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**Author:** Cheng, Weichung  
**Title:** War, trade and piracy in the China Seas (1622-1683)  
**Date:** 2012-06-12
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MONOPOLY LOST
1669-1683

Reorganizing the trading network 1663-1670

When a typhoon left the Manchu armada in shambles in the early summer of 1665, Cheng Ching’s navy seized the opportunity again to obtain a maritime advantage over its adversaries. At more or less the same time, his captains captured three Fu-chou junks and another one from Chang-chou loaded with a total of 600 piculs of white silk.¹ Now that the Kuang-tung exports were controlled by his new partners in Kao-lei-ran, Cheng Ching found himself in the auspicious position of being able to keep a tight grip on the China trade. He also found out that the defectors led by Cheng Tai’s brother, Cheng Ming-chun, were trying to withdraw the remaining money from Cheng Tai’s account in Nagasaki. Wasting no time, in a swift manoeuvre, he stepped in and claimed the money, said to amount to 500,000 taels, first in 1663.² Although the Shogunal court handed down a judgement stating that Cheng Tai’s successor was the rightful owner of this capital, Cheng Ching’s delegates refused to relinquish their claims, throwing the Japanese authorities into a quandary about to whom they should hand over the money.

Cheng Ching also had to tread a chary path because, if his men sold the captured goods from these four junks in Japan, this would violate the Shogun’s edict that no harm should befall any vessel bound for Japan. To avoid this accusation, Cheng Ching had to find another party to whom he could sell these looted goods. As Japan was ruled out for the reasons stated

¹ The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670,159-60. 30 Aug. 1665; VOC 1253, Missive door den koopman Jacob Grujs [en den raat ten comptoir Nangasackij] aen haer Eds.[ Joan Maetsuijcker], 19 Oct. 1665, fos. 1584-1585.
above, the Spaniards in Manila offered the next best market, but Cheng Ching’s father, Coxinga, had once demanded the Manila authorities pay him tribute after he conquered Taiwan in 1662. That aggressive gesture had sown panic amongst the Manila authorities and had resulted in a bloody massacre in 1662, in which 2,000-3,000 Chinese people were slaughtered and their property confiscated. Later, Coxinga’s sudden demise and the ensuing disputes over his succession had delayed the earlier declaration of war against Manila. After Cheng Ching eventually succeeded in legitimating his right of succession, he took control of Amoy, Quemoy and Taiwan in the spring of 1663. However, when he had taken this step but was faced by a bad harvest and subsequent food shortages, he cannily reversed his father’s hostile plans and chose instead to propose a mutually beneficial trading plan to Manila. His ambassador, the Jesuit father Victorio Riccio, commented: ‘The primary concerns [of the treaty] were that a great amount of property and silver owing them [the Chinese citizens] in Manila [should be returned].’ In May 1663, a peace treaty was concluded and the trade was re-opened the following year.

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6 José Eugenio Borao Mateo, Pol Heyns, Carlos Gómez, Anna Maria Zandueta Nisce(eds.), Spaniards in Taiwan, 2 vols (Tapei, SMC Publisher, 2002), II 1642-1682, 617.

7 Borao, Spaniards in Taiwan, II1642-1682, 617; VOC 1264, Missive door den
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Table 13-1: Chinese Junks Visiting Manila during 1663-1670

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>From China</th>
<th>From Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1663</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 13-2: Raw Silk Exports from China and Taiwan to Manila

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price per picul (rial)</th>
<th>Total amount (picul)</th>
<th>Total price (rial)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665</td>
<td>450-400</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>11,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>4,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>500-450</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the above table bears witness, a regular shipping link was restored between Taiwan and Manila, but only very small quantities of raw silks were

actually exported to Manila. The silk seized from the Manchu junks did not after all go to Manila as the Dutch had conjectured. In fact, as the Japanese authorities were not irritated by Cheng Ching’s action, the price differentiation between Nagasaki and Manila was the ultimate determinant of where the loot went:

Table 13-3: Raw Silk Price in Japan during 1668-1670

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Per picul in tael</th>
<th>Per picul in rial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1668*</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>(550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669*</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>(650)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
<td>(562.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670**</td>
<td>(480)</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: * The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 259, 298, 287. 19 June 1668; 19 Jan.1669, 4 May 1669 ,** Chang Hsiu-jung , The English Factory in Taiwan 1670-1685, 69; The estimated value is given in brackets according to following standard: 1 tael = 70 stuivers (after 1666) (Voc-glossarium: 112);1 rial= 56 stuivers (VOC 11207, Uijtrekening van de Goude en Silvere Munts waardye, 12)

During 1664-1670, the raw silk price in Nagasaki climbed from 550 rials to 600 rials, while in Manila it declined even more markedly from 650 to 400 rials. In other words, although Cheng Ching was developing new connections with Manila, most of the silk he got hold of was still sold in Japan. As the table below shows, from 1646, the Sino-Manila trade declined to 30 per cent of the amount traded at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Yet, the proportion of Chinese goods in the total imports of Manila was still 40-50 per cent in the period 1661-1670. The importance of these wares explains why both sides were willing to reconcile in the summer of 1663.

Table 13-4: The Tariff Revenues of Manila

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The tariff revenues of Chinese goods in Manila (rial)</th>
<th>Percentage of Chinese goods in total tariff revenues. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>31,045</td>
<td>10,192.25</td>
<td>22,673.2</td>
<td>23,831.8</td>
<td>12,249.4</td>
<td>9,991</td>
<td>4,905</td>
<td>2,786</td>
<td>2,501.8</td>
<td>1,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>73.5**</td>
<td>67.3**</td>
<td>75.8**</td>
<td>88.3**</td>
<td>83.81**</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>65.05</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>40.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques(XVI e, XVIIe, XVIII siècles)*, 200-19; * the tariff revenues of Taiwanese goods are included in; ** the percentage includes the tariff revenues of goods imported from Macao.

After the English merchants had been invited to establish a trade factory at Taiwan, they described how Cheng Ching’s junks circulated between Japan, Taiwan and Manila as follows:

‘The King (Cheng Ching) had five or six junks that went yearly to Manila in January and returned in April or May, then fitted out for Japan, where they usually went from June onwards until about 12th, 14th July or later and returned here again in November or December.’

This is corroborated by the following table.

Table 13-5: Taiwan Junks Visiting Japan and Returning from Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Junks from Taiwan in Japan</th>
<th>Junks from Japan to Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

8 Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to the East India Company in London, 16 Sept. 1672 (O. S.) in: Chang Hsiu-jung, Anthony Farrington, i.a. (eds), *The English factory in Taiwan: 1670-1685*, (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), 151. The text has been revised for more proper English style.
### MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Monopoly Lost</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1665.6-1666.6</td>
<td>8^9</td>
<td>15^10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666.7-1667.6</td>
<td>12^11</td>
<td>7^12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667.7-1668.7</td>
<td>7^13</td>
<td>&gt;5^14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668.7-1669.6</td>
<td>&gt;8^15</td>
<td>13^16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669.7-1670.6</td>
<td>&gt;10^18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670.7-1671.5</td>
<td>10^19</td>
<td>8^20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671.6-1672.5</td>
<td>13^21</td>
<td>16^22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 VOC 1253, Rapport van de seigneur [Jacob] Gruijs [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijcker][report from chief merchant Jacob Gruijs to gouvernor general Joan Maetsuijcker], Japan, 9 December 1665, fo. 1912.


12 Ibid., 205-6. 2 Nov. 1666; 5 Nov. 1666; 24 Nov. 1666.

13 Ibid., 224, 237. 25 July 1667, 26 July 1667, 28 July 1667; 1 Aug. 1667, 3 Aug. 1667; 23 Nov. 1667.

14 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 239; 242-4. 6 Dec. 1667; 16 Dec. 1667; 22 Jan. 1668; 31 Jan 1668; 11 Feb 1668.


16 Ibid., 281, 284. 30 Nov. 1668; 15 Dec. 1668.

17 Ibid., 307, 310. 21 July 1669; 17 Aug. 1669; 21 Aug. 1669.

18 Ibid., 319, 321. 9 Nov. 1669; 13 Nov. 1669; 15 Nov. 1669; 18 Nov. 1669; 25 Nov. 1669; 18 Dec. 1669.

19 Ibid., 341-4; 346; 353. 5 July 1670; 16 July 1670; 17 July 1670; 25 July 1670; 1 Aug. 1670; 20 Aug. 1670; VOC 1278, Dagregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij 't opperhoofd Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste inde negotie op de Jedose hoffreijen voorgevallene, Japan, 30 Jan. 1671, fo. 1770^3; 6 Apr. 1671, fo. 1788^3.

20 VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhooft Martinus Caesar[Diary of Japan kept by the chief merchant Martinus Caesar], Japan, 24 Nov. 1670; 26 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763^3; 29 Nov. 1670; 1 Dec. 1670, 2 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764^3; 3 Dec. 1670, fo. 1765^3.

21 VOC 1283, Japans daghregister, 30 June 1671, 1 July 1671, fo. 1792^3; 5 July 1671,
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Since 1663 most of the Taiwanese junks had been carrying sugar and deerskins to Japan. Ellis Crisp, English merchant, described this trade as follows:

‘The deerskins are a commodity that belongs solely to the King and annually provide 200,000 pieces. If it pleased him, he could have had even half as much again. This island produces 50,000 piculs of sugar annually.’

As the Dutch records show, the English merchant might have been slightly deceived by his Chinese informant. Before the Coxinga occupied Taiwan, about 16,000 piculs of sugar were produced each year.

Table 13-6: Sugar Production in Taiwan 1659-1661

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sugar produced in Taiwan (picul)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>17,500 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660</td>
<td>15,000 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1661</td>
<td>&lt;8,000 26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1663, Japan imported most of its sugar from Taiwan and other

12 July 1671, fo. 1793; 18 July 1671, 19 July 1671, 20 July 1671, fo. 1794; 22 July 1671, 23 July 1671, fo. 1795; 11 Aug. 1671, fo. 1802; 7 Sept. 1671, fo. 1809.

22 VOC 1290, Japans Daghregister, 30 Nov. 1671, fo. 326; 31 Dec. 1671, fo. 328; 31 Jan. 1672, fo. 333.

23 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670 (O.S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (ed.), *The English factory in Taiwan*, 65. The original text has been revised for more modern English style.

24 Cheng, *De VOC en Formosa*, 464.

25 Ibid., 482.

26 *Daghregister Batavia*, 1661, 65.
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places in Southeast Asia because the Manchu Emperor forbade any sugar exports from China. At no time did the amount imported exceed 26,000 piculs annually.

Table 13-7: Sugar Imports from Taiwan 1663-1665

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sugar carried to Japan by Chinese junks (picul)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1663.10-1663.10</td>
<td>21,045.3\textsuperscript{27}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>23,902.1\textsuperscript{28}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665</td>
<td>25,631.71\textsuperscript{29}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1663, only 10,790 piculs of the sugar imported to Japan came from Taiwan, an amount which was not very different from the 10,112.82 piculs of sugar carried to Japan by the Taiwanese junks in 1682.\textsuperscript{30} However, in 1641 the Chinese junks had carried as many as 57,269 piculs sugar from China and other places around South China Sea to Japan. Crisp’s testimony might only represent a vague estimate of Cheng’s commerce. The English later determined that about 10,000 piculs of sugar were produced in Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{27} Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen, 13. However, as counted in the Dutch records in the Dagregister van Batavia it was 1,9811.1 piculs of white and black sugar in total.C.f. Dagregister Batavia, 1663, 649.


\textsuperscript{29} Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 1637--1833-nen, 346. Innes, The Door Ajar, 506. Table 32.

\textsuperscript{30} Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 91-5:98-100. Both numbers include candied sugar.
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annually, an amount which would tally with our estimate.31

While the highest number of deerskins ever exported by the Dutch amounted to 151,010 items in 1638, according to an English report of 1663 the junks of Cheng Ching exported about 300,000 pieces,32 But this total number of deerskins included those from Siam and Cambodia as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>From Taiwan</th>
<th>From Cambodia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1663</td>
<td>348,081</td>
<td>117,20033</td>
<td>92,71035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>234,342</td>
<td></td>
<td>128,00037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Innes, The Door Ajar, 506; Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 15 Nov. 1672 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 159.


33 Daghtregister Batavia, 1663, 648-9. 9 Dec. 1663; Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 345.

34 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 91-95. The deerskins exported from An-hai were also included. Most of An-hai deerskins would have been purchased in Taiwan

35 VOC 1243, Missive van Hendrick Indijck en raad aen haer Eds. [ gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia geschreven int jacht Calff voor de baj van Nangasacqui [Letter Written by Hendrick Indijck and Council on the yacht the Calff to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Japan, 21 Oct 1663, fos. 1956-1957. It records that about 100,000 deerskins were exported to Japan from Cambodia; Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 91-95.

36 Nagazumi, Tōsen yushutsunyūhin sūryō ichiran, 345.

In 1667 Cheng Ching joined forces with a group of Kuang-tung privateers/pirates and wiped out the Dutch trade factory in Cambodia in order to get hold of Cambodian deerskins. His intention was to obtain 100,000 deerskins from there each year.41

Even when the Manchu court strictly enforced the maritime prohibition policy, the import figures of Chinese junks sailing to Japan remained steady.

Table 13-9: The Chinese Trade Accounts in Japan and Manila from 1663 to 1672. (Tail)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese Imports to Japan*</th>
<th>Chinese Silver Exports from Japan **</th>
<th>Taiwanese Imports to Manila***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1663</td>
<td>1,108,976.8</td>
<td>541,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664</td>
<td>2,084,075.3</td>
<td>1,666,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1665</td>
<td>1,269,057</td>
<td>804,200</td>
<td>&gt;9,035.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>1,309,970.4</td>
<td>723,600</td>
<td>&gt;2,626.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667</td>
<td>1,015,422</td>
<td>454,700</td>
<td>&gt;3,634.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>1,754,147.7 (280,000)42</td>
<td>341,500</td>
<td>&gt;16,166.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669</td>
<td>1,640,836.1</td>
<td>29,600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41 VOC 1264, Missive door den koopman Pieter Kettingh aen de edele heer gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker en heeren raden van India, Cambodia, 5 Dec. 1666, fo. 101‘.
42 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 267-8. 24 Aug. 1668. The private capital of the Tonkin private merchant Iitchin was estimated to be 280,000 taels.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Silver (Taels)</th>
<th>Copper (Taels)</th>
<th>Bilbao Silver (Taels)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1670</td>
<td>1,528,203.7</td>
<td>39,500</td>
<td>&gt;28,411.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671</td>
<td>1,442,611.5</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>&gt;3,197.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672</td>
<td>1,508,217.</td>
<td>896,400</td>
<td>&gt;8,644.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Innes, *The Door Ajar*, 410; **Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune*, 227. Table 21; ***Fang Chên-chên, *Ming-mo Ch'ing-ch'u T'ai-wan yü Ma-ni-la tê Fan-ch'uan Mao-i (1664-1684)*, 200. Table 5.23.

The rial was converted to tael according to the following standard: 1 tael = 70 stuivers (after 1666) (Voc-glossarium:112); 1 rial = 56 stuivers (VOC 11207, Uijtrekening van de Goude en Silvere Munts waardye, 12). Therefore 1 rial = 0.8 tael.

The silver exports from Japan rapidly declined after 1667, after the Shogunal court had grown alarmed about the continuous drain of silver and took measures to reduce the amount exported. The Japanese authorities also lifted the ban on the export of gold in 1664, hoping to balance the trade accounts after the prohibition of silver exports. The Dutch were quite sanguine about this change of policy because they could obtain sufficient Spanish silver in Europe and also had recourse to Persian silver. The Japanese gold could be invested on the Coromandel Coast, replacing the Chinese gold that they used to obtain from Coxinga. Consequently, this new Japanese export policy also weakened the motivation of the VOC either to regain Taiwan or to establish another trading station in China. When the maritime prohibitions failed to damage Cheng Ching’s trading network, the Manchu court sent an official delegate, K’ung Yün-chang, with a letter inviting Cheng Ching to surrender in 1667. Cheng Ching’s reply expressed no hostile feelings towards the Manchu court:

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‘… Tung-ning (Taiwan) lies in the ocean, it has never been part of Chinese territory. From here we trade eastwards with Japan, and southwards with Manila. The population is growing and business is prosperous. I sit on the throne here legitimately, and our government shall endure forever.

... If Your Excellency will consider allowing these coastal inhabitants [of China] to live in peace, I shall gladly conclude peace with Your Excellency. ... Please send a delegate to visit us and arrange the opening of trade between us.’

In 1667 Cheng Ching was eventually successful in reorganizing a trading network which was based on a monopoly of the sugar and deerskin trade. In 1668, the remaining Fu-chienese fleet was ordered to abandon its position on the coast and the Provincial Navy Commander, Shih Lang, was summoned to Peking to consult with Emperor K’ang-hsi about how best to tackle the problem of Cheng Ching. From 1669, the Emperor abandoned any idea of dispatching more expeditions and ignored Cheng Ching’s proposal to set up formal trading relations. In other words, both sides ceased fire, but for different reasons.

The struggle to maintain momentum 1670-1678

During 1667-1669, while official peace talks were proceeding, the administration of the maritime prohibition strictly according to the letter of

45 Shih Wei-ch’ing, Shih-lang P’ing-ch’uan (A Commentated Biography of Shih lang), (Amoy: The University of Amoy, 1987), 88.
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the law was slackened, and Cheng Ching’s merchants immediately again attempted to gain a foothold on the Chinese coast and obtain goods for trade by smuggling.

Table 13-10: Chinese Junk Visiting Japan from Chinese Coastal Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Junks arriving from Fu-chou/P’u-t’o-shan/Nanking in Japan</th>
<th>Junks departing from Japan to Fu-chou/P’u-t’o-shan/Nanking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1665.6-1666.6</td>
<td>2(^{47})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666.7-1667.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1667.7-1668.7</td>
<td>6(^{50})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668.7-1669.5</td>
<td>4(^{52})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669.6-1670.6</td>
<td>12(^{54})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670.7-1671.6</td>
<td>7(^{56})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 152, 158. 18 June 1665; 17 Aug. 1665.
48 Ibidem, 175. 31 Jan. 1666.
49 Ibid., 207. 11 Dec. 1666.
50 Ibid., 223, 241. 16 July 1667; 29 Dec. 1667.
51 Ibid., 243-4; 257-8; 262. 2 Dec. 1667; 31 Jan. 1668; 11 Feb. 1668; 23 May 1668; 4 July 1668.
53 Ibid., 273-4; 284, 300. 26 Sept. 1668; 30 Dec. 1668; 30 May 1669.
54 Ibid., 303, 310, 319; 322-3; 326, 337-8; 340. 7 July 1669; 19 Aug. 1669; 23 Aug. 1669; 9 Nov. 1669; 9 Jan. 1670; 12 Feb. 1670; 17 May 1670; 1 June 1670; 18 June 1670.
56 *The Deshima dagregisters*, XIII 1660-1670, 344, 350, 21 July 1670; 8 Aug. 1670; VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij ‘t opperhooft Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemst in de negotie op de Jedose hoffreijzen voorveggellene, Japan, 10 Feb. 1671, fo. 1171; 13 Feb. 1671, fo. 1789; 25 Apr. 1671,
Just over a fortnight after the Manchu delegates returned to Amoy from Taiwan on 10 December 1667, a Manchu smuggling junk arrived in Nagasaki on 29 December 1667. Cheng Ching had also dispatched trading junks to Fu-chou, which arrived in Japan on 15 March 1668 with 2,300 taels silver because they had not been able to spend that sum under the strict surveillance of Manchu Coastal Defence. When they sailed, these junks had left some goods and merchants behind on the coast of Fu-chou to await any new trading opportunities which might arise. On 2 April 1668 another two Fu-chou junks belonging to the same group of Taiwan merchants arrived in Japan laden with many silk goods. On 29 October 1668 a small Fu-chou junk arrived, carrying silk goods worth about 135,000 taels and she was followed another one on 15 December. Junks from Nanking and P’u-t’o-shan (located on the Chê-chiang coast) also began to arrive, although it cannot be said with any certainty to which camp they belonged. Whatever
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the case, the fact remains that during 1667-1668 six junks engaged in this smuggling business sailed to and from Japan.

In 1669, the Manchu Emperor K’ang-hsi called a halt to hostilities and replaced the strict evacuation policy with a more relaxed surveillance. This easing of the strictures allowed peasants to return to their forsaken fields and fishermen to sail to the nearby fishing grounds. However, the maritime prohibition was still in force and it was still forbidden to live near the seashore.65 Accordingly, in the summer of 1669, the number of smuggling junks climbed to fourteen, more than double the number in the previous season. One junk from Taiwan carried silk and silk goods worth about 185,000 taels,66 indicates patent clue that Taiwanese merchants were playing a large part in this smuggling.

Occasionally the smugglers were caught by the coastal patrols. One Chinese junk from P’u-t’o-shan carrying silk and silk goods worth about 71,600 taels arrived in Nagasaki on 10 February 1670, and reported that two of its companions had been captured en route.67 Perhaps to provide some counterweight, some of Cheng’s warships were also cruising around these smugglers’ haunts. Because of their presence, two Ch’ing Junks had to slip their anchors in order to avoid capture one of them at P’u-t’o-shan.68 Another two Ch’ing junks returning to P’u-t’o-shan on 26 September 1670 fled back to Nagasaki, after they unexpectedly met Cheng Ching’s fleet near

65 Sun Êrh-chun, TWYH (ed.), Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu [Taiwan Prefecture in the General Gazette of Fu-chien Province], TW no. 84, 432. ‘In 1669, an edict was proclaimed which allowed inhabitants to fish in coastal waters.’; 957. ‘In 1669… an edict was proclaimed which allowed people to build houses and farms outside the border, within a range of five li.’
66 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 310. 17 Aug. 1669.
67 VOC 1278, Daghregister gehouden int comptoir Nangasackij bij ’t opperhooft Francoijs de Haze vant voornaemste inde negotie op de Jedose hoffreijsen voorgevallene, Japan, 10 Feb. 1670, fo. 1945’.
68 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 338. 1 June 1670.
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Fu-chou.\(^{69}\) Eventually, in May of 1670, the anachodas of five Ch’ing junks were obliged to submit a petition to the governor of Nagasaki pleading to be allowed to remain until the arrival of the north monsoon. They did not dare to return to Fu-chou or P’u-t’o-shan after they had been informed that Cheng’s ships had appeared on the scene there.\(^{70}\) The presence of Cheng’s fleet on the Chinese coast was also reported by the English merchants in Taiwan:

‘Although they trade on the borders of China, it is only with stealth, being not yet at peace with the Manchus who are governing China. But he [King Cheng Ching] has settled people on islands near China called Amoy, Quemoy and P’o-t’u-shan.’\(^{71}\)

...To the last of these, [they] have sent the pepper that went on the [English] pink [ship].\(^{72}\)

On the Chinese coast, the Chens did business selling pepper and other tropical goods which have been supplied to them firstly by the English and others. In fact, this trade did not commence until 1666 when three of Cheng Ching’s junks loaded with pepper with a course set for the coast of China ran into a typhoon and drifted off to Quinam.\(^{73}\) In 1667, three Taiwanese junks

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69 Ibidem, 362. 26 Sept. 1670; VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhooft Martinus Caesar, Japan, 20 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763²; 23 Nov. 1670, fo. 1763²⁺.
71 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 20 Dec. 1670(0. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 74. The original text has been modified to facilitate modern readers. That Amoy and Quemoy were occupied by Cheng Ching’s force is also confirmed by a Dutch source: VOC 1290, Memorie van eenige Nouvelles uijt d Eijlinden van Macao [door Abraham Wijs opt Jacht de Valck], [19 Jan. 1673], fo.19°⁺.
72 Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 20 Dec. 1670(0. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 74
73 VOC 1264, Missive door den resident Ocker Ockerse tot Bantam aen Joan
from Japan arrived in Patani and another junk visited Johor en route from Siam, apparently in order to purchase pepper and other tropical goods. Eventually the quantities provided by these means were not enough. The flourishing smuggling on the Chinese coast demanded ever greater quantities of pepper from the Taiwanese merchants, especially after the silver export from Japan was restricted in 1668. In 1670 the English merchants reported that only 3,000 piculs of pepper of the rich booty captured by Coxinga when he conquered Zeelandia Castle remained in Taiwan Taking into consideration that Coxinga had purchased the amounts of 16,000 and 11,000 piculs of pepper from the Dutch in 1655 and 1657, the amount cited above would certainly not have been sufficient to satisfy the market. Therefore, in response to market pressure, the Taiwanese merchants were even obliged to purchase pepper and other tropical goods like sandalwood and putchuck from the VOC in Nagasaki in 1669. The following year, although the English merchants had carried these tropical goods to Taiwan from Bantam, this

Maetsuijker gouverneur generael en raaden van India [Letter from Ocker Ockerse in Bantam to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker in Batavia], Bantam, 12 Mar. 1667, fo. 696.

74 VOC 1265, Missive aan de heer Joan Maetsuijcker gouverneur generael en d'Ed. heeren raaden van Nederlants India door de commandeur Balthasar Bort en den raadt tot Malacca [Letter Written by Commander Balthasar Bort in Malacca to Governor-General Joan Maetsuijcker and the Council of the Indies], Malacca, 27 Aug. 1667, fo. 820v.

75 Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.) in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 66.

76 VOC 1216, Missive van den gouverneur Cornelis Caesar naer Malacca aen den gouverneur Jan Thijsen, Taiwan, 26 Nov. 1655, fo. 405v; VOC 1222, Missive van Frederick Coyett naer Batavia aen Joan Maetsuijcker, Taiwan, 19 Nov. 1657, fo. 35v. 77 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 319. 15 Nov. 1669; VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhoofft Francoijs de Haes uijt het comptoir Nangasackij aenden generael ende raen geschreven, Japan, 9 Jan. 1670, fo. 185v. The source does not record any direct contact between Cheng merchants and the factory on Deshima, therefore the exchange must have been mediated by the local merchants.
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practice still persisted.\(^7\)

After Coxinga took over Taiwan, in April 1662, March and September 1663, and April 1664 the Manchu court dispatched mandarins to the coast to supervise the proper administration of the evacuation policy.\(^7\) Its terms was very strictly enforced and resulted in Su Li’s defection. His followers and their fleet went over to Cheng Ching as mentioned earlier. However, the enforcement of the policy eased after peace talks between the Manchus and the Taiwanese were begun in 1667. In May 1668, the Kuang-tung Grand Co-ordinator proposed a relaxation of the evacuation policy, subject to the Emperor’s approval.\(^8\) Before the year 1670, most of the evicted inhabitants were allowed to return to their fields in the vicinity of the coast of Kuang-tung.\(^9\)

The Portuguese in Macao were also almost expelled as a consequence of the evacuation policy. Under its stipulations, all the Portuguese should have also been obliged to move to the hinterland of Kuang-tung, but even after the maritime prohibition had been imposed, Macao continued to welcome some country traders sailing between Manila, Johor and Macao carrying Chinese coarse wares.\(^1\) The man in charge of the evacuation policy

78 VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhooft Martinus Caesar, Japan, 2 Dec. 1670, fo. 1764'-1765'.
80 Ch’ü, Kuang-tung hsin-yü, I, 31-32.
81 Chang I-mei, Hui-lai hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Hui-lai County], KKCP no.178.
36. Chêng-chün, Hai-k’ang hsien-chih[Local Gazette of Hai-k’ang County], KKCP no.184, 264.
the Governor-General of Kuang-tung, Lu Ch’ung-chün, had proposed expelling the Portuguese inhabitants from Macao and consequently had ordered them return home in 1663, but the Manchu Court in Peking decided to allow them to remain. Perhaps having heard about the peace talks between the Taiwanese and Manchus or simply because of the plight in which they found themselves, the Maccanese pleaded with the Vice-Roy in Goa to dispatch an envoy to the Chinese court to petition for the opening of trade. Ambassador Manuel de Saldanha arrived in Macao on 4 August 1667. In the same summer, four Chinese junks arrived there as well, claiming that they represented a Siamese embassy which intended to pay tribute to the Manchu Court and the Emperor. However, the District Magistrate of Hsiang-shan (who supervised business in Macao), Yao Ch’i-shêng, noticed that half of the cargoes in the three Siamese junks were the property of a Fu-chien merchant Wang Wei-chung, and that one junk carried goods belonging to Wang’s son. He therefore questioned whether they were proper ambassadors with credentials or just transgressors of the maritime prohibition gambling on a main chance. Although the official capacity of the Siamese

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Maetsuiker] geschreven, Malacca, 10 Apr. 1659, fo. 441°.

83 Lu Ch’ung-chün, ‘Kuang-tung tsung-tu lu-ch’ung-chün t’i-i hsiang-shan-ao his-yang-jênn pu-i chün-liu pên [Suggestion Written by the Governor of Kuang-tung about not to Allow the Portuguese to Reside in Macao continually] 9 Apr. 1665’, in CKTI (et al eds.), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hai-pien, I, 48; Ch’i Ch’ê-pai, ‘Li-pu shang-shu ch’i-ch’ê-pai têng t’i-ch’ing chiang hsiang-shan-ao his-yang-jênn ch’ü-liu chih-shih jêng ch’ih ping-pu tsou-i pên [Suggestion Written by the Minister of Rituals about Consulting the Ministry of War about Deciding on Whether or Not to Allow the Portuguese to Remain in Macao] 17 June 1665’, in CKTI (et al eds.), Ming-ch’ing shih-ch’i ao-mên wên-t’i tang-an wên-hsien hai-pien, I, 55.

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ambassadors was repudiated, the trade went ahead covertly. Besides these officially problematic junks, five vessels returned to Macao from Makassar, Cambodia, Malacca, the Lesser Sunda Islands, and Indragiri. Altogether the nine vessels brought about 735 piculs of pepper besides all kinds of other tropical products. These were traded under the eyes of the Kuang-tung authorities, who pretended to confiscate all the cargoes. According to the Dutch records, the Siamese King did indeed dispatch an ambassador to Kuang-chou and, in their eyes, the Kuang-tung authorities’ repudiation of the genuine ambassador was rather puzzling. Although this semi-disguised smuggling did not guarantee Macao its old prosperity, it did attract more country traders to venture to sell their cargoes in this port. In the year 1669, eleven vessels from Southeast Asian ports arrived in Macao: three from Siam, two from Cambodia, two from Quinam and three from Timor, Manila, and Batavia respectively, plus one Portuguese vessel which had returned from Batavia. It was reported that they: ‘All did their trade secretly with the Portuguese and the Chinese at night, …and were forbidden to trade in town publicly on pain of death.’ After the Portuguese ambassador had been detained in Macao for three years, he was ordered to proceed to Peking on 4 January 1670. Grasping this chance of actually reaching the Imperial court, the Macao governor dispatched a small vessel to Bantam which carried a

86 Ibid.
87 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 712. 15 Dec. 1669.
88 Wills, Embassies and Illusions, 193-236.
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priest as his ambassador.\(^{90}\) He was clearly eager to procure pepper directly from Bantam. The Dutch merchants in Tonkin reported that: ‘Macao was suffering from a scarcity of silver and therefore was selling all Chinese goods off cheaply.’\(^{91}\) In 1671, the junk of the Siamese King with its Chinese crew returned to Siam from Macao via Japan, accompanied by two other Portuguese vessels, carrying a rich cargo of Chinese commodities like silk goods, \textit{radix China}, zinc and all kinds of coarse goods.\(^{92}\) The Chinese merchants in Batavia also smelled a profit and equipped six junks to sail to Macao in the summer of 1671, and all except one which was lost in a typhoon returned with similar goods. Their report reveals that the pepper price had risen to 13 Rixdollars (= 16.25 rials) per picul.\(^{93}\) This fleet is proof that the Batavian Chinese merchants had claimed their place as new agents in the Sino-Japan trade via Macao, and hence had become the competitors of the Taiwanese merchants who were operating the Sino-Japan trade via P’u-to-shan.

Therefore, just as Cheng Ching was struggling to overcome his problems in supplying greater quantities of pepper and tropical goods just at a time that the smuggling by his competitors was expanding, his peace talks

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\(^{90}\) Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to George Foxcroft and Council at Madras, 7 Apr. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, \textit{The English factory in Taiwan}, 51.


\(^{93}\) \textit{Generale Missiven}, III 1655-1674, 810. 31 Jan. 1672; VOC 11207, Uitrekening van de Goude en silver munts waardige inhout der maten en swaarte der gewigten, in de respective gewesten van Indien[intrinsic value of gold and silver coins according to its size and weight at different regions around East and Southeast Asia]. 1 rijksdollar= 60 light stuivers; 1 rial= 48 stuivers.
with the Manchus had resulted the re-opening of the Macao Sino-Japan trade. These privileged merchants, sailing under the flag of the Siamese King and the Dutch authorities, would have no difficulty providing tropical goods. In return, the Kuangtung merchants were quite willing to offer silk goods at a cheaper price than that asked on those from Chêchiang province.

The astute Cheng Ching will have realized he needed to open up new supply channels to obtain tropical goods. Therefore in 1668 or 1669, through his merchants he sent invitations to urge ‘all the merchants in general to trade in the parts under His Majesty’s jurisdiction.’\(^9^4\) It was a public letter, saying:

‘From the son of Coxin, whose father has passed away, for us [English] or any other that would trade there, declaring that he intended to give great encouragement to trade in his ports.’

The declaration ‘was done by public writings, dispersed to several adjacent ports and places’.\(^9^5\) In reply, in May 1670 the English East India Company factory in Bantam fitted out a pink and a sloop under the command of Merchant Ellis Crispe to initiate the trade with Taiwan.\(^9^6\) Cheng Ching also passed this message to the VOC in Batavia through the Shabandar of

\(^9^4\) Henry Dacres at Bantam to Iquan, ‘King’ of Taiwan, May 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 52-3. Here I change ‘your Majesty’ to ‘his Majesty’ for reader’s benefit.

\(^9^5\) Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 27 Oct. 1670 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, *The English factory in Taiwan*, 71. Original text: ‘About a month before wee were fitted came hither an invitation from the King of that place, vidzt. From the son of Coxin, his father being dead, for us or any other that would trade ther, declaring that hee intended to give great incouragement to trade in his ports,& this was done by publique writings disperced to severall adjacent ports & places, one whereof wee procured & sent with them.’

Bantam, who was a Chinese, expressing his wish to conclude peace with the Dutch.\(^{97}\) A leading Bantam merchant, Kea-nabby, fitted out a junk to visit Taiwan that year but she was struck by a typhoon and seized by the Amoy garrison under the Cheng regime as a foundered vessel.\(^{98}\) By some means or other Cheng Ching managed to solve this misunderstanding and engaged in the trade with Ki Nabby (Kea-nabby[E.], Keijne Secredana[D.]), probably prompted by the fact that the junk of the Sultan of Bantam arrived shortly afterwards.\(^{99}\) In March 1672, two Taiwanese junks visited the coast of East Java. Ki Nabi tried to apply for four passes from the VOC under his own name, but his secret dealings were disclosed by the Shabandar.\(^{100}\) Cheng Ching also ordered a junk to be built in Rembang in Java on Ki Nabby’s account.\(^{101}\) He planned to use this newly built junk to carry Ki Nabby’s cargo to Taiwan under the protection of the EIC.\(^{102}\)

The Amoy merchants under Coxinga had been involved in the Siamese trade since the 1650s. However, when the war between Coxinga and the VOC broke out, the Siamese King chose the VOC as his ally. As mentioned earlier, the Siamese-Dutch treaty persuaded the Cheng merchants to up sticks and

\(^{97}\) Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 747. 2 Sept. 1671.
\(^{99}\) Commission and instructions from Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to James Arwaker, Ellis Crisp and Charles Frith, 30 June 1671 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 94.
\(^{100}\) VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van India, Bantam, 23 Mar. 1672, fo. 40v; VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van India, Bantam, 26 Mar. 1672, fo. 43v.
\(^{101}\) VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van India, Bantam, 15 June 1672, fo. 66v.
\(^{102}\) VOC 1290, Missive van den resident Willem Kaaff aen de hoge regeringe van India, Bantam, 28 June 1672, fo. 70v. The junk was captured by the Dutch ship and detained for a while. Therefore, it missed the departure of the English ship and was later sold in Bantam.
move to Quinam and Cambodia in 1665. When the tension between the Manchus and the Cheng lessened after 1667, the Taiwanese merchants made yet another attempt to open trade with Siam. Some of these Japan-bound junks from Siam might also have called at Taiwan, as the English merchants witnessed in 1670, but the best solution open to them was to bypass the main harbours of Siam and sail to Ligor instead.\footnote{Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, \textit{The English factory in Taiwan}, 64.} The grandees there were entrusted by the Siamese king with bartering the locally produced tin for copper on the Siamese King’s account. Ligor was a vassal state and paid an annual tribute to the Siamese King as a token of its allegiance. Because then as now, it is located on the southern shore of the Gulf of Siam, the Taiwanese junks could avoid the blockade of the VOC ships around the estuary of the Chao Phraya River. The Ligor tin export was estimated at to 8-900 bahar (= 2,400-3,600 piculs).\footnote{\textit{Generale Missiven}, III 1655-1674, 543. 25 Jan. 1667.} In addition to this metal, it also produced about 500 bahar (= 1,500 piculs) of pepper.\footnote{VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208\textsuperscript{v}; VOC 11207, Uitrekening van de Goude en silver munts waardije inhout der maten en swaarte der gewigten, in de respective gewesten van Indien.} Several Taiwanese junks visited Ligor in 1666, selling silk goods, a large amount of porcelain and Japanese gold kobang and Japanese copper. In Japan, one kobang was valued at 6 taels 8 maas of silver, and sold in Ligor for 7 taels, which gave a negligible profit of 2 per cent. The same went for copper which was valued in Japan at 12 taels 4 maas and in Ligor at between 15 taels 5 maas and 16 taels. In that case the profit was only 25 to 29 per cent.\footnote{Nachod, \textit{Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie}, appendix, ccvii. Table D. VOC 1264, Rapport van den koopman Adriaen Lucasz. wegens sijne verrichtinge op Ligoor overgegeven aen de heer Balthasar Bort president en commandeur van de stadt en Forteresse Malacca, Ligor, 22 Nov. 1666, fo. 208\textsuperscript{v}.} The tin was purchased at 20 taels per
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bahar (=6.6 taels per picul) in Ligor, but could be sold for 15 taels per picul at Fu-chou in 1667, therefore generating a handsome profit of 127 per cent, assuming the Taiwanese could obtain about the same price as the VOC.107 In 1666, it looked as if the Taiwanese merchants were set to become serious competitors of the Dutch in Ligor, as the latter could only purchase about half the amount they had hoped for.108 After the Japanese court reduced the export of silver in 1668, the importance of the Ligor trade to the Cheng regime in Taiwan grew more crucial because Japanese gold and copper were not very profitable in Cambodia.109 In February 1668, one Cheng junk visited Ligor carrying gold, silver, copper and porcelain, which was bartered for 900 piculs of tin and 450 piculs of pepper.110 In 1669, Cheng junks carried away 1,500 piculs of tin and 450 piculs of pepper.111

Table 13-11: Pepper and Tin purchased by Cheng merchants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visiting Merchants</th>
<th>Pepper</th>
<th>Tin</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</table>

107 Ibidem, fo. 209v; VOC 1264, Memorie voor den coopman David Harthouwer verblijvende als opperhoofd over des Ed. Comps. negotie ende ommezlagh in Hoczieuw om hem daer naer te reguleren door Constantijn Nobel en David Harthouwer[Memorandum Given by Constantijn Nobel and David Harthouwer to David Harthouwer Resident at Fu-chou as Chief Merchant to Arrange All the Company Business], Fu-chou, 19 Jan. 1667, fo. 163v.
109 The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 310. 21 Aug. 1669.
110 Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 666. 31 Jan. 1669.
111 Ibid., 686. 17 Nov. 1669.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tin (Chinese from Japan)</th>
<th>Tin (Chinese from Japan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>(a lot) 112</td>
<td>(Under Cheng regime) 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>450 114</td>
<td>900 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669</td>
<td>450 117</td>
<td>1,500 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671</td>
<td>(main cargo) 120</td>
<td>(main cargo) 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Chinese from Japan)</td>
<td>(Chinese from Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(main cargo)</td>
<td>(Chinese from Japan over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canton) 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1672</td>
<td>600 123</td>
<td>Two junks from Taiwan 124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Dutch merchants asked the Siamese king to grant them the sole purchasing rights for the tin in Ligor, but after this was eventually approved in 1670, aware that they were at a safe distance from Ayutthaya, the grandees of Ligor and the King’s factor, Oija Phraklang, still turned a blind eye to smuggling. The VOC was nonetheless satisfied with the king’s supply of tin.
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because the Batavian High Government believed that seizing ‘the Taiwanese junks visiting Ligor annually’ would only stir up more ‘hatred, hostility, and quarrels’ than benefits.\footnote{Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 869. 31 Jan. 1673.}

In 1672, when two Taiwanese junks again visited Ligor to purchase tin, the Dutch were very keen on keeping their sole rights and put pressure on the local grandees who still wished to trade with the Cheng merchants and had asked whether the Dutch were still at war with Coxinga’s people.\footnote{VOC 1290, Rapport van den coopman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker], Siam, 20 Nov. 1672, fo. 240v-241v; 244v.}

In the meantime, King Narai of Siam had successfully restored the direct trade relations between Siam and Japan, which had been interrupted owing to the usurpation of the throne by his father, King Prasat Thong.\footnote{Iwao,’Reopening of the diplomatic’, 2-7.} In 1667 King Narai dispatched a tributary envoy to China who was detained for a few consecutive years with the Portuguese ambassador in Macao. According to Chinese records, the Siamese tributary envoys finally reached Peking in January of 1671.\footnote{Wang Chih-ch’un, Kuo-ch’ao jou-yüen-chi[Chronicle of Chinese Foreign Diplomacy during Ch’ing Dynasty], ( Taipei: T’ai-wan hsüeh-shêng shu-chü, 1975), 95.} As a result of this audience, the interrupted Sino-Siamese trade at Kuang-chou (Canton) was restored. Not only were the Batavian Chinese replaced on the Macao-Japan route but the Siamese King Narai and the Sino-Thai merchants who protected by him were also active on the Siam-Macao-Nagasaki route. The ruler of Kuang-tung province, the Pingnan viceroy, was also eager to participate in the Sino-Japan trade in the light of this reconciliation and invested in new ship-building.\footnote{VOC 1304, Daghregister ofte dagelijckse aanteekeningh van ’t voornaamste gepasseerde ten Comptoire tot Nangazackij in Japan gehouden bij den opperkoopman Joan s’Camphuijs opperhooft over ’s Compagnies negotie ende verderen ommeslagh}
Table 13-12: The Junk of the Siamese King Dispatched to China and Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Arrivals in Japan</th>
<th>Departures to China</th>
<th>Returns to Siam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1669.7-1670.6</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{130}</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{131}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670.7-1671.6</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{132}</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{133}</td>
<td>4\textsuperscript{134}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671.7-1672.6</td>
<td>1\textsuperscript{135}</td>
<td>3\textsuperscript{134}</td>
<td>(4)\textsuperscript{137}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


daldaan aanvanck nemende den 29 October 1673 ende eijndigende 19en October 1674 [below is cited as ‘Daghregister ten Comptoire tot Nangasackij’], Japan, 1 Dec. 1673, fo. 60\textsuperscript{v}.


\textsuperscript{131} VOC 1278, Missive vant opperhoofd Nicolaes de Roij aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 20 Oct. 1670, fo. 1873\textsuperscript{v}-1974\textsuperscript{v}. It returned from Japan.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibidem; The Deshima dagregisters, XIII 1660-1670, 350. 9 Aug. 1670; VOC 1283, Missive van den cooeman en opperhoof Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706\textsuperscript{r-v}.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibidem.


\textsuperscript{135} VOC 1283, Missive van den cooeman en opperhoof Nicolaes de Roij en den raet aen den [gouverneur] generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden, Siam, 31 Oct. 1671, fo. 1706\textsuperscript{r-v}; Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671; VOC 1283, Japans daghregister gehouden bij het opperhoofd Martinus Cesar, Japan, 26 July 1671, fo. 1795\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{136} Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 778. 19 Dec. 1671.

\textsuperscript{137} VOC 1290, Rapport van den cooeman Nicolaes de Roij [aan gouverneur generael
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1672.7-1673.6 | 1\(^{138}\)  
1673.7-1674.6 | 1\(^{139}\)  
1674.7-1675.6 | 3\(^{140}\)  
1675.7-1676.6 | 3\(^{141}\)  
1676.7-1677.6 | 3\(^{142}\)  
1677.7-1678.6 | 1\(^{143}\)  
1678.7-1679.6 | 1\(^{144}\)  
1679.7-1680.6 | 1\(^{145}\)  
1680.7-1681.6 | 1\(^{146}\)  
1681.7-1682.6 | 1\(^{147}\)  

Joan Maetsuijker, 20 Nov. 1672, fol. 247v; VOC 1290, Daghregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 12 July 1672, fo. 348. Four king’s junks intended to visit Canton. One of them was on her homeward-bound voyage from Japan to Siam.

138 VOC 1290, Missive van d’edele [Johannes] Camphuijs en raet aen haer Edwards [Joan Maetsuijker] te Batavia, Japan, 23 Oct. 1672, fol. 320. This junk might have returned from Canton; VOC 1290, Daghregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 12 July 1672, fo. 348.

139 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 28 Feb. 1673, fo. 580. One junk sailed to Siam from Japan, but there is no indication given that she belonged to the Siamese king.

140 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 28 Aug. 1673, fo. 609. On her voyage to Japan, she had called at Taiwan.

141 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raet in Siam aan haar Edwards [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302; 304. One junk returned from Japan, the other two had sailed back from Canton.

142 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1685, 4, 31 Jan. 1675.

143 VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer Edwards [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, 30 Nov. 1675, fol. 14. The Siamese King dispatched two junks to Amoy and one junk to Canton.

144 VOC 1322, Missive van het opperhoofd Dirck de Jongh en raedt geschreven uijt Siam aen haer Edwards [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 14 Nov. 1676, fo. 1203. Two King’s junks returned from Japan.

145 Ibidem.

146 VOC 1332, Daghregister gehouden ten comptoire Nangasackij in Japan, Japan, 3 Jan. 1678, fo. 640. Assuming this returning Siam junk had arrived previous summer.

147 VOC 1339, Notitie van aengecomene en vertrokken vreemde scheepen en vaertuigen in en uijt Siam zedert 14 October 1677 tot 11 September 1678, Siam, 22 Feb. 1678, fo. 458; 13 Apr. 1678, fo. 459. Two Siamese royal junks returned from
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In 1671 King Narai sent another envoy to collect the Chop granted by the Manchu Emperor as symbol to confirm the restoration of relations. In order to share in the benefits of the trade by expanding it into a Sino-Siamese-Japanese triangle trade, the junks of King Narai usually participated in the Sino-Japanese trade via Macao. But the Siamese King was not the only monarch to restore a direct link with the Manchu court.

The Ryūkyū (Liu-ch’iu[C.]) Kingdom, which had played an instrumental role as middleman between the Far East and Southeast Asia in the early Ming period, also again put itself forward to act as go-between in the Sino-Japan trade at a time in which it was paying tribute to the Tokugawa Shogunate via the daimyo of Satsuma. Before Taiwan opened negotiations with Peking in 1667, in 1663 and 1665 the King of Ryūkyū had already dispatched envoys to the Ch’ing court via Fu-ch'ou in the traditional manner. The Manchu Emperor granted him the right to trade in Fu-ch’ou once every three years. However, after the Manchu Emperor refused to continue the peace talks with Cheng Ching in Taiwan in 1670, the latter sent ships to the coast of Fu-ch’ou to capture the Ryūkyū tributary junk and had her brought to Taiwan. This was the forcible strategy adopted by Cheng Ching to curb any attempt by other parties to build a Sino-Japanese trade link in which he was not involved. As some crew members of the Ryūkyū junk

Japan.

148 Wang, Kuo-ch’ao jou-yüen-chi, 97-98; VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker]tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302v. The Chop was eventually received in Siam in 1674.


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managed to flee home, the news was revealed to their protector the daimyo of Satsuma, who thereupon claimed damage from the Shogun’s court in 1672. As a consequence, three rich junks belonging to Cheng Ching were detained in Nagasaki in lieu of the losses.\footnote{VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 2 Dec. 1672, fo. 586°; Li-tai Pao-an, Ts'ai Do comp., (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972), 15 vols, I, 205-6. ‘Li-pu Wei Liu-ch’iu-kuo chii-piao chin-kung fang-wu-shih’[The Report of the Ministry of Rituals regarding to the Tribute from the Ryūkyū Kingdom Composed of tributary letter (Piao) and Gifts](18 Oct. 1671). It mentions a Ryukyu junk was captured by ‘pirates’ which departed at 1670.} A fine at 30,000 taels had to be paid before they were released.\footnote{VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 14 Jan. 1673, fo. 572°; VOC 1294, Missive van het opperhoofd Martinus Caesar en den raet tot Nangasacki aan den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijker] en raden van Indien geschreven, Japan, 31 Jan. 1673, VOC 1294, fos. 538°-539°.}

After 1669 Cheng Ching as adopted the pose of a peaceful trader and the Chinese merchants under the Dutch, Siamese and Ryūkyū flags all tried to ease their way into the China trade. Meanwhile the Chinese trade with Manila did not expand as expected because the Spanish silver galleons from Mexico did not show up either in 1670 or in 1671.\footnote{Ellis Crisp at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Oct. 1670(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 67; Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam to the East India Company in London, 30 Jan. 1671, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 81.} Cheng Ching is said to have been thinking of launching a surprise attack against Manila with 15,000 soldiers, but as the governor of Philippines dispatched an envoy, Don Francisco Arriki de Lorade, to visit him in the summer of 1672, this might have prevented Cheng Ching carrying out his plan.\footnote{Simon Delboe and Council at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 12 Feb. 1673(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 171;}
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By that time, Cheng Ching had grown conscious of the fact that rival merchants were making use of his peaceful overtures to the Manchu government and saw in them a opportunity to join the Sino-Japan trade. Therefore, offended that his junks had been fined by the Shogunal administration in Nagasaki, Cheng Ching decided to use force against those rivals who were intent on undermining his monopoly. In the spring of 1673 he declared a blockade of all junks sailing to Japan. Not only did he withhold all his junks from any voyages to Japan, he even dispatched a war fleet to the coast of Kuangtung. When four junks bound for Japan were intercepted on the high seas, one managed to escape.

Cheng Ching also warned King Narai of Siam about his blockade. A Taiwanese junk arrived in Siam in April of 1673 which delivered a letter from Cheng Ching to King Narai, explaining why he would order his war-junks to patrol the waters around Japan for the express purpose of capturing trading junks to compensate for his losses. Since the Siamese king was keeping the peace with Cheng Ching, the junks under Siamese flag would be spared. Indeed, a junk of the Siamese King did arrive safely in Japan via Taiwan in the summer of 1673.

Generale Missiven, III 1655-1674, 781. 31 Jan. 1672; 813. 31 July 1672 ; VOC 1290, Memorie van eenige Nouvelles uijt d Eijlanden van Macao, [Bantam], 29 Sept. 1672, fo. 19r.
155 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 9 July 1673, fo. 598'; 18 Aug. 1673, fo. 608'.
156 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 6 July 1673, fo. 595'.
157 VOC 1295, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raet in Siam aende heer gouverneur generael Joan Maatsuijker ende d'Ed. heren raden van Nederlants India tot Batavia, Siam, 26 Dec. 1673, fo. 788'-789'.
158 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 28 Aug. 1673, fo.609'. On her journey to Japan, she had called at Taiwan.
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On 28 August 1673, an envoy of Cheng Ching sailed on a junk carrying silk and silk piece goods valued at 250,000 taels to Japan. As a sign of his good intentions, he was also bringing along several Japanese shipwreck victims. While Shogun and the council of elders were deliberating on how to deal with this unforeseen challenge from Cheng Ching, the Sino (Manchu)-Ryūkyū trade and the Sino (Manchu)-Siamese trade came to an abrupt end. In the spring of 1674 the Siamese King’s junk on her way back from Kuang-tung delivered the news that the three southern provinces (referring to Yün-nan, Kui-chou, Ssu-ch’uan) under the P’ing-hsi vice-roy (Wu San-k’uei) had risen in rebellion. The same source also reported that Cheng Ching had dispatched 200 junks to the coast of China when news of this uprising came to his ears. The outbreak of the rebellion was a warning that Siamese king should not venture into the direct trade with Kuang-chou.

The Ching-nan vice-roy of Fu-chien refused to facilitate the Ryūkyū envoys’ trading activities (with Peking) any longer because he decided to throw in his lot with the rebels. Hence, as a consequence of unforeseen circumstances, in the spring of 1674, the crisis in Cheng Ching’s monopoly of the Sino-Japan trade was suddenly relieved. Under these circumstances, Cheng Ching also ceased hostilities against Japan and again dispatched trading junks from Taiwan to Japan. Since the losses of the Ryūkyū merchants had been compensated, the Shogun remained neutral and adopted a detached attitude about this matter.

159 VOC 1294, Japans daghregister van den jare 1673 gehouden bij den Ed. Martinus Caesar int rijck van Japan, Japan, 20 Sept. 1673, fo. 615’.
160 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 304’.
161 Li-tai Pao-an, Ts’ai Do (comp), (Taipei, National Taiwan University: 1972), 15 vols, 1, 322-8 at 325 ‘Fu-chien téng-ch’u Ch’êng-hsüan-pu-chêng-shih-ssu wei-fang-hsūn ch’ing-ch’ao-shih,’ [A letter of the provincial governors in Fu-chien. about consultancy with the Ch’ing court (20 Aug 1677)].
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The rebellion of the Ching-nan viceroy in Fu-chou created the opportunity for open competition in the Sino-Japan trade. This statement is supported by the shipping movements in the year that followed. The Fu-chou merchants might have had been able to make a better assessment of the Nanking silk goods than the Taiwanese merchants who operated the smuggling trade via P’u-t’o-shan and Amoy. The Fu-chou junks enjoyed the protection of both the Japanese court and the VOC ships and therefore the risks in this trade were alleviated. An anachoda of a Fu-chou junk declared that the Ching-nan viceroy had informed local Chinese merchants that the maritime prohibition was no longer in effect in Fu-chou and that the trade could proceed free of all restrictions in 1674. Although the Ching-nan vice-roy had asked Cheng Ching for assistance because he was worried that the local forces might not join him when he proclaimed his independence of the Manchu court at the beginning of 1674, he soon realized he had been overly concerned and he regretted having given Cheng Ching too many trade concessions. The latter promptly reacted by mounting a blockade when the promises turned out to be empty.

Cheng Ching now sent about 200 junks to the Chinese coast in an effort to keep his advantage against the Fu-chou merchants. Through mediation by the Pinghsi viceroy, the Chingnan viceroy agreed to ally himself with Cheng Ching again in the winter of 1674, which meant that the Taiwan merchants were allowed to visit Fu-chou. In 1675, the Ching-nan viceroy sent a pass to the English merchants who had followed Cheng Ching and taken up residence in Amoy and bade them welcome to trade at Fu-chou. He

163 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wén lu, 46-7.
164 VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. tot Batavia, Siam, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 304².
165 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wén lu, 47-8; VOC 1314, Dagregister van Japan [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 14 Nov. 1674, fo. 166⁵.
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also dispatched two Chinese merchants to Batavia to declare that Fu-chou was a free harbour for the Dutch as well. The Chinese now proclaimed that all merchants from other places were welcome to trade in Amoy and would be exempted from paying customs duties for a period of three years. Moreover, he dispatched a Chinese war-junk manned with all soldiers clad in full body armour to the Siamese court in March 1675. When they arrived in Ayutthaya, a quarrel broke out between them and some Dutch sailors. The 150 soldiers would almost have torn the Dutch factory apart if the King’s factors and their anachoda had not intervened. This same junk also carried eight Chinese sailors from Batavia, who had been blown off course by a typhoon to Taiwan on their voyage to Manila. The Anachoda requested a pass from the Dutch merchants in Siam, saying that Cheng Ching was preparing to send an envoy to Batavia in the following spring to open the peace talks with Governor-General Joan Maetsuijker. This gesture could be seen as an attempt to gain equal status with the Fu-chou merchants, because the Dutch ships were now allowed to trade in that port again. As well as Cheng Ching’s junk, one belonging to the Ching-nan viceroy also showed up in Siam in April. King Narai dispatched two junks to Kuang-chou (Canton) and Amoy respectively once he had understood that these two ports were now in the hands of two different camps. For one reason or another Cheng Ching’s envoys never set sail to

166 John Dacres, Edward Barwell and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Dec. 1675 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung, The English factory in Taiwan, 223; Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1685, 89. 7 Feb. 1676.
167 John Dacres, Edward Barwell and Samuel Griffith at Taiwan to Henry Dacres and Council at Bantam, 22 Dec. 1675 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 219.
169 Ibidem, fo. 317v.
170 VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer...
Batavia, but the Ching-nan viceroy’s messengers did and traded there successfully.171

Although the Fu-chou merchants dreamed of grasping their own share in the Sino-Japan trade after the maritime ban was lifted, the new frontline between Fu-chien and Che-chiang obstructed their access to the silk production area in Chiang-nan.172

However, Cheng Ching solved the problem of access in a different way, besides maintaining a smuggling network along the Chê-chiang coast, he was successfully running his business from the Kuang-tung coast. In July 1674, two Chinese junks arrived in Nagasaki from Canton carrying 1,200 piculs of silk which were sold at 300 taels per picul.173 It is reasonable to assume that they both belonged to Cheng Ching because his army had just defeated the local troops of the Ping-nan viceroy near the eastern border of Kuang-tung province in June 1674.174 In the following summer, the Regional Commander of the Kao-chou, Tsu Tse-ch’ing, joined the rebellion against the Kuang-tung authorities, which associated the Kao-Lei-Lien area with Cheng Ching.175 As the tangible result of this Amoy-Kao-Lei-Lien axis, the four

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171 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 89. 7 Feb. 1676.
173 VOC 1304, Daghregister ten Comptoire tot Nangasackij, Japan, 13 July 1674, fo. 84r.
174 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 48-9; VOC 1314, Daghregister van Japan [gehouden door Johannes Camphuijs], Japan, 14 July 1675, fo. 196v.
175 Ch’ien I-chi, Pei-ch’uan hsüan-chi[Selections from Inscriptions], TW no.220, 224.’ the rebellious commander Tsu Tsê-ch’ing occupied Kao-chou, and led his party to capture Lei-chou and Lien-chou prefectures and the Tê-ch’ing, K’ai-chien and Tien-pai districts.’ ; Chiang Liang-ch’i, Tung-hua-lu hsüan-chi [Selections of Documents Preserved by the Historical Bureaus within the Tung-hua Gate], TW, no.
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Cantonese junks which visited Nagasaki in 1676 carried 1,282.29 piculs of silk.\textsuperscript{176} In April 1676, the Pingnan viceroy (residing in Kuang-tung) also threw in his lot with the rebellion.\textsuperscript{177} Consequently, Cheng Ching was able to join forces with the authorities in Fu-chou and Kuang-chou, which helped to assuage the hostility between Cheng Ching and the VOC.\textsuperscript{178}

Once the Kuang-tung authorities joined the rebellion and had allied themselves with Cheng Ching’s force, all the coastal areas in the southeast were connected. But, even though Cheng Ching’s naval force controlled the coastal areas from Ch’üan-chou to Canton, and an abundance of tropical goods was being transported to China, he was still thwarted in his attempts to exchange these import items for silks from Chiang-nan area (Nanking) for the simple reason that the roads were cut off. The troops of the Ping-hsi viceroy’s force were fighting the Manchu army in Hu-nan, while the Ching-nan viceroy was engaged in battling the Manchus in Chiang-hsi province. These two battlefields cut off both the routes from Kuang-tung to the silk-producing areas around Nanking.\textsuperscript{179} Cheng Ching’s expansion along the coast inevitably required him to hire more soldiers to guard his territory, which increased his financial burden.

In October 1676, the Chingnan viceroy’s army collapsed on the frontlines in both Chiang-hsi and Chê-chiang provinces and he was forced to surrender to the Manchu General-in-Chief, Imperial Prince Kang (of the

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\textsuperscript{176} Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684,87-88 7 Feb. 1676. A Tonkin junk dare not sail to the Gulf of Tonkin because of the rising might of the Kuang-tung ‘pirates’.

\textsuperscript{177} Li, Chüeh Huo-lu, 1250.

\textsuperscript{178} VOC 1322, Japans daghregister [gehouden door Johannes Camphuys], 12 Jan. 1676, fo. 1464v.\textsuperscript{179} Kai hentai, I, 133-5 at 134. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou; 105-107 at 106. The report of the junk no. 28 from Fu-chou.
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Knowing that Fu-chou had surrendered to Manchus again, the Regional Commander of the Coastal Defence, Chu T’ien-kuei, chose to surrender to Cheng Ching with his fleet.181

Table 13-13: The Exports of Japan on Chinese Junks between 1673-1684

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1673</td>
<td>(1,152,198.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1674</td>
<td>1,827,031.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1675</td>
<td>(1,670,687.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1676</td>
<td>739,988.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1677</td>
<td>959,988.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1,277,997.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1679</td>
<td>956,820.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680</td>
<td>1,142,857.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681</td>
<td>147,756.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1682</td>
<td>952,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1683</td>
<td>486,929.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>418,184.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Innes, The door ajar, 416. Table 23.

In November 1676, Cheng Ching’s force of 20,000 soldiers was defeated by the joint forces of the Manchus and the Ching-nan viceroy, who had about 30,000 soldiers under his command.182 That winter the Ch’ing army slowly pushed Cheng Ching’s forces out of most of the cities he had

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180 P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 80-1. VOC 1330, Dagregister van ‘t voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoir Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens ‘s compagnies negotie en verderen ommeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 5 Aug. 1677, fo. 1138".
181 P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 81; Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 50.
182 P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 81; Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President and Council at Surat, 2 Nov. 1677, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), The English factory in Taiwan, 287.
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occupied. His main forces retreated to Amoy and several other coastal spots which controlled Fu-chou Harbour and the sea routes to Kuang-tung.\textsuperscript{183} As Table 13 shows, although these events caused a slowdown in the Sino-Japan trade, the Kuang-tung-Siamese trade profited as a result.

\textbf{Table 13-14: Junks from the China coast visiting Siam}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1674 | 2\textsuperscript{184} From Japan  
One via Macao |
| 1675 | 1-2\textsuperscript{185} |
| 1676 | 6-7\textsuperscript{186} 3 from Kuang-tung  
1 from Fu-chou  
2 from Amoy |
| 1677 | 5\textsuperscript{187} 3 from Amoy,  
(2 belonging to Siamese)  
2 from Kuang-tung  
(1 belonging to Siamese) |
| 1678 | 7\textsuperscript{188} 1 from Fu-chou |

\textsuperscript{183} P’êng, \textit{Ching-hai chih}, 83; VOC 1330, Dagregister van ‘t voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofdt wegens ‘s compagnies negotie en verderen ommevaanders aldaer, Japan, 21 June 1677, fo. 1134\textsuperscript{v}; Edward Barwell and Council at Amoy to the President and Council at Surat, 2 Nov. 1677 (O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), \textit{The English factory in Taiwan}, 287.

\textsuperscript{184} VOC 1311, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck en raat in Siam aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, 10 Dec. 1674, fo. 302\textsuperscript{v}.

\textsuperscript{185} VOC 1314, Missive van den coopman Jan van der Spijck ende den raedt aen haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Joan Maetsuijker] tot Batavia, Siam, 30 Nov. 1675, fo. 13\textsuperscript{v}-14\textsuperscript{v}.

\textsuperscript{186} VOC 1322, Missive van het opperhoofdt Dirck de Jongh en raedt geschreven uijt Siam aen haer Eds. [gouverneur general Joan Maetsuijker]to Batavia, Siam, 4 Nov. 1676, fo. 1198\textsuperscript{v}.

\textsuperscript{187} VOC 1330, Notitie van aengecomen en vertrocken vreemde en inlantsche scheepjes en vaertuijgen uijt Siam sedert December 1676 tot October 1677, Siam, fos. 691-692. 20 Oct. 1677; 8 Feb. 1677; 20 Feb. 1677; 7 Mar. 1677; 20 Apr. 1677.

\textsuperscript{188} VOC 1339, Notitie van aengecomene en vertrokken vreemde scheepen en
Because the alliance between the rulers of Fu-chou, Amoy and Canton opened the way for all their junks to visit Siam, the profits declined. In 1677, Cheng Ching also tried to invest in Tonkin silk as a means to obtain silver from Japan, but because that year’s harvest was poor owing to bad weather, the silk exports to Japan had to be reduced. Chinese merchants from Yün-nan province who were trading under the flag of the Pinghsí viceroy were also not immune to competition. During the civil war, the Ping-hsi viceroy had been busy transporting copper to Tonkin and these copper exports inevitably reduced the profits made on Japanese copper exported on Cheng Ching’s junks. Under the prevailing Japanese trade policy, the silk vaertuijgen in en uijt Siam zedert 14 October 1677 tot 11 September 1678.Notice of all junks arrived Siam, Siam, fos. 458-462. 23 Feb. 1678; 1 Mar. 1678; 7 Mar. 1678; 12 Mar. 1678; 14 Mar. 1678; 27 Mar 1678; 20 Apr. 1678.

189 VOC 1341, Missive door den E. Aernout Faa en den raet uijt Siam geschreven aen den gouverneur generael [Joan Maetsuijker] ende raden van Indien, Siam, 18 Feb 1679, fo. 845v.

190 VOC 1362, Notitie der aengecomene en vertrocken schepen en vaertuijgen et cetera tot en uijt Siam sedert primo October 1679 tot primo October 1680, Siam, fos. 990-992. 26 Feb. 1680; 1 Apr. 1680.

191 VOC 1330, Dagregister van ’t voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoire Nangasaki in Japan gehouden bij den opperkoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens ’s compagnies negatie en verderen ommeeslaegh aldaer, Japan, 17 Aug. 1677, fo. 1142v.

192 VOC 1330, Missive van den coopman Jan Besselman en den raet in Toncquin nae Batavia, Tonkin, 13 Oct. 1677, fo. 703-704. The vice-roy of Tonkin tried to forbid any further exchange in silver for copper coins from Chinese border. VOC 1348,
price had also been reduced to as low a level as 290 taels per picul.\textsuperscript{193} Only when the battle line shifted from Fu-chou to Chang-chou in 1678, did the smuggling route by sea from Amoy to Fu-chou, which benefited from the support of Chu T’ien-kuei, gradually prove its worth.\textsuperscript{194} On 19 July 1678, one Taiwan junk alone carried goods worth about 151,952 taels to Japan.\textsuperscript{195} Again on 31 October 1678, another Fu-chou junk arrived in Japan carrying goods worth 97,000 taels. These data attest to the fact that smuggling was still going strong in this period.

**Losing competiveness 1677-1683**

By October 1678, all the rebellions against the Manchus on the Chinese mainland had been suppressed.\textsuperscript{196} After a new building programme of war-junks had been launched, the Manchu General-in-Chief, Imperial Prince of Kang, Chieh-shu, returned to Peking in September 1679.\textsuperscript{197} On his recommendation, the evacuation policy was also rescinded by the Emperor in

\textsuperscript{193} VOC 1330, Dagregister van ’t voornaamste gepasseerde ten comptoir Japan gehouden bij den oppercoopman Dirck de Haas opperhoofd wegens ’s compagnies negotie en verderen ommezaegh aldaer, Japan, 23 Sept. 1677, fo. 1151.\textsuperscript{194} Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 380. 13 Mar. 1680. The copper coins dropped in price because of imports from ‘Bauland’, which designated the border between Vietnam and Yünnan province in China. The VOC merchants in Tonkin seized it as an opportunity to avoid competition from Taiwanese merchant as the latter also imported large amounts of copper coins from Japan as payment for silk goods.\textsuperscript{195} Missive van den coopman Jan Besselman en raet in Tonquin aan Gouverneur Generaal Rijcklof van Goens, 1 Feb. 1679, fo.798. Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 15 Feb. 1678; Kai kentai, III, 2997-9 at 2998. The report of the junk no. 1 from Fu-chou.\textsuperscript{196} VOC 1332, Dagregister gehouden [door Albert Brevinck] ten comptoir Nangasakij in Japan, Japan, 19 July 1678, fo. 677.\textsuperscript{197} P’êng, Ching-hai chih, 87.\textsuperscript{198} Sun, Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu, 983.
November 1679. According to Dutch records, in September of the same year Cheng Ching had sent an envoy to the Imperial Prince of Kang (before he had left for Peking) respectfully submitting that he ... 'conclude a treaty for a truce and free traffic with this kingdom (China). Under the terms of this treaty the Manchu Emperor would recognize Cheng Ching as the King of Formosa, Amoy and Quemoy, in other words that Cheng Ching be recognized as a free and sovereign monarch.'

Imperial Prince of Kang refused to receive the envoy and insisted that before he did so Cheng Ching should return all the territories he occupied on the mainland to the Emperor. Despite this sign of imperial disapproval, the envoy was nonetheless received by the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Yao Ch'i-shêng, before he returned to Amoy on 3 October. As soon as the new war-junks were completed in March 1680, the Manchu fleet sailed out of Fu-chou Harbour for the express purpose of attacking Chu T’ien-keui’s fleet in Tin-hai. The Manchu authorities knew that Cheng Ching had always doubted Chu T’ien-keui’s loyalty because he was a former subject of the Ching-nan viceroy, and therefore had deliberately spared Chu’s junks. Some of Cheng Ching’s junks fled to Amoy after this battle, which caused Cheng Ching mistakenly to believe that Chu had betrayed him and had joined

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198 Sun, *Fu-chien t’ung-chih t’ai-wan-fu*, 983.
199 VOC 1350, Repport schrieffelijck gestelt en aande Ed Hr gouverneur generael Rijkloof van Goens ende De Heeren raden van India overgeleverd door het opherhooff den coopman Jacob van der Plancken met sijn verschijninge uijt Hockzieuw op Batavia int jacht den Alexander ter rheede Batavia, Batavia, 16 Dec. 1679, fo. 576.
200 VOC 1350, Repport schrieffelijck gestelt en aande Ed Hr gouverneur generael Rijkloof van Goens ende De Heeren raden van India overgeleveren door het opherhooff den coopman Jacob van der Plancken met sijn verschijninge uijt Hockzieuw op Batavia int jacht den Alexander ter rheede Batavia, Batavia, 16 Dec. 1679, fo. 576.
202 Ibidem.
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forces with the Fu-chou navy. Eventually, on 26 March 1680, Cheng Ching decided to abandon Amoy and Quemoy and take all his people to Taiwan.203

After his return to Taiwan, Cheng Ching again focused his attention on Kuang-tung and in collaboration with the Ping-nan viceroy dispatched two junks worth about 290,000 taels from there to Japan.204 According to Dutch records, he ordered his admiral, Liu Kuo-hsüan, to lead a ‘respectable’ number of junks to occupy several islands in the vicinity of Macao, where they prepared to sell the salt from Taiwan. The Portuguese fitted out two ships to repel them but it was to no avail. They continued to occupy the islands after the Portuguese ships had left.205

Cheng Ching’s shipping network, which connected Cambodia, Ligor and Manila so as to be able to provide the Japanese and Chinese market with goods and to maintain the prosperity of Taiwan, became hard to sustain after 1679. The Siamese King’s direct trade with Japan and Canton had resumed, and a civil war had erupted in Cambodia.206 Attempts to build a direct link with Bantam were thwarted by the VOC. Meanwhile, the Chinese merchants in Bantam and Batavia, once possible allies, also gradually began to participate in the Japanese trade under the protection of the EIC and the VOC.

203 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 58.
204 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 381. 13 Mar. 1680. Since the Cheng force allowed the Ping-nan viceroy’s junks to depart to Japan, I assume that this was the result of their collaboration.
205 VOC 1369, Missive van den coopman Jurriaen de Munninck en ondercoopman Albert Bruiningh aan haer Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijklof van Goens]tot Batavia geschreven in dato 20 November nevens een post scriptum van 26 November 1681 leggende geaneerkt onder ’t eijlant Maserican [Letter written by Merchant Jurriaen de Munninck and Under Merchant Albert Bruiningh to Governor-General Rijklof van Goens in Batavia on 20 Nov. 1681, with a postscript written on 26 Nov. 1681 when anchored off Maserican Island just off Canton], Canton, 20 Nov. 1681, fo. 775v.
206 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 381. 13 Mar. 1680; Kai hentai, I, 301-302 at 302. The report of the junk no. 16 from Amoy.
In 1678, the Sultan of Bantam even dispatched a junk valued at 10,000 rixdollars to Japan under the English flag. The need of the VOC for gold to spend on the Indian market had been satisfied by Japan since 1668, and there was a steady supply of Mexican silver dollars coming in via Europe. Consequently, the VOC was willing to tolerate the participation of Batavian Chinese merchants in the Japanese trade, especially as this would be to the detriment of the Cheng Ching’s trade with Nagasaki.

Table 13-15: Export of Precious Metal from Europe and Japan by the VOC (in guilders)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>from Europe</th>
<th>from Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1640-1649</td>
<td>8,800,000</td>
<td>15,188,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650-1659</td>
<td>8,400,000</td>
<td>13,151,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1660-1669</td>
<td>11,900,000</td>
<td>14,549,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670-1679</td>
<td>10,980,000</td>
<td>11,541,481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gaastra, ‘The Dutch East India Company and Its Intrasiatic Trade in Precious Metals’, 104. Table 2.

Another of the reasons which prevented Cheng’s junks from taking a large share in the trade of the South East Asian ports lay in the expansion of the Indian Ocean trade. This trade had been making marked progress since the 1670s. As it expanded, more and more Surat merchants were tempted to try their luck in the Southeast Asian trade and extended their networks to

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Bantam in West Java. The Batavian authorities did not welcome Indian shipping in the roadstead of the Company headquarters and this negative policy backfired by making neighbouring Bantam 'great, bold and rich.' (groot, stout en rijk). The waxing prosperity of Bantam made it possible for this sultanate henceforth also to carve out a niche for itself in the Chinese and Japanese trade.

The expansion of the Indian trade also had an impact on the Manila trade. As the provider of Mexican silver in the Malay Archipelago and Siam, Manila became a popular destination of the Indian country traders in search of more direct trading links. Consequently, the Manila trade with ports in India steadily increased after 1670 as the following table shows:

Table 13-16: Junks Arriving in Manila

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Junks from China and Japan</th>
<th>Junks from Indo-China</th>
<th>Junks from the Indonesian Archipelago</th>
<th>Junks from India and Malacca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1660-1669</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1670-1679</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1680-1689</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1690-1699</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 13-17: The Percentage of the Tariff of Manila Contributed from Different Origins.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China and Japan</th>
<th>Indo-China</th>
<th>Indonesian Archipelago</th>
<th>India and Malacca</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1666-1670</td>
<td>42.46</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

209 Gaastra, ‘Merchants, Middlemen and money’, 309.
210 Generale Missiven, IV 1675-1684, 15 Feb 1678, 234.
The above data tally with the observations of George White who was residing in Ayutthaya in 1679:

‘... The places, where this country [Siam] has been supplied with silver, are Japan and Manila. The former, [by] its emperor [means: shogun] have been prohibited to export for some years ago, and the trade with the latter was declining a lot since the ships from Coromandel sailed to there directly. Silver-bar became very scarce here. Because of desire to hoard cash, the commercial contract has been altered to barter which is very inconvenient.’

To lay its hands on more Mexican silver, the Batavian administration also tried to conclude a contract with the Spaniards in Manila, offering terms under which the Dutch would provide spices in exchange for the right to acquire Mexican silver in Manila. The negotiations failed in 1668, foundering on a clause in the peace treaty in 1648 had decreed that no Dutch ship would be allowed to visit Spanish harbours in the East. Instead of even contemplating allowing local traders from the Spice Islands to exploit the indirect trade between the Dutch and the Spaniards, the VOC authorities preferred to leave this business in the hands of Chinese traders in Batavia. It seems plausible to assume that, because the Batavian Chinese could share the Indonesian Archipelago – Manila trade under the protection of the VOC, this freedom also curbed Cheng’s Taiwan-Manila trade.

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All these circumstances contributed to the unhappy fact that the Taiwanese merchants were gradually losing their share in the luxury trade in Manila, Siam, the Malay Archipelago and Bantam after 1678 and had no option but to give way to local Chinese merchants sheltering under the protection of the European Companies or local rulers. Nevertheless, against all the odds, after Cheng Ching had led his troops back to Taiwan in 1680, he still managed to keep a firm hand on the Sino-Japanese smuggling. He lost this advantage when, on 26 March 1681, the K’ang-hsi Emperor agreed to rescind the coastal evacuation decree so that the population could return home.214 Permanent Ch’ing garrisons were established in Amoy and Quemoy, but the strictest surveillance of the maritime ban was carried out by the newly constructed fleet of the Governor-General of Fu-chien, Yao Ch’i-shêng, led by the Naval Regional Commander, Chu T’ien-kuei, who had joined Manchus just three days after Cheng Ching had announced that he would return to Taiwan.215 The upshot of these decisions was that the Sino-Japanese trade dropped 87 per cent compared to what it had been the previous year.

Cheng Ching passed away suddenly on 17 March 1681 and was succeeded by his second son, Cheng K’e-shuang.216 From the moment he took over the reins the Cheng administration began to unravel. In a quandary about what to do for the best, an attack on either Hai-nan or Macao was toyed with as a diversionary tactic which would hopefully ward off the threat of a Manchu invasion of Taiwan and regain lost advantages in Southeast Asian trade.217 In April 1681, Regional Commander Yang Yen-ti did indeed mount a raid on Hai-nan, but his fleet was soon dispersed by the Kuang-tung Coastal

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214 TWYH(ed.), Ch’ing-tai kuan-shu chi ming t’ai-wan chêng-shih wang-shih[Records in Official Documents Referring to the Annihilation of the Cheng Regime during the Ch’ing Dynasty], TW no. 174, 19.
215 Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 58.
216 Ibidem, 59.
Defence Fleet, after which the plan to conquer Macao was postponed.\textsuperscript{218} In August of 1681, the Taiwanese regime mobilized all its resources to defend the Pescadores against an imminent attack by the Manchu fleet.\textsuperscript{219} As it happened, this threat still did not materialize as the Manchu authorities were still hesitating, debating about whether they should really launch an expedition against Taiwan.\textsuperscript{220} In Taiwan, the sudden decline in trade since 1681 caused a shortage of daily necessities, because the population there had grown rapidly as many new immigrants had poured in when Cheng Ching retreated from mainland China. According to Dutch sources, 35,000 soldiers were transported to the island which swelled the total population to 500,000-600,000 people. The fields in Taiwan were pushed to their limits in food production.\textsuperscript{221} In order to provide rice for its subjects, the Cheng regime postponed paying its soldiers and used the money to purchase rice from Siam.

\textsuperscript{218} Chen, ‘The migration of the Cheng Partisans to South Vietnam (Part I)’, 444-5; VOC 1377, Missive van den resident Leendert de Moij en Johannes Sibens aan haer Eds.[gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens ], Tonkin, 5 Jan. 1682, fo. 557\textsuperscript{v-v}; Tonkin diary,5 Mar. 1682, in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al eds.), \textit{The English factory in Taiwan}, 467. In the winter of 1681, the remnants of Regional Commander Yang’s fleet retreated from Lungmen and sailed to Tonkin with their wives and children.

\textsuperscript{219} John Chappell and Council at Taiwan to  Edward Barwell and Council at Bantam, 22 Dec 1681(O. S.), in Chang Hsiu-jung (et al. eds.), \textit{The English factory in Taiwan}, 458.

\textsuperscript{220} Juan, \textit{Hai-shang chien-wên lu}, 60.

\textsuperscript{221} VOC 1377, Rapport door den coopman Johannes Leeuwenson opperhoofd tot Hocksieuw aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens] uijt de Maccause eijlanden overgesonden wegens zijn verrichten en afscheijd mitsgaders het opbreecken van het comptoir aldaer aan haar Eds. [gouverneur generael Rijcklof van Goens] overgesonden van voor Maserican uijt het jacht Odijck [Report Written by Johannes Leeuwenson Chief Merchant at Fu-chou to Governor-General Rijcklof van Goens about His Activities, Delivered via Macao after His Departure from Fu-chou, Carried on the Yacht the \textit{Odijck} from Maserican], Canton, 10 Jan. 1682, fos. 590'-591'.

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instead.\textsuperscript{222} In the spring of 1682, six junks were dispatched to Siam for rice and returned fully laden.\textsuperscript{223} At this point most of southern China and northern Vietnam were afflicted by a drought which caused twenty-five junks from different places to arrive in Siam in a quest for rice.\textsuperscript{224} The Cheng authorities again had to dispatch another four junks to Siam for rice in the spring of 1683.\textsuperscript{225} In the following summer, Liu Kuo-hsüan’s fleet lost a sea battle off the Pescadores on 16 July 1683.\textsuperscript{226} After deliberating for two weeks, the Cheng authorities finally decided to surrender to the Manchus. According to two English merchants, Thomas Angeir and Thomas Woolhouse, who witnessed the whole event at Taiwan:

‘His Majesty and his grandees here had observed the continual grumbling of the poor people and his army in want of rice. And there was about ten days in this time of distress in which no grain was brought until they had sold (what remained) at an extremely dear price, so that the poor people could not stuff their bellies unless they mixed rice with potatoes. If the supply from Siam and Manila would not arrive, some of the subjects must die in pain. Therefore they decided, after the loss of the Pescadores, now it is not possible to subsist and retain the prerogatives of his predecessors, for without a trade this country cannot be kept and without the Pescadores it is impossible for them to manage any commerce with foreigners.’\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{222} Dagregister van Batavia, 1682 Deel I, 438. 3 Apr. 1682.
\textsuperscript{223} VOC 1377, Notitie der aengekomene en vertrooke scheepen, jonicuen, barkien en vaartuigen uijt en in de revier van Siam sedert October 1681 tot September 1682, Siam, fo. 534\textsuperscript{r}v; fo. 535v.
\textsuperscript{225} Kai hentai, I, 357. At least four junks were dispatched to Siam from Taiwan.
\textsuperscript{226} Ch’ing shêng-ts’u shih-lu, vol 110, 1466. 18 Aug. 1683; Juan, Hai-shang chien-wên lu, 62.
\textsuperscript{227} Thomas Angeir and Thomas Woolhouse at Taiwan to the Agent and Council in
MONOPOLY LOST 1668-1683

The crisis brought on by the food shortage and the loss of the Pescadores were the last straw. To make matters even worse, the rice junks had to be unloaded on the Pescadores when it was discovered that alluvial deposit had made the bay of An-ping too shallow to enter. The coup de grace for the internal crisis came when any chance of external aid was cut off by the Manchu fleet. The rice trade, which had raised the Cheng lineage from maritime mercenaries to merchant princes, eventually also led to its collapse.

Siam, 20 Dec. 1683 (O.S.), in: Chang Hsiu-jung, The English Factory in Taiwan, 552. The text has been modified to a more readable English style for modern readers.