Introduction

In the past decades scholars have repeatedly found strong support for democratic norms\(^1\) accompanied by difficulties to apply these norms to practical situations. In other words, while people generally believed democracy to be a good thing and supported basic freedoms, the willingness to extend these freedoms to disliked groups, i.e. Political Tolerance, appeared to be rather low (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 244). Indeed, as recent developments, such as the forming of human chains in Germany to prevent right-wing activists from marching peacefully\(^2\), the adoption of a burqa ban in France\(^3\) and the discussions in the Netherlands about the pedophiles’ right to exist as a legal group have shown, Political Tolerance is a good not easily attained (Openbaar Ministerie 2011). Yet, as e.g. Roberts et al. (1985) have pointed out, democratic institutions can only be preserved if accompanied by a commitment to politically tolerant norms, i.e. if civil liberties are also extended to disliked groups (Roberts et al. 1985, 83)\(^4\). Several authors have shown that Political Tolerance is not only influenced by support for democratic norms, personality traits, education and threat perception but seems to be independently influenced by certain contexts (Sullivan et al. 1993, Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Dutch and Gibson 1992).

Sullivan et al. (1993) suggest that political tolerance can be learned in the political arena, a context where one is steadily and strongly exposed to democratic norms and needs to regularly apply these norms in practice (Sullivan et al. 1993, 70, 71). Furthermore, Dutch and Gibson (1992) have found higher levels of tolerance towards fascist groups in countries where radical groups enjoy some popular support, thus where people are exposed to a variety of political ideas (Dutch and Gibson 1992, 262, 267). Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) found a

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\(^1\) E.g. Freedom of Speech
\(^4\) Gibson (2006) however maintains that allowing all liberties to all groups might not be good for democracy either (Gibson 2006, 23).
positive link between federalism and the willingness to extend the rights to demonstrate and
hold public office to disliked groups. They suggest that federalist structures offer more
opportunities to absorb democratic norms due to the need to accommodate a greater variety of
interests and because of the options to resolve conflict at a much lower level, “involving
citizens directly” in the democratic process (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 245, 246).
As aforementioned these authors suggest that Political Tolerance can be learned in the
political arena, when exposed to a wide range of interests and in a context where conflicts can
be solved more directly. These attributes are to some extent also reflected in systems that have
Direct Democracy provisions. Through these mechanisms issues previously neglected by the
legislature can become a point of discussion and conflicts can be solved (Alber 2012, 80). In
addition, while certainly watered down, the direct participation in decision-making somehow
reflects the political arena. Finally, as opposed to purely representative systems, in systems
having a more Direct Democracy citizens are most certainly exposed to a greater variety of
interests. As Dahl (1971) argues "the greater the opportunities for expressing, organizing, and
representing political preferences, the greater the number and variety of preferences and
interests that are likely to be represented in policy making" (Dahl 1971, 26). These multiple
interests might challenge previously held ideas and demand compromise among the wider
population.

However, while research has been conducted on the effects of Direct Democracy, the
relationship between Direct Democracy and Political Tolerance has hardly been addressed.
Gamble (1997), conducting a study on Direct Democracy and minority rights in the United
States, found that measures restricting minority rights were more likely to be adopted than
other measures when brought to a popular vote. Unfortunately these findings might only
reflect the extension of intolerant attitudes to the actual vote and do not measure Political
Canadian referendum and found a decrease of Political Intolerance over the course of the referendum process. However, the authors did not employ the same measurement for Political Tolerance as will be used in this study, which makes a comparison of the findings difficult. In addition, both studies lack a country comparison. Since it has been found that sources of tolerance vary significantly between countries, in order to draw more general conclusions about system-level attributes a country comparison is essential (Dutch and Gibson 1992, 238, 260). This study wants to address this gap in the literature by asking the following question: How does the directness of democracy influence Political Tolerance?

Conceptualization and Literature

**Political Tolerance**

Although different definitions exist, Political Tolerance is widely accepted as “the willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes” (Sullivan et al. 1979, 784). In other words, if, for example, one has no aversion to right-wing ideas one will have no difficulties to extend civil liberties (e.g. speech, holding office) to groups representing such ideas. Under circumstances however where one does not approve of these ideas, one’s abstract support for democratic norms is challenged and one is assumed to be politically tolerant if one is still willing to extend the civil liberties supported at an abstract level to these groups (Sullivan et al. 1979, 784).

Stouffer (1955) who had conducted one of the earliest Political Tolerance studies measured the willingness to allow communists, socialists and atheists (among others) to speak publicly, to teach and to have a book written by them available at a public library. He found that a majority of the respondents would not allow communists these rights and, although to a lesser extent, would also not extend these rights to atheists, socialists and suspected communists. He
suggested that with education, more liberal child-rearing practices increasing the likelihood of freedom of thought, more personal movement and developments in the media, these attitudes would become more positive over time (Stouffer 1955 in Sullivan et al. 1979; Stouffer 1955, 236). Indeed, when tested a few years later (1975; 1978) measuring Political Tolerance with the same groups and items, scholars discovered that the likelihood to allow these rights to the respective groups appeared to have increased offering some credit to Stouffer’s original predictions (Davis 1975; Nunn et al. 1978).

Nevertheless, while acknowledging these previous findings, Sullivan et al. (1979) were critical of those approaches to the subject at hand and the validity of these findings. Their main point of criticism was that these studies had focused on left-wing targets only, targets of dislike that were time-bound (during the Cold War) and depended on one’s political position (left-right on political scale). The responses might have been contaminated by these exogenous influences and what was measured might have been the salience of a group or whether it was liked or disliked (Sullivan et al. 1979, 792). In order to address the assumed previous shortcomings they employed a content-controlled measurement that enabled respondents to first choose their least-liked group as well as their second least-liked group before being asked to answer whether they were willing to extend a set of civil liberties to these groups. Indeed, when employing this new measurement Sullivan et al. (1979) were able to cast serious doubts about the previously held assumptions. Their findings suggested that the aggregate willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups had not increased. Instead, attitudes of intolerance had moved to new and a greater variety of target groups (Sullivan et al. 1979, 792). The definition of the concept will therefore be in line with these findings “as the willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests” that one finds most objectionable (Sullivan et al. 1979, 784).

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5 Respondents could either choose from a list of potentially disliked groups or choose a group not on the list (Sullivan et al 1979, 785).
Direct Democracy

Direct Democracy is seen as a “publicly recognized institution wherein citizens decide or emit their opinions on issues- other than through legislative and executive elections- directly at the ballot box through universal and secret suffrage” (Altman 2011, 7). As of today, on a state level, no pure direct democracies exist anymore. In many countries however, direct democracy mechanisms (DDM) complement representative elements. DDMs can take the forms of plebiscites, referendums, citizens’ initiatives, counter-proposals and recalls (Altman 2011, 7). In this study recalls will not be considered as (nationally) they are not that common and are also not one of the mechanisms used in the countries⁶ being the focus of this study (Altman 2011, 16).

Among countries as well as among scholars there is little consensus about what constitutes a plebiscite and what constitutes a referendum. According to Altman (2011) plebiscites are popular votes on a constitutional reform, law or other measures that change the present stage of political affairs. They come from above either mandated by the constitution or initiated by the president or the legislature. A further distinction is made between a consultative plebiscite, a non-binding popular vote to determine public opinion on a simple question of national importance⁷ and a facultative plebiscite, a binding popular vote to ratify a proposed decision (decree or law) made by the authorities (“executive, legislative or both”) (Altman 2011, 13). Conversely referendums by Altman’s (2011) definition are instruments that come from below, i.e. a popular vote triggered by a number of citizens to adopt or reject an adopted law⁸ (Altman 2011, 15). However, this distinction does not easily fit with the country specific

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⁶ Australia, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, New Zealand
⁷ For example, both Sweden and Finland held a popular vote on the accession to the European Union. Australia consulted the public on the adoption of national anthem and New Zealand on the publicly preferred electoral system (R2D 2012a, b, c, e).
⁸ For example, Switzerland has held votes on issues including the participation in the Bretton Woods institutions, health insurance and old age insurance (R2D 2012d).
information offered by the Research Center on Direct Democracy. According to this source plebiscites appear to be what Altman (2011) refers to as consultative plebiscites or facultative plebiscites and referendums appear to be either mandatory plebiscites or facultative referendums (R2D 2012; R2D 2012a, b, c, d, e). Hence, in this research project a plebiscite will be defined as a consultative non-binding vote on a question of national importance or a facultative binding vote on a decree or law proposed by the authorities. The term referendum will be divided into mandatory referendum, i.e. an obligatory popular vote usually on a constitutional amendment and facultative referendum, i.e. a popular vote triggered by a certain percentage of the citizenry to approve or veto an existing law.

Like facultative referendums, Citizens’ initiatives are bottom-up devices. However, in contrast to facultative referendums a certain percentage of the citizenry can propose new legislation or a revision of the constitution (Altman 2011, 15). Counterproposals as the final DDM considered in this study are devices that are used by government or the legislature as a reaction to the activation of another DDM (usually citizens’ initiative) and are simultaneously voted on with the other proposed measure. Both initiative and counterproposal outcomes are legally binding (Altman 2011, 14).

Political Tolerance, Direct Democracy and Socialization to System Norms

After having elaborated on the concepts central in this study I will now turn to considering the literature on the question at hand. Up till now little has been written on Direct Democracy in relation to Political Tolerance. In a study conducted in the United States, Gamble (1997) found that the support at the ballots for initiatives that restrict the civil rights of minorities was much greater than for any other initiatives or referendums held in the respective states.
However, these findings might only reflect the translation of already intolerant attitudes into practice. The study lacks the comparison with other states in which DDMs are not used.

Mendelson and Cutler (2000) examined Political Intolerance in a 1992 Canadian referendum and found that over the course of the referendum process Political Intolerance actually decreased. While the findings are certainly interesting, the authors employed a different conceptualization\(^\text{10}\) as well as a different measurement of Political Tolerance than will be used in the upcoming study. More specifically their targets of dislike were preselected (either English-Canadians or French-Canadians and immigrants so not content-controlled) and for the measurement of tolerance they used a “feeling thermometer” as well as three additional variables: support for minority rights, prejudice towards immigrants and “provincentrism” (Mendelson and Cutler 2000, 696).

The measurement with a feeling thermometer is problematic in that it only measures the warmth towards the respective groups and not whether respondents would be willing to allow civil liberties to these potentially disliked groups. The additional variables were not measuring Political Tolerance as it is understood in this paper, they were measuring abstract support of minority rights, prejudice\(^\text{11}\) and through “provincentrism”\(^\text{12}\), how one rates the other province (Gibson 2006, 25, 26; Mendelson and Cutler 2000, 696). All these variables do not touch upon the concept of Political Tolerance handled in this research project. Also, both of

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\(^{9}\) A study in Switzerland on the restriction of religious minorities’ rights through initiatives and referendums could not find such an effect (Christmann A., and D. Danaci. 2012).

\(^{10}\) The authors appeared to have conceptualized Political Intolerance in terms of “tribal loyalties” and “the willingness to restrict minority rights” (Mendelson and Cutler 2000, 696).

\(^{11}\) Prejudice as part of the Social Tolerance measurement appeared to only be weakly related to Political Tolerance (Gibson 2006, 25, 26).

\(^{12}\) This artificial variable only makes sense in the context of the Political Tolerance study in bilingual Canada taking into account provincial differences.
the studies, the one by Gamble (1997) and the one by Mendelson and Cutler (2000), focused on one country only, so general conclusions could not be drawn.

Due to the lack of evidence it is therefore useful not to focus too much on Direct Democracy per se but to examine the literature on its individual aspects. DDMs enable citizens to participate directly in the decision-making process thus involving them in politics. Several authors have investigated the linkage between exposure to the struggles of democratic politics and Political Tolerance. While Sullivan et al. (1981) conducting a study in the United States did not find evidence for a relationship between political participation and Political Tolerance, Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) who conducted a cross-country comparison of 17 countries found higher levels of tolerance among people that engaged in democratic activism, i.e. signing a petition, joining boycotts and demonstrating which suggests a learning effect due to the stronger exposure to politics (Sullivan et al. 1981, 99; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 251). Sullivan et al.’s findings (1993) support the broader understanding of this notion. The greater Political Tolerance found among legislators, given the least-liked group did not pose a threat to democracy or democratic stability, is explained through the legislators’ experience of acting in the political arena which offers a steady “prime” with democratic norms, confronts them with different ideologies and asks for compromise (Sullivan et al. 1993, 53, 72). A system in which people have to cast their vote on a greater variety of issues and in which people have to vote more frequently might, to some extent, be comparable to a political arena. Through a greater diversity of issues to vote on, people are more likely to be confronted with interests remote from their own set of ideas, principles or ethical values, which forces them to tackle such “unfamiliar” interests. When doing so, they must reconsider their own attitudes towards these new, different, uncomfortable and “strange” subjects of discussion. This constant introspection and conscious task of revisiting one’s own position is believed to be a necessary step in learning to become politically more tolerant.
However, *Direct Democracy* is also a system-level variable, an institution that can, especially if frequently used over a long period of time and on a diversity of issues, affect the tolerant attitudes of citizens. Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) found that individuals were more likely to extend the right to hold public office and to demonstrate to their least-liked groups in older stable democracies and countries with a federalist state structure. They argue that a long and consistent exposure to the “ruff-and-tumble of democratic politics”, provided by older democracies, as well as opportunities to absorb these norms, accommodate different interests and the existence of “multiple points of access to resolve conflict”, provided by federalist state structures, can be conducive to the adoption of more tolerant attitudes (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 245, 246, 254).

DDMs in older stable democracies have similar implications in that they can encourage citizens to absorb democratic norms. Barber (1989) argues that initiatives and referendums can help citizens understand their rights and duties as citizens. In addition, growing experience with this form of participation leads people to become more careful in forming their opinion (Barber 1989, 282, 284). DDMs also have the potential to accommodate conflicting interests. Referendums have been used to break political deadlocks while in some countries popular initiatives can bring interests that have been previously overlooked by the legislature on the political agenda and into the public sphere. Especially if these issues are controversial it can lead to lively debates within the population, between political elites as well as between these elites and the various interest groups. This creates the need to find consensus (Alber 2012, 80; Papadopoulos 2001, 44).

Issues raised through DDMs, especially where they are successful at the poles and legally binding, can lead to greater interest diversity at system-level and even where issues do not get
the anticipated popular support or these instruments are not binding they might still indirectly influence the decisions by legislators and so lead to more issue diversity (Papadopoulos 2001, 44, 45). While controlling for the effects of threat perception, Dutch and Gibson (1992) examining Political Tolerance towards “fascists” in 12 Western European countries found a greater willingness to allow the group to exist as a legal group, to hold public rallies and to run for public office in systems where radical parties enjoy some popular support. They argue that a greater system-level ideological diversity can legitimize the existence of other political interests and can therefore lead a greater likelihood that tolerant attitudes are adopted (Dutch and Gibson 1992, 242, 263). While one should be careful with readily accepting these finding (the study only focused on “fascists”) they nonetheless offer some limited support that Political Tolerance can be learned in countries where multiple political ideas enjoy system-level representation.

As pointed out above, DDMs can lead to a more pluralistic political environment, especially where they are used frequently, on a diverse set of issues and where they are legally binding. Systems not only including plebiscites but also further DDMs such as referendums and initiatives, offer more “points of access” to accommodate different interests. Thereby an environment conducive to the learning of democratic norms is created and consequently the likelihood of extending civil liberties to disliked groups might increase. This leads to the following expectation:

H1 Independent of other system level variables Political Tolerance should be more likely in more direct democracies.

13 Boehmke (2002) conducting a study in the United States has found a greater number and diversity of interest groups in states that have citizens’ initiatives, thus Direct Democracy is likely to also have an indirect effect on interest diversity (Boehmke 2002).
Methods and Operationalization

While individual level variables have shown to be associated with Political Tolerance, due to the limited time frame, this research project focuses on the impact of system-level variables only. Five countries, Australia, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and New Zealand will be considered\textsuperscript{14}. They were chosen on the basis of having enjoyed at least fifty years of continuous and stable democratic rule and scored the same on the polity III data\textsuperscript{15} set in all aspects but federalism. They also vary in their Direct Democracy provisions.

For the key variables Political Tolerance and Direct Democracy data from the World Value Survey (WVS) 1995-1998 and data collected from the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy is used (C2D). The WVS 1995-1998, the second wave of a five wave worldwide investigation (1981-2007) into “socio-cultural and political change” was conducted in 57 states encompassing all continents (Inglehart and Baker 2000, 23; World Value Survey 2012a, c). Of the original number of respondents\textsuperscript{16} a number of respondents had to be dropped because they were either not asked the questions or did not answer them. The final number of respondents was 1949 for Australia, for Sweden 872, for Finland 865, for Switzerland 1046 and for New Zealand 936. The WVS data is well suited for the purpose of this study because its Political Tolerance questions, entailing the content controlled “least-liked group” measurement by Sullivan et al. (1979), were also asked in a number of stable Western democracies that vary in their directness of democracy at national level.

The R2D is a research center that collects data and conducts research on direct democratic institutions worldwide including their “history, legal origins and political implications” (R2D

\textsuperscript{14} West Germany and the United States of America were not taken along because they only have Direct Democracy institutions on a region level. Other countries (e.g. Italy, United Kingdom) had to be dropped because of missing data on the key dependent variable.

\textsuperscript{15} The Polity III dataset offers the yearly Democracy-Autocracy score of 161 independent countries with a population size of more than 500'000 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 470).

\textsuperscript{16} Australia had 2048 respondents, Sweden 1009, Finland 987, Switzerland 1212 and New Zealand 1201 respondents.
2012f). Compared to other sources (e.g. Beramendi et al. 2008) the R2D database offers detailed information on Direct Democracy Mechanisms, the number of votes conducted since their institutionalization, the issues voted on and their legal bindingness, which makes it suitable for the purpose of this study.

Dependent Variable

Political Tolerance was operationalized by first asking respondents to choose their least-liked group (see table 1) and then letting them answer whether they would let their least-liked group hold public office, teach in one’s schools and hold public demonstrations (see appendix 1). Answers were dichotomous (Yes/No). For the purpose of this study these answers were recoded in 0 = no and 1 = yes and then combined in a Political Tolerance index with values ranging from 0 = allows none to 3 = allows all. One of the problems already encountered by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) with the WVS data is that criminals, who by law often do not enjoy the same civil liberties as other groups were also included as a least-liked group (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 247). However, this can also apply to other groups in society as illustrated by Finland’s repeated outlawing of right-wing organizations after World War II (Alvarez-Rivera 2011). In addition removing these respondents would have lead to a greater disproportion in respondents between countries, making the countries less comparable. Since in none of the countries, criminals as a least-liked group exceeded 40% these respondents were therefore taken into account.

Table 1 shows the percentages of the “least-liked group” responses per country. One aspect clearly visible, is that target groups of dislike not only differ among respondents (as

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17 Least-liked groups were adapted to country-level differences.

18 The right to demonstrate and the right to hold public office have been identified as basic civil liberties (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 248). To teach at one’s school was explicitly included as a variable. The ones that teach at one’s school raise the future generation of political participants. If certain groups are denied this right, the future civil liberties of that group might become seriously restricted.

19 The respondents might misunderstand the question. They might not give “Political Tolerance” answers (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003, 247).
discovered by Sullivan et al. 1979) but also per country. While there is generally a greater
tendency towards adopting right-wing extremists as a least-liked group New Zealand’s radical
Maori for example appear to be the most frequently selected target of dislike among
respondents from New Zealand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Least-Liked Group by Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Independent Variable**

The key independent variable is national-level *Direct Democracy*, taking into account all data collected from 1945 up to 1995\(^{20}\). It was measured by creating an index\(^{21}\) including the number of *Direct Democracy Mechanisms* (1=No to 5=4)\(^{22}\), the frequency of use of the DDMs (scale from 1=low to 5=high), issue diversity (scale from 1=No to 5=High) and whether the DDMs are legally binding (1=Never to 5=Always). Even though other studies have used other indices\(^{23}\) to measure *Direct Democracy*, this newly created index most closely measures the aspects of *Direct Democracy* that are of interest to this study. Firstly, the number of instruments used reflects Peffley and Rohrschneider’s notion (2003) of multiple access points “to resolve conflicts”. As pointed out above DDMs can help resolve conflicts by putting the contested issues to a popular vote (Alber 2012, 80; Peffley and Rohrschneider

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\(^{20}\) It is assumed that if effects took place that these effects took place before or right up to the beginning of the survey. Peffley and Rohrschneider have shown that the learning of politically tolerant attitudes needs time (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). This period seems an appropriate time to develop such attitudes. One acknowledges that some countries have and have used DDMs much longer. Yet, selecting this particular period has the advantage that all countries have used DDMs for at least the entire period and the collected data might not be too much influenced by the impact of the Second World War.

\(^{21}\) The aggregate variable is called VDD and added up to 5=less direct to 20=more direct.

\(^{22}\) Each of the instruments has equal weight.

\(^{23}\) Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) used a seven-point index to measure Direct Democracy. However, their index does not properly reflect the frequency of use of DDMs and the diversity of the issues.
2003, 246). They serve as alternative channels that directly involve the citizens in the conflict resolution. Thus, where the number of such instruments is greater the potential to resolve conflicts is assumed to become greater resulting in a greater likelihood to adopt politically tolerant attitudes.

Secondly, where votes take place more frequently exposure to democratic norms is believed to be greater. Having to go to the ballots more often on multiple issues might to some extent reflect Sullivan et al.’s (1993) political arena and might therefore have a similar effect on the willingness to extend civil liberties to one’s least-liked group. In addition, through a greater diversity of issues to vote on people are more likely to be confronted with values different from their own, which as pointed out above, may lead to the learning of more tolerant attitudes. Finally, where DDM outcomes are legally binding, people most certainly think more carefully about the issue at hand (weighting pros and cons) not only before casting their vote at the ballots but also when forming an attitude in general. Table 2 shows the aggregate index of Direct Democracy per country including its individual components. As illustrated, Finland has the lowest score on Direct Democracy (scoring lowest in all measured aspects) and Switzerland the highest with the highest number of binding DDMs, most ballot proposals and the highest issue diversity among the countries at study.
Control Variables

To control for country specific differences, federalism, party-pluralism and population density were also taken into account in this research project. Firstly, federalism\(^24\) has been shown to have a possible positive effect on Political Tolerance (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Secondly, party pluralism\(^25\) might also account for some of the variance. Dutch and Gibson (1992) found a greater willingness to allow fascists civil liberties where radical voting enjoys some popular support. While not directly controlling for radical voting, but in line with their reasoning of more political ideas present at system-level, the number of effective parties in parliament might positively affect Political Tolerance. Finally, where population density is higher, exposure to system level issues is expected to be greater due to the circumstance that it is more difficult to evade issues being discussed within the population.

The source for federalism is the polity III data set (1= Unitary, 2= Intermediate, 3= Federal) (Gleditsch 2012). The data for party-pluralism (ENPP) originates in Lijphart’s study on party

\(^{24}\) “Unitary” denotes that “regional units have little or no independent decision making” and “Federalism” is understood as considerable decision-making power of most or all regions of a state (Gurr et al. 1990, 83).

\(^{25}\) Measured by the number of effective parties in parliament (Lijphart 1994, 160-162).
systems (1994) and was coded into 1=one party to 5=five parties (Lijphart 1994, 160-162). The CIA World Factbook was the source for the final variable, population density (Central Intelligence Agency 2012). Population density was calculated by dividing the size of the country through the size of the population and then coded into 1=low-, 2=medium- and 3=high density.

Analysis Techniques

In order to get a general overview of tolerant attitudes across countries a crosstabs descriptive analysis was conducted. Then the main hypothesis was tested. Since the dependent variable Political Tolerance had a natural order (ranging from 0 to 3), yet the numbers had no quantitative interpretation, an Ordered Probit regression was used by regressing the index of Direct Democracy (VDD) on the aggregate index of Political Tolerance (Model 1). In a further step (Model 2) the individual components of the VDD index were regressed onto the Political Tolerance index (also using Ordered Probit). Unfortunately running the Ordered Probit analysis the output could not produce the proportional odds ratios. One could therefore only make an assessment of a relationship between the variables but could not determine the individual per unit impact on the dependent variable. In order to test the relationship between Direct Democracy and the individual aspects of Political Tolerance (office, teach, demonstrate) as well as the relationship between the individual aspects of Direct Democracy and the willingness to allow the least-liked group to hold office, to teach and to demonstrate, a binary logistic regression model was used. In contrast to a multiple regression model, the advantage of this model is that it allows one to predict categorical outcome variables, the characteristic of the outcome variables “office”, “teach” and “demonstrate” (all coded 0, 1).
Results

Table 3 shows the per country percentage of respondents who expressed the willingness to allow members of their least-liked group to hold public office, to teach and to demonstrate. It shows a general low frequency of tolerant attitudes, with Switzerland appearing to be least tolerant (1.1%) and New Zealand the most tolerant (8.4%) among the countries at study. In addition across all countries there seems to be a tendency to be more generous towards letting one’s least-liked group demonstrate while it is lowest towards “teach” in Australia, Finland, Switzerland and New Zealand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Teach</th>
<th>Demonstrate</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>74.9%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>92.4%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>69.2%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows the results of the Ordered Probit analysis. The expectation was to find higher levels of Political Tolerance in more direct democracies (VDD). Unfortunately, when controlling for other system-level variables this hypothesis could not be confirmed. Model 1 shows an insignificant negative relationship between Direct Democracy and the aggregate Political Tolerance values across countries. Conversely, all control variables appear to make a significant and negative contribution to Political Tolerance. Thus, the likelihood to adopt norms of tolerance appears to be smaller in countries that have a federal state structure, multiple effective parties in parliament and a higher population density.

However, regressing the individual variables of Direct Democracy on Political Tolerance (Model 2), the diversity of the issues voted on as well as the number of DDMs appear to become significantly negatively related and the frequency of use of DDMs and their legal
bindingness seem to become positively related to Political Tolerance. Thus, where citizens live in systems with more DDMs and with the possibility to vote on issues of greater diversity, they appear to be less likely to allow the basic liberties of holding office, teaching and demonstrating to their least-liked groups. Conversely where citizens live in systems where DDMs are frequently used and where outcomes are binding on the government the likelihood to adopt tolerant norms increases. This again offers some support for the hypothesis by showing that certain aspects of Direct Democracy, namely where having the option to vote more frequently and where outcomes are binding people tend to adopt more tolerant attitudes.

Table 4 Political Tolerance Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimates (SE)</td>
<td>Estimates (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDD</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-1.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDM</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of use DDM</td>
<td>.67**</td>
<td>(.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Diversity</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
<td>(.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Bindingness</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP (Parties)</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-.25*</td>
<td>0a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>285.71**</td>
<td>285.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ordered Probit: p < .05*, p < .01**, a. Dropped because of Multicollinearity

Tables 5 to 9 show the results of the binary logistic regression analysis. While controlling for other system-level variables, when people live in countries where democracy is more direct (VDD) they are more likely to allow their least-liked group to hold public office but no more likely to allow the liberties to teach at their schools and to demonstrate (table 5). On the contrary, while not being significant, this relationship is slightly negative indicating that in more direct democracies it appears to be more difficult to allow these rights to disliked groups. These findings therefore only partially confirm the original hypothesis. People living
in more direct democratic systems appear to be only more willing to extend to their disliked
groups the right to hold public office. Chi-square is significant with all three outcomes
variables, indicating that the model explains a significant amount of additional variance in
“office”, “teach” and “demonstrate” compared to when these variables were not included.

Table 5 VDD index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Office (B (SE))</th>
<th>Teach (B (SE))</th>
<th>Demonstrate (B (SE))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.65** (-0.23)</td>
<td>-0.50 (.27)</td>
<td>1.34** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VDD</td>
<td>0.06 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (.03)</td>
<td>-0.04 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>-0.49** (.13)</td>
<td>-0.26 (.14)</td>
<td>-0.28** (.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP (Parties)</td>
<td>0.08 (0.11)</td>
<td>-0.20 (.11)</td>
<td>-0.24** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-0.93** (0.26)</td>
<td>-0.36 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.49** (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>76.00**</td>
<td>78.34**</td>
<td>300.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit: $p < .05^*$, $p < .01^{**}$

Table 6 shows the effect of the number of Direct Democracy Mechanisms (DDM) on the
scores of the willingness to allow the least-liked group to hold office, to teach at one’s school
and to demonstrate. All else equal, in countries with more Direct Democracy provisions
people appear to be significantly more likely to allow their least-liked group to hold office
while this effect appears to be insignificant and slightly negative with “teach” and
“demonstrate”. However, as with the previous model Chi-Square remains significant.

Table 6 DDM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Office (B (SE))</th>
<th>Teach (B (SE))</th>
<th>Demonstrate (B (SE))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.70 (.23)</td>
<td>-0.49 (.27)</td>
<td>1.36** (.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDM</td>
<td>0.23* (.10)</td>
<td>-0.05 (.10)</td>
<td>-0.12 (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>-0.38** (.09)</td>
<td>-0.28** (.10)</td>
<td>-0.34** (.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP (Parties)</td>
<td>0.02 (.08)</td>
<td>-0.19** (.09)</td>
<td>-0.20** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-0.86** (.23)</td>
<td>-0.37 (.24)</td>
<td>-0.53** (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>76.00**</td>
<td>78.34**</td>
<td>300.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit: $p < .05^*$, $p < .01^{**}$
Tables 7 and 8 show similar patterns. People are significantly more likely to extend the liberty to hold office to their most objectionable group when living in systems where people vote more frequently (table 7) and where outcomes are legally binding (table 8). This partially confirms the hypothesis. The likelihood to allow people to teach and to demonstrate in such countries remains negative and insignificant. Chi-Square appears to again be significant for all three outcome-variables.

Table 7 Frequency of use DDM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Office (SE)</th>
<th>Teach (SE)</th>
<th>Demonstrate (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.59**</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>1.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of use</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDM</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>-.49**</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP (Parties)</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.28**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-1.16**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>76.00**</td>
<td>78.34**</td>
<td>300.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**

Table 8 Legal Bindingness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Office (SE)</th>
<th>Teach (SE)</th>
<th>Demonstrate (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.66**</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>1.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Bindingness</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>-.27*</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP (Parties)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-2.71**</td>
<td>-.39*</td>
<td>-.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>76.00**</td>
<td>78.4**</td>
<td>300.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit: p < .05*, p < .01**

Table 9 shows the effect of the issue diversity on the willingness to allow the disliked group to hold office, to teach and to demonstrate. When controlling for other system-level variables the effect on “office” appears to have assumed a significant negative value, which indicates that people living in countries in which issues brought to a popular vote are more diverse are
less likely to extend the respective freedom to their least-liked group. To some extent this finding fails to confirm the original hypothesis. Political Tolerance, in this case measured by the willingness to allow the least-liked group to hold office, is less likely in countries where people have to vote on a greater diversity of issues. The findings also fail to confirm the hypothesis in the aspects of the willingness to allow the rights to teach and to demonstrate. The relationship between issue diversity and the respective freedoms is insignificant and negative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Office (SE)</th>
<th>Teach (SE)</th>
<th>Demonstrate (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>1.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Diversity</td>
<td>- .90*</td>
<td>- .20</td>
<td>- .48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>1.39*</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(.55)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPP (Parties)</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.44*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>1.76**</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SE)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
<td>5668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>76.00**</td>
<td>78.34**</td>
<td>300.71**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logit: $p < .05^*$, $p < .01^{**}$

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Thus, how does the directness of democracy influence Political Tolerance? At the onset a single hypothesis was defined, namely that a greater directness of democracy should be conducive to the learning of politically more tolerant attitudes. More precisely, independent of other system level variables, in more direct democracies greater levels of Political Tolerance were expected.

Testing the main hypothesis the initial expectations to find higher levels of Political Tolerance in more direct democracies could unfortunately not be supported. Citizens living in such systems appeared to be as unwilling to extend to their least-liked groups the rights to hold public office, to teach at their schools and to demonstrate, as citizens living in less direct
democracies. This suggests that in more direct systems Political Tolerance is as hard to learn as in less direct systems. However, when engaging in a more detailed analysis of the different components of Direct Democracy one discovered that the effects of Direct Democracy on tolerant attitudes appeared to be much more complex. In other words the different components appeared to contribute differently to the adoption of more tolerant attitudes. In the countries at study where people had to decide on issues more frequently and these decisions were binding on the government, the willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups appears to be more likely. Conversely, in systems with multiple available Direct Democracy Mechanisms (DDM), tolerance levels appeared to be lower. The same applied to countries where ballot propositions were more diverse. This indicates that in such systems citizens appear to “unlearn” the willingness to extend to objectionable groups the right to hold office, to teach and to demonstrate.

Why should there be such a difference in effect? First considering the aspect of having to decide on issues more frequently, Sullivan et al. (1993) assume that the frequent direct exposure to democratic norms leads to a greater likelihood to adopt tolerant attitudes due to a constant priming effect. This could be one explanation (Sullivan et al. 1993, 53, 72). However, having the possibility to frequently decide on issues might also give citizens a sense of control over what is decided at system-level. Thus, when extending liberal rights to least-liked groups the expected damage caused by the respective groups could, if necessary, be corrected by a popular vote. If these votes are legally binding (the second positive relationship) this sense of control might even become stronger.

The negative relationship between the number of instruments as well as issue diversity with Political Tolerance is more puzzling. Due to the construction of the variable the countries that have more direct democratic provisions also have the right to initiate law or propose an
amendment to the constitution (New Zealand, Switzerland). Hence, in countries where people are allowed to raise their own issues, allowing the liberties at discussion to the least-liked groups might give these groups undue influence over what issues are raised and which issues are adopted. In countries that provide citizens with the possibility to decide on a variety of issues it might be seen as rather negative to allow objectionable groups to hold office, to teach and to demonstrate because these ideas have the chance to affect a greater number of aspects of public policy.

An investigation into the different aspects of Political Tolerance, showed that in more Direct Democracies people were only significantly more likely to extend “the right to hold public office” to their most objectionable groups, while they were no more likely to extend the other liberties to those groups. More specifically, in countries with more Direct Democratic Mechanisms, where votes took place more frequently and where the outcomes of these votes were legally binding, people had more positive attitudes towards the holding of public office. Note that the previous findings, that a system’s number of DDMs leads to lower tolerance levels, when only measuring the likelihood in such systems to extend to least-liked groups the right to hold public office, the relationship had become positive. This is possibly due to the slightly negative values of “teach” and “demonstrate” that might have influenced the initially more positive attitudes toward the allowing of least-liked groups to hold office. It could also be the control variables (that had previously dropped out due to multicollinearity) explaining away some of the negative influence of the number of instruments. Whatever the reasons, the findings suggest that the greater number of access points to accommodate conflicting interests provided by multiple DDMs, the greater exposure to democratic norms and control over decisions by voting more often as well as the security offered by the legal bindingness of such instruments might indeed have had a certain learning effect in the respective countries. In such systems citizens might have learned that they could correct possible mishaps caused by
their least-liked groups in office and might have therefore been more likely to allow this activity to their most objectionable group.

One relationship that had remained negative appeared to be the greater diversity of issues. In the countries where people not only had to vote on their country’s accession to an international organization, but where they were asked to cast their vote on human rights issues, economy, public service and other issues, in these systems people did appear to be less likely to extend the right to hold public office to their disliked groups. Why might that be? Maybe in such countries, if people were confronted with a greater diversity of political ideas - which is believed to be more likely in systems where people are voting on multiple issues – with this experience over an extended period of time, they tended to become more cautious of extending the right to hold public office to their disliked groups. The respective groups may have been expected to abuse their power positions to rally support for their own set of interests affecting with their behavior a greater variety of issues. According to Altman (2011), Plebiscites for example can be abused by power holders and can have potentially harmful effects when supported by extensive campaigning. The same could apply to citizens’ initiatives when particular party interests favor a specific outcome (Altman 2011, 53, 86).

Why was no apparent significant relationship found between Direct Democracy and allowing disliked groups the teaching at the respondents’ schools as well as allowing the respective groups to demonstrate? One explanation could be that the control variables federalism, the number of effective parties in parliament and the population density had already explained a great deal of variance in the respective civil liberties across countries. However, these variables only appeared to be strong predictors for demonstrations by the respective groups. An explanation for the insignificance of allowing the teaching at one’s school could therefore be confounding individual-level variables. In more direct democracies, with people having
young children or being in a child-rearing age the fear that the ideas of objectionable groups might unduly influence the opinion of future political participants might be much stronger than with people without children or already grown-up children. An alternative explanation could be that while people might not have direct control over what is taught at their schools, the teachers’ influence on the political system through the greater directness of democracy, might have been seen as of an indirect, more marginal nature. Their tolerant attitudes might have therefore been influenced by other much more important attributes not considered in this study. One could make a similar argument for allowing demonstration by objectionable groups. Gibson and Bingham (1982) have found that individuals were much more likely to adopt less tolerant attitudes if they expected violence occurring from a certain activity. This kind of threat is of a different nature than threat to the system as a whole. However, these are only hypothetical explanations.

The results show that a future inquiry into the effects of *Direct Democracy* on *Political Tolerance* must also take into account individual level differences such as threat perception and age. Another limit closely related to this notion is that with this data one could not control whether people in these countries actually casted their votes at the ballots. Furthermore, the individual variables for the *Direct Democracy* index were built subjectively in relation to the data collected from the countries at study and in relation to country-level differences to one another. Future studies, including more countries might have to use a more refined index including all possible instruments and ordering them more precisely according to their actual impact they might have on tolerant attitudes. In addition, instead of using categories it might have been more useful to actually include the *numerical* values of the number of votes, the diversity of ballot propositions and the legal bindingness of ballot outcomes. Finally, due to

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26 Gibson (2006) argued that if a group is believed to pose a threat to the wider community or the system as a whole, people tend to adopt less tolerant attitudes (Gibson 2006, 25).
the research focusing on system-level variations only, regional *Direct Democracy* Mechanisms could not be taken into account. As a result West Germany and the United States having DDMs at sub-state level but not at system level could not be considered in this research project. Future research might indeed take these along while simultaneously controlling for regional-level differences in *Direct Democracy*. Despite these limits this research project might have revealed some important aspects contributing both to the *Political Tolerance* literature as well as the literature on *Direct Democracy*. First of all it showed, that *Direct Democracy* as an institution might to some extent influence aggregate *Political Tolerance* levels, at least in the countries at study. Furthermore it may have revealed some of the complexity of the two main concepts *Direct Democracy* and *Political Tolerance*. In other words irrespective of other system-level variables, certain aspects of *Direct Democracy* appeared to contribute differently to the individual aspects of *Political Tolerance*. When extending the right to hold public office, given the issues are not too diverse, being able to circumvent the legislature more often and more decisively appears to be something positive. In such systems citizens might indeed learn more tolerant attitudes by having a greater likelihood of being exposed to democratic norms, by having alternative channels to resolve conflict and by having the option to exercise a certain control over what is decided at system-level. The circumstance that *Direct Democracy* did not have a significant impact on the aggregate tolerance levels towards teaching and demonstrating showed that in order to get a more in-depth understanding of this relationship, individual-level variables such as age and threat perception will have to be taken into account in future studies.

**Appendix 1**

*Least-Liked Group and Political Tolerance Questions*

“I'd like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order in this society. Would you please select from the following list the **one** group or organization that you like
least?” (World Value Survey Organization 2012b)

1. Jews*
2. Capitalists
3. Stalinists/hard-line Communists*
4. Immigrants
5. Homosexuals
6. Criminals
7. Neo-Nazis/Right extremists*
*(Functional equivalent used for these items)*

“Do you think that (identified least-liked group) should be
allowed to” (World Value Survey Organization 2012b) (Yes/No/ DK):

Hold public office?
Teach in our schools?
Hold public demonstrations?^{27}

Sources


Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (R2D). 2012a. ”Australia.”

Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (R2D). 2012b. ”Finland.”

Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (R2D). 2012c. ”New Zealand.”
http://www.c2d.ch/inner.php?table=country_information&sublinkname=country_infor

^{27} Source World Value Survey Organization (2012b).
Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (R2D). 2012d. “Sweden.”

Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (R2D). 2012e. “Switzerland.”


http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_46

Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.

Codebook

V2.2 (Country)
1 = "Australia"
2 = "Sweden"
3 = "Finland"
4 = "Switzerland"
5 = "New Zealand"

V167 (Least Liked Group)
1 = "Jews"
2 = "Capitalists"
3 = "Stalinist/Hard line Communists"
4 = "Immigrants"
5 = "Homosexuals"
6 = "Criminals"
7 = "Neo-Nazis/Right Extremists"
8 = "Members of New Religious Movements"
9 = "Radical Maori Activists"
10 = "Christian Fundamentalist"
11 = "Non-Christian Fundamentalist"
12 = "Racists"

V168.3 (Least Liked Group allow: hold office)
0 = "No"
1 = "Yes"

V169.3 (Least Liked Group allow: teach)
0 = "No"
1 = "Yes"

VTOL (Aggregate Index Tolerance: Office, Teach, Demonstrate)
0 = "Allows none"
1 = "Allows one"
2 = "Allows two"
3 = "Allows all"

VIns (Number of DDMs National Level)
1 = "No"
2 = "1 (Plebiscite)"
3 = "2 (Plebiscite, Constitutional Referendum)"
4 = "3 (Plebiscite, Constitutional Referendum, Initiative)"
5 = "4 (Constitutional Referendum, Facultative Referendum, Initiative, Counter-Proposal)"

(Finland, Sweden= 2, Australia= 3, New Zealand= 4, Switzerland= 5)
Vnum (Number of Votes 1945-1995)
1 = "Low (1)"
2 = "(12)"
3 = "(28)"
4 = "(56)"
5 = "High (>56)"

(Finland= 1, Sweden= 2, Australia= 3, New Zealand= 4, Switzerland= 5)

Vbin (Legal Bindingness of DDMs)
1 = "Never"
2 = "1%-29%"
3 = "30%-59%"
4 = "60%-99%"
5 = "Always"

(Finland, Sweden= 1, Australia, New Zealand= 4, Switzerland= 5)

Vdiv (Issue Diversity 1945-1995)
1 = "No (0)"
2 = "(4)"
3 = "(6)"
4 = "(12)"
5 = "High (> 12)"

(Finland= 1, Sweden= 2, New Zealand= 3, Australia= 4, Switzerland= 5)

VDD (Aggregate Index Direct Democracy: DD instruments, Frequency of Use, Diversity of Issues, Legal Bindingness of DD Decisions)
5 = "Less"
14
15
20 = "More"

VFed (Federalism)
1 = „Unitary“
2 = „Intermediate“
3 = „Federal“

(Finland, Sweden, New Zealand = 1, Australia, Switzerland= 3)

VParty (Number of Effective Parties in Parliament)
1 = "One"
2 = "2"
3 = "3"
4 = "4"
5 = "Five"
(New Zealand, Australia= 2, Sweden= 3, Finland, Switzerland= 5)

VPopdens (Population Density, Country Size/Population)
1 = "low"
2 = "Medium"
3 = "High"

(Australia= 1, Finland, Sweden, New Zealand= 2, Switzerland= 3)