European Integration Theories and African Integration Realities

Federalism, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism in African Integration

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Africa is one continent, one people, and one nation

- Kwame Nkrumah -
Abstract

In this thesis, three European integration theories are applied to the case of African integration. The use of federalism, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism for explaining African regional cooperation are tested. Academic writing combining these two topics can hardly be found, creating a gap in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill. In analysing the historical development of the three theories, a set of indicators for each is constructed, leading to the formulation of hypotheses that are tested in the African case.

The main driving force behind African integration in the 1950s and 1960s was the Pan-African movement calling for independence of African states and the end of colonialism. This ideologically driven movement was supported by a transnational elite pushing for regional cooperation. The main actors in creating the Organization of African Unity, the African Economic Community and the African Union were national leaders, basing their efforts both on Pan-African reasoning and on the maximization of national gains. The neofunctionalists’ main claim of spillover effects occurring in the integration process leading to wider and deeper cooperation cannot be proved, neither seems the role of supranational institutions to be of importance. This leads to the conclusion that a combination of federalist assumptions and liberal intergovernmentalist claims provides the best explanation for African integration.
Abstract

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<tr>
<td>AAPC</td>
<td>All-African Peoples’ Conference</td>
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<td>ACOJ</td>
<td>African Court of Justice</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CIAS</td>
<td>Conference of Independent African States</td>
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<td>COREPER</td>
<td>Permanent Representatives Committee</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>MLG</td>
<td>Multi-Level Governance</td>
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<td>NAFTA</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PAP</td>
<td>Pan-African Parliament</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>SADR</td>
<td>Saharan Arab Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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1. Introduction
   a. Problem statement

   European integration forms a big part of International Relations (IR) theory and has been studied at great lengths. The history of the European Communities, the European Union (EU) and its integration processes have been under scrutiny by scholars from all over the world. Often, it is rightfully mentioned that the EU forms a unique case in the international sphere, having fewer competences and sovereignty than nation states, but experiencing a higher level of supranationality and integration than other international organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But the times where European integration was the only case to test regional integration theories are over. Similar to other regional integration organizations like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Latin American Andean Group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Arab League, Africa has experienced efforts for cooperation since the 1960s. Nevertheless, surprisingly little literature can be found on the dynamics behind integration in the Americas, Asia, or Africa. Especially the latter continent is seldom taken into account when discussing the question of determining an integration theory’s applicability, i.e. its validity. As will be shown in chapter 2, scientific work on the development of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), is mainly of a descriptive nature. Despite the claims of integration theorists to provide a ‘grand’ approach to integration, their assumptions have barely been tested with regard to the African case. It is important to understand and explain African integration because it constitutes one of the main regional cooperation efforts since the 1950s. Insights can help researchers to learn more about integration processes and to improve the validity of integration theories. Politicians and other actors can learn how to stimulate, steer, and control integration.

   b. Aim of the Study and Research Question

   This paper applies three main theories of European integration (federalism, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) to African integration and thereby deals with the topic concerning the “relevance of this ongoing theoretical schism [...] between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism [...] for identifying, describing, and predicting the eventual outcome of the process of economic and political integration in Africa” (Maluwa 2003: 159). The goal is both to find parts within the theories (and their assumptions) that need to be reviewed as well as to explain the history of African integration from a theoretical standpoint.
All three theories applied in this paper have been named ‘grand’ theories, seeking to explain the full process of integration. Middle range theories aim at explaining parts of the processes only and, hence, are not taken into account. The following research question will be used as a guideline throughout this paper:

To what extent do Federalism, Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, traditional theories for explaining European integration, explain regional integration in Africa?

This thesis argues that African integration can only be explained using a mixture of both federalist and liberal intergovernmentalist arguments. There is no single approach that can fully account for all processes in African cooperation since the 1950s (just as the European case cannot be explained completely by one single theory). The main finding is that African integration can only be explained by using both federalist and liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions. The validity of neofunctionalism is not proven, as its main concept of spillover effects cannot be traced in the African case. The main actors involved in international cooperation are transnational elite groups with a common ideology and national actors seeking gains from integration. The fact that neofunctionalism fails to explain halts or setbacks in the integration process further limits its applicability.

c. Caveats

It is impossible to explain the entirety of African integration with all of its various aspects in one paper. This thesis aims at adding to the academic knowledge by testing three European integration theories with regard to one specific case. There are two main limitations of such an approach, namely the selection of theories that are used and the selection of the case to be examined. In order to better explain African integration, all theories should be taken into account, although not even such an approach can guarantee an all-encompassing answer. The focus on three theories is as much a limitation as is the choice for a single case. However, using this case provides new insights into both African integration and the power of the theories. Nevertheless, this approach should be used in other cases as well, as the only way to test and improve integration theories is their application.

d. Structure of the Report

This introduction is followed by a section providing a review of existing literature, arguing that most academic writings employ descriptive approaches to successes and failures of African integration, and do not make use of the explanatory power of main integration
theories. The three theories that will be tested are described and analyzed in chapter 3, including a section in which a set of indicators is established. The methodology of this paper is explained in chapter 4, providing definitions of main concepts and laying out the data collection as well as hypotheses. Finally, chapter 5 will apply the theories to the case of African integration and evaluate in how far the European approaches can be used. The chapter dealing directly with the integration process is divided into five time periods, according to major developments: the Pan-African conferences leading to the creation of the OAU; its first years of existence; the Organization’s decreasing impact and importance; the creation of the African Economic Community; and finally the foundation of the AU. The concluding section summarises the main findings and provides ideas for further research on the topic.
2. Literature Review

Literature on the topic of African integration is extensive, which makes it even more remarkable that one approach capable of explaining all parts of it does not yet exist. Comparable to the European Union, African integration has been characterized by a common idea, or ideology, but the process has been set back several times, due to the failure of the Organization of African Unity and its missing impact on the economies and political spheres of the continent. In general, important literature for this paper dealing with African integration can be divided into three categories:

(1) purely descriptive analyses, laying out the development of both the OAU and the African Union (Magliveras and Naldi 2002; Manby 2004; Melber 2001; Omorogbe 2011; Williams 2009);

(2) attempts at explaining the failure of African integration (Ayittey 2010; Barbarinde 2007; Muchie et al 2006; Olivier 2008; Packer and Rurare 2002; Tieku 2004);

(3) literature seeking to explain the (partial) successes of African integration (Murithi 2008 and 2005; Langer 2008; Maluwa 2003 and 2009).

In the following, each of these categories will be assessed individually, as they deal with different topics of the integration process in Africa. It should be noted, however, that a different categorization, e.g. according to political fields like integration in peace and security issues, constitutes another option of assessing existing literature.

a. Descriptive literature

Various scholars have approached the topic of African integration without the intention of explaining it according to theoretical considerations. Instead, they focused on telling the story of its historical development. Mostly, literature of a descriptive nature only deals with parts of African integration. For example, focusing on the African Union, Magliveras and Naldi (2002) provide an overview of its objectives, principles, and institutions. Melber (2001) follows a similar approach by researching the New African Initiative and its relation to the AU. Both of these articles offer insights into the workings of the organization(s), but rarely provide theoretical insights into the process of integration. Manby (2004), Omorogbe (2011) and Williams (2009) deal with the topics of Human Interventions and Peace and Security, and how the AU can play a role in them. The respective findings correspond, arguing that the success of initiatives and frameworks already in place depends
on the political will of African leaders (many of whom have good reason not to encourage the concept of close inspection of performance on good governance), and on wealthy nations who have repeatedly failed to live up to commitments to the African continent.

(Manby 2004: 998)

Omorogbe concludes that the “experience to date is that the basic lack of resources of this fledgling organization has led to its role being limited” (2011: 62). In a similar vein, Williams argues that the Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) future efficacy is highly dependent on the member states’ will to commit resources (financial and human) to the case (cf. 2009: 622f).

b. Explaining the Failures of Integration

More insights concerning theoretical application to the process of African integration can be drawn from literature concerning its failure. The idea of Pan-Africanism, of African unity or even the United States of Africa has often been used to explain integrative processes. With the creation of a purely intergovernmental OAU, however, limitations in the commitment of the member-states regarding deeper political integration can be observed. Ayittey describes the shift from the (failing) intergovernmental approach towards a neofunctional one by pointing at the influence of a strong ideology: “Leaderless, the OAU drifted, but continental Pan-Africanism nevertheless remained a dream and a strategy for addressing Africa’s economic problems. This was significant because it underscored a more potent rationale for unification—economic integration.” (2010: 90). In any case, this attempt at integrating Africa economically did not succeed, as inter-African trade stayed at a low 10% of overall African trade (cf. ibid: 91). Hence a (European) neofunctionalist theory that is not altered according to the African case fails to explain the failures of integration. Barbarinde follows the logic of using intergovernmentalist theory in order to explain the setbacks in the integration process by pointing at the need for stronger (supranational) institutions, an increased involvement of the peoples, and the possibility for the AU’s Commission to “develop its own resources” (2007: 11); i.e. to create a real supranational level of governance. Muchie et al also focus on the limited commitment of nation states despite the common idea of Pan-African unity, describing how a strong civil society is needed in order to enhance integration: “Integration of Africa would have to prioritise the integration of Africa’s peoples and not just states” (2006: 14). Similarly, Tieku concludes that the AU is not a supranational body and highly dependent on national leaders. Instead of following the Pan-African ideal of unity, the author describes the process of negotiating the AU as follows: “While Ghaddafi managed to influence them to adopt a couple of his ideas, the entire AU is a composite of the foreign policy interests and preferences of [Presidents] Obasanjo and Mbeki” (2008: 267).
Olivier blames the lack of neofunctional thinking for the failure of Africa’s integration, describing how the European case proves that small steps are needed for progressive integration, pointing at economic cooperation succeeding while ‘bigger’, political cooperation (like the European Defense Community) failed (cf. 2008: 15). In contrast to this approach, Packer and Rurare argue that economic integration in Africa is not feasible because of the great differences in the member-states’ economies (cf. 2002: 378). Zank supports this argument by comparing European to African integration, stressing the importance of two necessary conditions for successful integration:

The first one is a consensus on basic constitutional principles. Such a consensus was in place in Western Europe after World War II (democratic rule by law), whereas Africa has exhibited a broad array of incompatible constitutional models after independence. The second condition has been compatible (not identical) socio-economic systems.

(2007: 1)

c. Explaining the Successes of Integration

Interestingly, researchers experience greater troubles theorizing the successes of African integration than they encounter explaining the failures. Nevertheless, three different approaches to integration can be observed, namely a neofunctionalist idea, one using Multi-Level Governance (MLG), and one resting on Constructivism (combined with Institutionalization theory). The latter resembles the description of Pan-Africanism being the driving force behind African integration, as Murithi argues. The author distinguishes three waves of African integration based on common belief in a united continent among the states. Murithi acknowledges the fact that “Pan-Africanism is an invented idea” (2005: 35). The three waves of institutionalizing this idea are the Pan-African Congress, the creation of the OAU, and finally the foundation of the AU. However, this theory fails to explain the obvious set-backs in the integration process.

Multi-Level Governance, as debated by Langer (2008), does not take into account earlier attempts at African integration, but focuses on the AU only. Because of its limited aspiration in trying to explain only parts of African integration, Multi-Level Governance (and other middle range theories) is not considered in this paper. Nevertheless, it offers insight into regional cooperation through focusing on the people and the civic society, in contrast to the nation state as centre of the unit of analysis. Maluwa slightly contradicts this argument by stating that the success of the AU lies in the fact that it does not address “the issue of the political unification of the continent in any substantive and direct manner, beyond the objectives stated in Article 3(a) and (c)” (2003: 168). In doing so, the focus is on economic cooperation rather than political integration, following neofunctionalist argumentations.
From this short literature review it can be understood that so far, African integration cannot convincingly be explained by a single theory, hence calling for the adoption of hybrid theories, or at the very least asking for changes to existing European integration theories in order to understand the phenomena of successes and failures in African integration. The aim of this thesis is to combine aspects of the existing integration theories in a way that they serve to explain African integration.
3. European Integration Theories

The academic field of regional cooperation theories picked up great speed after the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the conclusion of the Rome Treaties in 1957. Maybe the mostly debated dichotomy in European integration theory is the one between functionalism and realism, with two groups of theories that have developed over time. Verdun (2002) defines these two groups as the ‘neofunctionalist family’ and the ‘intergovernmentalist family’. Nevertheless, the role of Altiero Spinelli and other federalists during and after World War II should not be underestimated.

Chryssochoou, who argues that one of the main tasks for scholars is to analyze the interactions between the EU, its member states, and its institutions in order to improve the theories’ explanatory power, cites Taylor: “Each theory [...] leads to unique insights which are valid starting points for the purpose of comparison and evaluation” (Taylor 1971, as cited in Chryssochoou 2007: 127). Hence, it is not the purpose of this section to show the competition between European integration theories, but rather to provide an overview, a deeper understanding, and lay the basis for the application thereof. Jachtenfuchs points at Ernst Haas, who in 1971 “had already complained that different integration theories had different or underspecified dependent variables and were thus not really competing but complementary or party overlapping”, and continues: “[t]oday, this is even more true” (Jachtenfuchs 2002: 651). Verdun (2002) uses the example of the European Monetary Union (EMU) to point at the deficiencies of both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, and to argue for an approach that seeks to merge theories rather than excluding them from one another. Warleigh (1998), although taking a more general approach, supports this view by saying that any theory so far has proven to be narrowly focused and hence lacking the capability to explain the entirety of the European integration process. This section will present the important developments, assumptions, and criticisms towards federalism, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. As the aim of this thesis is to evaluate the degree of applicability of the three theories, it is important to first explain their logics and assumptions. Their applicability can only be tested if the theories are fully understood. The following section allows the creation of a set of indicators that can be systematically used in the analysis.

a. Federalism

Federalism as a theory of regional integration is not as prominent as the theories of neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are. Nevertheless, it can help to provide

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1 The former one covers theoretical approaches like neofunctionalism, historical institutionalism, and multi-level governance; the latter comprises of intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and two-level games.
explanations for integration in general and international cooperation in Europe (and Africa) specifically. However, it must be made clear that a single theory of federalism can hardly be found, a characteristic that stems from the fact that many authors dealing with federalism have connected it to specific cases or political projects. Some aspects and assumptions of this theory can be found in several academic contributions to the debate nonetheless. It is uncontested, e.g., that the Italian Altiero Spinelli was one of the main actors in the aftermath of World War II to promote the idea of a politically united, federal European structure of government. But he was not the only one; in May 1948, the The Hague Congress (or Congress of Europe) took place, convening over 750 representatives from different political parties and organizations from Europe, and adopting several resolutions arguing for the creation of European institutions and a common market. This congress is seen as having given a boost to both the creation of the Council of Europe and the European Movement (cf. Laursen 2010). Concerning ideas of pushing for European integration, Loughlin claims that “the federalists”, Spinelli being one of them, “differed by their emphasis on the ideal of European unity as a political goal”, and continues: “the early years of European integration owed more to federalism than to regionalism” (1996: 142f). Other authors agree on the impact of federalism on European integration by pointing either at other projects like the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) (cf. Burgess 2009), or by explaining institutional set-up created in the Treaty of Rome through ‘federal aspirations’ by Community leaders (cf. Koslowski 1999).

All of these works rather point at the important role that federalism has played in the creation of the European Union, but it is important to take a closer look at the assumptions it makes about how such integration processes come about. Concerning the definition of federalism, Burgess states that it “has been construed as a particular way of bringing together previously separate, autonomous, or independent territorial units to constitute a new form of union based upon principles that, broadly speaking, can be summarized in the dictum ‘unity in diversity’” (2009: 26). The notion of ‘unity in diversity’ is especially important when looking at international federal unions or organizations, as they differ from national ones like Switzerland, the USA, or Germany. Elazar adds to this definition and already points at a few factors that lead to the creation of a federation: “Federalism should be understood both in its narrower sense as intergovernmental relations and in its larger sense as the combination of self-rule and shared rule through constitutionalized power sharing in a noncentralized basis” (1993: 190). Hence, the focus is put on the degrees to which each level of government has authority or sovereignty over certain fields of politics. Again, Burgess follows this idea in
mentioning the importance of an ‘anti-centralist’ and ‘anti-absolutist’ system, bringing into play the aspect of subsidiarity, which is the concept of delegating decision-making power to the lowest possible level of government in order to allow for policies that are as close to the problem and the people as feasible, and as high up as necessary (cf. Burgess 2009). The specific outcome of federal integration processes, however, is not a fixed concept. Weiler (2003) agrees by stating that the EU was probably not created with the goal of being a federation, and refers to the constitutionalizing steps that have taken place after its creation, like the establishment of direct effect and supremacy of European law through the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Both a federation and a confederation can be thought of as goals of the integration process, which Forsyth (according to Burgess) has defined as follows: “[a] confederation [is] a union of states in a body politic in contrast to a federation that is a union of individuals in a body politic, suggesting the unity of one people or nation” (italics in original, Burgess 2009: 30). Taking into account the phrase ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ from the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, a confederation is probably what best describes the structure of the EU.

A lot has been published about factors that play a role in the integration process according to federalism, one of the main points being the desire for common security. If nation states or their people feel (or rather fear) they cannot provide security for themselves anymore, it might be a logical step to seek such security in the union with other states. An example for this can be seen in the project of the EDC, and the underlying idea behind creating European economic interdependency in order to prevent further war after the experiences of World War I and II. Vollaard describes the influence of William Riker on this aspect, also mentioning the role that a single ‘federal bargain’, or constituting event, plays in such a process (cf. 2008: 5). According to McKay, there are always two conditions that need to be fulfilled before an international agreement can be signed. Firstly, there must be the intention of the participating parties to peacefully expand the territory that is being governed so that any military threat from outside can be challenged. Secondly, the will to exchange some political power to a higher level in exchange for the promise of security must be given (cf. McKay 2004: 169). The threat of security, however, is not deemed important to the process of integration by all of the federalist scholars (cf. Vollaard 2008: 6).

Søren Dosenrode describes Riker as belonging to the Realist school of federalism and mentions the Liberal school, to which he counts scholars like M. Burgess, D.J. Elazar, and K.C. Wheare. Following the latter school of federalism, Dosenrode describes four factors that might lead to international regional integration: security, prosperity (economic wealth),
commonness (cultural likeness), and geographic proximity (cf. 2010: 13). These factors are not seen as leading to integration directly, however. Several authors stress the importance of strong political leaders, political groups, or elites that are needed to pursue such an interest in order to make integration happen (Dosenrode 2010; Laursen 2010; Elazar 1993; Pinder 1986). Thomas Franck argues that “the principal cause of failure, or partial failure […] can only be found in the absence of a sufficient political-ideological commitment to the primary concept or value of federation itself” (as cited in Vollaard 2008: 6).

**Criticism**

Federalist theory has been criticized by other scholars, mostly not for what it is, but for what it is missing. Some call federalism an ideology (Moravcsik 2005); others underline the supposedly lacking explanatory power of the theory. McKay focuses on the validity of one of the basic assumptions, namely by challenging the idea that security issues/threats are the core factor leading to regional integration (2004: 170). The author also addresses problems with the assumption that (federal) integration sees the starting point in interstate bargains, which are mostly presumed to provide some kind of a constitutional setting which regulates all relationships between the different levels of governments. This of course is heavily criticized by neofunctionalist scholars who believe in a gradual integration process. As has been shown above, all of these critical points have been addressed within the field of federalism itself, which makes it harder to speak of a single federalist theory with clearly defined assumptions and predictions.

b. **Neofunctionalism**

One of the major European integration theories stems from Mitrany’s approach of functionalism on the one hand, federalist thinking on the other hand, and was initially developed in the 1950s and 1960s by Ernst B. Haas and Leon Lindberg, two very influential authors (McCormick 2005). Emerging as a response to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, neofunctionalism’s main focus rests on the concept of ‘spillovers’. Roughly speaking, this concept describes how international cooperation in one field stimulates cooperation in other fields through different ways. Because of its importance, this concept will be dealt with in its own section.

Despite its name, neofunctionalist theory shows some major differences to functionalism. The role of any emerging international organization was considered to be greater than initially thought, meaning that it serves as an actor in future integration processes.
Supranational institutions, similarly, are seen as actors, capable of developing own interests and stimulating further integration (cf. Niemann and Schmitter 2009). The role of public support was considered limited, whereas the importance of national elites in international cooperation was deemed bigger. Also, the theory was no longer unattached to territory, but rather aimed at explaining regional (European) integration.

As Niemann and Schmitter put it, “Haas argued that the purpose of his theory was merely to describe, explain, and predict, [although] it was also meant to prescribe”, hence was both explanatory and normative (2009: 46). Even in the beginnings, however, did Haas and Lindberg differ in their definition of what integration actually entails (cf. Rosamond 2005; Niemann and Schmitter 2009). Despite these slightly different definitions, neofunctionalist theory of that time was based on several key aspects and assumptions. First of all, it was supposed to be a ‘grand’ theory, meaning that its applicability can be tested in, but is not limited to, European regional integration. Furthermore, integration is seen as a process rather than a single event; Dosenrode describes it as being “able to explain ‘organic’ or slowly developing regional integration” (2010: 4). Although belonging to the realist branch on the tree of theories, neofunctionalism is of a pluralist nature, as has been described above with the introduction of international organizations and institutions as independent actors. Nevertheless, states are seen as decision-makers to some extent. Actors are still considered to be rational and self-interested, although national societal and governmental, as well as international, elites are considered to constitute the main impetus for integration (cf. Niemann and Schmitter 2009). Schmitter adds to this the aspect that “interests, rather than common ideals or identity are the driving force behind the integration process” (italics in original; 2005: 259). These interests, however, should neither be seen as constant nor limited to the national level.

The Concept of Spillover

The main aspect of neofunctionalism is the concept of spillover effects, which is closely connected to the notion of integration as a process, as has been described above. The fact that regional integration is connected to self-interested actors, and that these interests might change over time, together with the rather short-term planning of governmental decision-makers underlines the idea of integration as a process, as opposed to the liberal intergovernmentalist’ focus on single events like international treaties. Spillover effects can

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2 The former one included a clear ‘end’ to the integration process and foresaw a shift of loyalties to the international level of government, while the latter only spoke of shifting expectations and activities.

3 These actors are of a pluralist nature, including different societal and governmental elites, as well as supranational actors that develop interests on their own and are able to act independently.
only occur and be observed over time. One example of spillover both in theory and in practice is the creation of the ECSC and the EEC, which led to the creation of Euratom. As McCormick describes, the ECSC was “created partly for short-term goals such as the encouragement of the Franco-German cooperation, but Monnet and Schuman also saw it as the first step in a process that would eventually lead to political integration” (2005: 16).

This is only one example of spillover in the European integration process, but Niemann (1998) finds four different types in neofunctionalist theory, namely functional, political, cultivated and induced (or geographical) spillover. Functional spillovers refer to economic cooperation leading to further integration in other economic fields, mainly due to the connectedness of different economic fields and the increased interdependencies of nation states in economic areas. Non-state actors play an important role in this case. With economic sectors benefitting from inter-state trade, actors in these fields increasingly work together across borders, and hence push their respective national governments to cooperate so as to create institutionalized structures (and thus more integration). Political spillover goes back to the definition of Haas and Lindberg, arguing that learning processes during integration happen within national and international elites leading to the shift of expectations, political activities and loyalties towards an international centre. This political shift would put pressure on the decision-makers to cooperate internationally, as that would be in the (national) interest. Cultivated spillover, according to Niemann, refers to supranational institutions stimulating political and functional spillover effects and, hence, integration (cf. 1998: 431). Here, the international institution does not only act as a meeting place for nation states and their representatives, but actively promotes integration by e.g. introducing new topics or deliberate agenda-setting. Main examples for cultivated spillover occurring are the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its rulings or the European Commission in the fields of telecommunications or energy (ibid.). Schmitter describes these as institutions developing “an independent esprit de corps and [interjecting] ideas and programmes into the process that cannot be reduced to the preferences of national or sub-national groups” (highlights in original; 2005: 260). Induced spillover describes how the changed economic situation and trade patterns of the integrated countries lead other nation states to consider joining the community. In that sense neofunctionalism hypothesizes the geographical widening of an international organization, an assumption that can relatively easily be supported when looking at the number of member states to the EU and its increase over time.
Criticism

The 1970s were the time when neofunctionalism was thought to be useless, mainly because of its poor empirical record. European integration came to a halt, most prominently expressed by the ‘empty-chair-crisis’ initiated by then French President Charles de Gaulle. But criticism has been as plenty as it was differentiated, it took into account the assumptions as well as the applicability and the empirical record.

Its deterministic character, predicting an inevitable shift of competences and loyalties to the ‘European centre’, is only one of the critiques. The theory could not provide explanations for any form of setbacks or halts in the integration process. In general, neofunctionalism was challenged for being too linear, as it did not take into account several factors like unintended consequences by political decision-making on the international stage or other factors that influence the process of integration. These range from changes in public and political attitudes to the underestimated role of national sovereignty and nationalism (cf. McCormick 2005). Another logic, namely that of constant economic growth, has never been clearly stated by Haas and Lindberg; nevertheless it can be considered to be inherent to the theory. Economic cooperation leading to growth and wealth is seen as stimulating further and deeper integration, a process that was not supposed to stop at any point. If anything, one could have argued that the assumption of economic growth leading to political cooperation was simply a dichotomous variable in the way that absence of such economic growth would cause a halt in the integration process. In the light of the economic crisis that hit Europe in 2008 and is still strongly affecting EU member states, however, the absence of such economic growth and even the possibility of failing states could be considered to increase integration. As the EU is heavily involved in providing money and guarantees for Greece, it is also in a position to impose policies and monitor the outcomes in the country.

One of the major points of criticism on neofunctionalism has been acknowledged by Haas himself: the lacking consideration of the environment and the context that any international or supranational organization exists in, namely the wider world (or the international sphere). The point here is not that the effects of the international setting are misjudged by neofunctionalists, but rather that their effect is not considered at all. The actual influence remains debated, as Niermann and Schmitter argue: “Hoffmann saw external factors as a disintegrative force […] his criticism overlaps with Webb’s and Holland’s on the changing (international) economic climate. Conversely, other writers have emphasized the integrative impact of external pressures” (2009: 52).
**Comeback**

With the treaty of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 uniting Europe’s market, one could easily argue that the functionalist idea of spillover is what led governments to start cooperating in the coal and steel industries and expanding this cooperation into a much wider field of economics (and politics).

Instead of bringing neofunctionalism back to the table in its ‘old’ form, authors paid attention to the criticism bestowed upon them and proposed some changes. Verdun summarizes that “various authors revamped neofunctionalism in one way or another [...] They did not reintroduce the determinism of neofunctionalism but did emphasise the importance of functional spillover and the role of supranational actors and interest groups” (2002: 11). Hence, the most obvious mistake about regional integration has been addressed, namely that the process would be inevitable. This determinism was clearly disproved once European integration came to a halt. Tranholm-Mikkelsen examines the role of spillovers closer and defines them as a “matter of probability” rather than a “matter of certainty” (1991: 9). One of the causes for the decreased deterministic approach, according to the author, lies in the fact that “two forces, nationalism and diversity [of member states], limit the effects of the logic of spill-over” (ibid.: 17).

Hence, neofunctionalism has changed as a response to vast criticism. Another important aspect in the ability to account for halts in the integration process is renaming it a ‘dialectical process’. Integration is seen as divided between the logic of integration versus the logic of disintegration, with spillover effects on the one side and the influence of sovereignty, nationalism, and national politics (public opinion for example) on the other.

c. **Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

Intergovernmentalism appeared as a response to criticism on neofunctionalism. The main argument of intergovernmentalism is that states are the main actors in international cooperation and that they act both unitary and rational. In his influential work “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe” (1966), Hoffmann introduces the new approach by criticizing Haas’ neofunctionalism on several grounds. During the 1990s, scholars were facing the renaming of the EC to the EU and both a widening and deepening of issues being dealt with at the European level. This led Andrew Moravcsik to further develop the idea of intergovernmentalism and to adapt it to the developments that took place in the integration process.
While the core assumptions are similar in both intergovernmentalism and its newer, liberal, form (rational actors with sets of preferences, nation states as primary actors), Moravcsik added a few aspects to the theory, making it one of the most used approaches for explaining European integration. Moravcsik himself summarizes the theory as follows:

European integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments.

(Moravcsik 1998, as cited in Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009: 69)

Three things become apparent when reading this definition: (1) nation states are no longer seen as the only actors as liberal intergovernmentalism acknowledges the fact that domestic preference formation is a process that is influenced by economic interdependencies and sub-national actors. (2) International negotiations are based on nationally reached preferences, but determined by the individual states’ relative power at the negotiation table. This is based on Putnam’s two-level game theory, where nation states are actors both domestically and internationally. (3) The role of international institutions is perceived to be bigger, compared to intergovernmentalism. Pollack describes how this approach “nests three complementary middle-range theories within [the] larger rationalist framework: a liberal theory of national preference formation, an intergovernmental theory of bargaining, and a new theory of institutional choice stressing the importance of credible commitments” (2001: 232). This corresponds with Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig’s claim that liberal intergovernmentalism constitutes a ‘grand’ theory, which is able to explain any regional integration process (cf. 2009). But it is important to take a closer look at the three aspects of said logic of integration. National Preference is the first stage, describing the domestic influences and pressures that lead the nation states to define their order of preferences or interests. Most important in this regard is the economic sector, with powerful players seeking either governmental regulation, open markets (due to globalization forces), or broader competition (cf. Moravcsik 2005). In contrast to other beliefs, liberal intergovernmentalism does not attribute initial European integration to security and ideational issues, but rather supports the hypothesis that possible economic gains led the nation states to seek cooperation. These economic pressures develop because of a greater interdependency within Europe and the world; they are the key, but not the only factor in preference formation. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig argue that “geopolitical interests (even more than ideology) also had an important impact on European integration” (2009: 70). The second stage of international cooperation, according to liberal
intergovernmentalism, is called *Substantive Bargains* and deals with the negotiation processes that lead to international treaties. The two main aspects about these negotiations are the limited role of the supranational institution as an independent actor and the influence of asymmetric interdependencies on the outcome (cf. Moravcsik 2005). The former refers to the limited gains that nation states receive from supranational actors apart from reducing transaction costs. It is a common conception that non-state actors at the negotiation table possess better or more information than the other (state) parties, but Moravcsik argues that “generally representatives of the most interested national governments are better informed” (2008: 164). The latter aspect deals with the outcomes of such negotiations, which liberal intergovernmentalism believes are shaped by the different importances the nation states attach to the preferred outcomes, thus speaking of asymmetric interdependencies. The third stage of the integration process is what Moravcsik calls *Institutional Choice*. Following regime theory, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that nation states during negotiations create international (even supranational) institutions in order to prevent unwanted consequences, tackle unforeseen outcomes, and reduce future transaction costs of cooperation. Although such a shift of competences to a higher level than the national is similar to the above-mentioned neofunctionalist model, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig argue that the motives behind it are different. Instead of shifting loyalties and power leading to the creation of supranational organizations, nation states’ interests in securing their own (future) benefits play the most important role. In the authors’ words, “states establish rules for the distribution of gains according to the pre-existing bargain and reduce the costs of coordinating their activities, monitoring the behavior of others, and mutually sanctioning non-compliance” (2009: 72).

**Criticism**

Although liberal intergovernmentalism has become a fairly popular European integration theory, it has been subject to a fair amount of criticism. In general, three different types are worth mentioning; there is criticism about the assumptions, the reasoning, and the empirical testing. Firstly, constructivist theorists claim that liberal intergovernmentalism fails to take into account the role that values and identities play in the integration process. It is the assumption of the states as rational actors that is generally contested. Although liberal intergovernmentalism takes a pluralist or societal approach to preference formation in the first stage, the second stage is about independent states bargaining in an anarchic setting, simply following their (mostly economic) preferences. Another point of criticism concerning the assumptions is what Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig consider one of its strengths: “Though
multi-causal, LI remains simple. […] the aspiration to parsimony differentiates liberal intergovernmentalism from atheoretical concepts like ‘multilevel governance’” (2009: 68). The simplicity of separating the integration process into three steps, each of which follows a single logic, is being criticized. It is argued that the three stages in fact are intertwined, i.e. states shape their preferences also under the influence of how their bargaining position is, the role that supranational institutions play in the negotiations play and so on. Scharpf refers to this phenomenon of interrelation as the ‘joint-decision trap’ (cf. 1988). Criticism about the reasoning of liberal intergovernmentalism mostly deals with claims that the theory underestimates the role of supranational actors, fails to take into account the role of unintended consequences, and omits the concept of path dependence.

One of the main aspects that leads to criticism is the way the theory has been tested, which also relates to its assumptions. Stating that integration can be explained by nation states forming preferences and bargaining in anarchy, liberal intergovernmentalism only looks at the ‘big steps’ of integration, the treaty-making negotiations. Moravcsik himself acknowledges this point and “makes clear that […] scepticism about supranational influence is limited essentially to claims about informal agenda-setting or entrepreneurship in unanimous treaty-amending decisions, and does not apply to the day-to-day policy-making within the treaties” (italics in original, Pollack 2001: 233). One common example for the role of supranational institutions is the European Court of Justice, which through its rulings played a major part in not only interpreting the treaties which created the EU, but also used its legal supremacy to extend the Union’s competences (cf. de Witte 1999).

d. **Indicators**

In order to test the theories elaborated above, one needs to establish a set of indicators. Based on its assumptions, each respective theory has its own conditions and predictions. In this section, a general group of indicators will be developed along with specific predictions from the theoretical insights drawn above. Following de Lombaerde and van Langenhove (2005), indicators can be grouped into six distinct categories, which are:

1. **actors**, describing the main players of the integration process;

2. **structural factors**, dealing with the background of the parties involved, e.g. their geographical and cultural proximity, historical patterns of cooperation, or the existence of a common threat;
(3) **institutionalisation**, describing the number of treaties and agreements, their contents, the time frame, and the character of the institutions created during the process;

(4) **implementation**, focusing on the degree of implementation of the treaty provisions, and on the level of convergence;

(5) **effects**, representing the outcomes of integration of factors like economic growth, military security, migration, or capital flows;

(6) **interdependence**, dealing with the level of interdependence between the participating states regarding political, economic or informational issues and policies.

Although not all of the three theories’ predictions correspond to all of these six categories, this framework presents a good starting point for structuring the set of indicators used in this analysis. Nevertheless, because of the attribution problem of a few of these factors, some adjustments to this approach have to be made. For example, economic integration could be explained by both NF and LI, hence the role of actors in the process is as important as the time frame in which the process takes place. The notion of ‘effects’ needs to be clarified as well, as these can be both positive (integrative) or negative (disintegrative). Hence, the possibility of halts in integration is added to this category. Measuring the degrees of ‘implementation’ and ‘interdependence’, however, does not add to this thesis’ goal of explaining integration and will therefore be incorporated into the ‘effect’ category. *Table 1* provides a summary of the indicators for the three theories discussed in this paper.

**Federalism**

Federalist theory assumes that an elite group is the main driving force behind integration. In this pluralist/civil society approach, the role of national governments is disputed. Some authors claim the presence of a pressure group, or elite, to be most important in the integration process; others argue that no cooperation takes place without a strong political leadership pushing for it. Uniting in these views is the fact that some sort of common ideology has to be present. Federalism assumes integration to be a single event rather than a process, something also called the ‘big bang’ approach. In a constitutionalizing ‘federal bargain’, nation states agree on the creation of another level of government, to which a certain amount of power and authority is shifted. This is sought to lead to the creation of a federation, political union, or at least a confederation. While the elite or political leadership groups are seen as the main actors for integration, there can be different reasons next to the previous mentioned common
ideology. Most prominent is the notion of a common security threat that unites the participating parties. Also, common culture, geographical proximity and the prospect of economic wealth play a role.

**Neofunctionalism**

The concepts of spillover (functional, political, cultivated, and induced) are central to neofunctionalist theory. Strongly connected to this idea is the aspect of progress over time that is assumed by the theory, instead of predicting a single event leading to integration. After the criticism for being overly deterministic (and the halt in European integration during the 1960s), neofunctionalism has refrained from stating inevitability of spillovers; nevertheless failure of cooperation can hardly be explained. The theory’s proponents make no attempts to explain set-backs in integration. Furthermore, several actors are perceived to play a role in the integration process, namely (trans)national elites and supranational institutions. In later accounts, the influence of national governments was taken into consideration as well. Reasons for integration that are considered most important are the prospect of economic wealth in the beginning of the process, while the shift of loyalties and powers will lead to the integration of political sectors due to emerging interdependencies and the pressure of supranational institutions.

**Liberal Intergovernmentalism**

Liberal intergovernmentalism rests on three stages of integration, namely ‘preference formation’, ‘substantive bargains’, and ‘institutional choice’, as has been described above. In a response to criticism, the idea of nation states as main and unitary actors has been weakened a little. During the preference formation stage, several players are presumed to play a role, using a pluralist approach. These actors are all national. The second step assumes strict intergovernmental bargaining, with nation states as the main players making rational cost-benefit choices. The role of international institutions is seen as merely reducing transaction costs for further cooperation and as a way of securing compliance with the treaty or agreement provisions by the other parties. The aspect of time is not answered by liberal intergovernmentalism, as it can be used to predict single acts of integration as well as a series of events. It all depends on whether the participating states expect benefits in further cooperation. Unlike neofunctionalism, however, there is no inherent logic as to why integration should stimulate further integration.
Table 1: Indicators for Federalism, Neofunctionalism, and Liberal Intergovernmentalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Federalism</th>
<th>Neofunctionalism</th>
<th>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Elite/international community; national political leaders</td>
<td>Elite International community; Supranational institutions</td>
<td>National actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural factors</strong></td>
<td>Common security threat; Common culture; Geographical proximity; Common ideology</td>
<td>Economic interdependence; Prospect of wealth</td>
<td>National interest (security, economics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalization</strong></td>
<td>Single (constitutional) treaty</td>
<td>Several treaties with widening and deepening provisions</td>
<td>Either no treaty, single treaty, or multiple treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Frame</strong></td>
<td>“big bang”</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Single event(s); neither limited to “big bang” nor necessarily continuous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effects - integration</strong></td>
<td>(con)federation</td>
<td>Supranational organization; Political union</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No integration/halt in integration</strong></td>
<td>Missing common ideology; Missing political leadership</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>No cooperation because of cost-benefit analysis; Non-compliance because of changed domestic interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Methodology

a. Concepts

Testing theories requires clearly defined concepts. In this case it is important to understand what is meant by integration; the indicators mentioned above will be operationalized below. Nye (1968) proposes the distinction into economic integration, social integration and political integration (cf. p. 858). This approach addresses different levels of integration, as it combines ‘low politics’ (mostly economic sector) and ‘high politics’ (mostly security and foreign relations sector). Jacob and Teune include reasons for integration in their definition, stating that the “essence of an integrative relationship is seen as collective action to promote mutual interests” (as cited in Caporaso 1970: 364f).

Combining these two classifications, integration in this paper is being defined as coordination, cooperation or even convergence of national policies and laws on the international level. The (partially) giving up of national political sovereignty is part of regional integration. Integration is not limited to, but does include ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics and results from some form of common interest. Both ‘low’ and ‘high’ politics integration can occur separately and independent of the other form. While liberal intergovernmentalism is better at explaining ‘low’ integration, neofunctionalism focuses on ‘high’ integration. Hence, in order for the theories’ validity to be proven, not both forms need to be addressed at the same time. Regional integration is the voluntary cooperation of two or more sovereign nation states following political/economic interests or a common ideology, creating some form of international regime. Such a regime can consist of binding obligations for the participating states like the need to reduce tariffs and quotas, or take the form of international institutions (supranational, intergovernmental, or a mixture thereof).

b. Case Selection and Data Collection

Integration theories have been developed mainly according to the European integration process, but claims exist that such theories can, and in fact should, be applied to other cases of regional integration as well. Neofunctionalism as well as liberal intergovernmentalism have or had proponents who argued their potential for being ‘grand’ theories. Federalism as a theory is less prominent, but considering its assumptions, concepts, and principles, it is applicable to different cases.

This paper deals with African integration for several reasons. Its current (institutional) set-up bears a lot of resemblance with that of its European counterpart, hence does it make for an interesting case to analyze the process that lead to it. Babarinde (2007) argues that the
African Union has a similar institutional set-up to that of the EU, and is potentially influenced by the latter, although there are major differences as well (cf. p. 11). Furthermore, African integration happened (and continues to happen) at all levels of politics, both ‘high’ and ‘low’, and has its roots dating back to the beginning of the twentieth century. While national European leaders are hesitating to give up competences in defence and security, African integration contains a common defence policy. The Constitutive Act even states that one of the main objectives is to ‘defend’ the continent, a similar notion cannot be found in the European treaties. The OAU was founded in 1963, which makes it almost as old as European integration. A great discussion arose in Europe with the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty because of its name and the image that a ‘European Constitution’ would produce. In Africa, however, the Constitutional Act was adopted creating the AU. All of these major similarities (and some differences) between the history and current state of African and European integration provide for reasons to testing European integration theories in Africa. It has to be noted, however, that the African case has not nearly been as successful as the European one, an interesting aspect that can only partially be explained by the theories.

The distinction of five different time-spans is made based on major developments in the integration process. The focal points in this timeline are treaties/international conferences/meetings on the one hand, and legislation or other acts by the respective organizations on the other. This makes it possible to account for specific events (e.g. the contents of treaties) as well as for progress over time. The latter is achieved by not only looking at the treaties, but also by analyzing the influence of the respective organizations between the cornerstones of integration. By looking at the contents of the treaties and other acts across time, changes in contents and scope become apparent and allow for the inclusion of the time-variable. The data used will be (1) primary sources: treaty texts, conference declarations, legislation (regulation, directives etc) and (2) secondary sources: academic articles/books providing interpretations of the primary sources. The primary data can be derived from various online sources, including: www.europa.eu; www.au.int; www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/index.html (Information Resources on Integration in Africa).

c. Hypotheses

The assumptions and indicators derived from the theories discussed above need to be transformed into testable hypotheses in order to determine whether European integration theories can explain (parts) of African integration. Nye writes about the difficulties of assessing different cases of regional integration, and argues that “doubts about comparison can only be met by the formulation of precise hypotheses [...] Yet efforts to formulate such
hypotheses are hindered by the fuzziness of the general concept of integration” (Nye 1968: 855). Because of this paper’s approach of combining the theories to account for different phases in African integration, not all aspects of the theories are hypothesized to be found in the analysis. This way, weak points in the explanatory power of one approach can be filled in by using another. Generally, it can be estimated that federalist theory describes the beginning of the integration process, and the creation of the OAU and the AU. Neofunctionalism is considered to explain a general trend (over time) of a deepening and widening of integration, whereas liberal intergovernmentalism should be able to explain the design of the international organizations as well as halts or set-backs in the integration process. The determination of the main actors of integration can make use of all three theories, with the importance of elites (federalism), supranational institutions (NF) and national leaders (LI). It is expected, however, that elites (often in the diaspora) play a major role, along with national heads of state and government. Pluralist decision-making on the national level is not very likely considering the number of undemocratic leaders in African states before the 1990s. To summarize, the hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapter are:

(F) Transnational elites with a common ideology concerning international cooperation are the main actors in the creation of ‘big bang’ integration, leading to single constitutional-like treaties.

(NF) Integration will first occur in fields of ‘low’ politics and over a period of time widen and deepen, leading to ‘high’ political integration. Supranational institutions are the main driving force behind the transformation of integration in economic fields towards cooperation in security, defence, and foreign politics.

(LI) National leaders are the main actors in international cooperation, leading to either the creation of intergovernmental institutions or to no integration.
5. Application of the Theories

African integration has its roots in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the idea of Pan-Africanism developed as a response to colonialism and racism. As a result, a series of Pan-African Congresses between 1900 and 1945 were organized to provide a platform for discussion amongst black leaders, intellectuals and members of the African diaspora (cf. Ayittey 2010). One of the major aspects of these congresses was the call for an African ‘unity’, less in the economic or political integration sense, but much more in an ideological and cultural way of solidarity.

a. 1958 – 1963

The two decades after World War II were a time of decolonization. Ghana was the first sub-Saharan state to gain independence in 1957, and by the end of 1963 approximately 80% of the African states were freed from colonialist rule (cf. Ayittey 2010). Kwame Nkrumah, who was secretary-general of the Pan-African Congress between 1945 and 1947, became Ghana’s first prime minister in 1957. He ordered the creation of a Pan-African Secretariat within the Ghanaian government, which had the responsibility for two series of conferences: “first, the All-African Peoples’ Conferences were held to stimulate independence movements in other colonies. Second, Nkrumah organized the Conferences of Independent African States to establish a diplomatic framework for the political unification of Africa” (Ayittey 2010: 89). Because of their role in the African integration process, it is important to take a closer look at these two series of conferences.

All-African Peoples’ Conferences

Held in Accra, Ghana, in 1958, the first All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC) had more than 300 participants from 28 states. The main goals of the conference were to discuss ways of (non-)violent revolution in the colonies and to bring together African delegates from both independent and colonized states. Nkrumah used this forum to present his idea of political development in Africa in four stages: the first aim was the attainment of independence; secondly this independence was to be consolidated; thirdly the creation of a community and unity among the freed states was aspired; and the fourth step considered the economic and social construction of Africa (“AAPC” 1962: 429). The second AAPC was held in 1960 in Tunis, Tunisia, and hosted about 180 delegates from over 30 countries. The main topics were, again, ‘independence and unity’. Along the lines of dependency theory, the resolutions of the conference addressed the former colonial powers to reduce their methods of ‘neo-
colonialism’, i.e. the economic exploitation of supposedly free African states. The third AAPC took place in Cairo, Egypt, in 1961 and dealt with similar topics as its two predecessors. Most importantly, the adopted resolution recommended the formation of assemblies consisting of representatives from the independent African states in order to consult on and harmonize national policies in the fields of economy, security, cultural exchange and political unity (“AAPC”: 433).

Conferences of Independent African States

While the AAPCs were meant to bring together non-governmental actors, the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) in April 1958 brought together all governments of then independent states. Nkrumah’s goal was to achieve political unification, “institutionalized in a ‘Union of African States’ and ‘Union Government’” (Van Walraven 1996: 91). In the first and the second CIAS, which took place in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in 1960, the goals were similar to the ones of the AAPCs, namely promoting independence from the colonial powers and unification of African states. Resolutions, however, were rather reluctant to commit to strong unification and stated that “cooperation among African states was essential for the maintenance of their independence and sovereignty” (Johnson 1962: 429).

Theoretical Considerations

The importance of these two series of conferences for a united Africa should not be underestimated. The idea behind the conferences was a concept called ‘Pan-Africanism’, describing the commonness of Africans regardless of their nationalities. The goal of this notion was to unite African people and to create solidarity, with the ultimate thought of freeing the continent from dependency on others. It is the idea and call for an African independence, as Murithi summarizes: “If ideas are not designed by the Africans, then rarely can they be in the interest of Africans” (2005: 8). He adds that the first institutionalization of Pan-Africanism was the creation of the Pan-African Congress, which has been mentioned above. The second institutionalization is the creation of the OAU, the third wave of institutionalization is the AU (cf. ibid.). Hakin Adi and Marika Sherwood describe the speciality of the Pan-Africanist movement as “the belief in some form of unity or of common purpose among the peoples of Africa and the African Diaspora” (2003, as cited in Murithi 2005: 11). This notion clearly is comparable to that of the European federal movement, driven by people like Altiero Spinelli, which resulted in the The Hague Congress of 1948. The most important individuals behind the African conferences were Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Peter Abrahams (cf. Shepperson and Drake 1986). The first two were politicians, while
the latter is a South African writer; William Du Bois (an Afro-American scholar), is seen as another important player in the Pan-African movement. These four men are only representatives of a movement that is based on a common ideology of anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and African unity. But before the Organization of African Union was created, there were cleavages amongst Africans concerning the question of unity.

Along with the Congo crisis in the beginning of the 1960s came a division of African states that developed into two blocs: the Casablanca group on the one side and the Brazzaville and Monrovia group on the other. The transition of attitudes towards Congo into different ideas of a unification of the African continent can be explained in the fact that both groups “see their own alliance as the beginning of a continental framework of co-operation” (Van Walraven 1996: 108). The former bloc was mainly against any influence of non-African powers, very much in line with Nkrumah’s arguments, while the latter group prioritized economic cooperation (cf. ibid.). This distinction between the call for unification in ‘high politics’ in the one group and ‘low politics’ in the other group finds resemblance in the envisaged set-up of any African union. The Casablanca bloc was striving for a supranational institution with clear powers and sovereignty, whereas the Monrovia group “avoided words like ‘integration’, ‘union’ and ‘unification’” (ibid.: 112), and had an intergovernmentalist regime on their agenda. Even though the OAU turned out to be closer to the latter ideal⁴, the influence of the Pan-African movement on its creation should not be underestimated. It is interesting to note, however, that the main actors in this pre-institutional integration phase are both (transnational) elites and political leaders at the same time. Often, the elite consisted of exactly those leaders of countries who just managed to decolonize. Clearly, the movement was not a nation-state based one (as the influence of the diaspora shows), but it was also not completely removed from national interests.

b. **1963 – 1970**

In 1963, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in Addis Ababa by 32 participating states. It managed to incorporate the two above-mentioned groups of countries, the radical Casablanca group aiming at instant unification on the one hand, and the moderate Monrovia group, which believed in a gradual process towards unification, on the other. The ultimate goal of cooperation was unification, as Muchie describes: “A remarkable feature [...] is the fact there has always been an identified goal that is shared by all types of political communities” (2006: 8). By the time of the summit of Heads of State and Government, the

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⁴ The process leading to the creation of the OAU and its set-up will be discussed in the following section.
Casablanca bloc had lost its uniformity and power, with the Monrovia group gaining influence (cf. Sanger 1964). Nevertheless, both groups were present at the conference, holding powerful speeches both for strong and softer integration, respectively. The overall topic of decolonization and liberation for African states helped in bringing both groupings closer together, by focusing on a common goal. Haile Selassie from Ethiopia was not strongly connected to either group, but stated that the meeting could not “close without adopting a single African Charter. We cannot leave without having created a single African organisation” (as cited in Van Walraven 1996: 139). The creation of the - albeit intergovernmental - OAU is considered “no small feat considering the gap that has separated the radicals from the gradualists” (Padelford 1964: 540). This separation continued to create tensions within the framework of the OAU. Tanzanian president Nyerere, who was part of the gradualist approach group, declared at the first ordinary summit in 1964 that “we are divided between those who genuinely want a continental Government and will patiently work for its realization, removing obstacles, one by one; and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union Government’ for the purpose of propaganda” (as cited in Biney 2008: 138). It is not hard to tell that this attack was directed at Nkrumah and his fellows.

**Theoretical Considerations**

It is important to take a closer look at the exact provisions of the OAU Charter, the actors involved in its creation, and its implications. The name of the conference alone indicates that the only actors involved were national leaders. People like Nkrumah, for example, who attended the meeting as Prime Minister of Ghana, were active both on a national level in government as well as in the group of the Pan-African movement. Hence, the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption that nation states are the only actors in integration does not completely apply. Also the notion of national-level pluralism in preference formation is not entirely correct. Rather, it was the international (or transnational) elite that majorly shaped preferences of nation states. The aspect of governmental leaders being in both groups, however, leads to the conclusion that national preferences were not at all completely absent in negotiations. It is more plausible, then, that the elite group worked as a stimulus for international integration, whereas the nation states developed their own version of this vision. Also, they were the actors in the actual negotiation process, which in turn could rely on resolutions previously published at conferences like the AAPC and the CIAS. The federalist movement and its ideas are present in the OAU Charter, but it cannot be considered a constitution-like treaty as it grants almost no sovereignty to the international institutions, and mostly rests on consensus among its member states in decision-making. Van Walvaren
describes it as having no “legal enforcement mechanisms and [...] few concrete commitments for member states” (1996: 205). The general structure of the OAU includes an Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers, a General Secretariat, specialized Commissions (e.g. Defence, Economic and Social), and a Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Most importantly, the Charter states that the Assembly constitutes the “supreme organ of the organization” (OAU Charter 1963: 5), underlining the intergovernmentalist character of the Organization. From the Charter it also becomes apparent that the main concern of the states signing it was the continuation of the process of decolonization, of the freed states maintaining independence, and respecting the sovereign borders. Because of this focus on independence, and probably the fear of political leaders of any form of outside control over their territory, one of the OAU’s main principles was that of non-interference in internal matters (OAU Charter 1963: 4). To describe the extent of this principle, Murithi claims that “a policy of non-intervention was applied to the extreme point of African nation-states oppressing their people with impunity and doing little or nothing to prevent massive human rights abuses in their neighbouring countries” (2005: 26). It is this aspect and the strong power of the Assembly which led authors to call the OAU simply a ‘club of Heads of State and Government’, indicating that it had turned out to be a forum for discussion without competences more than anything else. Saadia Touval however, studying the influence of the OAU on cross-border conflicts in Africa, finds that the commitment of member states to cooperation within the OAU framework [has] endowed its Charter and resolutions with much weight and [has] influenced the behaviour of states. [...] The Conferences of the Organization provided opportunities for contact between adversaries which have helped to reduce misunderstandings.

(1967: 126)

Supporting the notion of its powerlessness, but arguing for its effectiveness, the author states that by ‘only’ being a forum for discussion, conflicts in Africa have decreased. Although powerless, the OAU did have an impact on its member states.

These intergovernmentalist structures also contradict the notion of a supranational institution as a driving force behind further integration (over time), as claimed by neofunctionalism. To elaborate further on this aspect, the work of the OAU after its creation needs to be considered. One interesting aspect is mentioned by at least two authors, and it has to do with the neofunctionalist idea of shifting loyalties over time. John Markakis in 1966 wrote a first “Progress Report” on the OAU, explaining how the General Secretariat, which is the main institution concerned with the task of executing decisions by the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, is lacking appropriate personnel. What seems to be a small
problem is gaining importance by the argument that “African governments [are not] eager to release eligible civil servants for employment in the OAU” (Markakis 1966: 136). Van Walraven supports this statement, mentioning the possible contradictions between national interests and supranational ones: “officials are often regarded by their governments as ‘their’ representatives, rather than as Pan-African civil servants working for the greater good” (1996: 172). This aspect points at a clear lack of member states’ commitment to the transfer of both power and loyalties to the international level. Interestingly, the European Commission (formerly the High Authority) was created as a supranational institution, with the provision that all delegates should act independently and without pressure from any national government. Comparing this to the African case, it can be said that the neofunctionalist idea of shifting loyalties and power is missing just as the presence of an independent, supranational institution is.

In the time between 1963 and 1970, a total of seven ordinary meetings of the Assembly took place. The declarations of these meetings mainly addressed inter-state conflicts on the African continent and urged the involved states to directly meet and discuss within the framework of the Organization. Additionally, the topics of independence and decolonization were pushed forward, calling for a determination of ‘foreign’ rule in African states. Economic cooperation was requested and stimulated, although never thoroughly established. Sessions of the Assembly merely served as a forum for debate between the member states without the necessary implementation of declarations (cf. Olivier 2008).


The time period following the first years after the creation of the OAU up until the agreement on the Treaty of Abuja in 1991 were marked by the growing insignificance and powerlessness of the Organization. As has been mentioned above, the role of mediating between rival states in Africa and keeping the peace both domestically and across borders has been achieved in most cases with assistance by the OAU, not so much because of its distinct characteristics, and rather because of its mere existence. For the period between 1971 and 1975, Van Walraven finds that 30% of the conflicts had been settled in or with the help of the framework of the OAU (cf. 1996: 285). This number dropped to 10% for the period of 1976-1981; and increased to 30% again during 1983 and 1993. It is important to note, however, that the author sees agreements to cease-fires as qualifying for reaching a settlement of conflict, although he notes that such truces constitute ‘neither war nor peace’ (cf. ibid.: 284). One of the strategies of the OAU, hence, was to ‘buy time’ during conflicts in order to prevent further violence, rather than finding a final solution of the dispute. Kufuor summarizes the problems of conflict
resolution as “the under-utilization of the OAU as a key institution for the resolution of Africa’s problems” (2005: 141). The Organization lost credibility and relevance due to its inability to “protect the African people from tyrannical excesses of their leaders” (Ayetey 2010: 91). The economic aspect, which was addressed in the Charter rather as a side note to the main goal of achieving decolonization and security, remained in the background during the existence of the OAU. Hence, Mathews describes the Organization as one being about politics, rather than economics (cf. 2008: 32). Nevertheless, during the course of several conferences of the heads of state and government, the idea of an economic union was further developed, ultimately resulting in the Treaty of Abuja in 1991.

Theoretical Considerations

Although the twenty years after the OAU’s founding period were marked by its decreasing significance, they nevertheless ended with the agreement to establish an African Economic Community in 1991. The paradox between the organization’s failure to unite Africa and its enduring existence can be explained by the gains that it granted to national leaders. Kufuor argues that the limited outcomes of the OAU can best be explained by the rational choices that leaders took (cf. 2005). The author continues by stating that the strongest relation was the “interplay between the strategic exploitation of the OAU by its members and its longevity as a weak organization” (ibid.: 142).

In order to track the developments within the Organization, the summits of the Heads of State and Government provide a good overview. When taking a closer look, the same topics as in the previous time-period seem to play the major role in the discussions and hence in the declarations. The call for decolonization is as important as are regional conflicts. Between 1970 and 1991, the official documents produced at the summits concerned issues like South Africa (apartheid); the continuation of Portuguese colonialism; the reconciliation between Guinea, Ivory Coast and Senegal; conflicts between Ethiopia/Sudan, and between Libya/Chad (cf. OAU Summit Declarations). Peter M. Munya analyzed the actual impact of the Organization on conflicts in Africa, and found that “[although] the OAU has been effective in resolving inter-state conflict, its performance in resolving intra-state conflicts is found to be wanting” (1999: 591). He sees the reasons for this in the Charter, which states the principle of non-interference in domestic issues. Further, the lack of financial resources is considered to be hindering effective intervention and limiting problem-solving capabilities.

Again, it is interesting to note the power of national members within the OAU. At the 19th summit in Tripoli, Libya in 1982, for the first time in its history, the necessary two-third threshold of participating states was missed, leading to an ‘unofficial’ meeting instead. Main
reason for the absence of so many members was the debate on the acceptance of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) into the OAU (Novicki 1983: 52). The resemblance with Europe’s ‘empty-chair-crisis’ is striking. When France boycotted meetings of the European Council, Great-Britain’s accession to the (then) EEC was one of the factors.

In the 1980s, another topic was brought forward in the declarations, that of ‘new colonialism’, describing the transformation from *de jure* colonial rule towards an economic dependency between rich (Western) and poor (African) states, leading to *de facto* control. In this light, the common African problem of foreign debts was being discussed, although no binding common action has been decided upon within the summits. The creation of the AEC in 1991, however, can be seen as a step taken in order to challenge this dependency and other problems. Considering the above-mentioned lacking resources of the OAU, another reason for strengthening Africa’s economic situation as a whole can be the ability to support international organizations. Only if the nation states improve their situation, they are able to financially support the OAU in its attempts at conflict resolution. This way, economic integration can be seen as an indirect tool of achieving peace and security on the continent.

For the time period discussed in this section, it can be summarized that the main characteristics of integration and international cooperation have not changed. The importance of non-interference, independence (decolonization), and sovereignty dictate the work of the OAU and its outcomes. Interesting, however, is the call for economic integration after the (mostly) failed attempt in the political field; this logic of cooperation in one field leading to agreements in another can be described with neofunctionalist logic. Also, geographical spillover effects can be noticed, with eleven new member states between 1970 and 1991. Considering Morocco’s withdrawal in 1985 and the accession of Eritrea in 1993 and South Africa in 1994, the total amount of members had reached 53 by the mid-1990s. In most cases, these countries joined the OAU as they became independent from colonial rule.

d. 1991 – 2002

The Abuja Treaty was signed in 1991, creating the African Economic Community (AEC) which came into force in 1994. Its plan is to develop an African economic and monetary union (including a single currency) by 2028, following six specific stages (cf. AEC Treaty 1991: 10). The first stage, with the goal of establishing regional economic communities, has been reached. The second stage consists of deeper and better political integration within the regional communities in the areas of tariffs, taxes and trade on the one hand, and of harmonization between these regional communities on the other. This stage has not been
completed yet, as it rather represents a continuous effort. The third stage calls for the establishment of Free Trade Areas within the regional communities as well as the creation of a Customs Union at this level by the end of 2017. The last three stages, dealing with the widening of the Free Trade Area to the whole African Union, the creation of an African Common Market, and finally the foundation of an African Central Bank (and a single currency for the continent), will be approached after the completion of stage three and are envisaged to be completed by 2028.

Apart from the progress in economic terms, the importance of the OAU has further decreased in the last decade of the twentieth century. The early 1990s saw the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. When apartheid was officially ended in South Africa in May 1994, the OAU’s goal of achieving the end of colonialism was reached (Mathews 2008). Also, democracy was spreading on the continent, with more than 30 multi-party elections taking place (ibid.). Maluwa summarizes these times by arguing that: “For many among the members of the OAU itself, the organisation had become moribund and irrelevant, in the face of the changed circumstances of the world” (Maluwa 2009: 55). In 1999, an extraordinary session of the OAU was held in Sirte, Libya, calling for the creation of an African Union to replace the OAU. The conference was initiated by Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader at that time. In 2001, again in Sirte, the Declaration of the African Union was announced. After a one-year transition period, the OAU was replaced by the new framework of the AU, established through the Constitutive Act, in July 2002.

**Theoretical Considerations**

The decade leading to the dissolution of the OAU and the creation of the AU experienced two major points in terms of integration: the foundation of the AEC and the recurrence of the Pan-African movement. As has been described above, the main goals of the AEC are the creation of a common African market without internal taxes or barriers to trade, a common external tariff and the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. The resemblance to the European model of a common market (established in 1986) cannot be overlooked. The driving force behind the creation of the AEC was the urge to decrease economic dependency of African states from third countries and to increase economic performance. The main actors during the process were nation states, whereas supranational organizations or transnational elites were not involved. With this in mind, it is even more surprising that the Treaty establishing the AEC contains provisions that shift power to the international level. Article 6 provides for the establishment of a single African Central Bank and the introduction of a common African currency. Also, the creation of an African Court of Justice is agreed on,
giving final judicial power in questions concerning Treaty provisions to an international institution. Article 18 even provides for the possibility of the Assembly to refer any dispute to the Court of Justice. This is in so far interesting as the Assembly itself relies on consensus decisions. If such a unanimity vote cannot be reached, however, a two-third majority is sufficient for legal action. Nevertheless, the wording of Article 18 is blurry at best. Naldi and Magliveras claim that the “capacity to annul municipal legislation would be a radical improvement. [But,] this provision is badly drafted and calls for speculation which may only be resolved with the adoption of the protocol relating to the court” (1999: 611). Such a protocol, and hence the Court of Justice, was not implemented until 2003, under the AU framework.

While the AEC can be seen as a major step in African integration, it can only be partially explained using neofunctionalist reasoning. The transition from (mostly failed) political integration towards one in economic terms is a form of spillover that has not been accounted for in the literature. Of course, the logic of reduced transaction costs leading to greater international cooperation is true for any form of spillover, but one could also argue that the difference between European and African integration is due to dissimilar starting conditions. While Europe needed economic growth first and political integration followed, Africa was striving for political independence first, with the economy appearing on the agenda in the 1980s. This would entail that it is not integration that leads to further cooperation, but simply changed interests by national leaders, hence contradicting neofunctionalist logic and supporting the liberal intergovernmentalist approach.

The idea of national leaders pushing integration forward becomes even more apparent when considering the processes that led to the Sirte declaration in 1999, which marked the dissolution of the OAU and the creation of the AU. As Biney describes, “the prime movers for the reform of the OAU into the AU were President Thabo Mbeki of South African and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria” (2008: 147), to which the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi must be added. At the end of the negotiations an agreement was reached to ratify a constitutive legal document that would establish the African Union with more political, economic and legal power than its predecessor. Naming the treaty the Constitutive Act already hints at another driving force behind its creation: the long shadow of Nkrumah and the Pan-Africanist movement (cf Biney 2008: 149 and Murithi 2005: 35). Maluwa concludes that “the project is, therefore, not one individual country’s sole initiative, or one particular leader’s obsession with personal aggrandizement” (2003: 161). Rather, it has its roots in the Pan-African idea that also led to the creation of the OAU (cf. ibid.).
e. Since 2002

Since its creation, the AU has been under criticism for merely being “a reincarnation of the OAU under another name”, and it has been doubted whether its structure was capable of facing the “twin-challenges of globalisation and the new regionalism” (Maluwa 2009: 57). The fact that its headquarters are situated in the facilities of the former OAU’s headquarter in Addis Ababa does not help to weaken this claim. Ayittey points at another factor that questions the initial will of African leaders to create a stronger union: The new AU would have had a debt of more than $50 million, stemming from missing payments by 45 out of the 53 members. “When [Gaddafi] settled their arrears, they overwhelmingly approved [Gaddafi’s] concept for the AU” (2010: 96).

In the Constitutive Act itself it is stated that the Organization of African Unity and its goals and principles are considered, just as the AEC is. But more importantly, the main objectives of the Act are, among others: the achievement of greater unity and solidarity; the defence of sovereignty of African states; the promotion of peace and security on the continent; and the promotion of human rights (Constitutive Act, Art. 3). It is interesting to note that the principles envisaged to achieve these goals include the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent (ibid, Art. 4). Although the Article concerning non-interference in internal matters of members to the AU has stayed in the Treaty (it stems from the OAU), another Article has been included that weakens this limitation. It grants “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (ibid., Article 4h). The institutions that have been created resemble the ones of the current EU to a great extent, and include the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (similar to the European Council); the Executive Council (similar to Council of Ministers); the Pan-African Parliament (similar to the European Parliament); the Court of Justice; the Commission of the AU; the Permanent Representation Committee (similar to COREPER); and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (similar to European Economic and Social Committee). Further important steps in African integration are the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) from 2001 and the creation of the Peace and Security Council in 2003, both of which operate under the African Union’s framework.

Theoretical Considerations

Two factors were important in the creation of the AU, namely the ideology of Pan-Africanism and strong national leaders seeking benefits through integration or even unification. The
influence of spillover effects is as questionable as the existence (and impact) of a transnational elite, as envisaged in both neofunctionalist and federalist idea. Two things that do fit into federalist arguments are the presence of a constitutional act shifting powers to the international level and the ideological background as a driving force behind integration. The question arises whether the organization that has been created is of a supranational or intergovernmental nature. At first sight, one tends to assign it to the latter, as the Constitutive Act states that the Assembly of Heads of States or Government “is the supreme organ of the Union” (Art. 6), taking decisions with a two-third majority. There are, however, aspects that make the AU more supranational than its predecessor, particularly its shift in principles away from non-interference towards non-indifference (cf. Mwanasali 2008), and the creation of a Pan-African Parliament (PAP) as well as an African Court of Justice (ACOJ). The treaty itself only establishes the PAP, leaving more detailed specifications as to its set-up and procedures to a specific Protocol. This Protocol came into force in 2004 and states that “the ultimate aim of the Pan-African Parliament shall be to evolve into an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected by universal adult suffrage” (Art. 2). Until now, however, the Parliament only has advisory and consultative powers and rests on members who are appointed by national parliaments or “[an]other deliberative organ” (Art. 5). This means that although having the potential of being a real international layer of legislation, directly elected by the people of the African continent, the PAP is still an institution standing at the side when important decisions are taken. Two things become apparent when analyzing the PAP's current and envisaged roles: (1) the Protocol provides for the shift of power away from the nation states, just as neofunctionalism and federalism assume, and (2) currently the PAP is nothing more than an intergovernmental institution depending on national interests, just as liberal intergovernmentalism expects.

The African Court of Justice tells a different story. The AEC Treaty envisaged an ACOJ that would have jurisdiction over the Treaty’s and the Organization’s provisions, as well as any other disputes between member states, as has been described in the previous section. Further, the actual Protocol Establishing an African Court of Justice, which was signed in 2003, gives the Court jurisdiction over “any dispute other than those referred to in this Article” (Art. 19). Following these clearly supranational characteristics, the member states decided to merge the African Court of Justice with the African Court of Human Rights in 2008, together with defining the competences of the newly established African Court of Justice and Human Rights. In the Protocol on the Merged Court, it is stated that the Court shall have jurisdiction over all aspects concerning the Constitutive Act and the African
Union’s decisions, but also over “any question of international law” (Art. 28). Even though determining that the laws which are applicable by the Court should be “international treaties, [...] ratified by the contesting States”, it includes the possibility of applying “any other law relevant to the determination of the case” (Art. 31). The supranational character of such an independent Court is striking.

The doctrine change concerning interventions by the AU also had an impact on the nature of African integration. Article 5 of the Constitutive Act gives the “right to the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”. Again, the important factor here is the two-third majority necessary in the Assembly, which makes it possible for a country to be intervened without the possibility to veto. This provision corresponds with the general objectives laid out in Article 4 of the African Union’s tasks to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent” as well as to “promote and protect human and people’s rights”. As any intervention in internal affairs of a state is unlawful according to the UN Charter as long as there are no threats to international peace and security, the application of this objective in the AU Charter will likely be “illegal under international law, no matter how legitimate it would be” (Møller 20010: 9). Again, a seemingly supranational feature is watered down by the role that nation states play in its use (through the Assembly) and its probable inapplicability due to international law.

f. **Summary of Main Findings**

In the following, a summary of the main findings and how they relate to the three hypotheses will be discussed.

*(F) Transnational elites with a common ideology concerning international cooperation are the main actors in the creation of ‘big bang’ integration, leading to single constitutional-like treaties.*

From the federalist perspective, focusing on ‘big bang’ integration, i.e. single events in the integration process, the African case offers two different interesting points. Firstly, the creation of the OAU was clearly based on the ideological Pan-African movement with a strong influence of a transnational elite group. Nevertheless, the actual outcome of international cooperation was highly intergovernmental and granted little competences to the established organization. The Constitutive Act creating the AU, however, came closer to what could be considered a constitution-like treaty, including the foundation of (possibly) supranational institutions. The second main assumption, the influence of a transnational elite
following a common ideology, however, has only partially been fulfilled. National actors, although deriving their arguments from Pan-Africanism, played the biggest role in this event.

Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected, because national actors played a strong role in the creation of the OAU, the AEC, and the AU. Although the influential Pan-African movement provided a first impetus for integration, both the main actors involved and the outcomes achieved were not predicted by federalism theory.

(NF) Integration will first occur in fields of ‘low’ politics and over a period of time widen and deepen, leading to ‘high’ political integration. Supranational institutions are the main driving force behind the transformation of integration in economic fields towards cooperation in security, defence, and foreign politics.

Neo-functionalist integration has almost completely been disproven in the African case. The OAU was aimed at supporting and promoting independence of African states and the African continent in general, without granting great attention to the economic field. Only later, namely with the AEC, did economic interests play a role in the integration process. The AU more or less combined both political (e.g. peace and security) issues with economic ones. Functional spillover effects could not be observed, nor did supranational institutions play any role in promoting integration. Geographical spillover, which has been shown with increasing membership to the OAU, was the only aspect of neofunctionalism that was visible. Hypothesis 2, hence, has to be rejected.

(LI) National leaders are the main actors in international cooperation, leading to either the creation of intergovernmental institutions or to no integration.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism can be used to explain most parts of African integration, as well as the failure of impacts by (mostly) the OAU. National interests were the main driving force behind cooperation, although the role of Pan-Africanism in important steps of the process should not be overlooked. Also the fact of first political, then economic, then again political integration can be attributed to the role of national leaders seeking gains through integration. First independence played the most important role, then did economic stability (and hence economic dependence), then peace and security on the continent. Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected when considering the processes of integration in Africa, showing that liberal intergovernmentalism might yield the most explanatory power.
6. Conclusion

This paper shows two things: European integration theories cannot be used as blueprints for explaining all regional integration, and African integration cannot be explained by a single theory. Of course, there are limitations to these two findings. Firstly, integration theories barely have the aspirations of explaining every aspect of international cooperation; and secondly, African integration cannot be explained by one of those theories tested in this paper. It remains remarkable, however, how little literature can be found combining these two topics: European integration theories and African integration realities.

This paper began by providing an overview of the existing literature in this field. It has been shown that research done on the topic has mainly remained descriptive or failed to take into account the theories that are used here. After a thorough analysis of the three theories in chapter 3, hypotheses could be formulated, representing each theory’s predictions about integration. Testing these hypotheses, however, showed that none of the approaches could be used to fully explain integration in Africa. It is argued that only a combination of federalism and liberal intergovernmentalism can provide explanations for (most) of Africa’s cooperation successes and failures. Neofunctionalist assumptions add little to this combination, as its main claim of spillover effects promoting integration could hardly be found in the African case.

In order to use the findings of this paper, it is important to focus further research on two aspects: the number of theories tested and the number of cases these theories are applied to. Generally, European integration theories are still heavily debated because of missing applications, or because reviews undertaken after such applicability tests have not produced good empirical results in other tests. Both neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have proponents, who claim their respective general validity, naming them ‘grand’ theories. These claims were not proven in this paper, calling for a reformulation of the theories and for further testing.

When looking at the case of African integration, there are two things that can be derived from the analysis above: Firstly, the role of the transnational Pan-African movement should not be underestimated, and could become crucial for future integration. Secondly, national leaders remain to be the strongest actors in the integration process, but their influence could be weakened considering the increasing independence of supranational institutions (like the African Court of Justice or the Pan-African Parliament). European integration theories are not yet capable of predicting what will happen next in the African integration reality.
7. Bibliography


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**Legal Texts**


