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CHAPTER FOUR

THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF THE AN-HAI TRADING EMPORIUM

1630-1633

1630: the exceptional year in which the Eastern Ocean monopoly of An-hai was established

Over such a span of time it is difficult to tell whether Iquan knew that the Dutch in Taiwan had decided to put a brake on their cruising expeditions against the Chinese junks sailing to and from Manila. Historical fact states that in summer of 1631 the governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, visited Amoy to pay compensation for the loss of a Chinese junk which had been plundered on her way back to China from Manila. The local Hai-ch’êng gazette reports the sea ban was lifted in that year. Interestingly, the tax revenues which Hai-ch’êng had hoped for from the expected rise in shipping fell short of the high expectations. This local record runs counter to both the Dutch and Spanish accounts, which mention large numbers of junks sailing to the Philippines. The Dutch records state that fifty-three Chinese junks arrived in Manila that year, a number which tallies fairly closely with the Spanish records which mention fifty. Perhaps this shortfall (many junks, but

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1 Liang Chao-yang, ‘Hai-ch’êng hsien-chih’, 382. ‘In the year 1631, the oceanic trade was again permitted. But the customs revenues were still meagre.’ The court records tally with this information, showing that the emperor ordered to open up the trade on 4 August 1631. cf. The Minister of War, Hsiung Mingyü, Ch’ou-i Fu-chien k’ai-hai li-hai [Considerations on pros en cons concerning the opening of the Overseas Trade in Fu-chien] Setp. 1631’, in: Ch’en Yün-lin, Ming-ch’ing Kung-ts’ang t’ai-wan tang-an hui-pien, vol. 3, 150-97 at 192-3.

2 VOC 1102, The Information about Manila, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555r; William
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disappointing tax revenues) can be explained by the prevalence of smuggling which continued to paralyse the legal trade. As mentioned before, fifty-three small junks carried about as much as twelve big ones. Since the officials were approached for permission by only a small number of applicants who wished to pursue licit trade, it would appear that most of the junks sailing on Manila were small-sized junks belonging to smugglers. Other evidence reveals that the size of a fishing junk was very similar to that of these small trading junks:

‘Whether, according to the instructions of the Honourable Governor-General, [our] junks should cruise between Fu-chou and Chi-lung (where the enemy’s stronghold is located) in the course of this voyage in order to intercept, confront, and attack Chinese trading junks sailing to or back from there, or whether according to the instructions from Japan, from their assessment of the situation in the Chinese trade, that we should save our expenses in this matter as [it seems the outcome of] a sustained cruising action against the Manila junks would be uncertain. [This is] because the many fishing junks which sail these waters every day are so big, they can scarcely if all to be distinguished from the trading junks. If some of them are hit or attacked by accident, this always arouses ire against us in China….’

It is true that two very important fishing grounds were located on the sea route between Ch’üan-chou and Japan, and that between Japan and Manila. The first lay very close to the sea route from Ch’üan-chou to


3 Cf. Chapter 2, footnote 105.

4 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert [door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 4 Oct.1631, fos. 543v-544r. Although it describes the size of fishing junks as ‘big’, this is a comparison with the off-shore fishing junks. It does not imply that these fishing junks were as big as the overseas trading junks sailing to Siam and Java. The enemy in Chi-lung refers to the Spaniards.
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Okinawa (J., Ryūkyū (J.), Liu-ch’io (C.)) and Japan, not far from the northeastern Taiwanese waters where an upwelling current forms a natural fishing ground. The junks sailing to Japan usually set a course towards these waters first before following the string of islands of the Ryūkyū Archipelago until they reached Kyushu. The second fishing ground was situated close to the southwestern coast of Taiwan, where a cold current (the Oyashio) meets a warm current (the Kuroshio). The junks sailing to Manila usually set course for the Pescadores, from where they headed south, sailing along the coast of Taiwan towards Luzon. This route crosses the fishing grounds where the warm and cold currents meet.

It is amazing that the Chinese officials believed that by restricting the size of ships and the quantity of provisions they could carry they could confine the activities of sailors close to shore. This line of thought was decidedly impractical in the silk-for-silver trade, because both commodities occupied far less space than bulky goods like elephant tusks and deer skins. The coastal defence force was rarely in a position to offer these trading junks any protection. Its principal job was to prevent smuggling, and guard the shores. Fishermen, who always needed money, were far more accommodating and often offered merchants their services in delivering messages or supplying them with essential food and fresh water. Usually the sailing rhythm of the Fu-chien fishing junks to the different fishing grounds was governed by the fishing season. When they arrived during the season, they poured in in such huge numbers, the soldiers of the coastal defence force felt overwhelmed. Since the fishing fleets on the high seas were not regulated by any official authority, the pirates tended to fill the vacuum. The report of the Chê-chiang Grand Co-ordinator, Chang Yen-teng, clearly reveals his worry that these Fu-chienese fishermen were actually under the protection, if not the control of the pirates, who collected private protection money from them.

'The massive number of fishing boats causes problems. The fishing grounds situated off Chê-chiang province, off Tai-chou and Chang-kuo and Ning-po
prefecture yield ribbonfish. Only the Fu-chienese fishermen in Pu-t’ien district and Fu-ching district are skilled [at catching this species]. Several hundreds of their fishing boats arrive every July and August. This really huge gathering only disbands in December. The coastal defence force is embarrassed by the situation.

...The pirates live in islands nearby. They choose their leader themselves and issue passes, which they sell according to the size of the junks, at a price ranging from 20 to 50 taels. Before anyone can begin to collect their catch, they must show them the pass which they have purchased. To issue a licence before the merchandise is sold is called’ Pao-shui ‘, to levy silver after the merchandise has been sold is called 'Chiao-p’iao’. This payment has always been collected efficiently in certain periods and has become a kind of custom. No one has ever even suggested that such a practice is illegal'.5

The size of the junks used in the rice trade was probably not very different from that of the fishing junks. They were certainly not as large as the big junks which sailed to Siam or Java. In other words, they fell also under the protection of the groups which controlled the fishing-boat. At the times the fishing-boats were under the control of pirates, they could be used against the official authorities because the coastal defence force was too weak to prevent the harassment by the pirates. When Iquan was recruited to serve in the coastal defence system of the Chinese empire, he tried to satisfy the requirements of both the officials and the fishermen. He did not stop collecting the protection money since he needed the revenue to feed his own men, but he opened the door for the fishermen to take part in the Manila smuggling trade.

When the Dutch decided to pay compensation for one plundered Manila-bound junk after Iquan had acted as mediator, the latter claimed that

he was more efficacious than the former officials in safe-guarding the welfare of the merchants. The Dutch did not yet realize that Iquan was not a proper official and that the Chinese administration had never asked for the compensation. The only solution the officials could think of was to forbid anyone ever to trade with the Dutch again. Emerging from this incident with a glowing reputation, Iquan might have seemed to have gained even more legitimacy to collect his protection money from all shipping, irrespective of whether it was legal or not.

So far, no solid evidence has been found to prove that Iquan also intervened/participated in the Chinese smuggling trade with Japan at the time. This was precisely the period in which the Dutch were forced to suspend their trading activities in Japan temporarily because of the Japanese-Dutch conflict of 1628 in Taijoun. Their trade activities in Hirado were not resumed until four years later in the autumn of 1632. 6 Coincidentally, the Portuguese trade with Japan was also suspended at more or less the same moment because the Bakufu had received the news that a Japanese junk had been attacked by a Spanish ship in Siam. 7 The interruption of the raw silk trade which passed through these two important channels naturally drove the price up to a new height. The raw silk price reached 345 taels per picul in Japan in October 1631 8 and in Manila it was selling for 311 taels. 9 Despite these inflated prices, the Dutch could purchase silk from the Chinese for only 135

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7 Innes, The door ajar, 266.

8 Ibid, 280. Table 10.

9 VOC 1102, Information about Manila, 10 Aug. 1631, fo. 555. The raw silk price was 350 rials per picul. As one Japanese tael equalled 58 stuivers and 1 rial equalled 51 stuivers, 1 rial equalled 0.89 tael. In this conversion, the raw silk price in Manila was 311 taels per picul.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN-HAI 1630-1633

taels.\textsuperscript{10} A simple calculation shows that the profits earned by the Chinese smugglers would have been at least 155 per cent in Japan and 130 per cent in Manila. Unsurprisingly they were loath to share this opportunity to make a large fortune. Besides the fifty-three Chinese junks which made port in Manila, approximately sixty arrived in Japan.\textsuperscript{11} Two junks belonging to Iquan also returned to An-hai from Japan in the winter of 1631.\textsuperscript{12}

How much profit Iquan actually earned from his fisherman smugglers is shrouded in mystery. However, in the above description the strong position occupied by the Ch’üan-chou or An-hai merchants in the silk-for-silver smuggling trade emerges quite clearly for the first time. For different reasons, the Chinese merchants in Chang-chou, the Portuguese merchants in Macao and the Dutch merchants in Taijouan were all temporarily excluded from the Japan trade in this exceptional year. The explosive growth of this trading link must have astonished every member of the newly constructed trading system which was based in An-hai.

Towards the An-hai Monopoly in the Western Ocean: the Taijouan trade from 1630-1632

The Dutch insisted on selling their goods from their yachts or junks at an anchorage in the bay of Amoy, in the vicinity of Amoy or Hai-ch’êng. As there was a ready market in Chang-chou for most of the commodities they had to sell, slowly and surely they had succeeded in building up a smooth-running channel of exchange through the good offices of Squadron Leader Hsü Hsin-su and Regional Commander Yū Tzu-kao when Iquan shattered their carefully laid plans in 1628. After his intervention threw all

\textsuperscript{10} The price in 1631 was 135 tael. Cf. Generale Missive, 1 Dec. 1632, in Cheng, \textit{De VOC en Formosa}, 103.

\textsuperscript{11} Innes, \textit{The door ajar}, 635. Table A.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Daghregister Batavia}, 1631-1634, 61. 21 Jan.1632.
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their projects into disarray, the newly appointed governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, decided to follow the Governor-General’s instruction to trade directly with Chinese peddlers and carry this commerce out on a cargo by cargo basis. This cautious approach would avoid being saddled with the huge debt which was frequently the unpleasant outcome of paying advances to rich agents too hastily.\textsuperscript{13}

While they were busily engaged in selling their commodities to some adventurous peddlers, their old partners, under the protection of Squadron Leader Hsū Hsin-su and Regional Commander Yū Tzu-kao, were eliminated on the orders of the new Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’an. When Iquan showed signs of gradually shifting his base to An-hai in 1630, the Dutch saw his move as a second option to fall back on if they ran into more difficulties in and around Amoy. As some of their fears had been allayed after Ch’u Ts’ai-lao’s pirate force had been rapidly reduced in October 1630, the Dutch decided that it was safe to return to the bay of Amoy again to purchase the Chinese commodities ordered by Batavia. By February 1631 the trade had been more or less resumed on a normal footing and was busily conducted throughout the whole of the following spring and summer. Then, sometime around August 1631, Iquan was formally assigned to root out the bandits who occupied the hilly areas on the southwestern border of Fu-chien province.\textsuperscript{14}

After he left on this mission on 8 September on the orders of Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an, the Amoy Regional Commander Chang (further name unknown) put up a placard forbidding any trade with the Dutch

\textsuperscript{13} Ts’ai, \textit{Ching-hai Chi-lüeh}, 16. ‘These pirates who betrayed Cheng Chih-lung would lure the red-haired barbarians into Amoy waters and cause trouble.’

and requiring all Dutch vessels to leave Amoy and return to Taiwan. The Dutch drew up an account which has survived of what the Chinese merchants had purchased from them between 30 November 1630 and 30 September 1631.

**Table 4-1. The various commodities sold by the Dutch between 30 Nov. 1630 and 30 Sept. 1631**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Stored amount on 30 Nov. 1630</th>
<th>Sold amount on 30 Sept. 1631</th>
<th>Percentage Sold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>231,074 catties</td>
<td>198,024 catties</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elephant Tusks</td>
<td>6,412 pounds</td>
<td>5,312 pounds</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandalwood</td>
<td>9,679 catties</td>
<td>800 catties</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>1,659 pounds</td>
<td>48 pounds</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutmeg</td>
<td>10,270 pounds</td>
<td>2,624 pounds</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen ‘tsedert primo November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565v-566v.

This account provides unequivocal evidence that, although various sorts of tropical commodities were offered for sale by the Company, the most popular commodities were pepper and elephant tusks. These goods were sold in different ways:

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15 VOC 1102, Missive van de Chinese mandarijn Soutongiou naer Aijmoeij aen Hollanders[Letter Written by Chinese Mandarin Soutongiou to the Dutch in the Vicinity of Amoy], Chiu-lung River, 8 Sept. 1631, fo. 556v.
### Table 4-2: the proportions of the commodities sold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Pepper (catty)</th>
<th>Elephant tusk (pound)</th>
<th>Nutmeg (pound)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash purchases</td>
<td>35,550 (18%)</td>
<td>2,297 (35.8%)</td>
<td>552 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartered in the bay of Amoy</td>
<td>140,574 (71%)</td>
<td>3,075 (47.9%)</td>
<td>872 (33.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese merchant Gampea</td>
<td>13,600 (6%)</td>
<td>1,200 (45.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Chinese merchants</td>
<td>8,100 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total amount sold</td>
<td>197,824</td>
<td>6,412</td>
<td>2,624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen ‘tsedert primo November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565v-566r.

The table reveals that, even though some Chinese merchants (Gampea, Hambuan, Injeij Watting) obviously had larger amounts of capital to dispense, most of tropical commodities sold by the Dutch passed through the hands of the peddlers who carried small portions of goods or cash to the Dutch vessels anchored in the bay of Amoy. As Governor Hans Putmans reported:

‘...So it is that the Chinese who come to the Chiu-lung River estuary with some commodities do so stealthily, running a grave risk not least because they are poor, obscure peddlers not men of property, and unless the Company allows them some credit, as indeed we have done so far, the Company must distribute its capital and receive some goods here.’

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16 VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens Naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 30 Oct. 1631, fo. 560v-5v.
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Table 4-3:
the revenue of commodities sold between 30 Nov. 1630 and 30 Sept. 1631

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Pepper (10 tael per picul)</th>
<th>Elephant tusk (55 taels per picul)</th>
<th>Nutmeg (50 taels per picul)</th>
<th>Total Amount (tael)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid in cash</td>
<td>3,555</td>
<td>1,035.5</td>
<td>226.2</td>
<td>4,816.7 (20.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartered in the bay of Amoy</td>
<td>14,057.4</td>
<td>1,386.3</td>
<td>357.4</td>
<td>15,801.1 (67.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese merchant Gampea</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>491.8</td>
<td>1581.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Chinese merchants</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,279.6 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally sold amount</td>
<td>19,782.4</td>
<td>2,421.8</td>
<td>1,075.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VOC 1102, Notitie van de waere bevindinge wat aftreck ende consumptie volgens de lopende boecken vant Comptoir Taijouan in de onderheven coopmanschappen ‘tsedert primo November 1630 tot ultimo September 1631, Taiwan, fos. 565v-566r. The price of each commodity. Cf. Dagregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 52. 20 Nov. 1631. Picul = 122 pounds.

The figures in this table leave no doubt that the bulk of the income came from the pepper trade, especially that conducted with peddlers in the bay of Amoy the total sum (23,279 taels) of the goods traded amounted to 32,591 rials.17 Putmans’ report states that some 80,000 rials in silver coins had been made available before 2 February.18 Bearing this in mind, the proportion of

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17 In 1632 one rial equalled 50 stuivers while one Chinese tael equalled about 70 stuivers. Therefore one tael equalled 1.4 rials. See Appendix I, table E: the value of rial and tael around Taiwan, 1624-1661.

18 VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende rade], Taiwan, 4 Jan. 1631, fo. 523; VOC 1103, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, Taiwan, 10 Oct. 1631, fo. 339. The former
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capital which the Dutch invested on the Coast of China in cash and tropical commodities was about 10:4. Silver coins imported from Batavia predominated in this trade.

Although it would be hard to say how much of this was invested with Iquan or with his merchants, it does give some idea of the scale of the An-hai-Taijouan trade during this initial period. The bulk was sold to the peddlers but certain established merchants were certainly involved. Gampea (Hung Hsü) and Bendiok (Ming Yüeh, alias Cheng T’ai) were the two most important merchants who represented Iquan in the An-hai-Taiwan trade. Bendiok took over the supplying of high quality silk goods after Iquan moved from Amoy to An-hai in the summer of 1630.19

In his guise of Iquan’s servant, Gampea seems to have begun to deal with the Dutch in the area around Amoy after the defeat of Ch’u Ts’ai-lao.20 As the tables show, his main duty was to take charge of the tropical commodities imported by the Dutch. Both of Gampea and Bendiok were also mentioned as food suppliers when the Dutch in Taiwan accidentally ran into a shortage of rice:

‘... since last month we have been informed of the need for such a quantity of rice, owing to the enemy’s siege[of Batavia], otherwise they would have been able to deliver more than enough to cover our requirements.

source mentions that Putmans decided to take cash to the Coast of China and the latter reported that most of the cash had been paid out before 2 Feb. 1631.
19 VOC 1101, Missive van Paulus Traudenius naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 7 May. 1630, fo. 478; VOC 1101, Missive van Nicolaas Kouckebacker naer Taijouan aen Hans Putmans, Chiu-lung River, 2 Jun. 1630, Fo. 484'. Hung Hsü and Cheng T’ai are two most prominent merchants who serve the Cheng family. Their active period and role correspond to those of Gampea and Bendiok in the Dutch archives. However no direct evidence of their identities can be traced.
20 Dagregister Zeelandia, 1 1629-1641, 46. 5 Apr. 1631.
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...upon which we and His Honour [Putmans] unanimously decided to draw up a contract with the merchants Bendiock and Gampea for 1,200 sacks of wheat and about as much again of rice, to be delivered in Taiwan.\(^{21}\)

Later the Dutch heard that a placard had been posted in Amoy on 8 September, ordering them to depart to Taiwan. Nearly a fortnight later, on 20 September they decided to send a letter to An-hai, requesting Iquan’s assistance. The response from An-hai was that Iquan’s mother told the messenger that because the mandarin ‘who was in charge of the annual inspection of the junk’s’ had arrived, she could not help and asked them to leave.\(^{22}\) Both Bendiock and Gampea were depicted as maintaining close links with Iquan, in fact they were his employees.\(^{23}\) They sailed to Taiwan with licences granted through his intervention.\(^{24}\) On 27 September 1631, the governor of Taiwan, Hans Putmans, decided to pay each of them 100 picul pepper and 400 rials in cash as an advance which would enable them to barter for the goods they desired from the Company yachts moored in the bay of Amoy, irrespective of the hostile proclamation on the placard.\(^{25}\) Hampered by the absence of Iquan and put under pressure by the Grand Co-ordinator, Hsiung Wên-ts’ an, the Dutch gradually acquiesced in trading with Iquan’s merchants rather than, as had been their wont in recent years, of with some

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\(^{21}\) VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 5 Sept. 1631, fo. 537°.

\(^{22}\) VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 20 Sept. 1631, fo. 539°.

\(^{23}\) VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens naer Batavia aen gouverneur generael Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 2. Sep. 1632, fo. 227°. Both of them are referred as Iquan’s ‘creatures’; VOC 1109, Missive van Hans Putmans naer Amsterdam aen de Camer Amsterdam, T’ung-shan, 30 Sept. 1633, fo. 227°.

\(^{24}\) VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 20 Sept.1631, fo. 539°.

\(^{25}\) VOC 1102, Resolutie in Taijouan gearresteert[door Hans Putmans ende raedt], Taiwan, 27 Sept.1631, fo. 543°.
obscure peddlers. Later, the Dutch left the Amoy roadstead and shifted their anchorage to an island in the mouth of the bay called Lieh-yü, where they waited to see what would happen next. When the stream of peddlers dried up completely, they decided to try to make official contact with An-hai in November:

'The Council...decided unanimously in agreement with His Honour [Hans Putmans] that because of the placard placed by the Grand Co-ordinator in Amoy (which forbids all our trade), now no one else other than Gampea and Bindiock will dare to come... and the trade will obviously slow down, to dispatch Traudenius to An-hai from Lieh-yü with 6,000 rials in an attempt to stabilize the trade to its former level. And in order to entice Mrs Cheng (who is a greedy woman), we shall bestow on her goods worth about 100 rials.'

The message seemed to be that only if the Dutch were to leave the place where the Amoy troops were garrisoned would their trade be tolerated. When he returned from his mission on a junk Merchant Traudenius reported that the 6,000 rials had been successfully spent mostly on raw silk and gold. Also In his opinion, An-hai could supply more than had been included in this order. When they heard this news, the Dutch in
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Lieh-yü decided to send another 8,000 rials to An-hai immediately, and dispatched another junk carrying all their remaining pepper, elephant tusks and 20-30 piculs of sandalwood from Taiouan to Lieh-yü to see what would happen. On 28 January, the Dutch gave both Gampea and Bindiok 300 rials because they were the only merchants who still continued to supply what the Company ordered. The upshot of these machinations was that in the spring of 1632 the Sino-Dutch trade fell into the hands of the An-hai merchants. Because no systematic accounts are available detailing the silver imports from Taiwan to An-hai, it is impossible to form some idea of the exact figure of the capital flow. What is known is that Batavia had shipped 80,000 rials to Taiwan on 1 July 1631 and some 20,000 rials still remained in Taiwan six months later on 7 January 1632. There is also evidence that 36,000 rials were still in store in Taiwan in April 1631. After calculating these amounts, it seems fairly safe to say that at least 96,000 silver rials were invested in the An-hai trade between April 1631 and January 1632, bearing in mind that the Dutch capital in Japan was still frozen by the Shogun during this period. Comparing this amount with the cash investment of 80,000 rials in February 1631, this estimate sounds acceptable.

Although the Dutch spent 176,000 rials in cash during the time they spent around An-hai between February 1631 and January 1632, the commodities they purchased were not delivered straightaway. The most of the goods had to be collected later either in Taiwan or in An-hai. As they were

1 Dec. 1631, fo. 215v.
29 Ibidem.
30 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Zeebrurch ter rede ondert Eijlant Lissuw inde riviere Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 28 Jan. 1632, fo. 219v.
32 Daghegister Batavia, 1631-1634, 10. 2 Apr.1631.
not sure whether they would be able to collect most of the goods before the south monsoon season in the summer of 1632, the Dutch authorities in Taiwan dropped their plan to intercept the junks which would be returning from Manila as they were afraid of running the risk of missing out on the goods which had not yet been delivered. In that monsoon season seventeen Chinese junks from Amoy and An-hai visited Manila And the Spanish records show that they exported about 114,279 rials from Manila. Hence the volume of the Dutch trade in An-hai was comparable to the Amoy-Manila trade, but the price which the Spaniards paid for raw silk in Manila was much higher than that for which it could be had in Taiwan. At a time at which the Dutch were reluctant to pay 134 taels per picul on the China Coast, the Spaniards were having to pay 360 rials (257 taels), almost double that price, in Manila. The bulk of the capital invested in An-hai by the Dutch

33 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Catwijck ter reede ondert Eijlant Lissuw in de revier Chinchoe, 7 Jan. 1632, fo. 217. The Dutch heard of the report from Japan stating that seven or eight junks were going to be fitted out for the run to Manila. They decided not to intercept them, which meant deliberately ignoring Governor-General Jacques Specx’s order to do so. They even consulted with Iquan about this matter.

34 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eijlant Lissuw [naer Batavia aan gouverneur generael Jacques Specx] [Letter from Hans Putmans on the Yacht Der Goes at the Anchorage nearby Lieh-yü to Governor-General Jacques Specx ], 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 206. It also mentions one of the junk was intercepted by a Chinese pirate, Liu-Hsiang ( Janglau[D.]), on its return voyage. The Spanish records state that only 16 junks from China arrived in Manila. Chaunu, Les Philippines, 156.

35 Ibid, 200- 219. The total amount of the Chinese commodities imported in Manila from 1631-1635 was worth about 571,396. 67 rials, therefore the average value for each year was about 114,279 rials. Chaunu accounted with Spanish ‘Peso’, which equalled one rial when circulated. Id., Les Philippines,30. The peso was equal to 8 reales. Cf. Oskar Hermann Khristian Spate, The Spanish lake, (Canberra: The Australia National University Press, 1979), xxi.

36 VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede
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consisted of silver coins, supplemented by some tropical commodities, especially pepper. After they had purchased a sizeable amount of pepper from the Dutch in the bay of Amoy in the 1630-1631 season, the realization that they could also reduce their costs if they purchased pepper directly from Batavia dawned on the Chang-chou merchants. When they were fitting out the junks for the voyage to Manila, they solicited Iquan’s help in applying for the requisite licences to participate in the trade to Batavia from Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an. It is a recorded fact that at least one Chinese junk sailing in Iquan’s name did depart from Chang-chou and arrive in Batavia. Hence, by giving them these sorts of opportunities, the Dutch indirectly helped Iquan to expand his influence among the merchants of Chang-chou.

As the trading season opened in August 1632, the Dutch began to contract business deals with the Chinese merchants again. With 32,000 rials in hand for their ventures, their first step was to visit Iquan’s mother and his brother, Cheng Hung-k’uei, an excuse they used to carry 8,000 rials to An-hai. When they had ascertained the price of raw silk, on 2 September, the Dutch began to contract business deals with the Chinese merchants again. With 32,000 rials in hand for their ventures, their first step was to visit Iquan’s mother and his brother, Cheng Hung-k’uei, an excuse they used to carry 8,000 rials to An-hai. When they had ascertained the price of raw silk, on 2 September.

Onder het eilandt Lissuw [naer Batavia aan gouverneur Specx], Chiu-lung River, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 206r; the rate of conversion between the tael and the rial, see: Appendix I, Table E: the value of rial and tael circulating in Taiwan 1624-1661.

Ibid., fo. 197r. Iquan had returned from his mission in the hills and spent a short time in An-hai. He also had a meeting with Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an whom he consulted about the strategy to be employed against the rising new pirate Liu Hsiang.

Dagregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 73. 3 May. 1632. The junk left Batavia on 6th July 1632.

VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende syne presente raeden int jacht der Goes leggendene ter reede buyten t Eijlant Quemoij voor de reviere Chincheo, 24 Aug. 1632, fo. 227v; VOC 1105, Missive van Hans Putmans uijt het jacht der Goes liggende ter reede onder het eilandt Lissuw naer Batavia, 14 Oct. 1632, fo. 201v. Although the Dutch authorities decided to carry 32,000 rials to the Chiu-lung River estuary, they later reported that only 16,000 rials had actually been taken.
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1632 another 6,000 rials were sent to An-hai to be divided in half between Gampea and Bindiok.40 A fortnight later on 17 September they decided to send another 20,000 rials and 600 piculs of pepper from Taiwan.41 After these sums had been dispatched on 14 October their remaining capital amounted to 61,600 rials.42 Therefore at least 93,600 rials in silver coins were collected to be invested in China in that season.43 This amount was about the same as in the preceding two years.

The export of Japanese silver which had suspended on account of the Hamada Yahei Incident in Taiwan in 1628 was gradually resumed in the year 1632. On 27 January and 21 February 1633, new loads of Japanese silver were shipped to Taiwan.44 Governor Putmans decided to invest 175,730 rials in a more conservative speculation, because he was worried that the Chinese merchants would not be able to absorb any more. On 10 February he again sailed at the head of his ships to the bay of Amoy intent on trading. From there he set sail to Batavia at the beginning of March 1633.45 In the short time he spent in the bay of Amoy, he found that the limited free trade

40 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht der Goes leggende ter reede ondert eijlant Taota in de revier Chincheo [Resolution issued by Governor Hans Putmans and his current Council on board the yacht Der Goes in the roadstead of Ta-tan Island in the Chiu-lung River], 2 Sept. 1632, fo. 228r; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 15. 2 Sept. 1632.
41 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht der Goes ter reede onder eijlant Aijmoij in de revier Chincheo, Chiu-lung River, 17 Sept. 1632, Fo. 228r; Dagregister Zeelandia, I 1629-1641, 77. 17 Sept. 1632.
42 Generale Missive, 1 Dec. 1632, in Cheng, De VOC en Formosa, 103.
43 Dagregister Batavia, 1631-1634, 148. 7 Feb. 1633. At the end of 1632 only 16,000 rials remained in Taiwan. Therefore at least 77,600 rials must have been released up to then.
44 Ibid., 151. 22 Feb. 1633.
permitted with the An-hai merchants had been encroached upon once again. The merchants only dared to visit the Dutch vessels under the cover of the darkness. Putmans tried to contact Iquan, who had finally returned to An-hai from his bandit-eradication mission, so that he could push him to acknowledge the right of the Dutch ships to trade at the bay of Amoy, but all his efforts were in vain. He left for Batavia convinced that Iquan could not be trusted and feeling he was on slippery ground decided to suspend any further negotiations with the Chinese authorities. Why did Iquan suddenly become so reluctant to help the Dutch after he returned from the hills?

**Regional commander without a fixed base**

On 12 June 1631, after Iquan defeated the pirate Ch’u Ts’ai-lao, he was finally granted the longed for official status he had been promised earlier. But it was almost a year before the rank was formally confirmed on him and his adherents on 22 May 1632. In other words, tantalizingly Iquan was forced to linger eleven months before his rank was officially conferred. This gap offers a possible explanation of why his greatest supporter, Grand Co-ordinator Hsiung Wên-ts’an, had kept silent about his smuggling trade with the Dutch. He had been abashed that he had had to fund Iquan from the public budget. In the meantime, Iquan had to make do with the rather embarrassing rank of ‘Fu-i You-chi’, which literally means ‘Commander of the Barbarian-deterrent Mobile Corps’. 

This provisional title granted by the Grand Co-ordinator implied that he had still not been accorded a permanent title. This fraught situation might

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46 Wan, ‘Appendix I: Ch’ung-chên ch’ung-pien hsüan-lu’, 161. ‘On 22 May 1632.... Cheng Chih-lung was awarded the official rank of Commander of Mobile Corps and Cheng Chih-Hu was awarded the official rank of Defender.’

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have been one of the reasons Iquan had been willing to obey the Grand Co-ordinator’s order to do battle against the mountain bandits. Undoubtedly this military action had been deemed an essential exercise because one of its effects would be to protect the interests of the merchants in Ch’üan-chou and Chang-chou. The mountain bandits threatened the vital paddy-fields and harassed the merchants trading along the land route between Kuang-tung and Fu-chien provinces. As Iquan had been personally affected by these raiders, he was probably very happy to have the chance to eradicate them.48

The bandits, some 20,000 of them,49 had originally plundered at random in the hills on the eastern border of Kuang-tung province in April 1631 and had then gathered near the Mei River Valley, some 95 kms distant from the town of Wu-p’ing in the southwest of Fu-chien province, about 200 km from Amoy. This was far away from the area in which Iquan could exert what power he had. The bandits barricaded themselves in on the slopes of a mountain called T’ung-ku-chang, east of the Han River Valley. Downstream from here, stretched out along the Han River were located the most important paddy fields which were vital to provisioning the cities of Chang-chou and Ch’üan-chou. With such a prize at stake, no wonder Iquan’s mission was sanctioned by three high-ranking Mandarins: the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, the Grand Co-ordinator of Southern Chiang-hsi and the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Southern Chang-chou.50 A Dutch source discloses that Iquan departed from Amoy on his mission in September 1631:

'The China trade has recently lain under a threatening cloud, because the Mandarin Iquan and all his soldiers have been summoned by the Grand

48 For example, the porcelain was imported from Chiang-hsi and the preserved ginger from Kuang-tung. Both items featured on the Dutch order-list.
50 Ibid., 39.
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Co-ordinator to pacify some rebellious Chinese who have fortified themselves in the mountains.....It has been a month since they left Amoy. He has taken his brother along with him too.51

Iquan led 2,000 soldiers to Shang-hang almost on the southwestern border of Fu-chien,52 and set up camp at San-hê-pa near the northern end of the Han River Valley on 8 October 1631. This site was not far from the eastern side of T'ung-ku-chang Mountain.53 The bandit chief whose name was Chung Ling-hsiu had fortified himself at a place on the side of the mountain which was too high for the government force to launch an attack. The bandits had robbed their food supplies from the fields in the Han River Valley and frequently collected taxes in the local river port called Hsin-tu.54 Iquan’s first plan was to cut off the food supply of the robbers and only when this had been accomplished to attack them at Hsin-tu, which he did on 17 October 1631.55 He dispatched only 500 musketeers under the command of his brother Cheng Chih-hu to ransack the port in a night attack. Forty-five vessels which belonged to the bandits were set alight, so that they could no longer be used to exact private taxes.56 As they could not do without food,

51 VOC 1102, Missive van den oppercoopman Jan Carstens naer Batavia aen gouverneur general Jacques Specx, Taiwan, 30 Oct. 1631, fo. 557v. Although this letter does not mention that Iquan approached T’ung-ku-chang by water, the Dutch knew he had left Amoy. Later, on 31 December, they heard that Iquan might depart from Amoy and head for T’ung-ku-chang. Probably the Dutch only knew he had travelled farther than Wu-ping, which was at the southwestern corner of Fu-chien. They believed Iquan’s destination was Wu-ping (written as ‘Boupijingh’ in Dutch) by water. VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiulung River, 31 Dec. 1631, fo. 216v.
54 Ibid, 37.
55 Ibid, 40.
56 Ibid, 40.
the bandits decided to descend from the western side of the mountain and proceed to a port on the Mei River called Ping-ts’un. As this tactic had been predictable, Iquan sent his brother ahead with 300 soldiers while he collected another 1,000 soldiers for the final battle with Chung Ling-hsiu. When he heard that there were only 300 musketeers in Ping-ts’un, Chung Ling-hsiu lost no time in attacking them immediately, because he believed his troops were superior to Iquan’s musketeers. The scene is vividly depicted:

‘On the 30th... 1,000 bandits with Chung Ling-hsiu among them appeared. He was furious with Iquan’s musketeers so he selected his best people to confront them. Chêng Chih-hu pretended to be poorly armed, and kept his real force hidden. The bandits saw he had only a few soldiers with him, gathered into a pack and launched a headlong assault on horseback. Suddenly many muskets were fired simultaneously and the bandits could not hold their position. Some were decapitated, others were killed in other ways, and the rest fled, so they were totally wiped out.’

After this victory, Iquan wasted no time but led all his troops in an attack on the bandits’ lair on T’ung-ku-chang Mountain. From 6 to 8 November, Iquan’s soldiers destroyed most of bandits’ houses and food stores. The remaining bandits gathered 4,000 people to do battle against Iquan on the final day but all in vain. One of the officers of the reinforcements was 7.5 km away while the battle was raging. He testified that ‘the sky was filled with gunshots and the faint sound of yelling’.

Iquan’s victory won him a high reputation among the officers who took part in this military action. It seems they were all astonished by the performance of his musketeers, who had skillfully repulsed an enemy at least twice their number. This was the moment at which the value of Iquan’s musketeers was burst upon the world. Small firearms were widely used in

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58 Ibid, 41.
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East Asia at this time and therefore could not be classified as any kind of secret weapon but in that period, unless well-disciplined, the musketeers usually could still not gain the upper hand over archers. The overwhelming victory of Iquan’s musketeers against the bandits was only made possible by their discipline. A Japanese author, Kawaguchi Choju, had this to say about the military tactics deployed by Iquan:

‘Iquan led his troops in an attack on the bandits from Wu-p’ing. He ordered every soldier and officer to bear a musket and divided them into groups of five men. They opened fire in turn while the spearmen defended them. In this fashion they pushed forward step by step until they had destroyed the bandit lair.’

Iquan himself was a very good shot. In the autumn of 1629, Li K’uei-ch’i had occupied the harbour area of Amoy and destroyed Iquan’s vessels, while Iquan fortified himself and his people inside the walls of Amoy. Li K’uei-ch’i was forced to drop his siege plans because Iquan’s musketeers managed to hold his troops at some distance from the city walls, which made an attempt to storm them impossible. It was said that:

‘Iquan’s house was in the city of Amoy. He poured all his efforts into defending his own property. When the pirates stormed the city walls with 100 men, Iquan fired two shots and killed two people with two shots. Li K’uei-ch’i was shocked by this, and made no further attempts to storm the town.’

It was no coincidence that 600 soldiers, possibly his musketeers, were stationed inside the walls to defend the city. When Iquan captured the Dutch yacht the Westcappel in 1628, he enlisted seventy-six Dutch soldiers who had been on her to guard his house in Amoy and he probably used

59 Kawaguchi, T’ai-wan ké-chū chih, 8.
60 Ts’ao, Ching-hai Chi-lüeh, 45.
these men to drill a basic training into his 600 musketeers. The first muskets Iquan owned might actually have been furnished by the Dutch East India Company when he was hired as a maritime mercenary to intercept Chinese junks sailing to Manila in 1625. A contemporary Chinese record gives an impression of how efficiently the Dutch used these muskets when they intercepted Chinese junks:

After the Dutch sailed, they anchored their ships on the high seas and scanned [the sea] with their spy glasses. If a trade junk hove in sight, they would lower several of their ship’s boats. Each boat carried six to seven men. As the junk sailed past, they would close in on her. If we exposed our bodies above the side of the junk to defend ourselves, they would fire their muskets [at us] and each shot killed one person, and not a single shot was ever fired in vain. 63

Iquan’s 500 to 600 musketeers, sometimes reinforced by 1,000 to 1,500 infantry soldiers, seem to have been the backbone of his mercenary force. When he was forced to leave Amoy and move to An-hai in 1630, Iquan began to build a fort which he could use as an emporium for his trade in rice, tropical commodities and silver. As already said, the trading season of 1630 was probably his most profitable ever. The Dutch sources state that his fort was completed at the beginning of 1633. Gampea and Bendiok both admitted that they were the officers who commanded the soldiers who defended this An-hai fort. 64 Now Iquan’s star was rising and he had achieved more than his original aim of feeding his own people. He had also succeeded in integrating the fisherman militia into his smuggling network and he maintained a private semi-permanent defence force of 500 to 2,000 soldiers. The naval force assembled with the consent of the local interests of the Chang-chou and

64 VOC 1113, Missive van Gampea aan Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, 12 Apr. 1633, fo. 537; VOC 1113, Missive van Bendiok aan Nicolaes Couckebacker, Chiu-lung River, 12 Apr. 1633, fo 537°.
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Ch’üan-chou merchants was part of this army. As long as the illegal trade was tolerated by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, this official was prepared to overlook the fact that Iquan fed his soldiers from the proceeds of the smuggling trade.

After December 1631, after the provisions Iquan had brought with his soldiers had been consumed, he cut short the military action and returned to An-hai for a while. His respite was of short duration as it was not long before he received another order to pursue the bandits deeper into Kuang-tung province. On 30 March 1632, Iquan’s troops finally succeeded in capturing Chung Ling-hsiu at the northern end of the Mei River Valley. Most of the troops were due to have returned to An-hai in April, but Iquan was given more orders to pursue the remainder of the bandits into Chiang-hsi province the region into which they had fled in May. This time the order came from the General Surveillance and Military Defence Circuit of Southern Chang-chou who also sanctioned the issuing of two months’ worth

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65 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jacht Catwijk ter reede ondert Eijlant lissuw inde Rivier Chinchoe, Chiu-lung River, 31 Dec. 1631, fo. 216; VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden, Chiu-lung River, 7 Jan. 1632, fo. 217. Since Iquan did not depart from Amoy but left directly from An-hai, the Dutch believed he had taken the overland route and returned to the battlefield again. Liang, ‘Hui-ch’ao kuang-tung shan-k’ou chung-ling-hsiu teng kung-tz’u ts’an-kao’, 52. ‘Cheng Chih-lung struck deep into the neighbouring province but the soldiers ran short of rations and some succumbed to illness. Therefore he returned to recruit new soldiers and purchase food.’

66 Ibid, 54. ‘During December 1631 to January 1632,…The Fu-chienese Mobile Corps Commander of Fu-i, Cheng Chih-lung, dispatched by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien in response to the invitation of the Chiang-hsi Grand Co-ordinator. He led 2,000 soldiers who carried enough provisions to last for three months, as well as sailors and ammunition, heading in that direction.’

67 Ibid, 52.

68 Ibid, 64.
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of provisions for 300 musketeers.69 On 5 June, Iquan’s troop defeated the bandits in the mountain area of Ch’ao-guan, approximately 300 kms from Amoy.70 Although the size of Iquan’s musketeer army was small compared to the number of official troops dispatched from Kuang-tung and Chiang-hsi provinces, their efficiency gave them the leading edge in this mission. Just when the execution of the mission was drawing to its final stage, Iquan was summoned to return to Amoy again by the Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Tsou Wei-lien. Amoy was under attack from yet another pirate who was cruising the coastal waters of Kuang-tung province; his name was Liu Hsiang. A Dutch source records that Liu Hsiang’s fleet attacked the coast of Fu-chien in the first half of July:

‘…The pirate Liu Hsiang has plundered the whole area of the bay of Amoy with about 100 junks. He has destroyed all Iquan’s junks anchored in the harbour of Fu-chou and killed a group of people. Iquan has returned once again from Wu-p’ing and travelled there render assistance to the Grand Co-ordinator (in Fu-chou). Consequently all traffic has been blocked and the coastal areas around the bay of Amoy have become unsafe.’71

In short, Iquan had returned from his mission 300 kms away and rushed straight to Fu-chou to assist the new Grand Co-ordinator, Tsou Wei-lien, who had only been assigned to this position on 25 April. The latter must have informed Iquan that his formal rank had been approved by the emperor on 22 May. The former Grand Co-ordinator of Fu-chien, Hsiung Wên-ts’an, was promoted to the position of Supreme Commander of Kuang-tung and

69 Ibid, 64; 55.
71 VOC 1105, Resolutie genomen bij Hans Putmans ende sijne presente raeden int jach ten Catwijck leggende ter reede ondert Eijlant Lamao, Nan-ao, 22 Aug. 1632, fo. 224v. When the Dutch ships arrived in Nan-ao on the last day of July, they heard the news from one of their junks. The junk had sailed from Nan-ao 12 days earlier and had picked up this news from Taiwan.
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Kuang-hsi provinces on 14 April. 72 In order to set about securing law and order in Fu-chou prefecture, Iquan took up temporary residence on Wu-hu, an island located outside the estuary of Min River. Thereafter he was called the ‘Regional Commander of Wu-hu’. Because of Liu Hsiang’s depredations in the Fu-chou area, even the illegal trading junks were not able to depart on their voyage to Japan. In fact only four junks made it to Japan that year. 73 As they were able to take advantage of the disturbed situation around the bay of Amoy, the Dutch could continue to run their barter trade with Iquan’s servants in An-hai undisturbed during the autumn, but change was just on the horizon. After Iquan had again successfully defended Fu-chou from Liu Hsiang’s raids in October, the new Grand Co-ordinator instructed him to carry a new mission, one which embarrassed him. This official wanted Iquan to enforce the maritime prohibition as a means to reduce Liu Hsiang’s strength. Iquan was caught between the Devil and the deep blue sea, either he had to try to legalize the Dutch trade or he might run the risk of being instructed by the Grand Co-ordinator to destroy the Dutch base in Taiwan, if the latter happened to be tempted to cast their lot in with the pirates this time.

Although this was a seemingly impossible situation, Iquan still spent a great deal of time and effort trying to stifle this development in the bud:

‘The Red-haired barbarians had once occupied the Pescadores, in an attempt to force the Chinese government to open a market for them there. Later they shifted to Taiwan, but from time to time anchored their ships off Amoy. [Tsou]Wei-lien frequently advised Iquan to keep them away from Amoy, but he refused to comply.’74

A debate had been raging between two different parties at the imperial court. The different parties were divided about whether the Red-haired

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73 Innes, The door ajar, 635: Table A.
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barbarians were good or evil and whether the Chinese merchants should be
allowed to trade with them in Taiwan or not. Iquan had chosen the Dutch side
since he had just succeeded in creating his An-hai base, but, treading a wary
path, he affected an indifferent attitude as if to deny his friendly relationship
with the Dutch. At least this is the impression Governor Hans Putmans of
Taiwan had when he sailed from the bay of Amoy on his way to Batavia on 1
March, 1633.