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STROMY WEATHER 1632-1633

CHAPTER FIVE

STORMY WEATHER AT THE IMPERIAL COURT AND ON THE SOUTH CHINA COAST

1632-1633

The Dutch Petitions

During the summer of 1632, Iquan was summoned back to the coast of Fu-chien to ward off the raids mounted by the Kuang-tung pirate Liu Hsiang. For the duration of this mission he was placed under the direct command of Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien. This new Grand Co-ordinator had been profoundly shocked by the surprise attack of Liu Hsiang and in a hurry to remedy the situation he availed himself of a disastrous policy: the re-introduction of the sea ban. In October 1632 the Grand Co-ordinator reported the strong measures he had taken to the capital Peking. In response to this policy, Iquan had hurried to put his trade with the Dutch in order. Governor Hans Putmans reported that Iquan suddenly changed his attitude and became the obedient servant of the Grand Co-ordinator and the military officers at Chang-chou, Hai-ch’êng and Amoy:

‘Besides, Iquan not only refused to let us station a merchant in Amoy or An-hai as before, but also to anchor our junks at those places. Moreover, he did not allow us to accept a consignment of timber which we had purchased

1 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 165. ‘On 15 October 1632, the Fu-chienese pirate Liu Hsiang led several thousand followers aboard 170 junks to raid Min-an-ch’en. They plundered and slaughtered, sweeping all the houses clean. All the inhabitants fled and the citizens in Fu-chou were terrified… Commander Cheng Chih-lung happened to be in Fu-chou preparing for a new assignment in Chiang-hsi, therefore the Grand Co-ordinator diverted his attention from this in order to defend Fu-chou. …The pirates knew they were well prepared and decided to leave.’
on an earlier occasion. [This volte-face] seems attributable to the strict supervision of the new Grand Co-ordinator (Tsou Wei-lien) and other grandees.’

When Iquan’s merchants suddenly withdrew their co-operation, Governor Putmans was thrown into confusion:

‘Meanwhile, it seems also that his (Iquan’s) merchants show more commodities than ever happened before. Whether this is meant to hold our necks and lure us to leave the coast soon, or to foster his own benefits and profits, cannot yet be judged.’

In essence, Iquan was trying to create the impression that his merchants were acting to please themselves and that they contravened his wishes. He now assumed the role of the director of a drama in which the ‘Chinese-Dutch peddlers humbly sent petition to the emperor’. His new role as a royal official constrained him to remain neutral, acting as if he had nothing to do with the matter. The main actors on the stage were now his merchants, not himself. He masterfully created a spectacle around the Chiu-lung River estuary through his merchants. He also tried to convince the Dutch to act as friendly guests.

In the same letter the Dutch governor Hans Putmans reported:

‘Rushing back to An-hai from Fu-chou, on October 7 Iquan dispatched his representatives Gamsia and Bindiok, to greet Your Honours’ letter with gifts and sandalwood. On the same day they offered us an appropriate reciprocal honour and saluted us with cannon shots. It seems that Iquan was very inclined to receive us with appropriate ceremony. However, this does not accord with the customs of China and, because trading with us violates their

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2 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uit het jacht Der Goes liggende ter reede onder ’t eijlant Lissuw in de riviere Chincheo aen gouverneur generaal Specx, Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 204’.
laws, he did not dare to do so, fearing to create an enormous scandal.³

Iquan had tried to explain his new tack to Governor Putmans in a personal letter sent three week earlier. He had written to inform him that via his personal connections he had begun to persuade certain mandarins to open up a trade corridor between Chang-chou and Taiwan. He implied that the best option for the Dutch was to obtain the legal right to receive Chinese merchants in Taiwan. Iquan put it this way:

‘Nowadays our Emperor rules by means of severe punishments. Your Honour can easily picture how different the customs in our land are from yours. For the reason, not everything can be fulfilled according to your wishes. I have done my utmost to persuade various great mandarins in Chang-chou to obtain freedom of trade for the Company.’⁴

Iquan also set out his plan to help the Dutch (and himself) by legalizing Chinese shipping in Taiwan:

‘The Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou prefectures (Hsing-Ch’üan-Tao)[ Ts’êng Ying] heard that the great mandarin in Chang-chou will help Your Honour out in this trade affair. He has written me a letter asking what was the best way for people to go about their trade? Therefore I have addressed a letter to the Grand Co-ordinator in order to enquire how our people can run their business as before. What answer we shall receive, only time will tell.’⁵

Iquan’s intention was to imply that he had persuaded some of his acquaintances to create a ‘public opinion’ among the local gentry. The main supporter of this move was the Coastal Defence Circuit of Hsing-hua and

³ Ibidem.
⁴ VOC 1105, Missiven door Iquan aen den heer Putmans[Letter written by Iquan to Mr Putmans], 23 Sept. 1632, fo. 209r.
⁵ Ibidem.
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Ch’üan-chou prefectures Ts’êng Ying, 6 who was the key person in the issuing of all the licences for the Ch’üan-chou fishing boats and rice transportation junks and hence directly regulated Iquan’s An-hai trade and the smuggling trade with the Dutch. Ts’êng Ying had been appointed to this position in 1631 on the recommendation of the former Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an. 7 No doubt Ts’êng was aware of how the Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung had tolerated Iquan’s trade because this allowed him to maintain his troops. However, his co-operation with Iquan was not based only on secular interests, there is good reason to think that there might have been other grounds as well. Iquan had been baptized a Roman Catholic and during his expeditions in Chiang-hsi province he had been summoned to Fu-chou for several times by the Grand Co-ordinator. It is possible that he attended a Roman Catholic mass said there by the Jesuit Giulio Aleni. At that time there was a very active local circle of believers in Fu-chou who gathered around this particular Italian priest. Iquan and Ts’êng Ying were both members of this special group. 8 No wonder in his letter Iquan seemed to be expressing an appreciation of Western trade policies, assessing that they were better than the closed policy pursued by the Chinese empire. Whatever the

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6 All those efforts also recorded briefly in: Daghregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 119. 24 Nov. 1632.

7 Huang Jên, Kuo Kêng-wu, TWYH (eds), Ch’üan-chou fu-chih hsüan-lu [Selections from the Local Gazette of Ch’üan-chou Prefecture], TW no. 233, 68. ‘In the year 1631, Tsêng Ying was appointed the coastal defence official of Hsing-Ch’üan (Hsing-hua and Ch’üan-chou)… This was on the recommendation of Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an…’

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case might have been, the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, ultimately remained the only person who could legally issue passes to any Chinese trade junks sailing to Taiwan. Ts'êng Ying’s opinion, expressing the point of view of a lower-ranking official, would not have held any water with the Grand Co-ordinator. Iquan’s letter reveals that another high-ranking official was also involved in his lobbying. This ‘great mandarin’ who showed sympathy and was inclined to help resided in Chang-chou. Only because of the support this great mandarin did Iquan dare to beseech Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien to continue his predecessor’s, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an, policy of granting passes and allowing local people to trade with the Dutch in Taiwan. The highest-ranking mandarin in Chang-chou was the Regional Inspector (Hsün-an), Lu Chên-fei, who was actually ranked more highly than the Grand Co-ordinator himself.9

Hence it seems that Iquan’s party had lobbied the Chinese court to allow the Dutch trade ever since Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an’s term of office. According to a letter Iquan sent to the Governor-General Jacques Specx dated 6 November, these attempts had led to a dead end:

‘So far we have done all we can to achieve freedom of trade for Your Honour. We have always been and still are sincere in offering a helping hand. However, our emperor refused to countenance Chinese engaging in business with the Dutch in whatever form.’10

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9 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ang-pien hsüan-lu’, 165. 15 Oct. 1632, ‘[the emperor replied] Tsou Wei-lien had been just assigned as the new Grand Co-ordinator, therefore he should not resign because of the pirate raids. All the achievements and failures of the Fu-chien government will be reported by the Regional Inspector’; Chi Liu-chi, ‘Lu-wên-chên kung-ch’uan[Biography of Lu Chên-fei]’, in Lu Chên-fei, Lu-wên-chên-kung chi[Complete works of Lu Chên-fei], TWH, I, No. 4, 498. This confirms that this Regional Inspector was Lu Chên-fei; Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles, 253

10 VOC 1109, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Iquan aen den gouverneur
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This situation explains why the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, refused to fly in the face of the emperor’s order, even though Iquan pressed him to hand out at least a few passes for junks sailing to Taiwan, notwithstanding the fact that the Dutch obviously preferred to trade freely from their own junks in the Chiu-lung River estuary. Iquan reported the disappointing results of their lobbying:

‘We have approached His Honour ([Tsou Wei-lien]) several times, and seriously set out and championed the business prospect of the Company. His Honour replied, that we should exhort Your Honour’s people to return to Taiwan, and then passes will be granted to (Chinese junks to sail to) all places.’¹¹

In the other words, Iquan had arranged with the new Grand Co-ordinator that he could at least allow his people to trade with the Dutch if they met in Taiwan. After Gamsia and Bindiok had welcomed the Dutch, these two merchants sent petitions to the court. According to Iquan:

‘Immediately a letter (signed by Gamsia and Bindiok) was sent to His Majesty (in order to procure some passes so as to improve the trade). What answer we shall receive, only time will tell. Because I treat everyone fairly and reasonably, I fear no one (although there are some jealous people who slander me).’¹²

In Iquan’s opinion, the merchants’ petition was the best way to bring about the legalization of the Sino-Dutch trade. The Dutch considered this questionable. Their first objection was that the price of silk sold by the

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¹¹ Ibid., fo. 213v.
¹² VOC 1109, Translaet missive van den mandorijn Iquan aen den gouverneur generael [Jacque] Specx, Chiu-lung River, [received on] 6 Nov. 1632, fo. 213v.
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Chinese merchants in Taiwan would be higher than the price offered by the Chinese vendors who sold their goods in small lots in Chiu-lung River estuary. The second reservation was that the Dutch had been running their business in the Chiu-lung River estuary since at least 1630 more or less satisfactorily. Finally, although Shogun Tokugawa Iemitsu had ceased to issue passes in the year 1629 to 1630, in 1631 five and in 1632 three junks had left from Japan to visit the Spanish settlement in north Taiwan. In January 1633, a Japanese junk which belonged to a Chinese Anachoda named Kijko had arrived in Taiwan with a pass issued by the Dutch president at Firando, Cornelis van Nieuwenood. Its cargo was worth about 10,000 taels. This arrival of this junk from Japan would no doubt drive up the silk price in Taiwan. After due consideration of all these reasons, Governor Hans Putmans of Taiwan decided to take his trading capital to the Chiu-lung River estuary once again in the middle of February in 1633.

Putmans sent a letter to Iquan explaining that he had come because he was eager to know what the Emperor’s reply to the petition of October 1632 had been. Iquan replied immediately. He explained that the execution of the plan had been delayed because of some trivial problems but was going ahead nonetheless:

‘As regards the trade, I have remonstrated with the Grand Co-ordinator that when I was in Fu-chou I went to fill my junks with cargo. He therefore sent an express letter to the court. His Majesty’s reply was that it has never been the custom to dispatch junks to Taiwan in the past, therefore proposal was out

14 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer de rivier Chincheo aan Iquan[The letter from Hans Putmans to Iquan at Chiu-lung River], Taiwan, 12 Feb. 1633, Fo. 237'.
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of the question. In response to this, I have written to several notable men in Chang-chou explaining that those people in Taiwan [the Dutch] are one and the same nation as those in Batavia (or Kalapa, the original name recorded by Chinese for generations). 15

Under the constitution of the Chinese empire, all trade with foreigners had to be within the framework of the tributary system. Foreign rulers delegated envoys to pay homage to the Chinese emperor who symbolized the centre of the universe and the trade was carried out under the aegis of this diplomatic ritual as an extension of the exchange of presents. All foreign countries participating were supposed to have been registered on a list since the fourteenth century. The Europeans who had been arriving in Asia since the sixteenth century were all total strangers in this traditional picture. 16 Iquan had to persuade the emperor that the Dutch had taken the place of the Kalapa kingdom, because Kalapa (which was occupied by the Dutch and renamed Batavia in 1619) was known to the Chinese of former times. The idea was that, after the emperor had recognized the Dutch were based at Kalapa, the traditional trade with Kalapa could be extended to Taiwan and be legalized. It is a pity that Iquan did not explain this in detail and that the Dutch did not have the patience to wait for the outcome. The only matter which concerned them was whether Chinese junks would be allowed to visit Taiwan, yes or no. 17

Iquan was not able to offer Putmans any assistance in the trade in

15 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received on] 16 Feb. 1633, Fo. 2355. Kalapa is the original name of Batavia which had been recorded by the Chinese for generations.
17 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Taiwan, [received on] 16 Feb. 1633, Fo. 2355. Iquan mentioned five to six junks were ready to sail. Since the mandarin refused to issue passes, they dared not to leave for Taiwan.
Chiu-lung River estuary and An-hai, because he had been assigned to other places. He wrote:

‘Because I am now a mandarin and subject to the emperor, I am not allowed to trade. Therefore I cannot help Your Honour in the trade. The matters of trade are the business of the merchants and Your Honour should lodge your request with them and persuade them [to help you].

Your Honour falls under the jurisdiction of the Mobile Crops Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou (You-chi of Ch’üan-nan[C.]; Jouick van Swanglang[D.]). Your Honour can write a personal letter to him, explaining the purpose of your visit, and ask him to issue the licences which would allow the merchants to trade. Your Honour said in your letter that if the trade is not allowed, other measures will have to be resorted to. Let the above-mentioned Commander consider this.’

The evidence seems to indicate that Iquan’s plan for issuing passes by referring to the relations formerly maintained with Kalapa was not only doomed, but he personally was being transferred away to another post. He even returned the gifts sent by Governor Putmans with the same letter. This gesture terrified Putmans, especially because Chinese merchants were still 125,741 guilders in debt to him according to the accounts up to 18 February. Four days later, Iquan sent another letter informing Putmans about the petition. He mentioned that a group of mandarins had voiced strong objections to the legalization of the trade. Their opposition meant that the case now passed into the hands of the ministry of Rites (Li Pu, in charge of

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18 Ibidem.
19 VOC 1113, Per het Comptoir Taijouan aen het Comptoir Generael op Batavia f 503,817:17:2 voor soooveel de naervolgende contanten, coopmanschapen, scheeps behoeften, victualien, ammoniten van oorloge ende andere restanten als uijtstaende schulden comen te monteren [The factory of Taiwan had been lent f. 503,817:17:2 in cash, commodities, provisions, ammunitions by the general factory in Batavia], Taiwan, 18 Feb. 1633, fo. 527⁷.
the tributary missions). Before the matter was settled, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien refused to issue any pass. Iquan warned Putmans that if he ventured to engage in the smuggling trade right now, public opinion might turn against to him. The best solution was to halt the trade for a while. In despair, Putmans now wrote a very long letter protesting that the Dutch had been the dupe of the Chinese officials since 1622. He addressed this letter to all the principal mandarins, including the Grand Co-ordinator, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Chang-chou, the Coastal Defence Circuit of Chi’ian-chou, the Regional Commander in Amoy and the Mobile Crops Commander of Wu-t’ung. Then he sailed seething with resentment but with empty holds to Batavia on the first day of March.

Cry wolf again? Imperial permission for Sino-Taiwan trade

Ironically, the eventual success of Iquan’s strategy was just on the point of materializing. The Ministry of Rites agreed that the Grand Co-ordinator had the right to issue passes to trading junks bound for Taiwan. Iquan explained this as follows:

‘The superme mandarin in Chang-chou has sent a message to the Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch’ao-chou (Chootsieu[D]) and Chang-chou (Sonchieu[D]). His Honour has sent this notice to the Grand Co-ordinator [Tsou Wei-lien] and he had also remonstrated with the Imperial Council for Foreign Affairs [Ministry of Rites]. In the message, his Honour [announces that he] has decided to grant passes to junks bound for Batavia or Taiwan. It

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20 VOC 1109, Missive van Iquan naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, [received on], 21 Feb. 1633, Fo. 236v.
21 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Hocchieuw aen Combon van de provincie van Hocchieuw [Letter from Governor Hans Putmans to the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien in Fu-chou], Chiu-lung River, 25 Feb. 1633, fo. 238v.
is a sure and rightful way to [gain] freedom of trade for the Company. 22

It looks as if the other important mandarin the Coastal Defence Circuit of Ch’ao-chou and Chang-chou (Ch’ao-chang hai-tao) had sided with Iquan. Probably because the opinions of these two officials carried crucial weight, public opinion finally swung in Iquan’s direction. The emperor left the matter in the hands of the Ministry of Rites to decide. The time had now come for the Regional Inspector, Lu Chên-fei, the most superior mandarin in Chang-chou, to intervene. This mandarin dutifully recorded the emperor’s opinion on this matter and also noted how the local peoples had reacted to the maritime ban imposed by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien:

‘Regarding to the opening of foreign trade, the emperor has commented: ”The red-haired barbarians threaten us [by their attempts] to obtain trading rights. However, if all local authorities execute their administration as stringently as possible to prevent smuggling, their threats should not amount to anything much. Only because the Coastal Defence Systems have been corrupted and mischievous merchants trade covertly [with the Dutch] do such problems arise. At this court, we have still not made a decision about granting permission for this foreign trade. Someone has said it would be better to allow these people to trade in Manila rather than in Taiwan. My question is: since both of these are foreign countries, if we were to issue our junks permits to trade there, how can we force them to leave us alone? All mandarins should deliberate on this point and give your opinions.” The mandarins from Chiuan-chou have argued that the opening of foreign trade would generate four kinds of interests. The mandarins from Chang-chou have asserted that piracy is not the result of trade with the foreigners. I [Lu Chên-fei] and Grand Co-ordinator Tsou [Wei-lien] have listened to these opinions and, knowing that everyone had a firm perspective in mind and was eager to speak out, we have judged most of opinions were in favour of

22 VOC1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, [received on] 23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536°.
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opening up. 23

Yielding to the pressure exerted by Iquan’s party, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien declared himself willing to make a concession, but only if certain conditions were met. The Dutch should promise never again to visit in the Chiu-lung River estuary with their vessels. On 12 March, an official letter was issued by the Defender (Shou-peij[C.], Sijpeij[D.]) of Amoy, to confirm that the Dutch would be satisfied with such an arrangement:

‘Now Their Highnesses do not know how Your Honour[the Dutch commander] will react. Therefore they cannot proceed with the matter. If the eight junks mentioned above are issued with licences, this will be with the precedent that they enjoy the same treatment as the junks sailing to Manila.’24

Overjoyed by such a victory, on 23 March 1633 Iquan asked a merchant to send this official letter to Taiwan, accompanied by a private letter of his own. He was so excited that he even added some avuncular advice about how to address Chinese officialdom:

‘If you have a notion to write a letter to the high officials of this kingdom, you should add the honorific word “gentlemen (Lao-yeh[C.], Lauja[D.])” after the titles of Coastal Defence Circuit (Hai-tao[C.], Haijtos[D.]), the Provincial Military Commander (T’i-tu[C.], Titohous[D.]), the Assistant Regional Commander (Ts’an-chiang[C.], Samchangs[D.], the Mobile Corps Commander (You-chi[C.], Joukickx[D.]) and the honorific

23 Fan Hsien, Ch'ung-hsiu t'ai-wan fu-shih[Newly Complied Local Gazette of the Taiwan Prefecture], TW no. 105, 588. ‘The record was extracted from Regional Inspector Liu Chên-fei’s book ‘An-min chi-Lüeh [Regional Inspector ’s Memorandum in Fu-chien]’. The completed memorandum might have been lost and not preserved to present time.

24 VOC 1113, Missive van Pongsipij aen Nicolaes Couckebacker [Letter from Lieutenant Peng to Nicolaas Cuckebacker], Taiwan, [received on]12 Mar. 1633, Fo. 537’.
“General-in-Chief” (Ta Chiang-chün [C.], Thaitekoij[D.]) after the title of Deputy-Squadron Leader (Shao-kuan[C.], Tiquans[D.]), Squadron Leader (Pa-tsung[C.], Betsonghs[D.]), Defender (Shou-pei[C.], Sioupijs[D.]). If you treat these people with courtesy, they will soon be championing the trade with the greatest assiduity and bestow their favour on the Company.  

His final sentence says it all: ‘This is a sure and irrefutable act [werk].’ In other words, his efforts to propagate the Dutch trade had prevailed. Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien’s only condition was that the Dutch should promise never to dispatch any vessel to the coast of China again. On 30th, a ‘letter of credence (Credentie brief)’ from the Defender of Amoy was received. In this he urged the Dutch to reconfirm this condition. This letter was mandated by the Grand Co-ordinator, the Regional Inspector (Hsiün-an[C.], Sadnij[D.]), the Coastal Defence Circuit (Hai-tao[C.], Haijtoo[D.]) and the Assistant Regional Commander (Ts‘an-chiang[C.], Samgangh[D.]). The letter is a genuine official document because it not only mentions all the highest ranking officials in Fu-chien province who were affected by this matter, but also carries an addendum, ‘I have written to the Dutch governor, but have not received any reply. Therefore I am sending Your Honour this letter as verification.’

Iquan had pulled every string it was in his power to pull to have his trade with the Dutch legalized, but in his efforts he cut off all contacts between the VOC and the individual Chinese vendors. All trade would henceforth be controlled by the big Chinese merchants and if by some whim they were not willing to apply for passes to Taiwan, the Dutch would have no access to the Chinese market. Another worrying consideration was that, if the Japanese were to continue to visit Taiwan, they would soon outperform the

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25 VOC 1113, Missive van Iquan aen Hans Putmans, 23 Mar. 1633, Fo. 536v.
26 VOC 1113, Commissie ofte credentie brief door sioupij van Aijmoij bij den coopman Sidnia [Letter of Credence from the Lieutenant of Amoy delivered by the Chinese merchant Sidnia], 25 Mar. 1633, fo. 538v.
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Dutch because they had the edge in price competition. The only option open to the Dutch was formally to establish official links and exclude the Japanese traders, under the pretext that their participation was deemed illegal by the Chinese authorities.

Contrary to Iquan’s expectations, the Dutch in Taiwan did not seem overjoyed and replied ambiguously. The acting governor of Taiwan, Nicolaes Coeckbacker, replied on 6 April 1633:

‘We shall remove our ships from the coast of China, after the commodities ordered have been supplied in sufficient quantities. Only after the said eight junks have arrived here with all the appointed commodities, do we promise that your strictures will be obeyed. If you allow Cheng Tai and Hung Hsiû and the other merchants to bring the commodities in accordance with the order we dispatched, the Company will not only live with you in great friendship, but will also offer [you] some other special services [sonderlingen dienst].’

By the time this letter arrived on An-hai, Iquan had probably already left for Kuang-tung on his mission to pacify Liu Hsiang. Diplomatically speaking, the Dutch governor should have replied to the Defender or Regional Commander of Amoy rather than to Iquan who held no official position there. The former was the appropriate person with whom the Dutch should have had corresponded. The Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Chi’üan-chou, Chang Yung-ch’êan, sent another private letter to urge the acting president of the Taiwan trading factory, Nicolaes Coeckerbaker, to confirm the message:

‘I have sent Your Honour an earlier letter; but so far I have not received a reply. The three great mandarins dispatch their servants [hither] every day to

27 VOC 1113, Missive van Nicolaes Couckebacker naer de rivier van Chinehoe aen Iquan, Taiwan, 6 Apr. 1633, fo. 532v.
28 VOC 1113, Missive van Gampea aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537v; Missive van Bendioeq aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, [not located], [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fos.537v-538v.
hear your answer to our letter. Your Honour, please send us an answer quickly.'

These great mandarins must have been Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien, Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei and Coastal Defence Circuit. As the change of the monsoon season was imminent, the Dutch fleet could appear on the coast of China again at any time. To avoid the incipient catastrophe of the arrival of the Dutch fleet where it was no longer welcome, even before the Dutch had replied Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien decided to dispatch junks to meet it. Iquan sent a letter to Taiwan on 22 May informing the Dutch that four junks from Chang-chou and four junks from Ch’üan-chou were on the point of leaving carrying the imperial passes.

Acting-President Nicolaes Coekerbacker still doubted whether these eight junks would really show up in Taiwan, so he made cautious enquires among the Chinese merchants there, who confirmed this news, saying:

‘Placards have been posted in the jurisdictions of Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou, and also on all the gates of Hai-ch’êng city ( Haton[D.]) for this purpose, declaring that anyone who wants to take a junk to Taiwan after paying the imperial tax, as well as those people who intend to trade with Manila, can purchase their passes from the Assistant Coastal Defence Circuit, (Hai-fang t’ung-chih [C.],’ Haijon[D.]) who is issuing the passes by order of the Grand Co-ordinator.'

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29 VOC 1113, Missive van Silouja aen Nicolaes Couckebacker, [received on]12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537v. Chang Yung-ch’an was serving as Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou, vide: Tsou Wei-lien, ‘fêng-ch’ao hung-i pao-chieh shu’, 236.
30 VOC 1113, Missive van Thee Silongh [Iquan] aen Nicolaes Couckebaker, [received on]22 May 1633, fol. 539r.
31 VOC 1113, Missive van Nicolaes Couckebacker aen de gouverneur commandeur oft overhoofdén comende met de schepen van Batavia naer Taijouan [Letter from Nicolaes Couckebacker to the Governor, Commander or Admiral outward bound to
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Hence the first benefits of Iquan’s arrangement fell to the Chinese side; the Sino-Taiwan trade was legalized, using the example of Manila where the Spaniards had no official diplomatic ties with the Chinese empire as precedent.

Red-haired Barbarians at the Gate

Despite Iquan’s efforts, Governor Hans Putmans had long lost patience with the time-consuming procedure required to be granted access to legal trade on the basis of unequal status. In a letter to the Gentlemen XVII dated 14 October 1632, he had proposed to follow the belligerent example set by the Chinese pirates and make a strike, since when the latter had employed this tactic all of them had been able to force the Grand Co-ordinators to listen to what they had to say. He complained:

‘This truly reveals the sort of treacherous and cowardly people the Chinese are. ... The more you deal with them with courtesy, civility, and punctiliousness, (as we have seen in a host of examples), the more they make us suffer and the more they push us around in circles and wear us out.’

Putmans had reached the conclusion that military means would be necessary to force any granting of permission to trade with Chinese vendors in the Chiu-lung River estuary. When he returned to Batavia in April 1633, he

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Taiwan from Batavia], Taiwan, 31 May 1633, fo. 540v; According to the established pass-system, the pass was issued by an agent in Chang-chou prefecture, whose title was’ Hai-fung t’ung-chih’. Cf: Li Ch’ing-hsin, Ming-tai hai-wai mao-i chih-to[The Overseas Trade System of Ming Dynasty], (Peking, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2007), 320-25; This title is not included in Hucker’s dictionary and has been translated with the closest term.

32 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlandt Lissuw [naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam], 14 Oct. 1632, Fo. 197v.
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reported his experiences and revealed the plans he had made to Governor-General Hendrick Brouwer and the Council of the Indies in Batavia.\(^{33}\) After he had done so, they agreed to wage a war on China.\(^{34}\) On 2 June, Hans Putmans departed from Batavia with a fleet of six ships and four yachts and set his course towards Chang-chou.\(^{35}\) The fleet arrived at T’ung-shan Island, off the southern coast of Fu-chien province on 5 July. Here they met the yacht the Kamphaen sent from Taiwan on 3 June by President Nicolaes Coekerbacker to bring them up to date with all the negotiations which had taken place between March to June.\(^{36}\) On 7 July, after one day’s deliberation, Putmans made his decision: he assumed that this news was just another misleading lie and prepared for to launch an attack without further ado. He was confident that Iquan had no any knowledge of his secret plan. At that moment, five to six junks had just returned to Chang-chou from Manila. Iquan’s brother had put in charge of some of the war-junks en route from An-hai to the Kuang-tung coast where he was to take up a new assignment, but he bulk of his own fleet was still anchored in the Amoy roadstead after his second sea battle with the pirate Liu Hsiang.\(^{37}\) Is it possible that from the outset Putmans’ target had been Iquan’s force?

Hans Putmans left only three yachts moored near Nan-ao Island,


\(^{34}\) VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 228'.

\(^{35}\) Dagregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 186-7. 2 June 1633; Generale Missive, 15 Aug. 1633, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 110. The ship the Warmont was not in Batavia at that moment but was appointed to join this action.

\(^{36}\) Dagregister Zeelandia, 1 1629-1641, 93. 19 May 1633; VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230'. The yacht the Kamphaen had been dispatched to meet the new fleet from Batavia.

\(^{37}\) VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230'.
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with instructions to go after all Chinese junks returning from Manila, Quinam, Cambodia or any other destination to ports along the coast between Nan-ao and the Chiu-lung River estuary. He took the other seven vessels with him with the plan to destroy all Iquan’s war-junks anchored at Amoy at dawn on 12 July. This surprise attack was a great victory for the Dutch fleet because as it had been caught on the hop, the Chinese armada did not have time to prepare for battle. Twenty-five to thirty great war-junks were lying at anchor when the Dutch fleet opened its bombardment. Realizing the hopelessness of the situation, many of the Chinese crews soon gave up the struggle and fled into the city of Amoy. The action continued the whole day and the Dutch ended up capturing three big war-junks and burned or sinking the others.

When all this was happening, the commander of the garrison in Amoy, Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou (residing in Amoy) Chang Yung-ch’àn was not present. He had been dispatched to Ch’üan-chou with his most experienced soldiers and had probably taken the majority of his war-junks with him. Iquan who had taken up residence in An-hai, had left his fleet in Amoy for an overhaul and cleaning. As Coastal Defence Circuit Ts’êng Ying’s report states that only five large war-junks of the Amoy garrison were destroyed by the Dutch, most of those sunk in the raid must have belonged to Iquan. Ts’êng Ying’s report specifies that ten to nineteen war-junks were sunk, so that more than half of them were Iquan’s.38

As evening fell, the Chinese merchants Gamsia, Bindiok and the Defender Garrison Commander of Amoy (Wang shou-pei[C.J, Angpij[D.J)

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38 Lu Chên-fei, ‘Ping-pu t’i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u fu-chien hsūn-an Lu Chên-fei t’i kao[Report of Regional Inspector of Fu-chien Lu Chên-fei preserved in the Ministry of war’], in TWYH (ed.), Chêng-shih shih-liao ch’u-pien, TW, no. 157, 88. ‘Some ten more junks were burned by Cheng Chih-lung’s troops, while five junks were burned by Chang Yung-ch’àn’s troops, under Mobile Corps Commander of Wu-t’ung.’
came to parley with Putmans. They were bursting with questions about why the Dutch had carried out a raid of this nature. It seems they had booty in mind since five to six Chinese junks had already returned from Manila, so Putmans probably fostered hopes of confiscating the remaining five to six richly laden junks which were due to arrive any time. Finally, ten days later on 22 July, the Dutch fleet did capture a Chinese junk from Manila with a cargo worth about 30,766 rials, including 27,994 rials in cash. By then the Mobile Corps Commander of Southern Ch’üan-chou, Chang Yung-ch’an, had returned to Amoy city. The letter addressed to Hans Putmans written by the Coastal Defence Circuit on 26 July was also signed by Chang Yung-ch’an and Iquan. They asked whether he desired peace or war. Three days later Putmans replied that what the Dutch wanted was to be able to trade freely in the Chiu-lung River estuary on an equal footing with all the other vendors rather than to be restricted to do business with specific merchants assigned to them in Taiwan.

The conditions the Dutch had demanded after their arrival in the Pescadores Islands in 1622 had never been officially approved. Iquan had expended much time and energy trying to persuade the Dutch that these

39 It is certain the ‘pei’ refers to ‘Shou-pei’, but what the ‘Ang’ represents cannot be identified.
41 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230v.
42 VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, Fo. 230v; Inventaris vande Haer volgende contant ende coopmanschappen uitj een joncquen comende van Manila in dato 22en Julij anno 1633 bij t jacht den Zalm voordezen Rievier Chineeo verovert, [Inventory of Cash and Commodities on a Junk Outward Bound from Manila on 22 July 1633 captured by the Yacht the Zalm in the Vicinity of the Chiu-lung River], [not located], 22 July 1633, fo. 290v.
43 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 112. 26 July 1633.
44 Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 114. 29 July 1633.
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conditions were unacceptable to the Chinese Imperial court, but Hans Putmans remained obdurate. His motive might have been that he did not believe that the Dutch would be able to compete with the Japanese merchants in Taiwan. In other words, if they were to secure the Sino-Japan trade, the Dutch were limited to two options only: either somehow or other to exclude the Japanese merchants from Taiwan or to participate in direct trade with Chinese in the Chiu-lung River estuary. As it was, the Dutch seemed to have been convinced that if they harried the Chinese coast continually, they might be able to obtain opportunities to take part in the smuggling trade with Chinese vendors in the Chiu-lung River estuary. They also had an ulterior motive. Their reasoning also seems to have been that, if all Chinese naval vessels were destroyed, they personally could seize all the Chinese junks from Manila, which they had so far left to Iquan to deal with as he wished. The long and the short of it was that the Dutch appear to have believed that they could take Iquan’s place in the Sino-Japan trade.45

In August, Iquan decided that his best option was to tackle the Dutch outright, but still no real battle took place. On the 24th the area was struck by a very severe typhoon, which forced both sides to cease their hostilities. On 30 August, because of the hazardous conditions created by the strong winds

45 Leonard Blussé had correctly emphasized that Governor Putmans’s project was to follow in the footsteps of the Portuguese in Macao and win a free trade privileges from the Chinese court by means of eliminating any other force which happened to be cruising Chinese coastal waters. He also points out that the absence of Iquan was the factor which triggered Putmans’ aggressive action. However, in my opinion the trigger which fired Putmans’ aggressive attitude was the new Grand Co-ordinator’s, Tsou Wei-lien, plausible decision to cut off the illegal trade between peddlers and the VOC in Chiu-lung River estuary. Cf. Leonard Blussé, ‘The VOC as Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Stereotypes and Social Engineering on the China Coast’, in Wilt Lukas Idema (ed.), Leyden Studies in Sinology: Papers Presented at the Conference held in Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Sinological Institute of Leyden University, December 8-12, 1980, (Lieden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 87-105 at 101.
and driving rain, the Dutch fleet sailed from Amoy and returned to T’ung-shan Island in the south. The following day, they captured two big junks just returned from Quinam, loaded with cargo worth about 13,694 rials. After this rich capture, they did not encounter any other fully laden junks as the south monsoon season was gradually coming to an end. Because the north wind was increasing in strength, they could not sail back to Amoy again before 16 October.

Thwarted by the weather, the Dutch fleet was not able to put its strategy of blockading Amoy Harbour throughout of the whole southern monsoon season into action. Therefore the booty they had captured was far less than they had expected. On 22 October, the fleet of eight yachts succeeded in sailing against the wind to the outskirts of Chiu-lung River estuary. As he was well aware of the situation, it seems impossible to think that Iquan’s armada had not been feverishly recruiting new vessels to fight the Dutch flotilla during the past two months. After carefully weighing up his chances, rather than opting for a pitched battle, he reverted to the old tactics that he had adopted earlier against Frederik de Witt in 1629. He let the Dutch fleet sail into the Amoy Bay and then sealed its mouth with suicidal fire-junks. As the Dutch confronted his 150 war-junks, they did not realize all these junks were all crewed by men who were potentially prepared to drop their vessels if it should be necessary for them to do so. In the battle which followed they lost two yachts. Governor Hans Putmans wrote:

'[We] had no chance to compete against their suicidal fire junks, [so we]

46 VOC 1109, Inventaris van de coopmanschappen bevonden in twee jonquen, onder de stad Tangsoa op de wal sitende ende op 31 Augs- anno 1633 aengehaelt, ende voor een geode prijse verclaert, [Inventory of the Commodities Loaded in the Two Junks Captured in the Vicinity of T’ung-shan], location unknown, 31 Aug. 1633, fo. 291'. The total value of the goods was calculated from the inventory and the price list in the same document, see Appendix; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 123. 31 Aug. 1633.
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weighed anchor and sailed away.

..., having blown towards their fleet by the wind, the Coukerken did her best to escape. But it was too late. Encircled by fifteen to sixteen big junks, the yacht was immediately stormed by them. ⁴⁷

Putmans led the other five yachts towards the Pescadores, where he summoned his council and declared that the projected war against China would be abandoned.⁴⁸

Lever effect of the Typhoons at the Imperial Court

Superficially it seems that Iquan was the one who suffered from this Dutch raid, but closer examination shows that in fact it tended to reinforce and expand his already substantial influence. The two typhoons which arose at the end of August and in the middle of September prevented the Dutch fleet from blockading Amoy Bay. The upshot was that the combat between the Dutch and Chinese garrison troops did not happen around Amoy, but in the vicinity of T’ung-shan.

When the Dutch arrived at T’ung-shan on 5 July, they acted very calmly. Five days later on the 10th they left and set course for Amoy, leaving only three yachts behind. They bided their time before launching any raid and allowed the five junks belonging to Iquan’s brother to pass through into Kuang-tung waters. This reticence was deemed advisable if they were to conceal their intention of surprising Iquan’s armada in Amoy. On 12th they began to attack the junks belonging to Chinese garrison of T’ung-shan. One of the crews, Thijs Hendrisen, reported:

⁴⁷ VOC 1114, Missive van Hans Putmans aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 28 Oct. 1634, Fo. 2'.
⁴⁸ Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, p. 140. 31 Oct. 1633.
‘...we decided to follow your orders, and to destroy the vessels lying at Nan-ao. This was executed successfully. We attacked 28 junks and set fire to them. Most of these junks were equipped for war, and carried a full complement of soldiers. When they saw that we were in deadly earnest, they fled to land immediately.’

The report from the garrison troops states that there were thirteen garrison war-junks carrying 600 soldiers. Five junks were burned, even though they had returned fire ferociously. Their crews retreated to safety on land in T’ung-shan City. The leader of the garrison troops was the Regional Deputy-Commander of Nan-ao, Ch’êng Ying-lin. He was of higher rank than Iquan, and the Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, apparently showed a marked preference for him as an reliable military man. After Iquan’s force had been destroyed in Amoy by Putmans, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien, thought this might be a chance to get rid him or at least teach him a good lesson. He severely criticized Iquan, writing that his tolerant attitude towards the red-haired barbarians had caused this disaster. He also mentioned that the reason the Dutch fleet remained in Amoy rather at T’ung-shan was

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49 VOC 1111, Missive van Thijs Hendricxden aen Hans Putmans, onder zeijl voor Wierings baeij[Letter from Thijs Hendrisen to Hans Putmans under sail to Ching-hai T’ou bay], not located, 23 July 1633, fo. 542v. Wierings Bay is ‘Ching-hai T’ou’ Bay, see picture 3.

50 Lu, ‘ Ping-pu t‘i-hsing ping-k’ê ch’ao-ch’u fu-ch’ien hsûn-an Lu Chên-fei t‘i kao’, 86. ‘ The thirteen junks and six hundred soldiers of the Chang-chou garrison opened fire with cannon... In the opening stages [of the battle] Hsieh Chi’s junk was burned by the Dutch, the other four junks were also burned... the sailors and soldiers landed from their junks and ensconced themselves in Fort Nan-ao while the Dutch ships ceased their action.’

51 Ibidem, 83. Critical letter written by Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien to the emperor entitled ‘How my prediction came true when the Dutch launched a sudden assault. I accuse the Coastal Defence of negligence and urge them to expel the Dutch so as to redeem their laxity.’ The Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei thought this letter apparently referred to Iquan and was blaming him.
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because of the glorious victory won by Regional Deputy Commander Ch’êng Ying-lin. Perhaps for the same reason, this aversion to Iquan, the most important supporter of Iquan’s Dutch trade policy, the Coastal Defence Circuit, Ts’êng Ying, was demoted at the same time.

Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien might have achieved his desire had not the two typhoons brought the Dutch fleet back to Nan-ao Island, the area under the command of Regional Deputy-Commander, Ch’êng Ying-lin. There the Dutch fleet not only captured two valuable Chinese junks from Quinam, but also seized 214 cattle from the coast as booty.

When the Dutch did eventually return to the Chiu-lung River estuary where it was defeated by Iquan on 22 October, public sympathy swung his way. The Regional Inspector, Lu Chên-fei, Iquan’s other fervent supporter, made no bones about this. Making a comparison between Iquan and Regional Deputy Commander Ch’êng Ying-lin, he said that the former had not only fought on water in other areas where out of his garrison zone and had suffered greatly, he had also helped the garrison troops in Amoy to win a glorious victory. (Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien had put him in charge of this military action because of Ts’êng Ying’s recommendation). In contrast with his military proven prowess, Ch’êng Ying-lin had not been able to prevent the assaults launched on Amoy from T’ung-shan and had failed to protect his charge properly when it was attacked by the Dutch. Consequently Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien was dismissed by the emperor after this incident. His fall from grace was also partly attributable to the disputes

52 Ibid., 84.
raging between factions at the imperial court as well as his un-co-operative attitude which had irritated the Fu-chienese mandarins.  

As a consequence of accusations lodged by Regional Inspector Lu Chên-fei, Grand Co-ordinator Tsou Wei-lien’s impotence in military matters and in maintaining law and order in the local situation could no longer be overlooked by the court. The emperor ordered somebody else be appointed to his position. Ironically, the official order was issued on 21 October, just one day before Iquan’s victory in the Chiu-lung River estuary. Although the court still did not recognize Taiwan as an official trading destination, local opinion in Fu-chien was adamant about its commercial possibilities and Coastal Defence Circuit Ts’êng Ying issued the Ch’üan-chou merchants with provisional passes after February of 1634. Coincidentally, just at the same time the Ministry of War issued a command in response to Tsou Wei-lien’s letter: how could the Grand Co-ordinator complain about the militants under him? He should have apportioned rewards or punishment according to their achievements and abilities. Tsou Wei-lien is guilty of dereliction of his duty.

55 TWYH (ed.), Ming-shih hsüan-chi, TW no. 307, 153. ‘All the Fu-chienese mandarins who served in Peking accused him (Tsou Wei-lien) at the imperial court; consequently he was relieved of his post by the emperor.’


57 Dagregister Zeelandia, 1 1629-1641, 196-7. 21 Oct 1634. New Grand Co-ordinator Shên You-lung approved the provisional passes issued before October 1634 but some official had already issued these sometime earlier than that. In a letter written in 1639, Ts’ai Hsien-ch’ên had mentions that Coastal Defence Circuit Ts’êng Ying had issued the passes which allowed Amoy junks to trade in Kuang-tung with the acknowledgement of the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Shên You-lung, and the governor of Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, Hsiung Wên-t’san, This document confirms the official who was in the position to issue provisional passes was Ts’êng Ying. Ts’ai, Ch’ing-pai t’ang gao, II, 889-90.
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time the Nagasaki regent was accused of issuing passes for junks sailing to Southeast Asia, including Taiwan, without the acknowledgment of the Shogun. His slap on the wrist meant that no more Japanese junks would be able to come to Taiwan with a shogunal pass. The sense of urgency which forced the Dutch to fight so hard to obtain free trade in Chiu-lung River estuary suddenly dissipated. The hostile feelings towards Iquan vanished as snow before the sun as the first junks sailed into the bay of Taijouan. In retrospect, during the summer and autumn of 1633 Iquan was facing storms which threatened his personal career at the imperial court and in Fu-chien waters, but after the tempests had been ridden out with luck and patience, both turned out to be very beneficial to him.

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Picture 3. Map of China and Taiwan, part
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Source: VEL 272, Kaart van China en Formosa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Place name along the coast in Dutch</th>
<th>Place name along the coast in Chinese</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>Kuang-chou</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>I. Haitiumon</td>
<td>Island Hu-t’ou-mên</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>Ao-mên</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>P. Lantaon</td>
<td>Cape of Nan-t’ou</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Pedra Branca</td>
<td>Ta-hsing</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Haarlems Bai/ Pingaisou</td>
<td>P’ing-hai-so</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Branders Bay/ Kamptso</td>
<td>Yen-chou</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Kramers bay</td>
<td>Hou-mên</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Pesau de schaar/ Groote imbocht</td>
<td>Pai-sha-hu</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Oucham</td>
<td>Wu-kan near by (Groeningen Bay/ Tien-wei)</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Reiersens bai/ Cathei</td>
<td>Chia-tzu</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Cape de Goed hoop/ Phcio</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Tsinsing</td>
<td>Shên-ch’üan</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Nassouen bai/ onbekende imbocht</td>
<td>(Ch’ih-ao)</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Wieringens bai/Zinhaisou</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Orangebai/ Zoatoupou</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>I. Lama/ Lamon</td>
<td>Island Nan-ao</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Klox bay</td>
<td>Bay of Clock/ Bay of Hsüan-chung¹</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Tongsoa</td>
<td>T’ung-shan</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Tongsoa/ victorie bay</td>
<td>Bay of T’ung-shan</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Walvis bai</td>
<td>Bay of Whale / Bay of Liu-ao²</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Tinhaij</td>
<td>Chên-hai</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Berg van Chinchieu</td>
<td>Mountain South Ta-wu</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Quemoy</td>
<td>Quemoy</td>
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¹ ‘Hsüan-chung’ literally means ‘a clock hanged’.

² ‘Liu-ao’ literally means ‘six gigantic fishes’.
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<td>27</td>
<td>R. Cinchieu</td>
<td>Chiu-lung River</td>
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The Chinese place names are mostly taken from ‘Yen-hai Ch’üan-t’u [The Complete Coastal Map of China] ’in: Ch’en Lun-chiung, Hai-kuo Wên-chien-lü [My Knowledge about the Regions Abroad], T’ai-wan Wên-hsien Shih-liao Ts’ung-k’an [Compilation of historical documents relating to Taiwan] vol. 7, 36-69; * Hao Yü-lin, Fu-chien T’ung-chih [The General Gazette of Fuchien], Ching-yin Wên-yüen-kê Ssu-k’ut-s’ung-shu, No. 527, 59