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CHAPTER EIGHT

A Comparative and Anthropological Overview
The previous chapters showed that the region under study had long been an area of human occupation and where communities became organized into socio-political units. These units were small at first, but developed into one of the earliest complex social systems. The neolithic village communities are among the earliest known complex social systems and socio-political groupings.¹ From then on social classes began to crystallise; specialization had now appeared and consequently the first kinds of hierarchy followed. The forms of organization in these village communities were based on family and kin relationships and must have been similar to the small-scale communities found in Polynesia. There the leaders of communities consisting of a few hundred individuals exercised modest forms of leadership with only a few tasks.² Significantly, family and kin relationships and their involvement in the various functions of production, distribution and legal arrangements were a characteristic of the organization of local communities and remained in one way or another in later states.³

Economic growth and the accumulation of surplus production, a result of technological developments and population growth, led to an expansion of these units in size and complexity.⁴ Indicators of a complex socio-political organization, as listed by Schwartz, are the appearance of urban-sized settlements, monumental architecture, and

² Claessen, H. J. M., Was the State Inevitable?, in The Early State, its Alternatives and Analogues, eds. L. E. Grinin, R. L. Carneiro, D. M. Bondarenko and A. V. Korotayev, Volgograd, 2004, p. 76-7. Needless to say, the socio-political organization of Polynesia is diverse; there are small-scale local societies, large, well-organized chiefdoms and early states; cf. Claessen, op. cit., p. 76. The comparison here is made with the small-scale communities.
⁴ According to anthropologists, the ‘evolution’ of communities to statehood developed from ‘bands,’ to ‘tribes,’ to ‘chiefdoms’ and ultimately to the ‘state,’ cf. Yoffee, op. cit., p. 18f. But Yoffee himself and other anthropologists and archaeologists disagree with this model, considering it to have fallen out of use and “an illusion of history,” cf. Yoffee, op. cit., p. 231. They propose instead that social evolution did not inevitably pass through a sequence of stages from simple to complex, pre-state to state, but rather that they were more diverse; cf. Bolger, D. and L. C. Maguire, “Introduction: The Development of Pre-State Communities in the Ancient Near East,” in Development of Pre-State Communities in the Ancient Near East, ed. D. Bolger and L. C. Maguire, Oxford, 2010, p. 1 and 2.

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new administrative tools such as cylinder seals and writing. Expanding socio-political units led to the emergence of a new type of political organization, the chiefdom, in which the indicators just mentioned feature. According to some, not only these developments but also competing strategies of different social groups created an opportunity for chiefly lines to be promoted. In this new type of organization local communities are integrated within a single polity, presided over by a paramount chief and an accompanying ruling aristocracy. A chiefdom is known to have a more transparent hierarchy, with simple and acceptable principles of heredity or election for recruitment to offices. It also maintains its characteristics of centralization, hereditary ranking, and differential control of productive resources.

By applying the criteria presented for chiefdoms we consider the socio-political organization of the chalcolithic communities of Ninevite V make them chiefdoms. In his study of these communities in Northern Mesopotamia Schwartz showed how these polities organized themselves into a complex series of rival chiefdoms. Their elites derived their authority and power through the control of local surpluses produced by dry-farming agriculture. The archaeological data Schwartz examined date to the Ninevite V culture from Northern Syria and Northern Mesopotamia. He found that most of the data indicates “social systems of decidedly limited socio-political complexity,” and that the urban centres of this culture were relatively small and usually unfortified. Food surpluses came only from the lands in the immediate vicinities of the large centres and not from the smaller centres. Graves and their contents show a social differentiation, but one that is distinct from that of Southern Mesopotamia. A similar simplicity can be seen in the architecture: no monumental buildings such as palaces or temples are found. Only towards the end of Ninevite V does the situation change into a state organization. Then food surpluses were extracted also from the smaller centres, contrasts in social stratification increased, and monumental buildings appeared.

6 Wright, H. T., Prestate Political Formations, in Chiefdoms and Early States in the Near East, p. 81; cf. also the editor’s introduction on p. 67. Note also Schwartz’s statement that our knowledge about the Southern Mesopotamian activities of the Uruk period and the local socio-political development is still too fragmentary to allow a persuasive evaluation of the transition from Late Uruk complex societies to third millennium chiefdoms: Schwartz, op. cit., p. 164.
8 Chabal, P., G. Feinman and P. Skalník, Beyond States and Empires: Chiefdoms and Informal Polities, in The Early State, its Alternatives and Analogues, p. 58.
9 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 155.
10 Although some of the elements mentioned as criteria are also found in the preceding Ubaid and even Halaf communities, as seen in Tepe Gawra and Arpachiya for instance (see Chapter One), the lack of one or more elements, especially the urban-sized communities, prevents these communities from being counted among the complex societies.
12 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 156.
It is interesting here, however, to call attention to the significant finds of Tepe Gawra, where monumental buildings, represented by a series of temples, were uncovered. A clear social stratification is indicated by different types of tombs, some of which were even monumental, and different types of private houses, some of which look like palaces. One should also add the municipal services that point to a central authority. These are almost exactly the features of spatial organization by which Wright identifies not only a chiefdom but also a complex chiefdom society. He groups these features into three categories, A) Settlement hierarchy; B) Residential segregation and C) Mortuary segregation. While only further archaeological investigations and excavations can prove the fact that Tepe Gawra was the largest and architecturally more elaborate of the surrounding chiefly seats, the residential houses show a clear segregation, in which high-ranking domestic units of noble elites (for instance the large round house of level XI) are easily distinguishable from other low-ranking domestic houses. The mortuary segregations in Tepe Gawra constitute the clearest examples, with three types of burial (see Chapter One). Furthermore, there are architectural sectors specifically for administration or military purposes, for grain storage, for crafts, for religious usage and for residence.

An even more important point is that these cultural remains are older than those discussed by Schwartz, coming from the Uruk period, not Ninevite V. This may imply that the region of Tepe Gawra was organized in a complex socio-political polity centuries before the Habur region. Such differences in the developmental level and social complexity in different places and in different periods is observable also in other regions. Archaeologists and anthropologists widely acknowledge now that “social change among early societies such as those of the ancient Near East is likely to have been recursive and disruptive rather than unilinear.” There are others, however, who chose ‘multilinear’ models of social change to interpret the variable paths to complexity shown by the archaeological record.

The greatest part of the region under study was covered by the Halaf, Ubaid and Uruk cultures (see Chapter One). Ninevite V was no less widespread, since its pottery is found in regions from Urmia in the east to the Habur sites in the west, through Eski Mosul and Sinjār, and in the Hamrin Basin in the south through the Rāniya and Shahrazūr Plains (see Chapter One). This implies that the whole region under study was organized along those periods in simple or complex chiefdoms. In view of the archaeological data mentioned above, and by applying the theoretical criteria discussed, we can safely say that the societies which produced these cultures were stratified and were ruled by chiefly lines that collected and redistributed the local agricultural surpluses.

The conclusion reached by Schwartz, that the societies of Syria and Northern Mesopotamia were not organized into states until at least the very end of the Ninevite V period, is based on the absence of several pertinent elements and institutions. Among these were the absence of evidence of monumental architecture (palaces and temples),

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16 For details, cf. Chapter One.
17 Wright, Prestate Political Formations, in Chiefdoms and Early States in the Near East, p. 68.
19 Bolger and Maguire, ibid. with bibliographical references.
writing, urbanization before the middle of the third millennium BC, and the relatively small scale of social stratification and settlement pattern hierarchies.21

The situation changed sometime later. From after the middle of the third millennium these chiefdoms were transformed into urban states. The agricultural intensification, controlled by the elites, probably played a prominent role in this transformation, as Schwartz suggests. As proof for this intensification he points out specialized grain storage emplacements found in many sites of this period.22 Thanks to the abundant archaeological data from the latter part of Ninevite V, the transformation from chiefdoms to city-states in Northern Mesopotamia is better documented, in contrast to the poor documentation for the transformation to chiefdoms. By the middle of the third millennium, or slightly earlier,23 the dry-farming areas of Northern Mesopotamia were covered by large, walled, occupied cities24 and the existing urban centres witnessed great expansion. A city like Leylān, for example, expanded from 15 hectares to 90 hectares, and it was surrounded by a city-wall in around 2500 BC.25 Similar walled cities appeared in this period in the plains of Sinjār and the Habur, and at Mozan, Hamoukar, Khoshi, Hadhail, Taya, and probably Nineveh.26

Harvey Weiss advances the hypothesis that the development of organizational technology to overcome transport difficulties allowed for the mobilization of agricultural surpluses to support endogenous urban and state systems.27 The urban expansion in the region took place almost two centuries before the Akkadian dynasty, even before that in the Ebla region.28 Therefore, Weiss uses this data from Tell Leylān to “disprove one of Childe’s hypotheses concerning the military imposition of urbanism in Northern Mesopotamia, as well as Wheatley’s explanation of northern urbanism as ‘primary diffusion associated with the extension of empire’.”29

Although many different definitions for ‘state’ have been presented,30 most of them represent the background from which, or for which, the definition is made. Economists have an economic definition, which is different from that of sociologists, and so on. However, for our topic, we can simply define a state as “a certain form of organization that exercises power within a determined region, the territory. It is the manner according to which the society has organized its administration.”31 To further explain this simple abbreviated definition one should add that this form of organization is an independent

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21 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 159-62. He excludes Mari from this conclusion.
25 Weiss, op. cit., p. 83.
26 Ibid.
28 Weiss, op. cit., p. 87.
30 For a comprehensive overview of the definitions of the ‘state’ and the different views that see the state as a positive achievement or as wrong and despicable, cf. Claessen, H. J. M., Verdwenen Koninkrijken en Verloren Beschavingen, Assen/Maastricht, 1991, p. 9-18.
31 Claessen, Verdwenen ..., p. 19; cf. also Claessen, Was the State Inevitable?, p. 73.
socio-political one that exercises authority over a bounded territory from a centre of government. The exercise of authority needs legitimacy to be imposed by power. \(^{32}\) Legitimacy is a concept Max Weber introduced into the social sciences. \(^{33}\) Such a state must have an economy, be it agricultural or, in some cases, pastoral or mixed. Trade and a market system with taxes form a supplementary source of income beside the main source (agriculture or pastoralism). The society is stratified into at least two classes, with the ruler at its head, followed on the hierarchical ladder by his retinue, officials, administrators, generals, possibly governors, priests and craftsmen down to the lowest strata, the peasants, servants, and tenants. Sometimes a clear distinction between the rulers and the ruled can be made, but more often the transitions and boundaries between the various strata are flexible, dynamic and determined by context. \(^{34}\) Thus, several requirements have to be fulfilled to establish a(n early) state, what Claessen calls the ‘necessary conditions:’

- There must be a sufficient number of people to form a complex stratified society.
- The society must control a specified territory.
- There must be a system of production yielding a surplus to maintain the specialists and the privileged categories.
- There must exist an ideology, which explains and justifies a hierarchical administrative organization and socio-political inequality.\(^{35}\)

Only with a sufficient number of people can one have a complex stratified society of at least two classes: rulers and ruled. A specified territory in which a state comes into existence may not necessarily be sufficient for the maintenance of the population, so states with small territories may live from trade or conquest. \(^{36}\) A system of production that yields a surplus is necessary to feed the rulers and the other specialists, such as officials, soldiers (for a standing army), merchants, priests, scribes and craftsmen and the like. In fact, in this system a rich and powerful minority rules a poor and powerless majority.

The importance of ideology in (early) states, lies in the fact that there must exist an ideology “that makes it possible for the less fortunate to understand and to accept their modest position.”\(^{37}\) But this matter is more complicated; “a readily adaptable ideological background, be it religious, juridical or related to kinship, is a necessary condition for the emergence of the state.”\(^{38}\) Its role lies in the fact that ideology induces the moods and motivations which induce people to construct states and to give precedence to the central values of their ideological systems over their own interests. Their own interests are subjected to the interests of the state, “and people tend to accept that situation and even to approve of it. People do make sacrifices for the sake of ideological values and they may

\(^{35}\) Claessen, Was the State Inevitable?, p 77-9; Claessen and Oosten, *Ideology and …*, p. 5.
\(^{36}\) Claessen and Oosten, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
\(^{37}\) Claessen, Was the State Inevitable?, p 79.

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even sacrifice their own life in war if necessary.” Ideology was of crucial importance not only in the formation but also in the fall of early states. Since ancient times people have believed that some individuals had better relationships with the gods, spirits or deceased ancestors than others had. Thanks to this, these individuals were placed in higher positions to function as intermediaries between the people and the gods or whatever supernatural forces were responsible for fertility, prosperity and protection. A reciprocal relation emerged between these individuals, who became the rulers, and the people. The people offered goods and paid tax and the rulers guaranteed prosperity, fertility and protection through their contacts. This ideologically based position that legitimized the rulers makes them the pivot of the early state. The religious functionaries, for their part, usually supported the state ideology.

It is important to note that the existence of these elements alone would not necessarily lead to a complex socio-political organization and consequently state formation. These elements should reinforce each other. “When the strength of the factors varied greatly there is every reason to believe that some other type of socio-political organization would emerge – a big-man structure, a heterarchy. If, as often happened, the factors contradicted or hampered each other, stagnation (negative feedback) ensued, and an early state would not emerge.”

Although the ‘necessary conditions’ mentioned above are the elements without which the formation of a state would be impossible, there remains yet another factor to complete the process. Claessen describes this as “the cause that triggers the developments,” that may be considered as the fifth of the four necessary conditions mentioned above. Such a cause varies from case to case; it could be an impending danger, a need to develop irrigation or to protect trade routes that demand a strong leadership, a shortage of food and goods, or the introduction of new ideas and beliefs. Since the factors vary, the duration of the process varies as well. There are cases, such as the Betsileo State, where the formation of an early state was accomplished within 50 years. In other cases, such as the African Mbundu, where all the necessary conditions were fulfilled but a state never emerged. Complex stateless societies are not exceptional; there are societies that culturally and socially are not inferior to early state societies with respect to their territory, population, socio-cultural and/or political complexity. Such complex stateless societies, which are larger than simple chiefdoms and are in some cases at the same level of socio-political development as the early state societies, are called by some Early State Analogues.

39 Claessen and Oosten, op. cit., p. 15.
40 Claessen and Oosten, op. cit., p. 2 (with bibliography).
42 Claessen, “Was the State Inevitable?,” p. 81.
43 Claessen, op. cit., p. 80.
44 For examples, cf. Claessen, op. cit., p. 81.
45 Claessen, op. cit., p. 82, also for more details about Betsileo and Mbundu.
47 Grinin, ibid. A complex society is a society that has “institutionalised subsystems that perform diverse functions for their individual members and are organized as relatively specific and semiautonomous entities,” Yoffee, Myths of the Archaic State, p. 16 (referring to Shils, E., Center and Periphery, Chicago, 1975; Eisenstadt, S., “Social Change, Differentiation, and Evolution,” American Sociological Review, 29 (1964)). The complexity of a society is measured by its size, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the
According to the discussion above, the socio-political organizations that emerged in the Habur region towards the end of the Ninevite V period were early states: a large stratified population, territory, a productive economy and an ideology that must have been strictly bound with religion. A similar, though not identical, situation seems to have prevailed in the other parts of the region, the Transtigris and Zagros Mountains. The differences may be in the subsistence resulting from contrasting landscape and climate, but the economy of both regions was a combination of agriculture, animal husbandry and pastoralism (the latter by the non-sedentary groups). The early states of the Zagros region were distributed, as in the Habur, on the dry-farming zone of the Zagros piedmonts or on the plains between the mountain ranges. Examples are the kingdoms of Simurrum, Gutium, Lullubum, Turukkum (in the plains of the Urmia Basin) and probably Kakmum (if it was located in the Qala Dizeh Plain). There was a magician in Ḫamazi, who was so prized that he entered the service of the king of Aratta after his home city was devastated. This may indicate a stratified society in Ḫamazi as early as the Early Dynastic Period, in which assumed specialists such as this magician came to the fore. There are numerous allusions to kings, princes and sometimes to generals in the Mesopotamian texts in relation to the region under study, whose names are mentioned in the previous chapters. These different titles stem from the categorized nature of the political organization. Perhaps the Mesopotamian terminology used to describe the rulers of this region mean they were fulfilling the minimum Mesopotamian criteria for a king or a prince. It could be that it was those rulers who could not fulfil these criteria that were generally called “The man of … GN” (Sumerian LÚ … GN). A clear example of such a distinction in a Mesopotamian text is in “The Great Revolt against Narām-Sīn,” where a list of rebels includes the appellatives “King of …” as well as “Man of …”.

The allusions to “kings of Šubartum,” and “the (numerous) kings of Lullu” (Shemshāra letters) or “princes of Lullu” (inscriptions of Aššurnasirpal), the “kings of Šimaški” (inscription of Kutik-Inšušināk), indicate multi-leader socio-political organizations. These were political entities known to outsiders as one entity and under one comprehensive name, but ruled by multiple rulers, which can be understood as federal political organizations, perhaps based on tribal kinships. Similar federal organizations appeared in Elam as well. The case of Elam is discussed by Stolper, who thinks that after, and as a result of, the Ur III imperialistic policies political changes took place.

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48 As recorded in the text of Enmerkar and Ensukhešdana, cf. Chapter Two.
49 Michalowski is of the opinion that the term lú GN was primarily applied to governors of foreign lands in the Ur III period (Puzriš-Dagan archives): Michalowski, “Aššur During the Ur III Period,” Here and There Across the Ancient Near East, Studies in Honour of Krystyna Łyczkowska, p. 152. But this is not compatible with the text of the Great Rebellion against Narām-Sīn (see below).
50 For this text cf. Westenholz, Legends of Kings of Akkade, p. 248-52, cf. also Chapter Two, p. 88.
51 Cf. Chapter Six.
52 For bibliographical references see the previous chapters, especially Chapter Two.
place in Elam. Such policies led to the coalescence of alliances among highland states into larger political units, increasing and consolidating the existing regional and dynastic ties among the constituent widespread lands of later Elam. This resulted eventually in a confederate multicentric state with ranked members of a ruling family controlling individual regional centres.\(^{53}\) J. Eidem is of the opinion that the Turukkanean federation is a similar case, involving the same southern forces, but probably in more rudimentary forms.\(^{54}\)

This kind of organization does not seem to be that kind of socio-political organization known by early-state anthropologists as heterarchy. That word applies when the strength of the state formation factors discussed above varies greatly, instead of reinforcing each other, and as a result they produce complex stateless societies in which power and leadership is divided over several groups of persons.\(^{55}\) Federations in the region under study were usually formed to confront threats, mostly external threats. The best example to be drawn here might be the Median federation formed in the NA period to confront the subsequent Assyrian campaigns. In their case, the Medes had only two choices: either “existence under the banner of unity” or “possible disappearance under a foreign yoke.”\(^{56}\) They chose the second option, formed a federation of widespread tribes and small political entities, which later became the Median kingdom, and still later an empire. In a similar way we see that the Turukkanean political entities were united in a federation, probably since the Ur III campaigns, as Eidem proposes, but that federation was still needed in the time of the Shemshāra archives, to confront the Gutian aggression. The Lullubian federation too is attested in the period that follows the Ur III period. We assume that the Lullubians were organized in a federation because when Kuwari was instructed to make peace with them and accept their terms for peace, the texts treat them as one political body. Aššurnasirpal II says nothing about federation during his third campaign on Zamua (eponymy of Miqti-adur), when he fought the Lullubian kings Ameka and Araštua. Perhaps his scribes were not interested in mentioning it, or probably the Assyrian campaign was a surprise that left no time for such an organization to come into existence. But it was surely expected after they had withheld the tribute and the corvée due to Assyria. The inscription says:

> On the first day of the month Sivan I mustered (my army) for a third time against the land Zamua. Without waiting for the advance of (my) numerous chariotry and troops I moved on from the city Kalzi, crossed the Lower Zab, (and) entered the passes of Mount Babitu.\(^{57}\)

By contrast the Lullubians were organized in an alliance in the previous campaign (eponymy of Aššur-iddin), as mentioned explicitly in the annals:


\(^{55}\) Cf. Claessen, “Was the State Inevitable?,” p. 72 and 81.


\(^{57}\) col. iii 30) \(\text{ina ITL.SIGa UD 1.KAM 3-te-šu a-na 31) KUR Za-mu-a-a āš-ku-na di-ku-tu pa-an Giš.Giš.Giš.MEŠ ma-a-32) ū ERIN.HI.A.MEŠ a la-a ad-gul TA URU Kāl-zi at-tu-muš 33) ID Za-ba KL.TA e-te-bir ina nē-reb ša KUR ba-bi-te 34) e-tar-ba, Grayson, *RIMA* 2, p. 246 (text A.0.101.17).
Nūr-Adad, the sheikh of the land Dagara, had rebelled; (the inhabitants of) the entire land Zamua had banded together; they had built a wall in the pass of the city Babitu.58

As to the OAkk. period, we have unfortunately not enough data to judge whether there was a Lullubian federation in the Akkadian period to confront the Akkadian aggression, especially in the time of Narām-Sīn. But one expects such an organization to have existed, similar to the one this king faced in Subartu. The latter incident is recorded in the Basitki inscription, where the defeat of nine kings of the cedar-tree region in Subartu is reported.59

The situation in Šubartum was, in the same way, similar to the rest of the region. It was ruled by numerous kings and rulers with one probable exception. Since the term Š/Subartu was at certain times used to designate a widespread geographical region, regardless of the ethnic and cultural differences, it may have comprised more than one ethnic group. For instance, the “kings of Šubartum” mentioned in some Mari letters designate a group of rulers from the region of the Upper Jazirah and the mountainous territory to the north and northeast of the Habur (Tūr-2-Abdîn).60 That territory does not seem to have been wholly Hurrianized by this time. Rather one expects other ethnic groups still to be living there, such as Subarians. In the MA and NA periods, the Assyrian royal inscriptions mention the “lands of Nairi,” and their numerous kings.61 Tukulti-Ninurta I mentions in some of his inscriptions the defeat of forty kings of Nairi lands:

Forty kings of the lands of Nairi fiercely took up a position for armed conflict.62

He brought them in fetters into the presence of the god Assur:

I did battle with forty kings of the lands Nairi (and) brought about the defeat of their army. (Thus) I became lord of all their lands. I fastened bronze clasps to the necks of those kings of the lands Nairi (and) brought them to Ekur, the great mountain, the temple of my support, into the presence of the god Aššur, my lord.63

There were also occasions when these federations installed a king or a king of kings, probably to perform special tasks that necessitated a strong centralized and firm

59 However, note that Frayne reads 18) šu-ut i-RÍN₃-nim” as šu-ut i-ši₁₁<ù>-nim, “(the kings whom they (the rebels[?]) had raised (against him),” cf. Frayne, RIME 2, p. 113 (text E2.1.4.10).
60 Cf. for instance Guichard, “Le Šubartum occidental à l’avènement de Zimri-Lim,” FM VI, p. 120.
62 38) 40-a MAN.ME₅₃ KUR.KUR Na-i₃-ri a-na MURUB₄ ū MÊ 40) dáp-ni-i₃₃ iz-zi-zu-ù-ni, Grayson, RIMA 1, p. 244 (text A.0.78.5); the same is said in other texts, such as no. 6, 18 and 20, cf. op. cit., p. 247 (text A.0.78.6); 266 (text A.0.78.18); 268 (text A.0.78.20) and others.
63 46) i₃-i₃₅ 40-a MAN.ME₅₃ KUR.KUR Na-i₃-ri 47) i₃₃-na-qe₃-reb ta-ha-zì lu am-da-ha-as 48) a-bi-ik-tu um-ma-na-te-šu-nu a₃₃-ku-un₃₃ 49) kül-la-at KUR.KUR-šu-nu a-bél MAN.ME₅₃ KUR.KUR Na-i₃-ri 50) šá-tu-nu i₃₃-na be-re-et ZABAR GÚ.ME₅₃-šu-nu 51) ar-pi-i₃₃ a-na È-kur KUR-i GAL-i 52) È tu-kül-ti-ia a-na ma-har Aš₃₃-šur 53) EN-ia lu-bi-la-šu-nu-ti, Grayson, op. cit., p. 272 (text A.0.78.23).
leadership. The leadership of Pišendēn of Itabalūnum is a clear example (see Chapter Six). There is also the Subarian Zinnum, who attacked Ešnunna in the last years of Ibbi-Sîn’s reign (Chapter Five). He appears to have been the king who led a cluster of Subarian kingdoms or princedoms, since the text mentions only Zinnum as king, without other Subarian rulers. The allusion to Immaškuš, the Lullubian king of kings mentioned in the Hittite text, is also a good example, assuming the narrative is historically reliable. In the MA period too the Hurrian kingdoms of Northern Mesopotamia in Nairi and Šubartu allied together under the command of Ehli-Teššup, the king of Alzi to confront Tukulti-Ninurta I:

All the land of the Šubaru, the entirety of Mount Kašiyari as far as the land Alzu, which previously, during the reign of Salmaneser (I), king of the universe, my father, had rebelled and withheld tribute, had united itself under one command. I prayed to the god Aššur and the great gods, my lords, (and) marched up to Mount Kašiyari. (As) with a bridle I controlled the land of the Šubaru, the land Alzu, and their allied kings. I conquered the great cult centre of the land Purulimzu. I burnt them (the inhabitants) alive (and) the remnants of [their] army I took as captives. I conquered four strong capitals of Ehli-Teššup, king of the land Alzu, (and) six rebellious cities of the land Amadanu.64

These instances are reminiscent of the Roman office of dictator, when leaders were temporarily endowed with an extraordinary magistracy to deal with military (and later domestic) crises.65

Why did the prevailing socio-political pattern in the mountainous regions consist of numerous small entities, even within the same territory and the same ethnicity, while the model presented by kingdoms like Simurrum or Gutium does not suggest such a pattern? The numerous small entities pattern covered the whole region from Subartum and Nairi down to Šimaški, but was restricted to the mountainous territories of the Taurus and Zagros,66 except for Lullubum. The core area of the latter was the Plain of Shahrazūr, but we should not forget that their land had extensions into the mountainous territories to the east (to the regions of modern Mariwān67 in Iran and perhaps further) and to the north and northwest, where Aššurnasirpal fought Lullubian kingdoms in mountainous lands.68
The water sources in this region are basically springs, which can support limited communities and limited irrigated cultivation, as happens nowadays. The springs themselves are quite numerous but small in size and the quantity of water they supply is limited. The agricultural lands as well are restricted to the foothills and narrow strips of plain lands between the mountain ranges. Elsewhere there are either bushes (that need much labour to make the land suitable for cultivation) or it is rocky terrain that cannot be cultivated. These two factors, especially water resources, have imposed a pattern of settlements that is marked by small sized, scattered and isolated units with self-sufficient communities. Furthermore, the rugged landscape, intersected by endless mountain chains and water courses, has increased the isolation and independence of these communities. The positive side of this pattern is that it guarantees the survival of the population thanks to four factors: a) self-sufficiency: agriculture and animal husbandry of a small settlement and the natural wild products of its surroundings can produce and provide almost everything it needs to feed its population, a characteristic of the Kurdish villages even now; b) the natural defence the mountainous territory offers: for comparison, the demolition of the city walls of Southern Mesopotamia by Sargon of Agade, to prevent them from revolt again by depriving them of their defences, was impossible in these regions; c) casualties caused by natural disasters remain limited in number and range because the population lives in small groups and is scattered over a wide area, in contrast to a similar disaster in a large urban centre; d) in the same way, an attacking enemy can kill or capture only a limited number of the population; in addition scattered groups can warn other neighbouring settlements to flee before the arrival of enemy troops. The modern village communities of the region are tied with each other in a web of social relations and family relations, which seems a good parallel to the situation in antiquity. If this is correct, the ancient villagers would have been more eager and serious about warning each other in times of impending danger.

Nonetheless, this has also negative sides. Such a pattern cannot build a powerful united kingdom based on centralized administration. The self-sufficiency and independent life-style weakens centralization trends and undermines any attempt at unification. The difficulty of communications and interruptions because of the ruggedness of landscape and severity of climate, be it winter snow or spring-time fast-flowing currents, hinder the emergence of any effective central administration on the one hand, and ease the dismemberment of a state on the other, should one or more elements decide to separate. Another negative side is that small scattered communities do not have the same chances as large communities have to grow into more complex institutionalised societies comparable to those known in the large urban centres. Here, less complex societies with less specialization appear. The result of these negative sides is a politically passive socio-political pattern that is not taking part in the power games

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69 In the mountainous regions small fields of vegetables are irrigated by spring waters gathered in cisterns specially built for that purpose. These fields, which have to be below the level of the spring and the cistern, are called *barāw*, “below-water.” They are much more expensive than dry-farming fields because they are limited.


71 Both cases are attested in, for instance, the Shemshāra letters. The first by the retainer Kušiya of Šamšī-Adad, who could not reach his lord when the routes from Šušarrā to Šubat-Enlil were snowbound. The second by Išme-Dagan, who could not pursue the Turukkeans further because the river flooded. For the texts and translations, cf. Chapters Six (1 = SH 809) and Seven (*ARM* 4, 23).
the communities of the plains play, unless there is a catastrophe that pushes them towards the plains, such as famine, drought, earthquake or an outbreak of an epidemic. In some cases, these regions were a strategic extension of plain polities. The relationship of Urkeš with the north is one of these. The material culture of Urkeš shows a culture whose cradle was in the old rural Hurrian communities of the northern highlands, in northern and eastern Anatolia. This is likely evidence that the Hurrians of Urkeš came from these highlands and have kept their ties with their kinsmen there. It seems that the Turukkeans had similar ties later in the OB period with the eastern and northeastern mountains. When the Gutians attacked them from the rear, while the Turukkean troops were on duty in Qaṭṭara, they were compelled to withdraw. In a letter to Ḥaqba-ahum, they wondered whether they should leave the lands they currently held and go to the mountains. The idea of going to the mountains to live when their current holdings were lost can very probably be a reflection of the association the Turukkeans felt with their ‘original homeland’ in the Zagros Mountains. In the letter they said:

The Gutians threaten us, yes; we are ourselves for sure in a position of weakness now. Facing the Gutians, are we going to abandon our homes? The Gutians arrive now indeed. Shall we be driven out of everywhere we currently hold? Shall we reach the mountains? Shall we look for a soil to live on? And you, that is it?

The absence of allusions to the pattern of small scattered polities in relation to Simurrum and Gutium can be taken as a sign of their being what can be called one-unit states. This is quite possible in fact inasmuch as their lands were not mountainous; rather, they were located in the plains of modern Garmiyān. Although still largely a dry-farming zone, Simurrum was a state centred on a central city located at the junction of a river with its tributary (see Chapter Five). The plain landscape and the rivers were ideal for effective communications needed for the administration of a state and, as H. Weiss stated, important for the nucleation of population and settlements. The same must be valid for other states we know little about, such as Karḫar and probably Ḥ럼ûrûm, assuming the latter was an independent polity. As to Gutium, the case is somewhat complicated. The Gutians lived in a region to the north of Simurrum up to the Lower Zāb, probably including Arrapḫa and Gasur, but they seem also to have had extensions in relatively large parts of modern Iran, as far as Luristan to the south of Kirmeshān (see Chapter Two). This extension to Iran is assumed from OB period evidence, from incursions made into the Turukkean core land, presumably into the Urmia Basin (Chapter Six), and also from the Gutian Queen Nawarītum, who fought the Elamites and once led an army of 10,000 troops towards Larsa (see Chapters Two and Seven). Unfortunately no Gutian cities are known to us except for an allusion in the MA royal inscriptions to “cities” in the land of Uquma/enu, a Gutian kingdom in that period (see Chapter Three).

73 For the transliteration and bibliographical reference, cf. Chapter Seven.
74 The use of the river in Simurrum for communication is pointed to in the Sumerian proverb “Between the basket and the boat (are) the fields of Simurrum,” cf. the discussion on this in Chapter Five.
This absence is more probably a reference to the non-sedentary life-style of the Gutians, as the modern Jâf tribes were until a century ago. Although there is no explicit textual reference to plurality of kings among the Gutians, we have already suggested in Chapter Three that there was a great Gutian king who was king of a number of minor kings or tribal chiefs. This kind of hierarchy was, we think, not due to a direct geographical factor in this case, but more probably was due to the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the Gutians. Yet the absence of any mention of plurality may indicate that the geographical conditions in their land had helped this great king to strengthen his administration and consolidate his authority to a degree that he overshadowed the junior kings under him; hence they were not mentioned. That a nomadic people formed a powerful state that was able to conquer other countries should not surprise us, for there are numerous other examples in history, as Kradin states: “nomads have many times united into political formations and created great empires which have after time disintegrated.”

The situation is reversed in the Gutian kingdom of Uqumanu. Tukulti-Ninurta I campaigned against this kingdom in his first regnal year. Since the territory of this kingdom was mountainous, as the text clearly states, it has left its effect on the socio-political organization. The text speaks here of a federation of numerous princes led by the king Abulê. The geographical conditions seem to have changed even the lifestyle of the Gutians, as Kradin states: “nomads have many times united into political formations and created great empires which have after time disintegrated.”

At the beginning of my sovereignty I marched to the land of the Uq[umenu]. The entire land of the Qutu [I made (look) like] ruin hills (created by) the deluge (and) I surrounded their army with a circle of sandstorms. At that time they banded together against my army in rugged (and) very mountainous terrain. They fiercely took up position for armed conflict. Trusting in Aššur and the great gods, my lords, I struck (and) brought about their defeat. I filled the caves and ravines of the mountains with their corpses. I made heaps of their corpses [like grain piles] beside their gates. Their cities I destroyed, ravaged, (and) turned into hills. … (Thus) I became lord of the extensive land of the Qutu. With joy and excellence I stood over them. The hordes of princes of Abulê, king of the land of Uqumanu, I captured (and) brought them bound to my city, Aššur. I made them swear by the great gods of heaven (and) underworld…

The land of the distant Qutu, the paths to which are extremely difficult and the terrain of which [is unsuitable] for the movement of my army …

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76 There is also the possibility, although faint, that this absence was due only to the negligence of the ancient scribes.

77 Also for a comparison with these tribes in terms of the title of the tribal heads, cf. Chapter Three.

78 Kradin, N. N., Nomadic Empires in Evolutionary Perspective, in The Early State, its Alternatives and Analogues, p. 502.
That the Gutian territory at this time extended to mountainous regions in the north is indicated by the inscription of Šalmaneser I, who claims to have destroyed their land from the border of Uruatu (= later Urartu) to Kutmuḫu (see Chapter Two).

Eidem and Læssøe noted that Kuwari did not receive orders from his overlord, King Pišendēn, as was the case with the subjects of Šamšī-Adad and Zimri-Lim for instance. Instead he received requests, imprecations and words of advice.\textsuperscript{80} Now that we have discussed the socio-political situation in the Zagros Mountains, we can understand this contrast. In a region where political unity and social integrity were fragile, a flexible and soft policy was the ideal means to maintain alliances and cordial relations between groups. This certainly contributed to the formation of the socio-political mentality in this region, as is reflected in the diplomatic language used in the Shemshāra letters of the Pre-Assyrian domination phase. There one notes, for instance, the parity relationship not only in the traditional addressing of each other as “brother,” but also in the sequence of persons. The sender always mentions the addressee before himself. Moreover, the word brother, symbolizing parity and equality, had a special position in these letters and in the Hurrian society in general, for so many Hurrian PNs have the component šen, ‘brother.’ Examples can be found in the introductions of the Shemshāra letters. The letter no. 34=SH 826 from Sīn-išme’anni begins first of all with news of the brother of Kuwari, then with his own news, followed by referring to the house and wife: “Secondly: your brother who loves you, and I who love you are well, and [your] house [is well], but Šip-šarri, your maid ….” Note here that “I” follows “he,” in contrast to the letters sent by Assyrians. Letter 35 = SH 822 similarly states, “The king is well. The city of Kunšum, your brother, your estate, your wife, and your sons, and I who love you, are well.”\textsuperscript{81} The sequence shows brother directly after the king and the capital, before the estate and even before the sons, and “I” comes in the very end.

The patterns discussed above lead to the conclusion that there were three types of socio-political organization in the region: the small scattered polities, the one-unit polity, and a nomadic type of polity. According to parallels from later times, the nomadic type must have consisted of groups and sub-sections bound by kinship that moved between winter and summer resorts on fixed tracks. These resorts can be as much as 250 km apart;\textsuperscript{82} for example the winter resorts of a section of the Jāf are located in Qizil-Ribāt near Khanaqīn and the summer resorts round Halabja.\textsuperscript{83} Another Jāf section, the Mika’ili, had the habit of moving between Sangāw and Bāneh in modern Iranian Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{84} Such movements must have caused confusion for ancient Mesopotamians in determining the homelands of these nomads. Such nomadic and semi-nomadic movements were, and still are today, the cause of considerable overlap and interference of tribal domains, and consequently the names of lands were mostly derived from ethnonyms.

\textsuperscript{80} Eidem and Læssøe, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{81} For the transliterations of both letters, cf. Chapter Six.
\textsuperscript{82} Barth, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{84} Edmonds, C. J., \textit{Kurds, Turks and Arabs}, Oxford, 1957, p. 147.
One concludes, then, that the conditions in the region under study, particularly the mountainous regions, would have remained as small scattered polities or petty-states\(^{85}\) if there was no influence or threat from the southern powers. The conditions there would not necessitate a larger and more complex system than those small units, but the threat from the major powers compelled them to organize themselves in confederations and state conglomerations that developed into larger far-flung states. Some of these large unified kingdoms, like the Gutian, Simurrian and Turukkean kingdoms, covered large areas, almost the whole region under study, as with Turukkum. Under other circumstances, the organization of the northern communities would have remained as small-scale socio-political polities, best suited to dispersed populations in mountainous regions. As discussed above, the dependence of the population of the region on rain for cultivation and springs for personal use and small-scale irrigated agriculture meant the population had to live in small scattered communities. This is true with the exception of some relatively large communities in the urban centres of the Habur and Erbil-Kirkuk Plains. Harvey Weiss is correct when he notices that the absence of enough navigable rivers in the region as a whole has made them dependent on inefficient land transport, which constrained the nucleation of populations and settlements.\(^{86}\)

There existed, of course, peaceful relations between the highlands and the plains of the region. There is textual evidence of, for example, Lullubeans doing business in Gasur, Arrapḫa and Nuzi (see Chapter Two), and of commoners from Qatṭūnān going to Šubartum in search of work and food in some Mari letters (\(\text{ARM} 27, 26\) and \(\text{ARM} 27, 80\)).\(^{87}\) This was not always by individuals but happened in large groups as well. The Turukkean migration from their assumed land in the Urmia Basin and the Azerbaijān region to the plains of Erbil and Kirkuk and later to the Habur is a good example (see Chapter Seven). A good parallel to this episode may be the expansion of the Kurdish Dizayee tribe around one and a half centuries ago. According to oral traditions, they originate from the same region. They began to penetrate the Iraqi side of Kurdistan to the Erbil Plain,\(^{88}\) taking the villages and lands as far as those close to the Tigris banks, where they were checked back by the Arab tribes. The Turukkean expansion into Northern Transtigris and Northern Mesopotamia (including Northern Syria) must have been a similar episode, but it was apparently wider ranging and more successful; they reached Nineveh and then the Habur cities. The Gutian insistence on crushing the Turukkean power as recorded in the Shemshāra and the Mari letters must have been a reaction to the Hurrian (= Turukkean) penetration into the Gutian territories in the plains of modern Kirkuk. The later Hurrianized cities of Nuzi, Arrapḫa, Kurruḫani and others indicate that the Hurrians won the struggle in the end.

The Urmia Basin and the Azerbaijān region had always been densely populated places (including in the OB period), for they were agriculturally rich and productive. The factor that pushed the Turukkeans out of their land into the regions of Rāniya and further west

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85 Or ‘micro-states’ as Yoffee calls the early, territorially small states, cf. op. cit. p. 17.
86 For this, cf. Weiss, “‘Civilizing’ the Habur Plains….” p. 387 (with bibliography). Weiss’s statement is about the Habur, but it is also true for the whole region under study in general.
87 For these letters, cf. Heimpel, \textit{Letters to the King of Mari}, p. 420 and 438.
88 Cf. also:

\(\text{www.al-mostafa.com}\)
seems to have been the Gutian warfare against their kingdoms and its consequences, as
documented in the Shemshāra letters.89 In these events, the Rāniya Plain played a crucial
role: it was the source of foodstuff for the lords of the Turukkean kingdom,90 the
destination of the refugees and, most importantly, the place where the spark of the
Turukkean uprising was lit.91

Although we think that the name Turukkeans was applied in the documents of this
period to the Hurrians in general, not exclusively to the refugees and deportees from
Utûm (see Chapter Seven), those who were refugees and deportees must have played an
important role in the cultural exchange. One expects, as Eidem and Læssøe do,92 that they
have maintained contacts with the other Turukkeans who remained in the Zagros or the
Urmia Region, and through this mutual relationship many cultural elements must have
been exchanged between the two regions, the homeland and the new land they settled, in
other words, between Northwestern Iran and Northern Mesopotamia. It is important to
note in this regard that with the considerable expansion of the Turukkeans to the west
under Zaziyā, Itabalhūm still was a prestigious name; Zaziyā bore the title ‘nulān of
Itabalhūm’ on his seal, the impression of which is found in Mari (see Chapter Six). This
further proves the close relations they maintained with their homeland.

The widespread kingdom the Turukkeans built in the Mari period under the leadership
of Zaziyā must have played a significant cultural role in addition to its political role. The
kingdom that stretched from the Habur region across the Hilly Arc and the mountains to
the north of it, to the east Tigris Plains probably as far as the Turukkean homeland in
Urmia Region (with certain enclaves for other non-Turukkeans), was a unifying factor.
Such a kingdom, that provided a political framework for the whole region mentioned
must have facilitated the transport and exchange of cultural elements as well as goods and
products. However, it is difficult to imagine that the unification of the different
Turukkean tribes and clans which resulted in such an extensive state was achieved by war
alone. Domestically the Turukkeans could have reached some kind of agreement, with
reconciliation where necessary, to achieve a unity. Here it is appropriate to cite the
example of the Hasanwayhi state, centuries later in the Eastern Zagros region, and to offer
an overview of its comparable features.

The Hasanwayhi state was founded by two generals, Wandād and Ghānim, sons of
Ahmed, in the 10th century AD; it lasted until the beginning of the 11th century.93 These
were generals of troops mobilized from Barzīkān Kurds who succeeded in the conquest
of large parts of western Iran, including the regions of Dinawar, Hamadān, Nihāwand,
Ṣamghān, districts in Azerbaijān as far as Shahrazūr for a period of some 50 years.94
After the death of the two brothers (Wandād in 349 AH / AD 960 and Ghānim in 350 AH /
AD 961), their nephew, Hasanwayh bin al-Hussain al-Kurdi, replaced them and ruled the

89 Eidem and Laessoe, The Shemshāra Archives I, p. 28.
90 This does not contradict the fact that the Urmia Basin was rich and fertile if we remember that the region
was under Gutian threat and their grain, the Shemshāra letters state, was set on fire on three or four
successive years.
91 The spark for the general Kurdish uprising against the former Iraqi regime in 1991 was also lit in Rāniya,
which is a striking similarity.
92 Eidem and Laessoe, ibid.
kingdom until 369 AH / AD 979. When Hasanwaih extended his sway westwards to Shahrazūr, the Buwaihids under Muʿizz ad-Dawla felt worried about his ambitions and sent troops to Shahrazūr under the command of Yanal Kush to push him back to the east. Hasanwaih, however, defeated this army by cutting off its way to the west of Erbil. When Hasanwaih extended his sway westwards to Shahrazūr, the Buwaihids under Muʿizz ad-Dawla felt worried about his ambitions and sent troops to Shahrazūr under the command of Yanal Kush to push him back to the east. Hasanwaih, however, defeated this army by cutting off its way to the west of Erbil. Although the Buwaihid sultan sent another army against him and succeeded in plundering and burning the city of Dīnawar, he was finally compelled to make peace with Hasanwaih. In 356 AH / AD 967, the war broke out again between Hasanwaih and the Buwaihid sultan Bakhtyār, son of Muʿizz ad-Dawla, but the victory of Hasanwaih was soon followed by peace in the year after. As a result of this peace, and at the demand of Hasanwaih, both parties undertook a successful attack on the Hmadānīs of Northern Syria to take over their territories up to the Upper Zāb by Hasanwaih. In 359 AH / AD 967, the Buwaihid sultan sent another army against him and succeeded in plundering and burning the city of Dīnawar, he was finally compelled to make peace with Hasanwaih. Later, in 388 AH / AD 998, the Buwaihid sultan Sharaf ad-Dawla sent his troops against Badr, but the latter inflicted a bitter defeat upon the army of the sultan. As a result of this victory he expanded his kingdom by controlling the jibāl (= mountains) province and became stronger. 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The history of this kingdom is interesting. Its founders were military generals. If our interpretation of the word *nūldān(um)* as a military title held by the Turukkeans is correct (see Chapter Six; the use of *hanizārum* is probably another military title), it would offer a good parallel to the military positions the Turukkean chiefs occupied. The Hasanwaihi state is also a good example of a state that could cover such a vast territory, from Susiana (= Ahwāz) to Azerbijān and Shahrazūr up to the Upper Zāb, including rugged mountainous regions. However, one important note is that the centre of power of this kingdom was not in a mountainous region, rather in the plains of Hamadān and Kirmashān. Similarly, the capital of the Turukkeans must have been located somewhere in the plains of Urmia region. More important is that the lands round the Hasanwaihi kingdom were also populated by the Barzikān Kurds, the same tribe of the ruling family, as indicated for instance by the mention of the revolt of the Barzikān chieftain, whose domain was near Qumm.104 This fact points to the ethnic extension of these tribes to regions as far north as modern Tehran, providing a strategic ethnic depth for the state. From the west, towards Qarmīšān and Hulwān, another Kurdish tribe, the Shadhinjān, particularly the cAnnāzīd family, had been rivals of the Hasanwaihids for as long as anyone could remember.105 One may assume that the rivalry with the Shadhinjāns to their west was one of the reasons why the Hasanwaihids remained inside the Eastern Zagros, except for Shahrazūr and the Upper Zāb in the north. Had they been able to bring the Shadhinjāns to their side they would probably have extended their rule to most of the western Zagros. The Turukkeans on their part seem to have crossed this obstacle, either by warfare or by peaceful means or simply thanks to more ethnic homogeneity of their region of influence.

A good example of a powerful extensive state in the same region under study is the Sorān princedom. This princedom was founded sometime in the 16th century AD, but reached its zenith under Prince Muhammed Rawāndizī, who ruled from AD 1808 or 1813 until 1836.107 Thanks to his political, organizational and military abilities, he became within a few years “the most prominent prince in Kurdistan”108 and his princedom was the most powerful one at that time.109 He commenced by conquering the small principalities to the north of Rawāndiz: Bradōst (1816), Lītan and Shirwān.110 Then he conquered Margawar, Mahabād, Lahijān and probably Shinō (= Ushnawiyeh)111 on the Iranian side. Afterwards he conquered Erbil and Pirdē (= Altun Kopri), probably in 1824,112 and took the districts of Harīr, Rāniya and Kūy Sanjaq, which were under the rule of the Babān princedom. By now he had reached the Lower Zāb. In 1833 he began his campaign on Behdinān princedom and its capital Amēdi. First he took Akrē (cAqrāh) by force, a decisive victory that made Amēdi surrender without a fight.113 This victory ended the rule of the Behdinān princedom, and Prince Muhammed marched towards

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104 Cahen, *ibid*.
105 Or cAyyārīd, according to others.
106 Cahen, *ibid*.
110 Nebes, p. 126.
111 Only one report lists Shinō among the conquered cities, Nebes, p. 127-8.
Duhok, Zakh and Sinjar and took them. These victories encouraged the prince to attack the princedom of Botan, with its central city Jazira (modern Cizre), and approached both Mardin and Nusaibin.\textsuperscript{114}

Prince Muhammed’s capital, the city of Rawandidz, located in a naturally well-defended position and at the intersection of the communications of the region, was an important advantage that helped the princedom to reach such a position. The city is located on the routes that link Mosul and Erbil with Mahabād in the Urmia Basin.\textsuperscript{115} Furthermore, Prince Muhammed was aware of the key elements needed to build a powerful princedom, among which were good administration, a well-organized army and the capability of manufacturing weapons, all of which he did successfully.\textsuperscript{116}

This princedom was located in a rugged mountainous terrain but could become a major power of the region, even though only for a short time. Its economy was the traditional self-efficient dry-farming agriculture and animal husbandry,\textsuperscript{117} but what appears to have helped him in financing his campaigns were war spoils and the conquest of the fertile plains of Erbil, and further west he had the control of the important trade routes mentioned above. Similarly, the conquest of the Erbil Plains by Zaziya was a great support for the Turukkean kingdom, and a fatal blow for the kingdom of Išme-Dagan. After this his kingdom suffered from grain shortages and his army began to starve. This shortage was not caused by drought, since grain was available in Kawalhum, as stated in the letter $ARM$ 26, 491 (cf. Chapter Seven).

Sorān provides a clear example of a mountainous state that can expand and unify a vast area without having rich irrigated arable plains or major navigable rivers that help the nucleation of population. The circumstances and historical events of this princedom bear the characteristics of ancient Kakmum. The range of influence of Sorān in the south, in Raniya and Koy Sanjaq, being out of reach of the centre of Kakmum itself, and its attack on Pirdē, close to ancient Qabrā, are all parallels to ancient Kakmum. If Kakmum was in Rawandidz (the second, most probable, option discussed in Chapter Six), Sorān can be considered a late reflection of Kakmum.

Both the polities of Hasanwaihi and Sorān show how it is possible for a state to expand over a vast rugged area within a few years. In this regard, it should not be surprising that the Gutians may have reached the Urmia Basin to the core land of the Turukkeans as assumed in Chapter Six.

In discussing the history of the region under study, the Amorites are unavoidably important. Their immigrations to Mesopotamia as a whole changed its shape and history. They infiltrated the Habur region to form an additional Semitic element to the ancient Semites who are attested there from the third millennium BC and probably earlier. They also penetrated the west and east Tigris plains. The presence of Hurrian elements to the north of the Hilly Arc together with Amorites, as the PNs indicate, means that this part was not wholly dominated by the newcomers, but rather the Hurrians; other probable indigenous elements could maintain their positions. The same is valid for the east Tigris

\textsuperscript{114} Nebes, op. cit., p. 138, for these conquests and the range of his princedom cf. also Nikitin, B., “Rawandidz,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. VIII, Leiden, 1995, p. 463.

\textsuperscript{115} Nikitine, ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Cf. for details Nebes, op. cit., p. 75-7; 117.

\textsuperscript{117} Nebes, op. cit., p. 119-22. He refers also to the reports of Dr. Roos, who had personally visited the princedom and the city of Rawandidz.
plains, where few Hurrian PNs appear in the texts which show an Amorite majority (for example see Chapters Six and Seven). However, the small number of non-Amorites here, as the records show, should not be taken as an indicator to their scarcity. The written documents concern the ruling elites and their affairs, the Amorites, and do not necessarily reflect the overall ethnic pattern. A similar case was discussed in Chapter Two, the case of Gasur. In Gasur, a large proportion of the PNs recorded in the documents were Akkadian, which was taken by some as a sign of a dominant Semitic population in Gasur at that time. Nevertheless, we tried to show that the archive must have concerned a group of people, most probably Akkadians, who lived in the city and did business with the local population, causing the frequent attestation of Akkadian names. The PN proportions from Gasur, then, should not be taken as an indicator of the ethnic background of the city population as a whole, for everyone was not necessarily involved in the business activities. The same must be true for the indigenous population of the East Tigris plains, who have by this time formed the substratum of the Amorite kingdoms of the region and were not directly and actively involved in the political affairs of the new masters.

It is important to note that some of these Amorites have infiltrated deep into regions close to the foothills, but not into the mountains and mountain valleys themselves. One example is the kingdom of Aḥazum, of which the centre was at modern Taqtaq. It appears to have controlled a large surrounding area up to the Kōy Sanjaq Plain. The eastern border of Aḥazum reached the Dukān gorge, which was the beginning of the land Utūm, the modern Rāniya Plain. Although these Amorites were newcomers, who would have been seen as invaders by the locals, we saw that the Hurrians (Turukkeans) had good relations with some of them. In some cases, such relations lasted for more than one generation, as indicated by the letter of Pišendēn to Yašub-Addu (see Chapter Six, letter 67 = SH 816), in which he points to the old alliance between their kingdoms since the times of their fathers and grandfathers. At the same time we saw the deep hatred Puzur-Sīn, the ‘Assyrian,’ expressed towards Šamšī-Adad I in his inscription from Assur, describing him as a foreign plague, not of the flesh of (the city of) Aššur (see Chapter Seven). The Nurrėgeans, shortly after the conquest of their land by Šamšī-Adad, contributed to the siege of Turukkeans in Amursakkum (ARM I, 90), who were supposedly their blood relatives. The numerous changing alliances discussed in the two previous chapters (Chapters Six and Seven) were concluded or broken off regardless of the ethnic backgrounds of the parties. This was not only on the political, but also on the individual level. The Turukkean chieftain Lidāya, for instance, had a retainer that bore the Semitic name Nabi-Ištar (see letter 24 = SH 852 A in Chapter Six), probably implying he was a Semite. Bunu-Ištar, king of Qabrā, had a Hurrian in his service called Eki-Teššūp, as his seal legend indicates (see Chapter Six). A better example is the famous Sīn-išmeʾanni of the Shemshāra letters, a prominent figure in the politics of the Pre-Assyrian domination phase. Although his Semitic name alone does not prove he was a Semite, the content of letter 65 = SH 918 gives valuable hints to support the idea. Letter 65, discussed in Chapter Six, was meant to reach the family of Sīn-išmeʾanni in Awal in the Hamrin Region, and we concluded that he most probably had his roots there. But the question here is how he could reach such a high position in the Turukkean kingdom if he was a foreigner, a Semite from the Hamrin Region.

For this one may look for parallels in later history which can provide interesting hints. In the middle Ages the Abbasid caliphs began to use foreign slaves in the army, and later
in the special guards of the caliph himself. These slaves, who were mostly Turks, gained more and more power and influence; their chiefs ascended to the highest military ranks so that in later days they were able to kill the caliph and install the one they wanted. The history of the Muslim states often refers to slaves occupying high-ranking positions, used to performing important tasks for their masters. Still later the Ottomans were organizing campaigns to hunt slaves or buy them, particularly male boys to be educated under strict discipline and subject to harsh military training; they were called mamālık (pl. of mamālūk, ‘slave’), and from them they mobilised the inkishārī troops. These inkishārīs then became a powerful class in the Ottoman army and later reached political posts, such as governors of provinces. The Baghdad province, for instance, was ruled for centuries by mamālūk, mostly Georgian in origin. In Egypt, they even founded a ruling dynasty known as al-Mamālīk.119 In the light of such parallels one may conjecture that Sīn-išme’anni was perhaps such a slave, one who had reached the high status he occupied thanks to his qualifications. The suggestion of foreign slaves from Middle or Southern Mesopotamia in the highland societies of the Zagros should not be taken as odd, strange or unexpected. The only side of the image coming from South Mesopotamia referring to slaves from the highlands is not the complete image; one should think of southerners as slaves in the northern societies too, although perhaps in smaller numbers.

In returning to the Amorite immigrations, in Chapter Seven we pointed to the times when they were advancing to occupy new territories and seize power; this began in the Ur III period and lasted until the rise of Zaziya. During this period, the Amorite tribes are attested in most of ancient Mesopotamia, they infiltrated into its territories, settled themselves and established ruling dynasties, as seen in Sumer, Babylonia, Diyāla Region, Erbil Plains, the Habur Region and Mari. The Haladiny inscription of Iddi(n)-Sīn provides good evidence of their attempt to infiltrate his territories in the modern Garmiyān region (southeast of Kirkūk), but he was able to turn them back and kill their five chieftains (see Chapter Five). Other Amorites, such as the Ya’lānians and the Ahazians, were more successful in the north, where they could enter the land and establish kingdoms such as Qabrā, Ahazum, Ya’ilānum and perhaps others. In doing so, they formed a superstratum of a population of which the substratum was still a majority of Hurrians and other aboriginal ethnic groups. This was the case in the Upper Habur too. The success of the Amorites in the Transtigris was certainly thanks to the absence of powerful kingdoms there similar to Simurrum. Nevertheless, as soon as these kingdoms were established and the tribes settled, they began with endless disputes and bitter struggles for power and influence. The age of Mari, as reflected in the letters of its archives, is a story of perpetual fighting, peacemaking, alliances made and broken, and changing allegiances. Small kingdoms had to seek powerful patrons, ally themselves to others, and fight each other on behalf of major powers.

118 The process was begun in 220 AH / AD 835 by Caliph Al-Muṭtasim. He brought large numbers (about 18,000) Turkish slaves to Baghdad from Transoxiana and modern Turkestan; cf. [Amīn, Ahmed, Dhuhr el-Islām (Midday of Islam), vol. 1, Beirut, 1969, p. 3 (in Arabic)].

On the other side, the mountain peoples could benefit from these struggles; they organized themselves and united the different tribes to form powerful kingdoms, such as those of Turukkum and Gutium. With the weakness of the Amorite kingdoms, especially the kingdom of Šamši-Adad and his sons, with large parts of territory in the Transtigris and the Habur Region, these mountainous powers regained control. But it took somewhat longer in the Habur because of the influence there of Mari. With the appearance of the Kassites in the arena, a time begins when the Amorites recede and the mountainous peoples rise. It ended with the emergence of the Mittani, Kassite and Hittite Empires who came to hold the upper hand in the region.

This situation looks very much like the age of the Arab conquests, when the Arabs fought and defeated the ancient empires and established their own kingdom. But as soon as this kingdom was established and the numerous bedouin Arabs settled in the new founded cities, endless disputes and merciless fighting with each other started. Each group was striving for sovereignty over the whole population and the whole kingdom, claiming an exclusive right, that of pure and correct Islam. As a result the kingdom was fragmented into petty-kingsdoms and the defeated peoples of Persia, part of Anatolia, and Kurdistan recovered from the defeats and built again their states, which sometimes developed into empires.

As mentioned above, ideology is the fourth ‘necessary condition’ for the formation of states. As for the Arabs, they brought a new religion, which became the ideology of their new kingdom through which they legitimised their conquests and occupation of land. Their old local paganism was not able to promote and control the extensive empire they built. The new religion provided the new believers with all the ideological means necessary for conquest. They gave the name *fath* (lit. “opening”) instead of “occupation” or “invasion,” to these conquests, claiming the performance of a divine mission by bringing God’s religion to other *infidel* peoples. This new religion united the different Arab tribes that were raiding and plundering each other before Muhammed, and directed their efforts against the outsiders; instead of raiding each other, they were permitted to pillage and take booty and told they would be rewarded in paradise. Almost the same phenomenon was repeated in Arabia in the 18th century AD, although on a smaller scale. A new radical trend of Islam (Wahābīsm) was introduced to the Arab tribes by Muhammed bin Abdulwahāb al-Najdī, who convinced the tribesmen that only they bear the correct Islam, and other Muslims who disagreed with his teachings were outside the pale of Islam altogether. Therefore they could fight and plunder those in other, non Wahābī, streams of Islam to make them comply. This resulted in the opening of an era of Wahābī raids on Mesopotamian cities (from AD 1790) during which numerous urban centres on the Euphrates from south of Baghdad were pillaged, burned and

121 See for example:


For Wahabi movement in general cf. Commins, *op. cit.*

[Longrigg, *op. cit.*, p. 256].
devastated, while the centres under Wahābi control were engulfed with fortune. These two instances clearly show how ideology can stimulate, organize and legitimise incursions, conquests and migrations.

We do not know whether the Amorites brought their own ideology to the newly conquered lands, but they most probably had an ideology. As for their religion, we know some names of Amorite gods, but there is no evidence of them imposing their beliefs on the conquered people, as the Arab Muslims did. Perhaps it was because their ideology was based on other principles or perhaps their religion had much in common with the existing Mesopotamian religion, more than Islam had with Christian, Zoroastrian and other minor religions of their conquered lands. In contrast to the Arab Muslims, it seems that some of the Amorites adapted themselves to the existing Mesopotamian culture and religion, as was the case with Šamsī-Adad I, who adapted his Amorite name Samsī-Addu, including the theophoric element, to a Mesopotamian form Šamšī-Adad, which is found in some of his royal inscriptions. One ideological contrast with the Mesopotamian traditions of that time is that the OB kings, who were mostly Amorites, did not adopt a notion of divinity, except in certain contexts. Whatever Amorite ideology was, it was neither able to unify the Amorite tribes nor to establish political stability; on the contrary, they spent centuries in wars against each other. For comparison, the ancient Iranians believed that among the numerous Iranian tribes, there were seven noble tribes, but only one of them had royal blood. The kings came from this tribe, and the high ranking officials and generals from the other six. Such an ideology guarantees stability from the viewpoint that others do not think of taking kingship by force unless they possess royal blood. The famous myth “Kāwa and Zohāk” confirms and consolidates this belief. When the blacksmith Kāwa revolted and killed the usurper, the tyrant Zohāk; after a reign of a thousand years he freed the people; he did not rule for himself, which he could have done, but instead brought back the legitimate king Fereidūn, who was “of the seed of Kayān,” and restored him to the throne. Such an ideology plays a unifying role by the idea that all the tribes need each other for prosperity and stability of society and to keep alive their socio-political organization.

One may tentatively assume that a similar ideology existed among the Hurrians, particularly those of the Zagros. Letter 63 = SH 812 from Shemshāra clearly states that not only Kuwari but also his ancestors were nulēnum. This can be understood as a hereditary post held by certain noble families among the Turukkeans, not a post taken by force or granted by the king.

The times after Išme-Dagan and Zimri-Lim are not so well-documented. However, we learn from little reports that the Hurrians kept the lands they controlled after the overthrow of the dynasties of Šamsī-Adad and Zimri-Lim (see Chapter Seven). Tigunānum became the centre of a Hurrian kingdom, rendered in this period as Tikunani. According to Salvini, Tikunani was probably “one of the Hurro-Akkadian political entities of North Mesopotamia, which later were incorporated with the Kingdom of

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124 Christensen, L’Iran sous les Sassanides, p. 15-6.
125 Or Dahāk, from Azhi Dahāka, which later has become Azhdahāk.
Mittani.” Of course there were more Hurrian polities that were unified and likewise incorporated with Mittani. There were still small and medium-sized Hurrian polities such as Uršu, Ḥaḥhum and Ḥaššum in Northern Syria and the Taurus, ruled by “kings,” and it was these polities that were probably designated as the “Hurrian foe,” (seemingly a collective term) in the annals of Ḥattušili I. This “Hurrian foe,” the annals relate, invaded the realm of Ḥattušili, into Anatolia, in the year after the expansionist conquests of this king in northern Syria. “Hurrian troops” were also among the allies of Uršu during the Hittite siege of this city, according to a Hittite literary text (KBo I 11). This alludes to the existence of a powerful Hurrian state to the east of the Euphrates at this time that supported the North Syrian states against the Hittites. Another literary text mentions the names of four “kings of the Hurrian troops,” who rescued a member of an anti-Hittite coalition. These allusions clearly show the political situation of the Hurrians in this phase, which was still consisting of small kingdoms, that could sometimes form coalitions and threaten the Hittite kingdom or any other power. Here again we have an alliance formed by small polities to resist a foreign enemy, in this case the Hittite State.

Yet the formation of the Mittani empire needed more effort and internal developments. This was done after the contacts had taken place between the Hurrians and the Indo-Aryans. The Mittani PNs and technical terms of Indo-Aryan origin found in the texts point to a clear Indo-Aryan contribution in the formation of the Mittani Empire, and to the Indo-Aryan background of its ruling dynasty. Such contacts, although still unclear, must have led to profound developments among the Hurrians. W. von Soden is of the opinion that the Indo-Aryans first came from Eastern Iran to Mesopotamia in about 1500 BC, but there were contacts with the Hurrians, according to Klinger, before that time. These Indo-Aryans unified the numerous Hurrian (as well as some Amorite) polities of the region between the bend of the Euphrates and the Upper Tigris, forming the state of Mittani. This unification was seemingly prompted by the threat the Hittite expansion to North Syria posed to the Hurrian polities and Hurrian populated regions there. It bound them first, Kühne thinks, by “treaties of loyalty that stipulated Mittani’s position of superior strength, which automatically led to suzerainty.”

127 Salvini, The Habiru Prism ..., p. 13. Salvini emphasizes the ethnic diversity of the kingdoms of Northern Mesopotamia that formed the Mittani Empire: Salvini, “Un royaume hourrite en Mésopotamie du Nord…,” Subartu IV/1, p. 310. This fact, however, needs more precision. It is true that other ethnicities inhabited the core region of Mittani, but one has to take into consideration the predominance of the Hurrian element that gave Mittani its Hurrian identity. Saying “…et assez variée d’un point de vue ethnique..” and “…aït eu une composition multi-ethnique” (ibid.) gives the impression that the founders of Mittani and its citizens were from different ethnic backgrounds in equal proportions, which was not the case.
132 a-na LUGAL.MEŠ ERIN.MEŠ Ḥur-ra[...]
133 Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 292-3.
Because the capital of Mittani remains unexcavated and its state archives unrecovered, the history of the Mittani empire, particularly its early phase, is still poorly known. Its history depends on external sources, mainly what is recorded by its enemies. There remain questions to be answered about the process of Mittani state formation that took place in Northern Mesopotamia in the period between the Mari period and the reign of king Parrattarna. Questions Wilhelm asked include the numbers of immigrants or warlike invasions from the neighbouring mountains; the role these groups played; the source of the Indo-Aryan linguistic remains in the Mittani Empire; whether the battles of Ḫatušiliš I and Muršili I against the Hurrians were battles against Mittani but without mentioning that; perhaps Parrattarna, attested as “King of the people of Ḫurri,” was a king of Mittani, or perhaps the state of Mittani coexisted with that of Ḫurri; and connections between the emergence of the Mittani empire and the Hyksos rule in Egypt. Kühne suggested answers to some of these questions in his ‘Imperial Mittani’ cited above, in which he showed that the designations “Hurrians,” “Hurrian enemy,” and “Hurrian country,” as used by the Hittites, seem to have meant Mittani. Thus it was not a separate polity, since “Hurrian country,” was also used by Mittanians themselves, and the title “King of the Hurrian troops/people” is attested at different times and places to denote later kings of Mittani. It is also noted that the language of the Mittani chancellery in the 14th century was different from the Hurrian of the Pre-Mittani period. Thus “it seems possible that the "Hurrian troops" meant in our annalistic texts were drawn from a recent wave of Hurrian invaders who had descended from the mountainous flanks of northwestern Iran and superseded the older Hurrian ethnic layers.” The new wave of the Hurrians seems to have established itself by force; their military elites became powerful landowners by exploiting the lands and subjecting the surviving settlements to a framework of a quasi-feudal system. Regarding these ‘Hurrian invaders,’ Kühne suggests that the Indo-Aryans, after they had settled for a while among the Hurrians, may have played a leading role in the military and political successes the Hurrians achieved. They may even have been behind their emigration (or invasion) in search of better homesteads. There remains the question whether these Indo-Aryans emigrated along with the Hurrians to Southern Anatolia and Northern Syria; or whether the borrowed linguistic features were derived from earlier encounters between the two groups in the Trans-Caucasus during their migrations to Iran and India. Wilhelm discussed this point saying that the latter possibility can be confirmed if Hurrian or (proto-) Urartian borrowings were found in India, but this has not so far been demonstrated. He further adds that the flow of influence would have been one-way only, from Indo-Aryan into

137 The capital city of Waššukanni has according to Anthony an Indo-Aryan name, composed of vasukhani, meaning “wealth-mine,” Anthony, D. W., The Horse, the Wheel and Language, Princeton, 2007, p. 49.
138 Kühne, op. cit., p. 204; Klengel, op. cit., p. 91.
139 Wilhelm, RIA 8, p. 291.
140 Kühne, op. cit., p. 206 and 208.
141 Kühne, op. cit., p. 209, (referring to Salvini, “The Earliest Evidence....” Urkesh and the Hurrians); cf. also Wilhelm, The Hurrians, p. 16.
142 Wilhelm, The Hurrians, p. 16.
143 Kühne, op. cit., p. 209.
144 For this question and the controversy about it, cf. Wilhelm, The Hurrians, p. 17.
145 Wilhelm, ibid.
Hurrian. In fact, if no Hurrian or (proto-) Urartian linguistic borrowings existed in India, it would mean that the contacts took place with that group of Indo-Aryans that did not migrate to India, which also means that the contacts were after the split of the Indo-Aryans. Those who did not migrate to India must have remained in the areas populated at the same time by the Hurrians, and groups of them might have accompanied the Hurrian new wave of migrations to northern Syria. However, the most likely possibility seems to have been the one Wilhelm considers the “easy” one: “Indo-Aryan splinter groups from the main stream of migration through Iran to India, who along with Hurrians ended up in the amalgam of the Fertile Crescent.” The few Indo-Aryan elements found in the Kassite DNś in this period must have been related to a similar process of contacts with Indo-Aryan groups in Iran.

The suggestion of an Indo-Aryan leading role seems to be quite possible for several reasons: 1) the Mittani kings bore Indo-Aryan names or throne-names; 2) swearing by the Indo-Aryan deities in a state treaty means that they were deities of the ruling elite, and the ruling elite was thus of Indo-Aryan stock; 3) the technical terms in relation to horse training (found in Boğazköy, and Nuзи) and for combat wagons

146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
149 For example, Artatama > rtā-dhāman- (nominative: rtā-dhāmā), “whose domain/dwelling place is Rta,” Mayrhofer, op. cit., p. 23. Rta (written also rtā) means “true, right; divine law; truth,” cf. Hess, op. cit., p. 224; cf. also Kammenhuber, A., Die Arier im Vorderen Orient, Heidelberg, 1968, p. 80: a central concept in the Indo-Aryan and Iranian religions; for the names Tušratta and Šattiwaza see below. Although the names Sauš(sa)tat(t)ar, his father in the Indo-Aryan and Iranian religions; for the names Tušratta and Šattiwaza see below. Although the names Sauš(sa)tat(t)ar, his father Pār/Bar/Maš-sa-ta-tar and Pa-ra-ta-na (var. Bar/Pār-ra-at-tar-na) are Indo-Aryan, no plausible etymologies for them are found: Kammenhuber, Die Arier..., p. 79; Mayrhofer, Die Arier..., p. 25. Wilhelm assumes that the tradition of giving Indo-Aryan royal names to the kings of Mittani “was established under the influence of Indo-Aryan settlers in Transcaucasia and that this accompanied the ruling class more than 500 kilometres southwest to northern Mesopotamia.” Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 17. It is interesting that this tradition was practised even by city-rulers in regions of Syro-Palestine that were not under Mittanian rule and it continued after the collapse of the Mittani Empire in Hanigalbat, as seen with some of their kings, cf. Mayrhofer, Die Arier..., p. 17 and note 32; p. 18 and 27-8.
150 The treaty was between the Hitittes (under Šuppiluliuma) and Mittani (under Šattiwaza). The deities are: DINĞİR.MEŚ Mi-it-ra-aš-ši-il DINĞİR.MEŚ Û-ru-wa-na-aš-ši-el DINĞİR.MEŚ Mi-it-ra-aš-ši-il DINĞİR.MEŚ A-ru-na-aš-ši-il 4In-da-ra or In-da-ra DINĞİR.MEŚ Na-ša-a[t-ti-ia-a]n-na 4In-da-ra DINĞİR.MEŚ NA-ša-at-ti-ia-an-na
151 Also to Wilhelm, the worship of these deities may have been restricted to dynastic circles, op. cit., p. 18-19.
152 This is strengthened by the notion that when a Hurrian entered the circle of the Mittanian kings he had to choose an Indo-Aryan throne name. We have at least one such occurrence: Šattiwaza’s birth name was Kili-Teššup, cf. Mayrhofer, Die Arier..., p. 17, note 30; Kammenhuber, Die Arier..., p. 82.
153 This is the well-known Kikkuli tablet, who was “a horse trainer, stable master, from the land of Mittani,” Mayrhofer, ibid. The text provides the following Indo-Aryan words: aika-wartanna (< ēka- *aika- “one” + Vedic vartanī “way, path, track”) “one-fold race-track,” tēra-wartanna (< tri- “three”) “three-fold race-track,” panza-wartanna (< pāṇca- “five”) “five-fold race-track,” šatta-wartanna (< saptā-
were Indo-Aryan. So, one may speculate that the profession of horsemanship and its techniques were Indo-Aryan inspired. The Indo-Aryan contribution to the rise of Mittani by horsemanship and horse breeding was coupled with (though not necessarily Indo-Aryan) the use of the composite bow, the “Hurrian (type) battering ram”\(^{155}\) and the combination of horses with the two-wheeled chariot in warfare, which were altogether essential for the expansion of the empire.\(^{156}\) The chariot-drivers were the military elite of the Mittani Empire and were called in Mittani and Syria-Palestine marianni-na.\(^{157}\) The Indo-Aryan names of some of the kings of Mittani carry connotations in relation to warfare, which may refer to the military role this royal family played: Tušratta < tvešá-ratha-, “who pushes forward the impetuosity of the (two-wheeled) war-chariot;”\(^{158}\) Šattiwaza < *sāti-vāja-, “obtaining fighting gear,”\(^{159}\) and Šuttarna < satvar, “warrior.”\(^{160}\) The same could be said about the name of the city ruler Bi-ri-ia-aš-šu-wa (from Alalah) < Oir. Friyāspa-, Indo-Aryan Priyāśva-, “having dear/beloved horses.”\(^{161}\)

For such a leading role to be played by a foreign minority ethnic group is not unique. Some later examples are good parallels with Indo-Aryans among the Hurrians. In the late Abbasid Period, the Kurdish family of Saladin formed the ruling dynasty of a widespread state that ruled Egypt, Muslim Syro-Palestine (including Lebanon), most of Upper Mesopotamia and Yemen.\(^{162}\) The population of this state was mainly Arab (or Arabised peoples) beside other minor ethnic groups like the Turkomens. The Indo-European Kurds formed only a thin layer over a huge body of Semites. The substantial political and military role the Kurds played in the Ayyubid State (AD 1171-1250) is comparable to the role the Indo-Aryans played in the Mittani state. In the Ayyubid State, in addition to the king, there were governors and other important officials, numerous army cavalrymen and

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\(^{154}\) Such as babrunnu or paprunnu, p/binkarannu and p/barittannu consisting of the Hurrian article –nni (Akkadianized into –nnu) and the oldest Indic colour adjectives babhrú- “brown;” pingalá- “reddish brown,” and palitá- “grey,” Mayrhofer, Die Indo-Arier..., p. 15-6 and 19.

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\(^{159}\) Mayrhofer, Die Arier..., p. 25.

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\(^{160}\) Anthony, The Horse, the Wheel and Language, p. 49.

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\(^{161}\) Mayrhofer, Die Arier..., p. 19.

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generals, and several leaders who were Kurds. In Mittani the kings, even if they were Hurrian, took Indo-Aryan throne names, and in the army, the Indo-Aryan *mariyanni* warrior class formed an important component. As in Mittani, where there were Indo-Aryan words in the Hurrian of Mittani, so also there were and still are numerous Kurdish words, especially technical terms, in the Arabic of the lands of former Ayyubid state; which is another point of comparison.

Ideology played a significant role in the ascent of the Ayyubid family to power. Under the slogan of liberating Muslim territories from the Crusaders, supported by Islamic ideology, the Ayyubids succeeded in a persistent ascent to power through their service as generals and fortress holders under the Turkomen Zangīs, a branch of the Seljūqs, since 1138 A.D. After the seizure of the highest post in the state, they unified by different means the peoples and incorporated the polities of the whole region mentioned above into one state. But what ideology enabled these Indo-Aryan groups to reach that status is still unknown. Their deities were worshipped side by side with those of the Hurrians, so there is no evidence for imposing a new religious ideology. But because the throne names and the deities by whom the kings swore were Indo-Aryan, their religion must have had the virtue of being the religion of the ‘Upper Class.’ The case of the Ayyubids was quite different; the religion of their subjects was prevailing and so their throne names and titles were of an Arabic-Islamic background. One may conjecture that the Indo-Aryans may have reached high military positions thanks to their horsemen and their swift war chariots mounted by the *maryanni* warriors, and through their high military posts they gained political influence. This is no wonder if we again note that the Ayyubids followed almost the same path.  

The fact that *mārya*-，“young man,” refers to the heavenly war-band assembled around the god Indra in the Rig Veda and was employed by the Mittanian warriors (if the derivation is true) may shed light on the ideological side of the Indo-Aryan contribution. Perhaps they have presented themselves as warriors of the god Indra, fulfilling earthly tasks based on heavenly orders. Whatever the reasons, the ascent of Indo-Aryans to power seemingly coincided with the Hurrian will to expand their kingdoms, to confront the Hittites and to fill the vacuum that followed the decline and later the fall of the first dynasty of Babylon and the murder of Muršili I.

The oldest as yet known mention of Mittani is on the tomb of the Egyptian official Amenemhet (Imn-m-h3.t) from Thebes. He was in the service of the pharaohs from Ahmose, founder of the 18th dynasty until Thutmose I (1494-1482). On his tomb is written “… a land, one calls it Mittani. The enemy….,” which proves that Mittani already

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164 The Albanian family of Muhammed Ali Pasha of Egypt is another example. Muhammed Ali Pasha was installed by the Ottomans as governor of Egypt. Thanks to his reforms and the modernization of the country, Egypt became powerful and, trusting in his power, he declared independence. His Albanian, Turkish speaking family continued to rule Egypt until 1952, when monarchy was overthrown by a coup.


existed before 1500 BC, perhaps since 1550 BC. According to Wilhelm, Mittani had perhaps existed since the first half of the 16th century BC (or the middle of the 17th century BC according to the middle chronology). Another early record, probably contemporary to Amenemhet’s tomb, of Mittani is the seal impression found in later dynastic use that reads “Suttarna, son of Kirta, king of Mittani,” and seemingly belongs to Suttarna I. Other data, such as the Idrimi inscription, which speaks of a treaty between his forerunners and Parattarna, and another treaty between Ḥalab and Mittani, in addition to the Indo-Aryan traditions seen in the throne-names of the king of the latter, all clearly date the emergence of Mittani before 1530 BC, or almost 100 years earlier than what was previously known. So, it seems that Mittani goes back to the period following the death of Hammurabi of Babylon, and then started to fill the power vacuum in Northern Mesopotamia created by his death. Supported by the Hurrian population already inhabiting Northern Syria, it expanded its supremacy there, where it came into armed conflict with the Hittites, who tried to control Northern Syria and the Upper Habur regions, but were resisted by the Hurrians, as shown above. These battles recorded in the Hittite historical and literary texts represent the early, if not the formative, stages of Mittani’s statehood, as Kühne describes. If the identification of Parattarna of the Terqa texts with Parattarna of Mittani mentioned on the statue of Idrimi, according to its excavator O. Rouault proves to be correct, it proves that Mittani under Parattarna extended further south than had been thought.

However, the best times for Mittani to build its power and become an unchallenged polity in Northern Mesopotamia was after the assassination of Muršili I. This brought a period of weakness in the Hittite state, during which it could neither pose a danger for Mittani nor compete with it. Just before the murder of Muršili I, he overthrew the first dynasty of Babylon; in doing so, he opened the way for the Kassites to invade Babylonia. Yet, before the overthrow of Babylon, Muršili campaigned against Northern Syria and conquered Ḥalab, thus weakening another power which was in the range of Mittanian activity. The Mittanians were not standing silent, waiting to see what the Hittites would

168 Klinger, op. cit., p. 28-9, also with arguments for this dating. Wilhelm makes the oldest mention 1500 BC, cf. Wilhelm, RIA 8, p. 292.
170 Wilhelm, RIA 8, p. 192; cf. also Wilhelm, “l’état actuel…” Amurru I, p. 179.
172 It seems to be the same Parattarna who is mentioned in texts from Terqa (see below), Wilhelm, “l’état actuel…,” p. 179 and note 56.
174 Cf. Klinger, p. 37. But note that there are chronological problems concerning the Mittani Empire. These are because the reconstructed chronology is based on the Assyrian eponym lists and king lists which do not cover the 15th century BC and so cannot be connected with the OB chronology. The history of Mittani Empire before the Amarna Period does not show any synchronism with Hittite or Babylonian history; for further details on these, cf. Wilhelm, RIA 8, p. 291; Kühne, op. cit., p. 203 and note 1.
175 Klinger, op. cit., p. 35.
176 Ibid.
177 Kühne, op. cit., p. 208.
179 Wilhelm, ibid.
180 Klinger, op. cit., p. 37.
181 Kühne, op. cit., p. 211.
do. They appear to have fought Muršili I after his retreat from Babylon. The texts of Terqa mentioned above, refer to a victory over the troops of the Hittites, those who were very possibly under Muršili I. 182 The reduction of pressure from both the south and the northwest was ideal for Mittani to expand and fill the vacuum. 183 Mittani then easily advanced through Western Syria and southwards along the Orontes River into Southern Canaan. 184 The emergence of Mittani owes much to Muršili, both alive, by the sacking of Babylon and Ḥalab, and murdered, by the ensuing weakness. The Hurrians appeared as a powerful opponent of the Hittites in Northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia in the 16th century, 185 and the high position the Indo-Aryans enjoyed in the state of Mittani must be a result of the great role they played in the Hurrian successes.

It is significant to note that the core region of Mittani was not the Transtigris or the Zagros Mountains. Rather it was the plains of the Habur, where its principal cities of Waššukkanni, Taidi and Kaḥat were located. 186 Although Mittani soon extended its sway to Nuzi and the Arrapha region in the east and to Alalaḥ in the west, as early as the reign of Parattarna, 187 the question remains why Mittani did not emerge in the East Tigris plains. One may suggest that the new wave of Hurrian immigrants, together with the Indo-Aryan groups, was perhaps directed to the Upper Habur, not the Transtigris, a wave that came from the eastern mountains via the Taurus, the same track of the Urkeš-north communications. The Hittite expansionist policy, in the Upper Habur and Northern Syria, was seemingly another factor that unified the Hurrian polities there and made them ready to become a powerful unified state as soon as the Hittites weakened. Similar factors and conditions were perhaps absent in the Transtigris at this time. A quick look at the scene gives the impression that there was a gap between Zaziya’s state and the emergence of Mittani, but the birth of Mittani, in fact, was somehow achieved by the grace of a leader like Zaziya. Without the great efforts of Zaziya, who unified the Hurrians, crossed the Tigris with his troops, established a widespread state in the Transtigris and large parts of the Habur, and overthrew the rival Kingdom of Išme-Dagan, the coming into being of Mittani would have been very difficult, if not impossible.

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183 To these, Klengel adds the control of North Mesopotamian trade routes by Mittani and the weak rule of Assyrian kings, cf. Klengel, op. cit., p. 107.
184 Kühne, op. cit., p. 211-2. He states also that the appearance of the Hyksos in Egypt was probably because the Hurrian penetration into southern Canaan “even before there is evidence for Mittani’s existence,” Kühne, p. 212 and note 58 for different views.
185 Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 292.
186 Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 291.
187 See for this Kühne, op. cit., p. 214.