoy France, obtained 14\textsuperscript{th} May 2012 from:

Fetherston, AB (1995) UN peacekeepers and cultures of violence, cultural survival quarterly (spring) 19-23

Fleshman M (April 2005) Tough UN line on peacekeeper abuses- actions initiated to end sexual misdeeds in peacekeeping missions, Africa renewal, 19 (1) p.16

Garces R.O (Sept 19 2011) Uruguay: peacekeepers accused of sexual abuse in Haiti Jailed, Huffington post, obtained on May 14\textsuperscript{th} 2012 from:


Herz, A (Sept 2011) UN troops accused of exploiting local women, IPS, obtained 14\textsuperscript{th} May from: http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=105016 (IPS Sept 2011)


Human Rights Watch (1 march 2005) MONUC: a case for peacekeeping reform, *Human Rights watch*, obtained on 14th May 2012 from:  


International Development Association (IDA) *Resource Allocation Index*, retrieved on 19th March 2012 from:  

International Human Development Indicators, Country profile: *Human development indicators*, retrieved on May 14th 2012 from:  


Ladley A (2005) Peacekeeper abuse, immunity and impunity: the need for effective criminal and vicil accountability on international peace operations, *Politics and Ethics review*, 1(1) 81-90


Murphy, R (2006) An Assessment of UN efforts to address sexual misconduct by peacekeeping personnel, International Peacekeeping, 13 (4) 531-546


Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, (December 2011) Country briefing DR Congo, Oxford dept of international development, obtained on June 7th 2012 from: www.ophi.org.uk


Save the Children (2011) Mother’s Index, Save the Children, obtained 14th May 2012 from: http://www.savethechildren.org/att/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-df91d2eba74a%7D/SOWM2011_INDEX.PDF

Social institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) obtained from: http://genderindex.org/


The Times of India (June 7th 2011) Indian Army probing sexual abuse charges against UN peacekeepers in Congo, The Times of India, obtained on 14th May 2012 from:


United Nations (29th December 2005) Implementation of the recommendations of the special committee on peacekeeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/640

United nations (24th May 2006) special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse: Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/862

United Nations (16th August 2006) Ensuring the accountability of United Nations staff and experts on mission with respect to criminal acts committed in peacekeeping operations note by the secretary general, A/60/980


United Nations (9th October 2003) Secretary General’s bulletin special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, St/SGB/2003/13


United Nations Task Force from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (December 2006) To Serve with Pride (video file) retrieved from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-kMaq7mGulo
United Nations (2003) public information guidelines for allegations of misconduct committed by personnel of United Nations peacekeeping and other field missions, DPKO/MD/03/00996, retrieved from:

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_statements05.htm

United Nations Peacekeeping Statistics, retrieved on 19th March 2012 from:

United Nations Peacekeeping Gender Statistics, retrieved on 14th May 2012 from:

United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, (n.d) UN Strategy,
http://cdu.unlb.org/UNStrategy/Prevention.aspx

United Nations “To serve with pride- zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse”
UNDP, retrieved from: http://www.un.int/wcm/content/lang/en/pid/10612

UNICEF (n.d) UNICEF focus areas, statistics, retrieved on 14th May 2012 from:
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/congo_statistics.html


USAID, Gender equality & Women’s empowerment, obtained from:
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/wid_stats.html


